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Copyright by Seth Kincaid Jolly 2006 A EUROPE OF REGIONS? REGIONAL INTEGRATION, SUB-NATIONAL MOBILIZATION AND THE OPTIMAL SIZE OF STATES by Seth Kincaid Jolly Department of Political Science Duke University Date:_____________________ Approved: ___________________________ Herbert Kitschelt, Chair __________________________ Robert O. Keohane __________________________ Gary Marks __________________________ Steven Wilkinson Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Political Science in the Graduate School of Duke University 2006 ABSTRACT A EUROPE OF REGIONS? REGIONAL INTEGRATION, SUB-NATIONAL MOBILIZATION AND THE OPTIMAL SIZE OF STATES by Seth Kincaid Jolly Department of Political Science Duke University Date:_____________________ Approved: ___________________________ Herbert Kitschelt, Chair __________________________ Robert O. Keohane __________________________ Gary Marks __________________________ Steven Wilkinson An abstract of a dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Political Science in the Graduate School of Duke University 2006 Abstract As European countries continue along their path to a deeper and wider Union, the prospect of state fragmentation threatens the traditional boundaries of Europe. But the current literature neglects an important theoretical and empirical question: does European integration increase sub-national mobilization within European Union member states? With the first truly comparative, cross-national quantitative study of the incidence and electoral success of regional political parties, I show that European integration makes regional political parties more likely to compete in national parliamentary elections. Once they enter competition, European integration makes these parties more attractive to voters. The implicit assumption among most scholars that European integration has no effect is, therefore, unjustified and unwarranted. To explain this relationship, I suggest the following causal mechanism: European integration has created conditions under which regional groups (e.g. the Scottish) may not need the state (e.g. United Kingdom) to survive internationally. For the viability theory to explain this relationship, though, elites and citizens must recognize and take advantage of the new political opportunity structure. For elites, I find that regional political parties are Europhiles, not Euroskeptics, consistent with the theoretical expectations of the viability theory. In Scotland, I find that citizens considered independence a more viable option within the European Union. The “Independence in Europe” option, as favored by the Scottish National Party, explains increased support for independence among Scottish respondents. By triangulating on the research question with multiple techniques and levels of analysis, I show that European integration does strengthen sub-national iv movements. Supranational integration and sub-national fragmentation are not merely coincidental phenomenon but are related in a theoretical and predictable way. Emphasizing the EU as a crucial new explanatory variable, this dissertation contributes to the literature on small parties and regional or ethnic parties theoretically as well as empirically. It also clearly demonstrates that European integration has had a quite significant effect on internal domestic politics of the member states. In the future, therefore, proponents of supra-national integration will be forced to consider a trade-off between the economic benefits of integration and greater sub-national mobilization and fragmentation when evaluating regional integration. v To my wife, Gretchen, with love vi Table of Contents Abstract iv List of Figures viii List of Tables ix Acknowledgements x 1. Introduction 1 Part 1. Theories on European Integration and Sub-National Mobilization 2. Viability or Fear? Two Views on European Integration and 12 Sub-National Mobilization Part 2. Another Reason to Party? European Integration and Regional Political Parties 3. The Incidence of Regional Political Parties 41 4. Determinants of Regional Political Party Electoral Success 80 Part 3. Fear, Loathing and the Optimal Size of States: Support for European Integration and Sub-National Mobilization 5. Assessing Regional Political Party Views on European Integration 111 6. Assessing Public Opinion in the 1979 and 1997 Scottish Devolution 143 Referenda 7. Conclusion 167 Appendix A 184 Bibliography 194 Biography 210 vii List of Figures 3.1 Observations with Regional Political Parties, By Country 60 3.2 Observations with Regional Political Parties, By Decade 61 3.3 Predicted Probability of Regional Political Party Incidence, 75 By European Integration and Language Difference (Model 4) 4.1 Expected Vote Share, By Level of Integration (Model 1) 101 4.2 Expected Vote Share, By Language Difference (Model 1) 103 4.3 Expected Vote Share, By Level of Decentralization (Model 1) 104 4.4 Expected Vote Share, By Preference Difference (Model 2) 106 5.1 Support for the European Union, By Party Family 126 5.2 Support for the European Union, By Regional Political Party 127 5.3 Regional Political Party Support for European Union, Across 129 Left/Right Dimension 5.4 Regional Political Party Support for European Union, Across 130 GAL/TAN Dimension 5.5 Trends in Regional Political Parties: Position on EU, Salience and 132 Dissent 5.6 Support for European Union, By Regional Political Party and Issue 134 Area viii List of Tables 3.1 Regional Political Parties in Western Europe 57-8 3.2 Observations with Regional Political Parties 59 3.3 Group Differences 67 3.4 Determinants of Regional Political Party Incidence 73 3.5 Robustness Tests, By Different EU Specifications (Model 4) 74 4.1 Determinants of Regional Political Party Success 99 4.2 Robustness Tests, By Different EU Specifications (Model 1) 100 5.1 National Vote Shares of Regional Political Parties 122 6.1 Attitudes and Actual Voting Positions on Devolution in 1979 and 1997 151 6.2 Referendum Positions in 1979 and 1997, By Group Identity 152 6.3 Expected and Actual Voting Positions on Devolution in 1979 and 1997 156 6.4 Preference Ordering on Devolution in 1979 158 6.5 Referendum Positions in 1979, By Preference Ordering 159 6.6 Preference Ordering on Devolution in 1997 161 6.7 Attitudes on Devolution in 1979 and 1997 162 7.1 Typology of Strategies of Central States and Regional Movements 180 ix Acknowledgments As a collegial intellectual environment, Duke University provided an ideal setting for my graduate education. Thanks to financial support from the National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship and the Katherine Stern Dissertation Fellowship, I had the freedom to pursue the research questions that engaged me. Further, my colleagues and teachers challenged me and taught me to be a scholar and teacher myself. My dissertation committee, in particular, deserves much of the credit for this research project. My chair, Herbert Kitschelt, provided constructive feedback at every stage and was always available for me. His own wide- ranging and insightful work provides an example for me to strive to achieve. From his research design course to telephone calls from his new home at Princeton, Bob Keohane not only guided my research but also provided mentorship on academia, the job market, and any other topics with which I needed help. Gary Marks and Steven Wilkinson, from very different research backgrounds, helped shape the direction and quality of my research. As my dissertation lies at the intersection of my entire committee’s research interests, I realize that, without each of them, the end product would have lacked what depth and quality it has. But to make it through graduate school, you need more than a dissertation committee. Other teachers have provided guidance and friendship along the way. Scott de Marchi, with his sharp wit and sharper intellect, taught me about methods and kept me grounded. In just one of many conversations, Liesbet Hooghe managed x to organize and frame my research better than I thought possible. Without these and many others, I would be less of a scholar. Among fellow graduate students, my first debt must be paid to Gerry DiGiusto. Other than myself, he read more drafts more frequently than any other person, always providing unerring criticism and insight, with his unique blend of sarcasm and compassion. By the end, he probably knows my research as well as I do. In addition, I had the great fortune to attend Duke with a magnificent collection of comparativists, several of whom, Jorge Bravo, Kevin Morrison, Dan Kselman, and Matt Singer, formed a dissertation working group with me. Based on their own research and their constructive feedback to me, I am convinced that this group will yield several stars in the field. In addition, I learned much from my partnership with Adam Brinegar and look forward to future collaboration with him. But, I must admit that six years of graduate school required more than colleagues and critics for me to succeed. A brilliant group of friends in my extended cohort at Duke, including Mike Tofias, Mike Ensley, Claire Kramer, Laura Stephenson, Jennifer Merolla, Phil Demske, Ari Kohen, Bill Curtis, and Dennis Rasmussen, made graduate school a fantastic experience from start to finish. Finally, I owe one group more than any other, my family. Dave, Jane, and Dan all provided much support and strength throughout this process.
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