Transformation: Addressing Sustained Unit Readiness See Page 7

PB 17-02-3 May-June 2002

Time to Saddle Up…

Editor’s Note: The author, Jon T. Clemens, re- tired in March after 18 years as managing editor of ARMOR.

The job of managing editor of ARMOR Maga- zine looked like an interesting prospect in 1983, when I drove over to the little house on Vine Grove Road for my interview. At that point, I had worked for newspapers for 16 years, had been managing editor of a magazine, had edited hun- dreds of stories, had written a weekly syndi- cated column on popular music, had published an underground newspaper, and had coached writers. I figured that the ARMOR job would be subscribers than were going to the addresses more of the same, and in any case, I wasn’t on the official mailing list. A lot of people obvi- committed to doing it for the rest of my life. ously cared about this magazine I was inherit- My interview with Colonel Steiner went well. ing. But I really had no idea the extent of it. As When he asked for questions, I asked about the the weeks passed, I realized that I had stumbled magazine’s budget to pay writers for articles. He into what any editor would consider a dream job, said there wasn’t any. “They get a nice certifi- as the middleman in a love affair between writ- cate and a couple of free copies, but that’s it,” ers, readers, and an institution with a history. he said. Then he showed me the drawer full of Ironies piled up. One of the smallest branches pending stories, more than 120 of them waiting in the Army was sustaining a truly remarkable for publication! This was my first big surprise, professional dialogue, and it wasn’t like this was because at that point, I really had no idea what I a new development. It had all begun in 1888 had gotten myself into. when cavalry officers on the frontier, separated The magazine was almost 100 years old at the from each other by at least a day’s ride on time, one of the oldest in America, yet they horseback, used the medium of a journal to talk didn’t pay their writers! The letters in each issue about their craft, to trade ideas, to argue the continued page after page, essentially a long, things that were important to them. Papers were running dialogue about tactics and techniques, submitted to the Cavalry Association’s editorial strategies and technologies, argued passion- board, and the good ones were published on a ately. Soon after taking the job, I also discov- steam-driven press in a little town in Kansas. ered that while the copies that went out to units After I joined the staff, I discovered that you were free, there were ways to subscribe if you could read the results in the magazine’s library, wanted your own copy. My next surprise was that there were more copies going out to paid Continued on Page 53

By Order of the Secretary of the Army: Official:

ERIC K. SHINSEKI JOEL B. HUDSON General, United States Army Administrative Assistant to the Chief of Staff Secretary of the Army 0205301

The Professional Development Bulletin of the Armor Branch PB 17-02-3

Editor-in-Chief LTC DAVID R. MANNING Features

Managing Editor 7 The Blind Men and the Elephant by Lieutenant Colonel Tim Reese JON T. CLEMENS 12 The Bugle Calls: Armor on the Modern Battlefield Commandant by Major James K. Morningstar MG R. STEVEN WHITCOMB 16 How to Defeat the Motorized Rifle Company at the National Training Center by First Lieutenant Sean P. Hazlett ARMOR (ISSN 0004-2420) is published bi- monthly by the U.S. Army Armor Center, 22 The Four-Tank Platoon 1109A Sixth Avenue, Fort Knox, KY 40121. by Major John B. Richardson IV Disclaimer: The information contained in AR- MOR represents the professional opinions of 25 Armor Against the Huertgen Forest the authors and does not necessarily reflect by Captain Mike Sullivan the official Army or TRADOC position, nor does it change or supersede any information 30 “Ilich’s Eyebrows”: presented in other official Army publications. Soviet BDD Tank Armor and Its Impact on the Battlefield by James M. Warford Official distribution is limited to one copy for each armored brigade headquarters, armored 32 The First Tanks and Fate cavalry regiment headquarters, armor battalion headquarters, armored cavalry squadron head- by Ken Wright quarters, reconnaissance squadron headquar- ters, armored cavalry troop, armor company, 35 A New Personal Defense Weapon? and motorized brigade headquarters of the by Captain John S. Wilson United States Army. In addition, Army libraries, Army and DOD schools, HQ DA and MACOM 38 The Seven Breaching Habits of Highly Effective Units staff agencies with responsibility for armored, by Lieutenant Colonel Thomas H. Magness direct fire, ground combat systems, organiza- tions, and the training of personnel for such 43 Know the Enemy: A New Type of OPFOR Reflects Current Realities organizations may request two copies by by Major Kenneth C. Cary sending a request to the editor-in-chief. Authorized Content: ARMOR will print only 46 Recent Merkava Attacks Highlight those materials for which the U.S. Army Armor Growing Command Detonated Mine Threat Center has proponency. That proponency by Adam Geibel includes: all armored, direct-fire ground com- bat systems that do not serve primarily as Back Cover: Army Names New IAV “Stryker” infantry carriers; all weapons used exclusively in these systems or by CMF 19-series enlisted soldiers; any miscellaneous items of equip- ment which armor and armored cavalry or- Departments ganizations use exclusively; training for all SC 12A, 12B, and 12C officers and for all CMF- 2 Contacts 19-series enlisted soldiers; and information 3 Letters concerning the training, logistics, history, and 5 Commander’s Hatch leadership of armor and armored cavalry units 6 Driver’s Seat at the brigade/regiment level and below, to 51 Reviews include Threat units at those levels. Material may be reprinted, provided credit is given to ARMOR and to the author, except where copyright is indicated. Periodicals Postage paid at Fort Knox, KY, and additional mailing offices. Postmaster: Send address changes to Editor, ARMOR, ATTN: ATZK-ARM, Fort Knox, KY 40121-5210. Distribution Restriction: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. USPS 467-970 May-June 2002, Vol. CXI, No. 3

DSN prefix – 464- Points of Contact Commercial prefix– (502) 624-

ARMOR Editorial Offices U.S. Army Armor Center

Editor-in-Chief Commanding General (ATZK-CG) LTC David R. Manning 4087 MG R. Steven Whitcomb 2121 E-Mail: [email protected] E-Mail: [email protected] Editor Deputy Commanding General (ATZK-DCG) Vivian Oertle 2610 BG Robert W. Mixon 7555 E-mail: [email protected] E-Mail: [email protected] Staff Illustrator Chief of Staff (ATZK-CS) Mr. Jody Harmon 3923 COL Robert T. Gahagan 1101 E-Mail: [email protected] E-Mail: [email protected] Production Assistant Command Sergeant Major (ATZK-CSM) Kathy A. Johnson 2249 CSM William J. Gainey 4952 E-Mail: [email protected] E-Mail: [email protected] Directorate of Force Development (ATZK-FD) COL Henry Joe Hughes III 5050 E-Mail: [email protected] Mounted Maneuver Battlespace Battle Lab (ATZK-MW) ARTICLE SUBMISSIONS: To improve speed and accuracy in COL Dennis J. Szydloski 7809 editing, manuscripts should be originals or clear copies, either typed E-Mail: [email protected] or printed out double-spaced, with a 3½-inch disk in Microsoft Office, Chief of Armor (ATZK-AR) Word, WordPerfect, WordStar, Rich Text Format, or ASCII (please Aubrey Henley 5155 indicate wordprocessing format on disk or cover letter). Tape E-Mail: [email protected] FAX 7585 captions to any illustrations or photos submitted. Additionally, we accept articles as e-mail or attachments at: Special Assistant to the CG (ARNG) (ATZK-SA) COL Randal Milling 1315 [email protected] E-Mail: [email protected] When sending articles via email, please include a complete mailing TRADOC System Manager for Abrams (ATZK-TS) address and daytime phone number. COL James H. Nunn 7955 SUBMISSION POLICY NOTE: Due to the limited space per E-Mail: [email protected] issue, we will not print articles that have been submitted to, and TRADOC System Manager for Force XXI (ATZK-XXI) accepted for publication by, other Army journals. Please submit COL Timothy D. Cherry 4009 your article to only one Army journal at a time. E-Mail: [email protected] GRAPHICS AND PHOTOS: We prefer conventional photo prints, Assistant TRADOC System Manager but will accept electronic graphic and photo files. (Please do not Soldier - Mounted Warrior (ATZK-ATS) send photos embedded in PowerPoint and Word.) If you use Power- LTC J. B. Iddins 3519 Point for illustrations, please try to avoid the use of excessive color E-Mail: [email protected] and shading. If you have any questions concerning electronic art or photo submissions, call Vivian Oertle at the phone number above. Directorate of Training and Doctrine Development (ATZK-TD) COL Keith A. Armstrong 8247 CHANGE OF ADDRESS-PAID SUBSCRIPTIONS AND ST. E-Mail: [email protected] GEORGE-ST. JOAN AWARDS: For paid subscription ser- vice, address changes, and delivery problems, or for awards in- formation, contact Connie Stiggers or Darlene Kennedy, United States Armor Association, P.O. Box 607, Fort Knox, KY 40121; U.S. Army Armor School E-Mail: [email protected]; phone (502) 942-8624; or FAX (502) 942-6219. You can also access the Association through their web- Director, Armor School (ATSB-DAS) site at www.usarmor-assn.org. LTC David M. Pratt 1050 E-Mail: [email protected] UNIT DISTRIBUTION: To report unit free distribution delivery problems or changes of unit address, phone DSN 464-2249; com- Armor School Sergeant Major (ATSB-CSM) mercial: (502) 624-2249. Requests to be added to the free dis- CSM James E. Dale 7091 tribution list should be in the form of a letter or email to the Editor- E-Mail: [email protected] in-Chief. NCO Academy (ATSB-NC) EDITORIAL MAILING ADDRESS: ARMOR, ATTN: ATZK- CSM George DeSario Jr. 5150 ARM, Bldg 1109A Sixth Avenue, Room 371, Fort Knox, KY E-Mail: [email protected] 40121-5210. 16th Cavalry Regiment (ATSB-SBZ) ARMOR MAGAZINE ONLINE: Visit the ARMOR magazine COL John Antal 7848 website at www.knox.army.mil/armormag. E-Mail: [email protected] ARMOR HOTLINE — DSN 464-TANK: The Armor Hotline is a 1st Armor Training Brigade (ATSB-BAZ) 24-hour service to provide assistance with questions concerning COL John L. Ballantyne 8736 doctrine, training, organizations, and equipment of the Armor Force. E-Mail: [email protected]

2 ARMOR — May-June 2002

Training Lethal Sections and Crews: warfighting skills. Since their career timelines safety concerns, higher headquarters did not The Army Dilemma are shortened, this is often their only oppor- even consider a night attack, so our momen- tunity to lead a platoon before they must fill tum slowed to a crawl as we waited for the

Dear Sir: the empty company XO or specialty platoon sun to rise. Throughout the early morning, I slot. They can look back at their time as a sat in my TC’s hatch, frustrated, listening to LTC Mark Pires’ article, “Training Lethal platoon leader and sometimes only see one CPT Cook’s urgent SITREPs from the hill he Tank Crews and Sections” (ARMOR, March- Level II gunnery and two iterations of tank was now defending under increasingly dev- April 2002), has highlighted one of the many services. No wonder this year’s Armor Con- astating mortar and small arms fire. Finally, training shortfalls that the armor force ex- ference is concerned about training at the at 0800, I was granted permission to cross periences annually. I am sure that most, if lieutenant and captain level... they can sit in the line of departure, and from that point on not all, tank company commanders in the the leadership seat for 12-18 months and the battle unfolded in conventional fashion. force would agree with LTC Pires’ assess- maneuver their elements once or twice or Ultimately, the light infantry company’s suc- ment that such training makes “a huge dif- not at all. cessful infiltration was helpful, but not deci- ference.” However, in the same section, he sive, to my attack, and I was not able to take also highlights why such training events do The FORSCOM commander once directed advantage of the commanding position CPT not happen: “The major requirements are that each company commander be afforded Cook had seized, other than the obvious time and training areas.” These resources one continuous week of his/her own training benefit of getting some great “cross talk” on are, of course, the scarcest of all within the and that brigades and battalions assist in the the battalion command net as I entered the realm of a company or even a battalion train- resourcing and supporting of it. This does main battle area. ing calendar. Although it may be different at not happen at Fort Hood in any measure and a smaller post such as Fort Carson, here, at I would wager that it does not happen regu- I understand the need for risk assessments Fort Hood, training time is a luxury that few larly anywhere in the heavy community. and common sense judgment calls when it company commanders enjoy (or are given). I Company, battalion, and even brigade com- comes to safety. I went to my first NTC rota- personally know tank company commanders manders are held hostage to garrison task- tion shortly after an entire Bradley platoon who have been in command since June, ings and exercises mandated by a higher drove off a cliff into the Colorado Wadi, and 2001 who have yet to take their platoons to echelon such as an IOT&E for the TUAV or experienced a number of “close calls” my- the field for anything other than gunnery. the “Systems of Systems” test. Throw in self. We never conducted combat missions This is not their choice — rather they are “Quick Train” and the damage is irrevocable. under limited visibility, not even a perimeter held hostage to higher priorities: continuous LTC Pires’ article is well written and an ex- defense. But our Army likes to claim to the force protection duties, NTC white-cell duty, cellent blueprint on how training should be world that we own the night. Either we need augmentees to other units, O/C duty, and done on a routine basis. The powers who to (1) start training at night or (2) change our division and corps red-cycle taskings, to can influence the calendar must now step up slogan, or at least add a disclaimer that name just a few. at all levels and do what is right: allow pla- “Only our light infantrymen own the night.” toon leaders and company commanders the Unfortunately, world events may not give us I understand paying the rent, but at the ex- this luxury. pense of training sections and crews? We opportunity to train on their own or else run are putting ourselves at risk. In today’s army, the risk of having a future cadre of leaders We urgently need to equip our tanks to fight the only time tank companies are afforded who have spent only 9-12 months as platoon at night on every potential battlefield we may the opportunity to get out to the field is at the leader and 12-18 months as company com- face, i.e., places other than a wide open behest of a higher headquarters mission: mander, with little or no experience in how to desert environment. While I’m glad that OPFOR for another NTC train-up, or a bri- train soldiers, crews, or platoons. every one of my tank drivers has a VVS-2, gade-run NTC train-up. Although I agree with CPT CHRIS L. CONNOLLY and every TC and loader has a set of PVS- LTC Pires that “trimming a few days of Fort Hood, Texas 7s, that much equipment by itself doesn’t higher-level events” is worth the gain, it is my help us fight any better. And a main gun that experience that senior-level commanders destroys targets 3000 meters away at night would not make such a sacrifice to their own With the Right Equipment, is really not very useful in cramped villages, training events; at least, I have never seen it We Could Truly “Own the Night” or mountainous terrain — in Korea or any- happen. The same goes for adding days to a where else in the world — which easily overwhelms the main gun’s maximum eleva- gunnery density: having to hold to a Gunnery Dear Sir: Standardization Program torpedoes such an tion. What we need is to equip our TC’s and effort the vast majority of the time. The over- CPT Mike McCullough wrote a great article loader’s machine guns with some of the crowded ranges and training areas will rarely (“Designating targets with ‘God Guns,’” Jan- same equipment that the light infantry com- allow this. uary-February 2002 ARMOR), which I hap- munity has been using for years: AN/PAQ-4 pened to read immediately after a battle at IR laser pointers, or AN/PEQ-2 combined IR Finally, the idea of a company green week my brigade’s ARTEP exercise last month. I floodlight and pointing devices. The good would be a dream come true to most tank had just finished fighting a light-mechanized- news is that it does not take a huge invest- company commanders. In my 18 months as heavy task force offense mission and “lived” ment, just an MTOE change. PAQ-4s cost a tank company commander, I received this the infantry-tank communication dilemma $250 (PEQ-2s a little more), which is pen- opportunity exactly once — and we did ex- CPT McCullough discussed in his article. My nies compared to a tank that costs upwards actly as LTC Pires described because his tank company was cross-attached to 2-9 of $2 million. The kind of money that it would training methodology is widely held to by Infantry (Mech) for the ARTEP, along with an cost to upgrade my entire battalion, would many of my peers. air assault infantry company from the 1st BN, barely register on a week’s worth of ULLS-G Something on the calendar has to give. The 503d IN (AA). exception reports. problem is that FORSCOM, corps, division, During the mission, the light infantry com- How does this stuff work in reality? Fortu- brigade, and even battalion all have their pany, superbly led by CPT Sean Cook, con- nately, I have been able to find out, on a own taskings, training events, and contract- ducted a night infiltration and seized a critical limited basis. Last November during Table sponsored tests to execute. hill overlooking my objective, while suffering XI, one of my tank platoons tested PAQ-4s What is truly tragic is that many platoon minor losses to enemy artillery and direct on their TC’s and loader’s machine guns, leaders are arriving at units during an off- fire. However, because my company team’s and experienced immediate and decisive cycle and are subjected to 6-12 months of a tanks and Bradleys were not nearly as well improvements in their ability to acquire, en- myriad of support taskings and are not given equipped for night fighting as are most light gage, and “hand off” targets to one another any opportunity to hone their own platoon infantry units, and because of real-world at ranges out to about 500 meters. There ARMOR — May-June 2002 3

was a brief learning curve, while crewmen from different perspectives, as I fought CPT Johnson’s comments give the BLU- got familiar with distinguishing between eight against them as a BLUFOR scout platoon FOR units an excuse to not train and to not laser spots, but afterward they performed leader and now command them. Having develop better TTPs. There are many great extremely well and were not confused by the fought on both the red and blue sides of the soldiers out in the Army that would figure out “light show.” Pretty soon, TC’s started using fence, I can tell you that the standards of how to accomplish the missions that we the lasers to designate battle positions for ROE enforcement and punishment for need them to conduct. But, as long as indi- their (or their wingman’s) drivers, an unin- MILES violations are much tougher in the viduals like CPT Johnson provide them with tended side benefit. This is similar to how OPFOR than in most BLUFOR units. excuses why they are failing, those great paratroopers have perfected operating in Americans will not spend the extra energy drop zones that are cluttered with dozens of CPT Johnson does highlight in his letter required to develop those TTPs, especially strobes, pointers, beams, and markers. why the OPFOR scouts are good when he given the oppressive OPTEMPO of most states that “[t]hey have the opportunity to units in the Army today. The only loser in this Imagine a future battlefield where a light create and hone field SOPs because they scenario is the Army. company conducts an infiltration to seize a spend two weeks out of every month imple- critical mountain pass at 0300, then is fol- menting them.” Yes, it’s called training, and Finally, what is perhaps the most negative lowed by a tank company team an hour later the fact is that the OPFOR scouts have tre- element of CPT Johnson’s letter is that he which attacks through the defile to seize a mendous training opportunities. Rather than gives no credit to the soldiers who make up terrorist base camp. Tank commanders walk making bogus allegations against young the OPFOR scout platoons. I fully agree that their .50 caliber machine guns’ fires onto soldiers, CPT Johnson should focus on the our scouts train more than BLUFOR scouts. enemy trenches and cave openings by reasons the OPFOR scouts do well and what The operative word is “train.” They deploy to matching their laser designators’ beams to other units can learn from them. When a the field ten days every month and train the light infantry spotters’ beams. (Oh by the BLUFOR unit has successes against us, we themselves and the BLUFOR they oppose. way, our Apache helicopters have been seek to learn from their successes and em- Credit the platoon’s work ethic; do not dis- grounded hours earlier after receiving mur- ploy some of those same techniques rather credit the individual ethics of my soldiers. derous ground fire, and low cloud cover is than simply claiming that our opponent had TIMOTHY A. NORTON frustrating our precision bombers... is this cheated. Your magazine should focus its LTC, AR starting to sound familiar?) Meanwhile, tank attention in the same direction. Cdr, 1/11 ACR loaders easily identify and destroy enemy personnel trying to ambush them from the ALLEN PEPPER flanks or rear. Finally a mechanized infantry CPT, IN CMTC Bottom Line: Success of Unit platoon dismounts its two squads, which Depends on Leadership and Training attack under a curtain of protective machine gun fire to enter the headquarters bunker Dear Sir: and capture the enemy commander along Army Is the Real Loser with his personal staff. In OPFOR “Play the Game” Myth I just read the response by CPT T.J. John- son to CPT Shaw’s article, “Breaking the How far out does that really sound? Reconnaissance Code,” in the January- CPT SHERMAN S. POWELL Dear Sir: February 2002 issue of ARMOR, and had to respond. The first half of CPT Johnson’s C Co, 2/72 Armor I read CPT T.J. Johnson’s letter to the edi- response was well stated in using the TOW- tor in the January-February 2002 issue with equipped HMMWV as a method of gathering dismay. His accusing the OPFOR scouts of intelligence on enemy forces. What I do have Blanket Accusation Disappointing; being successful only because they know an issue with is CPT Johnson’s statement OPFOR Is Held to a High Standard how to “play the game” continues to perpe- that the reason OPFOR scouts are success- trate a myth that only does the Army harm. ful is they know how to “play the game.” As a Dear Sir: We take cheating in the OPFOR very seri- former scout platoon leader at the Combat I am currently serving as commander of ously. I have been in command of the 1st Maneuver Training Center in Hohenfels, HHC/1-4 IN, the OPFOR at the Combat Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment Germany, I couldn’t disagree more. CPT Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) in Ho- for 18 months, and during that time, we have Johnson states that OPFOR “cheats” to be henfels. As the HHC commander, I am dual- had two cases of alleged cheating. Both successful. OPFOR recon doesn’t have to hatted as the chief of recon for the OPFOR, cases were handled with a 15-6 investigation cheat to be successful. OPFOR scouts are so I read with great interest the letter from conducted by a field grade officer. These successful because they apply the basics of CPT T.J. Johnson in the January-February investigations are very thorough. The MILES scouting and execute them on a daily basis 2002 issue. The first paragraph of CPT II system is downloaded to identify each to standard. Because OPFOR recon is out- Johnson’s letter has some great advice for event. The investigating officer obtains a gunned and has less technological advan- the combined arms community with respect copy of the battle hyper during which the tages than their BLUFOR counterparts, they to employing the TOW in the looker role. I alleged cheating took place. Extensive inter- are forced to return to the basics of scouting take issue, however, with his allegations in views are conducted with anyone who could — using sight and, more importantly, sound the next two paragraphs of his letter. possibly shed light on the incident, to include to be successful in defeating their enemy. any O/C who may have witnessed the al- He alleges that “OPFOR scouts...are suc- The second tactic CPT Johnson attributes leged violation. If CPT Johnson really identi- cessful because they know how to ‘play the for the success of the OPFOR is that they fied OPFOR soldiers cheating, then he let game.’” He then goes on to describe how the “face the same scenarios month after his organization, the OPFOR, and the Army OPFOR “cover[s] their MILES head halos month.” This is only partially true; yes the down when he did not immediately report the with the front flap of the boonie caps... [and] missions are the same, but the opponent is incident. uses Vaseline on their torso sensors.” Re- different. The assertion that this is a basis for membering that all OPFOR soldiers are U.S. CPT Johnson goes on to state that “the OPFOR success is ridiculous. Many times I Army soldiers, I’m disappointed to see a OPFOR are so good because they train on had to change infiltration routes based on leader make a blanket accusation against the same ground month after month and the enemy’s disposition and composition of the OPFOR recon soldiers. I’m equally dis- year after year.” As a force projection Army, I its screen line. This proves that when you appointed to see that your magazine pub- would ask CPT Johnson to give me a realis- lished such an accusation. Like CPT John- tic scenario where we will not be fighting an son, I too have observed the OPFOR scouts enemy on his own turf. Continued on Page 49 4 ARMOR — May-June 2002

Major General R. Steven Whitcomb Commanding General U.S. Army Armor Center

Picking the Best Team For the Army of Tomorrow

“Our military forces are one team — a new platform; it is a system of sys- branches and functional areas. Rather in the game to win regardless of who tems. FCS will be a collection of holis- than producing a simple piece of carries the ball. This is no time for tically integrated systems designed to equipment, this process will develop ‘fancy Dans’ who won’t hit the line function together seamlessly. It will and deliver a system of systems in unit with all they have on every play, unless serve as the core building block within sets with the fighting doctrine, the they can call the signals. Each player all Units of Action, encompassing the force organizations, the training pack- on the team — whether he shines in the brigade and below echelons in the Ob- ages and devices, and the logistical spotlight of the backfield or eats dirt in jective Force. The Units of Action will support. Soldiers will remain at the the line — must be All-American.” be manned by soldiers both mounted very heart of process so that every and dismounted, empowered to operate fighter, supporter, and sustainer will – General of the Army Omar N. Bradley with information superiority gained have their needs and capabilities fac- 19 October 1949 from military and interagency re- tored into the fielded force. sources. It will fight as a team of teams When I was young, all the kids in the — tailored to dominate ground combat At Fort Knox, and at every other or- neighborhood would gather around to ganization included in this process, the pick teams for a game. The exact game and to be overwhelmingly lethal at the “team picking” has begun for the ef- point of contact against the threats on to be played depended on the season, today’s battlefield and in the opera- fort. Together, all of the teams will but the process was the same: the two work to produce the requirements captains, usually the guys with the tional environment we expect to en- documents for each aspect of the Units counter in the future. In order to de- equipment, would vie to select the best sign, develop, and field this kind of of Action and the FCS. While Fort talent in the neighborhood. On some Knox, as the proponent for FCS and days, a relative of one of the guys, or revolutionary force, the Army needed a the Units of Action, may in some ways revolutionary new process. Many of us some kid from another neighborhood from across the Army are now imple- represent a “home court,” it is never would wander in and the selection the playing field but rather the players process really heated up — especially menting this process. that determine the quality of the game. if we knew the new guy had talent. The first step is the rechartering of We offered up the best and the bright- Today, the Army is choosing up a est of the mounted force to provide great team that is going to help field our Maneuver Battle Lab by TRADOC expertise to this team process, and my to serve as a center for collaboration the force that will carry us onto the for the developmental work required to fellow commandants at the schools and battlefields of the 21st century. We, the agencies are doing the same. The re- Army, are going to do the development make the Units of Action a reality. The sult, we believe, will be the capturing Battle Lab will be linked, in a “hub work for the Objective Force Unit of and spoke” manner, with other TRA- of great ideas and insights from across Action and the Future Combat System the Army rather than focusing on any (FCS) and our Army’s leaders are DOC Battle Labs, the proponents and single piece of it. Additionally, as their schools, and with needed exper- picking the best guys from the best tise wherever it exists. The Battle Lab various systems begin to emerge from neighborhoods to do it. Recently, Fort our efforts, these soldiers will repre- Knox was tapped by TRADOC to lead “hub” will maintain continuous contact sent the soldiers of their branches and with all of the designated “spokes” by this effort in concert with the other using facilities designed to support organizations as end system users dur- proponent schools, the Objective Force ing this development process. Collabo- Task Force, and the Lead Systems In- intellectual sharing, personnel ex- ration and joint effort will mark every changes, and collaborative communi- tegrator (LSI). cations. This design represents an ear- step from the initial ideas of today to the force fielding of tomorrow. The FCS, as each of you probably nest effort to focus all of our collective knows, will be totally revolutionary. skills and knowledge on developing a From its inception, it is more than just “product” that is integrated across all Continued on Page 37 ARMOR — May-June 2002 5

CSM William J. Gainey Command Sergeant Major U.S. Army Armor Center

Positive Attitude Is Your Key To Success

First, let me say it is a great honor to you approach your duties and how you several attempts to reach the South have been chosen as YOUR United relate to those serving around you, Pole, Shackleton remained vigilant in States Army Armor Center and Fort good or bad. his quest. Ultimately, a Norwegian ex- Knox Command Sergeant Major. I can Attitude is a reflection of the person plorer achieved the goal before him. assure you I have not forgotten where I However, the unfettered Shackleton started and will do everything in my inside. While the external circum- challenged himself again with an even stances in your life may seem hectic, power to help you improve yourselves you can always chart a path of excel- greater quest, to be the first to cross the professionally. Together we will make Antarctic continent. the Armor Community a better place lence by assuming a positive mental attitude. There are many historical ex- On the way to the coast to begin the for all. amples of how a strong positive attitude trek, Lieutenant Shackleton’s ship be- We are well into the many missions of can be the difference between triumph came frozen in the ice and sank. What the New Year and are performing all and defeat. followed was an epic story of survival training tasks to the highest standard. that included exploits of sailing open Major General Joshua L. Chamberlain As we continue to serve our great na- was a self-taught college professor lifeboats in winter seas, living off the tion, we must continually reevaluate land and enduring more than 18 months our attitude so we maintain the proper from Maine who volunteered for ser- in subfreezing weather! vice in the Union Army during the War level of motivation, esprit de corps and Between the States (Civil War). During There have been numerous books ‘drive on spirit’ required to be success- ful. Our duties can be very demanding the Battle of Gettysburg, then-Colonel written about the adventure, all credit- Chamberlain led the 20th Maine Infan- ing the crew’s miraculous survival to and may, at times, seem much to bear. try Regiment to the defense of Little Lieutenant Shackleton’s leadership and Your attitude, though, will remain the key component in determining the way Round Top and ultimately saved the positive attitude. day for the Army of the Potomac. For his action, he was awarded the Con- While I was in the Balkans, an indi- vidual shared this poem with me one gressional Medal of Honor. In his ca- afternoon. It reminded me of how im- reer, he was wounded six times and contracted malaria, but always returned portant a positive attitude can be during I am very interested in re- any adverse situation. Read it carefully ceiving concerns, comments, to lead his men in the most arduous of and reflect on how your perception of situations. and suggestions from soldiers life may become easily tainted by not out in the field. Please send Later in life, Major General Chamber- recognizing the goodness in the duties all questions and comments lain served as president of Bowdoin you perform. to the following email ad- College and four-term governor of the dress: state of Maine. Chamberlain’s rich life I woke up early today, excited over all I [email protected] can clearly be attributed to his attitude get to do before the clock strikes mid- of tackling the toughest situations. night. I have responsibilities to fulfill to- Two or three questions will Another great example of how far a day. I am important. My job is to choose be selected and featured in what kind of day I am going to have. each edition of ARMOR. positive attitude can take you is the British Antarctic explorer, Lieutenant Ernest Shackleton. Although he failed Continued on Page 29 6 ARMOR — May-June 2002

The Blind Men and the Elephant

The personnel turbulence that cripples our Army Places the career progress of the individual Above the unit’s need for stability. This needs to change...

by Lieutenant Colonel Tim Reese

“Despite the repeated in many of their war- assurances of senior Ad- time tasks primarily ministration officials, the due to personnel turbu- readiness of our armed lence caused by the forces is suffering.”1 Army personnel system because that system places a higher priority This 1997 statement by on the individual sol- Chairman Floyd Spence dier’s personal profes- of the House Committee sional development on National Security was than the mission or merely a reiteration of a training needs of the campaign he began some tactical unit. three years before. The General Accounting Of- Let us first take a fice (GAO) supported the look at some of these Chairman in 1999 with other proposed solu- its own report on the inef- tions and why they fectiveness of the Combat Photo by Robert L. Stevenson have not — and indeed Training Centers (CTC) Tank crews need to train together to get the most from their superior cannot — fix the prob- at improving unit readi- equipment. But how long can they stay together? lem of unit readiness. ness.2 The Joint Chiefs Then I will propose a began in 1998 to tell way that the Army Congress that the military suffered training, don’t Army units perform well could transform its personnel system to from serious readiness problems and at our best approximation of combat, raise unit effectiveness to new heights. began in 2000 to say that the nation is the CTCs? Why, no matter what train- at high risk to execute the two-MTW ing “fixes” are attempted, do units con- Part I: The Problem (Major Theater of War) strategy.3 tinue to make the same mistakes over and over again in training? At all lev- The United States Army has probably Whether one compares CTC data from the best professional education system the 1980s, early 1990s, or today, the els, we have the same problem — we tactical lessons learned are essentially don’t do well on the test.5 in the world; the Army Officer Educa- 4 tion System and Noncommissioned the same. The level of training among The Army is unable to find out why Officer Education System are the envy Task Force Hawk units still haunts the its units cannot reach or sustain high Army in the current war on terrorism. of many nations. But ironically, these levels of readiness, for it is “feeling” or two systems contribute to the turmoil What do all of these official and anec- looking at only part of the problem and that prevents units from reaching peak dotal bits of evidence tell us? missing the real reason. We are like the performance. Unit commanders strug- The bottom line is that the great ma- proverbial blind men attempting to de- gle daily to balance the absence of key jority of Army combat units are not scribe an elephant by feeling its ap- leaders and soldiers completing their ready for combat without significant pendages and thus finding themselves professional development requirements additional training. This is not a new unable to describe the huge beast in with their unit’s training needs. Any phenomenon. While recent readiness front of them for what it really is. The 1SG, CSM, CO, or BN CDR can pro- and tactical performance trend lines elephant of low unit readiness cannot vide dozens of examples of training may be down from the alleged “hey- be explained by feeling its appendages conducted while the vehicle com- day” of the late 1980s, the same ques- — such as battlefield operating sys- mander is at BNCOC, the PSG is at tion has been asked for decades. Why, tems, leadership, or doctrine. Army ANCOC, and the BMO at CAS3. The despite all the hard work and time spent tactical combat units are poorly trained effect on unit readiness is devastating. ARMOR — May-June 2002 7

And no 1SG or CDR wants to damage ability to control our training calendars training events, 5 or 10 percent (over a the professional development of sub- destroys what little personnel stability summer it may reach 33 percent) of the ordinates by denying them timely at- they may have been able to carve out in unit’s personnel have changed. In a bat- tendance at schools. The centralized their unit. Given the international situa- talion, those percentages usually in- schooling system at MACOM and DA tion, our national interests and our na- clude the TF CDR, XO and/or S3, one levels is extraordinarily inflexible and tional budget, there is little the Army or or two company commanders, and hand- totally removed from the needs of the its leaders can do to alleviate the tempo fuls of platoon sergeants and leaders units it purports to serve. and eliminate resource constraints. and squad/vehicle commanders. It is Yet another layer of schools that de- Third, maybe our tactical and opera- near impossible to train a task force to conduct a deliberate breach of a com- tract from our readiness includes the tional doctrine is wrong. Do our CTCs plex obstacle belt against a well-pre- local or skill schools system, courses train the wrong tasks, missions, or fo- such as the armorer’s course, PLL clerk cus on the wrong tactics? Gallons of pared defender when part of the task force is still not proficient at terrain certification courses, NBC officer, and ink and reams of paper have been con- driving, part is not skilled at fire and a myriad of others. Even if a unit man- sumed seeking an answer to this ques- ages to work these kinds of schools tion. Frankly, we will never know the maneuver, and part is still learning how to operate the tank plow. What good around its training and CTC schedule, answer until the next war is fought. does it do to talk about using CTC take units cannot avoid having key person- Who knew that AirLand Battle doctrine nel missing from the train-up. We con- would work until February 1991? As home packages (THP) or inspection results to focus a unit’s post-FTX or stantly find ourselves retraining on the the famous military historian Michael post-CTC training when the unit is not most basic tasks since, as a unit, we Howard once stated, “It is not the job cannot get beyond the rudiments of our of the military to get it right before the the same unit it was only six months ago?9 THPs are at best another source profession when individuals are con- next war, only not to get it so wrong of “good ideas” and the solutions rec- stantly missing from training.6 that it can’t rapidly fix it before losing ommended are generally applicable to that war.”8 Whether we “break the pha- Second, could it be that our training any unit in the Army. At worst, they are doctrine is wrong? The answer here is, lanx,” “transform the force,” or “main- doorstops, dust ball collectors, or per- tain the legacy,” our units must be well I believe, an emphatic NO — our train- trained as units. Even if we have the sonal souvenirs. We are awash in at- ing doctrine works. Training gates, tempts to fix what’s broke — but again, METLs, the tasks-conditions-standards future rightly understood, and yet can’t we’re just not getting there. field units that can carry it out because triad, AARs, O/Cs, OPFOR, MILES of the way we man them, it won’t mat- and the CTCs, and the role of the NCO Most of the officer and NCO corps, in training are now almost immutable ter in the end. like whirling dervishes, work them- truths. The Oracle at Delphi has never Fourth, is the problem that we do not selves into a frenzy, training harder, but spoken more definitively. Our training take our lessons learned to heart and merely spinning in place. In some doctrine resurrected the Army out of focus our training to get better? Our cases, it is the personnel system that the ashes of Vietnam; it won the Cold training system and professional librar- dictates the training schedule. Battle War, and by 1991 had made it perhaps ies are overflowing with CTC take- Command Training Program exercises the greatest army in the history of the home packages, CALL newsletters, and CTC rotations are scheduled so as world — more about that later. Even CTC quarterly training bulletins, the to “fit” the command tenure of the FM 25-101, however, acknowledges Chief of Staff’s Trends Reversal Proc- commander, and the training calendar the negative effect of personnel turn- ess, and CTC-focused rotations. Every cascades downward from there. The over on unit effectiveness, but it greatly year, some senior Army leader appears, logic is that every commander must understates its degrading effect on unit like a prophet bearing witness to the “get a rotation under his belt” before he training proficiency.7 We have known burning bush, only to repeat what is leaves command.10 The adage about the risks since the inception of our already on the stone tablets of Mount putting the cart before the horse has training doctrine, but we have been Sinai — “We must train more, rehearse never been more applicable. Perversely, unable to avoid those rocky shoals. more, synchronize better, …” ad nau- the result has been no tactical im- provement but a great decrease in mo- Many have argued that the problem in seam. We know the tactical and doc- trinal solutions. We repeat them over rale and quality of life and an increase recent years is that we do not follow and over like a Tibetan monk reciting in officer attrition and command decli- our own training doctrine. Ask any nations. As individual leaders, we sim- leader at any level his opinion of the his mantra. Certainly all these efforts are helpful at the margins; things can ply do not have the practice time to get value of QTBs, training guidance, and always use a new gloss coat. But some good at our wartime tasks. training schedules and you will hear an unending tale of woe. Since 1991, the of these “fixes” themselves contribute The CSA’s recent initiative to fully to the problem. Training units spend lack of resources, the burdens of peace immense amounts of time trying to man the divisions has greatly alleviated support operations, and high OP- the chronic undermanning problem, TEMPO all have made it more difficult understand, manage, and implement the though only in part of the Army. It will latest “silver bullet” at the expense of to follow our training doctrine than it spending time fixing the very problem not, however, fix the problem of turbu- was during the Cold War era. We all lence. Our units will at least be close to talk about taking an “appetite suppres- we are addressing! fully manned, but they won’t be better sant” for good ideas, but we somehow Very few platoons, battalions, or divi- trained as units because turbulence re- just cannot quite manage to swallow sions can progress in skill, intensity, or mains the same. Perhaps OPMS XXI the pill. Any unit leader can relate mul- complexity from one exercise to the will improve officer competency in tiple horror stories about how our in- next because, in the interval between tactical units by increasing time on 8 ARMOR — May-June 2002

station and in critical positions, perhaps When it really “counts,” we do all we personnel management system. Their not. If so, leaders may over time be- can to limit the damage of our person- unique set of tasks and conditions en- come individually more experienced nel system. Since 1990, it has really ables them to overcome its most dam- and competent. When a highly compe- “counted” quite a number of times. aging effects. tent leader takes a unit through a major Both the Persian Gulf War and our de- Another less obvious example of what training event or CTC rotation, how- ployments to various regions of the happens when units and their leaders ever, it will be likely that he will be Balkans are great case studies. leading and will be part of an ad hoc train together, without major personnel Part II: Points of Light turnover, can be found within BLU- team that was put together for the event FOR units while at the CTC. All sol- only a short while before. Often the commander will be brand new, having The United States Army is still the diers, leaders, and O/Cs can attest to best in the world. Some leaders and the improvement in their unit’s skill taken command after the train up and units manage to perform amazingly over time at the CTC. The problem before the execution. well despite these many shortcomings. remains that they enter the CTCs at a When forced, or allowed, to speak Whatever our current challenges in low level of readiness, make solid openly, we admit the problem. In the recruiting may portend for the future, gains, and then return home only to 1999 GAO study, 49 percent of the the Army still attracts and retains large lose whatever was gained due to per- responders stated that personnel turn- numbers of superb leaders and soldiers. sonnel turnover. Every battalion com- over had the most negative impact on Evidence of outstanding warfighting mander drools at the prospect of keep- readiness at the battalion level; 54 per- skill and combat readiness, using our ing a captain in command of his com- cent said the same thing about pany long enough to take him to readiness at the company and pla- two CTC rotations as a company toon levels.11 Officers are routinely commander. Every task force S3 pulled out of units to serve in al- relishes the prospect of the scout legedly key positions, such as aide- One of the NTC’s OPFOR bat- platoon sergeant who knows the de-camp to general officers, with- talion commanders summarized terrain at the CMTC and can focus out regard to the unit’s needs.12 on his mission — not land naviga- Our soldiers and leaders at the his secret: “Rigorous and repeti- tion and cold weather survival. tive training is the core of our battalion level and below know How many commanders have at well the reality of personnel turn- training program.” over. the final AAR said to themselves, and perhaps to their units, “Boy, if In 1995, Colonel John Rosenber- we could only come back here in ger boldly asserted “… We, the two months and do this again, we officer corps, particularly battalion and very own soldiers, leaders, personnel could really kick some OPFOR a*!” brigade commanders and our staffs, are system and training doctrine, is staring Instead, BLUFOR units redeploy home incompetent.”13 The key reason behind us in the face. We could learn some and the PCS diaspora begins. Within his assertion is that officers spend in- critical lessons by examining them and weeks, PCS moves and intra-unit sufficient time practicing the nuts and applying them on a broader, Army- moves render it a wilted, pale shadow bolts of their profession. He also con- wide scale. of what it so recently became. Most of cluded that given the conditions that our tactical units remain mired at a exist in the Army today, particularly One can find evidence of readiness rather low level of combined arms pro- the personnel system that does not train excellence at the CTCs in the form of ficiency, unable to get better due to officers well at combined arms opera- the various OPFOR units who routinely personnel turnover and lack of experi- tions and which inhibits repetitive prac- embarrass BLUFOR on the laser battle- ence. tice by key leaders, officers simply field. Moreover, they do it with anti- 14 Occasionally, a unit does manage to cannot become tactically skilled. quated weapons systems. BLUFOR leaders bemoan the advantages of the conduct two or more CTC rotations, All these systems that are designed to OPFOR — they know the terrain like with large parts of its leadership and improve readiness have, at best, a mar- the backs of their hands,15 they fight soldiers remaining in place, and shows ginally positive effect; some even have missions over and over, they are ex- great improvements. Anyone who has negative effects. Like an incurable in- perts at MILES gunnery, etc. Constant been through a CTC rotation with a fection, we take the personnel system repetition, as a unit, makes them mas- unit whose key leaders and the majority as a given and merely apply different ters of the battlefield. The complaints of its soldiers have remained together types of salve to the wound. None of are true and interestingly enough con- as a team has seen this first hand. COL them can cure the glaring problems tain the answer to our training di- Dan Bolger’s Battle for Hunger Hill caused by the turbulence of the person- lemma. One of the NTC’s OPFOR bat- chronicles the experiences of an air nel system. History, practical experi- talion commanders summarized his assault battalion with two JRTC rota- ence, common sense, and even our doc- secret: “Rigorous and repetitive train- tions in 12 months. He clearly lays out trine tell us that soldiers and leaders ing is the core of our training pro- the lessons learned at his first rotation, must train together as a unit, over long gram.”16 The key word above is repeti- 94-10, the changes he and his leader- periods of time, to perform well in tive. An OPFOR company probably ship made in the intervening year, and training or in combat. But we don’t fights ten times the number of battles the much improved performance they follow through. In fact, we can’t follow its BLUFOR equivalent fights in the achieved in Rotation 95-07. There are through because our manning system same period. Even the CTC OPFOR, many other less-heralded examples that won’t let us. Intuitively we know it. however, must live within the Army’s illustrate the same point. The personnel ARMOR — May-June 2002 9

system does not allow much more than Germany, or at the NTC were the most forces (AEF) now being used by the nibbling around the edges of the prob- intense training and team-building ex- Air Force. Naval battle groups rotate lem.17 One can occasionally delay a key perience most had ever experienced. through an 18-month cycle of training, leader’s PCS move or school date to What would have been the result if maintenance, and operations, with 25 to take him to a major training event or Saddam Hussein and his incompetent 33 percent of the fleet in operations. CTC, but not often. generals had continued their attack in The Air Force has created ten AEFs August 1990, or if our units had to fight which rotate through a 15-month cycle To a similar degree one can see the only hours or days after unloading at of training, deployment readiness, and same thing in units that deploy for peace operations. Personnel stability the ports in Saudi Arabia? What would recovery, with two of the ten being at have happened if NCOs and officers peak readiness at any given time and policies are put into effect months be- continued to go to schools and left their the rest able to rapidly train and deploy fore the deployment to enable the unit to reach peak performance before the units days or weeks before we at- in a time of crisis. The Navy and Ma- tacked? rine Corps have done this for genera- mission begins. Units usually undergo tions; the Air Force has recently adopt- an intense mission rehearsal exercise at The biggest obstacle blocking our home-station or a CTC that prepares path to fielding effective combat units ed it for both readiness and quality of life reasons. them for the unique tasks of the mis- is the Army’s personnel system. Our sion. Extensive right-seat ride programs personnel management system trains In the same way, Army tactical units with units in theater further increase the individuals in a wide variety of tasks could have a “life cycle” between 24 unit’s proficiency before that magical over their professional lifetimes. We and 36 months — longer than the other milestone, the transfer of authority, is train individuals who belong temporar- services due to our unique training re- allowed to occur. Then, during the six ily to a unit. They move in and out of quirements. In the first or “activation months of deployment to the Balkans those units based on their personal pro- phase,” units should be filled with sol- or other exotic locales, the unit reaps fessional development timeline. What diers (filled to 110 percent of required huge dividends in unit cohesion, mo- the unit is doing is of little or no conse- manning levels to account for attrition) rale, esprit, and effectiveness (albeit quence.19 We count on having time for and trained to a high state of individ- effectiveness at non-combat tasks, in these individuals to coalesce into effec- ual and collective readiness. Soldiers most cases). Again, personnel stability tive combat units when needed. Those would report and remain assigned to is the key — it can’t be achieved in individuals learn, perhaps counter-in- the unit throughout its entire life cycle. normal times, but the Army strives to tuitively, to correct the system’s own put it in place for our “real-world” de- faults when lives are on the line. This After perhaps 12 months of training, these units would then be certified and ployments. The system has worked, requires large amounts of time, exten- made available for deployment to un- however, only because the “real world” sive retraining, last-minute changes in has given us time to get ready for it. our personnel system, and luck. We got foreseen missions or deployed to ongo- ing missions as needed. These units The most obvious example of how all four of these in 1990/91 in the Gulf. would have a stable population of sol- Our foes in the Balkans have not really good Army tactical units can be, if put us to the test. Will any foe be that diers and would conduct sustainment given the time to train with one set of training when/if not actually deployed. leaders and soldiers in the unit, is the stupid again? Repetitive training would sustain and Persian Gulf War of 1991. Whatever Part III: A Modest Proposal hone their warfighting skills. Due to a one’s opinion of the operational and stable base of soldiers, these units strategic aspects of the campaign, at the If the Army wants units trained to a would not be in the maddening person- tactical level Army units performed high level of proficiency and ready to nel manning vs. readiness predicaments brilliantly. It is important to note, how- fight on very short notice, then we faced by our units today. Training to- ever, that the Army had several months MUST change the personnel system to gether as combined arms teams would to ready its units for combat. We did support our training system and ensure further increase their battlefield prow- not deploy and fight within FM 25- our readiness. The Army’s transforma- ess. These probably ought to be bri- 100’s mystical “band of excellence.” tion process — to create new types of gade-sized battle groups, à la Colonel We deployed, trained extensively, then forces and make them rapidly deploy- McGregor’s ideas, though size and task fought at a time and place of our choos- able to anywhere in the world — is a organization would perhaps vary by ing against an incompetent foe.18 We recognition that the world has changed. theater and mission.21 Some would be were able to overcome the limitations Unfortunately, there seems to be no forward deployed and some based in of our personnel system and peak for recognition that to generate these kinds CONUS. This portion of a unit’s life the war. of units the Army must change the way cycle could be called the “deployable 20 To get there, many aspects of the cur- it mans and trains those units. The phase.” transformation must reach down into rent personnel system were put into our readiness-eroding personnel sys- This would require a massive change abeyance — stop-loss, PCS moves, of our individual-based promotions, NCO and officer professional school- tem. We must be able to win the first particularly for senior NCOs and offi- battles of the next conflict without the ing, retirement, and command tours. need for “peaking” before the first cers. While assigned to a unit, leader Why? Was it because we knew they promotions should be limited to those would hobble our ability to field units round is fired. that would not require moving the that could fight and win? Was it be- The Army should adopt a system leader to a new position. For example, cause the prospect of a “real war” en- somewhat akin to the naval battle 2LTs would be promoted to 1LT, but abled us for a moment to see through groups fielded by the Navy, the am- 1LTs would not make CPT until they the fog of our own mistakes? The phibious ready groups deployed by the leave the unit. A PVT could be pro- months of unit training in the U.S., Marines, and the air expeditionary moted to SPC, but a SFC would not 10 ARMOR — May-June 2002

make 1SG. An alternative would be to a unit at its “activation” and remain in that have been mined many times, over and over have leaders selected and promoted but the duty position until the “deactiva- again. not reassigned in order to provide sta- tion” of the unit. Individual career pro- 5Spence, “Military Readiness: 1997,” p. 14. See bility in key positions. Tank companies gression would serve the unit. Units also GAO, “Military Readiness: 1999, “ pp. 2-3 might end their life cycle with two would cease to be (or perceived to be) CPTs — the original commander and a promotion platforms for individuals, 6Spence, “Military Readiness: 1997,” p. 5 newly promoted CPT serving as the especially officers. It would require a 7U.S. Army Field Manual 25-101, Battle Fo- XO. It is essential that promotions not massive shift in priorities — from train- cused Training, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Gov- be allowed to undo key leader stabil- ing individuals at the expense of unit ernment Printing Office), pp. 1-6 to 1-7, and ity, unit cohesiveness, and warfighting readiness, to training and fielding com- figure 1-3. readiness. bat ready units with soldiers whose 8Michael Howard, oral remarks made at the At the end of a unit’s deployable primary purpose is to support that United States Military Academy to the Depart- unit’s readiness. The Army will also ment of History, 1992. phase, it would be “deactivated” and realize huge benefits in morale and the cycle started over again. Some sol- 9GAO, “Military Readiness: 1999,” pp. 21-22, diers in those units might be staying on retention as its training and deployment pace becomes more predictable. also Table 2. as a cadre for a repeat tour with the unit 10 in a position of greater rank and re- Conclusion Author, personal notes. Information about the sponsibility. Others would be headed BCTP comes from observing, via VTC, the The evidence is clear, overwhelming, Combat Training Center Quarterly Training off to school, TDA assignments, and and available for anyone who wants to Briefs to the CSA. Information about MACOM eventual reassignment back to the same look at it (including our potential ene- CTC scheduling comes from personal experience or other deployable units.22 Leaders mies). It is not new — in different as joint readiness officer, a battalion commander, should attend all NCOES and OES guises we have been dealing with the and a CMTC Observer-Controller in USAREUR schooling during PCS moves or be- 23 from 1996 to 2001. tween tours in a unit if staying for a problem for at least 50 years. Our current personnel system does not sup- 11GAO “Military Readiness,” p. 12. repeat tour at a post. Unlike the CO- port combat readiness and, in fact, in- HORT system of the 1980s, many 12Author, personal notes. One USAREUR ar- families could remain in place for long directly works against it. The elephant mor task force executed its CMTC rotation in of low unit readiness is in our living 2001 without a battalion executive officer be- stretches of time while soldiers partici- room, but we can’t see the whole beast pated in 36-month unit tours. Perhaps cause he was selected to serve as an aide-de- we could even make a true regimental at once because each of us feels only camp two weeks prior to deployment and a re- that part of it that is immediately in placement was not available. Another task force system a reality. front of us. Our attempts to improve had its battalion executive officer replaced one At any given point in time, some por- unit readiness have at best limited util- week prior to a real-world deployment in 2000 tion of the Army would be fully trained ity because they address only its ap- when he was “pulled up” to become the brigade S3 when that officer was selected to serve as an and deployable for whatever missions pendages. We’ve become so used to its aide-de-camp. arise, some would be in their activation corrosive effects on readiness that we phase and some would have just deac- have developed work-arounds to try to 13COL John D. Rosenberger, “The Burden our tivated. If a crisis arose that required overcome the problem. Soldiers Bear: Observations of a Senior Trainer O/C,” Combat Training Center Quarterly Bulle- more of the Army than that part of it If we are indeed transforming our- which was in their deployment phase, tin, (Ft. Leavenworth, Kan.: Center for Army training for other units could be intensi- selves for a new era — an era in which Lessons Learned, 4th QTR, FY 95), Part I, pp. 1- a force projection Army must be ready 2, and Part IV, pp. 1-2. See also his article, fied and sped up. Essentially, this is to fight across the entire spectrum of “Reaching Our Army’s Full Combat Potential in what we have been doing for decades the 21st Century,” ARMOR, (Ft. Knox, Ky.: U.S. on an ad hoc basis. It is what the Navy conflict on very short notice against asymmetric threats, and so on — then Army Armor Center, May-June 1999), pp. 8-14. has always done, and what the Air this old problem is intensely more acute 14 Force now does. A critical aspect of History is replete with examples of forces us- this mix would be to determine how than at any time since the end of ing less effective equipment defeating techno- WWII. It is time to take unit readiness logically superior foes. much and what portions of the force to a higher and sustainable level. It is need to be in the deployment phase at 15We’d better get used to it. In any future con- any given time so that they could re- time to take bold measures before the flict outside of Korea, this will be true of our real future is visited rudely upon us. spond to a crisis and await the arrival of enemies. the rest of the Army should that crisis 16LTC Jim Zanol, “Training to Achieve an OP- expand. Notes FOR Level of Proficiency,” The Combat Train- 1 The above notion is admittedly sim- Chairman Floyd D. Spence, “Military Readi- ing Center Quarterly Bulletin, (Ft. Leavenworth, ness 1997: Rhetoric & Reality,” (Washington, Kan.: Center for Army Lessons Learned, 1st Qtr plistic and would need far more work D.C.: U.S. Congress, House Committee on Na- FY98, No. 97-2), p. 1. to implement. Probably not all of the tional Security, April 9, 1997), p. 1 Army could adopt such a system. The 17Dan Bolger, The Battle for Hunger Hill part of the Army that deploys and 2Mark E. Gibicke, Ed. “Military Readiness: Full (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1997), pp. 58-60. Training Benefits From Army’s Combat Training fights as units, however, must do so. 18 Centers Are Not Being Recognized,” (GAO/T- GEN Fred Franks, Jr., Into the Storm, (New The personnel system must be stood on NSIAD-99-2, Feb. 2, 1999). York: Berkley Books, 1998), Chapters 7 & 8. its head. The training, education, and This is just one of many books and articles that promotion of individual soldiers must 3Rick Maze, “Congress Hears Readiness stress this point. become tied to the “life cycle” and Woes,” Army Times, 12 October 1998, p. 4. needs of the unit to which they are as- 4Each CALL publication is a veritable gold signed. In particular, leaders would join mine of good ideas. They are, however, old ideas Continued on Page 15 ARMOR — May-June 2002 11 Photo by Robert L. Stevenson

The Bugle Calls: Armor on the Modern Battlefield

by Major James K. Morningstar

Is there a role for armor on the new nation faced challenges from proxies fields of battle for America’s armor modern battlefield? This article exam- who employed Soviet equipment and force. ines that question and finds there is a tactics. On battlefields like Iraq in role for armor, a vital role, but one that 1991, the Army proved supremely pre- The changing post-Cold War strategic will require a change in armor structure pared to meet such challenges. The environment met the austere military and thought. armor force, fielding unmatched 70-ton budget that typically follows whenever M1 Abrams main battle tanks, demon- America overcomes a major threat. For many years, the United States This combination led the U.S. military Army was organized and trained to act strated surprising dominance in com- bat. establishment to agree on one point: in concert with the other services to America’s armed forces would have to meet and defeat the forces of the Soviet In the ten years since, the world has be deployable. Forward positions in Union in battle on the fields of Europe. sought to evolve in adaptation to the Europe were of little help if the threat In large part this strategic mission performance of America’s arms. The was elsewhere, and no money was United States military has, in turn, available to build forces everywhere. translated into a requirement to have a searched to identify the characteristics robust armored force that could defeat For the armor community, this task was masses of Soviet tanks. Through nu- of the next threat so as to redesign itself daunting in many ways. The U.S. Air to maintain the ability to win. As for- Force’s largest transport aircraft, the C- clear deterrence and massive retalia- mer Soviet clients fell away and others tion, through flexible response on a 5, can only carry one 70-ton M1 main deep battlefield, to high maneuver Air- lost faith in the doctrine and weapons battle tank and then only at a high cost employed by the Iraqis, new varieties to its operational capability. On a given Land Battle doctrine, America’s ar- and asymmetric methods appeared on mored force prepared to stop a Soviet day, the Air Force has about 120 avail- attack and then seize the initiative. The the threat horizon. For the American able C-5s, the Army has purchased military, especially during fiscally tight 7,880 M1s since 1981, and the two fact that the Soviets had a well defined times, the new environment posed a and publicized tactical doctrine, evolved systems are usually located far apart. from linear methods employed since very difficult question: how does one build a force to win possible simultane- By 1994, armor doctrine confirmed Napoleon, enabled American planners ous engagements in places as diverse as that, “The land warfare strategy of the to fine-tune strategy and tactics to meet 1 the threat. Korea, the Middle East, and unforesee- U.S. military has changed,” and noted able Third World locations? The range “large, forward-deployed forces” were With the collapse of the Soviets, this of possible engagements stood in stark being replaced by “rapidly projecting specific threat also collapsed. Still, the contrast to the previously expected combat power from CONUS.” Armor 12 ARMOR — May-June 2002

“Operations against small bands of guerrilla forces in Africa, Afghanistan, or the Asian periphery are becoming the norm. In such operations, a tank can leaders prepared doc- be very persuasive, and the absence of a tank can be In his letter to Con- trine to employ a gressman Murtha fol- lighter than 25-ton M8 downright tragic...” lowing the Battle of ‘light tank’ (the Ar- Mogadishu, Task mored Gun System) Force Ranger Com- that could deploy and “operate with Now the strategic environment once mander MG William F. Garrison wrote, light infantry-based contingency forces again seems to change. In the current “Armor reaction would have helped but worldwide.” Armed with the low-recoil war against terrorism, we see the out- casualty figures may or may not have 105mm M35 main gun and recon- lines of the modern battlefield. Opera- been different.”4 It is hard to believe figurable armor, M8 crews were ex- tions against small bands of guerrilla the disastrous outcome could not have pected to provide “…security, recon- forces in Africa, Afghanistan, or the been alleviated by support from a sin- naissance, and anti-armor firepower to Asian periphery are becoming the gle Abrams tank platoon. Parting mobs, the light infantry division (LID)…” and norm. In such operations, a tank can be suppressing militia positions, and break- “…engage and destroy enemy forces very persuasive, and the absence of a ing through ad hoc roadblocks, tanks using mobility, firepower, and shock tank can be downright tragic. would have protected the force, enabled effect in coordination with other com- quicker operational tempo, and drawn 2 These threats cannot be considered bat arms.” In 1993, the Army re- disabled by the mere presence of an fire away from more vulnerable per- quested 237 M8s for $1.3 billion, but armored vehicle. Equipped with recoil- sonnel and equipment. Although the fiscal austerity reduced those figures to less rifles, rocket-propelled grenades, entire operation seemed vexed, it seems 26 vehicles for $142.8 million in 1996 and anti-tank mines, small enemy assured that tanks there would have and then altogether eliminated the pro- bands in Mogadishu and Kabul do not saved lives — American and Somali. gram in 1997 as a money-saving meas- 3 fear light armored vehicles. Some re- In Kosovo, the ability of airpower to ure. ports claim a Soviet-built RPG-7V nullify enemy armor appears open to The M8 was touted as a means to sup- shaped charge round can penetrate the debate. Although NATO claimed to port operations other than war, to in- equivalent of 12 inches of cold-rolled have destroyed 93 Serb tanks and clude: counterinsurgency, anti-terror- steel. The proliferation of future fire- nearly 500 other military vehicles,5 the ism, relief operations, shows of force, and-forget anti-tank weapons will de- Munitions Effectiveness Assessment noncombatant evacuation, and peace- crease the effectiveness of light ar- Teams found only 26 tank hulks (also keeping operations. In war, it could mored vehicles in such environments. reported by some as 14 tanks and 12 support the infantry during close as- In field tests and the Gulf War, how- self-propelled artillery vehicles) and 18 saults, reduction of bunkers and road- ever, the M1 tank demonstrated near armored personnel carriers and as- blocks, urban operations, defense, mo- invulnerability to these threats. sumed the other 500-plus kills had been 6 bile reserve, and rear area operations. On the battlefields in Afghanistan, the removed by the Serbs. Air Force Light armor was anticipated to provide combination of Special Forces teams Colonel Ed Boyle of the Combined Air exceptional security and reconnais- supported by indigenous militia and Operations Center said civilian traffic sance support. When enemy anti-tank combined with air-delivered precision and bad weather allowed the Serbs capability was not present, the M8 munitions proved more than adequate “…periods during this entire campaign could conduct standard armor missions to turn the tide against a once respect- when they could freely move around of movement to contact, hasty attack, the battlefield, move equipment, and able Taliban ground force. And they 7 deliberate attack, exploitation, and pur- did it with almost no armor support. reposition it.” suit. The Special Forces teams hunted down In later testimony before the House of The problem with the M8, and the ra- enemy positions, sometimes containing Commons regarding the BDA tallies, tionale for its cancellation, was that single tanks, and guided devastating Vice Admiral Sir Alan West, the Brit- there already existed a weapon system airpower against them. Allied tribes- ish Chief of Defense Intelligence said, that could perform these missions: the men provided manpower for hasty “I think probably they were optimis- M2/3 Bradley Fighting Vehicle. In es- defenses and attacks when needed. tic.”8 Photos appeared of plastic bridges sence the M8 was a Bradley with a Against such a force, Taliban armor and tanks used to effectively decoy larger main gun, no TOW launcher, and proved little more than a target for the bombers away from actual targets. On less infantry carrying capability. If you United States Air Force. 15 May 2000, Newsweek magazine were an infantry commander, which ve- What role would American armor openly challenged the validity of the hicle would you prefer to support you? BDA claims and reported actual results play on this modern battlefield? Maybe 9 The short life cycle of the M8 left an none, in a place like Afghanistan. If, were far lower. important lesson. It was born out of a however, we look at what happened in I must confess that I am a true be- need to have an armored vehicle light recent fights in places like Somalia, and liever in airpower. As a tank company enough to deploy quickly to meet the what could have happened in Kosovo, commander in the Gulf War, I passed threat wherever it may appear. It died a role for armor becomes clear and too many smoking Iraqi hulks to doubt because it could not offer significant necessary. In Somalia, clan militias the power of the United States Air ability to meet the threat in comparison caused havoc with heavy machine guns Force. That said, one must allow for the to existing systems. Simply put, it was mounted on the back of pick-up trucks. limitations of airpower. Weather can designed to meet operational limita- In Kosovo, a well-equipped modern turn bad. Decoys can be effective. tions (lift capability), not operational army modified its operations to miti- Enemies can develop anti-aircraft ca- needs (specific threat abilities). gate the effect of American airpower. pabilities. Close air support aircraft are ARMOR — May-June 2002 13

not always available.10 Even when they Raids, ambushes, and movements to Armor leaders are familiar with move- are, the need for targeting support from contact are not unknown to the cavalry; ment to contact, but we do not do it systems ranging from ground-based they are the tactics of the western fron- well at the small unit level. Junior offi- radar to reconnaissance satellites might tier. To win in them, one requires cers and NCOs need to read the terrain require too large a footprint to be feasi- speed, firepower, protection, and ma- and anticipate how an enemy, free of ble in certain operational environments. neuverability — the very characteristics the constraints of “threat doctrine,” In these situations, the accurate and of armor. One must also be able to op- would use it — and how friendly dis- heavy firepower of tanks would be a erate with relatively slower, lighter, and mounts would use it. They must under- highly desirable presence supporting more vulnerable infantry. In the scale stand how concentrating fires differs forces engaged. of battle found in Somalia and Af- from massing troops. Finally they must ghanistan, these operations do not re- have the confidence in their independ- Does the infantry community think tanks can play a part in modern com- quire large formations of tanks. The ent decision-making required to ma- requirement is not lighter tanks, but neuver on the enemy and get every gun bat? Their doctrine says: “Heavy forces lighter formations. Most importantly, it into the fight. They need these abilities help infantry by leading them in open terrain and providing them a protected, requires teams highly trained for move- and more, without a company or battal- ment to contact operations. ion commander spoon-feeding them fast-moving assault weapons system. instructions. They suppress and destroy enemy weap- Armor can make a vital contribution ons, bunkers, and tanks by fire and ma- in today’s combat environment if tank- This last point cannot be emphasized neuver. They also provide transport ers are properly trained to conduct enough. When I was a tank battalion when the enemy situation permits.”11 raids, ambushes, and movement to con- S3, I sat down with nearly every lieu- My company team (and three others) tact as part of a small team with Special tenant from our unit who had decided provided all this support and more to Forces, infantry, and indigenous allies. to leave the Army. I would ask them the infantry units of the 1st Infantry They must be able to operate in an un- why they were leaving and, inevitably, Division during the attack into Iraq. certain environment without doctrinal they would say they were given little Infantry doctrine also points out (and templates of enemy formations and opportunity to lead their platoons. situational templates of enemy posi- Training schedules were full of ser- this is key): “However, tanks and infan- tions. The tankers in such an operation geant’s time, command maintenance, try must work closely. In most opera- tions where they work together, infan- must be able to contribute planning family time, consideration of others considerations for armor and teach oth- training, and other command-directed trymen must establish direct contact ers how to work with tanks. Currently, events. There were so few opportunities with individual tanks. They will not have time to designate target or direct at the small unit level, armor does not to go to the field that most of these train for raids, does not emphasize am- events were dominated by company fires through the platoon chain of bushes, and does not adequately con- commanders anxious to exercise their command. Infantrymen and tankers must know how to communicate by duct movement to contact with allied chance to command. Even PT was dic- 12 dismounted infantry. tated by three-star policy on when to radio, phone, and visual signals.” I begin, when to end, what exercises to never worked with the infantry platoon Infantry doctrine defines an ambush assigned to my unit prior to our arrival as “a surprise attack from a concealed perform, and how far to run. On the rare occasion when a lieutenant could in the Gulf. In the small unit operations position on a moving or temporarily decide his own course of action, many on today’s battlefields, platoon and halted target.”13 The armor definition section leaders must be able to work deletes the reference to a concealed felt discouraged from taking a chance 14 for fear of failing and earning a lower closely with infantry and Special position. How many armor lieutenants rating. Some said they knew a ‘three Forces teams on the ground. That kind have trained with infantry in construct- of cooperation requires a high degree of ing a hasty or deliberate, point or area, block’ on a platoon leader OER meant never getting a chance to command a training and familiarity with specific linear or L-shaped ambush? How many battalion. Who wanted to stick around tactical missions. infantry lieutenants would like to have a tank section to assist them in an anti- in that kind of Army? What kind of tactical missions would armor have to perform on the modern armor ambush? Constructing a well- Now we need those guys. The threat covered kill zone with obstacles, em- environment demands the presence of battlefield? The same kind foot soldiers ploying assault, support and security Armor, not battalions but platoons. We currently face. Out of the broad spec- trum of current American armor mis- elements, and executing a well-timed need independent thinking lieutenants operation are skills requiring training. who can take command, take a risk, sions, today’s fights focus on relatively and take the fight to the enemy. We small, light, and fast-moving opera- A raid is defined as “a combat opera- tions. With the threat breaking free of tion to attack a position or installation need to develop men everyday who can 15 perform that role under the conditions the rigid Soviet tactical doctrinal followed by a planned withdrawal.” faced in places like Afghanistan. To model, and most likely not capable of Infantry does not conduct squad-level massed armor attacks, modern combat raids; they are rather highly choreo- build such tank commanders, leaders and trainers just have to keep in mind is reduced to raids, ambushes, and graphed platoon- and higher-level op- the original motto of the United States movements to contact. Of course any erations. Is there a role for tanks in a conflict with countries like Iran, Iraq, raid? The initial operation to seize war- Armor Corps: “Treat ’Em Rough!” North Korea, and China would proba- lords in Somalia was a raid, and clearly Some say we need a new light armor bly require massed armor engagement, tanks could have gotten the convoys system to get to the modern battlefield. but these countries would most likely through, helped secure the buildings Maybe, but probably not. Because the first test American strength in smaller and crash sites, and broke through to small scale and tactical composition of proxy conflicts. the crashed helicopters. current operations requires fewer tanks 14 ARMOR — May-June 2002

Blind Men... in support of infantry, and the enemy is erate without company and battalion Continued from Page 11 able to face up to light armor systems, commanders. This can only be solved we can and should use our existing by instilling in the Armor Corps a little main battle tank. We may only be able of the old cavalry and tanker mindset. 19 to fly one Abrams tank per C-5 or C- MAJ Donald E. Vandergriff, “Truth@Readi- ness.com,” U.S. Naval Institute: Proceedings, 17, but the requirement for fewer tanks Notes Vol. 125, Issue 6, June 1995), p. 56. MAJ Van- means we can get by with current dergriff attributes our current readiness problems means. That is not to say a future 30- 1See introduction FM 17-18, Light Armor Op- to a wider problem of officer leadership, culture, ton tank is not desirable, but it is not erations, 8 March 1994. passivity, and reluctance to speak the truth. While absolutely necessary. As Patton said, 2Ibid. I do not subscribe to the more nefarious tone of his article, I believe he has correctly identified “The best is the enemy of the good. By 3 this I mean that a good plan violently See Military Analysis Network at http://www. our personnel system as the culprit. He is one of executed now is better than a perfect fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/m8-ags.htm. many authors addressing the same issue. plan next week.” The M1 is plenty good. 4MG Garrison letter “Operation on 3/4 Oct. ’93 20The recently released results of one of the in Mog” addressed to the House National Secu- CSA’s “Blue Ribbon Panels” on officer training If we do operate with a few forward- rity Committee to be shown to President Clinton and development acknowledges that, “many [of- deployed platoons, we must make some and Secretary of Defense Aspin. ficers] do not know or understand what right changes in their support network. Large looks like” and “units cannot conduct home sta- 5NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe tion training according to Army doctrine …” forward-deployed maintenance depots briefing 16 September 1999. Based on an as- Unfortunately, the panel’s recommendations are will not be feasible for forward- sessment made by 35 experts, under USAF BG that officers must adopt the so-called “enduring deployed platoons. Forward-deployed John D. W. Corley, examining 429 bombing sites meta-competencies” of self-awareness and adapt- spare tanks are feasible. A small main- on the ground. tenance team may go forward and ro- ability. How these new buzzwords will improve 6See Stephen T. Hosmer, The Conflict Over officer skill and unit effectiveness is left as an tate the crew to a fresh tank when nec- Kosovo: Why Milosevic Decided to Settle When exercise to the reader. It does not directly address essary and extract broken tanks out of He Did, Chapter 7, “Damage to Military Forces personnel or officer turnover nor call for any theater for repairs. and KLA ‘Resurgence’ Generated Little Pres- significant changes to the personnel system. “The Fuel and POL will also have to be de- sure,” the Rand Corporation, p. 83. Army Training and Leader Development Panel 7 Officer Study, Report to the Army,” May 2001, livered and packaged in new ways. Quoted by John Tirpak in “Survey Shows pp. OS-2, 3, and 14. Armor can borrow Forward Air Refuel NATO Close on Serb Damage Estimates” in Air Point (FARP) techniques from aviators. Force Magazine, November 1999, Volume 82, 21COL Douglas McGregor, Breaking the Pha- Envision a blivet C-47 flying to a for- Number 11. lanx, (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1997), pp. 56- 86. ward rendezvous point when necessary 8House of Commons Select Committee of De- to refuel M1s on the move. We did fence Testimony Minutes of Evidence, 29 March 22The German Bundeswehr used a similar sys- something similar when I was an S4 for 2000. tem for many years during the Cold War. Their 1/4 Cavalry in 1988. It can still be done. 9 system worked within battalions and brigades John Barry and Evan Thomas, “The Kosovo instead of across the entire Bundeswehr. A possible immediate solution to the Cover-Up,” Newsweek, May 15, 2000, pp. 23-26. 23It is by now axiomatic that unit cohesion, es- challenges of providing armor to the 10 For example, Task Force Hawk’s AH-64 prit, trust, and pride, among other intangibles, global hotspots today would be the Apache attack helicopters in Kosovo never got gained through long periods of training men creation of two companies of deploy- into the fight. together under tough conditions, are the key to able platoons. Locating one at Fort 11FM 7-8, Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad, small unit battlefield success and individual Lewis and one at Fort Bragg would section 2-44. survival. The U.S Army’s individual replacement enable cross training with Special 12 system of WWII and the individual rotation sys- Forces and co-location with air trans- FM 7-8, section 2-45. tem of Korea and Vietnam all violated this prin- portation assets. They could be manned 13FM 7-8, section 3-17 through 3-22. ciple. See for example, Richard Holmes, Acts of War: The Behavior of Men in Battle, (New York: with highly qualified volunteers, cross- 14FM 71-1, Tank and Mechanized Infantry The Free Press, 1985), pp. 31-73 and 261-63. trained for special skills like FARP fuel Company Team, section 6. handling, and outfitted with satellite 15FM 7-8, section 3-23. communications gear. I’m certain many old commanders like me would gladly LTC (P) Timothy R. Reese be- take a reduction in rank to be a part of LTC James K. Morningstar is a came an Armor officer in 1981. He such a unit. 1983 graduate of the U.S. Military has served in the 1st Cavalry, 3rd Armor can play a role on the modern Academy. He served as a tank pla- Armored, 2nd Infantry, and 1st In- battlefield. After watching the depic- toon leader and company XO in fantry Divisions. He commanded 1st tion of Black Hawk Down in the thea- Germany during the Cold War; as a Battalion, 77th Armor in the 1st ID ters, most Americans are realizing ar- company commander in combat in from 1998 to 2000 and, in June mor must play a role on the modern the Gulf War; and as a task force 1999, led the first U.S. armor battal- battlefield. The benefits tanks offer to S3 in Bosnia “to end a war.” Addi- ion to enter Kosovo as part of our soldiers in combat is immense. tionally, he was an OC at the NTC; KFOR. He has also served as a Support and technical challenges can served 3 years aboard the USS Mt. senior maneuver task force obser- be overcome with a little brainpower ver-controller on the Warhog O/C and administrative muscle as long as Whitney with the Navy, and taught forward-deployed armor elements are military history at the University of Team at the Combat Maneuver small but effective. The bigger chal- Virginia. He is now a broken down Training Center in Hohenfels, Ger- lenge is in breaking the mindset that old tanker riding a desk in D.C. into many. Currently, he is a student at platoon and section leaders cannot op- retirement in May 2003. the U.S. Army War College.

ARMOR — May-June 2002 15

How to Defeat the Motorized Rifle Company At the National Training Center: Observations from an MRC Commander

by First Lieutenant Sean P. Hazlett

Over the past decade, the National ron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment BMPs and one or two BRDMs, which Training Center’s Opposing Force combines with its counterpart infantry conduct reconnaissance for the MRB (OPFOR) has served as one of the troop from 2nd Squadron to form a five to ten kilometers “in front of the toughest opponents that its Blue Force motorized rifle battalion (MRB). Each forward patrol on the primary route of (BLUFOR) opponents will ever face. 1st Squadron troop provides 9 to 10 advance.”3 The OPFOR’s track record has been so tanks and 3 BMP-1s, and each 2nd consistent that one of its former colo- Squadron troop provides 24 to 26 When enemy contact is likely, the nels has described it as “the anvil upon BMP-1s or BMP-2s. The MRB is typi- MRC transitions from an MRC column which we have ham- to a platoon column for- mered and forged the mation. Some MRCs pre- combat power of our fer to put three T-80s at Army.”1 the front of their columns so that the tanks can de- In his article, “Reaching ploy laterally while the Our Army’s Full Combat trailing BMPs fall into Potential in the 21st Cen- their respective motorized tury,” Colonel John D. rifle platoons (MRPs). Rosenberger pointed out Other MRC commanders the many reasons why allow their MRPs to travel the OPFOR is successful together in column in a T- against its adversaries. 80…BMP…BMP… T-80 This essay aims to sup- …BMP…BMP sequence. port and to refine those Both techniques have their arguments from the level respective advantages and of the motorized rifle disadvantages. Once en- company (MRC). It will emy contact is imminent, provide a brief back- the MRC deploys into a ground about how the single line of three MRPs individual MRC is com- using terrain to mask their posed, who leads it, and maneuver. Figures 1, 2, how it fights. Finally, this essay will cally divided into three MRCs. An MRC and 3 demonstrate each of these forma- discuss the relative advantages and commander commands each MRC with tions respectively. disadvantages of the OPFOR and the the aid of his deputy, his counterpart OPFOR vs. BLUFOR: BLUFOR in the areas of tactics, ex- platoon leader from a sister troop. In Advantages and Disadvantages perience, weapons systems, numerical the OPFOR, every leader controls a superiority, and unit cohesion. From an unit one increment larger than its While fighting at the National Train- assessment of these five core areas, this equivalent in BLUFOR. Thus, a lieu- ing Center, both the BLUFOR and the essay will conclude that the BLUFOR tenant typically commands an MRC, OPFOR have relative advantages and company team can defeat the OPFOR while a captain commands an MRB. disadvantages. In order for BLUFOR MRC provided it takes full advantage Prior to contact, the MRC moves out commanders to defeat the OPFOR of its relative strengths and the OP- in column. During a tactical road MRC, it is essential that they under- FOR’s weaknesses. march, an MRC commander typically stand their relative advantages over the sends one or two BMPs forward of the OPFOR and how they can exploit these The OPFOR advantages. There are five major areas Motorized Rifle Company MRC as forward patrols (FPs). These FPs provide “security forward of an that can serve as a basis for comparison Before examining the relative attacking FSE or MRB on the primary between the OPFOR and the BLUFOR. These areas include tactics, experience, route of advance.”2 Additionally, the strengths and weaknesses of the BLU- weapons systems, numerical strength, FOR and the OPFOR, it is essential FPs can serve to link the MRC with the that one discuss the nature of the OP- next forward MRC. If a particular and unit cohesion. FOR motorized rifle company. It typi- MRC is first in the order of march, its The first basis for comparison is tac- cally consists of three T-80s and eight FPs can tie in that MRC with the com- tics. Most rotational units rely heavily BMP-1s or BMP-2s. During each rota- bat reconnaissance patrols (CRPs). on material found in FM 17-15, FM 7- tion, each armor troop from 1st Squad- These patrols normally consist of three 7J and FM 71-1. For a tank-pure com- 16 ARMOR — May-June 2002 BMPs T-80s

Fig. 1. OPFOR MRC in Column Formation pany team, the BLUFOR fights with mander must plan and direct operations pendent decisions because they fear the three platoons of four tanks each. This in a manner that requires a minimum of consequences of making a mistake. company team is integrated into a task intervention. He operates on the princi- More often than not, a BLUFOR pla- force of at least two other tank or ple that some loss of precision is better toon will come to an abrupt halt once mechanized company teams. In turn, than inactivity.”4 they report contact and await further this task force and one or more others instructions from higher units. Instead In theory, this doctrine operates upon constitute a brigade. During a fight, the the implicit assumption that the unit in of seeking cover and beginning to de- smallest maneuver unit is a tank or a velop the situation on their own, they mechanized infantry platoon, each of contact with the enemy is in the best sit and wait for instructions from higher position to make a timely and aggres- which consists of four vehicles. One of sive decision. It requires units at the echelons to engage the enemy. In the the reasons why the BLUFOR is organ- inevitable delay that follows, their OP- ized in this manner is to enable the lowest level (platoons) to make and ex- FOR counterparts engage them and ecute these decisions. Ideally, a com- smallest unit possible — the platoon — mander should ensure that all his sub- pound their stationary vehicles with to act independently while in contact to artillery. It seems that the tendency of ensure that it meets the commander’s ordinates understand his intent and are many commanders to insist upon “pre- intent. In fact, FM 71-1 explicitly ad- prepared to execute it in his absence. cision” rather than local initiative re- dresses this issue: Although a focus on local initiative sults in the frequent stagnation of some and independent decision-making is BLUFOR units on the NTC battlefield. “When soldiers expect the commander part and parcel of American mecha- to make every decision or initiate every nized doctrine, small units rarely exer- In stark contrast, the OPFOR operates action, they may become reluctant to cise this flexibility at the National with a doctrinal derivative of the Soviet act. To counter this tendency, the com- Training Center. The failure of Ameri- military command system. This system can mechanized doc- operates on a rigid command structure trine at the NTC can- in which units move in lockstep and in not be blamed on its precise formations toward preordained theory, as it is based points on the battlefield. “The Soviets on an extremely suc- emphasize swift, efficient movement, cessful style of lead- or transfer, of combat power from one ership. Rather, its point on the battlefield to another. failure lies in what Units frequently rehearse the march, many would describe and its conduct is strictly controlled.”5 as a “zero defect” The advantage of Soviet doctrine, culture within many therefore, is speed. Additionally, the units in the Ameri- OPFOR MRC successfully couples this can military. Leaders speed with the local initiative so char- do not make inde- acteristic of American military doc-

Fig. 2. OPFOR MRC in Platoon Column Formation

Fig. 3. OPFOR MRC On Line

ARMOR — May-June 2002 17

trine. The result of the BLUFOR units fought amalgamation of these the way American two disparate doctrines doctrine intended, they is a fast and flexible would be far more MRC. A prime example successful on the NTC of this system in practice battlefield. is the MRC radio net. The second area of Although the lowest unit in an MRC is on “a clear understanding of what they comparison is experience. At NTC, the MRP, the lowest level at which have to do, when they have to do it, and there are three areas where experience information is conveyed is at the MRC. where they have to do it.” He makes no comes into play. These areas are lead- To enable the MRC commander to mention of “how they have to do it.” ership experience, experience fighting maintain strict control over every vehi- He does this ostensibly because the on particular terrain, and individual cle in his MRC in accordance with So- OPFOR’s success lies in its ability to experience. On two out of three of viet doctrine, all vehicles in the MRC maximize initiative at the lowest unit these areas, the OPFOR has a clear are on one radio net. Although this level. Thus, although the original intent advantage. However, if BLUFOR were makes it difficult for the MRC com- of using one single published order to capitalize on a third, they would be mander to process information from his may have been to replicate the Soviet much more successful on the NTC bat- subordinates, it reduces one layer of command style of rigid leadership, it tlefield. has since enhanced the ability of the delay in the dissemination process. Any At the NTC, BLUFOR company information passed down from the OPFOR MRC to maximize local initia- MRB commander is instantaneously tive and decision-making in nearly commanders have a tremendous advan- every battle it fights. Although OPFOR tage over their OPFOR MRC com- passed on to every vehicle in the MRB mander counterparts. First, all BLU- by each MRC commander. Since all doctrine is designed to maintain strict MRP subordinate vehicles are monitor- control over all subordinate units, the FOR commanders have a minimum of OPFOR MRC fights in a manner that is four years of tactical and leadership ing on the MRC net, there is no need experience. Second, all of them have for each MRP commander to repeat, much more oriented toward the funda- and possibly to distort, each situation mental intent of American doctrine — a been educated at the Captain’s Career focus on independent initiative and de- Course for several months prior to as- report. Because all vehicles in the MRC suming command. Put simply, they are on the same net, each vehicle has cision-making at the lowest possible access to nearly perfect situational level. have more leadership experience and awareness. With this knowledge, MRC training than their OPFOR counterparts The irony of these two doctrinal sys- to accomplish their mission. commanders can trust their senior NCO tems is that neither the BLUFOR nor MRP leaders to react to the enemy in- the OPFOR uses them as they were In contrast, all MRC commanders are dependently while simultaneously fol- intended. BLUFOR tends to operate lieutenants — many of them second lowing the MRC commander’s intent. under a very rigid command structure lieutenants — with little to no tactical experience. After learning how to direct A second major advantage to the OP- where leaders at the lowest level seem FOR command system is the operations to be discouraged from taking local platoons in combat situations at the initiative. Of course, American doctrine basic course, they are required to com- order. Its simplicity gives every vehicle mand a company-sized element upon in the regiment a clear idea of the regi- is not designed to operate this way. In ment’s objectives. Colonel Rosenber- contrast, the OPFOR’s doctrinal system arrival at the NTC. This step is not dif- ger’s article describes the effectiveness is intended for use in a very rigid com- ficult to take conceptually, but is very mand structure where strict orders are challenging in practice. MRC com- inherent in the simplicity of the OP- manders are also given fewer resources FOR orders process: passed from higher to subordinate units. Doctrinally, individual units are to accomplish the mission then their “Take the operations order. Only one strongly discouraged from taking inde- BLUFOR counterparts. Instead of three written operations order is published pendent initiative and operating outside four-vehicle platoons, they must ac- for the regimental combined-arms team, of command directives. In practice, complish similar missions with three which addresses multiple courses of ac- OPFOR battalion commanders allow platoons of three vehicles apiece and a tion. Tasks to subordinate units are al- their subordinates to take more risks two-vehicle FP element. ways expressed in the form of task and and to exercise more initiative in com- purpose. Only one set of graphics is While BLUFOR commanders may bat. They allow their MRC command- have a clear advantage in leadership produced and every leader in the regi- ers to make their own decisions based experience, the OPFOR MRC has two ment, from top to bottom, uses this one on the local situation in their sector. set of graphics. Subordinate units do tremendous experiential advantages of MRB commanders use mistakes as terrain knowledge and battle experi- not develop their own, unique graphics. learning points for future battles and ence. The majority of troopers at the In other words, every member of the are willing to accept them so long as combined-arms team is looking at the NTC have fought over the same ground their subordinates strive to better them- repeatedly. They have fought with their same sheet of music. Subordinate com- selves in the process. In essence, the units for long periods of time and fre- manders issue their oral operations or- OPFOR is successful because they quently fight in similar tactical situa- ders, based on a clear understanding of practice the true intent of American what they have to do, when they have tions over the same ground. Because of 6 doctrine — that of the importance of these two factors, a unit can be success- to do it, and where they have to do it.” local initiative — despite the fact that ful in battle regardless of whether or It is interesting to note that Colonel their own Soviet-based doctrine not it has an inexperienced commander. Rosenberger clearly mentions that sub- strongly discourages such independent In contrast, the soldiers of many BLU- ordinate commanders base their orders action from subordinate units. If more FOR units are fighting on unfamiliar 18 ARMOR — May-June 2002

terrain. They are also fighting in a se- TTS. The Sheridan TTS quality is infe- II battlefield, the BMP-1 and BMP-2 ries of unusual tactical situations that rior because it has been degraded are both more survivable and possess are difficult to replicate at their home through years of use and there are very greater lethality than the M2A2/A3 stations. few resources at the NTC to maintain Bradley. However, the M2A2/A3 Brad- these TTSs adequately. Therefore, the ley possesses an advantage over the Therefore, although the OPFOR MRC M1A1/A2 possesses a tremendous ad- BMP-1 in regard to stabilization and has a relative advantage in regard to an intimate knowledge of the terrain at vantage against the T-80 at night. night fighting. Like the T-80, the BMP- According to NTC standards, the 1 must stop movement in order to fire NTC and more experience per crew its main gun and rarely possesses a than their BLUFOR counterparts, the M1A1/A2 also possesses greater lethal- BLUFOR has more experienced leader- ity and survivability than the T-80. TTS. The fielding of the BMP-2/OSV ship. To be successful, BLUFOR com- From a comparison of the probabilities has begun to remedy both of these manders should take advantage of this in Figures 4 and 5, it is clear that the problems. experience whenever they face an OP- M1A1/A2 has a significant lethality ad- The BLUFOR also possesses a sig- FOR MRC. vantage over the T-80 on three out of nificant advantage with the use of artil- four sides of the vehicle. The only side lery. The NTC Rules of Engagement The third basis for comparison is the that the T-80 weapons systems have a prohibit the OPFOR from killing over difference between the weapons sys- higher probability of kill is the rear of 50 percent of BLUFOR combat vehi- tems of the BLUFOR and the OPFOR. the M1A1/A2. At the NTC, the BLUFOR weapons cles with artillery. The BLUFOR pos- In a one-on-one fight with an M1A1/ sesses no similar restriction. Theoreti- systems are technologically superior to cally, the BLUFOR can kill 100 per- their OPFOR analogues. A2 firing at the front slope of a T-80, and the T-80 firing at the front slope of cent of the OPFOR by artillery alone. The greatest differential between an M1A1/A2 with its main gun (the From the MRC commander’s perspec- weapons systems exists between the most common engagement), the M1A1/ tive, BLUFOR frequently starts its at- M1A1/A2 and the visually modified T- A2 is three times more likely to kill the tack with impressive momentum. How- 80. Because the M1A1/A2 has stabili- T-80 than the T-80 is to kill the M1A1/ ever, the moment many BLUFOR zation, it can fire on the move. In con- A2. Even if a T-80 uses a missile company teams transition from move- trast, a visually modified T-80 lacks against an M1A1/A2, the M1A1/A2 is ment to maneuver and initiate contact stabilization and must stop before it still more lethal than the AT-8 is with an OPFOR MRC, the BLUFOR fires its MILES laser. The M1A1/A2 against the front slope of M1A1/A2. company-team stops. When a BLU- also has a tremendous advantage with Against the flanks, the AT-8 has an FOR company team stops, it becomes its range. According to the SAWE/ equivalent probability kill to the highly vulnerable to artillery. It seems MILES II Handbook, the range of the M1A1/A2’s 120mm. that some units in the United States 120mm main gun of an M1A1/A2 is Army have forgotten a bitter lesson that 3750m, whereas the range of the T-80’s Not only is the M1A1/A2 more lethal goes back to World War I. In Achtung- 125mm main gun is 2500m. In practice, than the T-80, but it is more survivable. Panzer!, Major-General Heinz Gud- most T-80 lasers cannot kill targets Figures 4 and 5 demonstrate that on erian pointed to a lesson the French beyond 2000m. As a result, the M1A1/ three out of four sides, the M1A1/A2 is learned when they attempted to capture A2 has nearly twice the range of a T-80 more survivable than the T-80. the Chemin-des-Dames on 23 October on the MILES battlefield. While the T- In contrast, the BMP-1 and the BMP- 1917. He wrote that the French discov- 80 does have a complement of five AT- 2 have a slight edge on the M2A2/A3, ered that “the tanks were liable to heavy 8 missiles with a similar range to that as demonstrated by the kill probabili- losses whenever they were standing of the M1A1/A2 main gun, the limited ties in Figures 4 and 5. On the MILES still within sight of the enemy, and in number of missiles fails to establish range parity during longer engagements and the T-80 BMP-1 BMP-2 T-80 must expose itself for Front Side Rear Front Side Rear Front Side Rear ten seconds to guide its mis- 120mm 30% 40% 45% 70% 80% 90% 70% 80% 80% sile toward a target. 25mm 0.5% 0.5% 1% 10% 15% 20% 10% 15% 15% The M1A1/A2 system is also vastly superior to the TOW 25% 35% 30% 70% 90% 100% 70% 90% 90% OPFOR T-80 at night. While every M1A1/A2 has a Figure 4: OPFOR MILES II Kill Probabilities11 functional TIS or TTS, only a select number of T-80s M1A1/A2 M2/M3 have functional TTS sys- tems. In the past, most Front Side Rear Front Side Rear MRBs have had four or T- 80 125mm 10% 40% 80% 80% 90% 100% fewer T-80s with functional TTS systems. While these AT-3 (BMP-1) 10% 40% 90% 60% 80% 90% numbers have been in- AT-5 (BMP-2), AT-8 (T-80) 10% 40% 100% 70% 90% 100% creased over the past few months, the Sheridan TTS BMP-1 73mm 0.5% 10% 30% 10% 20% 30% system’s quality is vastly BMP-2 30mm 0.5% 0.5% 1% 5% 10% 15% inferior to that of a typical M1A1 TIS and an M1A2 Figure 5: BLUFOR MILES II Kill Probabilities12

ARMOR — May-June 2002 19

the future this should be demanded and 28 BMPs defended against 116 quately man every vehicle at the MRC only in case of emergency;”7 More than tanks and 90 Bradleys — again, an level. There have been several rotations eighty years later, many BLUFOR units attack-to-defend ratio of nearly 6:1. In where four or five vehicles in some consistently make this same mistake. the latter case, assuming that all tanks MRCs will operate with two-man targeted only tanks and all Bradleys crews — a driver and a tank com- Neither side possesses a significant targeted BMPs with their main guns mander. In such an arrangement, the advantage with the employment of smoke in both the offense and the de- with only frontal shots, simple statistics tank commander of a visually modified dictates that the expected value of T-80 does not have the luxury of his fense, but the OPFOR MRC tends to BLUFOR kills on the first shot fired own independent sight. Instead, he utilize the effects of smoke more effec- tively than their BLUFOR opponents would be 34.8 T-80s and 9 BMPs. On must acquire the target as a tank com- the other hand, the OPFOR’s expected mander and then drop down into the do. FM 90-3 states that the “lack of value of first shot kills would theoreti- gunner’s station to aim and fire at the cover and concealment in flat desert terrain makes the use of smoke more cally destroy .9 M1A1/A2s and 2.8 target. The sheer inefficiency of such a 8 Bradleys using the BMP-1 or 1.4 Brad- system should put the vehicles at a tre- vital to survival.” Without smoke, it is leys using the main gun of the BMP-2. mendous disadvantage against their very easy for enemy forward observers to call fire missions on an attacking or Keep in mind that these calculations BLUFOR counterparts. In contrast, assume that every vehicle on both sides many BLUFOR crews seem to be much defending unit. Effectively employed scores a hit on its first shot and BMPs slower on the draw because they either smoke can be extremely frustrating for an OPFOR MRC commander. Despite and Bradleys do not use their AT or have more difficulty in identifying tar- TOW systems. From an analysis of this gets in desert terrain, are unfamiliar the well-known effectiveness of smoke, raw data, it is clear that when the with their equipment, or simply do not most BLUFOR units fail to use it. Only two units effectively employed smoke BLUFOR attacks the OPFOR, BLU- take action until they are ordered to do FOR units have an overwhelming ad- so from higher for fear of committing between Rotations 99-10 and 00-08, vantage, not only in numerical strength, fratricide. It is probably safe to con- most notably when an attacking BLU- FOR unit inundated the Central Corri- but also in simple statistical probabil- clude that the last of these three expla- ity. Consequently, the laws of probabil- nations is probably the most plausible dor with smoke in Rotation 00-04. ity overwhelmingly favor the BLUFOR explanation. Where smoke was effectively em- in the attack. ployed, the results were devastating for If the BLUFOR has overwhelming the defending OPFOR MRCs. In the regimental attack against a superiority in both numerical strength Therefore, if a BLUFOR company BLUFOR defense, the regiment is and a much greater theoretical chance team takes full advantage of the M1A1/ never afforded similar odds. A BLU- of killing the OPFOR, why do they A2’s ability to fire on the move, supe- FOR package defends with 44 tanks encounter so much difficulty? Although rior range, firepower, survivability, and 44 Bradleys. Although the OPFOR the BLUFOR typically has numerical and night-fighting capabilities; uses the may be allowed to operate with more superiority and has a higher mathe- TOW system of the M2 Bradley to pro- vehicles than the BLUFOR, it rarely matical expected value of winning, the vide long-range overwatch for the ever exceeds a 2:1 ratio. OPFOR MRC is usually more success- M1A1/A2; maximizes the company ful because it masses its forces at the team’s ability to call for fire; and judi- At the company level, the BLUFOR critical point in battle. As Clausewitz ciously uses smoke to cover the com- armored company team has an over- attested, “the superiority at the decisive pany team’s movement, a BLUFOR whelming statistical advantage over the point is a matter of critical importance, company team will be successful OPFOR MRC. If an armored company and that this subject, in the generality against a smaller OPFOR MRC. team were to face an OPFOR MRC in a of cases, is decidedly the most impor- frontal engagement for one round, two tant of all.” Success depends not on the The fourth basis for comparison be- M1A1/A2s fired on each T-80, all absolute number of a force but rather tween the BLUFOR company team BMPs attacked with their AT-5 mis- the relative number applied at the deci- and the OPFOR MRC is numerical siles, and every vehicle hit another on sive point in battle. The size of a force strength. In the early nineties, the OP- its first shot, 1.1 M1A1/A2s, 5.6 BMP- is critical, but so is the skill to which FOR did frequently outnumber the 2s, and 1.8 T-80s would be destroyed. that force is utilized.9 BLUFOR by as much as two to one. In Rounding, after one round of the en- recent years, the situation has changed gagement, the armored company team If the typical company team has a drastically. In a standard rotation, an would have 13 tanks left, while the good situational awareness and is ag- MRB defends with 7 tanks and 17 OPFOR MRC would have 1 T-80 and 2 gressive, they can use their superior BMPs, while the standard BLUFOR BMP-2s. In short, if an OPFOR MRC numbers to overwhelm one MRC. A task organization consists of 44 M1A1s is pitted against a BLUFOR armored BLUFOR platoon of M1A1/A2s is and 44 Bradleys. These numbers pre- company team, it has little chance of more than capable of destroying a typi- sent an attack to defend ratio of 3.67:1, survival if it stands its ground. Of cal OPFOR MRP of one T-80 and two greater than the standard requirement course, OPFOR MRC commanders BMPs. If one tank section focused on of 3:1. Although these numbers are mitigate these almost assured chances the T-80, and the other focused on the quite typical, there have been cases of destruction by maneuvering their two BMPs, they would simply over- where one MRC has defended against MRPs against an armored company whelm them. If two platoons worked in light brigades. In a Rotation 00-05 de- team’s flanks and rear to maximize the concert, they could annihilate them in fense, 11 vehicles from an MRC de- MRC’s kill probabilities. detail with one platoon fixing them and fended against 22 tanks and 40 Brad- the other enveloping them. As long as leys — an attack-to-defend ratio of To add to these numerical imbalances, the company team maintained its mo- almost 6:1. In another defense during the OPFOR frequently does not even mentum and established rolling sup- Rotation 00-04, an MRB with 9 tanks have enough crewmembers to ade- port-by-fire and attack-by-fire posi- 20 ARMOR — May-June 2002

tions, they would never have to contend On the other hand, the OPFOR has at the NTC. Finally, a BLUFOR com- with artillery. While one platoon fixes much better unit cohesion, because in- mander should make every conceivable and another platoon envelops, the third dividual MRC commanders fight only effort to train with attachments at his platoon could advance to the next roll- as a combined arms team and they train home station. If he is unable to conduct ing support-by-fire where they fix the only as a combined arms team. Perhaps joint training with these units, he next OPFOR platoon. If the typical Colonel Rosenberger said it best: should make every effort to coordinate BLUFOR company team commander “Fundamentally, the warfighting abil- and train with them during joint re- were to give his subordinates more hearsals. If a BLUFOR commander local autonomy and forced them to ity of the OPFOR stems from how it is maximizes these advantages, success organized. It is organized as a com- fight fluidly (i.e., maintain their mo- bined-arms team. It lives together as a will be a certainty at the NTC. mentum), that company team could easily overwhelm echelons of MRCs combined-arms team, and it fights as a combined-arms team — all the time. It pitted against it. It seems that many is not a collection of units, thrown to- Notes BLUFOR company commanders are never able to capitalize on the numeri- gether on an ad hoc basis from various divisions and installations, who have 1Colonel John D. Rosenberger, “Reaching Our cal superiority of their formations be- never trained together, or a collection Army’s Full Combat Potential in the 21st Cen- cause they waste too much time await- tury,” ARMOR, May-June 1999, p. 8. ing orders, adhere rigidly to a plan that of units within a division which task organize and train infrequently as a 211th Armored Cavalry Regiment, MRC Hand- no longer matches the current tactical 10 situation, and piecemeal themselves brigade combat team.” book, 24 March 1999, p. 9-4. into battle. If the lowest unit — the To counter this notable advantage, 3Ibid. platoon, were empowered to take more BLUFOR commanders should make 4 independent action, the BLUFOR com- every available effort to train as much Department of the Army, FM 71-1, Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Team, 26 January pany team would be a force to be reck- as possible with their sister units. If this 1998, p. 2-2. oned with. is not possible, they should focus every available amount of time they have on 5Department of the Army, FM 100-2-1, The The fifth basis for comparison is unit joint rehearsals to mitigate potential Soviet Army: Operations and Tactics, 16 July cohesion. At NTC, it is critical that 1984, p. 5-1. units coordinate with one another and problem areas on the NTC battlefield. fight well together. Frequently, many While the OPFOR MRC can be a 6Rosenberger, p. 12. BLUFOR units come together for the daunting foe and may possess major 7Major-General Heinz Guderian, Actung- first time at NTC. A company team is advantages in its use of tactics, soldier Panzer!, trans. by Christopher Duffy, (London: sometimes pieced together with a ran- experience, and unit cohesion, a BLU- Arms and Armour Press, 1995), p. 71 dom mix of M1A1/A2s and Bradleys, FOR commander can frequently best 8Department of the Army, FM 90-3, Desert Op- from different units that have never his MRC counterpart by taking advan- erations, p. D-5. trained together. Because they have not tage of his superior tactics, leadership fought together for very long, some experience, weapons systems, numeri- 9Carl von Clausewitz, On War, (London: Pen- company teams tend to fight in a ran- cal superiority, and unit cohesion. To guin Books, 1982), p. 266. dom and haphazard manner. For in- improve his use of tactics, a BLUFOR 10Rosenberger, p. 8. stance, a company team mix of Brad- commander must provide his leaders leys and M1A1/A2s will frequently with a profound situational awareness 1111th Armored Cavalry Regiment, SAWE/ attack an MRC with the Bradleys for- of the battlefield, empower them to MILES II: Simulated Area Weapon Effects/Mul- ward of the tanks. Because the next take initiative in his absence, and en- tiple Integrated Laser Engagement System II. intervisibility line has not been cleared, courage his subordinates to take risks 1211th Armored Cavalry Regiment, Annex D, the Bradleys frequently get surprised during training prior to arrival at the Miles Handbook, May 1998. and destroyed by OPFOR vehicles, NTC. A BLUFOR commander can leaving the M1A1/A2s without infantry maximize his superior leadership ex- support. Had some of these units been perience by isolating individual MRCs 1LT Sean P. Hazlett graduated together longer, they would discover in on the battlefield. In doing so, he forces from Stanford University in 1998 practice, that the Bradley’s strength the opposing MRC commander to with a B.S. in Electrical Engineering prior to enemy contact is its TOW sys- make decisions in a vacuum. Ulti- tem. If, prior to contact, Bradleys used mately, in such a situation, the BLU- and a B.A. in History. He was com- their TOW systems to overwatch the FOR commander’s superior experience missioned as an armor officer from movement of the M1A1/A2s as the will prevail. A BLUFOR commander the Santa Clara University ROTC M1A1/A2s cleared intervisibility lines, can capitalize on his superior range, Program in 1998. He served as a they could instantly engage any OP- mobile firepower, and night-fighting tank platoon leader and MRC com- FOR vehicles that surprise the M1A1/ capability by emphasizing these advan- mander in C Troop, 1/11 ACR, and A2s. Once the enemy had been identi- tages during training at his home sta- as a support platoon leader in HHT, fied, the M1A1s could close within tion. Doing so will force his subordi- 1/11 ACR. He is currently serving coax distance and then the Bradleys nates to use these advantages instinc- as the executive officer and Combat could move forward to dismount infan- tively against their technologically infe- Reconnaissance Patrol (CRP) com- try on restrictive terrain. Too often, rior foe. As noted above, the typical BLUFOR company team commanders BLUFOR commander possesses nu- mander for A Troop, 1/11 ACR. He rush to get their dismounts to the high merical superiority both in sheer num- has participated in 29 rotations at ground before the intervening distance bers and in kill probabilities. Conse- the National Training Center. His is secured. More often than not, they quently, a BLUFOR commander can military schooling includes AOBC pay dearly for their mistake. afford to be, and should be, aggressive and SPLC. ARMOR — May-June 2002 21

The Four-Tank Platoon: Maximizing Combat Power and Leader Development

by Major John B. Richardson IV

The organization of the four-tank M1- series tank platoon provides the ulti- mate in combat power (maneuver, pro- tection, leadership, firepower, informa- tion) and leader development. I take serious issue with the alternative out- lined in the article by MAJ Stringer and MAJ Hall (ARMOR, March-April 2001) advocating a three-tank platoon in the heavy division of the 21st cen- tury Though I agree that a three-tank platoon would be more cost-effective to maintain (obviously 10 tanks are cheaper to maintain than 14) and col- Photo by Robert L. Stevenson lective training would be more effi- cient, I disagree that a three-tank pla- shared. I always considered the fourth rather as part of a CO/TM. However, in toon enhances leader development and company in our tank battalion structure many instances, it is expected to pro- is as effective at accomplishing its mis- a luxury, extra combat power for the vide its own fire and movement (ma- sion as a four-tank platoon, due to ad- battalion S3 and commander to use in neuver and protection). The CO/TM vances in technology and digital mission analysis. Taking a tank com- commander expects the platoon to have communication. pany from a tank battalion still leaves the following capabilities outlined in the battalion commander an overwatch FM 71-1 (Tank and Mechanized Infan- I disagree with anyone who is charged element, a maneuver element, and a try Company/Team): That “it has the with our nation’s defense and responsi- reserve.2 There is no shift in doctrine, necessary manpower and equipment to ble for the lives of our soldiers, who and if you accept the premise that the effectively develop the situation. It can would be bold enough to state, “Cur- technological advances in the M1A2 conduct operations requiring firepower, rent and future threats…do not appear provide the M1A2 tank battalion equiv- mobility, armor protection, and shock to offer the kind of Cold War challenge alent firepower with the three-company effect, and it can employ maneuver (a that required fielding massed armored 1 structure as a four-company M1A1 combination of fire and movement) to formations on the battlefield.” If that tank battalion, then there is no loss in destroy enemy tanks, fighting vehicles, were the case, we could scrap the Leg- combat power. But this is not the case anti-armor systems, and emplace- acy Force right now. How many TF in a three- versus four-tank platoon. ments.”4 FM 71-1 also states, “The tank Smiths or Kasserine Passes do we have platoon is the smallest maneuver ele- to endure to learn our lesson? Lest we Maneuver and Protection ment within a tank company.”5 The forget. Luckily for us all, our Chief of Maneuver and protection are drasti- platoon leader must have the capability Staff’s vision is multi-dimensional and cally affected when converting a tank to “employ his forces on the battlefield much more realistic than that. His vi- platoon from a four-vehicle to a three- through movement of combat forces in sion provides unbeatable security for vehicle structure. FM 3-20.15 (formerly relation to the enemy, supported by today and the assurance we will be FM 17-15), Tank Platoon is based on fire, to gain potential advantage from ready to dominate the battlefield twenty the wingman concept. “Under battle- which to destroy the enemy” in support years from now. field conditions, the wingman concept of the company’s mission.6 I left my last tank battalion in 1999. facilitates control of the platoon when it To do that, the platoon leader must On my way out the door, the S3 was operates in sections. The concept re- quires that one tank orient on another have the flexibility to use his sections putting together the tank battalion’s to perform fire and movement inde- plan to transition from a four-tank tank on either its left or right side. In pendent of the company. He maneuvers company MTOE to a three-tank com- the absence of specific instructions, wingmen move, stop, and shoot when his platoon to place it at an advantage pany MTOE. The authors advocating over the enemy in support of the com- the three-tank platoon use a number of their leaders do. In the tank platoon, pany mission and commander’s intent. similar arguments for transitioning to a Tank 2 orients on the platoon leader’s three-tank platoon that were used to (PL) tank, while Tank 3 orients on the The three-tank platoon cannot maneu- justify the reduction in the number of platoon sergeant’s (PSG) tank. The ver independent of the company with- companies in a tank battalion. The platoon sergeant orients on the platoon out violating force protection at the problem is, the arguments are not doc- leader’s tank.”3 Doctrinally the tank most basic level. The opening sentence trinally parallel in nature and cannot be platoon is not designed to fight alone, of FM 3-20.15 states, “By itself, any 22 ARMOR — May-June 2002

tank can be vulnerable in toon…” accentuating the the face of diverse battle- leadership principle “set field hazards… and situa- the example,” anyone who tions; these vulnerabilities has served as a tank pla- are significantly reduced toon leader or platoon ser- when tanks are employed geant knows that there is as units.”7 Sure, the three- a great deal more to tank platoon in bounding mounted combat leader- overwatch could set the ship than charging at the PSG in overwatch, and the front of your platoon for- PL and his other tank mation.11 I argue that there could bound forward, but is no greater challenge, who is watching the PSG’s and therefore developmen- back, and can one tank tal experience, on the bat- provide the necessary sup- tlefield than that of a four- port as the PL’s section tank, tank platoon leader bounds forward in contact? or four-BFV mech infantry Who is covering the PL platoon leader in close, and his wing tank when the PSG seeks The worst argument for the three-tank high-intensity combat. an alternate position? platoon is that it would, “offer the Army the opportunity to concentrate on Firepower What the three-tank platoon structure the development of junior armor lead- does is it strips the PSG or PL of his ers.”9 As company XO, I remember my In close combat, the tank and mech wingman. The tank platoon is now commander sitting the platoon leaders platoon is where the battle is won or nothing more than a three-tank section, down and telling them, “I’m not train- lost. The platoons are the killers. Keep- requiring another three-tank section ing you to be platoon leaders, I’m train- ing that at the forefront, we must re- (platoon) to overwatch it as it moves. ing you to be company commanders.”10 member, “the fundamental mission of The tank platoon can no longer maneu- the tank platoon is to close with and ver independently; it will require This enlightened approach to leader destroy the enemy.”12 We’ve discussed another platoon to provide its cover. development is supported by the four- the fact that the three-tank platoon’s This severely hamstrings the CO/TM tank (or even the old five-tank) platoon. ability to close with the enemy is se- commander who now has to be person- We learn the most by doing. Our train- verely reduced compared to the four- ally involved in moving his platoons. ing doctrine and supporting CTCs are tank platoon. I submit that, despite the No longer can the commander tell 1st based on this developmental approach target acquisition advancements in the Platoon to, “Move to SBF 1 and report to learning our profession, the man- M1A2, the firepower of a three-tank set,” he will have to personally escort agement of violence. The three-tank M1A2 platoon cannot match the fire- him to the SBF using the assets of an- platoon reduces the platoon leader to a power of a four-tank M1A1 platoon other platoon. Are commander’s re- glorified section leader. He is a section using the wingman concept. The advan- quired to do that at times? Absolutely, leader who is unable to maneuver his tage of the four-tank platoon providing based on METT-T, but now there is no unit, unable to DO. Even a five-tank mutual supporting fire within the sec- option. A commander, unless complete- platoon paradigm would be more in the tion and platoon allows the platoon to ly sure there is no enemy in the AO, spirit of leader development, where a mass fires more effectively and con- can never send a tank platoon anywhere platoon leader in his own tank maneu- tinuously. Clearly, massed volley fire alone. The only way the three-tank pla- vers his two sections while maintaining from four tanks is more devastating toon structure would work, while al- complete situational awareness of the than massed volley fire from three lowing the commander freedom to think higher unit’s mission, just as a CO/TM tanks. The wingman concept also al- two-up instead of focusing one-down, commander maneuvers his platoons in lows the platoon to keep two tanks up would be to make a CO/TM an organi- support of the BN/TF mission. at all times, providing continuous fire- zation of four three-tank platoons, with The four-tank platoon is truly the power on the enemy while maintaining two sets of two platoons serving in a premier leader development organiza- sufficient protection to the platoon as habitual maneuver relationship. This tional structure in close combat. The wingmen seek alternate positions. The would negate the only two valid argu- tank platoon leader is not only required three-tank platoon will often only have ments made for the three-tank platoon to maneuver his platoon as part of a one tank at any one time up and firing. in the article advocating this “revolu- CO/TM, oftentimes using fire and Fire control and distribution will be- tionary transition,” cost effectiveness movement at the platoon level, but he is come increasingly difficult to control. and training efficiency. fighting his own tank as an integral Loss of this control will ultimately re- member of his platoon. The four-tank sult in less efficient killing. Leadership platoon PL is a platoon leader, section Ultimately, the four-tank M1A2 pla- “The most essential dynamic of com- leader, and tank commander simultane- toon would provide the maximum fire- bat power is competent and confident ously while maintaining situational power to destroy the enemy. Coupling officer and noncommissioned officer awareness of higher units two levels the M1A2 advances with the teamwork leadership. Leaders integrate maneu- up. Though the advocates of a three- of the wingman concept doctrine in FM ver, firepower, and protection capabili- tank platoon point to the fact that a 3-20.15, will increase the volume of ties in a variety of combinations appro- “three-vehicle concept places the pla- fire by over 25 percent in the platoon’s priate to the situation.”8 toon leader at the spearhead of his pla- sector. The argument that four M1A1s ARMOR — May-June 2002 23

or three M1A2s can both kill X number experience with their force structure the world security issues will allow us of enemy vehicles between TRPs A and changes since the end of the Cold War. to accept that risk, then we accept it on B is great. But if four M1A2s can kill The Swiss recently transitioned to a that basis. But let’s all be clear, the X+10, then that’s the firepower I want three-tank platoon, and it is working four-tank M1-series tank platoon pro- in the platoons I employ as a company very well for them. The fact that “the vides the maximum combat power and or battalion commander. Swiss Army is essentially a militia ultimate leader development platoon army based on universal conscription structure in the world. Information with a very small cadre of professional

The recent addition of information as instructors” provides the very argument why we, the U.S. Army, should not Notes an element of combat power really model our heavy forces in the same doesn’t effect the tank platoon structure 14 1Major Kevin D. Stringer and Major D. Andre either way. As the Army transitions to light. I agree, if we only trained to- gether “three to four weeks a year” as a Hall, “The Three Tank Platoon, A Consideration the Objective Force, the size and struc- unit, we should consider a tank platoon For Army XXI,” ARMOR, March-April 2001, ture of a maneuver platoon should be Vol. CX, No. 2, p. 24. revisited based on the capabilities of where we don’t expect too much from our platoon leaders and NCOs at the 2FM 71-2, The Tank and Mechanized Infantry the FCS. However, this is a Legacy platoon level; however; that is not the Battalion Task Force, 17 August 1994, Chp. 3. Force organizational structure debate and, as such, the elements of combat case in our Army. The American Army 3FM 3-20.15, Tank Platoon, 1 November 2001, is a full-time, all-volunteer Army. It is Chp. 1. power used to design the Legacy Force a professional Army that not only ex- equipment and its supporting doctrine 4 pects more from junior leaders, but is FM 71-1, Tank and Mechanized Infantry Com- should focus on the elements of combat pany/Team, 26 January 1998, Chp. 1. obligated to develop them for greater power that were used to design them. responsibility. I applaud the Swiss 5Ibid. Quick Fixes: Personnel, Army leadership for maximizing their 6FM 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Graphics, Maintenance, and Training Time time by structuring their force based on 30 September 1997. METT-T. We must do the same, and 7 The article espousing the three-tank for the tank platoon of the Legacy FM 3-20.15, Chp. 1. platoon referenced arguments that the Force, that is the four-tank platoon. 8FM 100-5, Operations, 14 June 1993, Chp. 2. new structure would solve many of our 9Stringer and Hall, p. 23. personnel shortage problems and alle- Conclusion viate maintenance and logistical prob- 10CPT (MAJ) Keitron Todd, “Platoon Leader lems of the fourth tank motor pool bur- Our Army is in the midst of a major OPD, ” Commander, C Company, 4-67 Armor, transformation. For the first time in our July 1993. den. It states that, because of personnel Army’s history, instead of reacting to shortages, “the reality of current man- 11Stringer and Hall, p. 23. ning levels often shows that this the next adversary, our senior leader- ship is proactively thinking deep, look- 12FM 71-1, Chp. 1. [fourth] crew is already missing from ing forward at our future security issues 13 many platoons…” and that “the three- Stringer and Hall, p. 24. and tailoring our forces to fight our tank platoon actually increases the 14 future adversaries instead of preparing Ibid. chance that armor platoons will be fully to fight our last battle, again and again 15 manned, despite reduced personnel Ibid. and again. General Shinseki’s vision intake, because fewer spaces will need 13 will ensure our national security is to be filled.” This argument is weak at maintained for our watch, while setting best. It is all relative, as is the issue of MAJ John Richardson is a 1991 parts and maintenance of a four- versus the conditions for the next generation to graduate of the U.S. Military Acad- maintain it on their watch. His plan to three-tank platoon. If we argue, due to transform the Army over the next 15 emy with a BS in Military History. personnel shortages, a typical tank pla- He holds a MA in Counseling and toon of 16 tankers is usually manned at years while maintaining the forces nec- essary to protect tomorrow is genius. Leader Development from Long Is- 12-14, then yes, often the platoon is Part of that plan is maintaining a cred- land University. His first assignment reduced to a three or three and a half was with 1AD, 4-67 Armor in Fried- tank platoon. But this platoon, if called, itable and unbeatable Legacy Force, unmatched in the world. That Legacy berg, Germany, where he served as could deploy, fight, and win as a three- Force’s smallest maneuver element on tank platoon if necessary. We’ve all a tank platoon leader, tank com- been around long enough to realize that the heavy battlefield is the four-vehicle pany XO, and BMO. In his next as- platoons of M1 tanks and BFVs. if we reduce a tank platoon to a 12- signment with the 1ID, he served as tanker organization, we will still be If we choose to change the tank pla- battalion S1 for 1-34 Armor, division short personnel. Considering the nature toon structure and go to a three-tank LNO from TF Eagle to the Nordic- of the U.S. Army, we will always have platoon, make no mistake of it, it will Polish Brigade in Bosnia (IFOR) in 10 percent coming, 10 percent going, be for MAJ Stringer and MAJ Hall’s combined operations, and then com- and 10 percent missing. Now what do main point thread throughout their arti- manded C Company, 1-34 Armor 15 we have in our three-tank platoon? cle: cost-saving efficiency. Let’s not and HHC, 1-34 Armor at Fort Riley. Two, maybe two and a half, tanks hide behind personnel issues, techno- manned. Now, if called, could that tank logical advances, or the Swiss Army. If He is currently serving as a com- platoon accomplish its mission? I say it we go to a three-tank platoon it will be pany tactical officer at West Point. cannot. As for training efficiency, MAJ because we want to save money to ap- He is a graduate of AOB, AOAC, Stringer provides unique insight into ply it to other programs in the Trans- CAS3, Maintenance Officer Course, the Swiss Army based on his first-hand formation. If our senior leaders believe Airborne, and the MFT course. 24 ARMOR — May-June 2002

Armor Against the Huertgen Forest: The Kall Trail and the Battle of Kommerscheidt

by Captain Mike Sullivan

“The mission of Armor is to close with into the plains of Belgium. Limited by sion, moved towards the Huertgen For- and destroy the enemy by means of fire, fuel shortages and Allied air superior- est. Unbeknownst to Allied intelli- maneuver and shock effect.” ity, German armored units were rapidly gence, on the other side of the forest FM 17-15, Tank Platoon depleted. As the Americans approached lay key strategic dams that controlled , Aachen, birthplace of Charlemagne and the level of the Roer River, a major 3 April 1996 the first German city threatened with obstacle on the drive to the Rhine.5 capture, it seemed clear nothing could Today’s armor force is based on a stop the weight of the Allied armor Named for a nearby village, the Huertgen Forest was a 70-square-mile highly flexible, mobile, and lethal ar- onslaught. region that actually encompassed three mor doctrine. Terms such as maneuver and shock effect are the keynote As the Allies neared Germany, Lieu- major state forests, the Roetgen, the tenant General Courtney Hodges’ First Wenau, and the Huertgen. The forest is phrases of the modern United States Army approached Aachen. First Army an extension of a large wooded region armor community. Steeped in tradition, the U.S. armor forces have long sought had moved north of the Ardennes to stretching across the German border support Field Marshal Bernard Law into Belgium. A ridge system runs to fight a war of maneuver where speed Montgomery’s 21st Army Group, on through the area from southwest to and cunning mimicked the cavalry bat- tles of old. But in late 1944, when U.S. his left. General Hodges’ three corps northeast. The highest parts are over reached the German border with 2,100 feet in elevation west of Mon- mechanized forces entered the Huert- enough combat power to attempt a schau and the lowest area (600 feet gen Forest, they lost their ability to 2 fight as a maneuver force. On terrain breach into the enemy homeland, but above sea level) near Duren. The ridge as the battle for Aachen began, Hodges divides the areas into three separate both unfamiliar and unsuitable for ma- felt it was important to protect his right compartments. Numerous cold, fast- neuver warfare, and denied the ele- ments of speed and maneuver, U.S. flank from a potential attack. A veteran moving streams cut through the area of the First World War, Hodges re- with steep banks. The Weisser Weh armor was no longer a highly flexible called the devastating attack launched creek and Kall River are two of the arm of the combined arms team. On the Kall Trail in November 1944, both the from the Argonne Forest against Amer- major water obstacles in the area. The ican forces in 1918.3 With the Huert- east-west road networks were limited restrictive terrain of the Huertgen For- gen, another massive forest, on his and the only major north-south routes est and the stubborn resistance of the German defenders seriously challenged flank, Hodges ordered units to protect ran along the edges of the forests. No his right. roads in the Huertgen area could sup- U.S. armor doctrine. port heavy volumes of traffic.6 The Germans were surprised he took The lessons learned from the Kall this approach. As they noted in an af- The forest provided almost perfect ter- Trail battle are highly applicable to today’s armor force as we find our ter-action report of the fighting in the rain for a defense. Pine trees often grew Huertgen: over a hundred feet tall and blocked out tanks in increasingly restrictive terrain, light. The steep ridges and slopes cou- whether in the streets of Somalia or the “The German command could not un- rugged hills of Kosovo, derstand the reason for the strong pled with the lack of sun penetrating through the trees, kept the ground con- Approach to the Huertgen American attacks in the Huertgen For- stantly moist and cold. Fog permeated est, after the effectiveness of the Ger- On 21 July 1944, the New York Her- man resistance had been ascertained. the area. The water table was within a ald-Tribune few feet of the surface. An attacker headlines had screamed, There was hardly a danger of a large- fighting from west to east faced in- “Allies in France Bogged Down on scale German operation pushing through creasing higher ridgelines, thereby Entire Front,”1 but by September, the the wooded area into the region south nearly always attacking uphill. tide had changed and the Allies were of Aachen, as there were no forces literally at Germany’s doorstep. After available for the purpose and because The forest was originally cultivated as the successful breakout from Nor- tanks could not be employed in the an obstacle to prevent an invasion into mandy in Operation Cobra, and the territory. In fact, such an operation was Germany from Belgium, and the West defeat of the Germany counterattack at never planned by us.”4 Wall tied perfectly into its confines.7 Mortain, armor spearheads drove deep An Uphill Battle Ahead German engineers sited over three into the heart of the German army. thousand pillboxes, dugouts, and ob- Thousands of Allied tanks charged The 9th Infantry Division, supported servation posts to exploit the natural across the open fields of France and by elements of the 3d Armored Divi- terrain features. The pillboxes, many of ARMOR — May-June 2002 25 “The Mark V, better known as the Panther, was one of the best tanks of the war. With sloped, thick armor, and a top speed of 46 kph, the Panther was highly survivable.”

them circular, were made of steel eight with its high-velocity 75mm cannon to ten inches thick covered by a layer of and top speed of 46 kph (29 mph). The concrete a foot deep. Tank obstacles high muzzle velocity of the Panther’s included ditches covered by pillboxes cannon (1,120 meters per second) al- and hundreds of miles of “dragon’s lowed it to penetrate 170mm of vertical teeth.” Passable roads were blocked armor, equal to that of the Tiger tank’s with cratering charges. The Germans larger 88mm cannon.11 The other major realized the defenses could only delay tank facing the Allied armor forces was an attack into Germany, not prevent an the well-known Tiger (Mark VI) tank. invasion. Not nearly as numerous as GIs re- ported, the Tiger was a squat, angular, Critical to the forest’s defenders was yet highly armored tank with a very Hitler’s need for time to build up forces for his impending Ardennes counterof- deadly 88mm cannon. The heavy fire- 8 power and armor protection, however, fensive. The Huertgen Forest was the sacrificed the mobility on which Ger- perfect place to delay the Allies while 12 preparing for his grand assault. Tech man armor relied for survivability. Well suited for the defense, Tigers Sergeant George Morgan, 1st Battalion, would often delay entire companies of 22nd Infantry, said of the Huertgen: Allied armor. In the Huertgen Forest, “The forest up there is a helluva eerie Tigers were rarely seen but highly ef- place to fight… Show me a man who fective when used. went through the battle… and who says he never had a feeling of fear and I’ll The Allies relied on their mass- produced M4 Sherman tank and its show you a liar. You can’t get protec- in the Huertgen Forest, were extremely tion. You can’t see. You can’t get fields numerous variants. Over forty thousand Sherman tanks and associated variants devastating to both the vehicles and of fire. Artillery slashed the trees like a crews of these combat vehicles. scythe. Everything is tangled. You can were produced during the years of 1942-1946, compared with less than scarcely walk. Everybody is cold and The Attack Begins wet, and the mixture of cold rain and fifteen hundred German Tigers pro- duced. The later models of the M4 were sleet keeps falling.”9 American armor, so reliant on mobil- mechanically reliable and highly ma- ity to survive against superior German It was in this terrain that American neuverable, but the high maneuverabil- tanks, entered the forest initially with armored forces would face their tough- ity resulted from the tank’s lack of ar- the 9th Infantry Division. Immediately, est fight. mor protection. Armor thickness varied the difficult terrain and stubborn resis- from 25mm to 50mm at the frontal tance of German forces became obvi- The Armor Balance slope. The M4 reached a maximum ous. The Normandy hedgerow and later speed of 38 kph (24 mph) and most bunker fighting had lent experience to After battling their way from Nor- models had a 75mm main gun. Later mandy to the German border, American U.S. tankers, but nothing prepared them models had an upgraded 76mm gun tankers developed battle drills and 13 for the defensive terrain of the Huert- with improved muzzle velocity. How- gen. The tankers, when teamed up with standard operating procedures (SOPs) ever, the majority of the Shermans to defeat the superior German armor. infantry, became highly skilled at tak- Although outnumbered nearly 10 to 1 were under-gunned and under-pro- ing out fixed positions. “On the dawn tected when confronting better German of the third day, the enemy developed a in tank production, the principal Ger- tanks. Shermans relied on their maneu- man tanks were as good as, if not better counterattack against I Company (3d than, the Allied tanks. The most com- verability and superior numbers to de- Battalion, 39th Infantry Regiment). The feat enemy tanks. Mobility was key to Americans drove off the Germans and mon tank in the German army was the the survival of Allied tanks. Hedgerow Mark IV. Equipped with a high-ve- fought forward along two trails while locity 75mm cannon, it had a top speed fighting demonstrated the severe weak- under fire from pillboxes. Tanks and nesses of Allied tanks when fighting tank destroyers forced the bunkers to of 38 kph (21 mph) and was used against both German armor or antitank throughout the war. Easily produced button up until the infantry could en- weapons one-on-one. and modernized, the Mark IV was the velop them.”15 However, the obstacles, backbone of the German panzer force.10 In addition, tank destroyers based on coupled with an incredible number of The Mark V, better known as the Pan- the M4 Sherman chassis were used mines, often hindered any attempted ther, was one of the best tanks of the extensively in an assault role. Many armored advance. “Soldiers from L war. With sloped, thick armor, and a were equipped with a larger gun than Company, hidden by a smoke screen, top speed of 46 kph, the Panther was the tanks, but the turrets of Allied tank cleared a minefield through a gap in the highly survivable. It could destroy any destroyers were open and highly vul- dragon’s teeth. But when a tank unit enemy tank in existence during 1944 at nerable to artillery fire and airburst started through the opening, a mine a combat range of two thousand meters ammunition.14 Tree bursts, so common blew up the first one. During the night, 26 ARMOR — May-June 2002 German engineers had re-mined the control a downstream flood should the As the trail descends towards the river, passageway.”16 Obviously, fighting in Allies cross the Roer: “Bank overflow a large rock outcropping juts out in the the Huertgen promised to be difficult and destructive flood waves can be path. Opposite the rocky outcropping is for infantry and armor alike. produced by regulating the discharge a sharp drop of approximately fifty from the various dams.”18 feet. As Captain Hostrup’s tank moved The 9th Infantry Division was stopped down the narrow, muddy trail, it far short of its objective, the key cross- The attack on Schmidt by the 28th In- road town of Schmidt. Two regiments slipped off the edge while trying to fantry Division initially seemed suc- maneuver around the rock. Hostrup’s of the 9th ID gained about three thou- cessful. After negotiating the harrow- driver managed to keep the tank from sand yards in the Huertgen Forest, but ingly narrow Kall Trail, elements of the at the cost of forty-five hundred men. careening over the cliff and backed the 112th Infantry Regiment secured the tank up the trail. Hostrup reported the General Hodges set a target date of 5 towns of Kommerscheidt and Schmidt. trail was not passable and no armor November for the renewal of the First The Kall Trail was merely a cart track Army’s big push to the Roer and the would reinforce the soldiers at Schmidt that supposedly was to serve as the until the trail was improved.21 Rhine. However, before launching his main supply route for the attacking main effort, Hodges knew he still had division. Open and exposed at its en- As dawn approached on 4 November, to secure his right flank. Schmidt was trance by the town of Vossenack, the engineer efforts to improve the trail the key, and V Corps would have to Kall Trail snakes sharply downward, yielded little. The rock outcropping re- take the town while clearing the forest. crosses the Kall River, then continues mained despite numerous attempts at demolition. Weary U.S. infantrymen in The entire main effort fell to one divi- up some very steep ground into the sion, the 28th ID. For the first two town of Kommerscheidt. On 3 Novem- Schmidt were still asleep with little ber, two officers from the 20th Engi- thought given to the defenses of their weeks of November, it would be the main objective. Only a few antitank only division attacking across the entire neer Combat Battalion reconnoitered First Army front, affording the German the Kall Trail and reported it capable of mines were surface laid on the road supporting tanks.19 The 707th Tank leading into Schmidt. Captain Hostrup defenders the opportunity to concen- attempted to move his company again trate all their resources. The 28th would Battalion, commanded by Lieutenant forever be known as the “Bloody Colonel Ripple, was attached to the around the outcropping on the morning 28th Infantry Division. Captain Host- of 4 November. The 1st Platoon, com- Bucket” after emerging from the hor- manded by First Lieutenant Raymond rific fighting in the Huertgen Forest.17 rup of A Company supported the 112th Regiment and attempted to move down Fleig, led the movement. Just as he Sadly, no key leader realized that the the Kall Trail.20 managed to maneuver around the out- vitally important Roer River dams lay cropping, Fleig’s tank struck a mine. just beyond the town of Schmidt. The Members of the 112th Infantry Regi- The mine blew the track off and par- only officer to note their importance ment in Schmidt awaited both resupply tially blocked the trail. Fleig’s platoon was the 9th Division G-2, Major Jack and armor support when Captain Host- sergeant, Staff Sergeant Anthony Houston. Houston knew the dams could rup led his first platoon down the trail. Spooner, suggested winching the other ARMOR — May-June 2002 27

tanks around Fleig’s disabled tank. mediately bailed out of their tank and The after-action report of the attack- Using tow cables from the immobilized sought cover. Fleig then realized he had ing German company commander at Sherman, Spooner winched his tank fired high-explosive ammunition, not Kommerscheidt highlighted the need around Fleig’s and back onto the Kall armor piercing. Worse, Fleig discov- for “antitank combat by two integrated Trail. Fleig hopped onto Spooner’s tank ered that he had no armor-piercing am- groups cleverly combines the exploita- and ordered his platoon sergeant to munition inside the tank; all of it was tion of friendly firepower and the reac- repeat the winching process with his stored outside in the sponson box. Fleig tions of the enemy.” In addition, he three remaining tanks. Fleig continued ceased firing and rotated his turret to stated, “A good interplay of movement down the narrow trail towards the Kall get at his armor-piercing ammunition. and fire must be maintained until the River.22 The Panther crew saw Fleig was no moment of penetration.”28 Although longer firing and that their tank was severely limited by the horrible Kall The German counterattack against Schmidt started just as Fleig and his undamaged. They rapidly reboarded Trail, the American armor that initially their Panther and fired at Fleig, missing reached Kommerscheidt fought a battle tank platoon began their move down high. Fleig and his crew managed to get of maneuver and defeated the first en- the Kall Trail. Led by ten Mark IV and Panther tanks of the 16th Panzer Regi- an AP round into the breech and fired. emy attack. However, the uncoordi- Luckily for the Americans, their first nated efforts of the M4s and M10s ment (116th Panzer Division) and ele- shot sliced the Panther’s main gun bar- conducting a static defense against a ments of the 1055 Infantry Regiment,23 the German assault smashed into the rel in two. Fleig fired three more AP well-coordinated maneuver element in rounds into the side of the Panther be- the second attack resulted in defeat for defenders of Schmidt. The battalion fore it caught fire and killed the crew.25 the Americans. headquarters was quickly overrun with much of the battalion staff and its Fleig and two other tanks would act as Conclusion roving linebackers throughout the bat- commander surrendering. Panic-strick- tle, destroying a total of five German The fighting in the Huertgen Forest en GIs watched as bazooka rounds ricocheted into the air off the thick Ger- tanks and stopping the enemy assault. was both tragic and unnecessary for Their ability to maneuver to the hardest U.S. forces. The terrain was not suited man armor. Immediately a stream of hit parts of the town prevented the for armor operations and the infantry GIs headed from Schmidt back to Kommerscheidt. Without tank support, Germans from overrunning it. By noon paid the ultimate price, over twenty- on 5 November, an additional Sherman eight thousand casualties. An often the infantry of the 28th Division had platoon joined Fleig and two platoons forgotten and neglected area of study, little chance to stop the German assault. of M10 tank destroyers from the 893d the Huertgen Forest still provides les- Lieutenant Fleig’s remaining three Tank Destroyer Battalion reinforced the sons on how to use armor in battle and tanks successfully bypassed the out- defenders of Kommerscheidt.26 what the results are when it is not used cropping, but one threw a track climb- Hampered by the Kall Trail, resupply correctly. Denied the chance to fight a ing up the far side of the Kall Trail. maneuver battle, U.S. armor in the Fleig and his two tanks took up posi- and reinforcing efforts into Kommer- Huertgen suffered heavy casualties. scheidt were extremely limited. The tions in a shallow draw in an open field Germans prepared for another assault In terms of the development of U.S. just northwest of Kommerscheidt near the Kall wood line. After driving the on 6 November, led by nine Panthers. armor doctrine, the fighting in the The Germans left their assembly area at Huertgen was a step backward from the Americans out of Schmidt, the German 0500, hoping a limited-visibility attack significant gains made earlier in the attack spilled towards Kommerscheidt. The Germans did not immediately pur- would drive out the defending Ameri- war. Committed piecemeal in the cans. Without infantry support, nine Huertgen’s highly unfavorable terrain, sue the fleeing Americans. Instead, Panthers, three Mark IVs and two Mark American tankers faced the same diffi- German tanks stood out of bazooka range and fired main gun and machine V antitank guns (Jagdpanthers) began culties experienced by British tankers their assault at 0630. The assaulting in their early World War I battles. As gun rounds into the foxholes of the German company commander reported: U.S. armor forces today conduct peace- Kommerscheidt defenders. The Ger- mans then launched an attack against “At a distance of 150 to 200 meters, the keeping operations in unfavorable advancing platoon was attacked by “tank country,” doctrine writers and ar- Kommerscheidt with at least eight enemy tanks, which were well con- mor operators should reexamine the Mark IV tanks, three Mark V tanks and cealed but hampered in their move- lessons learned from the battle of the approximately two hundred infantry.24 ments between houses and in gardens. Huertgen Forest. Tanks will continue to Fleig immediately maneuvered his Owing to poor visibility and the re- fight on difficult terrain as long as en- tank platoon against the approaching stricted line of fire, the enemy tanks emy forces defend that ground. Essen- enemy armor. Using the intervisibility now attempted to retire from their posi- tial to the combined arms team, tankers line provided by the lower field they tions. In doing so, they were destroyed must learn how to overcome a harsh were sitting in, Fleig’s platoon immedi- by German tanks, which had taken up battlefield environment to ensure future ately knocked out three enemy Mark ambush positions in the gardens outside success. IVs. Fleig noticed GIs retreating from the town.”27 The defenders uncoordi- the left side of the town and maneu- nated efforts resulted in the loss of vered his tank to shore up the now- eight M10s and eight Shermans. The Notes exposed flank. Fleig entered an orchard loss of Kommerscheidt eliminated the 1Quoted in William Breuer, Death of a Nazi just in time to see a Panther tank ap- chance to recapture the key town of Army (U.S., Scarborough House, 1985), 11. proaching. Fleig fired at a range of Schmidt. The town would remain in 2John T. Bookman and Stephen T. Powers, The three hundred yards, hitting the German German hands until elements of the March to Victory: A Guide to World War II Bat- twice but with no effect. The Panther 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment tles and Battlefields from London to the Rhine crew, frightened by the shell hits, im- captured it in February 1945. (New York: Harper and Row, 1988), 264. 28 ARMOR — May-June 2002

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3Gerald Astor, The Bloody Forest (Novato, Battles and Battlefields from London to the Today I can complain because the Calif., Presidio Press, 2000), 37. Rhine. New York: Harper and Row, 1988. weather is rainy or I can be thankful that 489th Division Review, translated by IPW team Ellis, Chris. Tanks of World War II. London: the grass is getting watered. 11. Chancellor Press, 1997. Today I can feel sad that I don’t have 5Bookman and Powers, March to Victory, 264. Folkstead, William B. The View from the Turret: more money or I can be glad that my 6 The 743d Tank Battalion During World War II. finances encourage me to plan my pur- Edward Miller, A Dark and Bloody Ground Shippensburg, Pa: Burd Street Press, 1996. (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, chases wisely and guide me away from 1995), 12. Hart, S. and R. Hart. German Tanks of World waste. War II. London: Brown Books, 1998. 7Ibid., 12-13. Today I can grumble about my health or Herrly, Peter. “Battle of the Huertgen Forest Bat- I can rejoice that I am alive. 8Astor, Bloody Forest, 8. tlefield Staff Ride Workbook.” Reep, Inc., 1999. Today I can lament over all that my 9 Dark and Bloody Ground, Miller, 1. Hohenstein, Adolf and Wolfgang Trees. Holle im parents didn’t give me when I was 10Dr. S. Hart and Dr. R. Hart, German Tanks of Huertgen-Wald: Die Kampfe vom Hohen Venn growing up or I can feel grateful that World War II (London: Brown Books, 1998), 79- bis zur Rur September 1944 bis Februar 1945. they allowed me to be born. 81. Aachen: TriAngel, 1981. Today I can mourn my lack of friends or 11Ibid., 105-107. Karamales, Jay and Allyn R. Vannoy. Against I can excitedly embark upon a quest to The Panzers. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & 12 discover new relationships. Ibid., 120-121. Company, Inc., 1996. 13 Today I can whine because I have to go Chris Ellis, Tanks of World War II (London: Keegan, John. The Second World War. New Chancellor Press, 1997), 163. York: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1989. to work or I can shout for joy because I have a job to do. 14Ibid., 57. Landschaftsverband Rheinland. Rheinisches Amt Der Westwall: Vom Today stretches ahead of me, waiting to 15Astor, Bloody Forest, 47. Fur Bodendenkmalpflege. Denkmalwert des Unerfreulichen. Fuhrer zu be shaped. And here I am, the sculptor 16Ibid. archaologischen Denkmalern im Rheinland Nr. who gets to do the shaping. 2. Koln: Rheinland-Verlag GmbH, 1997. 17Peter Herrly, “Battle of the Huertgen Forest What today will be like is up to me. I get Battlefield Staff Ride Workbook” (REEP, Inc. Mahin, LT. “Attack Without Artillery.” Written to choose what kind of day I will have! 1999) 45. by LT Mahian, Seigfried Line Section for Genlt Hans Schmidt, 275th Infantry Division Com- – Author unknown 18 Miller, Dark and Bloody Ground, 32. manding General on 10 January 1945. 19 Ibid., 67. Miller, Edward. A Dark and Bloody Ground: The As you reflect on these words, I hope 20Herrly, “Battle of the Huertgen,” 73. Huertgen Forest and the Roer River Dams, you see that your attitudes truly shape 1944-1945. College Station: Texas A&M Uni- 21Miller, Dark and Bloody Ground, 67. versity Press, 1995. the life you lead. Having a great atti- tude is not the result of having a great 22Allyn R. Vannoy and Jay Karamales, Against United States Army Military History Institute. life; instead, having a great life is the the Panzers: United States Infantry versus Ger- The Army Air Forces Evaluation Board in The result of a great attitude! I challenge man Tanks, 1944-1945, (Jefferson, N.C.: McFar- European Theater of Operations. The Effective- land and Co., Inc., 1996), 104. ness of Third Phase Tactical Air Operations in everyone to maintain a positive attitude the European Theater. Carlisle Barracks, Pa: and lasting ‘drive on spirit’ to ensure a 23 Holle Adolf Hohenstein and Wolfgang Trees, U.S. Army Military History Institute, 1945. secure and stable environment for all of Im Huertgen-Wald, (Aachen: Triangel, 1981), our soldiers and families. 153. Waldenburg, Seigfried von. “116th Panzer Divi- sion (1-9 November 1944).” Historical Division 24 PRIDE IS CONTAGIOUS!!! Miller, Dark and Bloody Ground, 71. Headquarters, United States Army, Europe, 25Vannoy, Against the Panzers, 111. 1954. 26Ibid., 73. 27Siegfried von Waldenburg, “Report on 116th CPT Mike Sullivan was commis- CSM William J. Gainey assumed Panzer Division (1-9 Nov. 44),” (Historical Divi- sioned in the infantry from West the position of Armor Center Com- sion Headquarters United States Army, Europe, Point in 1994. He served as an anti- mand Sergeant Major on 20 Febru- 1954), 58. tank platoon leader, XO, and rifle ary 2002. He has served as the 28Ibid., 61. platoon leader with 3-505 PIR. After Command Sergeant Major for sev- Armor Officer’s Advance Course, he eral units, including 2-68 Armor and Works Cited branch transferred to armor, then 1-35 Armor, 2d BCT, 1st AD, in served as a Combat Arms Ground Baumholder, Germany; 1st Squad- V Corps IPW Team 11. Division Review of the ron, 2d ACR, Fort Polk, La.; 2d Bde, 89th Division: The Battles of Schmidt and Employment controller at the War- Kommerscheidt. 9 November 1944. Translated rior Preparation Center in Kaiser- 3d ID, Fort Stewart, Ga.; 2d ACR, by IPW Team 11. slautern and deployed to Kosovo Fort Polk, La.; and for Eagle Base, Astor, Gerald. The Bloody Forest. Novato, Calif.: for 7 months as the S3 Air with 1-63 Bosnia and Herzegovina. Addition- Presidio Press, Inc., 2000. Armor, then as company command- ally, he was the Commandant of the Fort Polk and JRTC NCO Academy. Breuer, William B. Death of a Nazi Army: The er, A/1-63 Armor. Currently, he com- Falaise Pocket. United States: Scarborough mands HHC, 1-63 Armor. CPT Sul- CSM Gainey served in Operations House, 1985. livan conducts Military Heritage Joint Endeavor (IFOR), Joint Guard Bookman, John T., and Stephen T. Powers. The Tours on behalf of the USO to both (SFOR 3), and Joint Forge (SFOR March to Victory: A Guide to World War II the Huertgen Forest and Bastogne. 8) in Bosnia and Herzegovina. ARMOR — May-June 2002 29

“Ilich’s Eyebrows”: Soviet BDD Tank Armor and Its Impact on the Battlefield

by James M. Warford

The practice of adding additional or add-on armor protection to older tanks to increase their effectiveness and lengthen their service life has been around almost as long as tanks them- selves. Add-on materials ranged from a mixture of quartz gravel, asphalt, and wood flour to more sophisticated non- explosive and explosive reactive armor designs. A classic example of successful add- on armor is the Soviet-developed BDD armor. Nicknamed “Brow” armor be- cause of its resemblance to Vladimir Ilich Lenin’s thick eyebrows, BDD armor has had a significant impact throughout its service life, most re- cently in the fighting in Afghanistan. In 1983, the Soviets initiated an up- grade program for the T-55 main battle tank (MBT) intended to lengthen its The T-55 upgrade includes additional armor, a laser rangefinder above the main gun, service life. This rather extensive up- a new fire control system, and an improved gunner’s primary sight. grade program included the addition of the new Volna fire control system with - Jody Harmon drawing a laser rangefinder mounted externally in an armored box above the tank’s tion of the BDD armor involved the would be forced to penetrate several of 100mm main gun, and a new, stabilized addition of three external steel boxes; the alternating layers before reaching primary sight for the tank gunner. The one large box on the glacis, and two the turret base armor. The complete ap- upgrade program also allowed the op- smaller curved boxes on the turret (one plication of BDD armor adds about 2 tional incorporation of the new 9K116 on either side of the tank’s main gun). metric tons to the weight of the tank. “Bastion” gun-launched anti-tank guid- The glacis box was made of steel plates ed missile (which in NATO was known BDD armor is classified as non-ener- 30mm thick and covered most of the getic reactive armor (NERA) since the as the AT-10 Stabber). The T-55s that original glacis. The box was filled with were equipped with this missile capa- solid polyurethane. Encased within the reaction it produces (the defeat mecha- bility could be identified by the new nism) is not caused by an explosive beer-colored polyurethane were six material, but by the impact of an attack- and larger 1K13 turret roof-mounted angled and evenly spaced 5mm thick gunner’s primary sight. steel plates. These internal steel plates ing projectile on the polyurethane in each box. This reaction can have a huge In addition to these significant fire- were held in-place within the polyure- impact on an attacking projectile or the power improvements, the upgraded T- thane by what appear to be structural brackets. molten “jet” from a shaped-charge war- 55s were also fitted with the new V- head. When the projectile strikes and 55U up-rated diesel engine that pro- When viewed in profile, the BDD ar- penetrates the outer layer of the BDD vided a power increase to 620 hp. mor provides an impressive multi- steel box, it sends an intense shock These upgraded T-55s were known by layered array of alternating layers of wave into the polyurethane, which a variety of designations depending on steel and polyurethane. The BDD glacis compresses within the steel box. Since where they were produced: T-55M and box was a total of 150mm thick. The the compressed polyurethane (and the T-55AM (Soviet/Russian produced); T- curved turret boxes, on the other hand, energy transferred to it from the projec- 55AM2P (Polish produced); and T- each had an outer layer of 60mm thick tile impact) has nowhere to go due to 55AM2B (Czechoslovakian produced). steel plates and include a larger number its confinement in the steel box, it is While these and other less significant of the internal 5mm plates encased forced to move back into the path of the upgrades and modifications greatly within the polyurethane. Additionally, projectile. The effect is like compress- improved the capabilities of the T-55, these 5mm plates are apparently verti- ing a powerful spring and suddenly the most significant part of the upgrade cal (not angled like those used in the releasing it towards the projectile. program was the addition of the BDD glacis box) and are configured in such a While the cause and effect of this reac- or “Brow” add-on armor. The applica- way to ensure an attacking projectile tion within the BDD box is well under- 30 ARMOR — May-June 2002 At left, Russian T-62s with the added turret armor are seen on a road in Chechnya. The close-up above shows the added armor on one side of a Czech T- 55AM2B turret. Also seen on the turret roof is the larger gunner’s primary sight “doghouse” that can control the AT-10 “Stabber” guided missiles.

stood, the role played by the 5mm steel tant details concerning BDD armor. In (also known as the Northern Alliance) plates and the structural brackets hold- a section called Armor Protection Up- was supplied with 40 T-55AM2 MBTs. ing them in place is not as clear-cut. grading – Variant 1, BDD armor (de- These tanks offer a variety of advan- While some sources report that the scribed as “metal-polymer block”), is tages to the forces of the United Front. 5mm plates are in-fact “bulging plates” credited with adding 120mm of protec- In addition to being simple, reliable, (designed to be set in motion by the tion against APDS and 200-250mm of and well understood (ideally suited for reaction of the polyurethane to actually protection against HEAT or shaped- Afghan tank crews), the “new” T- “attack” the projectile), a more likely charge ammunition. In effect, the 60- 55AM2s include capabilities beyond explanation is that the 5mm plates and degree frontal arc of a T-55 fitted with those of tanks previously used in Af- the structural brackets are intended to BDD armor was suddenly immune to ghanistan. In a manner reminiscent of further confine the polyurethane in each tank-fired 105mm APDS and HEAT, as the Cold War years, the BDD armor BDD box. By increasing the surface well as Rocket Propelled Grenade protecting these T-55AM2s provides area beyond that provided by the box (RPG) ammunition. This new informa- complete frontal protection against key itself, the additional confinement of the tion confirms that this additional capa- opposing anti-tank weapons. In Af- polyurethane (between and around the bility was a huge step forward at the ghanistan, the weapon at the top of this 5mm steel plates) equates to a larger time, and easily extended the service list is certainly the ubiquitous RPG. reaction working against the attacking life of these upgraded T-55s for several Whether deployed in Afghanistan in projectile. years. In addition to the upgraded T- 2001 or serving with the Soviet and 55s, BDD armor was also added to Warsaw Pact forces during the Cold In recent years, NII Stali (Russia’s upgraded T-62 MBTs starting in 1983. War years, BDD add-on armor has primary tank armor research and de- These upgraded T-62s were designated been an unqualified success. Perhaps velopment organization), has become T-62M and T-62M1. A number of these the most important thing to keep in- much more forthcoming with informa- T-62Ms were recently used in combat mind when evaluating the success of tion regarding its armor developments. in Chechnya. Finally, a few years ago, BDD armor is to remember that it was In a product pamphlet called “Sugges- a surprising single photo was published not developed in a vacuum. The rela- tions on Modernization of MBTs and of a T-72 MBT fitted with BDD armor. tionship between it and other more re- IFVs” distributed at a recent arms exhi- Virtually nothing is known about this cently developed Soviet/Russian add- bition, NII Stali provided a few impor- particular T-72 or where the photo was on and composite tank armors is still to taken. It could have been part of a be determined. test project or it may have been (based on the terrain in the photo) one of the small number of T-72s James M. Warford was commis- that were reportedly deployed to sioned in Armor in 1979 as a Dis- Afghanistan during the Soviet- tinguished Military Graduate from Afghan War. Interestingly enough, the University of Santa Clara, Santa no confirmed photos of those Soviet T-72s have ever been pub- Clara, California. A frequent con- lished. tributor to ARMOR, Mr. Warford has held a variety of Armor and Cavalry The value and impact offered by assignments, ranging from tank BDD add-on armor have once platoon leader to brigade S3, and again made themselves known; this time, by the deployment of has served as a tactics instructor upgraded T-55AMs in Afghani- both at Fort Knox, Ky. for AOAC Close-up of 5mm steel plates embedded in stan. As part of a $45 million and at Fort Leavenworth, Kan. for polyurethane blocks, a form of non-explosive weapons transfer package from CGSC. He is currently a training reactive armor, added to the glacis. Russia, the Afghan United Front developer in the Kansas City area. ARMOR — May-June 2002 31

The First Tanks and Fate “The failure to exploit the potential of an original idea is a recurring problem throughout history...”

by Ken Wright

(Editor’s Note: There are General Headquar- several claims to the devel- ters in France was opment of the tank. In our demanding a solution January-February issue, Ma- to trench warfare. jor Dennis Gaare explored the claim of the American An accomplished inventor, Edwin Wheelock, writer for the British and his “Skeleton Tank.” Army, Lieutenant The following story comes Colonel Ernest Swin- from an Australian author, ton, observed these describing the unsuccessful early battles first- attempts by a countryman, hand and wrote to his Lancelot Eldin de Mole, to superiors that a gaso- interest the British in what line-powered tractor was, for its time, a revolu- on the caterpillar tionary approach.) principle, with hard- ened steel plates, would be able to The failure to exploit the counter the effects of potential of an original the machine gun. But idea is a recurring problem General Sir John throughout history. Take, French and his scien- for example, the develop- tific advisors rejected ment of the tank during his proposal. WWI. By early 1915, the war on the Western Front Fortunately, some- had stalemated into static one in power had a trench warfare, both sides little more imagina- wasting men and material tion, and that person to gain an advantage. Sol- was Winston Chur- diers faced an impossible chill, The First Sea task, considering the way Lord. In February the generals of the time 1915, he set up a thought war should be con- “Landship Commit- ducted. Artillery barrages tee” to look into the would be followed by long possibility of devel- lines of men leaving the oping the new war comparative safety of their trenches to machine Swinton had proposed. The charge across a strip of land to attack committee commissioned Lieutenant A period photograph of Lancelot Eldin enemy trenches. They struggled into de Mole in his Australian Army uniform, W. E. Wilson of the Naval Air Service the murderous hail of machine gun and the model of his tracked vehicle, and its and William Tritton of William Foster artillery fire, slowed by miles of barbed blueprint are included in this montage and Company of Lincoln to construct a wire entanglements. The result was by Jody Harmon. small “landship,” their name for the usually mass slaughter on a grand concept. The work was carried out in Although a full size prototype was scale. never built, de Mole came up with an great secrecy and the new war machine unusual method of steering by curving was code-named ‘tank,’ implying that it Then, a few days later, the opposition the track path. His concept pre-dated was a device for carrying fresh water. would carry out the same insane tactic the beginning of the First World War by The first prototype was demonstrated to with the same result, over a no man’s two years and the first employment of the Landship Committee on September land covered with shell holes and lit- the tank by four years. 11, 1915, but its performance was dis- tered with corpses. No wonder Allied appointing: it could not cross broad 32 ARMOR — May-June 2002

trenches. Wilson and Tritton immedi- “Curved track steering…involves bow- De Mole had been thinking of a fleet ately went back to work to design a ing the tracks in the horizontal plane by of 500-1,000 armored vehicles with better model. It was Wilson who came pivoting some or all of the road wheels mounted guns that could be used to up with the idea of taking the tracks about vertical axes, or by displacing attack the enemy in overwhelming right around a body of rhomboid shape, them sideways relative to each other. force, but the official could only think pointed at the top and sloping down at Curved track steering was proposed as in ones. So much for imagination! the back. From that point, all work was early as 1912 by L.E. de Mole, al- When the bitter fighting in the Somme concentrated on Wilson’s design. though his ideas were not put into ef- was over and the secret of the tank fect…” After much trial and error, the first common knowledge, de Mole realized crude British tanks were shipped to the After his rejection by the British, de his design was superior and had been Western Front and spearheaded the Mole’s friends urged him to try to sell ignored by the British authorities. By attack on the Somme on September 15, his idea to the German consul in West- this time, in order to enlist, de Mole 1916. Historical records vary, but ap- ern Australia, but he declined with the had gone on a special diet to improve proximately 47 tanks were brought up comment that they might one day be an his health and was finally allowed to for the attack, and only 11 actually got enemy. The outbreak of WWI, in Au- join the Army in 1917. With financial into battle. The long hoped-for decisive gust 1914, proved him right. Along backing from a friend, Lieutenant Har- victory was not achieved despite the with many of his fellow countrymen, old Boyce, (later to become Sir Harold surprise and terror the new weapon he answered the call to war, but his first Boyce and Lord Mayor of London), de caused the Germans, because the tanks attempt to enlist in the Australian Impe- Mole had a one-eighth scale metal were underpowered, unreliable, and too rial Forces wasn’t successful; the Army model constructed by the mechanical few in number. rejected him as too tall and delicate. and electrical engineering firm of Wil- liams and Benwell in Melbourne. Lieu- The result may have been different if The war moved on, and the tanks took tenant Boyce managed to get Private de the ideas of an Australian inventor had to the field of battle on the Somme in Mole assigned to him, and as they been used when offered. Lancelot Eldin September, 1916. The Landship Com- sailed from Melbourne on a troop ship, de Mole was born in Kent Town, South mittee and the development of the tank the model tank remained locked in the Australia, and by 1908 was a draftsman were, of course, unknown to de Mole. ship’s orderly room under constant and inventor working on surveying and The new secret weapon only became guard. As soon as they arrived in Eng- mining projects in several Australian common knowledge after the Somme land, de Mole managed to get leave to states. (One of his early inventions was battle. take his model to the Munitions Inven- an automatic telephone system designed De Mole had actually made a second, tions Office. three years before a similar type was unsuccessful attempt to interest the introduced in the United States. In a By now it was January 1918. His British. Personal papers and official model passed the first test and he was typical example of the failure to exploit documents differ slightly about the a potentially good idea, the Australian asked to demonstrate it to a second exact date, but it is generally accepted committee. But just when it seemed he Postal Department declined to even test that de Mole resubmitted his plans, it.) was actually getting somewhere, he be- based on the original ones from 1912, came sick and was unable to follow up De Mole, while working in the very to the British Munitions Inventions the second demonstration. When he re- rugged countryside of Western Austra- Office around July or August, 1915. turned in March to the Munitions In- lia, had the idea for a chain rail system Even if he sent the plans early in 1916, ventions Office, he found his model had of traction for use in heavy haulage. the British authorities failed to pass his been left in a basement. The letter from This idea led him to work on a design design on to the Landship Committee. the first committee recommending his for a chain rail armored vehicle. He One can only speculate why the plans model to the Tank Board had not been sent his sketches to the British War were not made available to the people passed on to the second committee. Office in 1912, two years before World who were working on the tank. It’s Before he could arrange a second War I broke out. Perhaps the design quite possible the Munitions Inventions demonstration, fate dealt him another was too complicated for the British Office knew nothing of the Landship body blow. At 9:40 a.m. on March the War Office. Or perhaps they saw no Committee because of the great secrecy 21st, the Germans launched their spring need for the invention at the time. They that surrounded what they were doing, offensive after a five-hour bombard- returned some of his sketches in 1913 or perhaps there was some form of in- ment, striking a massive blow against with a letter rejecting his idea and the ter-departmental rivalry. Whatever the the weak divisions of the British Third comment that they were no longer ex- reason, an opportunity to explore a new and Fifth Armies. De Mole was called perimenting with chain rails. perspective was wasted. De Mole re- back to active duty with the 10th Bat- ceived a letter suggesting that a work- talion and fought at Merris, Meteren, For the technically minded, de Mole’s ing model must be provided to have and Villers-Bretonneux. design called for the front end of the any chance of consideration. tracks to be capable of pivoting left and He was to remain in France until the right so that, as the machine proceeds, Not being the type to give up easily, armistice, then returned to London to the links of the chain rail will be laid to de Mole tried to get the local South be demobilized. It was here that he the right or left of the path that the ve- Australian Inventions Board interested heard about a Royal Commission being hicle had been traveling. This forces in his idea. The official in charge could established to reward inventors for their the tracks to form a curve which, as the not understand the plans. The idea was contribution to the war effort. With vehicle proceeds, will alter the direc- rejected with the very poor excuse that regard to the area of tank development, tion of travel. As Richard Ogorkiewicz the vehicle might fall into a hole on the de Mole, along with a few others, describes it in his Technology of Tanks, battlefield. lodged his claim. In November 1919, ARMOR — May-June 2002 33

the Royal Commission handed down their findings. The credit for designing the tank actually used went to Wilson and Tritton, and they were jointly awarded 15,000 pounds — a nice little sum in those days. As to Lancelot Eldin de Mole’s claim, the commissioners considered he was entitled to the great- est credit for having made and reduced to practical shape as far back as 1912, a brilliant invention, which anticipated, and, in some respects, surpassed that which was actually put into use in the year 1916. The commissioners went on to say that it was the claimant’s misfor- tune, and not his fault, that his inven- tion was in advance of its time, failed to be appreciated, and was put aside because the occasion for its use had not yet arisen. They regretted they were unable to recommend any award for him. A claimant must show casual con- nection between the making of his in- vention and the use of any similar in- vention by the Government. De Mole was, however, awarded 965 pounds for out-of-pocket expenses by the British Government. De Mole’s tank was more maneuver- able than the early British variety, in- corporating a mechanism that simpli- fied its handling and enabled it to be steered in a comparatively sharp turn. It also had a climbing face at both the front and back, which enabled the tank to back out of trouble, something the early British tanks could not do. De Mole’s invention looked good on paper and worked out what Wilson and Trit- ton had to work out the hard way. His plans did not include an engine or any In 1919, as debate developed over the credit for the invention of the tank, de Mole’s form of armaments as he was con- claim made news in this London publication, which noted that his design “would have vinced those things were better left up made a better tank” than the first tanks used at the Somme. to the experts in those fields. Unfortu- The Royal Commission decided that the award of £15,000 should go to Wilson and Trit- nately, his ideas were never actually ton, who developed the Somme tank, but de Mole was awarded £965 to cover his ex- built and tested in a full-scale vehicle, penses. so one can only speculate about what – Drawing by W.B. Robinson, Illustrated London News contribution, if any, his design would have had on the development of the early tanks. Fate still deals de Mole a bad hand. References Because his ideas were never put to the After the war, the recently established Personal Papers; Stephanie Hart, Anthea Fleming. Australian War Memorial sent de Mole test in a full-sized vehicle, historians, past and present, tend to ignore him De Mole Papers; Australian War Memorial Can- a letter asking him if he would donate berra. his model to the museum, which would either out of ignorance or by selectively include trophies and relics captured or presenting their subject matter. Because Archives; Australian War Memorial Canberra. of this deplorable treatment, his name acquired by Australian troops. It would also include a tank section, and the and what he tried to achieve have been all but forgotten. Ken Wright was a representative model would be a tribute to the inven- for a book publisher for 15 years, tive genius of Australians. The War On the July 28, 1921, a grateful Aus- Memorial, located in the Australian tralian Government placed him on the spent 13 years as a correctional capital of Canberra, is one of the best in New Year’s Honor List and awarded officer, and 5 years in the Australian the world and de Mole’s model is cur- him with the C.B.E. After a long ill- Army reserve, 4/19th Prince of rently in the museum’s Treloar Centre ness, Lancelot Eldin de Mole died in Wales Light Horse, an armored re- for Conservation. 1950. con regiment. 34 ARMOR — May-June 2002

A New Personal Defense Weapon?

Actually, we already have one… And it’s in the inventory

by Captain John S. Wilson

Editor’s Note: Captain Wilson wrote long tradition of the MP5 with the U.S. use as PDWs: the standard MP5K, the this article to answer the Stanley C. Military’s Special Operations Com- MP5KA4 and the MP5K-PDW. These Crist article in the November-Decem- mand (SOCOM). are all classified as “machine pistols.” ber 2001 issue of ARMOR, entitled, “Do Armor Crewmen Need a More The MP5 is derived from the highly MP5K/MP5KA4. The MP5K is Effective Personal Defense Weapon?” successful H&K series (HK G3, PSG- H&K’s smallest sub-gun offering. The 9, etc.) common around the world. MP5K was originally developed in

With all the changes and compromises They all use the same roller-locked 1976 at request of an HK South Ameri- delayed blowback system and share a can sales representative who saw a being forced down the throats of the number of components (such as the market for its use in protecting dignitar- armor community by well-intentioned 4 5 defense consultants, one thing we pistol grip and trigger unit) with the ies. It weighs 4.4 pounds and is less firm’s bigger main battle rifles. The than 13 inches long.6 The MP5K is should not compromise on is the Per- MP5’s closed bolt, roller-locking, de- easy for armored crewmen to carry sonal Defense Weapon (PDW) our ar- mored vehicle crewmen will carry in layed blowback system provides the accuracy the future. Mr. Crist proposes we “de- of a bolt action rifle velop” some new hybrid pistol/carbine (such as the M24 sniper based on the M9 Beretta pistol.1 While system) with the rapid a better, more accurate, more lethal self-loading function of replacement is necessary, Mr. Crist neglects to point out that we already any other automatic weapon. This type of have a suitable PDW in the DOD sys- action, coupled with a tem, the Heckler & Koch MP5 Subma- chine Gun. Also in the system is a more free-floating barrel (nothing touches the powerful compact weapon, the G3KA4, barrel beyond the ac- a shortened derivative of the HK G3 7.62mm rifle that provides the penetra- tion) makes the MP5 far more accurate than tion and range of the 7.62 NATO round the average submachine in a compact carbine. gun. Heckler & Koch USA pitches the The MP5 is con- MP5K as “the ultimate close quarters The Heckler & Koch MP5KA4 2 structed mostly of weapon.” The MP5 family is re- stamped metal with nowned as the most accurate, most reli- tucked out of the way. Using any of a able submachine gun system in the plastic grips. It is a solid, well-built, and reliable weapon. I have had occa- myriad of after-market holsters or world. It is the most widely selected sion to fire several variants of the MP5. slings, a vehicle crewmen could wear submachine gun used by military and this lethal package almost anywhere on police special units worldwide. When They are simple, accurate, and easy to manage. his person, ready to fire in seconds, yet the U.S. Navy SEALs fielded their first out of the way of their primary duty to counterterror unit, SEAL Team 6, they H&K offers three K-versions (the “K” crew and fight their tank or IFV. An selected and fought for the MP5 as stands for “Kurz,” the German word for 3 optional folding buttstock fits ALL their primary weapon. Thus began the “short”) all of which are suitable for MP5Ks, allowing soldiers to increase their accuracy at extended ranges.7 MP5K Specifications MP5K-PDW. According to Heckler Barrel Overall Length & Koch USA, the MP5K-PDW is a Caliber Weight Length stock in/out compact submachine gun designed spe- cifically for vehicle crewmen who re- MP5KA4 9mmx19 4.40 lb 4.50 in. 12.80 in. quire a small, but powerful weapon.8 It MP5K 9mmx19 4.40 lb 4.50 in. 12.80 in. is comparable in performance to full- size MP5s. The MP5K-PDW would be MP5K-PDW 9mmx19 6.14 lb 5.50 in. 14.50/23.75 in. an ideal choice where a rifle or full- Magazine 15- or 30-shot detachable box sized submachine gun is unmanageable and a handgun is a poor compromise.9 Cyclic Rate 900 rds/min With its sturdy folding buttstock and ARMOR — May-June 2002 35

threaded barrel, the MP5K-PDW is inch barrel on any new PDW.13 The reverse engineering to allow such de- an exceptionally flexible weapon.10 inherent accuracy of the free-floated vices. The top of the MP5, however, While both the MP5KA4 and the barrel would likely overcome any per- allows for a “claw” mount system that MP5K-PDW are suitable, the MP5K- formance lost by the missing half-inch. allows the soldier to quickly attach or PDW is the weapon best suited to re- A “Grenade” grip and finger guard detach a wide array of sights that im- place the M9 as the Armor commu- prevents the soldier’s hand from stray- prove target acquisition and accuracy. nity’s new PDW. ing in front of the muzzle (another con- cern expressed by Mr. Crist). Further, Double-Action Versus Single-Action. Development and Acquisition. Mr. his PDW is based on an already admit- Mr. Crist seems enamored with the idea Crist mentioned the Beretta M93R, a tedly inaccurate design14 (indeed, that the PDW be double-action for larger framed version of the M9 capa- match shooters I have spoken with state rapid target engagement.16 The MP5K ble of firing three-round is a single-action with a bursts and feeding from M9- function selector switch style magazines.11 This may similar to (if not easier than) provide a more valuable the selector switch on the basis from which to “de- M16A2/M4. velop” a new PDW than the current M9. However, the Holsters Versus Slings. An MP5 is a proven design cur- after-market shoulder sling rently in the DOD system. allows soldiers to strap the There is NO need for the weapon, draped under the excessive cost and time re- armpit, out of the way. Such quired to “develop” Mr. a rig would forgo the neces- Crist’s brainchild. The inor- sity of a cumbersome hol- dinate cost to develop and The H&K MP5K-PDW ster. The soldier can rapidly field his new design would “grab” the weapon and put easily pay for the rapid im- it into action and then plementation of the HK5K-PDW. that the M9 is all but impossible to “ac- “drop” the weapon without losing ac- curize” compared to its predecessor, the cessibility to it later on. This is ex- Compatibility. Mr. Crist claims that M1911A1). Adding to the length of a the M9 should be the basis for the new tremely important for a crew enter- barrel in the new PDW would do little ing/exiting or climbing onto an ar- PDW based on “commonality and in- 12 to fix this. Why build a new weapon mored vehicle. terchangeability.” Invariably, his de- from a less accurate design? sign would require reverse engineering Training. Mr. Crist placed some im- to meet the demands he requires (not Full-Auto Versus Semi-Auto and the portance on compatibility with the M9 mentioning further demands made by Issue of Controllability. Mr. Crist’s to ease “transitional” training.17 Again, others along the acquisition food dream PDW is a semiautomatic-only the changes necessary to convert the chain). Such changes would adversely model because he is concerned with M9 into the PDW he proposes would affect compatibility with components ammunition consumption and control- still require “transitional” training due of the current M9 pistol desired by Mr. lability.15 The 30-round magazines to the extreme amount of reengineering Crist and nullify the purpose of using available for the MP5K-PDW would required. His shoulder stock and fore- the M9 chassis in the first place. If allow for full-automatic or three-round arm grip alone changes the whole close compatibility is such a grave is- burst fire that a crewman bailing out of scheme of training away from tradi- sue, it would be better to completely a burning LAV might need to suppress tional M9 marksmanship training. The replace the M9 on unit MTOEs. If the foe while moving to safety. The MP5K-PDW, especially when com- MP5Ks are made standard to armor and shoulder stock and/or the “grenade” plemented by the M68 Reflex Sight, cavalry MTOEs (replacing the M9 al- grip of the MP5K-PDW would allow operates in much the same way as the together) there is no problem with lo- the crewman to fire the weapon single M16 Rifle/M4 Carbine that all soldiers gistical compatibility. The cost to re- or double handed with infinitely greater qualify with at basic training. From place the M9s is offset by the savings accuracy, even when fired fully auto- personal experience with the MP5 fam- realized by not pursuing the Crist PDW matic. MP5Ks possess a threaded bar- ily, I can safely say that the transition design. rel. This allows for the addition of a would be remarkably easy. flash compensator or muzzle brake to Increased Firepower, Accuracy and reduce the signature of the weapon and The G3KA4. The G3KA4 is a select- Penetration. The robust pattern of the fire, short-barreled (12.4-inch) 7.62 increase controllability. The MP5K- 18 MP5 also allows for “hotter” 9mm PDW comes standard with a folding NATO rifle with retractable stock. submachine gun ammunition (which stock rather than the older, less com- The G3 rifle was the first HK firearm caused premature maintenance prob- fortable HK telescoping stock. Full developed with the delayed blowback lems in the M9 resulting in service auto is also more desirable in a MOUT roller-locked operation common to member deaths). Such ammunition environment. most current Heckler and Koch subma- would increase the possibility of pene- chine guns, rifles, and machine guns.19 trating body armor. The MP5 would Target Acquisition Hardware. Mr. Crist This would make an excellent compan- even handle experimental “sabot” sub- mentions no additional Target Acquisi- ion to the MP5K-PDW. While certainly machine gun ammunition to increase its tion Hardware aside from the standard not quite as accurate as the G3, the sting. The MP5K-PDW has a 5.5-inch iron sights present on the M9. A new G3KA4 would have far greater range free-floating barrel. This meets the in- PDW based on the M9, as Mr. Crist and penetrating power than the M16A2 tent of Mr. Crist’s requirement for a 6- proposes, would require a great deal of or M4. Because it chambers the 7.62 36 ARMOR — May-June 2002

NATO cartridge, the G3KA4 would be far more compatible logistically than they are with the current issue M16A2. Some components and accessories that fit the MP5K will also fit the G3KA4. Common throughout each weapon group is the ability to use many inter- changeable assembly groups and com- ponents. This allows the unit to train personnel within one weapons group and have them competent with both The H&K G3KA4 7.62mm Carbine weapons.20 If forced to dismount, the crew could unlink belted ammunition Notes 18www.hkweaponsystems.com taken from the M240 Machine Gun and 19www.hecklerkoch-usa.com 1Crist, Stanley C., “Do Armor Crewmen Need a feed it into the G3KA4. This increases More Effective Personal Defense Weapon?” 20Ibid. the crew’s dismounted firepower. A ARMOR, Nov-Dec 2001, pp. 27-28. dismounted armored crew with four 2www.hecklerkoch-usa.com MP5Ks, one or two M240s (with dis- CPT John S. Wilson is a 1989 mount kits) and one G3KA4 would 3Marcinko, Richard and Weisman, John (Con- ROTC commission from Ouachita prove a dangerous fire team. At the tributor), Rogue Warrior, Simon and Schuster, Baptist University and holds a MBA 1992, pp. 221, 228. very least, if armored and cavalry units from Webster University. He is a 4 are further called upon to provide dis- www.hkpro.com graduate of AOBC, IOAC, BMOC, mounted patrols (either in combat or as 5www.hecklerkoch-usa.com and CAS3. He served as tank pla- peacekeepers), they will possess the ap- 6Ibid. toon leader and assistant S4 with 2- propriate means to defend themselves. 7Ibid. 64 Armor in Schweinfurt, Germany. Mr. Crist is correct in calling for a 8Ibid. He joined the Arkansas Army Na- better PDW for our armored crewmen, 9Ibid. tional Guard in 1994 and has but his approach will prove too costly 10Ibid. served as an anti-armor platoon in terms of time, energy, treasure and, 11 leader, support platoon leader, bat- ultimately, blood. It is a neat concept Crist, pp. 27-28. 12Ibid. talion S6, HHC commander, bri- sketch drawn in a Fantasyland future gade assistant S3 air and battalion when a far superior PDW exists in the 13Ibid. S4 in the 39th Inf Bde (Sep), 7th ID real world right now. We should not 14 Ibid. (Integrated). He has also served in delay fielding the HK MP5K-PDW and 15 Ibid. the CTC Branch, National Guard G3KA4 and giving our transitional 16 Armor Force a personal defense Ibid. Bureau. He is currently the training weapon that works. 17Ibid. officer for 1-153 IN, 39th IN Bde.

Commander’s Hatch from Page 5 The Battle Labs and Army teams will for insuring compliance with cost/per- ley stated in the opening quote, we will have the support of two other key play- formance measures and schedules. The need everyone hitting the line with all ers: the Lead System Integrator (LSI) PM will help develop, produce, field, they have on every play. Fortunately, and a Project Manager (PM). and sustain the full range of systems we have a great team of schools, Battle envisioned for the Units of Action. The Labs, and organizations involved in The LSI will serve as the Army’s key industrial partner in developing and in- PM will be in charge of developing the this effort. Your Armor Branch and the acquisition and program management Armor Center will be involved hand- tegrating the FCS. Responsible for the framework as we transform the Army in-hand alongside the other members traditional job of turning thoughts and requirements into products, they have to the Objective Force. This will be an of the combined arms team to bring immense process when you consider Units of Action and the FCS to the the additional missions of lending sci- the numbers of systems to be fielded field. We have an important role to entific and technological support to the concept design process and helping us and the synchronization that will be play in the creation of the force that required to field them together. Obvi- will one day soon bear the responsibil- with the experimentation and analysis ously, very close coordination will be a ity for our Nation’s security, and we process. The LSI possesses the needed corporate horsepower to work with oth- necessity between the PM, the LSI, will gladly play our position to the best and the coordinating Battle Labs. of our ability. We are honored to host er members of industry and technology the “new” Maneuver Battle Lab at Fort in order to find innovative solutions for military problems. From the beginning We are involved in a whole new ball Knox that will have such a key impact game. The process of designing, de- on Objective Force design. But, we are of the process, right down to force veloping, building, testing, and field- equally honored that Armor Branch is fielding, the LSI is partnered with the Army to give the Unit of Action the ing an entire force in less than a decade a member of the overall effort to bring is a task of amazing enormity and com- FCS enabled Units of Action to the required integrated systems they need. plexity. We are moving into uncharted field. The Program Manager will be the fi- territory and writing history with every nal partner in the process, responsible step in this process. Just as GEN Brad- FORGE THE THUNDERBOLT! ARMOR — May-June 2002 37

The Seven Breaching Habits Of Highly Effective Units

by Lieutenant Colonel Thomas H. Magness

Mobility is Job One. Without it, our says, “Breaching forces will go nowhere. is perhaps the Throughout history, combatants have single most dif- ficult combat found numerous methods of blocking task a force can roads, creating barriers, and limiting En- the movement of advancing forces, and encounter.” gineer magazine in turn, great armies have conducted dated May 2001 combined arms breaching operations to overcome these various obstacles and indicates that it took the Marines barriers in an effort to breach the obsta- 2.5 to 9.5 hours cle, press the fight, and destroy the en- emy. The orchestration and execution to clear two lanes through an of this task may be the toughest one a Iraqi obstacle maneuver commander will ever face. belt during Desert Storm.2 operations. The list reflects continued The purpose of this article is to provide failures in these areas: an assessment of breaching operations It took another 24 to 48 hours for • at the National Training Center (NTC) friendly elements to pass through the Planning. while also revealing “The Seven obstacle and continue their movement - Unfocused R&S planning/unfo- Breaching Habits of Highly Effective toward the enemy. This was an unop- cused intelligence requirements. Units.”1 posed breach with the best available equipment, personnel, and planning, - Poor terrain analysis that fails to In 1999, TRADOC developed a trends answer the “so what?” question. reversal program to review unit execu- and had been rehearsed for weeks. tion of numerous mission essential - No reverse breach planning. tasks and develop ways to improve in We can and must reverse this trend. Many rotational units — with great - No detailed plans to set the condi- areas where units are traditionally weak. tions for breaching. One task, combined arms breaching, leaders, adequate equipment, and was high on the list for review and as- strong motivation — are stymied at the • Preparation. sessment. TRADOC designated NTC breach and cannot push their combat power across to destroy the enemy. - Observers fail to provide detailed Rotation 00-10 as a combined arms obstacle intelligence. breach-focused rotation and began ef- Some units never even get to the forts in coordination with the Engineer breach or cannot identify where or how - Units fail to interdict enemy engi- School to assess negative trends seen to breach, despite the fact that breach- neer defensive preparations. in breaching operations. This onerous ing is a top priority for combat engi- neers and Brigade Combat Teams - Inadequate rehearsals (engineer task, executed by some tremendous and combined arms). maneuver and engineer leaders, vali- (BCTs) in mid- to high-intensity opera- dated one thing — the trend was not tions. • Execution. reversing. Combined arms breaching Combined arms breaching may be the - Breach execution is unsynchro- operations are hard, and they remain a ultimate team sport; success relies on nized. negative trend. This is no surprise to warfighters anywhere and is echoed by the skill, techniques, and training of all - Maneuver forces lack mass and the Sidewinder (Combat Engineer) the players — not just the engineers. piecemeal forces into the breach. Observer Controller Team at the NTC. - Maneuver forces “stumble” into Opposed combined arms breaching, Trends – What We See obstacles. under fire, against a capable opponent First, let me offer a quick review of like the NTC Opposing Force (OP- - Engineers not in position when the combined arms breaching trends conditions are set. FOR) is tough…but not impossible. seen at the NTC, based on observations FM 3-34.2, Combined Arms Breach- during the planning, preparation, and - No consideration for traffic con- ing Operations (formerly FM 90-13-1) execution of combined arms breaching trol or expansion of lanes. 38 ARMOR — May-June 2002 The Seven Breaching Habits of Highly Effective Units

• Habit No.1 – Mass kicks a**! • Habit No. 2 – Focus on the enemy engineers. at your plan — how many maneuver units are focused at that point? Is every • Habit No. 3 – The “Orchestrated Ballet of Farm Implements” doesn’t BOS focused at that point to ensure just happen. success? Is that an enemy weakness? If • Habit No. 4 – Don’t call them farm implements. not, how are we creating one there? • • Habit No. 5 – Obstacles are like rivers – learn to breach or…learn to When do we place the BFT? Early swim. enough to ensure the massed effects of maneuver, fires, and every other BOS. • Habit No. 6 – Use all available smoke assets – someone is always In other words, before we finalize the watching! friendly course of action (COA). • Habit No. 7 – Breaching operations in restricted terrain are not “busi- • Who (BOS) is focused at the BFT? ness as usual.” Who isn’t! • Can we adjust the BFT location? Absolutely. As information changes our understanding of the enemy we will adjust the BFT location. Use these to “I approve of all methods of attacking • Breaching is conducted by rapidly trigger a re-synchronization of the plan provided they are directed at the point applying concentrated efforts at a point …are we still focused? TOC battle cap- where the enemy’s army is weakest and to reduce the obstacle and penetrate the tains and XOs must ensure we have a where the terrain favors them the defense. battle drill to confirm focus at the BFT least.” through execution. • Massed combat power is directed – Frederick the Great against the enemy’s weakness. TTP: Isolate the point of penetra- • tion. Wherever we penetrate the en- The location selected for breaching emy, we must ensure that the remainder Habit No.1 – Mass Kicks A**! depends largely on the weakness in the of the opposing force remains fixed. enemy’s defense, where its covering We do this with fires, CAS, maneuver, Quite simply, most units lack suffi- fires are minimized. and scatterable mines. We must do this, cient mass to be successful in penetrat- • If friendly forces cannot find a natu- however, without violating the princi- ing prepared enemy positions. Success ral weakness, they create one by fixing ple of mass. The OPFOR has great or failure can often be predicted at the success in the offense fixing enemy line of departure (LD) based on this the majority of the enemy force and isolating a small portion of it for attack. (BLUFOR) forces using MRCs and fact alone. In fact, most BCT attacks FASCAM and does so without signifi- will effectively mass no more than one TTP: Conduct detailed terrain cantly reducing his ability to mass at CO/TM at the point of penetration — analysis — answer the “so what?” the point of penetration. All too often, clearly not enough to penetrate the pre- question. We are beginning to see units BLUFOR units commit BN/TFs to this pared fortifications of an enemy who leveraging the technological advances task — often one-third to two-thirds of conducts this defensive mission three of terrain visualization tools. The prod- their total BCT combat power. times for every regimental attack. ucts from Terrabase, DTSS, and other visualization tools are just that — TTP: Mass engineers at the breach. The OPFOR is good. We should ex- products. But with analysis comes an- Breaching doctrine basically requires pect no less from our next enemy, one engineer platoon (with attach- wherever we may meet him. We should swers to the “so what?” question that maneuver commanders must demand ments) to execute one lane. Addition- expect complex obstacle fortifications — namely where can we concentrate ally, there is a requirement for redun- with antitank and anti-personnel (AP) dancy — typically 50 percent. You do mines, ditches, wire, booby traps, anti- efforts against an enemy weakness and where are the enemy’s covering fires the math! In a maneuver TF supported handling devices, and whatever else the minimized? If one is not identified, by an engineer company, most of that enemy can muster. Behind this line of company is required at the breach. De- obstacles we can expect prepared fight- where must we create one? Where does the terrain facilitate the positioning of velop a scheme of maneuver and a task ing positions for both vehicles and per- support forces? Where is the enemy’s organization that masses engineers at sonnel with interlocking fires, interior this critical point. Identify triggers to repositioning lines, and the massed “red zone” and how can we stay out of it? The scheme of maneuver, scheme of change task organization as required to effects of as many forms of contact as fires, task organization, and BOS focus mass engineers at the breach and incor- possible. await the answer to these questions. porate them into the decision support matrix (DSM). This is not, nor will it be, a scenario TTP: Plant the BFT (Big Fat Tack)! against which we should expect to be Mass on the point of penetration successful without the massed effects . We Habit No. 2 – Focus on the Enemy coach the use of a BFT (an extraordi- Engineers. of fire, maneuver, and every battlefield narily bigheaded pushpin!) to help fo- operating system (BOS) in the unit. cus the planning and execution on the In post mission summaries at the The standard for mass is articulated point of penetration. It is a great tool to NTC, we often quote from FM 3-34.2: pretty clearly in FM 3-34.2, Combined help ensure focus at the point where we “An unverified enemy template can Arms Obstacle Breaching: must have massed effects. Take a look lead to disaster because the force may ARMOR — May-June 2002 39

aim an attack at the wrong place. Units high-risk mission for enemy soldiers to and work backward through the breach may deploy to reduce expected obsta- employ mines. When an enemy soldier to the LD. Assign clear tasks and pur- cles early, wasting mission time to feel gets the mission to emplace mines, he poses to all sub-units with graphic and their way into nonexistent obstacles; or must tremble with the thought of his fire control measures and triggers that they may blunder into an unexpected impending destruction! take the unit from LD through the ob- obstacle or an enemy engagement area TTP: Find the Obstacles! This can- jective. (EA).” Attacking units routinely have not be just an engineer reconnaissance TTP: Command and Control. En- little or no knowledge of how the de- fending enemy is shaping terrain with task. This is something that must in- sure, as a minimum, that the following volve COLTS/Strikers, brigade and are clearly addressed in the plan and obstacles, and engineers are usually task force scouts, UAV, JSTARS, and rehearsed during the rehearsal (see be- committed to breaching operations with very little information on the obstacles any other available “lookers.” Find the low): obstacles to confirm/deny the enemy • they are tasked to breach. It is this course of action. Confirm the proposed Who determines that conditions are shaping of the terrain that will tell the set? story of how the enemy is defending — point of breach/penetration. Consider layering reconnaissance assets by send- • Who initiates the smoke (artillery and where. Engineers (yes…even en- ing in initial forces to identify obstacle emy engineers) don’t lie. They cannot and mechanical)? — it simply goes against their very locations with subsequent forces (per- • Who adjusts and controls the haps engineer reconnaissance forces — nature! An obstacle on the ground focused on the BFT!) to obtain the pre- smoke? means something. It probably means • that, were you to back up to two-thirds cise information required prior to the Who chooses the specific breach of maximum effective enemy weapons commitment of breaching forces such location? as: range (typically 1200-2000 meters), • Who controls the breach assets? there will probably be an enemy posi- • Obstacle location and type • Who shifts suppressive fires? tion. Terrain visualization tools can • help confirm or deny these locations Gaps and bypasses • Who guides assault forces to the (more “so what?” questions). • Specific minefield composition breach? All too often, however, we do very (may dictate what breach assets to use • How and when do we communicate little to find these enemy obstacles… and in what sequence) this information…and on what nets? and yet they are the one component of • Soil conditions (may indicate suit- How do we do this digitally? the enemy defense that can most easily ability for plowing) • Who is the breach force commander be detected. They can be detected dur- Even in the very best of circum- and have we resourced him (without ing the day or night and are most easily detected during the actual construction stances, we do not have the technology exceeding span of control considera- to detect buried mines as well as many tions) to be successful? of the obstacle — men and machines other low-cost, low-technology explo- are working, vehicles with supplies are TTP: Conduct Combined Arms, forward, and the terrain is changing sive devices. Therefore we must com- mounted SOSA rehearsals. You may pensate for this with TTPs, task organi- shape. Finding precise enemy positions, zation, and focused reconnaissance. To be surprised to see the R (reduction) however, is very difficult. Most OP- missing from the breach fundamentals FOR positions are occupied for only a be successful, we must focus all avail- acronym (SOSR-A). This is the one able “lookers” to enable us to detect brief period during defensive prep (po- mining activity and enemy obstacles — component that least needs rehearsal — sition proofing, rehearsals, security it is the bread and butter battle drill for operations), and then not again until before they are emplaced (see “Kill the the engineers but is the one that, when just prior to contact. Most R&S efforts enemy engineers” above). units indicate that they have conducted focused on finding the enemy in those Habit No. 3: The “Orchestrated rehearsals, has received the most atten- positions are unsuccessful — the en- Ballet of Farm Implements” tion. Where synchronization most often emy is simply not there. Doesn’t Just Happen. fails, and where rehearsals need most TTP: Kill the enemy engineers! focus, is in setting the conditions (sup- En- FM 3-34.2 indicates that the “Com- press, obscure, secure) and in rapidly emy engineers will die. Kill them. Posi- tion observers (early) to detect and dis- mander ensures synchronization through projecting combat power (assault) proper planning and force preparation. through the breach and onto the objec- rupt the enemy’s defensive prepara- Fundamentals to achieve synchroniza- tive. Make this the focus of mounted tions. Target bulldozers, Class IV/V caches, engineer soldiers and equip- tion are: rehearsals. Work through timing, trig- • gers, positioning, and the C2 issues ment, and all obstacle emplacement Detailed reverse breach planning. identified above. Get the engineers to activity. The enemy’s ability to disrupt • our attacking formations and reduce Clear sub-unit instructions. the breach — they’ll do fine! • our momentum is directly related to his Effective command and control. Habit No. 4 – Don’t Call Them ability to successfully emplace his ob- • Farm Implements! stacles. He knows he cannot defeat the A well-rehearsed force.” BLUFOR in a direct fire battle without The first two are fairly straightforward We all (engineers, maneuver leaders, his battlefield shapers — deny him this and are articulated very well in our Army leadership) recognize that our advantage. Currently, mine emplace- breaching doctrine. Reverse breach breaching assets are slow, old, and of- ment is low risk and high payoff. We planning works — do it! Determine the ten inadequate for the assigned breach- must reverse this. We must make it a force ratios required on the objective ing tasks. But they’re the best the Army 40 ARMOR — May-June 2002

gives us — make them work! As a gen- and limitations and find opportunities TTP: Avoid the frontal attack. eralization, engineer and maneuver to increase the tactical and technical While our doctrine indicates that the leaders both fail to understand the ca- proficiency of the soldiers who use it. frontal attack is the least desirable form pabilities and limitations of our breach- of maneuver, it is the one most fre- ing systems, do not identify appropriate TTP: Never underestimate the quently seen at the NTC. Find a flank commitment criteria for specific sys- breaching capability of a single sap- — and mass on it. Exploit a weakness tems, and generally underestimate/un- per! There is absolutely no obstacle or create one. Isolate the point of pene- dersell the capabilities of the most known to man (and certainly none seen tration. BLUFOR units rarely, if ever, powerful breaching force on the com- on the NTC battlefield) that cannot be surprise the enemy but rather “tele- bined arms battlefield — the sapper! breached by an engineer soldier. We graph” their intentions long before LD. TTP: Fire the MICLIC! use mounted systems (MICLIC, tank Find a way to tell a deception story The lethal- plow/roller, ACE) to provide speed or without losing the ability to mass ef- ity of the MICLIC (Mine Clearing Line Charge) should not be understated. It mitigate the risk to dismounted sol- fects at the BFT — no easy task but diers. There may be cases where the one which the OPFOR routinely exe- consists of 1950 pounds of composition sapper is the best available breaching cutes. Use obscuration during prepar- A4 and is capable of defeating most pressure-activated mines, clearing a option (rough, restricted terrain for atory activities and movement to, example). And while there are certainly through, and beyond the LD to make it 14m x 100m lane. Unfortunately, until implications on timing, if the sapper is difficult for the enemy to determine sappers come to the NTC (or are de- ployed to a combat theater), they gen- the only available breaching option, we friendly intentions. should all be prepared to wait…the TTP: Plan for traffic control. erally have not fired a live MICLIC. alternative (mission failure), of course, Get CONUS-based units are authorized the MPs into the fight. Traffic control is (STRAC) only inert line charges, and being much worse! All of which relates a traditional task for military police but back to the importance of gaining spe- even then not enough for one per MIC- cific intelligence about the obstacle at one that they rarely execute at the NTC. LIC crew. This would be the equivalent There must be a trigger to hand over of tank crews achieving “Qualification” the point of breach (BFT) — prior to the cleared lane from the breaching the arrival of the sappers. The ability to having fired only TP (practice) rounds configure an appropriate breaching unit’s engineers to follow-on MPs and/ — or, not having fired one themselves, or engineers. BCTs should plan for a reaching qualification by watching their package without losing momentum de- forward passage of lines if more than pends on the timely and precise nature buddy fire one. Needless to say, there of this information. Your sappers de- one unit is passing through the lane. are a host of issues associated with the Consider detailed march tables with firing of 1950 lbs. of explosive attached mand it. graphic control measures, much like for to 550 feet of cabling and electrical Habit No. 5 – Obstacles Are Like a river crossing, that will facilitate the wiring. Work through them. Consider Rivers…Learn to Breach or Learn passage without losing momentum. the following: to Swim! TTP: Shifts happen. Build flexibil- • Bullet No. 5 of 144 in the safety ity into the plan. Most plans do not summary section of the MICLIC TM Our breaching tenets, while all appro- survive first contact with the enemy, let TM 9-1375-215-13&P priate, probably need to borrow a few ( ) indicates that bullets from our river-crossing doctrine alone make it very far beyond the LD. when the MICLIC trailer is towed by a FM 90-13 Most units identify branch plans for vehicle…restrict operations (in rough ( ): alternate courses of action but generally broken terrain) to 0-5 MPH. Slow • Surprise fail to include BOS implications as they down. Additionally, the launch angle • develop these alternate plans. This is must be 47° ± 2°. Elevations outside Extensive Preparation also where the TOC battle drill that this window may prevent successful • Flexible Plan refocuses all BOS at the revised BFT arming of the charge. Put the MICLIC • location must be in place. Regardless of on a good road or pick a point of Traffic Control where we breach, to be successful all breach that is suitable for the speeds • Organization team members must be refocused at the and launch angle that you require • new breach location if it is to be suc- (again — more “so what?” questions Speed cessful. for your terrain analysis). If units viewed the obstacle as a river Habit No. 6 – Use All Available that requires the passage of not just the • The MICLIC will destroy most all Smoke Assets — Someone Is pressure-activated mines in the 100m x lead maneuver formation but perhaps Always Watching! the entire BCT/division/corps on one or 14m lane. Some mines may remain in two narrow lanes, then perhaps we Of the breach fundamentals (SOSRA) the lane unaffected by the blast effect of the charge. That is why we proof, would be less inclined to “hand wave” the most challenging may be obscura- the details of the breach or to push the tion. Mechanical smokers (wheeled or using either rollers, sappers, or mine requirement to “execute the breach” tracked smoke generators) rarely create plows. down to the lead TF or CO/TM. There the conditions necessary to allow ma- • Until the Army fields a more capa- is little margin for error. If successful, neuver formations to get into position ble system, the MICLIC is still the we might have one to two — 14-meter- to breach. Units rarely identify triggers most capable breaching asset in the wide lanes through which to project to transition from artillery-delivered inventory that allows breaching without combat power. Smoke, dust, direct and smoke to mechanical smoke and even exposing soldiers to the risks associated indirect fires, scatterable mines, and to hand-emplaced smoke (smoke pots). with dismounted breaching operations. chemicals all further narrow this mar- This is one of the most critical compo- Know and understand its capabilities gin for error. nents of the breaching operation that ARMOR — May-June 2002 41

“Most units identify appropriate tar- gets and triggers for artillery-delivered smoke. Fewer use mechanical smokers during the approach to the obstacle or at the breach....” needs synchronization…and needs re- think about the implications for breach- around the point of breach and every hearsal. ing in Korea, Kosovo, or Afghanistan. enemy that can influence the point of TTP: Give a clear task and purpose FM 3-34.2 (Appendix D) is a pretty breach — and then breach. Is this sce- to mechanical smokers. good start to examine the implications nario possible? Yes. Is it possible with- Generally or- of restricted terrain and develop unit out multiple repetitions and the total ders to smoke units read like this… Task: smoke; Purpose: to provide TTPs and SOPs. focus of absolutely every team mem- smoke. Chemical units need a specific TTP: Restricted terrain operations ber? Maybe…but not likely! target (AT systems, MRP- or MRC- are slow — plan accordingly. The Ultimately, however, these habits are sized formations), location (north wall implications on the time required for the responsibility of the breach orches- of the valley, NV123456), and desired maintaining suppression, obscuration, trator — the unit commander. Translate effect (haze, blanket, curtain, etc.) to etc., while we work through a defile are these TTPs and breach habits into clear better leverage their capabilities. Re- tremendous and must be planned and guidance and intent that focuses the hearse their positioning within the for- rehearsed in detail. These are often entire unit on the penetration of the mation as well as the triggers for em- dismounted operations to clear high enemy and his obstacles. And while the ployment and transition from one task ground and, quite possibly, to set sup- use of the “Seven Habits” will not to the next (and yes, there is often more port forces on the far side of the obsta- guarantee success at the NTC or on than one; i.e., one to facilitate the cle. The terrain may restrict the ability any other future battlefield, their appli- movement of support forces into posi- to execute mounted breaching opera- cation, coupled with the warrior spirit tion, another to facilitate breaching tions, further adding to the timing chal- that our soldiers consistently display, operations, and perhaps a third to facili- lenges. All of these details point to a may help units begin to reverse this tate assaulting forces moving through slow, deliberate process. negative trend and give our force the the breach and onto the objective). TTP: Traffic control is critical. Not mobility it requires. TTP: Expend all ammo! Most units only is the river long, it’s wide…and identify appropriate targets and triggers deep! Because defiles may not allow Notes for artillery-delivered smoke. Fewer for two-way traffic and may extend for use mechanical smokers during the hundreds of meters, even kilometers, 1Apologies to Stephen Covey, author of The 7 approach to the obstacle or at the there is even less a margin for error as Habits of Highly Effective People, Simon and breach. Very rarely do units employ units move to and through the breach. Schuster, New York, N.Y., 1989. Combined arms smoke pots and smoke grenades at the March tables are critical as are deliber- obstacle breaching likely requires effective peo- breach — perhaps because it adds to ate controls for entering and exiting the ple as well as effective units! what already is a complicated menu of breach area. 2Colonel Michael K. Asada, et al, “The Grizzly: A System of One,” Engineer, May 2001, p. 41. tasks. Units do so often at their own Conclusion – Making the Seven peril. Assume someone is watching and Habits…Habits. leverage every available asset to create the necessary conditions for commit- The challenge for most units is how to LTC Thomas H. Magness is the ting soldiers to and through the breach. translate these habits into executable engineer battalion S3 trainer on the tasks. The answer, in a word, is repeti- Sidewinder Team at the National Habit No. 7 –Breaching Opera- tion. Units that practice these TTPs, Training Center at Fort Irwin, Calif. tions in Restricted Terrain Are incorporating them into battle drills, Previous assignments include bri- Not “Business As Usual.” SOPs, and mission plans, will develop gade and battalion S3, 4th Infantry Too many units fail to account for the these breaching habits. Multiple repeti- Division, Fort Hood, Texas; com- tions with all members of the combined implications of restricted terrain in the arms team will make the successful ex- pany commander, 16th Engineer planning, preparation, and execution of Battalion, 1st Armored Division, Ger- breaching operations. Units cannot ap- ecution of this extraordinarily complex combined arms task more possible. many; and platoon leader and bat- proach breaching operations in a defile talion staff officer, 17th Engineer as if it were an open valley floor. The These habits are designed to facilitate Battalion, 2d Armored Division. LTC implications for breach timing, maneu- success in the most complicated possi- ver unit positioning, observer position- ble scenario — breaching in contact. Magness holds a master’s degree ing, and breach assets are too critical to The goal must be to set the conditions, from the University of Texas and is overlook. For those who have trained in in accordance with these “Seven Hab- a graduate of the United States Mili- “Mojavia,” visualize breaching opera- its,” to breach out of contact with the tary Academy and the Command tions in Alpha or Bravo Pass — and enemy! Destroy every enemy in and and General Staff College. 42 ARMOR — May-June 2002

KNOW THE ENEMY: A New Type of OPFOR Reflects Current Realities

by Major Kenneth C. Cary

“If you know the enemy, and you and ancient war philosophers, the most those two categories, don’t be alarmed, know yourself, you need not fear the notable of whom is Sun Tzu. We regu- because you’re not alone. Change al- results of a hundred battles.”1 larly quote Sun Tzu’s sayings to the most always meets with resistance, point of axiom. Not to deny the rele- especially when those facing it have to vance, or reverence, of any of his great do some changing of their own to keep A tanker’s worst enemy might very works, but there’s a big difference be- up, but it’s not change for the sake of well be a single dismounted enemy tween “knowing the path, and walking change. What this OPFOR changes soldier equipped with a rocket-pro- the path.” most is the “predictable conditions for pelled grenade (RPG). Or perhaps it’s a victory.” We all like the “old” OPFOR sniper positioned more than two kilo- A Catalyst for Change because we know it and can defeat it. meters away who can put a bullet But one thing’s for certain: the new through one of your tank commanders. It has been more than 13 years since enemy isn’t predictable, and neither the 1989 collapse of the Berlin Wall, At the operational level, your initial and we’re just now getting a look at a will be our OPFOR. contact might occur when you lead Out With the Old, your armored column into a sophisti- new Opposing Forces (OPFOR) doc- trine. The new OPFOR may represent a And In With the New cated ambush that consists of 15 anti- world-class opponent, but it’s a living tank guided missile (ATGM) teams, all The conventional “Krasnovian” OP- firing at the same time and at selected FOR doctrine has served our CTCs and targets. Maybe tanks aren’t the target, battle labs for generations of officers but as you escort the battalion trains to across all branches. It was a fightable resupply a sister unit, the vehicle carry- “The key and critical opposition that tested our Army’s sys- ing ammunition erupts into a ball of difference for us, espe- tems, functions, and services to their fire as it passes over a command-det- fullest. We even got a chance to vali- onated mine. These are just a few capa- cially in terms of train- date our training against Iraq during the bilities of the “new” enemy, an enemy ing, is that the enemy Gulf War. Desert Storm proved to ev- that we are just now beginning to un- doesn’t follow the rules eryone that we trained the right way to derstand and respond to. as we know them. This is defeat the right kind of enemy. How- Military operations in Afghanistan ever, some still argue that we were a a fundamental element of very fortunate coalition force. It’s in- have many of us recognizing, some for teresting to consider a very different the very first time, that there are some asymmetric or adaptive fundamental differences in how we warfare....” outcome had Saddam Hussein been given a chance to read our new OPFOR deal with an enemy in the Contempo- manuals prior to the Gulf War. For rary Operational Environment (COE). Unfortunately, just as many fail to ac- many, the Gulf War only solidified the enemy, an enemy we face today. This opinion that the United States war ma- cept that there is any difference at all. chine is the supreme military fighting We can attribute that particular mindset new OPFOR is an excellent match to to the fact that the United States is the any number of potential threat coun- force of the world. Our notion of battle- tries that exist in the COE. The TRA- field superiority, especially in terms of lead actor on the global stage. We’re technology and intelligence, has re- also the best trained, best equipped DOC Threat Support Directorate (TSD) fighting force in the world. We’re a web site at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, sulted in some very painful and costly the recently released copies of the FM 7- operational lessons learned. Yet despite world power, world power, unstop- those lessons learned, many warfighters pable and dominant. In addition, we 100, OPFOR Doctrinal Framework have the most refined and robust intel- and Strategy, FM-700.1, OPFOR Op- continue to hold fast to the belief that erations, and FM-700.2, OPFOR Tac- fighting an adaptive enemy is no dif- ligence apparatus at our disposal. Our ferent than fighting an enemy that various intelligence resources are in tics manuals. TSD can also provide a place to give us critical information on copy of the OPFOR Interim Training marches to a timetable, has distinctive Support Package to all qualified in- organizations and structures, and relies every potential and existing threat on on numerical superiority to achieve the planet, whenever and wherever we structors who wish to begin implement- need it. As long as we know everything ing the new OPFOR doctrine into train- victory. there is to know about a specific threat ing. However, many soldiers, even be- The new OPFOR is the new enemy, country’s forces, namely their equip- fore reading the new manuals, are al- but what’s so new about it? To be sure, ment, tactics, techniques and proce- ready saying, “We don’t need a new the new, adaptive enemy is older than dures, we will know what they are ca- OPFOR,” and others will do just as the Former Soviet Union (FSU), which pable of and can easily defeat them. We much harm by adding the new manuals makes it older than our conventional are also great students of war and we to their FM library without even crack- “Krasnovian” doctrine. The key and study the writings of numerous great ing a cover. If you fall into either of critical difference for us, especially in ARMOR — May-June 2002 43

terms of training, is that the enemy doesn’t follow the rules as we know them. This is a fundamental element of asymmetric or adaptive warfare. His- tory is full of examples of military forces adapting their operations to overcome disadvantages and then de- feat a numerically superior, better equipped, or better trained opposing force. This is no gross oversimplifica- tion of the facts; adaptive warfare is more a cause for victory than for de- feat. Plainly put, the key to understand- ing adaptive or asymmetric warfare is in the ability to identify and exploit the weaknesses of your opponent while at Photo by Robert L. Stevenson the same time protecting your own as- sets. Infantrymen move ahead to clear a street at the Fort Knox urban warfare complex.

The New Enemy we protect our critical non-combat sys- gagement (ROE) he finds appropriate and His Objectives tems. When comparing our capabilities for the moment and will use our strict as an extra-regional force to any num- adherence to the ROE against us. For The road to better situational aware- ber of regionally dominant states from obvious reasons, operations under these ness begins with a look at how the en- around the world, one thing is clear conditions put us at a distinct disadvan- emy is described in the new OPFOR from the beginning: the enemy will tage. Here are the additional enemy manuals. “The military and non-mil- have the home-field advantage. When objectives: itary force of the ‘State’, a powerful, it comes to the close fight, a home-field regionally dominant, nondemocratic advantage is a big advantage. No Force on Force - “The enemy un- nation that seeks hegemony within its If the state cannot prevent us from en- derstands that “force-on-force” maneu- region. The State views the U.S. as a vers may not be the best way to win tering the region, it will work to protect potential threat to its regional and wars and achieve one’s goals.”4 You global aspirations. It seeks to under- its key weapons systems while target- ing ours. The enemy will accomplish will probably not see as many tank-vs- mine U.S. relations with other regional tank engagements develop on the COE nations in order to increase its own. It this by placing his critical units and battlefield, but that doesn’t mean you systems in sanctuaries, by mixing his seeks regional expansion. The State’s won’t see enemy tank formations ei- goals are long-term. The State is ag- special purpose forces in among the 2 ther. What’s important to study is how gressive yet patient.” and its “…infra- civilian populations, and by attempting armor will be used in the close fight, to control the restricted terrain and ur- structure and policy are representative namely in urban and restricted terrain. of nations that may threaten U.S. inter- ban environments. 3 There is a high probability that some ests.” This template fits many former The enemy’s biggest advantage is enemy armor may even be equipped and current countries we have been time. He will attempt to control time with niche technologies that will either involved with militarily, but it does not completely and will use it to manipu- equal or exceed our capabilities. represent any one particular country, or late our actions by attacking us accord- state. It represents the potential of any Systems Approach to Combat - ing to his schedule. His goal will be to “The enemy believes that a “systems number of states. This OPFOR model create “windows of opportunity” where serves as a basis for developing the he can successfully destroy our key approach to combat” is the most effec- training conditions that match our cur- tive means of achieving success.”5 systems, even if it means accepting a With the emergence of digitization, we rent global environment. We call this reasonable degree of loss with the ac- enemy an OPFOR for training pur- complishment of his mission. At a stra- are becoming more and more reliant on poses, but we call them “threat coun- systems that represent “single points of tegic level, his goal may be to force our failure.” Our biggest challenge on the tries” when we identify the state by early exit from the region by creating name. unacceptable casualties in an attempt to COE battlefield will be protecting key systems that are mission-enabling or The primary operational objective of influence our national will, or more mission-enhancing. the enemy is the destruction of key U.S. simply, he can just wait us out. The systems. This “systems approach to enemy knows the terrain in detail. He Our National Will - “The enemy be- combat” is a method employed by the will work to draw us into the “close lieves that if it can disable our econ- enemy to target critical systems that we fight” in an attempt to negate our omy, capabilities, or even political sta- need to perform or accomplish our mis- standoff capabilities. Standoff does not bility by use of precision weapons and sion. For example, we would be ex- only refer to range, it also means spoof- information warfare, it can cause our tremely degraded in our response to ing our reconnaissance, intelligence, armed forces to lose its effective- enemy artillery fires if the enemy at- surveillance and target acquisition ness….at the strategic level, the enemy tacks and destroys our Q-36/37 radar (RISTA) systems and sensors in an may choose to target our political will systems. It’s highly probable that we attempt to lull us into a false sense of and determination to continue the con- will have to take the fight to the enemy, security. Last, but equally important, flict.”6 The events of September 11, and because of this it is imperative that the enemy will fight using rules of en- 2001 serve as a perfect example of this 44 ARMOR — May-June 2002

“We are the enemy of our enemy, and as simple as that sounds, our awareness of that perception is often fleeting. The enemy knows and studies us, so let us know and study him....”

attempt, and there’s a strong likelihood ing the problem further is the increased training opportunity that will aid us in that we will experience this type of presence of civilians, non-governmen- the development of leaders who are attack again. In regards to information tal organizations, and multinational imaginative, innovative, and adaptive. warfare, it can range from false or un- corporations on the battlefield. Suffice We must train to fight the enemy on complimentary coverage of civilian it to say, “…in vast parts of the world, our terms, not his. “The goal of this casualties, to direct attacks on our no man, woman, and child alive today kind of warfare will encompass more computer systems. will be spared the consequences of the than merely “using means that involve 11 Sanctuary enemy newly-emerging form of war.” As the force of arms to force the enemy to - “The has deter- accept mined that it is able to use sanctuaries mentioned earlier, technical surprise one’s own will.” Rather, the will play a significant role in COE op- goal should be “to use all means what- — both physical and moral — to pro- erations. “Technological advances, di- soever — means that involve the force tect itself from the effects of our stand- versity, and access are generating of arms and a means that do not involve off RISTA and precision weapons.”7 changes in force structure and methods the force of arms, means that involve This can take the form of “hugging” of operation as well as creating condi- military power and means that do not friendly units, to dispersion in urban environments, and the relocation of tions for technological surprise. This involve military power, means that situation has begun an erosion process entail casualties and means that do not expensive and critical platforms and that is slowly eating away at the tech- entail casualties — to force the enemy equipment into a friendly nation-state. nological overmatch the U.S. has en- to serve one’s own interests.”14 We Deny Entry - “At the operational joyed over the last decade.”12 Access must train to fight the enemy when, level, the enemy may focus combat and means availability, and availability, where, and how we choose. engineers on destroying all airstrips to especially in terms of weapons like the prevent enemy forces from rapidly RPG, provide serious bang-for-the- 8 The Armor School, gaining a toehold in the region.” The buck and lead to the proliferation of “Actions on Contact” enemy will seek to deny points of entry cheap but effective weapons. This will to combat forces. He can achieve this have a severe impact on COE opera- At the Armor School, the 16th Cav- through the relocation of his forces and tions, as many States are taking steps alry Regiment began introducing adap- mining operations, to the use of chemi- to, “…move away from today’s large, tive and asymmetric warfare to its offi- cals and weapons of mass destruction expensive, powerful machines toward cers more than a year ago. The intro- targeted on air or sea points of debarka- small, cheap gadgets capable of being duction ranges from independent study tion. The enemy will do anything that manufactured in large numbers and to classroom presentation and discus- may deny our entry into his region. used almost everywhere.”13 sion, and finally to practical application in a field environment. Every student Adaptive - “At the tactical level, the The enemy knows we lack a desire to enemy may decide to emphasize small engage in the close fight. He will at- who attends the Armor Officers Basic Lieutenants Course and the Armor Cap- unit and terrorist tactics rather that di- tempt to draw us into restricted envi- tains Course is given supplementary rectly confronting a technologically and ronments, will engage us with cheap study materials like our “Know Your militarily superior force.”9 Working in but highly effective weapons, and will Enemy” compact disk, which contains three- or four-man teams, small units target key systems in an attempt to in- an extensive library of articles and in- equipped with machine guns, sniper fluence our abilities in the region. rifles, and ATGMs can significantly formation relating to asymmetric war- The real challenge, and a responsibil- fare. The disk is one of five in a com- influence our actions, as well as our ity for all soldiers, is to try and, “get prehensive CD library provided to each resolve. These enemy teams can easily blend in with local civilian populations into the head of the enemy.” Not an Armor student. We use classroom and easy task, especially when we can’t small-group instruction to facilitate dis- and will enjoy extensive freedom of even pin down a specific threat country cussions and to establish a consistent movement. These small units will pose the greatest risk to our force protection as our model, but in this case the need understanding of the enemy in the COE. to accept the change is undeniable. It’s effort, both in terms of direct action, true that the former Soviet Union The most productive training experi- and in the targeting of our key systems. ences we provide our students are trained military fighting forces from called “gauntlets.” Gauntlets are “mul- The Close Fight around the world, and that a lot of their doctrine is still in practice today, ti-echelon, multi-grade, battle-focused leadership experiences conducted in The two significant factors that char- mainly because much of that doctrine constructive (TACOPS), virtual (simu- acterize the COE are location and tech- makes sense. So don’t be surprised to nology. In terms of location, “Complex find some similarities. This is not lation), and live (FTX) training envi- ronments.” We use “gauntlets” to bring terrain and urban environments with change for the sake of change. This together students from the NCO Acad- civilian populations and infrastructures effort provides our OPFOR with a are increasingly becoming centers of clean break in a mindset of detailed emy, the Armor Officer Basic Lieuten- ants Course, and the Armor Captains gravity and therefore required areas of execution in exchange for a realistic Course, to function together to defeat operations.”10 Operations in these envi- COE enemy. This freedom to act out- ronments will involve close-combat op- side of traditional guidelines is not in- an adaptive enemy. erations that are resource-intensive, tended to stimulate the growth of the time-consuming, and costly. Compound- OPFOR; it is designed to provide us a Continued on Page 48 ARMOR — May-June 2002 45

Recent Merkava Attacks Highlight Growing Command Detonated Mine Threat

by Adam Geibel

The Command Detonated Mine (CDM) is quickly becoming a staple of Asymmetrical Warfare. It has been used with deadly effect in both the First and Second Chechen Wars, as well as in Sri Lanka, Lebanon, and the fighting in India’s Kargil region. Also known as an Improvised Explosive Device (IED), the standard device is often a 152mm HE artillery shell or its equivalent with a C-4 wad and detonator linked to a cell phone, pager, or radio initiator. Varia- tions on this theme, to include wire- nated a smaller bomb on a convoy ately, one died later. The only surviving controlled detonation, are as wide- route in front of a civilian bus traveling member of the tank crew was evacu- spread as the conflicts in which they with army jeeps and opened fire to- ated by helicopter to Beersheba’s So- can be found. wards the bus from several positions. roka Hospital. The convoy was moving along a road The Israeli Defense Forces recently The Israeli newspaper Ha'aretz quoted suffered two identical attacks in the between the Netzarim settlement and an unnamed top security official (in- the Karni checkpoint in the Gaza Strip. same area of the Gaza Strip and yet volved in both the Merkava’s develop- showed no perceived ability to respond Although this particular road was pa- ment and the use of the protective to this threat. Prior to February 2002, trolled every 30 minutes, it was clearly plates) who opined that tank operations the IDF’s $3 million, 60-ton Merkava a trap. The 188th Brigade tank was on field assignments without the plates Main Battle Tanks were considered called in to provide fire support and as was “totally stupid.” He explained that fairly invulnerable assets, since the it was moving to contact on a parallel the plates could have saved lives at the Palestinians had no real antitank weap- track, the second charge was detonated Netzarim junction, but other security ons. So Tel Aviv deployed their ar- when the tank passed on it. The tank officials never unanimously backed the mored Goliaths to deal with the Inti- was about 50 meters south of the set- 100 percent use of the protective plates. fada, in the assumption that their tank- tler’s road when it was blown up. The In muddy conditions, the plates limit ers were safe, that the tanks’ mere pres- convoy bus driver (identified only as the tank’s maneuverability. ence would dampen any crisis, and that Itzik) remarked that he heard an explo- they’d suffer no embarrassing losses. According to an initial inquiry headed sion and saw a blue flash in the orchard by IDF Chief Armor Officer Brigadier Wrong assumption. Three Israeli sol- area. He continued in the bus toward Karni, while the jeep behind stopped to General Avigdor Klein, no amount of diers were killed and one suffered mod- armor could have withstood the mas- erate to serious wounds when a bomb open fire at the spot where the terrorists sive explosion. Klein believed the life were apparently hiding. went off underneath their Merkava 3 of the gunner was saved because the tank on the night of February 14, 2002. A group including the military wings explosion did not detonate the tank’s This was the first time a roadside CDM of Hamas and Palestinian Authority ammunition or ignite its fuel. managed to seriously penetrate an Is- Chairman Yasser Arafat’s Fatah faction The CDM apparently consisted of raeli tank’s armor in the territories. claimed joint responsibility for the at- Even roadside CDM and ATGM at- tack. more than 50 kilograms of the highly tacks in Lebanon over the past decade explosive CTP, which is made in the did not hurt an entire tank crew. “In response to the killing of five sol- Czech Republic and is a favorite of diers of the national security forces and terrorist groups. It was placed inside an The attack occurred at about 2100 in response to the raid on our cities and empty water boiler. The inquiry con- hours along the single lane asphalted villages ... Salahudin Brigade detonated cluded that “no additional armor to the settlers’ road to Netzarim, a main two roadside bombs against a Zionist underbelly could have prevented the north-south Gaza road at a junction convoy ... then sprayed the convoy with loss of life from the large bomb.” constituting a no man’s land. Palestin- machine gun fire.” ian orange groves had been leveled on Brigadier General Ze'ev Bargil (for- either side of the road because the Is- The tank was toppled on its side and mer head of the Defense Ministry’s raelis claim that snipers were hiding in its 22-ton turret blown off, landing 10 Merkava tank project team) told the them, leaving sandy soil that IDF tanks meters away. The front-mounted en- media that “the tank wasn’t developed used as shortcuts. gine was blown upward by the force of to operate against terror; it is designed the blast, smashed into the gun barrel to take part in war. A tank is designed About 30 minutes before the blast, and flipped the turret off like a bottle to move forward in an open field, to suspected Palestinian fighters had deto- top. Two crewmen were killed immedi- move quickly and attack the target 46 ARMOR — May-June 2002

swiftly ... Were we to provide a solu- Merkavas were lost in October to orized that a hollow, multi-stage (prob- tion to every contingency and threat, ATGM hits. ably magnetic) charge was used, possi- the tank would weigh 100 tons, not 60; In another attack in the Mount Dov bly in combination with a powerful and that would hamper its speed.” magnetic mine or mines. They also region on the Israeli-Lebanese border, advanced that it was a form of sabotage Apparently, Hamas had executed a another soldier was killed in April 2001 similar CDM attack along the Karni- when a Hezbollah “Sagger” ATGM never before seen before in the Middle East. This turned out to be an inflated Netzarim road in the Gaza Strip almost damaged a Merkava turret. The driver estimate, as both CDMs were large but one year prior. In February 2001, as a had warned of the incoming missile, tank-led foot patrol scoured the route but the soldier in the turret had no time apparently not spectacularly sophisti- cated. for bombs, Hamas guerrillas, lying in to duck before it impacted on the tank’s wait, set off the charge when the tank front. Recent history indicated that Hamas halted. Hamas later distributed a video was capable of serial-deployment of recording of the attack, which moder- Another Mekava Mined! CDMs in the Netzarim area, turning ately wounded one IDF soldier. Shortly before 0700 hours, March 14, each operation into a learning event and Hamas bombers, who triggered four 2002, Palestinian terrorists triggered a improving their tactics for the next smaller CDMs in 2000, also favor the Command Detonated Mine under a attack. What is perhaps most troubling Netzarim junction. As a convoy of Merkava 3 MBT that had been escort- about the two Gaza attacks was that three civilian vehicles escorted by two ing a civilian convoy on the Karni- the IDF had fairly recent experience military vehicles reached the Netzarim Netzarim road in the central Gaza Strip. with CDMs and yet seemed to be ig- junction on the night in September The force of the explosion from the 50- noring their own “lessons learned” 2000, three roadside bombs were deto- kilogram (110 pound) radio-controlled from Lebanon. Due to OPSEC consid- nated in rapid succession. As the two mine blew the turret off the tank. The erations, we’ll probably never know soldiers stepped out of their vehicle to terrorists were apparently hiding in or how often or vigorously the IDF con- check whether anyone was hurt, the behind a nearby mosque near the set- ducted route reconnaissance, but appar- attackers activated a second roadside tlement of Netzarim. ently, it wasn’t enough. CDM loaded with a larger quantity of Three soldiers were killed and two explosives. The two wounded soldiers Could any armored behemoth with- were flown by helicopter to Beer- more were wounded. Rescue forces had stand a 50-kilogram CDM? Not likely, difficulty freeing the crew’s bodies unless one wanted to invest in some sheba’s Soroka Hospital. One soldier from the tank, while an IDF helicopter died later. The IDF and the Israel Secu- waddling 100-ton monster. So what rity Agency believed that Hamas mas- evacuated the wounded to Beersheba’s should the U.S. Army do when deploy- Soroka Hospital. One of the two ing to a potential CDM arena? terminded the attack, but did not rule wounded had been standing outside of out the possibility that Palestinian Au- the vehicle. The more useful responses are opera- thority police were involved. tional in nature, but expensive and Merkava Vulnerabilities Reuters reported that a coalition of time-consuming. Varied convoy sched- Palestinian militant groups (including uling is the simplest countermeasure. Even Hezbollah guerrillas (considered the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, the Intelligence operations can use IPB to much better trained and equipped than Salahudin Brigade, and the Islamic predict suitable ambush sights and Palestinian militants) using roadside movement Hamas) took responsibility chalk them up as NAIs, as well as track CDMs, mines, and ATGMs were un- for the attack. The attack took place the movement of enemy sappers who able to destroy a Merkava during 18 one month to the day after the first can build and deploy these mines. Ag- years of fighting against Israeli forces Merkava was destroyed, on the same gressive countermine engineering re- in southern Lebanon. road. connaissance can focus on these NAIs, By the end of 1997, Hezbollah had The area was closed to traffic when a while other reconnaissance efforts are acquired AT-4 “Spigot” ATGMs which giant crane was brought in to tow away sensitized to search for caches of ex- significantly strengthened their anti- the Merkava’s remains. Some Palestin- plosives and/or artillery shells. Fur- armor capability. While there were sev- ian witnesses said that IDF troops had thermore (and topic for a future article), eral incidents in Lebanon where tanks searched nearby fields for suspects, the use of electronic countermeasures were hit with ATGMs, the IDF tanks while other tanks drove several hun- should be exploited far more than we’re were never completely destroyed. dred meters into Palestinian territory currently doing. In September, 1997, Iranian-backed during the search. Palestinian Authority security officials and witnesses also Footnotes Hezbollah units had launched a broad insinuated that the IDF had retaliated offensive, firing mortars and missiles at The Israelis should be familiar with dozens of Israeli Army and South by sending 15 armored fighting vehi- how to quickly and stealthily emplace cles and three bulldozers towards the Lebanon Army militia bases. When LT nearby Nuseirat refugee camp. There charges. On the night of June 17, 1946, Eyal Shimoni’s Merkava, deployed in the Jewish resistance blew up 11 brid- the heart of Israel’s Southern Lebanon they demolished eight houses and a ges linking Palestine to the neighboring security post, as well as crops and irri- security zone, moved out to provide gation systems in the area. countries. Supposedly, they placed cover for troops, it took a direct hit close to 300 kg of explosives and were from a “Faggot” ATGM. Hezbollah CDMs, Speculation and Bad Habits gone in less than 30 minutes, all under claimed that a Tank Sniper Unit group the British guards’ nose. This operation targeted a Merkava at the Kassaret Al- On February 15, 2001, the Israeli- became known as “The Night of the Oroush post, killing one Israeli officer based Internet wire service DEBKAfile Bridges” and was the largest the Haga- and wounding two others. Two more reported that their military sources the- nah launched. ARMOR — May-June 2002 47

Know the Enemy from Page 45 References These shared learning experiences re- 3Ibid. Moqawama.org, September 1997 Operations sult in officers and NCOs who are, 4 Ibid. “self-confident, adaptive leaders who “Hizbullah gets radio up and revelations of ad- motivate teams to solve complex prob- 5 Ibid. vanced weapons,” Arabic News.Com, 16 Oct lems while operating in a full-spec- 6 Ibid. 97 trum environment in an Army trans- Moqawama.org, October 1997 Operations forming to an Interim and an Objective 7 Ibid. 15 “Islamic Resistance Detonates Bomb; 5 Israelis Force.” The Armor School continues 8 Ibid. Wounded,” Ba'labakk Voice of the Oppressed, to refine and enhance leadership devel- 29 Nov 97 opment that trains our future leaders to, 9Ibid. “Lead teams that are lethal at the point “Lebanon: Israel’s Vietnam?,” Peter Hirschberg, 10White Paper: Capturing the Operational Envi- The Jerusalem Report, 11 Dec 97 of contact.” ronment, TSD, TRADOC, Ft. Leavenworth, Kan., 2 February 2000. Moqawama.org, December 1997 Operations When discussing the new enemy, there are two words we should drop 11The Transformation of War, Martin van “The Vulture and The Snake - Counter-Guerrilla from our vocabulary — “always” and Creveld, The Free Press, 1991. Air Warfare: The War in Southern Lebanon,” “never.” Those two words quickly sum Shmuel L. Gordon, Mideast Security and Pol- 12White Paper: Capturing the Operational Envi- icy Studies, No. 39, July 1998 up our understanding of the enemy in the COE. The authors of the new OP- ronment. Ha'aretz, 27 Sep 00 FOR manuals fully understand the im- 13Martin van Creveld. “Soldier hurt in Netzarim bombing,” Arieh portance of their mission to bring us 14Unrestricted Warfare, Beijing: PLA Literature O'Sullivan, The Jerusalem Post, 23 Feb 01 this information; now it’s up to us to and Arts Publishing House, February 1999. use it to our advantage. “Thus we know “IAF hits Syrian radar station after Hizbullah that there are five essentials for victory: 15Command Philosophy, COL John F. Antal, attacks,” David Rudge, The Jerusalem Post, 17 May 2000. Apr 01 • He will win who knows when to 16Sun Tzu. “Huge bomb under tank kills 3 soldiers,” Amos fight and when not to fight. Harel, Ha'aretz, 15 Feb 02 • He will win who knows how to “Three crewmen killed when tank hits mine,” handle both superior and inferior MAJ Kenneth C. Cary enlisted in Margot Dudkevitch, The Jerusalem Post, 15 forces. Feb 02 1980, and served with the 101st • He will win whose army is animated Airborne Division, Fort Campbell “Israeli Tank Regarded With Pride,” Jack by the same spirit throughout all the Ky., and the 3rd Armored Division. Katznell, Associated Press, 15 Feb 02 ranks. He attended California State Uni- “Arabs Deploy New Explosive Against Tank; 3 • versity Fresno, earning his ROTC Israelis Die,” James Bennet, New York Times, He will win who prepared himself, 15 Feb 02 and waits to take the enemy unpre- Commission as a Distinguished pared. Military Graduate in 1989. After Ar- “A Hollowed Magnetic Charge and Mine Blew mor Officer Basic Course, he served up Chariot-3 Tank in Palestinian Ambush in • He will win who has military capa- Gaza Strip Thursday Night,” DEBKAfile, 15 bility and is not interfered with by during Operations Desert Storm Feb 02 his sovereign. and Desert Shield as a tank platoon “Wrecked Tank Lacked Special Plate Protec- leader in the 2-8 Cav, 1st Cavalry Victory lies in the knowledge of these Division. He later led 1st Cavalry tion,” Amnon Barzilay, Ha'aretz, 17 Feb 02 five points.”16 Division’s Horse Cavalry Detach- “Tank Inquiry: No Amount of Armor Could We are literally standing on the door- Have Helped,” The Jerusalem Post, 19 Feb 02 ment. In 1994, he transitioned into step of a new age of warfare, and we military intelligence, and served as “Israeli tanks leave Ramallah as U.S. envoy must embrace the fact that we are a visits,” CNN, 14 Mar 02 a G2 plans officer and as the spe- principal actor in the COE. We are the cial security officer for the 2nd ID, enemy of our enemy, and as simple as “Three soldiers die in Gaza Strip landmine explo- Korea. He later served with the sion,” Arieh O'Sullivan, Margot Dudkevitch that sounds, our awareness of that per- and the Associated Press, The Jerusalem Post, ception is often fleeting. The enemy 902d Military Intelligence Group, 14 Mar 02 knows and studies us, so let us know Fort Meade, Md., as the group S2; “Three IDF soldiers killed in tank blast near Gaza and study him. as operations officer for the 308th MI BN, and as commander of Char- settlement,” Amos Harel, Jalal Bana, and Haim Shadmi, Ha'aretz and agencies, 15 Mar 02 lie Company, 308th MI BN, Fort Notes Leavenworth, Kan. In 1999, he was assigned as the S2 and intelligence 1Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Thomas Cleary CPT Adam Geibel is the S2, (Translator), Shambhala Publications, Inc. Janu- instructor-writer for the 2nd Squad- 5/117th Cavalry, 42ID (NJARNG). ary 1991. ron, 16th Cavalry Regiment. Cur- In civilian life, he is the Associate rently, he is the regimental S2 for 2The Opposing Forces. (See also FM 7- Editor of the Journal of Military Ord- 100/.1/.2), TSD, TRADOC, Ft. Leavenworth, the 16th Cavalry Regiment, Fort nance and a freelance writer. Kan., 28 August 2001. Knox, Ky.

48 ARMOR — May-June 2002 LETTERS from Page 4 face a free-thinking opponent, you can have the original torsion bar design was based on lack of research. Furthermore, his article is different outcomes from the same scenario. Barnes and Preston’s designs or upon Ger- obscured by his lack of understanding the man ideas. He should have examined the G- organizational turmoil experience by the In closing, I would like to caution CPT 2, Military Intelligence Division (MID, Record Ordnance Department due to huge demands Johnson in making broad statements that Group 165, NA) files from the U.S. Army of developing new weapons under wartime attribute the success or failure of particular military attaché in Germany during the mid pressures and rapidly changing require- units on how much field time the unit has or 1930s. Other key ordnance members in ments insisted on by the using services. how they defeat the MILES equipment. The attendance on the torsion bar decision were Nevertheless, the torsion bar system would success or failure of a unit is a direct reflec- BG John Christmas, an engineer and tank never have been approved without the driv- tion on how the unit leaders train their sol- designer, and LTC Joseph Colby, a protégé ing force of the Ordnance Department. diers and the attitude that the leaders instill of General Barnes. in those soldiers. It is a pity that Mr. Dyer created another In addition, a few additional examples will myth. He has, over the years, contributed ROBERT W. PHILLIPS service to contradict Dyer’s thesis. many excellent technical drawings for vari- CPT, IN ous technical and buff magazines, many of HHC 1-4 IN (OPFOR) In The Tank Destroyer History, Historical which appealed to “nuts and bolts” histori- Section, Army Ground Forces, Study No. 29 ans. (1946), page 62, it was noted that the Torsion Bar Suspension Claim “greatest single accomplishment of the Tank GEORGE F. HOFMANN, PH.D. Falls Short on Documentation Destroyer Board was the development of the History Professor M18.” In its development, however, special University of Cincinnati Dear Sir: mention was noted regarding the coopera- tion of General Motor’s officials with the Ord- Mr. D.P. Dyer’s criticism of the Ordnance nance Department. Another example of the Battalion Master Gunner Disagrees Department for not having a torsion bar de- Ordnance Department’s initiative in develop- With Civilian Replacement Concept velopment program is fascinating but by no ing the torsion bar can be found in The Role means persuasive. (See “The Origins of of the Army Ground Forces in the Develop- Dear Sir: Torsion Bar Tank Suspensions,” March-April ment of Equipment, Historical Section, Army 2002 issue.) It is ludicrous. First, and most I am writing in regards to SFC McIntosh’s Ground Forces, Study No. 34, (1946), page letter in the March-April 2002 ARMOR. I important, is a definition of “development”; a 38 in reference to OCM Item No. 19775, 18 word the author uses acrimoniously to would like to start with this statement. I com- February 1943, subject: Medium Tank pletely disagree with his assessment! launch his misleading thesis. According to T20E3. It stated, “At the request of the Ar- English dictionaries, development means “to mored Board, it was decided to provide one I have served as a master gunner on both evolve to a more complete complex.” The model of the T20 series with torsion bar Active Duty and as a member of the National word also means, “advance, amplify, and suspension, which had been developed by Guard. I have served in positions at the promote.” The Ordnance Department fol- the Ordnance Department…[it] appeared to company, battalion, and brigade level. I will lowed this process during World War II. Fur- give greater promise than the conventional not say that I am the best there ever was or thermore, his article falls short on historical volute suspension.” Later when the T23 pilot the best there ever will be, but I will say that I substance because of a lack of important model was being evaluated (OCM Item No. am a leader and a soldier no matter what primary sources to support his argument and 20182, 15 April 1943, subject: Medium tank position I hold. Regarding SFC McIntosh’s subjective conclusions. Apparently, Mr. Dyer T23E3), the Ordnance Department sug- questions: “Do we really want or need that did not take the time to look at the important gested the torsion bar suspension be substi- high speed NCO in the tower, the MILES Andrew D. Bruce Papers at the U.S. Army tuted for the volute suspension system. warehouse, or making tracking charts? Military History Institute, Headquarters Army Eventually the torsion bar system was used Wouldn’t we rather have him leading his Ground Forces (Record Group 339, NA), the in the M24 Chaffee and M26 Pershing tanks. men?” — if he feels that he is not needed in Ordnance Historical Files (OHF) and the The developmental history of the torsion bar the tower, in determining those discreet Ordnance Committee Minutes (OCM) Items suspension is indicative that it would not CCFs, in making sure that the MILES and (Record Group 156, NA), and the Barnes have become a proven system without the LTIDs the battalion’s 44 crews are about to Files to mention a few. If so, he would have proposal, recommendation, and approval of use are operational, in tracking gunnery re- had a better understanding of the organiza- the Ordnance Department. sults for historical data, fixing broke fire con- tional process in weapon acquisition deci- trol systems, etc., and isn’t leading men or sions in the U.S. Army during World War II. What is even more disingenuous in Mr. training them to be warriors, maybe he These sources provide important information Dyer’s article was when he wrote (page 45) needs to evaluate exactly how high speed he on Ordnance Department initiatives regard- that General Colby stated, “he was never in is. ing the development of equipment for the a position to get funds for its [torsion bar] using services, including the torsion bar development until the winter of 1942-43.” I am currently serving as the battalion mas- suspension system. Dyer listed no source regarding Colby’s ter gunner for M1A1-equipped 2-123 AR, of comment. However, in ARMOR, November- the Kentucky Army National Guard. We do One example displaying development initia- December 1991 (page 18), the author of an not have the luxury of self-diagnosing tives was in late December 1942 during a article on tank destroyers quoted Colby from equipment, on-board diagnostics, in-line meeting with representatives from the Tank a personal letter he had received from the replaceable LRUs, or air conditioners. Our Destroyer Board, manufacturing representa- general stating, “I was never in the position master gunners are instrumental in keeping tives, and the Ordnance Department’s Sub- to get funds for its development until the our tanks operational on ranges and during committee on Automobile Equipment. At this winter of 1942-43.” In this case, the author maneuver exercises. The use of the STE-M1 meeting, it was proposed and recommended did list his source (page 19, fn 20). General and the BOB are still daily occurrences for to develop the torsion bar for the T70 (the T Colby wrote the letter to the author regarding us and, most times, we are the trainers for stands for development), which became the his early involvement over the torsion bar our turret mechanics in their use. I use them M18. The key member from Ordnance at this debate. It is courteous among professional often to ensure the OPTEMPO on firing meeting was the chairman, BG Gladeon M. military historians to quote accordingly and ranges continues at the highest possible Barnes, who in 1934-35 had submitted with not engage in plagiarism. This adventurism rate. They work hand-in-hand with my main- Warren E. Preston torsion bar suspension questions the validity of Mr. Dyer’s article. tenance sections. They provide the majority patent letters. (See Reference Material: His- of the input for the commander as we/he tory, Ordnance Department, WW II, Vol. II, For Mr. Dyer to say that the Ordnance De- develops yearly training plans. Chapter 6, Office of the Chief of Ordnance, partment did not approve and was not in- Record Group 156, NA.) Dyer, in his article, volved in the development of a torsion bar I will agree, to a point, that a lot of what is is not at all clear nor does he offer proof if program is shortsighted and demonstrates a taught at Master Gunner School is not al- ARMOR — May-June 2002 49

ways used at the unit level. However, I would graded just like those of the basic LAV III. In build and maintain two sets of fast sea lift submit that what they teach gives the Master fact, when I was associated with United De- ships with two sets of proposed heavy bri- Gunner a decent understanding of how the fense Technologies, the makers of both the gades aboard, it would be only a matter of Fire Control System and the subsystems Bradley and M113, I encountered numerous days before a heavy brigade-sized force work and at least provide a starting point for examples of upgunned M113s equipped with could be deployed wherever it was needed. diagnostics. 20mm or greater caliber cannons and TOW Having two sets of floating reserves would Replacing these dedicated and knowledge- missile launchers. These modified M113s allow one set to be in port at any given time able leaders with civilian contractors would were, and are, used by Saudi Arabia, the for maintenance and overhaul leaving the be a mistake. Are the civilian replacements Netherlands, and others. Although to the other to patrol in the vicinity of potential hot going to come out to the range in subzero purist these are not tanks, they don’t carry spots. If it became necessary to deploy the temperatures, climb through the mud at Graf infantry and they function as light armor. As floating heavy brigade, after an air/beach- or Hohenfels, show up at 0200 to trouble- such, the Armor Community has a strong head has been established, its soldiers could shoot a tank, or deploy to war with us? The interest in their development and employ- be airlifted out to meet their equipment at the master gunner must be in the same uniform ment. It occurs to me that the Army could dock. The second brigade could follow and face the same hardships as the soldiers. purchase these off-the-shelf items for the shortly thereafter. In effect, these two bri- IBCTs at far less cost than developing a gades would be the Armor Community’s He makes the argument that being the completely new 105mm cannon armed LAV version of the Rapid Deployment Force. master gunner keeps leaders from leading variant, which, as Mr. Crist notes in the Note that this concept is recommended for soldiers. The master gunner position is an March-April edition, may not be technically both the Legacy and the Objective Forces as additional slot on the TOE/MTOE of armor feasible. Light armor, M113 or LAV based, I have a very hard time believing that even units. Replacing them with a civilian would equipped with missiles and light cannon, the future armored vehicles of the Objective eliminate a senior NCO position, of which may be all the IBCTs get. Force will be light enough to be air deployed there are already not enough. in great numbers. That being said, where the rapidly air-de- The master gunner is a very valuable asset ployable infantry divisions are “light” forces Obviously, this is just an idea. I offer it in to the commander, at any level he is as- and the Abrams/Bradley divisions are “heavy” the hopes that it will spark discussion be- signed. His knowledge of the Abrams capa- forces, the IBCTs are “medium” forces falling yond what kind of Objective Force vehicle bilities and that of our possible enemy’s somewhere in between. As such, the IBCTs will eventually be developed to the debate on equipment can and should be a considera- can be air deployed where an Abrams/Brad- how that vehicle will get where it is needed. tion of commanders, not only on gunnery ley brigade cannot and, once on the ground, ranges but in the preparation for war. Our they provide the desperately needed stiff- TIMOTHY S. SMYTH input can and should help the commander ener to the light infantry forces likely to be Los Angeles, Calif. develop training scenarios that will help the deployed with them. However, if an IBCT Armor force prevail on the modern battle- encounters a local force of heavy armor — Look To Div Cav for Basic Concept field. The master gunner’s input during staff think Iraq, Iran, or North Korea — they may Needed to Empower Company CO exercises, Warfighters, and even during a survive the encounter, but they will suffer for basic MDMP process can help mold the way it. The key to surviving the next medium- to Dear Sir: commanders think and act. The key is to high-intensity conflict remains with the know when and how to present this valuable “heavy” forces that this nation used so suc- I am responding to MAJ Stollenwerk’s let- data. cessfully in WWII and Desert Storm. Follow- ter, “Empowering Company Commanders: ROBERT W. KYLOR ing on the letter by MAJ Stollenwerk, also in Now It’s Time; Here’s a Way,” in the March- MSG, KYARNG the March-April 2002 edition of ARMOR, April 2002 issue. 2-123 AR BN Master Gunner which advocated the elimination of various levels of intermediate headquarters between One need look no further for this basic con- cept than the divisional cavalry unit. The only Prepositioned Floating Heavy Brigade battalion and corps, I suggest that the “heavy” brigade be the core combat element difference with this concept versus MAJ Could Act as Armor RDF of any future American Expeditionary Force. Stollenwerk’s is that the brigade HQ is elimi- nated, instead of the the division. Just com- Dear Sir: A suitably reinforced heavy brigade with ing from such a unit in Germany, and now battalions of armor, mechanized infantry, being assigned to an armor battalion in I have been an avid reader of ARMOR aviation, artillery, and engineers, as well as a CONUS, I find myself missing the added magazine for many years, but have never beefed up support battalion, could serve as a support of having organic mortars, scouts, written to you before. As a former NCO and mini-division at the beck and call of the in- maintenance, and air support, as well as officer in both 3/185 AR and 1/184 IN, CA theater corps commander. Supplemented by having the added benefit of direct engineer ARNG, I retain both my interest in the go- the IBCT and infantry brigades deployed in and medic assests sliced to you at troop ings-on of the Armor Community and its front of it, the heavy brigade, especially digi- level instead of at battalion. future. The invitation issued by MG Whit- tized, would act as the wide ranging armored comb in the Nov-Dec 2001 issue, and the fist of the corps commander. I suspect that a The current armor battalion, as MAJ Stol- ongoing discussion within your pages over corps with one heavy brigade, a pair or more lenwerk points out, has too many echelons the formation and equipping of the IBCT of IBCTs, and an infantry division could, and directing training and training support, with- brigades, has inspired me to offer my own would, demolish just about anything our foes out the convenience of having any of the opinion about this new force structure and, could throw at it — certainly long enough for above-mentioned assets, and the number of more importantly, the role of the Legacy follow-on forces to arrive if needed. soldiers to train with directly. Making the Force and the Objective Force. companies larger by assigning CSS and To make this concept a reality, however, combined combat arms together and em- The decision to equip the IBCT with the requires the cooperation of the Navy and the powering the company commander to be LAV III has been hotly debated by many of support of the senior Department of Defense able to train his soldiers as a combined arms your authors, most noticeably Mr. Stanley leadership. As has been stated many times, team not only gives leaders at all levels the Crist, and I do not believe that I can contrib- and is the final justification for the IBCTs, the experience to work with every BOS, but ute significantly to it here except to say that I Abrams/Bradley forces are just too heavy to establishes an esprit de corps among the LIKED the M113A3. It is handy, quick, and get anywhere very quickly if deployed di- troops creating a more cohesive combat reliable. In the hands of a skilled driver, it rectly from CONUS. Transporting from home team. can overcome most types of terrain and, key station by rail to a suitable port and then point, it can swim. This is a capability sadly combat loading onto ships takes weeks. The SFC JASON R. MCMURRY lacking in today’s Legacy Force. As to its answer to this dilemma is pre-loaded, fast Platoon Sergeant protection and firepower, these can be up- sea lift. If the Navy can be prevailed upon to 2-70 AR, 1AD 50 ARMOR — May-June 2002

Toward a Revolution in Military Af- Jianxiang Bi, “The PLA’s Revolution in Op- The author appears to have strong convic- fairs? Defense and Security at the erational Art: Retrospects and Prospects” tion and commitment. Yet in his enthusiasm, Dawn of the Twenty-First Century, brings to light another fascinating aspect of he has lost objectivity; moreover, the book’s Theirry Gongora and Harald von Riek- the current era. While many of the other numerous inaccuracies and misrepresenta- chapters address the RMA from an interna- tions further detract from its credibility. hoff, eds., Greenwood Press, Westport, tional standpoint, few do so with such clear Conn., 2000, 206 pp. with index, $62.50. writing and relevance to the serving Ameri- Toner tackles important issues and does so with zeal and passion. But his proposed cure Since this is a professional journal catering can leader. (Admittedly, that was not the declared intent of the book, but the editors for any perceived problems with ethics in the to a professional audience, let me put the military might be worse than the disease. bottom line up front: This book costs more must have taken into account that the vast majority of their sales would be to Ameri- Furthermore, in spite of its outward trappings than $60. That one factor alone effectively to the contrary, this work does not represent places it in the “Gee, I’d buy it if I could cans.) Bi explains in clear and forceful lan- guage a phenomenon that passed (or is still serious scholarship and hence cannot offer but…” category. In effect, the only members plausible, reasoned guidance to military of our community with enough disposable occurring, depending upon your perspective) within the People’s Liberation Army of China professionals seeking solutions to problems income to readily purchase this book are in the area of military ethics. those least likely to do so, the lieutenants. as they struggle through the problems of Yet in the specialist market of military theory, picking a rational route through the minefield LTC DANIEL S. ZUPAN especially in the even rarer realm of “Aca- of available technology. U.S. Military Academy West Point, N.Y. demic Military Theory,” a high price is the The other chapters in this work are signifi- cost of business since the number of books cantly weaker than the three discussed printed is generally fairly small. above. Chapters on French perceptions of Marines Under Armor: The Marine The reason for that should be fairly obvi- the American RMA and Russian inability to ous; this is not a book created for popular do anything without money are, effectively, Corps and the Armored Fighting Ve- consumption. The manuscript is based upon useless to the tactical-level leader. (Some hicle, 1916-2000 by Kenneth W. Estes, revised versions of academic papers pre- might argue to the operational level as well.) Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Mary- sented at a conference held by the Institut While it is notoriously difficult to weave to- land, 2000, 267 pages, $32.95 (hard- Québécois des Hautes Études Internation- gether the papers presented at an academic cover). ales in Quebec City, Canada, in 1997. In conference, one gets the impression that addition to the editors (who wrote a 20-page these editors had decided beforehand that This book is the first compressive history on introduction), the book contains essays from they were going to do so. And once they the development of an armor doctrine in the nine other international authors, none of were saddled with lumping disparate discus- Marine Corps. It is not a book on combat whom will be immediately recognized by sions into some sort of common group, their operations. The author, a graduate of the most readers. Depending upon your point of efforts were not all that successful. Thus, U.S. Naval Academy, mainly served as a view, that may be either the book’s greatest while the essays listed above are certainly tank officer interspersed with military aca- selling point or its most distracting element. worth reading, the overall thematic cohesion demic tours of duty. He received a Ph.D. In either case, it should be noted that read- of the book is loose, and the book as a from the University of Maryland. His thesis is ing even one of the short selections that whole does not justify the cost. Ask your that attempts at modernization of the Marine makes up the book is heavy going. This is local library to buy a copy instead. Corps in the 20th century underwent a frus- not the work of intellectual featherweights. MAJ ROBERT BATEMAN trating history that was driven by an obses- sion over deployable light forces rather than While the book is interesting overall, three Military Fellow, Center for Strategic and International Studies developing a heavy seaborne combined of the chapters are particularly fascinating. arms mechanized force. The first, “Military Revolutions and Revolu- Washington, D.C. tions in Military Affairs: A Historian’s Per- Drawing on untouched archival resources, spective,” written by West Point Professor of numerous interviews, and supported by an History Clifford J. Rogers, is far and away Morals Under the Gun by James H. excellent listing of Marine Corps armored the easiest to read. Rogers explains how Toner, University Press of Kentucky, fighting vehicles and units, Estes provides various historians have postulated the exis- Lexington, 2000, 256 pages, $29.95. new information and analysis on the devel- tence of various “Military Revolutions” in opment of mechanization and how it affected history since the mid-1950s. Effectively, he James Toner’s Morals Under the Gun pro- amphibious warfare doctrine. Estes’ history has written the “History of the History of vides an example of a conservative religious begins with the first wheeled armored car for Military Revolutions,” but in addition to that movement affecting the American military. constabulary duty to the experimental light he adds another element. Rogers makes People in and out of the military should read tank platoon of M1917 Six-Toners deployed clear that all “RMAs” are not “MRs.” That is this book if only to get a glimpse of the in- to China in 1928 as Marine accompanying to say that unless the Military Revolution sinuation into our military culture of a non- weapons. Soon it became apparent that causes large collateral effects in society, it secular agenda that challenges the profes- ship-to-shore transportation of armored vehi- remains just that and does not qualify as a sional military ethic. cles would become a problem. As a result, full Military Revolution. Toner’s thesis is that morality “flows from Marines preferred an amphibious tank and religious principle,” and that, since the mili- light tank capable of being transported in a The next chapter, and perhaps the most lighter to the beach. This led the Marines in useful from a conceptual standpoint, is Mar- tary needs morality, its ethic should also flow from religious values. Anyone concerned the 1930s to pursue sporadic efforts to de- tin C. Libicki’s “What is Information War- velop a tankette, the unsuccessful Marmon- fare?” This chapter is condensed from a about the separation of church and state should have at least some initial misgivings. Herrington. These developments on the eve longer work and Libicki does an admirable of war with Japan, the author argues, were job of hiding the scars; the chapter stands And military professionals concerned about unit cohesion, morale, and esprit de corps the beginnings of the Corps’ obsession with alone very well. Although not all readers will lightness that for low-intensity beach assault agree with his proposed intellectual frame- should be especially alert to the threat posed by the author’s agenda. The danger is in the depended on cargo amtracs and M3 Army work for organizing the various forms of light tanks to support the landing force. “Information Warfare,” the mere fact that this divisiveness of superimposing a religious is the only work we have seen in recent value system on a secular institution com- After the Tarawa blood bath in November years that clearly and plainly lists all the posed of people from diverse cultural and 1943, doctrine changed because innovating different types makes it stand out. religious backgrounds. Marines, such as Louis Metzger, Lemuel C. ARMOR — May-June 2002 51

Shepherd, Jr., and Arthur J. Stuart were weakness regarding the lethality a mobile paign covered months of operations, Smith’s strong proponents for more powerful ar- mechanized force could provide in advanced book focuses on August and September of mored fighting vehicles for advanced am- amphibious warfare. The Marine Corps, he 1942 when the issue of victory or defeat was phibious assault. Marine Corps leadership argues, has yet to come to grips with the truly in doubt. was forced to recognize that high-intensity value of armor in large-scale mobile opera- assault operations now depended more on tions in high-intensity landing operations. Smith provides an excellent overview of the improvements in air and naval fire to support early naval and ground portions of the Gua- a combined arms landing force that required The most scathing portions of the book are dalcanal campaign, highlighting the surprise M4 mediums tanks, flamethrower tanks, and the author criticisms of Marine Corps com- amphibious assault by the 1st Marine Divi- improved armored amtracs, the work horses mandants. He argues they could not grasp sion and the rapid capture of Henderson of the Pacific. By the war’s end, the Corps more modern concepts of combined arms Field, the airfield that was the operation’s had effectually demonstrated its ability to where tanks and mounted infantry would principal objective. Defending the airfield, employ armor as part of a combined arms play key roles in future advanced assault however, was a difficult challenge for the force. operations. Estes accuses the commandants Marines. The Japanese wanted it back, and of too much personalization of budget deci- they reacted with fury. When the Korean War broke out, the Ma- sions. He criticized General Robert H. Bar- rine Corps like the Army had to improvise row for refusing to buy tanks and equivoca- Although numerous other books have been from a weak interwar posture. The author tions of Generals Alfred M. Gray and Carl E. written about Guadalcanal, Smith’s effort weaves very effectually through the prob- Mundy, Jr. He is also critical of General showcases the leadership, tenacity, and ex- lems the Marines experienced in using refur- Charles C. Krulak as wanting to eliminate the emplary battlefield conduct of the Marines bished tanks in small numbers for security Marine Corps tank fleet. who were outnumbered, sick, tired, short of supplies and ammunition, and who were and as antitank weapons. As before, the No doubt Estes’ armor history will raise starving on half rations. Living in squalid, Corps depended on a limited number of considerable concerns, both positive and disease-ridden tropical conditions, and fight- acquired Army tanks, the M26s, to replace negative, about the inability of Marine Corps ing in rugged, jungle terrain, the Marines the World War II Sherman series. One of the leadership to accept an enlightened mecha- defeated numerous Japanese attacks. Gua- most interesting parts of the book is the au- nized doctrine that takes in consideration dalcanal turned out to be the Imperial Japa- thor’s discussion of the postwar Marine maximum organizational combat effective- nese Army’s first major defeat of the Pacific Corps infantry leadership that adopted a new ness with the Fleet Marine Force. Estes’ War. dogma of lightness. This doctrine depended controversial book fills a void on Marine on the Ontos M50 antitank vehicle referred Corps armor and amphibious doctrine. It is to as the “Thing,” which represented a rever- As Smith carefully relates, the inland side of highly recommended, especially since the the Marine perimeter around Henderson sion to the Army’s failed tank destroyer doc- Army is currently confronted with the issue of trine abolished after World War II. This anti- Field was not as heavily defended as the light versus heavy and rapid deployment. beaches. The inland perimeter was defend- tank doctrine degraded the size and health The Marine Corps’ dilemma over an armor of the Corps’ tank force. ed by the 1st Marine Raider Battalion and doctrine is a lesson Army leaders need to the 1st Parachute Battalion. Colonel Merritt The author also gives special attention to look at as they attempt to build the Objective A. “Red Mike” Edson commanded the Raid- the “ugly duckling,” the Army’s rejected Brigade Combat Team. This reviewer feels ers. Strung out along an elevated terrain M103 heavy tank. Only the Marine Corps that Estes’ book also brings to light that, in feature later dubbed Bloody Ridge, Edson’s introduced it to active service. Tank crews, today’s military, there seems to be again a Raiders and elements of the Parachute Bat- according to Estes, preferred its weight and problem in learning lessons from the past talion met a vicious night attack by 3,000 the enormous firepower of its 120mm gun. and the might have been. Military history and Japanese soldiers on September 13, 1942. However, it was mainly the M48A3 that ef- its analysis is excellent mental PT. As such, Outnumbered four to one, the Marines fectually supported the Marines in Vietnam. it can provide a reservoir of knowledge for somehow held despite turned flanks, pene- Yet after the war, little thought was given to the decision-making process necessary to trations, and violent hand-to-hand combat. the value of armor in large-scale operations. anticipate and adapt. Instead, Estes argues, tankers became With gripping description, Smith tells of the GEORGE F. HOFMANN, PH.D. confusion, miscommunication, heroism, cow- wedded to the M48s in the postwar period, University of Cincinnati while the amtractors looked for an improved ardice, and overall chaos on both sides dur- amphibious vehicle, the LVTP-7 series, for ing a frenetic nighttime battle. He also drives employing the infantry as a mechanized war- home the lessons of patrolling, reconnais- fighting force. In the 1980s, the Marine Bloody Ridge: The Battle that Saved sance, simple plans, terrain appreciation, Corps introduced the surrogate light armored Guadalcanal by Michael S. Smith, Pre- and small unit leadership. The Marines won, vehicle (LAV), a new weapon that repre- sidio Press, Novato, Calif., 2000, 264 and Henderson Field was saved, but at great sented the acceptable vogue of lightness. pages, $27.95 hardcover. cost in blood and reputation. Smith’s battle With the acquiring of the LAVs, Estes ar- analysis is right on target and he skillfully gues, there was failure of developing a doc- Guadalcanal, in the Solomon Islands, was lays out the good and bad points of both trine on mounted operations suitable to the the site of the first major American offensive sides’ conduct in the fight. Fleet Marine Force advance amphibious against the Japanese in the Pacific War. To get a more complete picture of the over- operations. From August 1942 to February 1943, Ameri- all Guadalcanal campaign, read Richard B. can and Japanese forces battled on land, Frank’s Guadalcanal: The Definitive Account The Gulf War confronted the Corps with the sea, and in the air for control of that steam- of the Landmark Battle (1990). To read more problems of fighting a mobile campaign in ing tropical island. None of those battles, about the legendary “Red Mike” Edson, read the desert. The Marines went to war with however, had the ferocity or decisive impact Jon T. Hoffman’s Once a Legend (1994). their LAV-25s and outdated Army tanks, the of the Battle of Bloody Ridge. M60A1s, and the hurriedly issued new M1 Smith’s book fits in nicely with other histori- Abrams. Purchase of the Abrams tank, the Author Michael Smith’s first book is the cal works on Guadalcanal, and is a well- author maintains, was shrouded by the anti- story of “the battle that saved Guadalcanal,” balanced portrayal of the pivotal action in tank mentality that believed current equip- and denied the Japanese their best opportu- that campaign. ment was suitable and that TOW missiles nity to drive the Americans into the sea. would defeat Iraqi armor. Concluding, Estes Smith is an active duty naval officer with a COL WILLIAM D. BUSHNELL maintains the Marine Corps is still beset with gift for vivid narrative that brings this tale to USMC, Retired an emphasis on lightness and a doctrinal life. Although the entire Guadalcanal cam- Sebascodegan Island, Maine 52 ARMOR — May-June 2002

Time To Saddle Up... continued where all the past issues, bound in tattered at the time. George Patton’s frequent dissents buckram, were available. covered everything from the employment of tanks with infantry to the shape of a saber I paged through the old books on my lunch blade. He contributed 25 articles during his ca- hours, tracing the branch’s progress from boots and saddles to tracks and turrets as the busi- reer! This tradition continues today: see LTC Steve Eden’s dissent on maneuver warfare in ness of mobile warfare evolved. And after a our last issue, or LTC Tim Reese’s article in this while, it became obvious that while the tools of the trade might have changed, the purpose of one. the magazine had not. Another tradition has been the sharing of criti- What made this even more fascinating to a cal information, how-to articles that fill in the gaps between field manual optimism and on- professional civilian like myself was the degree the-ground reality… “I tried this and it didn’t to which writers felt free to express unofficial opinions and dissents. This value is rare in any work, but then we tried this and it did”-type sto- ries. Sometimes an author lays out the problem kind of hierarchal institution, and hardly ex- from the ground up: MAJ David Lemelin’s “Crisis pected in the armed services, which are hier- archal for a pretty good reason, this being a life in Battle: The Conduct of the Assault,” in Janu- ary-February 1995 is a classic story of this type, and death business. In any case, there was dis- powerfully-written, about the core task of this sent aplenty. And even more surprising was that it was tolerated in good will by a lot of guys with branch. stars on their shoulders. They depended on a The magazine’s pages have also been the field grade military editor to make the decisions launching pad for the discussion of issues well — no committees or editorial boards to knock off beyond our branch. MAJ Don Vandergriff’s de- the sharp corners, no political correctness con- tailed dissection of the Army’s up-or-out person- cerns — and this down-the-middle independ- nel system is an example. Perhaps too easy a ence clearly had a lot to do with the strong loy- target — the system seems a dull-minded, hide- alty of ARMOR’s readers. As a former enlisted ous waste of good people — Vandergriff ex- person, this did a lot to change my opinion of tended his fight to the web, gathered allies, and generals, too. It takes guts to listen to someone most recently edited a collection of essays on who disagrees with you, especially when you the subject. Publication of this book led to brief- don’t have to. This delicate balance, this edito- ings with high-level people who might actually rial laissez faire, continued during my years at have the power to change this atrocious system. ARMOR, violated only twice that I remember. Another type of story parallels the civilian trave- That has been another surprise. logue. These are the stories coming from the Indeed, General Donn A. Starry noted this sharp edge, describing what it’s like in Somalia, quality in his essay on the occasion of the or Bosnia, or Haiti, advisories to those who magazine’s 100th birthday in 1988: come after. An unusual candidate in this cate- gory was CPT Doug Huber’s humorous account “The great names of our branch have, al- most without exception, been contributors; it of his tour in Bosnia and his battle against the Social Security Administration to get a check has been their interest, concern, and willing- delivered to a Serbian widow — in peacekeep- ness to contribute to the debate, to share their experience and knowledge with others, ing today, these missions may come with the territory. that have enabled our journal and our branch to survive, grow, and be the strength we are Each day, when we opened the mail, we would today.” be surprised. These incoming stories were tes- tament to the vibrancy of this branch and its tra- When these great soldiers wrote for their jour- nal, it was often not to agree, but to challenge. ditions. Lieutenant John J. Pershing’s letter to the editor My instinct is that it will all continue without me. in 1889 took issue with the cavalry pistol in use But it’s been an honor to be involved. Drive on! Army Names New IAV “Stryker”

The Army, in a ceremony on February 27 at Fort Lauderdale, Fla., formally named the Interim Armored Vehicle (IAV) “Stryker” in honor of Private First Class Stuart S. Stryk- er and Specialist Fourth Class Robert F. Stryker, Medal of Honor recipients who served in two different wars. On March 24, 1945, near Wesel, Germany, PFC Stuart S. Stryker of Company E, 513th Parachute Infantry, 17th Airborne Division, inspired his fellow soldiers to follow him through intense German machine gun fire, ultimately enabling other elements of his company to capture more than 200 enemy soldiers and free three American prisoners. SPC Robert F. Stryker (a grenadier with Company C, 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry, 1st ID) during at Fort Lewis, Wash. The units, 3d Brigade, 2d Infantry an enemy attempt to encircle his company near Loc Division and 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, are Ninh, Republic of Vietnam, November 7, 1967, threw expected to be equipped and ready for deployment in himself on a mine as it was detonated, saving the lives Fiscal Years 2003 and 2004, respectively. There are of several of his wounded comrades. plans for four additional IBCTs. Both men, killed in these selfless acts, were posthu- The Stryker family of vehicles will include 10 configu- mously awarded the Medal of Honor. rations: Infantry Carrier Vehicle, Mobile Gun System, Anti-Tank Guided Missile Vehicle, Mortar Carrier, Re- Sergeant Major of the Army Jack L. Tilley, who pre- connaissance Vehicle, Fire Support Vehicle, Engineer sided at the naming ceremony, said, “This is a tre- Support Vehicle, Command Vehicle, Medical Evacu- mendous combat vehicle, and it is totally appropriate ation Vehicle, and Nuclear, Biological and Chemical that we name it after two great soldiers who gave their (NBC) Reconnaissance Vehicle. last full measure of devotion on the battlefield in de- fense of our nation.” This article was prepared by the ARMOR staff from Army The Stryker will equip the new Interim Brigade Com- new releases and information from the U.S. Army Center for bat Teams (IBCTs), the first two of which are located Military History website.

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