Philosophy at Cambridge Newsletter of the Faculty of Philosophy Issue 11 May 2014

ISSN 2046-9632

From the Chair Tim Crane

So much has happened in the Faculty since the last newsletter. As you will read here, we have said goodbye, sadly, to Raymond Geuss and Hallvard Lillehammer, but we welcome Dr Tom Dougherty as a new lecturer this autumn. Tom works on ethics and political philosophy, and his presence will add to the Faculty’s attractiveness for research students working in these central areas. On the subject of research students, I hope you will be as pleased as we are to read (on p. 3) about the successes of our recent research students in obtaining academic jobs. We are very proud of them all, and we believe this Inaugural lecture of the Centre for the Study of Existential Risk Photo: Glenn Jobson is more evidence of what a great place Cambridge is to do postgraduate study in philosophy. Application numbers Safeguarding the Future: bear this out: despite the financial pressures on postgraduate students – the AHRC has now withdrawn most The Centre for the Study of its funding for Master’s degrees – we still receive about 200 graduate of Existential Risk applications every year. But we must not be complacent. There is strong Jacob Trefethen competition among the world’s finest universities to attract the best graduate students. It is all the more The age we live in is unprecedented in found the Centre for the Study of Existential urgent, then, for us to seek funding many respects. Perhaps most exciting, is the Risk, a new inter-disciplinary research centre from all possible sources. To compete sheer speed of our technological progress. with a focus on anything that may pose a at the highest international levels, But with big changes come big risks: threat to the very existence of the human we need to be able to fund many synthetic biology, nanotechnology, and species. Their inaugural public lecture on more of our research students than artificial intelligence all have the potential ‘Surviving the 21st Century’ was hosted by we do now. to do harm as well as good, on a global 80,000 Hours, an organisation focused on Any readers who would like to scale. How do we navigate these unknown getting students and researchers to spend learn more about what we are doing waters when the stakes are so high? their careers helping solve the world’s most in this area are more than welcome to This is the question that Professor Huw important problems. contact me by email, or to come and Price, Lord Martin Rees, and Jaan Tallinn What can we do in the face of such visit the Faculty whenever they are in set out to answer last term to a packed unprecedented risks? Whatever the answer Cambridge, and experience our new audience in Lady Mitchell Hall. These three is, directing some of Cambridge’s foremost coffee machine, which is reported to men – a philosopher, a cosmologist, and intellectual power into the problem is a be the envy of all in Sidgwick Avenue! an entrepreneur – have come together to good first step.

Philosophy at Cambridge page 1 May 2014 Judith Jarvis Thomson visit Sophia Connell

event, such as a death, relates to the completion of a process, such as dying, when this process can be interrupted. Finally, Prof. Jimmy Lenman from the University of Sheffield sought to support Judy’s neo-Aristotelian meta-ethical naturalism in a paper entitled ‘Good people and good things’. During her visit, Judy also participated in many other philosophical events with tireless enthusiasm. She gave a talk to the Moral Sciences Club, entitled ‘Rights and Wrongs’ (the podcast is available at http://bit.ly/MSCthomson), which attracted record crowds and resulted in many an interesting supervision. Next, she presented her famous ‘trolley loop’ modification of the Trolley Problem to the first year philosophers, who came away in awe. She met with many other friends, colleagues and students, both postgraduate and undergraduate, all of whom benefited greatly by her generosity. It is fair to say that her presence here was an enriching and inspiring experience for staff and Rae Langton (left) with Judith Jarvis Thomson students alike. We hope to welcome her back again soon.

The name ‘Judith Jarvis Thomson’ of her gender, at a time when very few immediately brings to mind rigour and academic philosophers were women. Sophia Connell is an Affiliated tenacity, breath-taking imagination, and However she persisted, working first at Lecturer in the Faculty, and Director broad engagement with issues in ethics, Barnard College before joining MIT in of Studies for Philosophy at Newnham political philosophy and metaphysics. 1964, where she remained for the rest and Selwyn. It was our great honour at Newnham of her career. to welcome back Prof. Thomson for a Judy’s best-known work is in ethics week-long visit in Michaelmas of this and political philosophy, where she has year. I say ‘welcome back’, because Judy made key contributions to theories of (as she likes to be known) spent two years rights, action, and meta-ethical naturalism. studying at Newnham from 1950–1952. A workshop on her philosophy held at Her memories are warm ones, which Newnham College during her visit she enjoyed reliving – despite the fact focused on all three areas. Prof. Matt that her experience at Cambridge almost Kramer, from the Cambridge Law Faculty, ended her Philosophy career before it discussed the consequences of Thomson’s had begun! Trained by John Wisdom in distinction between infringements and a Wittgensteinian approach that aimed violations of rights when we consider to eliminate philosophical problems by cases of desperation. Prof. Jennifer careful attention to language, she lost a Hornsby from Birkbeck, London (another sense that philosophy might matter in Newnham alumna) discussed her work its own right. on action theory, with a focus on Judy’s After leaving Cambridge, Judy went 1977 book Acts and Other Events which into advertising in Manhattan, but soon Prof. Hornsby had reviewed at the time. felt the pull of philosophy calling her Her presentation on ‘Action and back. She completed a PhD at Columbia Imperfectivity’ discussed difficulties, University, but was discouraged from about the relationship between events pursuing an academic career because and processes: for example, how an Judy giving her talk at the Moral Sciences Club

Philosophy at Cambridge page 2 May 2014 People

Staff news of the ten best philosophy papers of Student Prizes 2012 by The Philosophers’ Annual. Emeritus Professor Onora O’Neill was Ali Boyle (Peterhouse) was awarded the Dr Arif Ahmed was awarded a Visiting made a Companion of Honour (CH) Matthew Buncombe prize for best overall Fellowship by the Australian National for her services to philosophy and public achievement in the MPhil. The Craig Taylor University, Canberra for Michaelmas 2013. policy in the Queen’s New Year Honours prize for best performance in the Tripos Dr Louise Hanson (University of Oxford) List for 2014. went to Kacper Kowalczyk (Trinity) for was appointed to a 5-year College Part IB, and Malthe Rasmussen Prof. Derek Matravers stepped down Lectureship in Philosophy for Fitzwilliam (Emmanuel) for Part II. from his role as an affiliated lecturer here and Churchill Colleges. in Cambridge, after 20 years invaluable Dr Raphaël Ehrsam (Universite Paris Appointments service to the Faculty. He has a full time 1 Sorbonne) was appointed to a role with the Open University. temporary lectureship. We are delighted that a number of our Prof. Rae Langton was inducted into the Dr Craig French (University of Antwerp) recent graduates have secured academic American Academy of Arts and Sciences was appointed to a 3-year Junior Research posts. Luca Incurvati was appointed to on 12 October 2013. She was also chosen Fellowship at Trinity Hall. an Assistant Professorship at the University for Prospect magazine’s 2014 list of the 50 Dr Raymond Lal was appointed to of Amsterdam; and Tom Simpson to a world’s top thinkers. a postdoctoral position on a 3-year lectureship at Oxford. The following were Dr Hallvard Lillehammer took up a interdisciplinary project in Philosophy/ appointed to postdoctoral research professorship at Birkbeck, University of Foundations of Physics at Oxford positions: Claire Benn at the Van Leer London in September 2013. and Cambridge. Institute in Jerusalem; Michael Hannon at Prof. Huw Price’s paper ‘Causation, Dr Caterina Tarlazzi is here on a 3-year Fordham University; Emily Thomas at the Chance, and the Rational Significance British Academy postdoctoral award; and University of Groningen; Rob Trueman at of Supernatural Evidence’, Philosophical Dr Michael Blome-Tillmann is an EC the University of Stirling; and Will Davies Review, 121 (2012) was selected as one Marie Curie Research Fellow for 2 years. at the University of Antwerp.

Raymond Geuss Retires Tom Stern

Raymond Geuss retired in 2014, having narrow, clapped-out debates; disconnected spent more than forty years, twenty at from real politics; self-consciously ahistorical Cambridge, in a profession he once and obsessed with rigour, yet lacking the described as ‘mildly discreditable’. historical sensitivity and the rigour to Raymond’s specialisations would best be understand its limitations. Raymond has listed as: social and political philosophy, devoted much of his intellectual energy to 19th and 20th century German philosophy, challenging political philosophers on these aesthetics and ancient philosophy. In fact, grounds, whilst reminding his readers that this would belie the extraordinary breadth things were not ever thus and that this, too, teach us German language and literature – of the subjects he writes on, and his ability shall pass (though you might not like what making him, as a contemporary put it, to write essays which don’t sit neatly comes next!). the world’s most overqualified German within any specialisation. His writing style Raymond’s lecturing style, grander teacher. Depending on the context, is a rare combination of clarity, depth and and more effective than most, was marked Raymond offered streetwise, professional antiquarian erudition. It is also very funny – by a keen sensitivity to the mood of the support or inspirational philosophical though even his essays cannot convey his room: “Am I boring you? You look bored. dialogue. I am hardly the only philosopher infectious laugh. Academics often divide Let me tell you a story…”. The subsequent to owe my career, in very large part, to his the books they read into ‘for work’ and ‘for anecdotes and illustrations gained dedicated supervision. pleasure’; with Raymond’s books, one Raymond something of a cult reputation: If Raymond means what he says about does not have to choose. “Is it true”, I was asked, “that he started his retirement – ‘no more philosophy’ – In political philosophy, Raymond has reciting the Iliad in Greek, while singing then his absence will be keenly felt. carved out a position for himself as a critic his own musical accompaniment?” (Not I wonder how long he can stay away. of liberal political philosophy from the Left. that I’ve seen, but it wouldn’t surprise A recent item listed on his website is a Contemporary political philosophy suffers, me.) Raymond has been extraordinarily recording of his poem, ‘Mr Bricolage’, in he thinks, from various ills: myopic in its generous to his students. He would, for which disgruntled customers write in focus on particular philosophers and on example, meet some of us each week to with complaints about their Rawlsians.

Philosophy at Cambridge page 3 May 2014 Logic and Assertion Michael Potter on his inaugural lecture

here is, “Assertion is merely psychological”. One of the things Frege is famous for Why did Wittgenstein think this was worth is anti-psychologism – opposition to the saying? Is it true? And if so, what follows? notion that logic has anything to do with To answer the first question – why did psychology – but the view does not he think it was worth saying? – we need originate with him. It was espoused by Kant to identify who Wittgenstein’s target was. and frequently repeated by others in the Who was it who thought that assertion is 19th century. What is relevant here though, not psychological? The only recent author I is not the view itself but the argument for am aware of who has discussed this remark it. Most of the 19th century opponents of at any length (Colin Johnston) treats it as if psychologism appealed to the distinction the target was Russell, but I do not think between the descriptive and the normative: this really gets to the heart of the matter, psychology, being the science of how we because although Russell did indeed at think, is wholly descriptive; logic, being one point (Principles of Mathematics, p. 35) the study of how we ought to think, is say that he was using “the word assertion normative; hence logic cannot be part of in a non-psychological sense”, I do not psychology. Or so they argued. (The word think it mattered greatly to him whether ‘truth-value’–in German, Wahrheitswert–was it has such a sense or not. Russell was, in coined, by Windelband, precisely to allude the end, too flexible a thinker to make his to the alleged normativity of truth.) Wittgenstein in the 1910s account of logic depend vitally on whether Frege repeated this argument for assertion is psychological or not. The anti-psychologism in several places, but My starting point is a remark spoken by person to whom the issue mattered rather in the most famous passage in which he Wittgenstein almost exactly 100 years ago, more, I think, was Frege. And there is some asserted the view his argument for it was on 9th October 1913, in Russell’s rooms in (admittedly circumstantial) evidence that a little different. Nevile’s Court at Trinity. Wittgenstein, who he was indeed Wittgenstein’s real target. Being true is quite different from being had by then been studying with Russell in The evidence consists of a set of three held as true, whether by one, or by Cambridge for two years, was about to questions addressed to Frege, not by many, or by all, and is in no way to be depart for a year in a small town in Norway Wittgenstein himself, but by a Cambridge reduced to it. There is no contradiction and wanted to leave him with a summary friend of his called Philip Jourdain. One of in something being true which is held of the progress in philosophical logic that these questions was: “Will you tell me … by everyone as false. I understand by he had made so far. To assist in the task whether you now regard assertion (I–) as logical laws not psychological laws of Russell hired a shorthand typist called merely psychological?” holding as true, but laws of being true. Miss Harwood, who prepared a typescript Now this is, as I said, only circumstantial If it is true that I am writing this in my to Wittgenstein’s dictation. Russell sent the evidence: by January 1914, when Jourdain room on 13 July 1893, whilst the wind typescript to Wittgenstein in Norway to sent his questions to Frege, Wittgenstein howls outside, then it remains true even check, and his handwritten corrections had been in Norway for three months, and if everyone should later hold it as false. If are visible on the surviving copy. we cannot be sure that the letter had his being true is thus independent of being Almost every sentence in these Notes on say-so. The stronger argument (as so often) recognized as true by anyone, then the Logic demands exegesis – a few years ago is philosophical: it consists in showing why laws of truth are not psychological laws, I published a book devoted to explaining it mattered to Frege, more than it did to but boundary stones set in an eternal some of them. The one I take as my text Russell, whether assertion is psychological. foundation, which our thought can overflow but not dislodge. And because of this they are authoritative for our thought if it wants to attain truth. (Grundgesetze (1893), Introduction) The point to note about this wonderful passage is that it appeals not to the normativity of logic, but to its undemocratic character: it is conceivable, Frege thought, that we might all mis-identify one of the laws of logic. Now we are in a position to see why Wittgenstein’s point about assertion mattered to Frege. If assertion is psychological, as Wittgenstein maintained, this is a problem because of what else Extract from Wittgenstein’s notes on logic Frege said about the nature of logic. Frege

Philosophy at Cambridge page 4 May 2014 realized that logic cannot be characterized conceptual notation one were to leave misunderstanding and to prevent the as being maximally general: that would not out the judgment strokes before the blurring of the boundary between distinguish a logical truth from something premised propositions, something psychology and logic, I assign to logic that happened by chance to be true always essential would be missing … What the task of discovering the laws of and everywhere. Instead he characterized is essential to an inference must be truth, not of assertion or thought. The logic by its subject matter. The problem was counted as part of logic. (Draft reply meaning of the word ‘true’ is explained that he thought (sometimes, at least) that to Jourdain, 1914) by the laws of truth. (Frege, `Thoughts’ the subject matter of logic is assertion: The way out of this bind was for Frege (1918), my emphasis) For there is no doubt that the word to recognize, as he eventually did, that If logic is about truth, and truth is not ‘beautiful’ actually does indicate the the subject matter of logic is not assertion psychological, then logic can be non- essence of aesthetics, as does ‘good’ but truth: psychological too, but not because it is that of ethics, whereas ‘true’ only makes Both grasping a thought and making normative. What is normative, on this an abortive attempt to indicate the a judgement are acts of a knowing view, is not logic (or truth, for that matter) essence of logic, since what logic is subject, and are to be assigned to but assertion. really concerned with is not contained psychology. But both acts involve This leaves us with one uncomfortable in the word ‘true’ at all but in the something that does not belong to problem, though. Recall the reason Frege assertoric force with which a sentence psychology, namely the thought. had offered for thinking that logic does have is uttered. (‘My basic logical insights’ (Notes for Ludwig Darmstaedter something to do with assertion: “what is (1915), Posthumous Writings, p. 252) (1919), Posthumous Writings, p. 253) essential to an inference must be counted as part of logic”. And surely he was right to Why, though, did Frege think that logic is And again: about assertion? It must be, he said, think that assertion is essential to inference. The word ‘true’ indicates the aim because otherwise logic would have So if logic is not about assertion, it is not of logic as does ‘beautiful’ that of nothing to do with inference: about inference either. And that couldn’t aesthetics or ‘good’ that of ethics. All possibly be right. Could it? What is to serve as the premise of an sciences have truth as their goal; but inference must be true. Accordingly, logic is concerned with it in a quite in presenting an inference, one must different way from this. It has much the Michael Potter is Professor of Logic in utter the premise with assertoric force, same relation to truth as physics has to the Faculty and a Fellow of Fitzwilliam for the truth of the premises is essential weight or heat. To discover truths is the College. He gave his inaugural lecture to the correctness of the inference. task of all sciences; it falls to logic to on 18 October 2013. If in representing an inference in my discern the laws of truth. …To avoid …

Philosophy at Cambridge page 5 May 2014 The Cambridge Women in Philosophy Group Claire Benn

History, Classics, Gender outside Cambridge such as Rae Langton Studies, Divinity, Politics, (now a member of the Faculty), David Economics and elsewhere. Archard, Sheri Ross, Catherine Wilson, Not only has the Susan James, Susan Wolf and, recently, Women in Philosophy Miranda Fricker. In Easter term, there are group helped to mitigate talks planned by Jennifer Saul, Elizabeth some of the problems Fricker and Sophia Connell. of under-representation The Women in Philosophy group is by bringing women focused, unsurprisingly, on women. together, it has also However, this is not to say that the provided a forum for raising group is open only to women – events and discussing these are open to everyone, of any gender and problems – both as women from any department or career stage. and as philosophers. Talks Events usually last for an hour and are have been given on often followed by lunch with the speaker ‘Being a Graduate Female or the organisers. They are generally held in Philosophy’, ‘Girly in the morning so as not to exclude those Philosophy’, ‘Not exactly with childcare responsibilities. a career plan: the truth Our group in Cambridge is part of a about work/life balance’ larger movement of Women in Philosophy and ‘The Climate for groups across the country. In 2011, the Women in Philosophy’. group contributed to the first UK report There has also been on the representation of women in an organised trip to a philosophy, cited above, produced by conference dealing with the British Philosophical Association under-representation of Committee for Women in Philosophy women in the sciences. and SWIP UK. This report can be found Alongside these talks, at: www.swipuk.org/notices/2011-09-08. other events have been The issue of gender in philosophy – Cambridge women philosophers past and present organised in order to and in academia in general – is an promote further discussion. important and difficult one. To quote Women are under-represented in For example, a panel was organised for from the contribution of the Cambridge philosophy. As discussed in the 2011 all current final year undergraduates to group made to the SWIP report: Society for Women in Philosophy (SWIP find out more about studying philosophy “Addressing gender imbalance is not UK) report, there is a “fairly steady decline at graduate level. Also, the group hosted only an issue for those affected, it also in the proportion of women from over a ‘Best Teaching Practices’ seminar headed is an important entry point for self- 45% at undergraduate level to under 20% by Prof. Jennifer Saul (Sheffield), and conscious analysis of the discipline as a at professorial level”. At PhD level, only attended by academics, graduates and whole – an analysis that any philosopher 35% of students are female compared to undergraduates from a wide range of should be interested in”. The Cambridge 61% in English and 53% in history. This departments on ‘Implicit Bias, Stereotype Women in Philosophy group goes some problem, which affects all UK philosophy Threat and Women in Philosophy’. way to address these issues by providing departments, is exacerbated in Cambridge The Women in Philosophy group also an opportunity for women working in due to the fact that women working in provides a forum to celebrate the work philosophy to meet; by raising and philosophy are spread out over a range that women are doing in academic addressing the problems faced by of faculties and are therefore unlikely to philosophy in Cambridge and elsewhere. women in philosophy, and by celebrating meet each other. These talks have been on a wide range the work of female philosophers. In 2010, three graduate students of subjects from the composition of If you are interested in finding from Philosophy and HPS got together philosophical writing, to sex, consent and out more, please see our webpage and formed the Cambridge Women in power; from hate speech and pornography www.phil.cam.ac.uk/seminars-phil/ Philosophy Group. The group was created to aesthetics; from the empathising- women-in-phil or look us up on Facebook to identify and provide a solution to this systemizing theory of sex differences to (‘Cambridge Women in Philosophy’). particular problem of under-representation love and revolution of the world. Speakers Alternatively, feel free to email me at by creating a forum to bring together from Cambridge have included graduate [email protected] female philosophers from diverse students such as Lorna Finlayson, Joanna departments. Although the group is Burch-Brown, Christine Tiefensee; and also Claire Benn is a PhD student in principally made up of philosophers Faculty members, such as Paulina Sliwa, the Faculty. from Philosophy and HPS, it is also Elselijn Kingma, Anna Alexandrova and attended by philosophers working in Jane Heal. We have also had speakers from

Philosophy at Cambridge page 6 May 2014 A Philosophical Defence of Monarchy Francis Young

The May 2013 issue of the Philosophy state, it becomes reasonable to argue places the welfare of the individual above at Cambridge newsletter contained that monarchy is a political good that the welfare of the commonwealth, yet the Professor Huw Price’s summary of the outweighs any possible curtailment of libertarian emphasis on children’s freedom inaugural lecture he delivered in freedom that the individual selected for to choose their own destinies raises November 2012, ‘Where would we be rule may suffer. Professor Price’s argument questions of its own. Should libertarian without counterfactuals?’, in which he ignores the fact that most princes and parents be allowed complete freedom to picked up Bertrand Russell’s famous remark princesses are brought up to rule; they give their children the best start in life, for regarding the obsolescence of the law of know from an early age that this is their example by paying for superior education causality, “surviving, like the monarchy, only destiny, and this knowledge weakens the and healthcare – or are there greater social because it is erroneously supposed to do potential constraint on their freedom goods at stake which mean that the no harm”. Professor Price went on to argue imposed by that destiny. An heir’s entire freedom of parents should be restricted, that there is “a significant harm associated view of life is conditioned by the and thereby the ultimate freedom of their with modern constitutional monarchies” knowledge that one day they will be children? Requiring that the children of the on the basis that individuals selected monarch. In this respect, princes and wealthy should be educated by the state, a to rule by an arbitrary accident of birth princesses are no different from anyone view espoused by some on the left of the suffer an unfair constraint on their fortunate enough to be born to wealthy Labour Party, is no more unreasonable personal freedom of choice. Recalling parents, who might expect from an early than requiring that a certain child be the republican bias of many of my age to have a guaranteed job working educated to become the monarch. undergraduate contemporaries, and for their parents’ company, and perhaps Professor Price objects to the fact that feeling the need to put forward an one day succeed to the position of “we think of royalty as a natural kind”, alternative point of view, I was inspired to managing director. Yet whereas the treating it as an example of sloppy thinking take issue with Professor Price’s argument. children of wealthy parents may choose – and it is certainly true that royals are not The underlying justification for to go their own way, future monarchs biologically different from the rest of hereditary monarchy, even in its diluted are bound by a duty to the body politic humanity. Again, however, the fact that constitutional form, is that it guarantees that should override considerations of princes and princesses are brought up to the continuity of the state. At the moment personal freedom. rule means that they are a natural kind the monarch dies, she is instantaneously To object to monarchy on the grounds within the social and political world. replaced so that the institution of of unfairness and inequality is the logical Professor Price’s argument requires us monarchy itself is inextinguishable. With consequence of a libertarian outlook that to accept a radical libertarian outlook in no need to elect a head of state, no continued on page 8 constitutional issues arise regarding the individual or individuals in whom final power resides during an interregnum. In Britain, the monarch guarantees the continuity of the state in much the same way that the Constitution of the United States is supposed to guarantee the legitimacy of that nation’s successive governments. Yet a written document is subject to the vagaries of interpretation and the limitations imposed by the foresight (or otherwise) of its authors, commanding respect only insofar as it serves the interests of citizens. A monarch, by contrast, feels the weight of history and tradition on her shoulders; by giving the state’s authority a human face, she can command respect as the living embodiment of continuity in a way that a contentious document never can. The need to command respect imposes an additional duty on the monarch to conduct herself in such a way that she merits it. If we accept that a monarch is better than (or at least complements) a written constitution as the symbolic and actual source of all authority exercised by the The Duke and Duchess of Cambridge with Prince George Photo: Christopher Neve

Philosophy at Cambridge page 7 May 2014 which children enjoy absolute freedom end of the monarchy itself than the to select their destinies apart from any granting of full degrees to women in considerations of the welfare of the 1947 meant the end of Cambridge Future Events commonwealth. It is inevitable that University. (I think that future generations Routledge Lecture in Philosophy some unfairness will be involved in a will shake their heads about the fact that 12 June 2014 monarchical system, but hierarchies of the former reform came so late, as we do Prof. Michael Bratman merit are also unfair if there are multiple about the latter.) (Stanford University) will give individuals capable of excelling in the most Francis allows that royal heirs suffer the 8th Routledge Lecture entitled authoritative roles. A successful argument a “curtailment of freedom”, but thinks ‘Acting and Thinking Together’. against hereditary monarchy would need it a price worth paying for constitutional to convince us that an alternative system stability. I’m sceptical about the claimed Alumni Festival 2014 can provide the same political goods as a advantage. Is monarchist Sweden more 27 September 2014 constitutional monarchy. Until that point, stable than republican Switzerland, Dr Nigel Warburton will give a the curtailment of freedom that being the or Norway more stable than Finland? talk on ‘Philosophy as Dialogue’. heir to the throne involves is a price worth Indeed, is Britain more stable than Further details will be available paying for the constitutional stability that Australia, Canada or New Zealand, where from: www.alumni.cam.ac.uk. a monarchical system secures. the monarch’s constitutional role is played Cambridge Festival of Ideas 2014 by a distinguished figure chosen from 20 October – 2 November 2014 public life? And the evidence in Britain over Francis Young read Philosophy at Prof. Rae Langton will give a talk Gonville and Caius 1999–2002 and the past century or so seems equivocal, to say the least. Sometimes all that childhood on identities. Please see the Festival now teaches Philosophy to Sixth website: www.cam.ac.uk/festival-of- Formers in Cambridgeshire. training has given us a steady hand at the ceremonial tiller, sometimes less so. (Some ideas for further details. of the stability surely rests on the fact that Information about other forthcoming the tiller is now only tenuously connected Huw Price responds: events is available from the Faculty to the rudder.) website: www.phil.cam.ac.uk. More importantly, I disagree with Francis that the price could possibly be an Choice, by acceptable one, even if there were a small advantage of this kind. Imagine a distant George? cousin of the famous trolley problem, in which we could reduce the risk of runaway I’m grateful to Francis for his thoughtful trams by committing a child to a life as response to my piece, but I’ve misled a transport engineer – she would be him in two ways. First, I’m not a radical raised from infancy for the profession, libertarian. I don’t think that children should without meaningful options of other kinds. have complete freedom, just that children Nobody would think this a price worth such as George Cambridge should have the paying, and it is only familiarity that same choices we take for granted for our prevents us seeing that the bargain in the own children. Second, I’m not a republican, case of royal children is just as bad, and just except in the sense that I presume that he as unfair. It would be unthinkable that we is – we both think that it a good thing should now begin to conscript children for that the real power rests with parliament state service; and only familiarity prevents Moral Sciences Club talks are and hence with the people. But I’ve no us from seeing that we are doing it already. now available on iTunes: objection to the monarchy, so long as (That’s why I felt that this point matched www.cam.ac.uk/video-and-audio future incumbents can be chosen from Russell’s words so well, the present system a field of consenting adults. This long- being in this respect “a relic of a bygone age overdue reform need no more mean the ... erroneously supposed to do no harm.”) Your comments and contributions are always welcome. Please send them to the Editor at: The Joint Session, BSPS and BSET Mrs Jenni Lecky-Thompson Faculty of Philosophy For the first time since 1987 the Faculty is hosting the UK’s leading philosophy Sidgwick Avenue conference  the Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association. Cambridge, CB3 9DA This is the 88th Joint Session and it will be held in Fitzwilliam College on 11–13 email: [email protected] July 2014. The speakers include Hallvard Lillehammer, Roger Crisp, Ian Rumfitt, Gary Kemp, Thomas Pogge, Kimberley Brownlee, Amber Carpenter, Stephen Makin, Tamar Szabo Gendler, Jennifer Nagel, Gideon Rosen and Marcia Baron. Either side of the Joint Session, the annual meetings and conferences for the British Society for Ethical Theory, and the British Society for the Philosophy of Science will also be held. The Faculty gratefully acknowledges support for the newsletter from Polity Press

Philosophy at Cambridge page 8 May 2014