DOCSLIB.ORG

The Authority of Hate Speech Rae Langton

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
The Authority of Hate Speech Rae Langton The Authority of Hate Speech Rae Langton (Draft: final version to appear in Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Law, Vol. 3) 1. Hate speech as doing things with words When we speak, we ‘do things with words’, and often we do things with words to people: advise them, marry them, warn them, and more, as J. L. Austin observed. Our topic here is hate speech, a category absent from Austin’s otherwise generous catalogues.1 But his insight that saying is doing applies to hate speech, as much as to anything else. When hate speech is minimized, or psychologized, shrunk down to expression of unpopular ideas, or injury of sensitive feelings, it is worth recalling that ‘the harm in hate speech’ involves its force as a speech act: it is in large part ‘performative’, as Jeremy Waldron, among others, has recently agreed.2 What is done with words can depend on patterns of authority. An Alabama slave law said, in 1861, that slaves are people and things: as ‘rational human beings, they are capable of committing crimes; and in reference to acts which are crimes, are regarded as persons’, but ‘because they are slaves, they are incapable of performing civil acts, and, in reference to all such, they are things, not persons’.3 The law turned people into property that could be bought and sold, like things, and sent to jail, like rational human beings. The harm in slave law depended, in part, on its authority. This illustrates Catharine MacKinnon’s observation that— Together with all its material supports, authoritatively saying someone is inferior is largely how structures of status and differential treatment are demarcated and actualized. 1 Austin 1962. I am grateful to the organisers and participants of the Analytic Legal Philosophy Conference 2014 in Oxford, where I had the privilege of being ‘Special Guest’, and where a draft of this essay had its first airing, benefiting enormously from the lively and forceful discussion. I am also grateful to audiences in Graz in 2016, and Paris 2017 at the ‘Republique des Savoirs’, École Normale Supérieure. The essay’s companion piece is ‘Blocking as Counter-speech’ (2017), versions of both to appear in my published John Locke Lectures (Langton 2018). 2 Waldron 2012, 166, agreeing explicitly with MacKinnon 1993, and implicitly perhaps with other work including Altman 1993, Anderson et al 2010, Butler 1997, Delgado et al 1995, Maitra 2012, McGowan 2009, Matsuda et al 1993, Langton 1993, Schwartzman 2002, Tirrell 2012. To consider a performative aspect to hate speech is not to be guilty of ‘febrile theorizing’, as some have suggested (Heinze 2016, 75, 167), nor to deify the hate speaker, as Butler suggests (1997), see Langton 2009. 3 Caterall 1926, 247; discussed also in Anderson et al 2012. Not all speech acts, or ‘illocutionary acts’ are performative, but I do not do justice to those distinctions here. 1 Words and images are how people are placed in hierarchies, how social stratification is made to seem inevitable and right, how feelings of inferiority and superiority are engendered, and how indifference to violence against those on the bottom is rationalized and normalized.4 Certain authoritative sayings can subordinate social groups, placing people in hierarchies, depriving them of powers and rights, and legitimating certain treatment of them. Such harms are achieved, in part, through the authority of the saying. 5 If a law could subordinate by ‘authoritatively saying someone is inferior’, could hate speech ever do likewise? Hate speech often says that ‘someone is inferior’, whether authoritatively or not. One form of hate speech is assaultive, its addressee being the target of hatred. These are ‘words that wound’, as Richard Delgado puts it. They convey, according to Mari Matsuda, a ‘message of inferiority’, ‘directed against a historically oppressed group’, that is ‘persecutory, hateful and degrading’.6 Another form of hate speech is propaganda, its addressee being the recruit to hatred. Such propaganda attempts to ‘justify or promote racial hatred and discrimination’, as the 1965 UN Convention puts it, based on ‘ideas or theories of superiority of one race or group of persons of one colour or ethnic origin’; to incite ‘racial discrimination’, or ‘acts of violence… against any race or group of persons of another colour or ethnic origin’.7 (An utterance of hate speech might have both roles, addressing targets and recruits.) It is worth observing that the Alabama slave law meets both those descriptions of hate speech, though it would not be normally be described as assaultive or propagandizing. Yet the slave law matches Matsuda’s description: it conveyed a message of inferiority, directed against a historically oppressed group, that was persecutory, hateful and degrading; and it would be an understatement to say these were ‘words that wound’. It matches the UN description: the slave law was based on an 4 MacKinnon 1993, 31. 5 This understanding of subordination is proposed in Langton 1993, 2007. Given our focus on bad authority structures, we shall not here be unpacking authority in terms of ‘reasons’. 6 Delgado 1993, Matsuda 1993, 36. 7 UN 1965. ‘Incitement’ deserves more attention than I give it here, but I would interpret it as a kind of directive, rather than the (perlocutionary) production of certain effects. 2 ideas or theories of superiority of one race or group of persons of one colour or ethnic origin, and attempted to justify and promote racial discrimination. Our question here is not whether a law could be hate speech, however. It is whether hate speech could be like a law: whether hate speech could have authority, and if so, of what kind, and from what source. Hate speech can have authority, I shall argue. I begin with a sketch (Section 2), and then fill in the detail. We shall need to pull authority down from its ivory tower, to confront non-ideal circumstances (Section 3), and bring out the relativity of authority to a subject domain, to a jurisdiction, and to rival authorities (Section 4). To treat authority in a non-ideal and relative way is not to oust the topic of ‘legitimate’ authority, only its exclusive demand on our attention. If authority is ‘a feature of roles embedded in practices’, as Scott Hershowitz has said, then whether some authority is justified will depend on whether the practice is justified.8 We may need to bear in mind the less ideal and the more, to capture the harm in hate speech, and see how actual authority patterns fail by the light of something better. Hate speech can have epistemic and practical authority: its words can be verdicts that tell someone how things are, and directives that tell someone what to do (Section 5). ‘Epistemic authority’ is authority for belief, including ‘theoretical authority’ or expertise; and also credibility.9 Its characteristic speech act is a ‘verdictive’, a judgement that something is so. ‘Practical authority’ is authority for action, and its characteristic speech act is an ‘exercitive’: a directive, or an enactment of status—‘a decision that something is to be so, as distinct from a judgement that it is so,’ as Austin put it.10 The law is a paradigm practical authority, and commands are its paradigm speech acts. Yet the slave law was doing several things with words. It was indeed an exercise of practical authority, a 8 Hershovitz 2011, 11, 18. This applies mutatis mutandis to authority not based on roles. 9 Besides expertise and credibility, I take epistemic authority to include certain knowledge-related skills, intellectual, perceptual and imaginative. Since epistemic authority include factors other than mastery of theory, I find ‘theoretical’ a misnomer (cf. Raz 1979, 2009, Green 1989, Enoch 2012). 10 Austin 154, but exercitives need not be decisions in my view. For important work on exercitives and their ubiquity, see MacGowan 2003, 2004, though she is interested in permissibility shifts that do not require speaker authority. 3 decision that ‘something was to be so’, creating legal fact: that slaves counted as ‘things’, that they were required to be so treated. It was also an exercise of epistemic authority, a judgement that ‘something was so’, reporting an independent fact, that slaves were ‘rational human beings’. Practical and epistemic authority are distinguished by Joseph Raz, who calls the latter ‘theoretical authority’, and offers a methodological desideratum: An analysis maximizing the similarities between authority for action and authority for belief is, other things being equal, preferable.11 We shall, at least, fulfill this desideratum. Epistemic authority can be practical, as we shall see, and hate speech can direct action with its authority for belief.12 Moreover, epistemic and practical authority can have a common source. There are many sources of authority, formal and informal, but I want to focus on authority gained, informally, by default. Authority can be obtained by accommodation, a default adjustment that occurs, without fuss, when hearers take on board what speakers presuppose (Section 6). Presupposition accommodation is a familiar phenomenon. Someone says ‘Even George could win’, presupposing that George is an unpromising candidate. No-one interrupts with a ‘Whaddya mean, even?’ and the presupposition is taken on board. David Lewis used this example to suggest that conversation, unlike baseball, tends to evolve in a way that makes what is done count as ‘correct play’. Acting as if it is your turn in baseball will not make it correct play, if you have just hit three strikes. But acting as if something is correct play in a conversation tends to make it correct play, if nobody stops you. Hearers routinely accommodate what speakers presuppose, and the hearer’s omission is a quiet engine of the speaker’s success.13 11 Raz p.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • How to Get a Norm from a Speech Act Rae Langton
    How to Get a Norm from a Speech Act Rae Langton The Amherst Lecture in Philosophy lectureP 10, 2015 http://www.amherstlecture.org/ the amherst lecture in philosophyP Lecture 10, 2015 How to Get a Norm from a Speech Act Rae Langton Preferred citation Langton, Rae. “How to Get a Norm from a Speech Act.” The Amherst Lecture in Philosophy 10 (2015): 1–33. <http://www.amherstlecture.org/langton2015/>. Abstract Doing things with words can create an ought that was not there before: Jones makes a promise, a master orders a slave. With the former example, Searle ‘derived’ an ought from an is. With the latter, Lewis showed that permissibility follows a ‘rule of accommodation’. The parallel between promise and order suggests that norms, good and bad, can be got from speech acts by accommodation: what is said ‘requires and thereby creates’ what is required, given certain conditions. Authority is such a condition: of a slave master, a desert island leader, a doctor, a quack doctor, a father, or a presidential candidate who ‘normalizes’ a behaviour. Authority can be pre-established, or gained by accommodation. It can be practical, or epistemic. It can belong to the speaker, or be outsourced. These cross-cutting distinctions allow for weakened authority, but a power to enact directives remains. Hearers can assist: in a two-part process, hearers accommodate presupposed authority, which in turn accommodates a speech act, cre- ating a norm. As hearers we may need, sometimes, to stop helping. The Amherst Lecture in Philosophy (ISSN: 1559-7199) is a free on-line journal, published by the Department of Philosophy, Amherst College, Amherst, MA 01002.
    [Show full text]
  • Self-Narrative, Feminist Theory and Writing Practice
    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by ResearchArchive at Victoria University of Wellington ON SHIFTING GROUND: Self-narrative, feminist theory and writing practice By Anne Else A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Victoria University of Wellington 2006 To Susan Moller Okin 1946-2004 Abstract This thesis centres on a problem that stands at the heart of feminist theory: how women may come to understand themselves as speaking subjects located within historically specific, discursive social structures, to question those structures aloud, and to seek to change them. It combines self-narrative, feminist theory and writing practice to make sense of a body of published work which I produced between 1984 and 1999, with a consistent focus on some form of gendered discourse, by setting it in its personal, historical, and theoretical contexts. Although the thesis is built around published work, it is not primarily about results or outcomes, but rather about a set of active historical processes. Taking the form of a spirally structured critical autobiography spanning five and a half decades, it traces how one voice of what I have termed feminist oppositional imagining has emerged and taken its own worded shape. First, it constructs a double story of coming to writing and coming to feminism, in order to explore the formation of a writing subject and show the critical importance of the connections between subjectivity and oppositional imagining, and to highlight the need to find ways of producing knowledge which do not rely on the notion of the detached observer.
    [Show full text]
  • In This Issue of KRITIKE: an Online Journal of Philosophy
    KRITIKE VOLUME FIVE NUMBER TWO (DECEMBER 2011) i-iii Editorial In this Issue of KRITIKE: An Online Journal of Philosophy Roland Theuas DS. Pada hilology of the future! An insult thrown at Friedrich Nietzsche by his contemporary philologist, Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, whose P polemics dampened the reception of Nietzsche’s The Birth of Tragedy, is one of the reasons why philosophy should be keenly aware with the difference between the idea of doing philosophy and understanding philosophy. On the one hand, doing philosophy in the sense of elucidation and exposition falls at the border between doing philosophy and philology. On the other hand, contributing something different to a discourse is one of the ways in which philosophy is able to live on and move towards the future. On a related note, the movement of philosophy is dynamic and unpredictable, a discourse at one time may be in vogue or in fashion, only to be eventually left as archive fodder. This is not to say that what we leave in an archive is entirely useless, rather this assertion speaks more of how we should overcome the very shoulders in which we erected our own philosophical edifice. Just as Heidegger had the anxiety of overcoming Kant in Sein und Zeit, and Derrida moving beyond Heidegger’s Destruktion, we must continue to think about the future of philosophy and to maintain an invisible thread that can tie and connect other discourses and disciplines together. I am very ecstatic to present the following papers for the tenth issue of KRITIKE: An Online Journal of Philosophy.
    [Show full text]
  • PGR Faculty List 2021 ALL Departments 24August2021 Draft
    Faculty Lists fall 2021 Email: [email protected] for corrections. Current update: 8/24/2021 #=75 or older in 2021 (* was over 70 in 2017 list) Part-time faculty are half-time, unless otherwise noted. UNITED STATES (the top 50 will be ranked) FACULTY # Arizona Faculty: Sara Aronowitz, Thomas Christiano, Stewart Cohen, Juan Comesaña, Reza Hadisi, RiChard Healey, Laura, Howard, J. Christopher Maloney, MiChael McKenna, Bill OberdiCK, Guido PinCione, Marga Reimer, Daniel Russell, Carolina Sartorio, David SChmidtz, Houston Smit, MarK Timmons, Joseph Tolliver, Jason Turner, Steven Wall, Jonathan Weinberg. Part-time faculty: *Allen Buchanan (.25 time) Cognate faculty and philosophers in other units: Martin FriCKe, Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini, Christopher Robertson, Simone Sepe. FACULTY # Arizona State Faculty: RiChard Amesbury, Brad Armendt, Thomas BlaCKson, Cheshire Calhoun, Peter de Marneffe, Typer DesRoChes, MarCello Di Bello, Peter Kung, Joan MCGregor, Shyam Nair, Ben Phillips, Nestor Ángel Pinillos, Douglas W. Portmore, Maura Priest, Steven Reynolds. Part-time faculty: Cognate faculty and philosophers in other units: RiChard Creath, Tyler DesRoChes, ZaChary Horne, Ted Humphrey, PatriCia J. Huntingon, Manfred LaubiChler, Jane MainesChein, Martin BeCK MatuštíK, Ben A. Minteer, *Jeffrie G. Murphy, BeCKett Sterner, Jason Robert, Hava Tirosh-Samuelson, Norbert Samuelson, BeCKett Sterner. FACULTY # BerKeley Faculty: Olivia Bailey, John Campbell, Timothy ClarKe, Shamik Dasgupta, Johann FriCK, Hannah Ginsborg, Florian Grosser, Wesley H. Holliday, NiKo Kolodny, Geoffrey Lee, John MaCFarlane, Paolo ManCosu, Alva Noë, Andreja NovaKoviC, Kristin Primus, R. Jay WallaCe, Daniel Warren, Seth Yalcin, Xueyin (Snow) Zhang. Part-time Faculty: Joshua Cohen (.25 time), MiChael (M.G.F.) Martin, Veronique Munoz Darde, Kwong-Loi Shun. Cognate Faculty and Philosophers in Other Units: Asad Q.
    [Show full text]
  • How Propaganda Works How Works
    HOW PROPAGANDA WORKS HOW WORKS PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS JASON STANLEY Princeton Oxford Copyright © 2015 by Princeton University Press Published by Princeton University Press 41 William Street, Princeton, New Jersey 08540 In the United Kingdom: Princeton University Press 6 Oxford Street, Woodstock, Oxfordshire OX20 1TW press.princeton.edu Jacket design by Chris Ferrante Excerpts from Victor Kemperer, The Language of the Third Reich: LTI, Lingua Tertii Imperii, translated by Martin Brady © Reclam Verlag Leipzig, 1975. Used by permission of Bloomsbury Academic, an imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing PLC. All Rights Reserved ISBN 978– 0– 691– 16442– 7 Library of Congress Control Number: 2014955002 British Library Cataloging- in- Publication Data is available This book has been composed in Sabon Next LT Pro and League Gothic Printed on acid- free paper. ∞ Printed in the United States of America 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 This will always remain one of the best jokes of democracy, that it gave its deadly enemies the means by which it was destroyed. — JOSEPH GOEBBELS, REICH MINISTER OF PROPAGANDA, 1933– 45 CONTENTS Preface IX Introduction: The Problem of Propaganda 1 1 Propaganda in the History of Political Thought 27 2 Propaganda Defined 39 3 Propaganda in Liberal Democracy 81 4 Language as a Mechanism of Control 125 5 Ideology 178 6 Political Ideologies 223 7 The Ideology of Elites: A Case Study 269 Conclusion 292 Acknowledgments 295 Notes 305 Bibliography 335 Index 347 PREFACE In August 2013, after almost a decade of teaching at Rutgers University and living in apartments in New York City, my wife Njeri Thande and I moved to a large house in New Haven, Connecticut, to take up positions at Yale University.
    [Show full text]
  • APA Newsletters NEWSLETTER on FEMINISM and PHILOSOPHY
    APA Newsletters NEWSLETTER ON FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY Volume 11, Number 1 Fall 2011 FROM THE EDITOR, CHRISTINA M. BELLON ABOUT THE NEWSLETTER ON FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY SUBMISSION GUIDELINES AND INFORMATION NEWS FROM THE COMMITTEE ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN, PEGGY DESAUTELS ARTICLES MARGARET URBAN WALKER “Why So Stuck?” PEGGY DESAUTELS “Is the Climate any Warmer for Women in Philosophy?” LINDA MARTÍN ALCOFF “A Call for Climate Change” MICHELLE SAINT “Women, the Profession, and the Blogs” RAE LANGTON “Women in Philosophy: An Australian Initiative” BOOK REVIEWS Lauren Rosewarne: Cheating on the Sisterhood:Infidelity and Feminism REVIEWED BY CELINA M. BRAGAGNOLO Wendy Lynne Lee: Contemporary Feminist Theory and Activism: Six Global Issues REVIEWED BY MARGARET A. CROUCH © 2011 by The American Philosophical Association ISSN 2155-9708 Kate Gilhuly: The Feminine Matrix of Sex and Gender in Classical Athens REVIEWED BY LISA A. WILKINSON Sarah Ahmed: The Promise of Happiness REVIEWED BY AMI HARBIN Brooke A. Ackerly: Universal Human Rights in a World of Difference REVIEWED BY JANE MUMMERY Christine de Pizan: The Book of Peace REVIEWED BY SARAH TYSON CONTRIBUTORS APA NEWSLETTER ON Feminism and Philosophy Christina M. Bellon, Editor Fall 2011 Volume 11, Number 1 associations and societies outside and apart from the APA, in ROM THE DITOR hallways and department meeting rooms across the continent, F E and increasingly in the blogosphere. Finally, we are talking openly. Finally, we are letting our voices be heard, some of us more loudly and assertively than others. Finally, also, we Dear readers, this is the last editorial I will write in my capacity are asking questions—not merely of those who produced the as editor of the Newsletter.
    [Show full text]
  • Ayala Structural Explanation Norms
    A structural explanation of injustice in conversations: It’s about norms Saray Ayala-López California State University Sacramento – [email protected] Draft. Forthcoming in Pacific Philosophical Quarterly. Abstract In contrast to individualistic explanations of social injustice that appeal to implicit attitudes, structural explanations are unintuitive: they appeal to entities that lack clear ontological status, and the explanatory mechanism is similarly unclear. This makes structural explanations unappealing. The present work proposes a structural explanation of one type of injustice that happens in conversations, discursive injustice. This proposal meets two goals. First, it satisfactorily accounts for the specific features of this particular kind of injustice; and second, it articulates a structural explanation that overcomes their unattractiveness. The main idea is that discursive injustice is not the result of biased interlocutors, but of problematic discursive norms. 0. Intro In the current debate on explanations of social injustice we find two important elements. First, individuals’ explicit and implicit attitudes towards those who are the target of injustice; and second, social structures and the material reality beyond individuals’ minds that constraint individuals’ judgements, decisions and actions. Depending on the explanatory weight given to each of these elements, explanations of social injustice lean towards either the individualistic or the structural side of the spectrum. Individualistic approaches proceed by identifying causally relevant mental states in individuals’ minds. Jennifer Saul (2013), for example, has argued that what 1 explains the underrepresentation of women in philosophy is, at least in part, implicit bias, that might result, amongst other things, in unfair evaluations of women philosophers’ work. Implicit attitudes have also been said to explain racial/ethnic health disparities (e.g.
    [Show full text]
  • 0287.1.00.Pdf
    rough notes to erasure Before you start to read this book, take this moment to think about making a donation to punctum books, an independent non-profit press, @ https://punctumbooks.com/support/ If you’re reading the e-book, you can click on the image below to go directly to our donations site. Any amount, no matter the size, is appreciated and will help us to keep our ship of fools afloat. Contri- butions from dedicated readers will also help us to keep our commons open and to cultivate new work that can’t find a welcoming port elsewhere. Our ad- venture is not possible without your support. Vive la Open Access. Fig. 1. Hieronymus Bosch, Ship of Fools (1490–1500) rough notes to erasure: white male privilege, my senses, and the story i cannot tell. Copyright © 2020 by Dolsy Smith. This work carries a Creative Commons BY-NC-SA 4.0 International license, which means that you are free to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format, and you may also remix, transform and build upon the material, as long as you clearly attribute the work to the authors (but not in a way that suggests the authors or punctum books endorses you and your work), you do not use this work for commercial gain in any form whatsoever, and that for any remixing and transformation, you distribute your rebuild under the same license. http://creativecommons.org/li- censes/by-nc-sa/4.0/ First published in 2020 by punctum books, Earth, Milky Way. https://punctumbooks.com ISBN-13: 978-1-950192-79-3 (print) ISBN-13: 978-1-950192-80-9 (ePDF) doi: 10.21983/P3.0287.1.00 lccn: 2020936034 Library of Congress Cataloging Data is available from the Library of Congress Book design: Vincent W.J.
    [Show full text]
  • APA Newsletter on Feminism and Philosophy, Vol. 20, No. 2 (Fall 2020)
    NEWSLETTER | The American Philosophical Association Feminism and Philosophy FALL 2020 VOLUME 20 | NUMBER 2 EDITOR’S INTRODUCTION BOOK REVIEWS Lauren Freeman Andrea J. Pitts, Mariana Ortega, and José Medina, eds.: Theories of the Flesh: Latinx and ABOUT THE NEWSLETTER ON Latin American Feminisms, Transformation, and FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY Resistance Reviewed by Michael Monahan SUBMISSION GUIDELINES AND INFORMATION Megan Burke: When Time Warps: The Lived Experience of Gender, Race, and Sexual Violence Reviewed by Caleb Ward ARTICLES Mari Mikkola Noelle Chaddock and Beth Hinderliter, eds.: Précis to Pornography: A Philosophical Antagonizing White Feminism: Intersectionality’s Introduction Critique of Women’s Studies and the Academy Reviewed by Shay Welch Esa Díaz-Len Is Feminist Pornography Possible? Serene Khader: Decolonizing Universalism: A Transnational Feminist Ethic A. W. Eaton Thoughts on Mikkola: Pornography, Artifacts, Reviewed by Jamie Ritzo and Pictures Robin S. Dillon and Armen T. Marsoobian, eds.: Hans Maes Criticism and Compassion: The Ethics and Politics of Claudia Card Pornography and Melancholy Reviewed by Spencer Nabors Katharine Jenkins Pornography, Social Ontology, and Feminist CONTRIBUTORS Philosophy Mari Mikkola Pornography: A Philosophical Introduction: Response to Commentators VOLUME 20 | NUMBER 1 FALL 2020 © 2020 BY THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION ISSN 2155-9708 APA NEWSLETTER ON Feminism and Philosophy LAUREN FREEMAN, EDITOR VOLUME 20 | NUMBER 2 | FALL 2020 EDITOR’S INTRODUCTION SUBMISSION GUIDELINES AND Lauren Freeman INFORMATION UNIVERSITY OF LOUISVILLE 1. Purpose: The purpose of the newsletter is to publish This issue is dedicated to a critical engagement with information about the status of women in philosophy Mari Mikkola’s 2016 book, Pornography: A Philosophical and to make the resources of feminist philosophy more Introduction (Oxford University Press).
    [Show full text]
  • HANDOUT Lecture 1. Accommodating Authority
    I. ACCOMMODATING AUTHORITY Rae Langton 1. Accommodating injustice. As theorizers of idealized speech, we don’t sufficiently accommodate injustice, i.e. acknowledge it and make space for it. As speakers and hearers, we accommodate injustice rather well, i.e. adjust to it, and help it along. Authority, norms and knowledge can follow patterns of accommodation, enabling some speech acts, and silencing others, for good and ill. 2. Two pictures of speech and its defects. Brandeis on speech, its defects, and remedies for these. Authoritative speech can pose different problems. Subordinating speech acts are not just ‘falsehoods and fallacies’, but acts of ‘authoritatively saying someone is inferior’ (MacKinnon): they rank as inferior, legitimate discrimination, deprive of powers, rights, authority, e.g. Alabama slave law, Nazi propaganda. ‘Free and fearless reasoning’ can’t straightforwardly answer it. (Important factors to be set aside: slurs and epithets, in locution; disgust and hatred in perlocution.) Can more informal hate speech subordinate? Perhaps, if it can gain authority in informal ways. 4. Accommodation. A routine process of adjustment that makes speech acts count as ‘correct play’ (Austin, Lewis). ‘Illocutionary’ speech acts distinct from their content (‘locution’) and their effects (‘perlocution’). A sports analogy, and disanalogy. Naming: ‘I hereby name this ship the Queen Elizabeth’. Permissibility: master to slave, ‘You are now permitted to cross the white line’. Presupposition: ‘Even George could win.’ 5. A three-part pattern Requirement: at t, something is required for ‘correct play’ (e.g. permissibility, presupposition) Felicity Conditions: certain conditions hold (e.g. master has authority, hearer does not block) Felicitous Outcome: ‘correct play’—at t, what is required comes into being (e.g.
    [Show full text]
  • Lectures and Seminars, Trinity Term 2019
    WEDNESDAY 24 APRIL 2019 • SUPPLEMENT (1) TO NO 5236 • VOL 149 Gazette Supplement Lectures and Seminars, Trinity term 2019 Cyril Foster Lecture 350 Social Sciences 357 Colleges, Halls and Societies 363 Anthropology and Museum Ethnography Green Templeton Humanities 350 Saïd Business School Hertford Rothermere American Institute Education Keble Classics International Development Kellogg English Language and Literature Law Linacre History Politics and International Relations Lincoln History/Modern Languages/Voltaire Social Policy and Intervention Magdalen Foundation Socio-legal Studies Mansfield History of Art Sociology Oriel Linguistics, Philology and Phonetics St Anne’s Music Institutes, Centres and St Antony’s Oriental Studies Museums 360 St Hilda’s Philosophy St Hugh’s Ashmolean Museum Theology and Religion St Peter’s Bodleian Libraries Somerville Mathematical, Physical and China Centre University College Life Sciences 354 Hebrew and Jewish Studies Wolfson History of Science Museum Worcester Chemistry International Gender Studies Centre Blackfriars Hall Earth Sciences Islamic Studies Engineering Science St Stephen’s House Reuters Institute for the Study of Mathematical Institute Journalism Physics Latin American Centre Other Groups 366 Foundation for Law, Justice and Society Friends of the Bodleian Medical Sciences 355 Oxford Centre for Life-Writing Friends of the Pitt Rivers Museum Oxford Martin School Pathology Oxford Institute for Population Ageing Pharmacology Physiology, Anatomy and Genetics Population Health Psychiatry 349 350 University of Oxford Gazette • Supplement (1) to No 5236 • 24 April 2019 Cyril Foster Lecture American Literature Research Seminar Faculty of Classics Dr Emily Coit, Bristol Annual lectures This event has been cancelled due to 2 May: ‘Pure English: Edith Wharton’s unforeseen circumstances. American elect’ The following lectures will take place at 5pm in the Ioannou Centre for Classical and Professor Philip Gould, Brown Byzantine Studies.
    [Show full text]
  • PGR Faculty Lists Non-US Departments 19August2021
    Faculty Lists fall 2021 Email: [email protected] for corrections. Current update: 8/17/2021 #=75 or older in 2021 (* was over 70 in 2017 list) Part-time faculty are half-time, unless otherwise noted. NON-US SCHOOLS FACULTIES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM (the top 15 will be ranked) FACULTY # Birkbeck Faculty: Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij, Sophia Connell, Cristian Constantinescu, Stacie Friend, Michael Garnett, Alex Grzankowski, Andrew Huddleston, Susan James, Hallvard Lillehammer, Robert Northcott, Sarah Patterson, Florian Steinberger. Part-time faculty: Ken Gemes, Jennifer Hornsby, Keith Hossack. FACULTY # Birmingham Faculty: Lisa Bortolotti, Darragh Byrne, Nikk Effingham, Salvatore Florio, Iain Law, Herjeet Marway, Yujin Nagasawa, Wouter Peeters, Martin Pickup, Merten Reglitz, Michael Rush, Alex Silk, Maja Spener, Scott Sturgeon, Jussi Suikkanen, Ema Sullivan-Bissett, Henry Taylor, Heather Widdows, Jeremy Williams, Alastair Wilson, Mohammad Saleh Zarepour. Part-time faculty: *Kit Fine (.20 time), *Alison Jaggar (.20 time). Cognate Faculty and Philosophers in Other Units: Kick Adams, Michael Hand, Richard Kaye, Ben Kotzee, Kristján Kristjánsson. FACULTY # Bristol Faculty: Joanna Burch-Brown, Catrin Campbell-Moore, Havi Carel, Anthony Everett, Jonathan Grose, Max Jones, Jason Konek, James Ladyman, Seiriol Morgan, Samir Okasha, Giles Pearson, Richard Pettigrew, Martin Sticker, Tuomas Tahko, Karim Thebault, Tuomas Tahko, Tzuchien Tho, Alan Wilson, Lena Zuchowski. Cognate Faculty and Philosophers in Other Units: *Ken Binmore, David Leech, Philip Welch. FACULTY # Cambridge (Philosophy and HPS) Faculty: Arif Ahmed, Anna Alexandrova, Alexander Bird, Julia Borcherding, Mary Augusta Brazelton, Angela Breitenbach, Clare Chambers, Hasok Chang, Helen Anne Curry, Sarah Fine, Neil Dewar, Marta Halina, Richard Holton, Nick Hopwood, Stephen John, Rae Langton, Lauren Kassell, Tim Lewens, John Marenbon, Dániel Margócsy, Staffan Müller-Wille, Natasha McCarthy, Jessie Munton, Alex Oliver, Michael Potter, Simon Schaffer, Jim Secord, Paulina Sliwa, Richard Staley, Jacob Stegenga, Liba Taub.
    [Show full text]