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CURRICULUM VITAE Name: Philip Noel Pettit Address: 308 Marx Hall, Princeton, NJ 08544-1012, USA Email address: [email protected] Website: http://www.princeton.edu/~ppettit Citizenship Dual: Ireland (from birth 1945); Australia (naturalized 1988); permanent resident, USA (2005). Education and qualifications 1950-58 Primary education: National School, Ballygar, Co Galway, Ireland. 1958-63 Secondary education: St Joseph’s College, Garbally Park, Ballinasloe. 1963-67 Undergraduate and graduate at Maynooth College, Maynooth BA in Philosophy, First Class Honours, Autumn 1966 (National University of Ireland) LPh (by thesis) Summer 1967(Pontifical College, Maynooth). MA (by thesis), First Class honours, Autumn 1967 (National University). 1967-70 PhD student in Philosophy (part-time), Queen's University, Belfast. PhD conferred1970. 1972 MA (ex officio) Cambridge University, Autumn 2002 Appointments 1967-68 Lecturing Assistant at Queen's University, Belfast. 1968-72 Assistant Lecturer at University College, Dublin. 1972-75 Research Fellow, Trinity Hall, Cambridge. 1975-77 College Lecturer, University College, Dublin. 1977-83 Professor of Philosophy, University of Bradford. Chair, School of Interdisciplinary Human Studies. 1983-02 Professorial Fellow in Social and Political Theory, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, Canberra. Professor of Social and Political Theory, 1989, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University Canberra (Special appointment) Joint appointment within Social and Political Theory and Philosophy Programs, 2000. Merit Award 1999-2004 1997-2001 Multi-year Visiting Professor of Philosophy, Columbia University, New York 2002- Laurance S.Rockefeller University Professor of Human Values, Princeton University. (Laurance S.Rockefeller University Professor of Politics and Human Values, 2004-17) (W.N. Cromwell Professor of Politics, Princeton University 02-04) 2013- Distinguished University Professor of Philosophy, Australian National University, Canberra (Fall semester, Princeton; (northern) Spring semester, ANU). Awards and honours Companion of the Order of Australia (AC) June 2017 D.Litt. (honoris causa), Politics, National University of Ireland, June 2000 2 Ph.D. (honoris causa), Political Science, University of Crete, June 2005 Ph.D. (honoris causa), Philosophy, Université de Montreal, June 2006 D.Litt. (honoris causa) Philosophy, Queen’s University, Belfast, July 2007 D.Ph. (honoris causa), Philosophy, Lund University, May 2008 Ph.D. (honoris causa), Philosophy, University of Athens, Sept 2014 Fellow of the Academy of Social Sciences in Australia, 1987- Fellow of the Australian Academy of the Humanities, 1988- Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2009- Honorary Member, Royal Irish Academy, 2010- Corresponding Fellow of the British Academy, 2013- 2014 David and Elaine Spitz Prize for ‘On the People’s Terms’ ‘State of Philosophy’ Laureate, University of Bayreuth 2012 Guggenheim Fellowship 2010 Awarded Australian Federation Fellowship 2005 (not taken up) Old Dominion Faculty Fellow, Council of the Humanities, Princeton University, 2005-06, 2007-08 Emeritus Professor of the Australian National University 2004 Centenary Medal for service to Australian Society and the Humanities in the Study of Philosophy 2003 Invited International Member, The Tampere Club, 2001- University Medal, University of Helsinki, April 1992 Elected Honorary Member, Italian Society for Analytical Philosophy, Rome, 31 Oct 1992 Honorary appointments Honorary Professor of Philosophy, University of Sydney 2008-17 Honorary Professor of Philosophy, Queen's University, Belfast 2009-19 Honorary Fellow, Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, University of Oxford, 2011- Commentaries Xavier Vanmechelen (ed.) (2002) Afhankelijkheid zonder dominantie. Over de sociale en politieke filosofie van Philip Pettit. Leuven - Leusden, Acco, 204 p. ISBN 90-334-5079-8 [Dependence without Domination. On Philip Pettit's Social and Political Philosophy. The authors are: Stefaan Cuypers, Barbara Haverhals, Stefan Rummens, Ronald Tinnevelt, Luc Van Liedekerke and Xavier Vanmechelen.] Common Minds: Themes from the Philosophy of Philip Pettit eds, Geoffrey Brennan, R.E.Goodin Frank Jackson and Michael Smith OUP, 2007. The authors are: John Braithwaite (ANU); John Ferejohn (Stanford and NYU); Richard Holton (MIT); Susan Hurley (Bristol); Rae Langton (MIT); Nicola Lacey (LSE); Cynthia Macdonald (Belfast); Graham Macdonald (Canterbury); Peter Menzies (Macquarie); Alva Noe (Berkeley); Thomas Scanlon (Harvard); Jeremy Waldron (Columbia). 3 Hans Lindahl, ed, Philip Pettit and the Incorporation of Responsibility, Special Issue, Rechtsfilosofie en Rechtstheorie,Vol 38, 2009 Jean-Fabien Spitz, Le republicanisme de Philip Pettit: Ontologie sociale et philosophie politique, Michalon, Paris, 2010; series ‘Le Bien Commun’. Antonio Gonzalez Carillo y Jose Luis Colomer Viadel Republicanismo cívico: socialismo de los ciudadanos, Ediciones del Laberinto de Madrid, 2010 Simon Derpmann, David P. Schweikard, eds, Philip Pettit – Five Themes from his Work, Muenster Lectures in Philosophy, Vol 1, Springer, New York, 2016. Special Lecture Series James B. and Grace J. Nelson Lectures as Philosopher-in-Residence, Dept of Philosophy, University of Michigan, April 2002 Pufendorf Lectures, Lund University, Sweden, May 2005 Blackwell Lectures, Philosophy, Brown University, April 2009 Albertus Magnus Lectures, Philosophy, University of Cologne, June 2009 Hourani Lectures, Philosophy, SUNY at Buffalo, Nov 2009 The Seeley Lectures, University of Cambridge, April 2010 The Uehiro Lectures, University of Oxford, June 2011 The Frankfurt Lectures, Frankfurt University, Feb 2012 The Wittgenstein Lectures, University of Bayreuth June 12 The Muenster Lectures in Philosophy, Muenster University, Oct 2012 The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, University of California at Berkeley, 2015 David Ross Boyd Lectures, Philosophy, University of Oklahoma 2015 Harold Stoner Clark Lectures, Philosophy, California Lutheran University 2016 John Locke Lectures, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford, 2018-19 Giuseppe Rotelli Lectures, Università Vita-Salute San Raffaele, Milan, 2020 <informal invitation> Special Lectures John Curtin Memorial Lecture, A.N.U.,1989. Annual Lecture, Academy of Social Sciences in Australia, Nov 1991 Key Speaker, Nordic Graduate Program in Philosophy, Helsinki Oct 1996 Parcells Lecture, University of Connecticut, Feb 1999 Discussant, Lionel Trilling Seminar, Columbia Uni., March 1999 Donald R.Brown Memorial Lecturer, University of Vermont, Sept 02 Sawyer Seminar Presenter, Oxford University, Oct 02 Madden-Rooney Lecture, University of Notre Dame Irish Seminar 2004, Newman House, Dublin, June 2004 Public Lecture, with reply from Spanish Prime Minister, Circulo de Bellas Artes, Madrid, July 2004; sponsored by Universidad Autonoma de Madrid and Vodafone Espana. “La Caixa” Lectures, Catalonia (Terragona, Girona, Lerida), Oct 04 Tanner Lectures (M.Sahlins) commentator, Uni of Michigan, Nov 2005 Judge William H.Orrick, Jr. Lecturer, School of Law, Berkeley, March 2005 The Dialectica Lecture, German Association for Analytic Philosophy Conference, Berlin Sept 2006 Francis W.Gramlich Lecture in Philosophy, Dartmouth College, Oct 2006 4 Inaugural Edmund Burke Lecture, Trinity College, Dublin 2007 Sprague and Taylor Lecture in Philosophy, Brooklyn College, CUNY, 2007 Public Lecture, in review of the Zapatero Government, Complutense University, Madrid, June 2007 Ethics, Society and Politics Lecture, Rice University, 2008 Max Kampleman Lecturer On Human Rights, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 2007-08 Bank of Finland, Tampere Club Lecture, Sept 2008 Distinguished Lecturer, University of Sydney Law School, July 2009 Routledge Lecture in Philosophy, Cambridge University, Oct 2009 Inaugural Lecture, Integrated Master in Analytical Philosophy Program, http://www.ub.edu/aphil/, Barcelona, March 2010 The Oslo Lecture on Mind in Nature, August 2010 Daxia Forum Lecture, East China Normal University, Shanghai, Nov 2010 Inaugural Quain Lecture in Jurisprudence, University College, London, March 2012 The Dewey Lecture, Law and Philosophy, University of Chicago, 2012-13 The Maurice Goldsmith Lecture, Victoria University, Wellington, 2013 The Alvin Plantinga Lecture for Human Value, Peking University, 2013 The David Norton Memorial Lecture, University of Delaware, 2013 Kendrick Lecture, Arizona Workshop in Normative Ethics, 2014 ‘So, What’ Lecture, University of New South Wales 2014 Dan and Gwen Taylor Lecture in Philosophy, Otago University 2014 Lecture in President of Ireland’s Ethics Initiative, Galway 2014 Garret Fitzgerald School Lecture, Dublin, 2014 The Mark Sacks Lecture, European Journal of Philosophy, University of Konstanz, 2014 The Alan Saunders Memorial Lecture, Canberra, 2014 The Martha Nussbaum Symposium Lecture, Human Development and Capability Association, Athens 2014 Plenary Speaker, Deutsche Gesellschaft fuer Philosophie, tri-annual meeting, Muenster 2014 European Forum for Philosophy Lecture, London, 2014 Annual Center for Political Philosophy Lecture, Leiden University 2014 The Barry Taylor and David Lewis Lecture, Philosophy, University of Melbourne May 2015 S.T.Lee Professorial Fellow Lecture, School of Advanced Studies, Institute of Philosophy, University of London, June 2015 Clough Distinguished Lecture in Jurisprudence, Boston College 2015. Sheffrin Lecture in Public Policy, Division of Social Sciences, University of California at Davis,
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