The Question

In the quandaries of World of What II, one finds the origins of . to Target By Phillip S. Meilinger

re- II air doctrine, How do you, for example, disrupt of making them more efficient and both in the US and Britain, a rail transportation system, or what effective. Pcalled for employing a strate- size and type of are most suit- The concept of OR was first tested gic major bombing campaign against able for putting an oil refinery out of in World War I when British scientists an enemy’s industrial centers. It was commission? What is the ideal were called in by the Admiralty to a “faith-based” theory, unsupported formation to maximize accuracy while help devise a solution to the German by hard evidence. Because strategic also minimizing exposure to enemy submarine menace. After the war, bombing had been seldom conducted defenses? however, this discipline was largely before 1939, things did not work These types of questions had never forgotten. The scientists returned to out as planned. For airmen, their really been asked before, for the simple their private and academic pursuits, ’s newness meant surprises reason that the air weapon did not ex- and military officers were busy with were frequent. ist to strike such targets. To address other matters. How did air commanders cope? these unique questions required a new World War II quickly identified the First, they realized that some of the discipline, Operations Research. Es- need for such methods once again. most basic questions regarding tactics, sentially, OR was the use of scientific The began attaching procedures, and cause and effect still and mathematical methods to study scientists and other specialists to its begged answers. military operations with the intent principal operational commands in 1940, 60 AIR FORCE Magazine / June 2010 and by the autumn of 1941, they had target as did US . Rather, they Operations analysts on the American been organized into OR sections, each proceeded individually to the target side borrowed heavily from their Brit- responsible to the unit’s commander. area in a long trail, usually stretch- ish counterparts. In September 1942, The leading members of these sections ing over a hundred miles. Operations Maj. Gen. Ira C. Eaker, who became were scientists and engineers, while the Research showed that, contrary to the commander of Eighth Air Force, set up rest of the consisted of personnel belief of the aircrews, concentration an OR section for studying bombing trained to “think numerically.” of the over the target accuracy and loss rates. The problems studied by the OR should be increased. About the same time, Gen. Henry H. sections were largely tactical or techni- The scientists calculated that the “Hap” Arnold, commander of the Army cal—such as the most effective use of odds of a midair collision were ex- Air Forces, established in Washington aerial photography, camouflage, aerial tremely small, not more than one per the Committee of Operations Analysts mines, searchlights, , , etc. hour, and the odds of being struck by (COA) composed of mathematicians, Perhaps more importantly, they also the bombs of an aircraft above were lawyers, physicists, engineers, and began studying the effectiveness of negligible. Presumably, this estimate even one architect. strategic bombing. Specifically, Op- allayed the fears of the aircrews, and The types of problems examined erations Research attempted to answer so the concentration of aircraft in the by the committee and its detachment the question of what happened to RAF bomber stream was gradually increased at Eighth Air Force were similar to bombers over Germany, and then to from under 10 aircraft per minute to those studied by the OR sections at suggest methods to improve accuracy 30 per minute over the target area. . Their first task and effectiveness while also lowering was to determine the accuracy of the the risk to aircrews. Determine the Accuracy American bombers and then suggest In 1941, RAF’s Bomber Command Similarly, OR determined that evasive ways to improve it. had a difficult time even locating cit- action over the target itself was “mean- Using cameras that automatically ies at night; bombing difficulties led ingless.” Although rapid heading and took photos during runs, they to radar and radio aids such as , altitude changes may have made aircrews found that, not surprisingly, the better , and . Operations Research feel better, they did nothing to lower their the weather, the better the accuracy. The would test, evaluate, and refine these chances of being hit. Worse, maneuvers Electronic bombing aids were there- navigation and targeting technologies. increased the odds of a collision while fore essential because the weather These aids became increasingly decreasing accuracy. over Germany was usually miserable. effective: In early 1942, less than If the resultant accuracy was so poor Regardless of the radio or radar aids 25 percent of bombs landed within as to require a restrike, then the risk employed, bombing through weather Question three miles of the target. By the end to aircrews actually increased through never matched visual bombing for ac- of the war, that number had climbed “evasive action.” In short, crews were curacy. By October 1944, 41.5 percent to 95 percent—with 50 percent hitting told to stiffen their upper lips, fly of Eighth Air Force’s visually aimed within a mile or so of the aimpoint. straight and level, and put their bombs bombs fell within 1,000 feet of the Bomber Command’s night bombers on target as the best ways to ensure aimpoint. Using only radio or radar did not fly in a large formation to the their continued survival. aids, accuracy plummeted to a miser- of What able five percent. As in Bomber Command, the opera- tions analysts tackled many specific problems, including range extension, tactical formations, bomb weights and to Target fuses, the utility of incendiary bombs, and the optimal strike mission size. A typical problem involved deter- mining the relative threat from enemy fighter airplanes versus anti-aircraft . After extensive interviews with crew members, especially those who had been shot down and lived to tell of it, operations analysts discov- ered that stragglers had it the worst. When a bomber fell out of formation, it was almost immediately pounced on by a half-dozen enemy fighters. A bomber usually fell out of formation, however, because it had been hit by AAA. Specifically, hits to an engine

Opposite: A B-17 with the 359th Bomb Squadron seen from above. Left: B-17s with the 547th Bomb Squadron drop their on a mission during World War II.

AIR FORCE Magazine / June 2010 61 Gen. Ira Eaker (shown here as a briga- dier general) called for the creation of The officers at the Tactical School rec- the Enemy Objectives Unit, which was ognized this problem and made the first tasked with providing detailed analysis rudimentary attempts to study the work- of designated targets. ings of a modern industrialized nation during the 1930s. The War Department forbade the gathering of intelligence on the scientists their full support, but also foreign economies, however, so in 1936, faced other problems. Theories and students and instructors studied the in- doctrine assumed that strategic bomb- dustrial infrastructure of the northeast ing against the industrial infrastructure United States. Their investigations led of an enemy would have decisive them to conclude that 100 well-placed results: It would sap and eventually bombs could shut down 75 percent of the break both the will and capability of region’s electrical generating capacity. the enemy to resist. This was an article Other targets to be struck included rail of faith, not science. lines, fuel storage depots, steel plants, Research gave commanders and and food distribution and preservation planners guidance on how best to facilities. The result of these attacks destroy specific elements of enemy would be paralysis. infrastructure, but the broader question This sounded promising—although it remained: What effect did destroying proved overly optimistic in practice—so an oil refinery or railroad marshaling at the start of the war, air planners called yard have on the overall goal of win- in industrialists to study the German ning the war or breaking the enemy’s economy. They also went to New York will and capability? City financial institutions that had heav- In short, because you knew how to ily invested in Germany before the war. destroy a factory did not necessarily These banks had blueprints of factories, mean you should destroy it. Opera- production schedules, and other crucial tions Research told air commanders data on the German economy. started fires that caused an aircraft to how to hit the target correctly; they Using this information, intelligence lose power, drop out of formation, and now needed to hit the correct target. provided by the British, and knowledge become a straggler. of American industry, planners projected The solution: Put armor around the Intelligence Gathering what specific systems were most impor- vulnerable engines to reduce AAA To address this problem, air leaders tant and also most vulnerable. damage, which would in turn reduce had to move analysis to a higher level of Even more important were the ques- the number of stragglers and losses to abstraction. Airmen realized that they tions that arose after obtaining basic enemy fighters. had not developed a clear understand- economic and industrial data. If you Another problem considered by the ing of what made an economy work. were able to neutralize a portion of a analysts involved accuracy. After study- After all, strategic bombing, like a na- country’s rail network, what effect would ing countless poststrike photographs, val campaign of blockade and surface that produce on the enemy’s economy analysts determined, contrary to proce- raiding, is at base a form of economic as a whole? In short, air commanders dures and popular belief, that bombing warfare. But if you aren’t sure how an and planners were vitally interested in accuracy would be greatly enhanced if economy functions properly, how can determining the effects of their bomb- an entire group released its bombs when you know what makes it fail? ing campaign. the leader did—rather than if every bombardier chose his own drop point. Such technical problems had not been entirely ignored before the war, but many assertions were later proved absurd. In 1938, for example, one school’s bombardment text stated that 100-pound demolition bombs were “particularly efficacious against the average factory or warehouse.” Such small bombs proved useless in combat. It was precisely because of such muddled thinking that OR was so es- sential to the success of the strategic bombing campaign. Top Allied air commanders recognized this and gave

A large formation of B-17s streaks across the sky. Operations Research added science to the art of bombing.

62 AIR FORCE Magazine / June 2010 A large billowing cloud of smoke ob- scures the view of the railyards at Mu- nich, Germany, after B-17s pummeled that area in September 1944.

informed agencies tasked to examine the German war economy looked at the same data and came up with totally different conclusions. The controversy over targeting seems never ending, and is illustrative. One historian has since argued that based on his extensive review of Ger- man railroad records, he is convinced that coal was the key commodity in the German economy, and since it was almost exclusively transported by rail, the transportation plan was the road to victory—albeit not for the reasons posited by rail plan advocates at the time. On the other hand, an author of the official history of British intelli- How did airmen address this prob- high altitude, combined with deliberate gence in the war maintained that his lem? They hired or drafted hundreds of German attempts to hide and mislead extensive study of German signals men and women to serve as intelligence Allied analysts, it soon became ap- intercepted during the war had con- gatherers and analysts from business, parent that BDA, then as now, was as vinced him that oil was the key target financial, scientific, engineering, and much an art as a science. set after all. Maj. Gen. Haywood S. legal backgrounds. Despite all of these efforts, basic Hansell Jr., one of the key planners It was a slow process. As late as questions regarding strategic bomb- of the American bombing campaign, 1939, there were only 22 people in ing remained either unanswered or in argued in his memoirs that it was not the Army’s entire G-2 intelligence dispute. In early 1944, for example, oil, coal, or railroads, but electricity division. Although G-2 expanded rap- Normandy invasion planners pondered that should have been given top prior- idly, virtually none of the hundreds of how best to employ heavy bombers to ity. And so it goes. new people hired had any experience support the landings. Air commanders were dependent on in intelligence gathering or analysis. intelligence, but the state of that art in Fortunately, much help came from Rail vs. Oil World War II made it difficult to have the British. Britain’s Ministry of Eco- The British, based on the results even a reasonable confidence that the nomic Warfare was established early in of the bombing campaign in Italy, chosen targeting strategy was correct. the war with an intelligence division concluded that a concentrated air Small wonder that specific target sets that collated and interpreted economic campaign against the German railroad moved up or down the priority list with information. When the US entered the network in northern France would be little explanation. Confused command- war and Eighth Air Force began de- most effective. ers were forced to use their intuition, ploying into British air bases in 1942, The Americans, backed by the analy- their limited experience, Operations Eaker called for a similar advisory sis of their Enemy Objectives Unit, Research, and intelligence analyses. body. The result was the Enemy Objec- argued for a campaign against German Regardless, the US and British air tives Unit, attached directly to Eighth oil. In this view, destruction of the oil doctrines prior to World War II were Air Force headquarters, composed of refineries and storage facilities would clearly flawed. Bomber operations over civilian economists and lawyers. Their bring the entire German war machine occupied Europe demanded new or- job was to provide detailed analysis to a halt. This “rail plan versus oil ganizations, new techniques, and new of designated targets, to include the plan” controversy raged on for several ideas so Operations Research and a importance of a particular plant within weeks until the supreme commander, unique strain of air-based intelligence an industry, the vulnerability of those Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, opted for grew and evolved to answer these fun- plants, and the time necessary for the rail plan in March 1944 because it damental needs. recovery after an air attack. seemed to offer more immediate results The results were dramatic. By early For this last function, the British and speed was imperative. 1945, the German economy was a established a section, termed RE8, What is interesting about this contro- shambles, and Japan’s would soon be which focused almost exclusively on versy is that the two most capable and as well. n bomb damage assessment. By mid- 1943, Americans joined RE8, which Phillip S. Meilinger is a retired Air Force pilot with 30 years’ service and a Ph.D. in then provided detailed BDA to both from the University of Michigan. He is the author of seven books Bomber Command and Eighth Air and more than 80 articles on military affairs. His latest book is Hubert R. Harmon: Force. Given the difficulty of measur- Airman, Officer, and Father of the Air Force Academy. His most recent article for ing damage from photographs taken at Air Force Magazine, “Paradox List,” appeared in the April 2009 issue. AIR FORCE Magazine / June 2010 63