The Question of What to Target P
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The Question In the quandaries of World of What War II, one finds the origins of Operations Research. to Target By Phillip S. Meilinger re-World War II air doctrine, How do you, for example, disrupt of making them more efficient and both in the US and Britain, a rail transportation system, or what effective. Pcalled for employing a strate- size and type of bombs are most suit- The concept of OR was first tested gic major bombing campaign against able for putting an oil refinery out of in World War I when British scientists an enemy’s industrial centers. It was commission? What is the ideal bomber were called in by the Admiralty to a “faith-based” theory, unsupported formation to maximize accuracy while help devise a solution to the German by hard evidence. Because strategic also minimizing exposure to enemy submarine menace. After the war, bombing had been seldom conducted defenses? however, this discipline was largely before 1939, things did not work These types of questions had never forgotten. The scientists returned to out as planned. For airmen, their really been asked before, for the simple their private and academic pursuits, weapon’s newness meant surprises reason that the air weapon did not ex- and military officers were busy with were frequent. ist to strike such targets. To address other matters. How did air commanders cope? these unique questions required a new World War II quickly identified the First, they realized that some of the discipline, Operations Research. Es- need for such methods once again. most basic questions regarding tactics, sentially, OR was the use of scientific The Royal Air Force began attaching procedures, and cause and effect still and mathematical methods to study scientists and other specialists to its begged answers. military operations with the intent principal operational commands in 1940, 60 AIR FORCE Magazine / June 2010 and by the autumn of 1941, they had target as did US bombers. Rather, they Operations analysts on the American been organized into OR sections, each proceeded individually to the target side borrowed heavily from their Brit- responsible to the unit’s commander. area in a long trail, usually stretch- ish counterparts. In September 1942, The leading members of these sections ing over a hundred miles. Operations Maj. Gen. Ira C. Eaker, who became were scientists and engineers, while the Research showed that, contrary to the commander of Eighth Air Force, set up rest of the staff consisted of personnel belief of the aircrews, concentration an OR section for studying bombing trained to “think numerically.” of the bomber stream over the target accuracy and loss rates. The problems studied by the OR should be increased. About the same time, Gen. Henry H. sections were largely tactical or techni- The scientists calculated that the “Hap” Arnold, commander of the Army cal—such as the most effective use of odds of a midair collision were ex- Air Forces, established in Washington aerial photography, camouflage, aerial tremely small, not more than one per the Committee of Operations Analysts mines, searchlights, radio, radar, etc. hour, and the odds of being struck by (COA) composed of mathematicians, Perhaps more importantly, they also the bombs of an aircraft above were lawyers, physicists, engineers, and began studying the effectiveness of negligible. Presumably, this estimate even one architect. strategic bombing. Specifically, Op- allayed the fears of the aircrews, and The types of problems examined erations Research attempted to answer so the concentration of aircraft in the by the committee and its detachment the question of what happened to RAF bomber stream was gradually increased at Eighth Air Force were similar to bombers over Germany, and then to from under 10 aircraft per minute to those studied by the OR sections at suggest methods to improve accuracy 30 per minute over the target area. Bomber Command. Their first task and effectiveness while also lowering was to determine the accuracy of the the risk to aircrews. Determine the Accuracy American bombers and then suggest In 1941, RAF’s Bomber Command Similarly, OR determined that evasive ways to improve it. had a difficult time even locating cit- action over the target itself was “mean- Using cameras that automatically ies at night; bombing difficulties led ingless.” Although rapid heading and took photos during bomb runs, they to radar and radio aids such as Gee, altitude changes may have made aircrews found that, not surprisingly, the better Oboe, and H2S. Operations Research feel better, they did nothing to lower their the weather, the better the accuracy. The would test, evaluate, and refine these chances of being hit. Worse, maneuvers Electronic bombing aids were there- navigation and targeting technologies. increased the odds of a collision while fore essential because the weather These aids became increasingly decreasing accuracy. over Germany was usually miserable. effective: In early 1942, less than If the resultant accuracy was so poor Regardless of the radio or radar aids 25 percent of bombs landed within as to require a restrike, then the risk employed, bombing through weather Question three miles of the target. By the end to aircrews actually increased through never matched visual bombing for ac- of the war, that number had climbed “evasive action.” In short, crews were curacy. By October 1944, 41.5 percent to 95 percent—with 50 percent hitting told to stiffen their upper lips, fly of Eighth Air Force’s visually aimed within a mile or so of the aimpoint. straight and level, and put their bombs bombs fell within 1,000 feet of the Bomber Command’s night bombers on target as the best ways to ensure aimpoint. Using only radio or radar did not fly in a large formation to the their continued survival. aids, accuracy plummeted to a miser- of What able five percent. As in Bomber Command, the opera- tions analysts tackled many specific problems, including range extension, tactical formations, bomb weights and to Target fuses, the utility of incendiary bombs, and the optimal strike mission size. A typical problem involved deter- mining the relative threat from enemy fighter airplanes versus anti-aircraft artillery. After extensive interviews with crew members, especially those who had been shot down and lived to tell of it, operations analysts discov- ered that stragglers had it the worst. When a bomber fell out of formation, it was almost immediately pounced on by a half-dozen enemy fighters. A bomber usually fell out of formation, however, because it had been hit by AAA. Specifically, hits to an engine Opposite: A B-17 with the 359th Bomb Squadron seen from above. Left: B-17s with the 547th Bomb Squadron drop their weapons on a mission during World War II. AIR FORCE Magazine / June 2010 61 Gen. Ira Eaker (shown here as a briga- dier general) called for the creation of The officers at the Tactical School rec- the Enemy Objectives Unit, which was ognized this problem and made the first tasked with providing detailed analysis rudimentary attempts to study the work- of designated targets. ings of a modern industrialized nation during the 1930s. The War Department forbade the gathering of intelligence on the scientists their full support, but also foreign economies, however, so in 1936, faced other problems. Theories and students and instructors studied the in- doctrine assumed that strategic bomb- dustrial infrastructure of the northeast ing against the industrial infrastructure United States. Their investigations led of an enemy would have decisive them to conclude that 100 well-placed results: It would sap and eventually bombs could shut down 75 percent of the break both the will and capability of region’s electrical generating capacity. the enemy to resist. This was an article Other targets to be struck included rail of faith, not science. lines, fuel storage depots, steel plants, Research gave commanders and and food distribution and preservation planners guidance on how best to facilities. The result of these attacks destroy specific elements of enemy would be paralysis. infrastructure, but the broader question This sounded promising—although it remained: What effect did destroying proved overly optimistic in practice—so an oil refinery or railroad marshaling at the start of the war, air planners called yard have on the overall goal of win- in industrialists to study the German ning the war or breaking the enemy’s economy. They also went to New York will and capability? City financial institutions that had heav- In short, because you knew how to ily invested in Germany before the war. destroy a factory did not necessarily These banks had blueprints of factories, mean you should destroy it. Opera- production schedules, and other crucial tions Research told air commanders data on the German economy. started fires that caused an aircraft to how to hit the target correctly; they Using this information, intelligence lose power, drop out of formation, and now needed to hit the correct target. provided by the British, and knowledge become a straggler. of American industry, planners projected The solution: Put armor around the Intelligence Gathering what specific systems were most impor- vulnerable engines to reduce AAA To address this problem, air leaders tant and also most vulnerable. damage, which would in turn reduce had to move analysis to a higher level of Even more important were the ques- the number of stragglers and losses to abstraction. Airmen realized that they tions that arose after obtaining basic enemy fighters. had not developed a clear understand- economic and industrial data. If you Another problem considered by the ing of what made an economy work. were able to neutralize a portion of a analysts involved accuracy. After study- After all, strategic bombing, like a na- country’s rail network, what effect would ing countless poststrike photographs, val campaign of blockade and surface that produce on the enemy’s economy analysts determined, contrary to proce- raiding, is at base a form of economic as a whole? In short, air commanders dures and popular belief, that bombing warfare.