LIBYA TRANSITION INITIATIVE 2
FINAL REPORT: AUGUST 11, 2014 – AUGUST 10, 2017
September 9, 2017
This publication was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared by Chemonics International Inc.
Contract No: AID-OAA-I-14-00006, Task Order AID-OAA-TO-14-00019
LIBYA TRANSITION INITIATIVE 2
FINAL REPORT: AUGUST 11, 2014 – AUGUST 10, 2017
Contract No: AID-OAA-I-14-00006, Task Order AID-OAA-TO-14-00019
Cover photo: Children pour into the streets to welcome the Peace Ambassadors to the town of Ajilat. In December 2016, more than 100 youth armed with messages of peace traveled through western Libya’s coastal and mountain areas, helping to reinforce reconciliation efforts in areas that had been wracked by violent conflict in 2014-2015. (Peace Ambassadors).
DISCLAIMER
The authors’ views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for International Development or the United States government.
CONTENTS
Acronyms ...... ii Introduction ...... 3 Political and Security Context ...... 4 Program Operations ...... 7 LTI 2 Startup (September 2014-February 2015) ...... 7 LTI 2 Tunisia Platform Establishment (March 2015) ...... 7 LTI 2 Partial Closeout (October 2015-January 2016) ...... 7 LTI 2 Organizational Restructuring (January 2016) ...... 8 LTI 2 Ramp-Up (Fall 2016) ...... 8 Program Strategy ...... 9 Phase 1 (2014-2015) ...... 9 Phase 2 (2015-2017) ...... 9 Program Highlights ...... 11 A. Promoting Voices of Nonviolence and Dialogue ...... 11 B. Advancing Key Political Processes ...... 12 C. Fostering Support for the LPA and Government of National Accord ...... 12 D. Increasing Confidence in Local Governance ...... 14 E. Increasing the Capacity of Communities to Reject Extremism ...... 15 F. Supporting Sirte’s Recovery and a Return to Normalcy ...... 16 Challenges and Lessons Learned ...... 18 The Way Forward ...... 20
LIBYA TRANSITION INITIATIVE 2 FINAL REPORT | i ACRONYMS
AAS Ansar al-Sharia BAM Bunyan al-Marsous BRSC Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council CDA Constitutional Drafting Assembly CSO civil society organization DMSC Derna Mujahedeen Shura Council FPA field program assistant GNA Government of National Accord GNC General National Congress HoR House of Representatives IDP internally displaced person IRI International Republican Institute IS Islamic State LNA Libyan National Army LPA Libyan Political Agreement LTI Libya Transition Initiative M&E monitoring and evaluation MC municipal council NSG National Salvation Government OKLES Organization of the Light of Knowledge for Science and Culture ORM operations risk manager PC Presidential Council PSA public service announcement RPD regional program director RPM regional program manager TMCCC Tripoli Municipal Council Coordination Committee UNSMIL United Nations Support Mission in Libya
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INTRODUCTION
The Libya Transition Initiative (LTI) 2 was a follow-on program beginning August 2014 through USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives. As a quick-response mechanism, LTI 2 worked toward the following six objectives, responding to evolutions in the political and operating environment: Promote voices of non-violence and dialogue Advance key political processes Foster support for the LPA and national unity Increase confidence in local governance Increase the capacity of communities in strategic communities to reject extremism Support recovery efforts in communities previously controlled by IS
OFFICE ACTIVITY COUNT TOTAL AMOUNT DISBURSED Benghazi, Libya 32 $2,335,380.76 Sabha, Libya 25 $1,420,523.01 Tripoli, Libya 65 $5,638,570.47 Misrata, Libya 6 $544,059.76 Washington, D.C. 2 $119,886.84 Grand Total 136 $10,058,420.83
Using a variety of mechanisms, including grants under contract, short-term technical assistance, and the direct distribution of goods and services, LTI 2 implemented $10,058,420.83across 136 transition activities across Libya. Over the course of the contract, the program delivered the following results: 36 activities focusing on service delivery and 15 on community improvement projects to boost confidence in local governance entities’ responsiveness to their constituents 28 advocacy campaigns such as reinforcing traffic laws, using media to promote moderate political voices, and encouraging civic activism 13 activities using media platforms to foster political dialogue between key constituent groups and government officials Capacity building workshops and training for civil society organizations (CSOs) and activists focused on non-violence, citizen journalism, and dialogue
LIBYA TRANSITION INITIATIVE 2 FINAL REPORT | 3 SECTION 1 POLITICAL AND SECURITY CONTEXT
LTI 2 began shortly after Libya’s post-revolution political transition had stalled indefinitely, spurring parallel legislatures and governments backed by precarious militia alliances. In May 2014, former Qadhafi-era general Khalifa Haftar had launched Operation Dignity in Benghazi, promising a swift defeat against Islamist and extremist groups responsible for deadly attacks on security forces, political figures, and activists. In the summer of 2014, Tripoli descended into conflict after the Islamist-leaning legislature, the General National Congress (GNC), suffered a heavy defeat in parliamentary elections in June. The Libya Dawn campaign, led by a coalition of militias mainly from Misrata and other western coastal cities, forced rival Zintani militias out of Tripoli, taking control of key infrastructure and institutions, and preventing the newly elected House of Representatives (HOR) from replacing the interim GNC. The internationally recognized HOR established its headquarters in the eastern city of Tobruk in September. Within weeks, Libya Dawn’s leadership had formed the Tripoli-based National Salvation Government. As time passed, each of these alliances sought to secure control of Libya’s lucrative oil industry via local proxies, inflaming local conflicts and fueling instability nationwide. The Dawn-Dignity conflict continued through mid-2015.
The December 2015 signing of the Libyan Political Agreement, brokered by the UN, initially enjoyed optimism among Libyans. The LPA’s complex government structure reflected a lack of political consensus, however, and the LPA’s prescribed Government of National Accord (GNA) was challenged from the onset. In western Libya, hardliners from the defunct Libya Dawn coalition continued to support GNC remnants, while moderates embraced the Presidential Council (PC) tasked with forming a unity government. In the East, Haftar’s refusal to recognize the LPA and the HOR’s subsequent failure to endorse the proposed GNA paralyzed efforts to establish a unity government. Since taking office in Tripoli in March 2016, the PC has been unable to exert durable control even in the capital due to entrenched militia influence.
By the end of LTI 2, public confidence in the GNA plummeted. Rival institutions in the East refused to recognize the GNA, while the GNA failed to re-establish security, reactivate basic services, and manage an ongoing cash liquidity crisis. Haftar, on the other hand, has enjoyed a relatively high degree of popular support in areas controlled by his self-proclaimed Libyan National Army (LNA). The LNA’s takeover of the Oil Crescent in September 2016 and its seizure of Tamanhint and Jufra airbases in 2017 enabled Haftar to expand his influence and strengthen his position vis-à-vis the GNA. Although Haftar and his allies provide security and stability more effectively than the GNA, it is through increasingly dictatorial tendencies.
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Turmoil on the political stage encouraged extremist groups’ exploitation of local conflicts and political-security vacuums. In 2014, some Libyan members of well- established jihadi groups like Ansar Al-Sharia (AAS) pledged allegiance to the Islamic State (IS). Supported by foreign fighters, IS affiliates established Libya’s first IS stronghold in the eastern city of Derna in late 2014. IS’s brutal tactics soon lost support, however, and its fighters were ejected by larger and better-equipped local militias in June 2015.
However, IS consolidation in Sirte pushed out Misratan militias there by mid-2015, enabling the group to establish a so-called caliphate in North Africa. Misratan-led brigades aligned with the GNA launched Operation Bunyan al-Marsous (BAM) in May 2016 to eradicate IS, which at the time controlled around 250 kilometers of central Libya’s coastline. Supported by U.S. airstrikes, BAM liberated Sirte in December 2016. Prior to the Sirte campaign, IS suffered another significant blow in the west when U.S. airstrikes disrupted the group’s Sabratha contingent. Despite sustaining significant losses, IS militants continue to regroup in areas to the south of Bani Walid and the Sirte Basin.
On a local level, conditions in Libya have varied significantly between and within regions since 2014. In the West, successful local ceasefire agreements in 2015 led to a significant reduction in organized conflict, although insecurity remained. In Misrata, Libya Dawn’s fracture exposed divisions between moderates and hardliners. Pro-GNC militias made repeated efforts to regain power until hardline anti-GNA forces were successfully forced out the capital in May 2017. Along the western coastline, powerful militias continue to control lucrative fuel-smuggling and human-trafficking industries.
In the East, Benghazi and Derna saw violent conflict and extremist activity during much of LTI 2, while the rest of the region was somewhat stable. In July 2017, the LNA overran the Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council’s final stronghold after over three years of fighting. However, isolated pockets of resistance remain. The LNA has since turned to Derna, which remains under the Derna Mujahedeen Shura Council (DMSC). As LTI 2 came to a close, easterners expressed concern over the growing influence of LNA-aligned Salafists, as well as the LNA’s militarization of local governance, evidenced in 2016-2017 by the replacement of nearly a dozen elected mayors with military figures.
Central Libya remains a largely ungoverned space where IS militants attempt to regroup. The area also remains a faultline between LNA- and GNA-aligned forces. The LNA has threatened to move westward into Bani Walid and continues to threaten the GNA’s control of Sirte. Although largely separated from the political and military struggles of coastal Libya, the South is the stage for proxy struggles between rival factions seeking to extend their influence into the country’s interior, and the capital. The GNA-aligned Misratan Third Force, which had been stationed in Sabha since 2014, withdrew from the region entirely following the LNA’s takeover of Tamanhint and Jufra airbases in mid- 2017, leaving the LNA the region’s dominant security force. Still, southern Libya continues to suffer from high levels of crime and insecurity, fueled by porous borders, the collapse of state authority, and the illicit smuggling of drugs, weapons, and migrants.
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SECTION II PROGRAM OPERATIONS
LTI 2 managed several significant operational transformations throughout the program in response to evolving policy priorities, resources, and security constraints.
LTI 2 STARTUP (SEPTEMBER 2014-FEBRUARY 2015)
LTI 2 began in September 2014 just as expatriate staff returned to Libya after the program’s first evacuation under LTI 1. LTI 2 initially retained the structure of LTI 1, with teams in Tripoli, Benghazi, and Sabha. Expatriate movement was limited to Tripoli. Management staff rotated out to Malta to oversee the work of the closeout and startup teams based there.
An office relocation to Shahat in late 2014 helped resume some operations in the East and limited expatriate visits. Startup in Malta was ultimately cancelled because of registration challenges, the inability of most local staff to travel to Malta, and the decision to move the U.S. Libya External Office to Tunis.
LTI 2 focused heavily on establishing remote management systems, given a lack of access to the South and East, and the possibility of a second evacuation from Tripoli. LTI 2 transitioned from hard files to primarily digital files, developed cloud-based trackers and tools, introduced the new OTI online database, and began to devolve some financial, signatory, and reporting authority to key local staff in Tripoli and Shahat.
LTI 2 TUNISIA PLATFORM ESTABLISHMENT (MARCH 2015)
Due to growing extremist threats in Libya, LTI 2 expatriate staff permanently evacuated in February 2015 and established the Tunis office in March. The team consisted of the chief of party, operations director, finance director, operations risk director, and regional program directors.
LTI 2 PARTIAL CLOSEOUT (OCTOBER 2015-JANUARY 2016)
The project faced an anticipated early closure in February 2016 due to a lack of funding. A phased closeout of the Shahat (east) and Sabha (south) offices and programs began in late 2015. In Tripoli, programming was limited to community parks/playgrounds grants with municipal councils and strategic communications activities to support the Libyan Political Dialogue process. The Tunisia platform was also downsized.
LIBYA TRANSITION INITIATIVE 2 FINAL REPORT | 7 LTI 2 ORGANIZATIONAL RESTRUCTURING (JANUARY 2016)
The program received notification of continuation in December 2015, and had to pivot immediately. The Tunis expatriate team decreased by nearly 50 percent from the first year of LTI 2. In southern and eastern Libya, the project retained two key staff in each region, working from home, to continue critical programming, with significant support from Tripoli and Tunis for finance, administrative, and grants management functions.
The staff reduction in Tunis and devolution of day-to-day management responsibilities were tied to increased management responsibilities and accountability for Libyan managers and staffThis transition required a significant overhaul in grant activity cycle systems and approvals, finance and procurement practices, and a reorganization of staffing with new reporting lines.
LTI 2 NORMALIZATION (FALL 2016)
In August 2016, the project received confirmation that it would be fully funded at a steady state through the end of the task order. LTI 2 re-opened offices in Sabha and Benghazi, and added new staff in all four offices to help re-instate programming capacity. The project added additional support in engineering and finance in response to an increase in infrastructure-related projects and Libya’s increasingly cash-based economy, respectively.
Finally, in November, LTI 2 received confirmation of funding for Sirte programming and set up an additional team and office based in Misrata (central Libya). Eight additional local staff joined LTI 2 in early 2017, reporting to the Sirte regional program manager, based in Tunis.
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SECTION III PROGRAM STRATEGY
LTI 2’s program objectives evolved continually to meet the needs of Libya’s complex transition and support U.S. foreign policy objectives in Libya. The collapse in 2014 of many of Libya’s transitional processes forced programming to focus on local level opportunities. LTI 2 worked around key milestones, such as the signing of the LPA and establishment of the GNA, while simultaneously addressing emerging trends in Libya’s rapidly changing political and security landscape.
Research and analysis played a key role in supplementing strategy development. Building on the success of previous research initiatives, LTI 2 developed the Flexible Research and Analysis Platform in September 2015 to inform programming bolster remote management capacity. The platform examined public perceptions regarding municipal councils, the Libyan Political Dialogue, prospects and priorities for a potential unity government, the militarization of governance in eastern Libya, and more. LTI 2 also conducted research on the drivers of violent extremism in Libya’s western corridor.
LTI 2’s objectives can be broadly clustered into two overlapping phases of programming:
PHASE 1 (2014-2015)
Promoting voices of nonviolence and dialogue. With the Dawn-Dignity conflict mid 2014, citizens increasingly sought security, deprioritizing aspirations for democracy. Advocates for democracy continued their work with significant risk to themselves and their families due to attacks by extremists and other armed groups. LTI 2 responded by helping support the safety and resilience of journalists, lawyers, and activists. In the spring of 2015, community elders and prominent militia leaders negotiated a series of ceasefire agreements in western Libya. To sustain these positive developments, LTI 2 supported a wide range of activities to create space and opportunities for communities in conflict to interact and rebuild a sense of social cohesion and national identity.
Advancing key political processes. As needed, LTI 2 made use of its flexible grant-making mechanism to respond to requests for in-kind support from UNSMIL and the U.S. Embassy, including helping coordinate international assistance to the Constitutional Drafting Assembly (CDA) and advancing the UN-facilitated Libyan Political Dialogue.
PHASE 2 (2015-2017)
Fostering support for the LPA and GNA. Following the signing of the LPA in December 2015, public support for Libya’s unity government rested on fragile foundations. Understanding of the LPA was low among average Libyans, and many had expressed deep skepticism about the political dialogue process that led to the GNA’s formation.
LIBYA TRANSITION INITIATIVE 2 FINAL REPORT | 9 Nevertheless, LTI 2 analysis of Libyan public opinion surrounding dialogue and prospects for a unity government revealed broad-based support and goodwill for the GNA. LTI 2 supported Libyan partners to reinforce general goodwill for national unity through the design and implementation of a strategic messaging campaign. LTI 2 also supported the GNA Media Administration to develop the capacity of GNA institutions to inform the public about their efforts and achievements.
Increasing confidence in local governance. As national-level ministries and institutions fragmented and collapsed, municipal councils (MCs) elected in more than 100 municipalities across Libya in 2014 attempted to step up and meet the needs of communities desperate to receive basic services. LTI 2 research revealed that MCs were the most respected formal governance institutions in Libya. Confidence in the MCs was strongly linked to their provision of tangible services, as well as the frequency and quality of their communication with constituents. These findings guided LTI 2’s design of participatory basic service delivery projects led by MCs and involving CSOs and communities, coupled with support for communication and outreach campaigns. Recognizing that local level actors possess neither the financial nor technical capacities necessary for sustainable service provision, the program supported municipal actors to coordinate with national-level ministries and institutions as soon as the GNA was formed.
Increasing the capacity of communities to reject extremism. LTI 2 launched a pilot program in a key community in western Libya after local ceasefires in the region created space for communities to begin rejecting extremist groups in their midst. Programming focused on addressing local conflicts to make the environment less conducive for violent extremism and disrupting networks that support violent extremism by giving families and communities the tools to identify and support those at risk of radicalization and provide alternatives to extremism.
Supporting Sirte’s recovery and a return to normalcy. Sirte was the Islamic State’s largest stronghold outside of Syria and Iraq until Misratan forces liberated the city with the support of U.S. airstrikes in December 2016. LTI 2 moved quickly to support the stabilization of the Sirte region by restoring key local services, reinvigorating economic activity, and productively engaging youth to alleviate the effects of violence and exposure to extremist ideologies on the community.
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SECTION IV PROGRAM HIGHLIGHTS
A. PROMOTING VOICES OF NONVIOLENCE AND DIALOGUE
From 2014-2015, LTI 2 supported a wide range of moderate voices to advocate for nonviolence and dialogue. Activities helped keep activists safe amid a wave of attacks against them, created space and opportunities for communities in conflict to interact, and assisted in rebuilding a sense of social cohesion and national identity. To this end, LTI 2 implemented 33 activities totaling $1,846,766.
Supporting the safety and resilience of Libyan activists and media actors. The program supported four workshops on safe and effective advocacy for a total of 95 influential Libyan activists. All returned home with a new set of tools for remaining safe and active. Participants adopted new digital security practices, for example, to protect their computers from hackers and safeguard data when using social network platforms. They also shared their newly acquired knowledge within their networks in Benghazi, Marj, Sabha, Ghat, Jufra, Tripoli, and Zawiya, giving many more activists the tools and confidence to remain active. As part of this initiative, LTI 2 provided dozens of laptops, smart phones and cameras to 22 CSOs and individual activists to facilitate their work, and enabled the Libyan Center for Freedom of the Press to create a unit to monitor, document, and report on violations.
Promoting peaceful dialogue and peace messaging. Across Libya, LTI 2 facilitated a series of sporting events, cultural activities, and peace campaigns to advocate for dialogue and unity, in particular among Libya’s youth. In the West, 17 ex-fighters from rival cities shared their powerful testimonies about the cost of war and called for collective forgiveness in a six-part video series
under the campaign “A Peaceful Libya Benghazi artists perform in the music video Displaced. Unites.” In the neighboring eastern (Benghazi Recording Studio) cities of Bayda and Shahat, where populations swelled in 2014-2015 due to the influx of families displaced by fighting in Benghazi, LTI 2 supported social events to bring internally displaced persons and host communities together. In southern Libya, LTI 2 worked to build shared civic interests that bridge tribal divides. In Sabha, for example, LTI 2 engaged the Scouts, who have been long-respected and trusted in the south for their neutrality, inclusivity, and community service, to conduct a peace seminar and rally that encouraged dialogue and
LIBYA TRANSITION INITIATIVE 2 FINAL REPORT | 11 peaceful coexistence. Other illustrative activities included a summer film festival featuring inspiring examples of non-violent civic activism and a marathon for peace.
B. ADVANCING KEY POLITICAL PROCESSES
LTI 2 responded with speed and flexibility to requests from UNSMIL and the U.S. Embassy, implementing eight activities totaling $349,970 to provide critical gap-filling support to advance key political processes.
Garnering support for the Libyan Political Dialogue. Prior to the signing of the LPA, LTI 2 helped advance the Libyan Political Dialogue and encourage grassroots support for the process. In the spring of 2015, following an urgent request from UNSMIL, LTI 2 moved swiftly to provide airfares and logistical support that enabled 12 Libyans to participate in UN-led negotiations in Morocco in March and another 30 to join concurrent talks in Morocco and Algeria the following month. LTI 2 also sponsored a one-day conference that brought together approximately 250 female Libyan leaders to discuss the ongoing dialogue with each other, and with the then UN Special Representative for Libya and head of UNSMIL, Bernardino Leon, who joined the event via Skype. In August 2015, a five-day training of trainers event in Istanbul taught 19 female activists how to lead effective advocacy campaigns in support of dialogue and non-violent
solutions to social and political A Sabha Women’s Union member participates in a town problems. Fifteen of the activists went hall event on the GNA. (LTI/Chemonics) on to conduct their own workshops.
C. FOSTERING SUPPORT FOR THE LPA AND GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL ACCORD
Following the signing of the LPA in December 2015, LTI 2 moved swiftly to sponsor a series of activities that informed the public about the agreement and assisted the GNA to communicate its priorities, plans, and successes with citizens. LTI 2 implemented 16 activities totaling $589,676 support of this objective.
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Sponsoring the Let’s Agree Now strategic messsaging campaign. LTI 2 worked with Libyan partners to develop a nationally owned strategic messaging campaign — Let’s Agree Now — to educate people about the GNA’s mandate, and communicate its progress in fulfilling the LPA and addressing citizens’ priorities. The Let’s Agree Now Facebook page, established by the well-known Libyan
organization H20, served as the A video PSA explains the structure and role of Libya’s cornerstone for these efforts. H20 Presidential Council. (Momken) shared multiple posts daily, providing factual and timely information on the GNA, encouraging the exchange of ideas and opinions, and refuting rumors circulated over social media. By the time the PC arrived in Tripoli in March 2016, the site had more than 140,000 followers. The Let’s Agree Now platform was also used to share infographics, short videos, and public service announcements (PSAs) developed by H20 and several other LTI 2 partners.
Supporting public outreach events. In the summer of 2016, the Tripoli Center and Abu Salim MCs staged public screenings of the Euro 2016 soccer championship in collaboration with the GNA’s Ministry of Youth and Sports. During the screenings, the MCs helped residents better understand the LPA and GNA by showing PSAs and distributing information leaflets created under the Let’s Agree Now campaign. In Sabha, Al-Nahda Sports Club and the Sabha MC kicked off a month-long advocacy campaign by hosting the Fezzan Marathon for National Unity. The marathon was followed by a month of town hall meetings led by civil society partners in Sabha, Wadi al-Shati, Ubari, and Ghat, designed to increase understanding of — and support for — the GNA. In Tripoli, a CSO facilitated a series of debates at Tripoli University after holding a four-day training on debate skills for 24 activists, students, and university lecturers.
Assisting the GNA to communicate priorities, plans and successes. LTI 2 provided an assistance package to the GNA Media Administration that helped the PC’s media office and GNA ministries develop their capacity to inform the public and media outlets about efforts and achievements. Not long after the PC’s arrival in Tripoli, LTI 2 sponsored a one-day seminar in the capital that brought representatives from the PC’s media office together with Libyan media outlets and institutions, opening critical communication channels. In October 2016, the GNA Media Administration and Tripoli University launched a rigorous, three-month training on journalism, social media, and television reporting for 76 GNA-affiliated communications staff. In addition to sponsoring the training, LTI 2 provided the GNA Media Administration and ministries with communications equipment. In December 2016, the program supported the GNA Media Administration to organize a forum in Tripoli to discuss efforts to address the country’s flailing economy. Nearly 200 experts from concerned ministries, government institutions, banks and businesses met to review and debate the outcomes of recent
LIBYA TRANSITION INITIATIVE 2 FINAL REPORT | 13 international meetings aimed at warding off the country’s financial collapse. LTI 2 also helped create dialogue opportunities between ordinary Libyans and national-level decision-makers by sponsoring a series of six town hall events in the spring of 2017. Lastly, following the liberation of Sirte from IS militants by GNA-aligned forces, the GNA Media Administration hosted a four-week training for nine local media stakeholders in Sirte. Participants developed and later launched a media plan to inform the public about ongoing recovery efforts in Sirte.
D. INCREASING CONFIDENCE IN LOCAL GOVERNANCE
LTI 2 supported municipal-level actors to respond to constituent demands in coordination with communities, CSOs, and national-level government institutions. LTI 2 implemented 53 activities totaling $3,789,001 to increase public confidence in the MCs’ ability to provide critical services and strengthen linkages between local and national- level governance structures.
Supporting MCs to upgrade community parks nationwide. LTI 2 collaborated with the International Republican Institute (IRI) from 2014-2015 to bolster the capacity and legitimacy of municipalities within their communities. While LTI 2 helped MCs upgrade community parks, IRI worked with the MCs to pursue effective public outreach and improve communication with citizens. LTI 2
supported a total of 12 community park upgrades in 11 municipalities throughout Sabha’s residents celebrate the rehabilitation of Independence Park. (LTI/Chemonics) Libya. Assistance included the rehabilitation of the community space and installation of multi-functional playground equipment. MCs staged opening ceremonies to mark the completion of the park upgrades between February and May 2016. The events drew several hundred residents on average and provided a unique opportunity for residents to interact with their elected representatives.
Assisting MCs with participatory basic service delivery: LTI 2 worked with southern and western municipalities to strengthen participatory basic service delivery. In the South, for example, LTI 2 supported the efforts of MC and GNA authorities to facilitate the return of displaced persons and reestablish basic services in Ubari following the signing of a Tebu-Tuareg peace agreement that brought more than a year of fighting to an end. Projects in Ubari grew out of a series of public listening sessions organized by a respected civil society group to help authorities better understand, and address, residents’ most critical recovery needs. In the West, LTI 2 worked with Tripoli’s MCs to establish the Tripoli Municipal Council Coordination Committee (TMCCC), which has enabled Tripoli’s five largest municipalities to coordinate responses across their
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communities more effectively. In both regions, LTI 2 supported road safety and cleanup campaigns, waste management initiatives, water and school refurbishment projects, and the rehabilitation of public spaces.
Strengthening the credibility of elected MCs in eastern Libya. In eastern Libya, LTI 2 focused on strengthening the credibility of elected municipal authorities in Bayda, Shahat, Qaminis, Suluq, and Tukrah. LTI 2 supported improvements to key learning institutions, including the provision of 350 student desks for 14 public schools in Bayda, equipment and furnishings for the Bayda Autism Center
and Bayda Center for the Blind, and upgrades to nine schools in Qaminis Bayda’s mayor (third from left) inspects the medical center’s CT municipality and six schools in Shahat. scanner. (Bayda MC) LTI 2 also supported upgrades to medical facilities. In Bayda, the program sponsored the provision and installation of a backup power supply system that enabled Bayda Medical Center to begin offering CT scans to the public in July 2017. In Tukrah, the full functionality of the hospital’s birthing ward was restored through the refurbishment of eight rooms and the installation of a wide range of equipment. Also in Tukrah, 15 wells were made operational with the provision of submersible pumps, while the Suluq MC received equipment to rehabilitate its water network.
E. INCREASING THE CAPACITY OF COMMUNITIES TO REJECT EXTREMISM
A series of local ceasefires signed in western Libya in the spring of 2015 significantly reduced conflict in the region, creating space for local communities to reject extremist groups in their midst. LTI 2 reinforced community and municipal council efforts to reject extremism by helping expand ongoing reconciliation efforts and assisting communities to develop indigenous responses to violent extremism. LTI 2 implemented six activities totaling $321,603 in support of this objective.
Expanding reconciliation between communities under ceasefire agreements. LTI2 supported municipal council efforts to celebrate a series of local ceasefire agreements that had brought violent conflict in the region to an end the previous year. Twelve municipalities came together for a two-day festival, including many that had been fierce adversaries. The event was covered by nearly every major Libyan media outlet and reactions were overwhelmingly positive. In August, one municipality added more than 19,000 new fans to its Facebook page, doubling its fans in just one month. In December 2016, LTI 2 sponsored a three-day tour of the region’s coastal and mountain areas by a group of 100 western Libyan youth calling themselves The Peace Ambassadors. Armed with messages of peace and backed by the MC, the youth visited more than a dozen cities and towns,
LIBYA TRANSITION INITIATIVE 2 FINAL REPORT | 15 distributing outreach materials, and meeting with mayors, elders, and CSOs to discuss the role of youth in peacebuilding.
Helping communities develop indigenous responses to violent extremism. LTI 2 piloted an initiative focused on disrupting the cycle of radicalization in one community by empowering families and communities with tools for confronting extremism. In August 2016, with LTI 2 support, one CSO began offering psychosocial support services to children affected by violence. After gaining trust through its community center and a series of public festivals and school campaigns, the organization began engaging families — especially mothers — to create support networks. Four networks were created to help nearly 70 mothers forge positive connections across families struggling with violence and, in some cases, the threat of radicalization. Due to overwhelming community demand, the organization’s community center ended up hosting twice as many groups as was originally planned. The success of these efforts demonstrates that Libyans, if empowered, are best placed to push back against violent extremism dynamics in their own communities.
F. SUPPORTING SIRTE’S RECOVERY AND A RETURN TO NORMALCY
LTI 2 launched a recovery initiative for the Sirte region in collaboration with the United Kingdom’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office in early 2017. LTI 2 implemented 11 activities totaling $1,112,718 to help relevant MCs and GNA institutions stabilize Sirte and promote a return to normalcy. Strategic messaging campaigns integrated into activities helped increase citizens’ awareness of these efforts.
Laying the groundwork for Sirte’s recovery. LTI 2 began supporting Libyan governance responses to the Sirte crisis in the summer of 2016 by enabling effective responses to Sirte IDP inflows in Tripoli. LTI 2 sponsored the delivery of commodities baskets to nearly 1,000 displaced families residing in the capital in June, followed by the delivery of 1,420 school kits to IDP students from
Sirte before the start of the school year. Through the Sirte Crisis Committee and Schoolchildren gather in a refurbished classroom in western Libya. (LTI/Chemonics) local partners, LTI 2 also supported the rehabilitation of eight schools in neighboring regions to help integrate Sirte IDPs into their host communities. These early interventions allowed LTI 2 to identify viable partners and test approaches in preparation for Sirte residents’ return to the region in 2017.
Helping youth affected by extremism and conflict develop resilience. Across the Sirte region, LTI 2 trained 16 teachers and social workers to help schoolchildren cope with trauma
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sustained during the area’s occupation by the Islamic State. Materials were also procured for four schools in central Sirte to establish “safe spaces” to help children recover. In June 2017, the Harawa MC organized a month of social and cultural activities for its conflict-affected youth in an effort to alleviate the effects of violence and exposure to extremist ideologies on the community. In addition to covering stipends for facilitators specializing in psychosocial work, LTI 2 provided equipment and furniture for the MC to refurbish part of a cultural club, which re-opened its doors for the first time since the expulsion of IS militants to host the activities.
Restoring key local services in Sirte Region. IS fighters — when they briefly occupied and looted the areas around Sirte in 2016 — severely damaged public facilities and left local authorities paralyzed in delivering services to over 12,000 residents and IDPs. LTI 2 sponsored the rehabilitation of a town civil registry and passport offices to restore key local services to the west of Sirte. Also with LTI 2 support, local authorities refurbished nine schools and two medical centers in the western half of greater Sirte. In July 2017, local authorities established a job skills training center at a branch of Sirte University to provide residents and IDPs with skills needed to seek and find employment. LTI 2 provided equipment, internet service, and startup support for the center.
Reinvigorating economic activity in Sirte Region. LTI 2 helped an elected municipal council to the east of Sirte promote a return to normalcy following the area’s yearlong occupation by IS militants. In June 2017, LTI 2 supported the MC to install an industrial ice machine, a generator, and equipment for a refrigerated room at a local facility, which has enabled an estimated 100
fishermen to store their catches and sell it locally. LTI 2 also supported the A fisherman stores his catch in a refrigerated room to the east of Sirte. (Harawa MC) revitalization of the factory that had employed many women including providing equipment that IS militants destroyed to prevent women from working. Fifty women are now back at work.
LIBYA TRANSITION INITIATIVE 2 FINAL REPORT | 17 SECTION V CHALLENGES AND LESSONS LEARNED
Startup approaches. The LTI 1-LTI 2 transition lasted nearly six months, with the same chief of party and deputy chief of party overseeing the transition with the support of a transition team and one project management unit. With this approach, responsibilities were not always clear. In response, Chemonics deployed separate LTI 2 closeout and LTI 3 startup teams, created separate project management units for each project, and had a chief of party (LTI 3) and acting chief of party (LTI 2) during the transition phase.
Remote management. In February 2015, near the beginning of LTI 2, expatriate senior management permanently evacuated Libya and established the Tunis office. This shift presented enormous challenges for staff management, host-country relations, finance, procurement, and program development and implementation. In response, LTI 2:
• Developed cloud-based systems and e-files for inter-office collaboration • Invested heavily in strong infrastructure to facilitate communication with Tunis • Gradually reduced the expat staffing platform in Tunis and delegated decision-making and management authority to experienced Libyan staff in each office • Organized local staff visits to Tunis on a rotational basis for check-ins, as well as biannual rolling assessments or strategy review sessions
Finance and procurement. The Libyan economy was volatile throughout LTI 2. Both Libya and the project shifted to cash-based systems in 2016 as the banking system collapsed. Rapid currency devaluation yielded unstable prices and limited availability for all goods, since Libya imports nearly everything. In response, LTI 2:
• Made additional financial resources available to manage increased oversight and compliance demands, partnering with cash-transfer companies to facilitate operations in Libya and employing additional finance staff • Shifted more financial transactions to Tunisia, • Strengthened market research and budgeting processes, particularly for in-kind grants
Project implementation. LTI 2 experienced constrained resources during some phases of the project. In the south and east, staff worked from home for nearly one year, and staffing across the board was cut. In response, LTI 2:
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• Deployed part-time field program assistants to provide support with program development, implementation, and M&E in areas without staff • Engaged home-office short-term technical assistance for specific surge support assignments during critical periods, both in Tunis and remotely for cost savings • Increasingly developed fixed-amount-award grants with experienced grantees to shift greater implementation responsibilities to local partners • Supported southern and eastern staff members with the necessary resources to work from home until resources became available to return to offices, and shifted administrative and grants management responsibilities to Tripoli staff • Invested heavily in the retention of critical staff — not only through financial incentives, but also with training and other opportunities
New partnerships. The program made a major transition from working almost exclusively with and through CSOs from 2011-2015 to working primarily with MCs and government institutions. In response, LTI 2 staff invested significant energy in building relationships and trust with MC members and GNA officials. The high-visibility park upgrade activities implemented in early 2016 throughout Libya went a long way in helping forge these relationships and demonstrate LTI 2’s strength and reliability.
Libya’s governance landscape. One of LTI 2’s largest challenges was finding ways to boost public confidence in the GNA, given the fluid and muddled governance situation at the national level. LTI 2’s initial attempts to build public confidence in the GNA using a top- down communications effort were met with mixed results. Average citizens wanted to hear about — and see — tangible results, and they wanted to hear this information directly from government leaders.In response, LTI 2 increasingly focused efforts on building confidence in government at the local level, where services are delivered and citizens have the most interaction with government officials.
Navigating the East-West divide. LTI 2’s aim of strengthening the linkages between MCs and relevant ministries to implement local service delivery activities was complicated in the East by the connection of these ministries to the parallel government of Abdullah al- Thinni. In response, the program distinguished between political and technocratic levels of the government in eastern Libya. This nuance allowed LTI 2 to involve the local offices of line ministries, which are staffed by career civil servants, in municipal-level projects, helping build much-needed vertical institutional linkages. The connection to government ministries was de-emphasized in the communications and public outreach components of activities in the East to ensure that credit for projects did not flow to entities that would undermine the GNA.
Militarization of local governance in eastern Libya. Beginning in August 2016, the LNA began replacing elected mayors with military figures. By the program’s end, approximately a dozen municipalities had fallen under the LNA’s authority in this fashion. In response, LTI 2 shifted programming to focus on MCs with democratically elected authorities.
LIBYA TRANSITION INITIATIVE 2 FINAL REPORT | 19 SECTION VI THE WAY FORWARD
LTI 2’s closeout coincided with the startup of LTI 3, and reflects a continued interest by the United States, in cooperation with the United Nations and other international partners, to assist Libyans to establish a unified, democratic government capable of securing its territory, controlling its resources, and providing services to its citizens. LTI 2 underwent a number of shifts to respond to changing priorities and critical needs throughout the life of the program, including a large focus in 2016-2017 on supporting the unity government, with the hope that a foundation would emerge from which eventual peace could be brokered among the many stakeholders.
By the end of the LTI 2 task order, however, faith in the GNA’s ability to lead effectively had waned considerably, and the country context had shifted from one of potentially positive transition to one that is sliding toward irreparable collapse. Discussion of democratic transition is now limited mostly to elites, while average citizens speak in terms of securing basic services, ensuring minimal security, and seeking financial survival. Though conditions are worse than they have ever been in Libya, the situation could still deteriorate significantly. National reconciliation and political transition will only be possible if the country is able to prevent growing unrest, angst, and instability from crossing a point of no return.
Under LTI 3, the program will shift its programming approach to prevent further deterioration of political and security conditions in Libya, and to try to keep the space open for civilian leadership, reconciliation, and progress at a later date. The goal is a Libya that is resilient to fragmentation and spoilers — be those people, groups, or countries — that challenge or threaten stability and progress toward stability. LTI 3’s program objectives are that stability in strategic, conflict-affected areas is improved; that inclusive, representative governance institutions demonstrate benefits or progress to the public; and that the influence of militant and extremist groups and values in strategic areas is reduced. These objectives are mutually reinforcing and will be achieved through multiple clusters of activities that address complex, unpredictable events with flexibility and speed. LTI 3 will look to program in strategic areas where windows of opportunity emerge, including areas recently liberated from the Islamic State or affected by violent extremism.
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