LIBYA TRANSITION INITIATIVE 2 FINAL REPORT: AUGUST 11, 2014 – AUGUST 10, 2017 September 9, 2017 This publication was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared by Chemonics International Inc. Contract No: AID-OAA-I-14-00006, Task Order AID-OAA-TO-14-00019 LIBYA TRANSITION INITIATIVE 2 FINAL REPORT: AUGUST 11, 2014 – AUGUST 10, 2017 Contract No: AID-OAA-I-14-00006, Task Order AID-OAA-TO-14-00019 Cover photo: Children pour into the streets to welcome the Peace Ambassadors to the town of Ajilat. In December 2016, more than 100 youth armed with messages of peace traveled through western Libya’s coastal and mountain areas, helping to reinforce reconciliation efforts in areas that had been wracked by violent conflict in 2014-2015. (Peace Ambassadors). DISCLAIMER The authors’ views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for International Development or the United States government. CONTENTS Acronyms ................................................................................................................ ii Introduction ............................................................................................................ 3 Political and Security Context .............................................................................. 4 Program Operations .............................................................................................. 7 LTI 2 Startup (September 2014-February 2015) ..................................................................... 7 LTI 2 Tunisia Platform Establishment (March 2015) .............................................................. 7 LTI 2 Partial Closeout (October 2015-January 2016) ........................................................... 7 LTI 2 Organizational Restructuring (January 2016) ................................................................ 8 LTI 2 Ramp-Up (Fall 2016) ........................................................................................................... 8 Program Strategy .................................................................................................. 9 Phase 1 (2014-2015) ...................................................................................................................... 9 Phase 2 (2015-2017) ...................................................................................................................... 9 Program Highlights .............................................................................................. 11 A. Promoting Voices of Nonviolence and Dialogue .............................................................11 B. Advancing Key Political Processes .......................................................................................12 C. Fostering Support for the LPA and Government of National Accord .......................12 D. Increasing Confidence in Local Governance ....................................................................14 E. Increasing the Capacity of Communities to Reject Extremism .....................................15 F. Supporting Sirte’s Recovery and a Return to Normalcy ................................................16 Challenges and Lessons Learned ........................................................................ 18 The Way Forward ................................................................................................ 20 LIBYA TRANSITION INITIATIVE 2 FINAL REPORT | i ACRONYMS AAS Ansar al-Sharia BAM Bunyan al-Marsous BRSC Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council CDA Constitutional Drafting Assembly CSO civil society organization DMSC Derna Mujahedeen Shura Council FPA field program assistant GNA Government of National Accord GNC General National Congress HoR House of Representatives IDP internally displaced person IRI International Republican Institute IS Islamic State LNA Libyan National Army LPA Libyan Political Agreement LTI Libya Transition Initiative M&E monitoring and evaluation MC municipal council NSG National Salvation Government OKLES Organization of the Light of Knowledge for Science and Culture ORM operations risk manager PC Presidential Council PSA public service announcement RPD regional program director RPM regional program manager TMCCC Tripoli Municipal Council Coordination Committee UNSMIL United Nations Support Mission in Libya LIBYA TRANSITION INITIATIVE 2 FINAL REPORT | ii INTRODUCTION The Libya Transition Initiative (LTI) 2 was a follow-on program beginning August 2014 through USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives. As a quick-response mechanism, LTI 2 worked toward the following six objectives, responding to evolutions in the political and operating environment: Promote voices of non-violence and dialogue Advance key political processes Foster support for the LPA and national unity Increase confidence in local governance Increase the capacity of communities in strategic communities to reject extremism Support recovery efforts in communities previously controlled by IS OFFICE ACTIVITY COUNT TOTAL AMOUNT DISBURSED Benghazi, Libya 32 $2,335,380.76 Sabha, Libya 25 $1,420,523.01 Tripoli, Libya 65 $5,638,570.47 Misrata, Libya 6 $544,059.76 Washington, D.C. 2 $119,886.84 Grand Total 136 $10,058,420.83 Using a variety of mechanisms, including grants under contract, short-term technical assistance, and the direct distribution of goods and services, LTI 2 implemented $10,058,420.83across 136 transition activities across Libya. Over the course of the contract, the program delivered the following results: 36 activities focusing on service delivery and 15 on community improvement projects to boost confidence in local governance entities’ responsiveness to their constituents 28 advocacy campaigns such as reinforcing traffic laws, using media to promote moderate political voices, and encouraging civic activism 13 activities using media platforms to foster political dialogue between key constituent groups and government officials Capacity building workshops and training for civil society organizations (CSOs) and activists focused on non-violence, citizen journalism, and dialogue LIBYA TRANSITION INITIATIVE 2 FINAL REPORT | 3 SECTION 1 POLITICAL AND SECURITY CONTEXT LTI 2 began shortly after Libya’s post-revolution political transition had stalled indefinitely, spurring parallel legislatures and governments backed by precarious militia alliances. In May 2014, former Qadhafi-era general Khalifa Haftar had launched Operation Dignity in Benghazi, promising a swift defeat against Islamist and extremist groups responsible for deadly attacks on security forces, political figures, and activists. In the summer of 2014, Tripoli descended into conflict after the Islamist-leaning legislature, the General National Congress (GNC), suffered a heavy defeat in parliamentary elections in June. The Libya Dawn campaign, led by a coalition of militias mainly from Misrata and other western coastal cities, forced rival Zintani militias out of Tripoli, taking control of key infrastructure and institutions, and preventing the newly elected House of Representatives (HOR) from replacing the interim GNC. The internationally recognized HOR established its headquarters in the eastern city of Tobruk in September. Within weeks, Libya Dawn’s leadership had formed the Tripoli-based National Salvation Government. As time passed, each of these alliances sought to secure control of Libya’s lucrative oil industry via local proxies, inflaming local conflicts and fueling instability nationwide. The Dawn-Dignity conflict continued through mid-2015. The December 2015 signing of the Libyan Political Agreement, brokered by the UN, initially enjoyed optimism among Libyans. The LPA’s complex government structure reflected a lack of political consensus, however, and the LPA’s prescribed Government of National Accord (GNA) was challenged from the onset. In western Libya, hardliners from the defunct Libya Dawn coalition continued to support GNC remnants, while moderates embraced the Presidential Council (PC) tasked with forming a unity government. In the East, Haftar’s refusal to recognize the LPA and the HOR’s subsequent failure to endorse the proposed GNA paralyzed efforts to establish a unity government. Since taking office in Tripoli in March 2016, the PC has been unable to exert durable control even in the capital due to entrenched militia influence. By the end of LTI 2, public confidence in the GNA plummeted. Rival institutions in the East refused to recognize the GNA, while the GNA failed to re-establish security, reactivate basic services, and manage an ongoing cash liquidity crisis. Haftar, on the other hand, has enjoyed a relatively high degree of popular support in areas controlled by his self-proclaimed Libyan National Army (LNA). The LNA’s takeover of the Oil Crescent in September 2016 and its seizure of Tamanhint and Jufra airbases in 2017 enabled Haftar to expand his influence and strengthen his position vis-à-vis the GNA. Although Haftar and his allies provide security and stability more effectively than the GNA, it is through increasingly dictatorial tendencies. LIBYA TRANSITION INITIATIVE 2 FINAL REPORT | 4 Turmoil on the political stage encouraged extremist groups’ exploitation of local conflicts and political-security vacuums. In 2014, some Libyan members of well- established jihadi groups like Ansar Al-Sharia (AAS) pledged allegiance to the Islamic State (IS). Supported by foreign fighters, IS affiliates established Libya’s first IS stronghold