The JapaneseAssociationJapanese Association of Indian and Buddhist Studies

Jburnal ofindiaH andBudd]leist Stttdies Vbl. 58, No.3, March 2010 (125)

Dharmottara's Interpretation of the Causelessness of Destruction

SAKAi Masamichi

O. Introduction

It goes without saying that the new proof of momentariness systematized by Dharrnak- irtiO (ca.6oo-66o) dctermines the direction ofthe later development ofthe proofofmomcn- tariness.2) In this prooC the existent (sat) is defined as being causally efficacious, and

thereby the lack of causal efficacy ofthe non-momentary (aksaptku) is deduced, fbr the

way a thing produces an effect i's either gradual or simultaneous and the non-momentary

can produce its effect neither gradually nor simultameously. Thus, it is proven by negating

the existence ofthe non-momentary that all that is existent is momentary. Meanwhile, ow-

ing to the appearance of the new prooC the traditional proof of mornentariness fbunded

upen the causelessness of destruction (vinljSas.va-ahetutva) was moved outside the main-

stream proofs for momentariness. In this traditional proof whose object of application is restricted to the produced (k.rtako) and which always requires the imperrnanence (anityatva)

ofthe produced as its presupposition, it is only possible to infer momcntariness ofthe pro-

duced from its impermanence by virtue of the causelessness of destruction. Therefore, in

the traditional proog the ascertainment of the pervasion (io,liptinis'eaya) of the property of

being produced (k.rtakatva) by the property ofbeing impermanent (anioTatva) is not the top-

ic in the first place. On the contrary, in the new proof not only the momentariness itselg but also the pervasion of the property of being existent (sattva) by the preperty of being

impermanent or being momentary (ksanikzxtva) is established. Therefbre, from the logical

point ofview, it may be no exaggeratien to say that the appearance ofthe ncw proofmakes

the existence of the traditional proof cempletcly superfTuous. In spite of this fact, however,

in the actual history of Indian Buddhism, the traditional proof never disappeared. One pos-

sible reason fbr this can be found in the activities of Dharmakirti's successors. For exam-

ple, Dharrnottara (ca.740-8oo) is engaged in the traditional proof in a unique way. That is,

1241

NII-Electronic Library Service The JapaneseAssociationJapanese Association of Indian and Buddhist Studies

(126) Dharmottara's Intcrpretation ofthe Causelessness ofDestructien (M, SAK,AL)

he places the causelessness of destruction, which is the very backbone of the traditional

prooC in the framework of the new proof and thereby gives jt a ncw function. Thc aim of

this paper is to introduce one interpretation, unique to Dharmottara, ofthe causelessness of

dcstruction by focusing on the argument that appears in an indepcndent werk ofhis, the

Kl,gatiabhaftgasiddhi (henceforth: KBhS) with the great help of Mukt5kalaSa's (ca.1000?)

commentary the K,ya4abhafigasidcthivivatraea KBhSV) (henceforth: .

1. 0bjection of the opponent

In KBhS, Dharmottara's uniquc interpretation appears in the course of the discussion

where he confironts a very distinctive objection of (all) opponent(s) . The fbllewing is the

outlinc ofthe opponent's assertion: (1) What the opponent asserts is that the legical reason

"being (hetu) existent (satn7a)" characterized as having the nature ofbeing eausally effica-

cious, from which the momentariness is inferred, is inconclusive (anaikdnttha) because the

exclusion ofthis logical reason from the dissimilar (vipaksa) is doubtfu1. (2) Namely, cven

the non-rnomeritary can produce an effect gradnally by depending on a gradually cooperat-

ing cause (sakakarin>. Therefore, the non-momentary is eausally efficacious and hcnce can

be considered existent. (3) Jn order to illustrate this theory by an examplc (d.rsgdinta) of

such a coopcrating cause, the opponent points to a hammer as a cause ofdestruction (i,in`-s'-

ahetu). According to the opponent, there is a certain similarity between the causcs of de-

struction and the cooperating causes that the non-momentary requires when it produces its

"to cffbct, that is, do nothing (akim. citkaffa) to a material cause (toptzddina)." The opponcnt

thinks according to the fbllowing sehema:

Anon-momentary thing as material cause + a cooperating cause => produce an efTect In this casc, however, a cooperating cause does not de anything to a material cause, namely, it nei- ther gives supcriority in quality (atisF(u?a) to a material eause nor does it refine (saeis-V7k.r) a ma- terial causc so that it produces an efiioct. A pot as matcrial cause + a hammer : > di sappear In this casc, bowever, a hammer does not do anything to a pet, namely, it neither gives superiority in qu ality to a material cause nor does it refinc a pot so that it disappears.

(4) MQreover, according to the opponent, one must not say that a hammer is not a cause of

destruction of a pot because it does not do anything to a pot, because destruction of a pot fbllows the presence and absence ofa hammcr. (5) In order to exernplify this theory, the

opponent gives a further example, that is, tlic causal relation between seed and sprout. The

- - 1242

NII-Electronic Library Service The JapaneseAssociationJapanese Association of Indian and Buddhist Studies

Dhamiottara's Interprctatien ofthe Causelessness ofDestmction (M, SAK,4i) (l27)

opponent thinks as fbllows: Although a seed does not refine a sprout so that it arises, a

sprout is suhjcct to the existence and non-existence ofa seed. Therefbre, a seed can be

called the cause ofasprout, in the same way that it can bc sajd: Althoughahaminer does

not refine a pot so that it disappears, destruction ofa pot is subject to the existence and

non-existence of a hammer. Therefbre, a hamnier is a causc of destruction.3) Thus, it is

proven that just ]ike the fact that a pot disappears in dependence on a hammer, evcn the

non-momentary produces its cffect dependent on a cooperating cause. Therefore, the logi-

"being cal reason existent" is a pseudo-reason that is inconclusive, fbr the exclusion from

the dissimilar is doul)tfu1. That is the assertion of the opponcnt.

2. New function of the causelessness of destruction

Answcring this objection in the KBhS, Dharmottara rebuts this attack of the opponent

"being eoncerning the logical reason cxistent" by rejecting the cause of destruction as an

example of a cooperating cause. Muktakalaga commcnts upon this very negation of the

cause of destruction by Dharmottara as fo11ows:

In order to prove the [ogical reason ["bcing existcnt"] conclusive, [Dharmottara,] aiming to refute the cause ofdestruction as thc cxample brought up by the opponent, repeats [thc above-mentioned objection] with vvrords "as opponent's the has been said." ... Just as seil in case of the seed ofrice,

the pot caznot depend on a thing as a cause ef destruction Thcrefore, apot is unestablished as the

example of [the theory] that a thing as a cooperating cause is, though it does not do anything to a material cause, llccded [by it]. [-[ence, that which is explained by an example ("da-rsganta) is unestablished. Ihereforc, the statement concerning thc inconc]usiveness [of the logicul Tcason of

"being existenV'] that cven the non-momentary can be an agent [that preduces an effect] gradually is pulled up ("uddh.rta)4) by its roots ('samtilam), and that is the content ef this treatise (Le., KBhS) in totality.5)

This means that, when Dhar nottara negates the cause ofdestruction as an example ofa co-

operating cause, his rejecting the cause of destmction is motivated by the special aim of

"being proving that the logical reason existen" is conclusive

when Dharmottara negates the cause of destmction as an example and thereby proves it to

be unestablished, then the theory explained by this example, that even the non-momentary

can produce its efft:ct gradually by depending on a gradually cooperating cause, is also

p. roven to be wiestablished, since the cxample is unestablished (d.rs. tantdsiddha). Accord-

`Cbeing ingly, the critiquc by the opponent that the logical reason existent" is inconclusive

-1243-

NII-Electronic Library Service The JapaneseAssociationJapanese Association of Indian and Buddhist Studies

(128) Dharmottara's Interpretatien ofthe Causelessness ofDestruction (M. SAKAi)

is invalidated. Thus, this logical reason tt}rns out to be conclusive.

Moreover, Mulct5kalaSa makes a conclusive remark of Dharinottara's argument to re-

ject the cause of destruction :

"therefore" With the words and se on, [Dharmettara] summarizes the purpose to which the above- mentioned [argumentation to reject the cause ofdestruction] centributes. This kind ofrejection of the cause ofdestruction is [taught] by the tbrmer teachers ("ptiJvactiryaih. ), [and it] is taughL by another person (*parerp,a, i.e., Dharrnaklrti) as thc prinuiple of the proof of momentarincss as `tSincc fo11ows ("iti): thcrc is no causc uf dcstruction, destructioll is cenncctcd with [things] en

'tu) of nature auther ofthis the basis [their] (==PV 1.193cd)."However (ni, , forthe trcatisc(i.c., Dharmottara), thc strcngth [, of this kind ofrejcction of the cause of destruction] should be

"bcing understood through the very iogical rcason existent,T' Land this kind ofrejection of the cause of destmction] is brought forward [by him], in ordcr to clear away its fault [i.e. the fault that this 6) logical reason should be inconclusive] .

r!The Hcrc, M. uktEkalaga is pointing out the fo11owing three important facts: (1) notion of the causelessness of destruction is ascribed to the fbrmcr tcachcrs. (2) This traditional no-

tion is formulated by Dharmakirti as the principle ofthe proof ofmomentariness in his PV

1.193cd. (3) For Dharmottara, however, its value and strength should be understood

"being through the very logical reason existent." What is striking in this commcntary of

"an- MuktakalaSa is that he ealls Dharmakirti not a teacher (acdrva) and so on, but merely

other person (gzhan,fpara)."

3. Conclusion

As observed above, fbr Dharmottara the causelessness of dcstruction has the special

"being role of eradicating the fault that the logical reason existent" is inconclusive. Name-

ly, the causelessness of destruction, which is the basc constituent of the traditional prooe is

inc!uded in the system of the new proof and given a new function there, that is, to prove

that thc logical reason of the new proof is conclusiyc. However, Dharmottara in his KBhS

also takes up th¢ primary function of the causelessness of destruction to infer the momen- tariness of the produced. Thercfore, his unique intei[pretation of thc causelessness of de-

struction, observed above, indicates one of its aspects in Dharmottara's loglcal system. In

addition, this interpretation is valid only against the opponent's objection in which the

cause of destruction is brought up as an example of a cooperating cause, depending on

which the non-momentary produces its effect gradually. The very same objection can be

-- 1244

NII-Electronic Library Service The JapaneseAssociationJapanese Association of Indian and Buddhist Studies

Dharmottara's Interpretation ofthe Causelessness ofDestruction (M. SAKAi) (129)

found in his Pramduavinis'cayatika, second chapter, where Dharmottara states that the

eauselessness ofdestmction that has the function ofrefuting the cause ofdestruction as an

cxample of a cooperating causc is an assistant lparikara) to the llegating valid cognition

(bfidhakopramdua) which ascertains the pervasion ofthe property ofbeing existent by the property ofbeing momentary.7) [n my opinion, this unique idca ofDharmottara, to inter-

pret the causelessness of destruction in the framework ofthe new prooC is one ofthe good

examples representi.ng his eriginality and creativity, which made Prot Frauwallner call

"der 8) him erste budtthistische Logiker nach Dharmakirti."

* 1 am obliged to Pro£ IUiken KyOma for his valuable comments and suggestions. I am also very

gratefu1 to Patrick McAllister who kindry corrected my English. Notes1

) For a detaited analysis ofhow Dharmakirti systematizes the new proof and what the theoretical and historical background of the new proofis, see Ybshimizu 1999. 2 ) Ct Steinkellner 1968: 376. 3) [[he above-mentioned arguments from (1) to (5) appear in KBhS 220,14-221,6. For translations of this passage of the KBhS, see Frauwallner 1935: 237-238, and Tani 1997 (a) : 24. My understanding of the contents of this objection is greatly indebted to MuktAkalaSa's com- mentary. Ci KBhSV D260a3-260b4; P279bl-280a3. 4 ) btonpa em.: stonpa DP. 5) KBhSV D263al-3; P283b2-5 (on KBhS 225,7-11). 6) KBhSV D267b5-7; P2g8al-3 (on KBhS 228,24-229,10). 7) CL Sakai tbrthcoming. 8) CC Frauwatlner 1935: 218.

Abbreviations and literature

D: Derge edhion. P: Peking edition. KBhS: KSa"abhahgttb'idd7ii (Dharmottara), ed. E. Frauwall-

ner, Frauwaltner 1935: 219-237. KBhS" KSaptabhangasiddhivivaraua, D 4254; P 5752. PV 1:

The first chapter ofthe Pramanavarttika, ed. R. Gnoli. Rome l960. PVin 2: The secend chapter of

the I'rama4avinis'caya, ed. E. Steinkellner, Beijing-Vienna, 2007. Frauwallner 1935: E. Frauwall-

"Dharmettaras ner, Ksaqabhahgasiddhih: Text und Obersetzung," PZZKMI 42 (1935), 217-258.

"Problems CCKijaqabhafigasiddhiJ' [Iitni 1997 : of Interpretation on Dharmottara's (a) (1)," BuUetin

7Vkitional thttege ofKbch of71,ehnology,41 (1997),19-37(inJapanese). Sakai forthcoming: M. "Salcyabuddhi Sakai, and Dhunnottara on the inference ofmomentariness based on the absence of externul causes of destruction," Pioceedings of the Pburth international Dharmaldrti ConjZtrence,

"Die Vienna, August 23-27, 2005. Steinkellner 1968: E. Steinkellner, Entwicklung des k$aptkatvtinurrianam bej Dharmakirti," ",ZLws, 12f13 (l968169), 361-377. YOshimizu 1999: Ch.

`C[Ihe Ybshimizu, Deyelopment ofsattvanumdna from the Refutation ofa Permanent Existent in the

Sautrantika [Ilradition," MZI

Dharmottara,dsasabhaitgasidtVii,MuktakulaSa,Kisanabhanga,yiddhivivaraua

(Doctoral candidate, University of Vienna)

- 1245

NII-Electronic Library Service