Fifth International Dharmakīrti Conference Abstracts

Heidelberg, 26–30 August, 2014 Crowne Plaza Hotel

Abstracts are arranged in alphabetical order according to the speaker’s last name. Please consult the conference program, available from the conference website http://idhc5.uni-hd.de, for information on the order of presentations.

The organizers gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Liudmila Olalde-Rico in the production of this document.

1 Balcerowicz, Piotr: Dharmakīrti and Samantabhadra

University of Warsaw; [email protected]

The paper analyses certain doctrinal points in the oeuvre of the Jaina Śvetāmbara thinker Samantabhadra who seems to respond to, to criticize and to be influenced by Dharmakīrti.

The issues involve the idea of identity, the use of the delimiting particle eva in the sense of vyavaccheda (exclusion, delimitation), and certain passages in some of Samantabhadra’s works which reveal his knowledge of the Pramāṇavārttika.

Samantabhadra – the author of such works as Āptamīmāṁsā, Devāgamastotra, Yuk- tyanuśāsana, Svayambhūstotra, Stutividyā – is traditionally considered to have lived around 500–550, maybe slightly later. Sometimes he is also thought to be contem- poraneous with Mallavādin Kṣamāśramaṇa, alias Vādimukhya (before 600 CE), the author of the Dvādaśāranayacakra, the source of plethora of quotations from Diṅnāga’s Pramāṇasamuccaya, who had apparently had no knowledge of Dhar- makīrti.

The analysis of the historical correlation of Dharmakīrti and Samantabhadra may have possible implications for the dating of Dharmakīrti.

2 Choi, Kyeongjin: The indeterminate role of bādhakapramāṇa in the Pramāṇaviniścaya

University of Tokyo; [email protected]

1 No one may be suspicious of the thought that bādhakapramāṇa validates pervasion (vyāpti) of sattvānumāna or dispute the idea that it materialized in complete form for the first time in the Pramāṇaviniścaya. Dharmottara proclaims the former in his commentary on the Pramāṇaviniścaya, and we also have Dharmakīrti’s Vādanyāya where he makes the proof of momentariness based on sattvānumāna whose pervasion is certified by bādhakapramāṇa. If this were the case, the traditional proof of momentariness, which is supported by the idea of nirapekṣatva, that is, the causelessness of extinction, would be nothing more than a redundant demonstration in the Pramāṇaviniścaya.

But if one does not have a biased impression of bādhakapramāṇa and just relies on the sentences which Dharmakīrti actually set forth in the Pramāṇaviniścaya, is it possible to see the position on bādhakapramāṇa pointed out by Dharmottara?

In this paper, I would like to reconsider the aforementioned popular belief regarding bādhakapramāṇa and the proof of momentariness in the Pramāṇaviniścaya, with the assistance of rNgog Blo ldan shes rab’s commentary. rNgog understands the causelessness of extinction as the primary reason for the establishment of pervasion in the proof of impermanence. Further, in his opinion, bādhakapramāṇa is a secondary supportive attestation which works to stabilize the validity of the logic of causelessness. That is why he denies Dharmottara’s assertion, saying his stance on the causelessness of extinction is contradictory to Dharmakīrti’s intention.

My aim in this paper is to indicate that the role of bādhakapramāṇa cannot be determined only based in the Pramāṇaviniścaya since Dharmakīrti did not yet make the purpose of bādhakapramāṇa clear in that text. I would like to carefully suggest that we must presume that this issue was still developing in Dharmakīrti’s mind at the time when he wrote this work. I will point out that, instead, what he mainly intended to establish is the effectiveness of svabhāvahetu as a logical reason, and that he only refers to the proof of impermanence based on the idea of causelessness as a prototypical example, not simply for the sake of proving impermanence, itself.

3 Chu, Junjie: Jitāri’s Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi

University of Leipzig; [email protected]

In this paper the author presents an analysis of Jitāri’s Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi, a short philosophical treatise that is up to now unknown.

In this work, Jitāri refutes the bahirarthavāda with regard to the image of object (ākāra). At the start of the treatise, Jitāri divides bahirarthavāda into sākāravijñāna- vāda and nirākāravijñānavāda. He does not pay much attention to the sākāra- vijñānavāda-branch of the bahirarthavāda, saying that it is not in conformity with the whole set of the generally established worldly communicative convention and is nothing but a false determination (mithyābhiniveśa). In the remaining part he con- centrates on refuting the nirākāravijñānavāda-branch of the bahirarthavāda.

2 The refutation begins with a formal reasoning: “What illuminates [in cognition] is cognition [itself], such as the conceptualization of a blue thing; and [a sensory object] like visible matter illuminates [in cognition, therefore, it is cognition with the image of object]. This is the essential reason.” Then, he sets forth a long discussion to prove that the reason is valid, as he does in many other works of him, in the form of proving that the reason is not non-established (asiddhiḥ), is not contradictory (viruddhatvaṃ), and is not inconclusive (anaikāntikatā). In proving that the reason is not inconclusive, Jitāri tries to prove that the shining of cognition is exclusively a self-shining, not in the sense that an external thing is illuminated by cognition; he uses the pattern of “four alternatives” (catuskoṭi) to discuss the relationship between shining and object, i.e., “shining is different from the object-referent,” “shining is non-different from the object-referent,” “shining is both different and non-different from the object-referent,” and “shining is neither different nor non-different from the object-referent.” The conclusion of this discussion is: “Since it is not correct that one thing is illuminated by another thing, the necessary conclusion (ekānta) is: That which shines is exclusively itself, that which is not itself does never shine.”

In the last part of the treatise, in order to explain that the shining of cognition is only self-shining, a further discussion is advanced on the temporal relationship between the cognition and the shining of object as the cause and effect from gram- matical point of view; in doing so, the opinions of Kumārila (ŚVK pratyakṣasūtra 54–55 quoted in TS 2923–2924) and Śubhagupta (BS 192b2: quoted in JNĀ 23,23– 24, 351,17–18; TSP(K) 569,15–17; TSP(Ś) 486,14–17) are also refuted.

4 Coseru, Christian: Consciousness and causal explanation – Śāntarakṣita against physicalism

College of Charleston; [email protected]

The Buddhist epistemologist’s justification for taking reflexivity as the condition for the possibility of warranted states of cognitive awareness is simply an extension of theoretical commitments to a certain conception of the mental. One place where this theory comes into particularly sharp focus is Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla’s challenge of Cārvāka physicalism (in the chapter XXII of Tattvasaṅgraha). The Cār- vāka’s objection to any presumed continuity of reflexive self-awareness is framed by some easily recognizable arguments. First, if an individual is nothing but a bundle of aggregates that are in turn reducible to more basic material substrata (viz., atoms), then conscious awareness must be an emergent property (that is, consciousness must be regarded as nothing more than a product of the type of material organ- ization that is constitutive of biological organisms). Second, since consciousness takes the form of an apprehension of objects (that is, since it is inherently intentional), and apprehension only occurs in specific modes of cognizing such as per- ceiving or reasoning, consciousness cannot be present either when the sensory sys- tems are not yet developed (as in the embryonic stage) or when they are not re- sponsive (as in a state of comatose). Finally, the physicalist argues for what seems like an obvious point: different types of bodies (for instance, those of humans and

3 nonhuman animals), and different tokens of the same human body, manifest different types of consciousness. Assuming otherwise would be akin to postulating that consciousness can apprehend that which is contrary (viruddha) – a problematic position (for the Buddhist) given our lack of direct access to the minds of others (and to the interior life of nonhuman animals). In this paper, I review the Cārvāka arguments and Śāntarakṣita’s response, and consider whether the Buddhist can answer the challenge of physicalism without undermining the explanatory function of causal explanation. I then offer an innovative way to conceive of the notion of material causation (upādānakāraṇa) that builds on some recent debates at the intersection of phenomenology and philosophy of mind.

5 David, Hugo: Maṇḍana Miśra on omniscience (sarvajña- tva) and the perception of yogins (yogipratyakṣa) – On the early appropriation of a few Buddhist concepts in the Mīmāṃsā tradition

University of Cambridge (UK); [email protected]

Philosophical reflection on the nature of the perception of yogins (yogipratyakṣa), as well as on its quality of being “valid knowledge” (pramāṇa), stems back to the very early stages of the “epistemological” school of Buddhism, to the works of Dignāga and, above all, Dharmakīrti. It is not, however, until a much later date that this topic received a systematic treatment as part of a proof of the Buddha’s omniscience (sarvajñatva) by Indian Buddhist thinkers like Kamalaśīla, Jñānaśrīmitra or Rat- nakīrti. An explicit articulation of these two areas of reflection is nevertheless found, prior to the 8th century, in several Brahmanical texts, which therefore constitute, in spite of their often polemical tone, an invaluable source for the study of the early developments of Buddhist thought on these matters. Our knowledge of these texts is still very unequal, though. If Kumārila’s arguments against the possibility of both omniscience and yogic perception in the Ślokavārttika (1.1.2/1.1.4) and Bṛhaṭṭīkā are now reasonably well known, this is not the case for those of his most immediate successor within Mīmāṃsā, Maṇḍana Miśra (660–720?), who devotes a whole section of his Vidhiviveka (k. 15–25 and svavṛtti) to a critique of the possibility of an omniscient being, involving an extensive discussion of Dignāga and Dhar- makīrti’s teachings on perception. In this presentation, I shall give an overview of Maṇḍana’s arguments against omniscience and yogic perception, considering them in their own philosophical and historical context, whenever possible regardless of their much later reformulation and development in Vācaspati Miśra’s Nyāyakaṇikā (second half of the 10th century). Particular attention shall be paid to Maṇḍana’s critical use of the works of Dharmakīrti – of whom he proves to be an early and very careful reader –, and to the theoretical plausibility of a denial of both yogic perception and omniscience in the framework of a Vedāntic soteriology (propoun- ded both in the Vidhiviveka and in the presumably later Brahmasiddhi) finding its achievement in the apprehension of the Absolute (brahman) in a direct, perceptive knowledge.

4 6 Eltschinger, Vincent: Buddhist philosophy as critical examination (parīkṣā) – From Buddhist canonical literature to Dharmakīrti

Austrian Academy of Sciences; [email protected].

Buddhist sūtra and vinaya literature often portrays the (future) Buddha as being dis- satisfied with and rejecting, sometimes on the basis of ad hoc philosophical arguments, the doctrines and practices of “contemporary” religio-philosophical traditions (the views expressed in the Brahmajālasūtra, etc.) and/or masters (the six “rival masters,” Arāḍa Kālāma, Udraka Rāmaputra, etc.). Elaborating on these earlier biographical narratives, Aśvaghoṣa (early 2nd century CE?) consistently represents the (future) Buddha as subordinating his choices in soteriological matters to a thorough critical examination (parīkṣā, vicāra, etc.) of the competing salvational methods (in fact, and quite anachronically, those available in first- to second-century India, especially Sāṅkhya, but also Vaiśeṣika, Vedic ritualism, proponents of time, nature, etc., as ultimate principles, etc.). The notion of parīkṣā also plays a promin- ent role in early Indian Buddhist literature of polemical as well as “meditational” in- tent. Thus it is that the Yogācārabhūmi (early 4th century CE?) makes critical examination the driving principle of its polemics against sixteen Buddhist as well as non- Buddhist religio-philosophical doctrines and practices (Sāṅkhya, Jainism, Sar- vāstivāda, materialism, claims to socio-religious superiority, ritual violence, purific- ation practices, etc.) and a key component of its definition of logic and dialectics (hetuvidyā, vāda). As for meditational handbooks such as Saṅgharakṣa’s Yogācārab- hūmi (early 2nd century CE?) and the so-called Yogalehrbuch, they also allot an important place to parīkṣā while describing the intellectual practices and the early ca- reer of a bodhisattva. In these and other texts, the appraisal of concurrent religio- philosophical streams through independent and allegedly value-free reasoning is made one of the conditions of the Buddha’s paradigmatic salvational experience and the very hallmark of Buddhism. After an introduction to the treatment of parīkṣā and related notions in Indian Buddhist works from the 1st half of the 1st millennium CE, this paper will attempt to exhibit the Buddhist epistemologists’ indebtedness to these earlier uses and interpretations of parīkṣā by focusing on the first chapter of Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttika, especially PVSV 108,2–109,3, a passage in which the celebrated logician presents his philosophical enterprise in an apologetic and soteriological perspective.

7 Franco, Eli: The determination of causation and the similarity between cause and effect

Leipzig University; [email protected]

The determination of a causal connection is one of the major issues in Dharmakīrti’s epistemology. The usual depiction of this topic is based on PV I 34 and similar passages where it is stated if all other conditions remain the same and upon the intro-

5 duction of a new element a certain effect arises, while when this element is removed the effect does not arise, this new element is the cause of that effect. Further, some scholars (e.g., Taber, Dharmakīrti against Physicalism; Steinkellner, Dharmakīrti’s Early Logic) state that such cause and effect have to be similar to each other, though the exact type of similarity remains contested.

In my paper, I will argue that various studies of the determination of causation according to Dharmakīrti have neglect to examine Dharmakīrti’s own practice in determining causation. When doing so, it becomes clear that the above depiction of the determination of causal relation can be true, but does not have to be true. In other words, it forms a particular case, to which a general validity cannot be attributed. For instance, Dharmakīrti allowed a determination of causation even if a certain entity is constantly present (and thus cannot be added to or removed from a causal complex), and even if cause and effect are entirely dissimilar from each other, at least on the level of everyday practice.

8 Fukuda, Yoichi: Reinterpretation of the compound svabhāvapratibandha in Dharmakīrti’s logical theory

Otani University; [email protected]

It seems to me that many scholars agree that svabhāvapratibandha forms the basis in reality of the logical nexus in Dharmakīrti’s logical theory. However, there are different opinions on what svabhāvapratibandha means.

Professor Steinkellner wrote in his “Svabhāvapratibandha Again” that “since the word pratibandha has only a formal meaning, the word svabhāva is responsible for connecting the reality needed” (Acta Indologica, 6, 1984). He does not distinguish the meaning of sambandha from that of pratibandha, and translates them with “connection” in formal meaning. However, in many cases, Dharmakīrti in fact uses the term pratibandha without mentioning svabhāva in the sense of the basis in reality. Therefore, we must examine the meaning of pratibandha independent of svab- hāva in all of these cases.

Before researching the use of this word in Dharmakīrti’s texts, I would like to consult the usage of pratibandha/pratibaddha in Mahāvyutpatti and Abhidharmakośa, two authoritative texts of Buddhist terminology. Mahāvyutpatti lists “phyir ’jil ba’am bgegs byed pa’am bar chad byed pa” as the Tibetan equivalents for pratibandha, which mean hindrance or obstruct. The case is the same in Abhidharmakośa, where pratibandha is translated into Tibetan as “gegs byed pa/bgegs su gyur pa” and into Chinese as “障, 障礙, 遮.” On the other hand, in Mahāvyutpatti, “rag lus pa’am ’brel ba’am bgegs su gyur pa” are listed as the equivalent Tibetan words to pratibandha and in Abhidharmakośa, “X-pratibaddha” is translated in four cases into Tibetan as “A la rag lus/las pa,” and in one case as “X dang ’brel ba.” In five cases, it is translated into Chinese as “繋属, 属, 随.” The translations in Abhidharmakośa all mean

6 “dependence upon.” In these traditional texts, pratibandha is never used to mean connection, and it is used chiefly to mean dependence.

In one-third of the cases where pratibandha is used in Dharmakīrti’s PVSV, the meaning of the word is “obstruct,” translated as gegs/gags byed (pa) in Tibetan. In two-thirds of the cases, however, where the word pratibandha is used, and in all cases of the use of the word pratibaddha, the translations are ’brel ba or rag las/lus pa, which in Tibetan provide no distinction between pratibandha and pratibaddha. The difference between them is only the Sanskrit syntax and not the word’s meaning. As we will see later, Dharmakīrti paraphrases svabhāvapratibandha with pra- tibaddhasvabhāvatva, meaning that something has its svabhāva depending upon another thing; in other words, that the svabhāva of something is dependent upon another thing. There are about 60 examples of pratibandha/pratibaddha in PVSV, and of these, I believe that none conflicts with the meaning of dependence.

To understand the meaning of the compound svabhāvapratibandha, I would like to discuss the role of svabhāva, the first component of the compound. Until now, there have been three interpretations of this compound: instrumental tatpuruṣa, genitive tatpuruṣa, and locative tatpuruṣa. The first interpretation is the predominant one according to how Dharmottara paraphrases the compound in NBT (svabhāvena pratibandha). However, we could not find any textual evidence confirming that pratibandha is used with a word in the instrumental case. Dharmakīrti mentions pratibandha with one word in the genitive case and another word in the locative case; the former word indicates a possessor of pratibandha and the latter word indicates an object upon which that possessor depends. The similar thing can be seen in the example of pratibaddha, which is used with a word in the locative case indicating the object of dependence and a notional subject in the appositional case, as in NB, below:

svabhāvapratibandhe hi saty artho(X) arthaṃ(Y) gamayet. (NB, 2.19) tad(Y)-apratibaddhasya(X) tad(Y)-avyabhicāra-niyama-abhāvāt. (NB, 2.20) sa ca pratibandhaḥ sādhye arthe(Y) liṅgasya(X). (NB, 2.21) [liṅgasya(X)] vastutas tād(Y)ātmyāt tad(Y)-utpatteś ca. (NB, 2.22) atad(Y)-svabhāvasya(X) atad(Y)-utpatteś(X) ca tatra(Y) apratibaddha-svabhāvatvāt. (NB, 2.23)

In these statements, X is hetu and Y is sādhya. According to NB, 2.23, X (hetu) is a notional subject of the bahuvrīhi compound pratibaddhasvabhāva, and according to NB, 2.21, X (hetu) is a notional subject of pratibandha (or svabhāvapratibandha). Therefore, X has pratibaddhasvabhāva upon Y (that is, X has the svabhāva that depends upon Y). All of these statements in NB are found in Dharmakīrti’s major work, PVSV. Therefore, it is possible to speculate that this pragmatics of pratibandha reflects Dharmakīrti’s fundamental understanding.

Finally, I would like to make a suggestion about the meaning of the dependence of X (hetu) upon Y (sādhya). Because Dharmakīrti himself does not discuss the mean-

7 ing of pratibandha explicitly, we must speculate on this term in its textual context. It is a word very closely related to ekanivṛttyānyanivṛtti (PVSV, 10.23; PV, I.24), the improved version of avinābhāva, which is a traditional notation of a logical nexus. While avinābhāva means the inevitable absence of one thing (X = hetu) in the sphere of the absence of another thing (Y = sādhya), ekanivṛttyānyanivṛtti means that the disappearance of one thing (X) causes the disappearance of another thing (Y). This causality of disappearance is expressed by the instrumental case, while the inclusion relation of the absence of two things is expressed by the locative case. Dharmakīrti introduces this causality of disappearance as a condition of inevitable logical nexus, and insists that the causality of disappearance necessarily requires the pratibandha relation, meaning the dependence of the existence of one thing (X = hetu) upon another thing (Y = sādhya). If there is this dependence of X upon Y, the disappearance of Y will inevitably cause the disappearance of X. Such dependence is, in itself, a connection in reality and, because of this, Dharmakīrti does not need to mention the word svabhāva.

9 Gillon, Brendan: Ṣaṭkoṭivāda in the Upāyahṛdaya

McGill University; [email protected]

The text thought to be the earliest on debate in Classical India is preserved only in a translation into Chinese. Known in Chinese as the Fang Bian Xin Lun and found in the Taishō, the great Chinese collection of Buddhist texts (T 1632: v. 32, pp. 23.2– 28.3), it was retranslated into Sanskrit, under the Sanskrit title Upāyahṛdaya, by the great Italian Indologist Giuseppe Tucci and the translation published in 1929. No translation into a European language has, ever appeared. The author of this text is unknown, though the Japanese Indologist, Yūichi Kajiyama, has presented arguments for its attribution to the famous Indian dialectician Nāgārjuna.

A puzzling dialectical, or perhaps logical, term found in the opening verses of Nāgārjuna’s Vigrahavyāvartanī is the term ṣaṭkoṭivāda. This term seems to apply to what is set out at length in the third chapter of the Fang Bian Xin Lun. The talk will explain what this term applies to.

10 Gorisse, Marie-Hélène: Jain conceptions of non- apprehension – A criticism of Dharmakīrti’s theory of inference

Ghent University; [email protected]

Whereas Buddhist conceptions of non-apprehension as a source of knowledge have received detailed attention of scholars in the past years, Jain ones are still to be studied. Yet, they depart from a dialogue with Buddhist philosophers on what count as a correct evidence within an inference. And, as such, Jain conceptions of non-apprehension as a source of knowledge can be seen as a relevant part of the studies on Buddhist theories of inference as well.

8 The discussion concerning the number of types of relation that can ensure certainty concerning the relative absence or presence of their members is a stylistic mnemonic way to present philosophical considerations concerning one’s conception of inference. For example, the fact that Jain philosophers accept four types of evidence, namely evidence grounded on identity of nature, causality, co-existence and suc- cession, is a way to say that they consider as relevant whatever evidence ensures the universality of the conclusion of the inference at stake (because the evidence is always seen with the target-property). Whereas the fact that Buddhist philosophers accept only two types of evidence, namely the ones grounded on identity of nature and on causality, means that they consider inference as relying on necessity (the evidence is always seen with the target-property because there is an underlying necessary relation).

The same apply to the discussions concerning the number of types of non-apprehension: this presentation in the form of a list of accepted non-apprehensions is a stylistic mnemonic way to present philosophical considerations concerning one’s conception of what ensures certainty in an inference.

The aim of this paper is in a first part to present and compare the types of non- apprehension ensuring inferential knowledge for Buddhist and for Jain philosophers, as well as to indicate the philosophical relevance of these lists.

And in a second part, I will show that the divergences between the types of evidence accepted by each school are rooted in the divergences between their respective conceptions of non-apprehension. More precisely, the possibility of acquiring knowledge of a presence of a property by means of the non-apprehension of an incompat- ible property can be seen as what led Jain philosophers to distinguish between four types of evidence.

I will present Dharmakīrti’s views and implicit attacks to the Jains as they are found in his Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti. As for Jain views, I will focus on Māṇikyanandi’s Parīkṣāmukham. This work consists in a digest of the final and mature epistemology of Akalaṅka reworked by Vidyānanda. Akalaṅka was a Jain Digambara philosopher contemporary of Dharmakīrti who devoted core parts of his work at giving a systematic answer to Dharmakīrti’s criticisms to Jain philosophers. But following his Buddhist opponent’s style, he gave very concise answers, which explains our re- course to his commentators.

11 Guerrero, Laura P.: Pramāṇa as conventional truth in the work of Dharmakīrti

Utah Valley University; [email protected]

This paper scrutinizes the relationship between conventional and ultimate truth in the work of Dharmakīrti. In particular, this paper raises a challenge for the interpretation that Dharmakīrti employs a sliding scale of analysis whereby he dialectically

9 progresses from claims that are soteriologically useful but strictly speaking false, up to the ultimate truth of the Yogācāra. In the spirit of recent work conducted with respect to conventional truth in the Madhyamaka tradition of Buddhism, this paper argues that the sliding-scale interpretation fails to take conventional truth seriously enough as truth. By bringing to bear work in analytic metaphysics, as well as the work conducted with respect to Madhyamaka, this paper shows why a more robust sense of conventional truth is necessary and why the sliding-scale interpretation cannot account for it. The paper concludes by suggesting that Dharmakīrti’s account of pramāṇa should be read as consistent with the ultimate Yogācāra position. Read in this way, the account of pramāṇa can be understood as itself providing an explanation of the sense in which conventional truth is true (and conventional falsehood, false) despite the ultimate metaphysical rejection of the objective existence of the experienced world.

12 He, Huanhuan/van der Kuijp, Leonard W. J.: Turning the Wheels – Yet another look at the *Hetucakra[ḍamaru]

Chinese Academy of Social Sciences; [email protected]/

Harvard University; [email protected]

Attributed to Dignāga, the Hetucakra[ḍamaru] or HC has been studied a number of times, even when so far no truly reliable edition exists of the only extant version, namely the Tibetan translation by most likely Śāntarakṣita and the Tibetan Lo tsā ba Chos kyi snang ba [Dharmāloka]. Some nine decades ago, the redoubtable Buddhist scholar Lü Cheng (1896–1989) published a Chinese translation in his “Diagrammatic Explanation of the Wheel of Reason [in Chinese]” ([Journal of] Neixue 4, 1928, 1–6), which he accompanied with brief but exceptionally insightful comments. In his “Translation of the Tibetan Translation of the Hetucakra; the Logic of the Nine Reasons [in Japanese],” Bukkyōgaku kenkyū 8–9 (1953), 100–110, Takemura Shōhō mentioned Lü Cheng’s paper, and, virtually following Lü in his analysis, offered the very same two diagrams of the sapakṣa and vipakṣa squares. As far as we are aware, Lü was the first (modern) scholar to have clearly explained the three wheels that are articulated in the text, that is, the sapakṣa-wheel and the vipakṣa-wheel, and that these two make up the final cakra-wheel of nine reasons.

Inspired by Lü’s concise annotated translation, in this paper, we would like to give a complete critical Tibetan edition of the text, an annotated English translation, and a few diagrams to show how the cakra-wheel actually works. How it can be turned or rotated as a drum (ḍamaru) is quite literally described by the HC’s author, but has been considered a puzzle of the text for some time. Finally, we will discuss ques- tions bearing on the authorship and the transmission of the HC, and venture to offer a different interpretation of HC 8 and 9 than what was recently given by E. Franco and L. Schmithausen.

10 13 Hugon, Pascale: Revisiting the prasaṅga passage of the Pramāṇaviniścaya

Austrian Academy of Sciences; [email protected]

The surfacing of new textual material is playing a significant role in our better understanding of Dharmakīrti’s thought and its Indian and Tibetan reception. In my paper I revisit the prasaṅga passage of the Pramāṇaviniścaya (PVin-Skt 3 4,4‒6,12; PVin-Tib D188a5‒189a5; P286a5‒287a5; N300a6‒301b) and its interpretations based on the now available Sanskrit version of Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇaviniścaya and Dharmottara’s Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā and on early Tibetan commentaries, with a focus on the ones by Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge (1109‒1169) and his student gTsang nag pa brTson ʼgrus seng ge (?‒after 1195).

A major point of dissension among Indian commentators regarding this passage is whether the example provided by Dharmakīrti illustrates a prasaṅga or its reverse form (prasaṅgaviparyaya), and what are the conditions for arriving at a reverse form that constitutes a correct proof, in particular the conditions pertaining to the status of the subject. Whereas Phya pa follows Dharmottara’s interpretation for the most part, he also introduces divergent explanations for single terms and compounds that reflects a different understanding of the original text.

In my presentation I first discuss Phya pa’s general understanding of this passage in connexion with his two extensive excursuses on prasaṅga (Tib. thal ’gyur/thal ba) found in the Tshad ma yid kyi mun sel and in the section that precedes the explanation of the prasaṅga passage in his commentary of the Pramāṇaviniścaya. Further, I consider Phya pa’s deviations from Dharmottara’s interpretation, raising the question whether they are due to Phya pa’s reliance on a Tibetan translation of the PVin and PVinṬ, the influence of other interpretative traditions, or simply reflect a personal understanding of the text. I also examine his criticism of two alternative interpretations of the example given by Dharmakīrti in this passage (interpretations that echo positions already mentioned in Dharmottara’s commentary) and explore their fluctu- ating attributions, to Prajñākaragupta and Vinītadeva by Phya pa, to Śāntabhadra and Vinītadeva by Zhang thang sag pa and Bu ston. Finally, I compare Phya pa’s commentary on this passage with that of his student gTsang nag pa brTson ’grus seng ge and raise the question of the compatibility of gTsang nag pa’s views on prasaṅga with the Candrakīrti-oriented Madhyamaka standpoint he is known to have adopted.

14 Inami, Masahiro: Two kinds of causal capacity – sāmānyā śaktiḥ and pratiniyatā śaktiḥ

Tokyo Gakugei University; [email protected]

Buddhist logicians advocate that there are two kinds of causal capacity, i.e., sāmānyā śaktiḥ and pratiniyatā śaktiḥ. According to some studies, they mean to say

11 that external objects, such as pots, have two different causal powers: one is the causal power common to other objects of the same kind, and the other is the causal power that is not common to any other object. For example, a pot has the causal power or capability of containing water, which is common to other pots, and, at the same time, it has the unique power of producing its own particular perception.

However, Dharmakīrti and his followers mean otherwise by the concept of the two kinds of causal capacity. They explain that because the entire pot does not exist dis- tinctly from its parts, the pot is nothing but the aggregate of multiple atoms such as color atoms. Then, they state that the atoms that constitute the pot have two different causal capacities. For example, the color atoms that constitute the pot have both the power of yielding those results such as containing water, which is common to all the constituents of the same pot, and the power of producing a visual sensation, which is not common to the other constituents such as the smell atoms. The point is that, in the case of a causal complex, each cause shares the ability of producing a single effect and has separately defined abilities as well.

Some modern scholars mistakenly attribute this theory to Prajñākaragupta, a commentator of Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttika (PV), and not to Dharmakīrti. Before Prajñākaragupta, Devendrabuddhi, an earlier commentator of PV, lucidly explains the theory by using the terms sāmānyā śaktiḥ and pratiniyatā śaktiḥ. Besides, the concept of the two kinds of causal capacity is clearly seen in Dharmakīrti’s works such as PV I (with svavṛtti), PV II, and Hetubindu. Commentators such as De- vendrabuddhi and Prajñākaragupta described Dharmakīrti’s concept in more detail.

15 Ishida, Hisataka: The exclusion of superimposition (samāropavyavaccheda)

Tokyo University; [email protected]

In his apoha theory, i.e. the theory of exclusion, Dignāga insists that a word expresses its meaning through the exclusion of others. Consequently, what is excluded decides the meaning of words and is, according to Dignāga, decided by the intention of the speaker (PSV ad PS 43b). Dharmakīrti following his predecessor admits the important role of the speaker’s intention. He develops the apoha theory, which asserts that one employs words or inferences, more precisely the inferential mark (liṅga), to eliminate the superimposition (samāropavyavaccheda) that results from other sources of confusion. A typical example of such superimposition is when one falsely recognizes a string as a snake or a small shell as silver, which should be eliminated by inference.

A question arises here as to whether the exclusion function of words or inference is restricted to the case when one falsely recognizes the object. Okada (“On the object of exclusion in case of the cognition immediately after the perception,” 2007) treats this problem, and he, consulting the commentary of Śaṅkaranandana and other sources, concludes that the word or inferential mark excludes the “future” possibil-

12 ity of superimposition in such a case. I think, however, the point is to consider what is excluded by words or by inference when there is no superimposition at all in conceptual cognition. Dharmakīrti explains that the word or the inferential mark can be regarded as having already excluded that which has not been superimposed (PV 1.48cd: asamāropitānyāṃśe tanmātrāpohagocaram). Consequently, Dharmakīrti ex- tends the function of the word or the inferential mark, i.e. the other-exclusion, to all conceptual cognition.

This idea is expressed in his later work Hetubindu as “To determine it is to exclude the other than it” (tat paricchinatti, tadanyad vyavacchinatti). This passage is later quoted by Jñānaśrīmitra, and Katsura (“Jñānaśrīmitra on apoha,” 1986) refers to it in showing the essential consistency between Dharmakīrti’s apoha theory and the ideas of Jñānaśrīmitra.

I would also like to discuss that other-exclusion could justify the validity of conceptual cognition as determining cognition (niścaya), since Dharmakīrti definitely states that the latter denies superimposition (PV 1.49ab: niścayāropamanasor bādhyabādhakabhāvataḥ).

16 Kanō, Kyō: On viparyayabādhakapramāṇa

Kobe Women’s University; [email protected]

In his Īśvarādhikāre vārttikasaptaślokīvyākhyānam Jñānaśrīmitra states: “the valid means of cognition which establishes a pervasion are of only two kinds, perception and non-cognition or viparyayabādhakaṃ, because both of these have perception and inference as their essential properties (tac ca pramāṇaṃ vyāptisādhakaṃ dvividham eva. pratyakṣānupalambhaṃ vā viparyayabādhakaṃ vā. anayoḥ pratyakṣānumānasvabhāvatvāt).” This statement admits of two interpretations. First, both of them, perception and non-cognition, and viparyayabādhakaṃ, have perception and inference as their essential properties. Secondly, the former, perception and non-cognition, has perception as its essential property and the latter, viparyayabād- hakaṃ, has inference as its essential property. Jñānaśrīmitra suggests in another passage that viparyayabādhakaṃ is an inference. If Jñānaśrīmitra’s intention is the second, is it Buddhists general idea at that time or only his original? Moreover, this statement seems to suggest that the former, perception and non-cognition, corresponds to kāryahetu and the latter, viparyayabādhakaṃ, to svabhāvahetu. Does he really intend this correspondence? Is it Jñānaśrīmitra’s idea that all pervasions with reference to svabhāvahetu can be established only by viparyayabādhakaṃ? If so, what kind of pramāṇa does it represent? Does it include prasaṅga and prasaṅgavi- paryaya, or it is different from these two? My paper will deal with these issues related to viparyayabādhakapramāṇa (correctly sādhyaviparyaye bādhakapramāṇa) mainly discussed in the texts after Dharmakīrti which have not been hitherto directly discussed upon.

13 17 Kataoka, Kei: How does one cognize a cow? A dialogue between Mādhava and Dignāga

Kyushu University: [email protected]

In PS V 39–44 Dignāga defends his theory of apoha replying to a Sāṃkhya theorist. PSV ad V 39 begins with words yas tv āha and the commentator Jinendrabuddhi identifies this theorist as Vaināśika, i.e. “a destroyer.” As Pind (2009: 286, n. 506) comments, this theorist must be the famous Sāṃkhya theorist, Mādhava, who is elsewhere often called Sāṃkhyanāśaka, a destroyer of the Sāṃkhya system, because his unique views often deviate from orthodox Sāṃkhya tenets. As Pind observes in his note 506 on PS V 39, it seems that Mādhava criticizes the theory of apoha by quoting from Dignāga’s lost work, probably either the Sāṃkhyaparīkṣā or the Sāmānyaparīkṣāvyāsa. The main scenario of PS V 39 can be depicted as follows:

1. Dignāga criticizes Sāṃkhya views in his earlier work.

2. Mādhava criticizes Dignāga’s theory of apoha.

3. Dignāga replies to Mādhava’s criticism in the Pramāṇasamuccaya.

PS V 41ab refers to a view that the cognition of a cow is based on the observation of dewlap, and so on (sāsnādidarśanād gopratyayaḥ). Pind (2009: 291, n. 516) ascribes this view to “an unknown Jain ‘distinctionist,’ a Vaibhāgika,” on the basis of Jinendrabuddhi’s commentary tatra hi vaibhāgikenoktam. He also ascribes the view presented in PS V 41d (bhinnāpohyās tu te mithaḥ) to Mādhava. The present author reexamines the relevant material, i.e. PS(V) and PSṬ, and shows that the first view is ascribed not to a Jain Vaibhāgika but to Mādhava and that the second view is ascribed not to Mādhava but to Dignāga.

18 Kawajiri, Yohei: The Pratyabhijñā school’s criticism of the Buddhist concept of svalakṣaṇa

Chikushi Jogakuen University; [email protected]

It is well known that Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta, who are respectively a sys- tematiser and an expounder of the Pratyabhijñā school, are surprisingly familiar with Dharmakīrti’s logic and epistemology. They often refer to the typical terminology of Buddhist epistemologists, for example, to svalakṣaṇa, arthakriyā, svas- aṃvedana, apoha, svabhāvahetu and so on. Of these terms, they utilize svalakṣaṇa in order to establish their theory of remembrance. However, the view of svalakṣaṇa entertained by the Pratyabhijñā school is not in complete accord with what is held by the Buddhist epistemologists.

For the Buddhist epistemologists, svalakṣaṇa is the object only of perception, what has causal efficiency, dissimilar to anything else, not the object of words, the source

14 of knowledge, real because what has causal efficiency is real, and the entity which has a unique character. However, though Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta consider the svalakṣaṇa as something determined in space, time and form, they criticize the Buddhist view of svalakṣaṇa in that it is the object only of perception and real. For, in the Pratyabhijñā school, what is called svalakṣaṇa is not the object only of perception and conceptual. The view of svalakṣaṇa entertained by the Pratyabhijñā school is called ābhāsanikurumbhātmakasvalakṣaṇavāda. According to this view, what is called svalakṣaṇa is a mixture of manifestations (ābhāsa).

This paper will show how Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta reinterpret what is called svalakṣaṇa by the Buddhist epistemologists in terms of the Pratyabhijñā school, to make clear how the theory of manifestation and a valid means of knowledge (pramāṇa) held by the Pratyabhijñā school is reflected in the argument.

19 Kobayashi, Hisayasu: Dharmottara and Prajñākaragupta on svalakṣaṇa

Chikushi Jogakuen University; [email protected]

When Dharmakīrti says that a valid cognition (pramāṇa) is a cognition which does not deceive our expectation toward its object (avisaṃvādi jñānam), he confronts the following problem: If the Buddhist theory of momentariness claims that an object- moment to be cognized by a cognition should be differentiated from an object- moment to be obtained through a practical activity, how can one establish the validity of the cognition?

In this paper I shall show that, in order to solve the problem of time-gap between an object-moment to be cognized and an object-moment to be obtained, Dharmottara and Prajñākaragupta adopt two different strategies. From the point of view of what is to be cognized by a cognition at the time when the cognition takes place, the former holds that an object of a valid cognition should be divided into two types: a direct object (grāhya) and an object to be obtained (prāpaṇīya, adhyavaseya); while, from the point of view of what is to be obtained through a cognition, the latter holds that it suffices to say that a cognition of a present object-moment is an erroneous cognition with respect to a future object-moment.

20 Lasic, Horst: What is the effect of what and how can one determine it?

Austrian Academy of Sciences; [email protected]

Steinkellner’s recently (2013) published translation of those parts of the first chapter of the Pramāṇavārttika and its Vṛtti that deal with logic is certain to receive much attention among scholars of South Asian philosophy and will without doubt have a marked impact on future investigations into Dharmakīrti’s thought. Steinkellner’s close familiarity with Dharmakīrti’s work and its intellectual environment, which he

15 gained through intensive research over roughly half a century, allows him to challenge traditional interpretations and find new understandings of crucial passages. A case in point is Steinkellner’s interpretation of Dharmakīrti’s explanation on how one can establish something as being the effect of a specific cause. In this special case, however, some of Steinkellner’s proposed understandings seem to ask for further re- consideration. I therefore plan to investigate the relevant materials anew and present arguments in support of or against Steinkellner’s interpretation as necessity arises.

21 Mc Allister, Patrick: Form and content in Ratnakīrti’s writings

Heidelberg University; [email protected]

The paper explores the content of some of Ratnakīrti’s writings from the perspective of his distinctive style. Already Anantalal Thakur noted that Ratnakīrti’s texts are organized around principles of Buddhist logic (e.g., pseudo-reasons). In light of closer examinations of those texts by various scholars, it has become apparent that they are very literally organized around inferences: each text is structured around a guiding inference, either one that an opponent upholds, or one that Ratnakīrti himself endorses.

I would like to investigate whether this method is simply a literary device, or whether this formal strategy has implications also for the actual content of the discussions. The answer to this question requires an investigation of the structure of his texts, and an estimation of how some of the arguments he makes fit into the Buddhist tradition, especially as upheld by Jñānaśrīmitra, his teacher, and also by Pra- jñākaragupta.

22 McCrea, Lawrence Joseph: Balancing the scales – Dharmakīrti inside and out

Cornell University; [email protected]

Recent years have witnessed much debate about the best way to make sense of Dharmakīrti’s apparent diversity of philosophical positions regarding the status of mind-independent objects: at some times he appears to argue in ways that presup- pose the existence of such objects, while at others he argues against them. Several approaches have been proposed to account for this apparent contradiction in Dhar- makīrti’s various statements regarding ontology. Most famously Dunne (2004) has suggested that we should see such positions as ranged along a “sliding scale” of hierarchically arranged stances, in which “more accurate descriptions of what we perceive and think supersede less accurate ones.” On this view, the externalist or “Sautrāntika” arguments Dharmakīrti often relies upon are there only as prelimin- ary, conditional positions, as stepping stones which invariably give way through a specific kind of “transition argument” to the more accurate and more soteriologic-

16 ally beneficial internalist or Yogācāra position which represents Dharmakīrti’s real views. Certain features of this overarching vision of Dharmakīrti’s philosophical methodology have been further investigated and in some respects questioned, for example by Arnold (2008) and Kellner (2011). This paper will seek to extend this debate, and to reexamine some of its main premises, especially in the light of additional evidence provided by the recently recovered Sanskrit text of Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇaviniścaya and not yet considered in discussions of Dharmakīrti’s stance on the realist/idealist question. In particular, I will seek to show that the purported hier- archical ordering of the realist and idealist positions is not as clear or as unambigu- ous as has sometimes been claimed, and that the “Sautrāntika” view Dharmakīrti often seems at least conditionally to present as his own may be meant as far more than a pedagogical straw man or stepping stone to an ultimately preferred Yogācāra view. On the contrary, there is evidence in several passages of Dharmakīrti’s major works to suggest that he wished, at least for certain polemical and pedagogical purposes, to present his own versions of the externalist and internalist positions as two irrecon- cilable but alternate and viable ontologies, rather than one less accurate stance de- signed to give way in the end to a higher and more accurate one, and therefore that the traditional classification of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti’s works as belonging to the “Sautrāntika-Yogācāra School” may not be as misguided as some contemporary ac- counts have suggested.

23 Miyo, Mai: Dharmottara and Prajñākaragupta on the non-distinction between pramāṇa and pramāṇaphala

Waseda University; [email protected]

My paper will examine the concept of vyavasthā in the theory of the non-distinction between pramāṇa and pramāṇaphala by contrasting Dharmottara’s interpretation in his Nyāyabinduṭīkā and Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā with Prajñākaragupta’s Pramāṇavārt- tikālaṃkāra, and then returning to Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttika (PV) and Pramāṇaviniścaya. The Buddhist logico-epistemological school holds that there is no distinction between pramāṇa and pramāṇaphala, that is, the means of valid cognition and its result. According to Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttika III 301–319, pramāṇa is cognition’s nature of having the form of the object (meyarūpatā), and pramāṇaphala is cognition’s function of understanding the object (prameyādhigati). Thus both, being aspects of a certain cognition, are distinguished from each other only from the viewpoint of aspects, but not of real entities. Moreover, previous research, along with Manorathanandin’s commentary on PV and Dharmottara’s Nyāyabinduṭīkā on NB I 21, has pointed out that pramāṇa and pramāṇaphala are related in the manner of vyavasthāpaka and vyavasthāpya, that is, that which differenti- ates the cognition and the cognition to be differentiated.

However, Dharmottara’s interpretation is not so simple because he uses two mean- ings of the word vyavasthāpaka, as Durvekamiśra suggests in his sub-commentary: (1) the cause of differentiation (vyavasthānimittaṃ vyavasthāpanam) with -aka suffix used in the sense of karaṇa, and (2) the agent of differentiation (vyavasthāpayatīti

17 vyavasthapakaḥ). Dharmottara uses the word in the first meaning when the me- yarūpatā is called vyavasthāpaka, and asserts that ascertaining cognition (niś- cayapratyaya) that arises after direct perception is the agent of differentiation. It follows that direct perception is differentiated by later conceptual cognition, not by the direct perception itself.

In this regard, we can find another interpretation of vyavasthā in Prajñākaragupta’s Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāra. In PVA on PV III 311, he criticizes a theory that is similar to Dharmottara’s interpretation, denying that ascertaining cognition intervenes in close relationship between pramāṇa and pramāṇaphala.

24 Nakasuka, Miyuki: Dharmakīrti’s apoha theory, perceptual judgement and lack of superimposition (samāropaviveka)

Hiroshima University; [email protected]

In the apoha section in the svārthānumāna chapter of his Pramāṇavārttika, Dhar- makīrti starts by characterizing apoha as difference among real entities from an on- tological point of view (PV 1.40–42) and then as the exclusion of superimposition (samāropavyavaccheda) from an epistemological point of view (PV 1.43–58). He defines as a determinate cognition (niścaya) inference (anumāna) and a perceptual judgement, the latter of which is precisely a conceptual cognition that follows a perceptual cognition (pratyakṣapṛṣṭhabhāvivikalpa), arguing that both have for their objects the exclusion of superimposition. It is important to note that Dharmakīrti means by the word vyavaccheda “exclusion” differs from inference to a perceptual judgement. In the case of inference, the word in question means that function of ex- cluding superimposition which is carried out by inference when there occurs an erroneous cognition with respect to the subject of inference. In the case of perceptual judgement, on the other hand, it means lack of superimposition (samāropaviveka). Dharmakīrti states:

PV 1.48: kvacid dṛṣṭe ’pi yaj jñānaṃ sāmānyārthaṃ vikalpakam / asamāropitānyāṃśe tanmātrāpohagocaram //

PV 1.48cd: asamāropitānyāṃśe tanmātrāpohagocaram is superficially clear but very difficult to understand. Steinkellner (1971: 190, n. 71) gives the following interpretation:

Die vorstellende Erkenntnis, welche ein Allgemeines zum Gegenstand hat, richtet sich, wenn irgendein [Ding] wahrgenommen wurde, ohne daß [auf dieses Ding] ein Teil eines andern [Dinges] übertragen worden ist, bloß darauf, diesen [fremden Teil] fernzuhalten [...]

According to Dharmakīrti, in the case of the perceptual judgement the determination of a perceived object is concurrent with the absence of superimposition. For in 18 Dharmakīrti’s theory of perception there can arise two kinds of cognitions: erroneous and determinate, after a perceptual cognition occurs. This implies that whenever there arises a perceptual judgement, there does not arise an erroneous cognition. Thus, we have to read the line in question as follows:

with reference to a part (say, non-blue) which is different from a determined one (say, blue) and which is not superimposed, [the conceptual cognition] has for its object the lack (apoha) merely of that [part].

The aim of this paper is to consider what leads Dharmakīrti to identifying the exclusion of superimposition with the lack of superimposition, by means of giving a reas- onable interpretation of the verses in question.

25 Nemoto, Hiroshi: Dharmakīrti’s notion of permanence and its impact on the Tibetan Buddhist doctrine of Buddhahood

Hiroshima University; [email protected]

The purpose of this paper is to examine Dharmakīrti’s notion of permanence (nitya), as found in his Pramāṇavārttika II 204cd, and its impact on the Tibetan Buddhist doctrine of Buddhahood. As is well known, Dharmakīrti holds the view that whatever exists is momentary (yat sat tat kṣaṇikam eva), which literally means that everything is impermanent; and this view is accepted by later Indian commentators, as well as by many of his Tibetan successors like Sa skya paṇḍita (1182–1251), Glo bo mkhan chen (1456–1532), and many others. However, Tsong kha pa blo bzang grags pa (1357–1419), the founder of the Dge lugs school, considers that Dhar- makīrti himself admits the existence of the permanent when the latter says: “Wise men speak of the thing which itself does not disintegrate as the permanent” (PV II 204cd). Moreover, Tsong kha pa asserts that to be permanent (rtag pa) does not necessarily mean to be always existing (dus thams cad pa), and hence that there are permanent phenomena which exist only at a particular moment (res ’ga’ ba): for example, the emptiness of a clay pot, which is permanent by definition, is existent only when there exists a clay pot, and it disappears when the pot disappears. Such an idea of permanence is peculiar to Tsong kha pa and his followers. And it plays an important role especially in their analysis of Buddhahood, for it enables them to explain why Buddhahood is permanent in spite of the fact that it is embodied only when one attains enlightenment. Rgyal tshab dar ma rin chen (1364–1432), developing Tsong kha pa’s idea, says that Buddhahood is permanent even though it is ab- sent when one is still an ordinary being, and becomes present only when one attains complete enlightenment. He remarks that Buddhahood is an unconditioned phe- nomenon occurring at a particular moment (’dus ma byas res ’ga’ ba). A similar line of discussion is offered by ’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa ngag dbang brtson ’grus (1648– 1721), who explicates Rgyal tshab’s doctrine of Buddhahood on the basis of Dhar- makīrti’s statement about permanence. Thus we see that Dharmakīrti’s notion of permanence has survived in the Dge lugs pa’s exposition of Buddhahood. This paper

19 gives an analysis of Tsong kha pa’s idea of permanence, as well as his interpretation of the Pramāṇavārttika II 204cd, and then examines how Tsong kha pa’s idea served to establish the Dge lugs pa’s doctrine of Buddhahood.

26 Ogawa, Hideyo: Dignāga on the view of a generic term as denoting a relation

Hiroshima University; [email protected]

In the apoha chapter of his Pramāṇasamuccaya Dignāga, who advocates the apoha theory, argues that a generic term like ghaṭa “pot” cannot denote an individual (bheda), a generic property (jāti), a relation between the two (yoga, sambandha), or an individual qualified by a generic property (tadvat). The third kārikā of the apoha chapter is devoted to adducing the conclusive reason that a generic term cannot denote a relation. The kārikā goes as follows:

PS V.3: (A) sambandhaś cātra sambandhidharmeṇa vācya ucyate / tathā hi bhāvaḥ kṛtvoktaḥ, bhāvaś cānyena yujyate // (Pind 2009: A 2)

(B) sambandho ’py atra sambandhidharmavācyo ’bhidhīyate / tathā bhāvīkṛtyocyate bhāvo ’py anyena yujyate // (NĀA 607)

(C) sambandho ’py atra sambandhidharmā [or, sambandhidharmo] vācyo ’bhidhīyate / tathā bhāvīkṛtyocyate bhāvo ’py anyena yujyate // (Emendation by Ogawa)

Pind (2009: 78) gives the following translation of the kārikā:

And in this context it is explained that the connection is denotable through the property of the relatum (sambandhidharmeṇa vācya ucyate). That is, it [viz. the connection] is denoted on the assumption that it is a state of action (bhāvaḥ kṛtvoktaḥ); and a state of action is connected with the other [relatum] (bhāvaś cānyena yujyate).

Hattori (1975: 27.1–3) explains:

Dignāga, after rejecting the theory that a class-property (jāti) is a denotatum of a word, goes on to refute the theory that a word denotes a relation (yoga, saṃbandha) between a class-property and an individual belonging to a class. According to him, since a relation is the property of a relatum (saṃbandhin), it is impossible that a word, which cannot denote either the individual or the class-property that are relata, denotes the relation alone. (English translation mine)

I have given variants of the kārikā so that we may grasp the point more fully. In my opinion, Hattori seems to miss the point. Pind’s interpretation of the kārikā, on the

20 other hand, is well-grounded. But I have to say that, relying even on Pind, it is almost impossible to fathom out what Dignāga intends to say in the kārikā.

Dignāga here simply brings out the point Bhartṛhari makes about the denotation of a relation. According to Bhartṛhari, there is no nominal that denotes a relation qua relation; a nominal such as sambandha “relation” cannot denote a relation in its own property (svadharmeṇa) but simply as a substance (dravya), because an act (bhāva) denoted by an action noun (bhāvasādhana) is treated like a substance (dravyavat).

The aim of this paper is to give a plausible interpretation of the kārikā by taking into consideration arguments Bhartṛhari brings forward about the denotation of a relation in his Vākyapadīya and thereby to show clearly the reason for which Dignāga argues that a generic term cannot denote a relation.

27 Okada, Kensho: A way of communication between a speaker and a listener similar to the way in which two persons with eye disease equally see double moon, in the light of the apoha theory of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla

University of Tsukuba; [email protected]

We experience the practical use of words in our daily activities 1) when a person grasps/understands an object through a word and 2) when a person tells another person something. The latter presents a scene in person-to-person relation. There, the meaning of a word is conveyed from one to another. According to the apoha theory, which Buddhist logicians propound, however, the object of a word is not real entity but exclusion (apoha). Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla explain the exclusion whose nature is cognition (buddhi) as image (pratibimba). This image is said to appear entirely differently in the cognitions of individuals. How can we communicate each other based on different images? Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla present an explanation with regard to this question in the śabdārthaparīkṣā chapter of their Tattvasaṅgraha (TS) and its pañjikā (TSP). By examining their view, this paper aims to clarify how they solve this question.

Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla discuss the manner that a speaker and a listener share the same notion when they communicate, although they speak on the basis of their respective images. For them, their respective images are the primary object denoted by a word. Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla discuss the question of whether it is proper to apply verbal convention to such an image. In this context, they illustrate the manner that a speaker informs something to a listener by the example, “two sick persons suffering eye disease see equally double moon.” Just as two persons share the cause of the erroneous image of double moon and see the same double moon, a speaker and a listener, sharing the same cause of an erroneous cognition (that is latent disposition or vāsanā), can mutually convey and receive a notion, even if they respect-

21 ively cognize images appearing in their own cognitions. Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla assert that a verbal communication is based on these different images in our respective cognitions, while they accept that it works because we grasp a verbal object erroneously in the same manner by virtue of latent disposition.

This example, i.e., “two sick persons suffering eye disease see equally double moon,” on which the present paper focuses, has already been used by Dharmakīrti in his Santānāntarasiddhi, by Vinītadeva in his Santānāntarasiddhiṭīkā as well as by Śākyabuddhi in his Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā (PVṬ ad PVP ad PV III 377). Of these, Vinītadeva in particular seems to express a similar view to that of Kamalaśīla. These earlier scholars adduce the example in their discussions irrelevant to the apoha theory. Indeed, to the best of my knowledge, there is no mention of the same example or similar descriptions in the Buddhist epistemological treatises that deal with the apoha theory as central issue, except for the TS, TSP, and Karṇakagomin’s Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛttiṭīkā. I would also like to attempt a brief historical survey of the usage of this example and indicate its peculiar use in the TS and TSP.

28 Ono, Motoi: On pramāṇabhūta – The change of its meaning from Dignāga to Prajñākaragupta

University of Tsukuba; [email protected]

An epithet of the Buddha, pramāṇabhūta, appearing in the maṅgalaśloka of Dig- nāga’s Pramāṇasamuccaya is the key concept explaining the relationship between the pramāṇa as valid cognition, i.e. perception and inference, and the Buddha’s authority in the Buddhist pramāṇa school. Prof. Vetter claimed that this word must be translated as “who is a pramāṇa,” and the translation “who has become a pramāṇa” based on Dharmakīrti’s interpretation cannot be justified in Dignāga’s context. However, if pramāṇabhūta means “who is a pramāṇa,” then one must ask: how can the Buddha as a person be called a pramāṇa which is supposed to mean valid cognition? In response to this question, Prof. Ruegg investigated the usage of the word in the Sanskrit literatures and proposed the translation “who is like a pramāṇa” for pramāṇabhūta in Dignāga. Thereafter, Dr. Krasser criticised Prof. Ruegg’s opinion by investigating the Sanskrit text of Jinendrabuddhi’s Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā.

By examining additional materials, this paper shall show that in Dignāga’s context Ruegg’s translation “who is like a pramāṇa” for pramāṇabhūta is acceptable and that the meaning of this word has been changed from Dignāga’s original one by his successors. In contrast to Dharmakīrti who never used the pramāṇabhūta as a compound word in his works, Prajñākaragupta used the term as a key concept in his religio-philosophical system. According to Prajñākaragupta, the word pramāṇabhūta means “true/ultimate pramāṇa.” By observing the change of the meaning of pramāṇabhūta from Dignāga to Prajñākaragupta, we can recognize that the relationship between the pramāṇa as valid cognition and the Buddha’s authority has drastic- ally changed in the history of the Buddhist pramāṇa school.

22 29 Pecchia, Cristina: Dharmakīrti on the role of rituals

Austrian Academy of Sciences; [email protected]

The efficacy of initiation (dīkṣā) as a means to liberation is the subject of a passage of the pramāṇasiddhi chapter in Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttika. His discussion, which is especially polemical against a Śaiva type of initiation (the “scales-initiation,” tulādīkṣā), is also about the reliability of scriptures (āgama). His argumentation, which is based on the nature of faults relating to transmigration, corresponds to a critique of the role of rituals in paths to liberation and a re-assertion of the role of knowledge in the Buddhist path. The present paper offers some reflections concerning the type of practice that a Buddhist philosopher such as Dharmakīrti considered adequate in view of liberation. Furthermore, featuring Kṣemarāja’s explicit reply to Dharmakīrti – reply that appears in his commentary (Uddyota) on the Svac- chandatantra – the paper also examines how the Tantric tradition represented in Kṣemarāja’s text understood and elaborated on Dharmakīrti’s arguments.

30 Prets, Ernst: Śāntarakṣita and the Naiyāyikas – On the references to “fragments” of the so-called lost Naiyāyikas in the Vādanyāyaṭīkā and the Tattvasaṅgraha

Austrian Academy of Sciences; [email protected]

Śāntarakṣita in his Vādanyāyaṭīkā called Vipañcitārthā on Dharmakīrti’s Vādanyāya quotes textual evidences of the so-called lost Naiyāyikas of whom only names, name of works, and fragments survived. Śāntarakṣita frequently quotes in the Vi- pañcitārthā passages of Aviddhakarṇa’s and Bhāvivikta’s works who are both said to have written a Nyāyabhāṣyaṭīkā. In addition, both of them are said to have com- posed also commentaries on the Bṛhaspatisūtra called Tattvaṭīkā. This raises the question of whether Aviddhakarṇa, obviously a kind of nickname, and Bhāvivikta might be the same person. Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāvivikta are neither referred to in the Vipañcitārthā nor in the Tattvasaṅgraha by Śāntarakṣita to the same topic. The main purpose of the paper is to compare the “quotations” of the “two” authors’ fragments in the Vipañcitārthā and in Kamalaśīla’s Commentary on the Tattvasaṅgraha. Additionally, the relation of the “fragments” of the “two lost” authors to Uddyota- kara’s Nyāyavārttika will be investigated.

31 Przybyslawski, Artur: The notion of valid cognition (tshad ma) in karma bka’ brgyud tradition of Tibetan Buddhism

Jagiellonian University; [email protected]

In Western studies of the Tibetan pramāṇa tradition the approach of karma bka’ brgyud school has not been discussed. The paper aims at presenting the notion of

23 valid cognition it this particular sect addressing the famous Tshad ma rigs gzhung rgya mtsho – a commentary to Dharmakīrti’s PV by the 7th Karmapa Chos grags rgya mtsho – and the manual sKye dgu’i bdag po la rigs lam gsal byed by Yongs ’dzin rnam rgyal grags pa (the principal teacher of 9th Karmapa). In the light of these two texts not only the particular notion of tshad ma in this tradition is shown (conver- gent with tshad ma rigs gter) but also some new light is shed upon the concept of Buddha as embodiment of valid cognition (tshad ma skyes bu, tshad ma gyur pa). The article also offers a new explanation of the requirement of novelty in the traditional definition of valid cognition.

32 Saccone, Margherita Serena: Śubhagupta’s theory about reality in the *Bāhyārthasiddhikārikā

University of Naples “L’Orientale”; [email protected]

Śubhagupta (720–780 CE), a philosopher connected with the logico-epistemological school of Buddhism, is the author of the *Bāhyārthasiddhikārikā (BASK) “Verses on the Establishment of the External Object,” where he mainly aims at proving the reality of external objects of cognitions. In doing so, he presents his view on the nature of atoms and their aggregates as well as on the cognitive process related to them. At the same time, though not always explicitly stated, Śubhagupta expresses his conceptions about dravya and what can be considered real, ultimately and con- ventionally.

As a way of proving his own standpoints, Śubhagupta deals with some of the major ideas of important Buddhist thinkers such as Vasubandhu, Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti in order to refute them. However, as already noticed by some scholars – among others, Hattori (1960); Eltschinger (1999) –, Śubhagupta was indicated by Haribhadra Sūri as a vārttikānusārin, a follower of Dharmakīrti.

In this paper, I shall examine Śubhagupta’s theory about reality as expressed in some kārikās from BASK, with a special reference to his views on dravya and arthakriyā. Moreover, I shall also try to highlight when and how Śubhagupta refers back to other philosophers (and works) from the logico-epistemological school and to which extent he can be considered a follower (or an opponent) of Dharmakīrti’s theories.

33 Saito, Akane: Maṇḍanamiśra’s arguments against Dharmakīrti’s ideas on language – Different definitions of the convention

Kyoto University; [email protected]

Maṇḍanamiśra (8 th c.), who inherited the philosophy of language promulgated by Bhartṛhari (5 th c.), has advanced the sphoṭa theory in his Sphoṭasiddhi (SS). In the latter part of the SS, he shifts the focus of his criticism from the varṇa theory of Kumārilabhaṭṭa (7 th c.) to the Buddhist theory of non-eternality of phonemes. After 24 narrating Dharmakīrti’s position from the first chapter of the Pramāṇavārttika (PV/PVS) (7 th c.), Maṇḍana rejects the Buddhist’s theory which criticizes and intends to replace the Mīmāṃsā theory that eternal phonemes manifested in a given sequence convey the meaning. According to Dharmakīrti, what makes phonemes distinct from each other is the prior-posterior relation, which is equivalent to the causality of mind-moments of the speaker and hearer. As Omae (1999: p. 299, l.16 ff.) pointed out, it is the convention (saṅketa) which plays an important role in his language theory. Maṇḍana, however, criticizes convention by asking whether the causality of mind-moments of the speaker and hearer is really needed at the time the convention is established. Maṇḍana’s argument at this point is quite similar to the one he gives when he accepts Kumārila’s varṇa theory partially, in the process of perception. In other words, whether there is a causal relation or distinction of phonemes in the middle of perception, Maṇḍana basically makes a concession to their ideas as “unessential but not impossible” before repelling them in the end as contrary cognitions (viparyāsa). In this presentation, I shall analyze the conventions of Maṇḍana and Dharmakīrti and show their differences.

34 Sakai, Masamichi: Dharmottara on the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa and trairūpya in Dharmakīrti’s sattvānumāna

Kansai University; [email protected]

As did his teacher, Dharmākaradatta, i.e. Arcaṭa, Dharmottara takes on a major in- terpretational task concerning Dharmakīrti’s inference of momentariness (kṣaṇikatva) from the property “being existent” (sattvānumāna), namely that, in this type of inference of momentariness, the so-called threefold characteristic (trairūpya) of a good reason property, which is essential for Buddhist logicians, seems to be of no use.

According to Dharmakīrti, in this inference, pervasion (vyāpti) of the reason property (hetu) “existence” (sattva) by the target property (sādhya) “momentariness” is proved by the so-called viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa, the source of knowledge that defeats the occurrence of a reason property in any inferential site (pakṣa) where the opposite of the target property is present. In his Hetubindu, Dharmakīrti asserts that this existence-momentariness pervasion is inclusive of everything (sarvopa- saṃhāravat). If this is the case, then it should be concluded that for the purpose of proving the momentariness of a certain inferential site, e.g. sound (śabda), it is suffi- cient to simply present the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa, since the site “sound” is included in the domain of the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa, which is itself an inferential argument that defeats the occurrence of “existence.” But this results in the threefold characteristic becoming useless. This is because 1) an example of a similar case (sādharmyadṛṣṭānta), e.g. a pot (ghaṭa), is no longer needed for proving a site to be momentary – the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa itself is capable of doing so, without an example – and because 2) given that the site is included in the category

25 of “everything,” it becomes useless to point out that the particular site possesses the reason property of “existence” (pakṣadharmatā).

In contrast to Arcaṭa, who appears bold enough to accept this undesirable consequence for Buddhist logicians and who even explains the reason why this must be the case in Dharmakīrti’s sattvānumāna, Dharmottara argues that dṛṣṭānta and pa- kṣadharmatā are nonetheless of service. That is to say, Dharmottara, on the one hand, agrees with his teacher that the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa itself is capable of proving any inferential site to be momentary and thus a dṛṣṭānta is of no use for proving a site to be momentary, and he also agrees that the existence-momentariness pervasion established via the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa is inclusive of everything. On the other hand, he insists that dṛṣṭānta and pakṣadharmatā are still needed. Compared to Arcaṭa’s consistency, this position of Dharmottara seems to be ambigu- ous. It appears that Dharmottara is struggling to find some significance for the trairūpya theory in order to defend his Buddhist intellectual tradition.

In my presentation, basing myself on Dharmottara’s own statement in his Pramā- ṇaviniścayaṭīkā, I would like to introduce and clarify his method of insisting on the significance of the trairūpya theory in Dharmakīrti’s inference of momentariness from existence. In addition, I will also try to situate Dharmottara’s unique position in the larger history of Indian Buddhist logic with regard to the so-called antar- vyāpti/bahirvyāpti discussion, which is well documented in Mokṣākaragupta’s Tark- abhāṣā.

35 Sasaki, Ryō: The significance of the Vādanyāya in the historical transition of the ‘debate’ concept

Waseda University; [email protected]

Indian philosophers developed their ideas in debates from ancient times, proving and refuting each other’s statements. The purpose of the debate, however, had not been necessarily fixed through the history of Indian thought because the concept of the debate and its purpose had changed in different periods and positions. Therefore, when Dharmakīrti’s view of the debate in the Vādanyāya is evaluated, we should place his work in the context of the historical transition of the ‘debate’ concept.

Dharmakīrti distinguished “the disputation for good men” (satāṃ vādaḥ) from “the disputation for men with the desire to win” (vijigīṣūṇāṃ vādaḥ) and defined the former as the good debate, the purpose of which is the benefit of others, and criticized the latter as the vicious debate which is held by means of cowardly actions. But even if “the disputation for good men” is considered to be recommended, it ultimately determines victory or defeat of the debaters just as “the disputation for men with desire to win,” so that the criticism of the latter type of the debate may be equally applied to the former type of the debate. Accordingly, Dharmakīrti redefined the term “victory” (vijaya) in “the disputation for good men” as “conferring benefits on others by means of declaring the truth.”

26 This idea of the Vādanyāya can be traced back to the Upāyahṛdaya, where “conferring benefits on others” is mentioned as the part of purposes of the debate and “de- siring to win” in the debate is censured. Both of these works share approximately the same opinion about this matter. Subsequently, the Nyāyasūtra defined jalpa and vitaṇḍā under the influence of Upāyahṛdaya, and these two types of debates are held for the purpose of victory according to the commentary in the Nyāyabhāṣya and the Nyāyavārttika. The debate criticized as the vicious method by Dharmakīrti is precisely the jalpa and vitaṇḍā. Thus, Dharmakīrti showed the new ideas of the ‘debate’ concept and its revised purpose through criticizing and unifying the previous views. Furthermore, I found out that the philosophical works of the Nyāya school following after the Vādanyāya (e.g. the Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā, the Nyāyabhūṣana and so forth) are influenced by Dharmakīti’s position in which the benefit of others in the debate is regarded as important.

In this way, we can grasp the significance of the Vādanyāya in the history of Indian thought by means of placing this work in the context of the historical transition of the ‘debate’ concept.

36 Shiga, Kiyokuni: On the meaning of bāhyārtha in Dignāga’s and Jinendrabuddhi’s theories of inference

Kyoto Sangyo University; [email protected]

In my previous paper, “Remarks on the Origin of All-Inclusive Pervasion” (hereafter Shiga 2011), I highlighted that the theory of all-inclusive pervasion (sarvo- pasaṃhāravyāpti), considered to have been newly created by Dharmakīrti, in fact originated in Dignāga’s theory of inference. Dignāga’s statement in the third chapter of the Pramāṇasamuccaya and its vṛtti (hereafter PS and PSV, respectively), “the co-existence of a logical reason with what is to be proved is understood by means of two types of exemplification that include external things (bāhyārthopasaṃhṛta) (PSV on PS 3.36b),” coincides with Dharmakīrti’s statement in his Hetubindu regarding all-inclusive pervasion. Considering other factors and grounds, I concluded that the idea that pervasion is established by including individual cases was shared by both Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. This presentation aims to further investigate the unsettled issues in Shiga 2011. As I mentioned there, the term bāhyārtha appears several times in the fourth chapter of the PS, PSV and Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā (hereafter PSṬ). At the first instance, the expression bāhyārtha is used in the definition of exemplification: “The main purpose of exemplification is to present external things.” Furthermore, we can find expressions such as “when external things are not included” (bāhyārthānupasaṃhāre) and “exemplification that relies on external things” (bāhyārthāpekṣam nidarśanam). These examples clearly show the close relationship between the term bāhyārtha and exemplification (nidarśana or dṛṣṭānta). The problem here is what do Dignāga and Jinendrabuddhi mean by this term. Does it denote “property-possessors outside [the property-possessor to be proved]” as Jin- endrabuddhi interprets it in his PSṬ, or does it literally denote “external objects,” i.e. “things in the external world”? To solve this problem, we will observe relevant

27 examples of bāhyārtha found in the PS, PSV and PSṬ, including those in the first chapter dealing with perception. If we compare Dignāga’s theory of pervasion with Dharmakīrti’s, we have to consider in which property-possessor pervasion is to be grasped or established, and how universal the pervasion is. It has been commonly believed that, at Dignāga’s stage, pervasion is hypothetical and exposed to a possible denial due to an appearance of a counterexample. However, it is possible that not only Dharmakīrti but also Dignāga aims for the establishment of pervasion that is universally true. As evidence to support this, I mentioned in Shiga 2011 that Dignāga introduced the term “a general substratum” (ādhārasāmānya) in the second chapter of the PSV, which implies his assumption that pervasion is to be universal. This study will also examine the context and significance of this term with the aid of Jinendrabuddhi’s commentary.

37 Steinkellner, Ernst: Closing a gap in the interpretation of Dharmakīrti’s logic

Austrian Academy of Sciences; [email protected]

This presentation is anchored on three papers published in the proceedings of the Second International Dharmakīrti Conference 1991: Brendan Gillon’s with a critique of Dharmakīrti’s proposal, in PV 1.34ab with PVSV 22,2–4, on how to ascer- tain a causal relation. Gillon argued, and in this was followed by Tom Tillemans, that Dharmakīrti’s method does not successfully hold back the ever lingering “in- duction problem.” The two other papers by Tadashi Tani and by myself dealt with Dharmakīrti’s method of how the concomitance (vyāpti) in the case of a svabhāva- hetu can be determined as being necessary. Tani was able to show that in Dhar- makīrti’s first work, the *Hetuprakaraṇa, a prasaṅga assumes this function. In my paper, I examined the meaning of the formulation in his last work, the Vādanyāya, where it is termed (sādhya)viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa. By experiment I was able to show that this later method, developed on the basis of the sattvānumāna, is applic- able to all svabhāvahetu-inferences. The question left open at the time of writing my paper was: “…whether the different treatments of the svabhāvahetu and the kāryahetu in this respect were not also resolved in a certain sense in order to design a homogeneous logical system, or at least, whether there are no indications to be found in Dharmakīrti’s work that he was aiming in this direction.”

Based on PV 1.23’cd and Hetubindu passages, Tani already gave this question a positive answer and was able to summarize: “The kāryahetu too can be interpreted by the same model …” And: “The necessary relation can be determined by SVB- pramāṇa.” He also added: “Nevertheless, Dharmakīrti did not explicitly explain so.” Thus, Tani only very closely missed the mark.

On a new interpretation of PVSV 22,2–4 and under full consideration of PV 1.34cd with PVSV 22,6f it can be seen that Dharmakīrti provided a consistent method for ascertaining concomitance for both kinds of possible logical reasons, svabhāva as well as kārya, already in his first work.

28 38 Taber, John: The structure of Dharmakīrti’s sahopalambhaniyama argument

University of New Mexico; [email protected]

Although excellent historical work has been done on Dharmakīrti’s sahopalambhaniyama argument (by Iwata), there have been only a few attempts (by, e.g., Chakra- barti and, most recently, Arnold) to evaluate it as a piece of philosophical reasoning. In this talk I shall consider what I take to be the strongest possible formulation of the argument that is consistent with Dharmakīrti’s statements and assess its strengths and weaknesses. First, I shall show how the argument might be schematized in terms of premises and conclusion. Then I shall assess whether the argument, so schematized, is valid; that is, does the conclusion follow from the premises? (I think it does.) Finally, I shall reflect on the soundness of the argument, that is, whether its premises are vulnerable to objections. (I believe they are.) We shall see that, indeed, the most telling philosophical objections are those that were historically raised against the sahopalambhaniyama argument.

39 Tamura, Masaki: The truth, the Buddha’s words, and inference – Bhāviveka’s theory of two truths

Hiroshima University; [email protected]

The Buddhist truth, which was directly realized by the Buddha, is beyond verbalization in itself. For it is precisely his personal, direct experience of reality. The Buddha, fully aware that the truth is ineffable, taught it to us by resorting to words.

No Buddhist can deny the authority of the Buddha’s words. But the critical problem has arisen that they are susceptible for various interpretations. The following serves as an example. In the Daśabhūmikasūtra the Buddha states that the three realms are mind-only (cittamātram idaṃ yad idaṃ traidhātukam). According to Bhāviveka, the Yogācāra school interprets the statement to mean that an external object does not exist independently of the mind (Viṃśatikā 1), while the Mādhyamika school interprets the same statement to mean that the self serving as agent of an action and as enjoyer of the fruit of the action does not exist independently of the mind (Madhya- makahṛdayakārikā [abbr. MHK] V 28cd). A question comes up: What is the means for arriving at a real understanding of the Buddha’s statement? According to Bhāviveka, it is scripturally based inference or the inference which follows the Buddhist scriptures (āgamānuvidhāyyanumāna). Bhāviveka argues that the truth is beyond the reach of inference and that inference plays the role of removing the mis- conception about the truth which arises from the Buddha’s statement (MHK V 107). It is important to note the following two verses:

MHK V 109: pratijñāmātrakeṇeṣṭā* pratipakṣanirākriyā / aniṣiddhe vipakṣe ca nirvikalpā matiḥ kutaḥ // ([*-mātrakeṇeṣṭā ] em.; -mātrakā neṣṭā Lindtner ed.; dam bcas tsam gyis ji ltar ’dod Tib.)

29 “How can one admit that what is opposed to [the knowledge of the truth] is negated merely by means of stating one’s own thesis? In addition, insofar as what is opposed to [the knowledge of the truth] is not negated, how can there arise a non-conceptual cognition?”

MHK V 110: satyadvayam ataś coktaṃ muninā tattvadarśinā / vyavahāraṃ samāśritya tattvārthādhigamo yataḥ //

“And, since reality is realized on the basis of vyavahāra, the Muni, the Seer of the truth, taught two truths.”

Hoornaert (2003: 168) and Eckel (2008: 296) render the term vyavahāra here as “conventional [truth]” and “conventional usage,” respectively. I do not think that they catch the point. The given context clearly reveals that the term in question refers to the Buddha’s verbalization of the truth, that is, the Buddha’s words about the truth, or the Buddha’s statement of the truth. The structure envisaged by Bhāviveka is such that, when there arise different understandings of the truth from the Buddha’s words, only its real understanding is arrived at by means of removing its unreason- able understanding through inference; what is assumed to be a real understanding of the truth is simply its conceptual understanding, so that it must be denied to get an intuitive insight into the truth.

The present paper aims at showing that, in Bhāviveka’s view, what is called vyavahārasatya is not mere “conventional truth” but the ultimate truth as it is spoken of.

40 Tang, Mingjun: The concept of sādhana in Chinese Buddhist logic

Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences; [email protected]

The present paper is an extended observation based on Tillemans’ article “More on Parārthānumāna, Theses and Syllogisms” (1991). It tends to show that in the Chinese tradition of Buddhist logic, the concept of sādhana was consistently interpreted as the reason-statement together with the positive and negative example- statements, or directly as the trairūpya, the triple characterization of a valid reason, and this interpretation of sādhana was explicitly ascribed to Dignāga himself as one significant innovation with regard to masters before him. Although the Chinese tradition was presumably asserted as basing their theoretical exploration on merely the NP and the NMu, this new interpretation can find its support only in the PS but not in the NP or NMu. The Chinese scholars following Dignāga also took various her- meneutic strategies to harmonize this new interpretation with the relevant theories of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu. Moreover, it was also told that Indian Buddhist logicians after Dignāga also held this new interpretation instead of the old one, and they interpreted accordingly the “incompleteness” (nyūnatā) of argument as the incompleteness of the three characteristics instead of the incompleteness of the three statements. In light of this new interpretation of nyūnatā, the present paper at last try to 30 make sense again, “from a slightly different angle” than Tillemans, that the point at stake behind this new interpretation is not only a terminological one, but also “about how logic works” in Buddhist logic.

41 Uckelman, Sara L.: The legitimacy of inference – Argumentation strategy in Ratnakīrti’s Īśvarasādhanadūṣaṇa

University of Heidelberg; [email protected]

Like many other medieval Buddhist philosophical texts, Ratnakīrti’s Īśvarasādha- nadūṣaṇa is structured as a dialogue between a proponent and an opponent. The text is divided into two parts; in the first section, the proponent, an unnamed Naiyāyika, argues for the existence of īśvara against an unidentified Buddhist opponent. The second part is Ratnakīrti’s arguments against the existence of īśvara. These arguments are interesting because they are primarily formal in nature. Rather than focusing on the content of the inferences used in support of the existence of īśvara, both proponent and opponent focus on the formal properties of the inferences that they use. The advocate argues that certain defects in reasoning are not present in the inference establishing the existence of īśvara, whereas Ratnakīrti argues that these defects are present.

The text should not be understood as a real dialogue recording an exchange between actual people, but rather, the two-party dialogue should be seen as providing a fram- ing structure for the argumentation. While the use of a dialogical structure is not unique to this text, or even to Ratnakīrti’s oeuvre, what has not hitherto been recog- nized is that the dialogical structure is not just window-dressing: It frames the debate in such a way that a two-level dispute can go on. On the one level, there is the dispute about the truth of the claim “īśvara exists.” On the other, more theoretical, level, however, there is dispute about the scope of inference and the types of arguments that are allowed in what contexts. In particular, many of the objections raised by both participants are based on the fact that if a certain argument is allowed, then other arguments which can be formed by analogy must also be admitted, and these analogical arguments have certain obviously unwanted consequences. The dispute can be seen as a back-and-forth about the range of application of inference as a method of proof and gaining knowledge. We show how the dialogical framework allows the investigation of the scope of inference, and what this argumentation strategy tells us about legitimate uses of argumentation.

In particular, we focus on the structural aspects of the dialogue, the unspoken rules governing it. These rules include who can offer a counter-argument when, what types of arguments can be offered as counter-arguments, when a participant can be said to have “won” an argument and thus make use of its conclusion in a successive argument, and how the entire argument structure is arranged so as to take advantage of these formal aspects.

31 42 Vasudeva, Som Dev: Bhoktṛtva and causation in Kṣemarāja’s response to Dharmakīrti’s critique of liberation through initiation

Kyoto University; [email protected]

The eleventh century Kashmirian non-dualist Śaiva author Kṣemarāja’s detailed point by point response to Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttika 2.575 ff. critique of the possibility of attaining liberation through initiation, appended to his Svacchandatan- troddyota commentary to verse 5.88 (cf. A. Sironi 1987: 89–113), draws mainly on arguments found in Abhinavagupta’s exegesis on two very different śāstras, a philo- sophically oriented īśvarapratyabhijñā, and a ritually and yogically oriented Krama influenced Trika. The present paper examines how Kṣemarāja rearticulates non- dualist Śaiva theories of the nature of the self and its experiencerhood (bhoktṛtva) in the context of the causal processes leading to liberation. For this Dharmakīrti’s arguments provide Kṣemarāja with a convenient framework, yet his most serious enemy is the Śaivasiddhānta with its rival theories of malaparipāka and karmasāmya.

43 Watanabe, Toshikazu: Dharmakīrti and his successors on āśrayāsiddha and prasaṅgaviparyaya

Austrian Academy of Sciences; [email protected]

For Buddhist logicians the logical fallacy of āśrayāsiddha is an intractable problem when dealing with a thing such as pradhāna or eternal ākāśa, the existence of which is not accepted by Buddhists, as the subject of their own thesis in the independent proof. This paper will first present the transition of Dharmakīrti’s view on the solu- tion of this problem by comparing his works, i.e., the first and the fourth chapters of the Pramāṇavārttika and the third chapter of the Pramāṇaviniścaya. Then, it will show that Dharmakīrti’s different attitudes towards this problem are the reason for the difference between Dharmottara’s and Prajñākaragupta’s interpretations of prasaṅgaviparyaya.

As Prof. Tillemans has pointed out, Dharmakīrti provides two different means for solving the problem of āśrayāsiddha: The first is based on Dignāga’s theory found in the Nyāyamukha that pradhāna, for example, has some kind of existence as a con- ceptually constructed thing (kalpita). In his Svavṛtti on PV 1.205–206 Dharmakīrti explains this kalpita as an image appearing in the cognition and thus ensuring its existence. The second one is mentioned in PV 4.136–148 where he comments on the word svadharmiṇi in Dignāga’s definition of thesis (pakṣa) given in the third chapter of the Pramāṇasamuccaya. According to this method, when the Buddhist puts ākāśa, for example, as the subject of his proof, what is intended by the word ākāśa is not an eternal thing assumed by Vaiśeṣika opponents, but any other entity whose existence is accepted by the Buddhist himself. In his later work Pramāṇaviniścaya,

32 however, Dharmakīrti employs only the first method, while he removes svadharmiṇi from his definition of the thesis and does not mention the second theory any more.

Based on Dharmakīrti’s different views in each work, Dharmottara and Pra- jñākaragupta interpret prasaṅgaviparyaya, which is mentioned by Dharmakīrti in the PVin 3, in a different way. Following Dharmakīrti’s description presented in the PV 4, Prajñākaragupta adopts the second method when he explains prasaṅgavi- paryaya as an independent proof for the Buddhists in his commentary on PV 4.12, even though he knows both of Dharmakīrti’s methods. On the other hand, Dharmot- tara, in his commentary on PVin 3, interprets prasaṅgaviparyaya basically on the ground of Dharmakīrti’s final position, i.e., the first method. But Dharmottara’s interpretation is also connected with his own view on apoha theory.

44 Yao, Zhihua: Non-activity (nirvyāpāra) in Dignāga and Dharmakīrti

The Chinese University of Hong Kong; [email protected]

In some key passages of the Chapter on Perception in the Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti, Dignāga spells out a Madhyamaka-like view of “non-activity” (nirvyāpāra). Does this suggest that he adopts a Madhyamaka position with regard to some fundamental issues in his theory of perception? This has puzzled me for some time. With the help of some sources in Chinese, Sanskrit, Tibetan and Uighur, this study will establish non-activity one of the main doctrines of Sautrāntika or, more precisely, Yogācāra-Sautrāntika. I will further explore the tension between Dharmakīrti and Dignāga on this issue of non-activity.

45 Yoshimizu, Chizuko: Consequence (prasaṅga) in Dignāga, Candrakīrti and Dharmakīrti

University of Tsukuba; [email protected]

A statement of consequence as a prasaṅga-style reasoning is the logical tool that the Mādhyamikas including Nāgārjuna (2nd c.), Buddhapālita (5th c.) and Candrakīrti (7th c.) frequently used. The basic principle of prasaṅga reasoning is that based on the temporal acceptance (abhyupagama) of the opponent’s thesis, one indicates unwanted consequences for the opponent and thereby refutes the opponent’s thesis. By nature the Mādhyamika’s prasaṅga is almost the same as that described by the Buddhist logician Dignāga (5th–6th c.) in his Pramāṇasamuccaya (3.14, 17). For him, too, prasaṅga is not formal proof that establishes the proponent’s own thesis, but refutation of another’s thesis. It has been formulated since Nāgārjuna as follows: “If (yadi or cet) ..., then, it follows that ....” In his Pramāṇaviniścaya 3 (5,7), Dhar- makīrti (7th c.) also mentions this formula as a typical prasaṅga statement.

It is clear that for the Mādhyamika a statement of consequence is not endowed with a logical reason that is the property qualifying the subject (pakṣadharma), because

33 the subject of the opponent’s thesis is not existent for the Mādhyamika proponent. Dignāga as well states that the consequence does not have a logical reason as the property qualifying the subject (PS 3.17). It is also the case in the well-known example of prasaṅga statement Dharmakīrti and his successors adduce in PVin 3 and its commentaries that a single entity (eka) would not occur in plural things (an- ekavṛtti), because, if the single entity refers to universal (sāmānya), the universal is not accepted as existent by Buddhists. In his discussion, however, Dharmakīrti carefully avoids to specify a subject or property-possessor and a logical reason as its property in contrast to his commentator Dharmottara (8th c.), who reads in the same prasaṅga the components of the property-possessor (dharmin) and its properties (dharma).

This paper will discuss that the sixth and seventh century Buddhists, Dignāga, Can- drakīrti and Dharmakīrti, share the following ideas about the prasaṅga reasoning:

1) It is formulated on the basis of the properties postulated by the opponent.

2) It is not formal proof and it does not need to a logical reason which fulfills the condition of being the property qualifying the subject (pakṣadharma).

3) It aims to refute the opponent’s thesis by indicating unwanted consequences.

4) It reveals a contradiction between the two properties postulated by the opponent as the pervader and the pervaded (vyāpyavyāpaka).

The forth idea is unclear but implied in Dignāga and Candrakīrti. Dharmakīrti, in contrast, explicitly states that its purpose is to show a correct inevitable connection of two properties (PVin 3, 4). On my reading, he seems to restrict the logical matter that the prasaṅga deals with to the vyāpti issue only, so that the prasaṅga would be free from the problem of pakṣadharmatva. My focus will be on this Dharmakīrti’s interpretation of the prasaṅga statement as a logical tool for establishing vyāpti.

46 Yoshimizu, Kiyotaka: Another look at avinābhāva and niyama in Kumārila’s exegetic works

Tohoku University; [email protected]

In two of my recent papers, I argued that it is not necessary to assume Dharmakīrti’s influence on Kumārila’s idea of niyama as the basis of logical connection – the idea he advocates in a fragment quoted from his Bṛhaṭṭīkā by Karṇakagomin. The present paper attempts to reinforce this argument by investigating the two terms, “inseparable connection” (avinābhāva) and “restriction” (niyama) used in Kumārila’s two exegetic works, the Tantravārttika and the Ṭupṭīkā.

For Mīmāṃsakas, customs are admissible insofar as they can be deemed as being based on Vedic scriptures. Kumārila argues that the fact some people invariably

34 bear a particular number of topknots (śikhā) according to their caste, clan, and Brah- min lineage (pratijātikulagotraniyata) can lead one to assume a Vedic injunction that authorizes their habit. Generalizing this assumption, Kumārila states that, on the basis of the law that an effect conforms to its cause (kāraṇānuvidhāyikāryanyāya), cause is invariably inferred when the effect is observed (upalabhyamānakāryānu- rūpakāraṇānumāna).

Moreover, in his theory of verbal denotation, Kumārila attempts to prove that bhāvanā, the general form of intentional action, is denoted by the suffix (tiṅ) of a fi- nite verb. Rejecting opponent’s view that it denotes the agent (kartṛ), he maintains that the agent is invariably understood when bhāvanā is denoted by the verbal suffix because bhāvanā is “inseparably connected” with the agent. He illustrates this by pointing out that when one refers to a tree by the name of a species, such as simśapā, the audience naturally considers the referent as a tree although the name denotes only the species. This is because the existence of a plant called siṃśapā is restricted by its being a tree (vṛkṣatvaniyatasiṃśapātva).

Taking the Mīmāṃsā theory of Vedic sacrifice into account, however, we find some inconsistency about which one is restricted. Considering bhāvanā to be inseparable from its aim (prayojyādibhir avinābhūtā), Kumārila maintains that bhāvanā requires (ākāṅkṣati) – something valuable for a human being (puruṣārtha) – as its aim. He thereby maintains that one who has heard the injunction of a sacrifice, proceeds from the awareness of one’s duty to perform it, to understanding its benefit. Accord- ing to him, however, what is restricted is the valuable thing one should aim for (niyatapuruṣārthaprayojyatva), not the performance that makes one anticipate one’s aim. This inconsistency occurs on account of the Mīmāṃsā view that the relation between religious action and its aim is exclusively determined by the Vedic scrip- ture. The valuable thing one aims to obtain through a sacrifice is restricted by the injunction (tena [i.e., vidhinā] yan niyamitam tad eva).

Nevertheless, Kumārila clearly states that there are many things to be ascertained on the basis of empirical observation. We may, therefore, assume that in the Bṛhaṭṭīkā, he pays attention to the nature of things in the empirical world to declare that the logical reason (gamaka) that invariably makes something known (gamya) in concept is restricted (niyamya) by gamya in reality.