A History of Buddhist Philosophy

A HISTORY OF B U D D H IS T P H ILO S O P H Y Continuities and Discontinuities * DAVID J. KALUPAHANA A HISTORY OF BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY Continuities and Discontinuities David J. Kalupahana MOTILAL BANARSIDASS PUBLISHERS PRIVATE LIMITED • DELHI Reprint: Delhi, 2006 First Indian Edition: Delhi, 1994 © 1992 University of Hawaii Press First Published by the University of Hawaii Press, 1992 ISBN: 81-208-1191-7 MOTILAL BANARSIDASS 41 U A Bungalow Road, Jawahar Nagar, Delhi 110 007 8 Mahalaxmi Chamber, 22 Bhulabhai Desai Road, Mumbai 400 026 236, 9th Main III Block, Jayanagar, Bangalore 560 011 203 Royapettah High Road, Mylapore, Chennai 600 004 Sanas Plaza, 1302 Baji Rao Road, Pune 411 002 8 Camac Street, Kolkata 700 017 Ashok Rajpath, Patna 800 004 Chowk, Varanasi 221 001 For sale in India only Printed in India BY JAINENDRA PRAKASH JAIN AT SHR1JAINENDRA PRESS, A-45 NARAINA, PHASER, NEW DELHI 110 028 AND PUBLISHED BYNARENDRA PRAKASH JAIN FOR MOTILAL BANARSIDASS PUBLISHERS PRIVATE LIMITED, BUNGALOW ROAD, DELHI -110 007 This work, completed three days before an accident that left our youngest son, Milinda, paralyzed, is dedicated to our friends and well-wishers, at home and abroad, especially my colleagues Eliot Deutsch and Larry Laudan, whose gracious support lessened the trauma for both Milinda and the family. CONTENTS Introduction ix Abbreviations xv Part One: Early Buddhism I Indian Philosophy and the Search for Ultimate Objectivity 3 II Life of the Buddha 22 III Knowledge and Understanding 30 IV Experience and Theory (Paficcasamuppana and Pa(iccasamuppclda) 53 V Language and Communication 60 VI The Human Personality 68 VII The Object 78 VIII The Problem of Suffering 85 IX Freedom and Happiness 90 X The Moral Life 101 XI Popular Religious Thought 110 viii CO NTENTS Part Two: Continuities and Discontinuities XII 121 The Emergence of Absolutism XIII 132 Moggallputta-tissa and the Kathavatthu XIV 144 Abhidhamma XV 153 The Perfection of Wisdom in the Vajracchedikd XVI 160 Nagarjuna and the Mulamadhyamakakarika XVII The Saddharmapun(larika-sutra and 170 Conceptual Absolutism XVIII The Larikavatara-sutra and the Great Emptiness 176 (Maha-£unyata) XIX 184 Vasubandhu and the Vijnaptimatratasiddhi XX 194 Dignaga’s Epistemology and Logic XXI 206 Buddhaghosa, the Harmonizer XXII 217 Tantras and Parittas: The Voiceful Tradition XXIII Silent Meditation and Ch’an (Zen): 228 The Voiceless Tradition 237 Epilogue: Philosophy and History 241 Appendix: History of the Lankavatclra 247 Notes 269 Select Bibliography 283 Index INTRODUCTION In 1976 the University of Hawaii Press published my introductory text on Buddhist thought entitled Buddhist Philosophy: A Historical Analy sis. I was pleasantly surprised by the enthusiastic response to that work. Within a few years permission was sought for a Chinese translation of the book, and the translation was published in 1983. Introducing that work the publisher stated: “This book is largely an outgrowth of his [the author’s] many lectures over the past fifteen years on the subject of Bud dhist philosophy.” To be specific, Part i contained the results of my own research on the early Buddhist tradition, while some chapters in Part n, especially those dealing with Mádhyamika and Yogácára, contained the interpretations of these traditions by classical as well as modern scholars. My evaluation of these schools assumed the correctness of these interpre tations and I was therefore arguing that these were incompatible with the doctrines of early Buddhism. However, during the next fifteen years, I undertook my own research into the later Buddhist traditions and real ized the possibility of reading the more mature works of Nágárjuna and Vasubandhu in a manner that would make them extremely compatible with the teachings of early Buddhism. This research was published in two volumes: Nagarjuna: The Philosophy of the Middle Way (1986) and The Principles of Buddhist Psychology (1987). The present work is therefore a consolidation of thirty years of research and reflection on early Buddhism as well as on some of the major schools and philosophers associated with the later Buddhist tradi tions. In a sense it is a complete rewriting of the earlier work, including the section on early Buddhism, which is simply an expansion rather than a reinterpretation. In recasting the section on early Buddhism, I attempted to synthesize two modes of explanation. The first explains Buddhist doctrines in terms of the philosophical themes that are gaining currency in the modem world. This should enable a student of Western philosophy and religion to look at early Buddhism in terms of the problems and categories with which he/she is familiar. The second retains the classical Buddhist cate x INTRODUCTION gories, such as the four noble truths and the noble eightfold path, in an attempt to pour old wine into new bottles (‘‘pouring new wine into old bottles” being incompatible with the anti-foundationalism and anti structuralism of early Buddhism). This enterprise may be frowned on by those who are against comparing an ancient (sixth century B .C .) Asian tradition with one founded on extraordinary developments in mathemat ics, science, and technology. Yet it is undeniable that some of the leading philosophers of the twentieth century have often renounced the ideas with which they started. Thus we have early and later Wittgenstein, early and later Russell, early and later Ayer, early and later Quine, and so on. In a very broad sense, the term “early” in these characterizations repre sents some form of foundationalism, and the term “later” signifies an anti-foundationalism. To bring out the very sophisticated character of early Buddhist thought and its non-absolutist approach, I decided that the chapter on pre-Buddhist thought should be more comprehensive. Chapter i of the present work therefore explains the absolutist character of all the major philosophical trends during this early period, with one philosopher, Sanjaya, adopting an equally absolutist skepticism as a response. Only against this background is it possible to highlight the middle standpoint adopted by early Buddhism in its explanation of epistemology, ontology, ethics, and logic. The examination of early Buddhist thought begins with Chapter n, a brief account of the life of Siddhartha, the historical Buddha, outlining the background to his attainment of enlightenment and the impact it had on Indian religious, social, and political life. Chapter hi, “Knowledge and Understanding,” is a vastly expanded version of the chapter on epistemology in the previous work. It includes a comprehensive examination of the various sources of knowledge—sense perception, yogic insight, inference and logic—and emphasizes the non absolutist standpoint from which the Buddha explained these themes. The central conception of Buddhism, namely, the “theory of depen dent arising,” previously explained under the rubric of causality, is now .cd in Chapter iv under two themes, namely, “the dependently arisen,” representing what is experienced, and “dependent arising,” which is the theory formulated on the basis of such experience. A new chapter on “Language and Communication” (Chapter v) has been added to explain the variety of uses of the term dhamma (Skt. dharma). It demonstrates how this term was used in five different senses, enabling the Buddha to relate the content of experience to both language and textual traditions. It was this method that prevented some of the Buddhist schools from getting involved in essentialist enterprises such as the study of etymology and grammar (these being the work of Buddhist monks of a later date, in both Sri Lanka and Burma). Instead, the early Buddhists engaged in hermeneutical studies that produced two treatises, INTRODUCTION xi the Pefakopadesa (Introduction to the Canon) and Netti (Guide), both of which gained semi-canonical status. The five chapters (vi-x) that follow recast and expand material included in Chapters 4 through 7 of the previous work. Chapter vi presents the various categories, such as the aggregates, elements, and the twelvefold formula, which the Buddha used to explain the conception of a human person, avoiding the Spiritualist and Materialist theories of “self.” Chapter vii analyzes the conception of the world of experience— physical, psychological, and moral. Chapters vm, ix, and x deal with the four noble truths. Chapter vm shows how the principle of dependent arising is used to explain human suffering and its causation. Chapter ix is devoted to the nature of freedom and happiness. The chapter entitled “Nirvana” in the previous work was very polemical, directed at those who considered freedom (nirvana) to be an absolute. Since it has served its purpose, I felt that a straightforward presentation of the Buddha’s conception of freedom was now appropriate. Chapter ix therefore exam ines freedom in relation to epistemological, behavioral, and psychologi cal dimensions, concluding with an analysis of the unanswered questions pertaining to the freed person. Chapter x appraises the nature of the moral life advocated in Buddhism. Herein the eightfold path receives a detailed treatment. Chapter xi, “Popular Religious Thought,” is new. It does not deal with the multifarious religious rituals practiced by the equally divergent Bud dhist communities. Instead, it discusses one of the simplest Buddhist ritu als, practiced in almost every tradition, and explains how even such a basic ritual reflects the teachings of the Buddha without doing violence to their important philosophical content. The second part of the book, entitled “Continuities and Disconti nuities,” deals with the constant emergence of absolutist tendencies and an equally persistent attempt by some later Buddhist philosophers to crit icize and reject such tendencies. Those who wanted to uphold the radical non-substantialist position of early Buddhism were faced with the dual task of responding to the enormously substantialist and absolutist think ing of the non-Buddhist traditions as well as to those within the Buddhist tradition who fell prey to such thinking.

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