Reverberations of Dharmakīrti's Philosophy
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
The proceedings volume of the Fifth International Dharmakirti Conference (Heidelberg, August 2014) is concerned with the logico-epistemological school of Buddhism, a long- Birgit Kellner, Patrick McAllister, lasting tradition that pursued the analysis of knowledge, inference and proof within a Horst Lasic, Sara McClintock (eds.) Buddhist soteriological framework based on the works of the Indian epistemologist and logician Dharmakirti (6th–7th c. CE). Having been shaped in the environment of medieval India, with its multiple mutually interacting and partly competing religio-philosophical schools, the methods and approaches of Buddhist logic and epistemology had lasting impact on the intellectual history of Tibetan Buddhism and were also received in China and Japan. The 30 papers in this volume offer a snapshot of an international research landscape with centers in Vienna and Japan. They address historical and philological problems raised by important recent manuscript discoveries, pursue specific research questions in the history of philosophy, and undertake philosophical reconstructions and critical examinations relating to individual theories and arguments. By focusing on currents in Asia that developed and Reverberations applied rigorous philosophical methods, the volume aims to contribute to the formation of a better-founded global historical awareness in the field of philosophy. of Dharmakīrti‘s Birgit Kellner is the director of the Institute for the Cultural and Intellectual History of Asia at the Austrian Academy of Sciences. Patrick McAllister is a research fellow and Horst Lasic is a senior scholar at the same institute. Sara McClintock is Associate Professor of Religion at Emory University, Atlanta, USA. Philosophy Reverberations of Dharmakīrti‘s Philosophy of Dharmakīrti‘s Reverberations Proceedings of the Fifth International Dharmakīrti Conference Heidelberg ReverberationsAugust 26 to 30, 2014 Reverberations Reverberations Dharmakīrti‘s ISBN 978-3-7001-8781-3 McAllister, Patrick Kellner, Birgit (eds.) Sara McClintock Lasic, Horst SBph Dharmakīrti‘sMade in Europe 904 Dharmakīrti‘s Accepted by the publication committee of the Division of Humanities and Social Sciences of the Austrian Academy of Sciences by: Michael Alram, Bert G. Fragner, Andre Gingrich, Hermann Hunger, Sigrid Jalkotzy-Deger, Renate Pillinger, Franz Rainer, Oliver Jens Schmitt, Danuta Shanzer, Peter Wiesinger, Waldemar Zacharasiewicz Published with the support of the Austrian Science Fund (FWF): PUB 806 Open access: Where not otherwise specified, this work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Unported License. To view a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ This publication was subjected to an anonymous international review process. Peer review is an essential part of the Austrian Academy of Sciences Press evaluation process. Before any book can be accepted for publication, it is assessed by international specialists and ultimately must be approved by the Austrian Academy of Sciences Publication Committee. The paper used in this publication is DIN EN ISO 9706 certified and meets the requirements for permanent archiving of written cultural property. Some rights reserved. ISBN 978-3-7001-8781-3 Copyright © Austrian Academy of Sciences, Vienna 2020 Typesetting: Institut für Kultur- und Geistesgeschichte Asiens, Vienna Print: Prime Rate, Budapest https://epub.oeaw.ac.at/8781-3 https://verlag.oeaw.ac.at Made in Europe Participants of the Fifth International Dharmakīrti Conference, Heidelberg 2014 Contents Preface xi Opening Speech xvii Shōryū Katsura Account of the Fifth International Dharmakīrti Conference xxiii 1 Jitāri’s Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi 1 Junjie Chu 2 Consciousness and Causality: Dharmakīrti Against Physicalism 21 Christian Coseru 3 Action Theory and Scriptural Exegesis in Early Advaita-Vedānta (2): Maṇḍana Miśra’s Excursus on the Buddha’s Omniscience 41 Hugo David 4 On the Determination of Causation by Dharmakīrti 77 Eli Franco 5 Reinterpretation of the Compound svabhāva-pratibandha in Dharmakīrti’s Logical Theory 91 Yoichi Fukuda 6 Jain Conceptions of Non-Cognition: A Dialogue with Dharmakīrti on Inferential Evidence 111 Marie-Hélène Gorisse 7 Universals, Demons’ Pots, and Demons’ Permanent Pots: Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge on Unestablished Subjects in Arguments by Consequence 129 Pascale Hugon 8 Two Kinds of Causal Capacity: sāmānyā śaktiḥ and pratiniyatā śaktiḥ 155 Masahiro Inami 9 Jñānaśrīmitra on viparyayabādhakapramāṇa 177 Kyo Kano viii CONTENTS 10 How Does One Cognize a Cow? A Dialogue between Mādhava and Dignāga 191 Kei Kataoka 11 Śāntarakṣita on Two Kinds of Arguments for Self-Awareness: sahopalambhaniyama and saṃvedana 203 Hiroko Matsuoka 12 Prajñākaragupta’s Argument for Two Means of Valid Cognition 221 Patrick McAllister 13 Balancing the Scales: Dharmakīrti Inside and Out 251 Lawrence McCrea 14 The Concept of vyava√sthā in Dharmottara’s and Prajñākaragupta’s Explanation of pramāṇa and pramāṇaphala 267 Mai Miyo 15 Dharmakīrti’s Apoha Theory: Perceptual Judgment and the Lack of Superimposition (samāropaviveka) 283 Miyuki Nakasuka 16 Dharmakīrti’s Notion of Permanence and Its Impact on the Tibetan Buddhist Doctrine of Buddhahood 301 Hiroshi Nemoto 17 Dignāga on the View of a Generic Term as Denoting a Relation 313 Hideyo Ogawa 18 Communication between a Speaker and a Listener as the Seeing of a Double Moon — In Light of the Apoha Theory of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla 331 Kensho Okada 19 On pramāṇabhūta — The Change of Its Meaning from Dignāga to Prajñākaragupta 343 Motoi Ono 20 Dharmakīrti on the Role of Salvific Initiation and the Reception of His Critique in the Later Śaiva Tradition 363 Cristina Pecchia 21 Dharmottara on the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa and trairūpya in Dharmakīrti’s sattvānumāna 375 Masamichi Sakai CONTENTS ix 22 Dharmakīrti’s Vādanyāya and the History of Conceptions of Debate in Indian Logic 391 Ryo Sasaki 23 The Meaning of bāhyārtha in Dignāga’s and Jinendrabuddhi’s Theories of Inference 411 Kiyokuni Shiga 24 Closing a Gap in the Interpretation of Dharmakīrti’s Logic 429 Ernst Steinkellner 25 Philosophical Reflections on the sahopalambhaniyama Argument 441 John Taber 26 The Truth, the Buddha’s Words, and Inference: Bhāviveka’s Theory of Two Truths 463 Masaki Tamura 27 The Concept of sādhana in Chinese Buddhist Logic 473 Mingjun Tang 28 A Causeless Liberation? Kṣemarāja’s Response to Dharmakīrti’s Critique of Initiation 497 Somadeva Vasudeva 29 Dharmakīrti and His Successors on āśrayāsiddha and prasaṅgaviparyaya 513 Toshikazu Watanabe 30 Another Look at avinābhāva and niyama in Kumārila’s Exegetical Works 529 Kiyotaka Yoshimizu Index 549 Universals, Demons’ Pots, and Demons’ Permanent Pots: Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge on Unestablished Subjects in Arguments by Consequence by Pascale Hugon Introduction According to Dharmakīrti, prasaṅga arguments – i.e., arguments that rely on a logical reason that is merely accepted by the opponent to draw an unacceptable conclusion – are legitimate means of proof provided that they are indicative of a correct, i.e., triply characterized, logical reason on which the reverse form of the prasaṅga (the prasaṅgaviparyaya) is based.1 The relevant passage of the Pramāṇaviniścaya (hereafter: PVin) has been subject to conflicting interpretations by Indian commentators who notably disagree about the nature of the example that Dharmakīrti gives in this context – namely, whether it is meant to illustrate a prasaṅga argument or its reverse form – and about the status to ascribe to the subject in this example – i.e., whether the subject “universal” is a real universal (as upheld by the intended addressee of the argument) or a non-entity (as accepted by the Buddhist proponent).2 The second point is crucial for the acceptance of the prasaṅga as a probative argument insofar as the validity of the reverse form would be threatened by the non-existence of the subject. Indeed, the non-existence of the subject would prevent the fulfillment of a required characteristic of the logical reason, being a property of thesubject (pakṣadharmatva) – a fallacy known as that of the “unestablished basis” (āśrayāsiddha). Whereas this fallacy allows the Buddhists to discard proofs by opponents upholding, for instance, the reality of space (ākāśa), primordial nature (pradhāna) or universals (sāmānya), it also threatens their own arguments aimed at the refutation of such pseudo- entities. The logical reason in the Buddhist proof would indeed also fail to satisfy the requirement of pakṣadharmatva.3 The status of the subject poses a similar problem in the The work on this paper has been generously supported by the Austrian Science Fund (FWF) in the context of the project P23422-G15 “Early bKa’ gdams pa scholasticism.” I wish to thank my colleague Toshikazu Watanabe for stimulating discussions on the topic, and Katharine Apostle for improving my English. 1 Dharmakīrti’s short mention of such arguments in PV 4.12 (on which see Tillemans 2000: 21–24) is supplemented by a longer discussion in the PVin (PVin 3 4,4–6,12; the references to the Tibetan translation of this discussion in the sDe dge, Peking and sNar Thang bstan ’gyur are: D188a5–189a5; P286a5–287a5; N300a6–301b1). 2 For an in-depth study see Iwata 1993. The main points appear in a summarized form in English in Iwata 1997a. 3 In NB 3.65 dharmyasiddha (“non-establishment of the property-possessor”) is listed as one type of fallacy of the logical reason. An additional issue with such proofs is that the Buddhist proponent