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MAX Security Report Intel@Max-Security.Com +44 203 540 0434 MAX Security Report [email protected] +44 203 540 0434 Air Strike Saudi Arabia & Yemen Alert (UPDATE): Saudi 17 Energy Minister, state-owned oil company AUG confirm Houthi-claimed attack on Shaybah Oil 15:31 UTC Field on August 17; highly notable given target, distance from Yemen Click here for previous report Please be advised: According to the official Saudi news agency, citing the Saudi Minister of Energy, Industry and Mineral Resources, an explosives-laden unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) attacked the Shaybah Oil Field at 06:30 (local time) on August 17. The attack was confirmed during the afternoon hours of August 17. Shaybah Oil Field is located in eastern Saudi Arabia’s Rub Al-Khali/Empty Quarter desert, approximately ten km south of the UAE. The field reportedly produces approximately one million barrels of crude oil per day and holds approximately 14 billion barrels of oil reserves. The minister, Khalid Al-Falih, indicated that the attack resulted in a fire, which was subsequently controlled. Limited damage was caused by the UAV attack, but no casualties were reported. The state-owned oil company released a statement on August 17 indicating that the company’s “response team controlled a limited fire this morning (August 17) at the Shaybah natural gas liquids (NGL) facility” and added that “no interruptions…to oil operations” were recorded. page 1 / 3 Meanwhile, on August 17, the official Houthi news agency claimed that ten UAVs attacked the oil field. The Houthis stated that the incident constituted the “largest attack” since the “start of the Saudi-American aggression on Yemen.” Reports quote the Houthis’ spokesperson as stating that “we promise more and wider attacks than the Shaybah Oil Field if the aggression continues,” adding that “we renew a call for companies and civilians to stay away from all vital sites in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.” Background: The incident comes against the backdrop of ongoing tensions between the US and its allies, including Saudi Arabia, on one side, and Iran and its proxies, including the Houthis, on the other, which has resulted in back-and-forth diplomatic and military actions between the parties. Please click here to read MAX Security’s analysis of the ongoing tensions and their ramifications. Assessments & Forecast: 1. The Houthi-claimed UAV attack is highly notable as it constitutes the furthest confirmed Houthi attack into Saudi Arabia since the beginning of hostilities between the parties. Namely, Shaybah Oil Field is located approximately 1,100 kilometers away from the Houthis’ nearest areas of control in northern Yemen. Prior to this, the only confirmed successful Houthi-perpetrated UAV attack deep into the Kingdom was on May 14, when the Houthis attacked Riyadh Province, located almost 800 kilometers from the closest-held Houthi territories. Meanwhile, in May 2019 footage was released confirming a Houthi-claimed July 28, 2018 attack targeting the UAE’s Abu Dhabi International Airport. In this context, the current incident further underscores the Houthis’ possession of sophisticated weaponry, as well as their enhanced capabilities to effectively manufacture and operate such explosives- laden devices over a significant distance in an adversary’s territory without being detected and effectively employ them at the target locale. 2. The incident underscores the Shiite militant group’s continued strategy of launching highly symbolic attacks against sensitive locales within the Kingdom, which have several goals. First and foremost, from a broader regional geopolitical perspective, the development comes amid ongoing heightened tensions between the US and its allies, including Saudi Arabia, on one side and Iran and its proxies, including the Houthis, on the other. Most recently, on August 17, the US reportedly issued a warrant to seize an Iranian oil tanker that has been held in UK- governed Gibraltar for several weeks. Thus, the Iran-backed Houthis’ attack against the Saudi oil industry, which many US-aligned countries depend on, likely constitutes an additional attempt by Iranian-linked groups to convey to Western countries the consequences of the detention of Iranian oil tankers and ongoing sanctions against the Iranian oil industry. 3. In addition to the regional aspect, the UAV attack also serves the Houthis’ broader strategy and goals in the context of the ongoing conflict in Yemen. First, the Iran-backed group aims to retaliate against the Saudi-led Coalition for the ongoing anti-Houthi operations in Yemen. Secondly, in this way, the Houthis likely seek to hinder the Coalition’s campaign by demoralizing the Kingdom’s citizens and illustrating the cost of Saudi Arabia’s involvement in the Yemeni armed conflict, which the Shiite group likely hopes will compel the Saudis to reduce their active military participation in Yemen. In this context, the Houthis were likely emboldened by a recent redeployment by Emirati forces operating against the Houthis in the country. Thirdly, as illustrated by the Houthis’ statement following the attack, the group seeks to target extremely sensitive locales, such as oil fields, that form the basis of the Saudi economy in order to destabilize the security environment in the country, portray the Kingdom as unsafe to foreign nationals and ultimately harm the Saudi economy. This, as per the other reasons, is ultimately geared towards hindering the Saudi-led Coalition’s anti-Houthi campaign by reducing the country’s revenues and ability to justify its involvement in the page 2 / 3 ongoing campaign. 4. The event is furthermore notable due to the Saudis’ swift confirmation of its occurrence. The Houthis have been known to claim large-scale attacks deep into the Kingdom in the past, which are neither confirmed by Saudi sources nor by independent reports. For example, on August 1, the Houthis claimed the launching of a long-range ballistic missile targeting a military site in Dammam, located in Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province, over 1,250 km from the nearest Houthi-controlled territory, which remains uncorroborated by non-Houthi sources. The fact that current Houthi-claimed attack was confirmed by Saudi officials indicates that it indeed materialized on a large scale and likely caused significant damage, rendering it extremely difficult for the Saudis to disregard. Moreover, the Saudis’ statement forms part of their goal of countering the Houthis’ narrative of events. The Saudi authorities have a firm interest in reassuring external actors and oil consumers that the Kingdom remains safe and that oil operations are not disrupted at its facilities due to its conflict with the Houthis, even though, in the current incident, this remains unconfirmed by independent actors. Given the Houthis’ precedent of exaggerating claimed attacks, the large scale of the incident and the strategic importance of the site, the Saudi authorities likely prefer to confirm the attack’s occurrence but diminish the details of the Houthis’ claim than allow the latter to disseminate its version of events. 5. Lastly, the attack demonstrates the gaps within the Royal Saudi Air Defense’s (RSAD) security protocols. The fact that the UAV was able to travel such a significant distance in Saudi airspace without being detected constitutes a major feat for the Houthis but also exposes significant flaws in the Saudis’ ability to defend highly sensitive locales from such attacks. FORECAST: The Houthis will likely be emboldened by the symbolic achievement and confirmation of the attack and will consequently be inclined to launch further UAVs or ballistic missiles at sensitive targets deep inside Saudi territory over the coming weeks and months. Meanwhile, the incident will likely prompt Saudi security forces to bolsters protocols in order to mitigate the threat emanating from such attacks. While such instances will likely remain relatively rare, the threat of additional Houthi-perpetrated ballistic missiles or UAV attacks deep in the Kingdom remains over the coming weeks and months. Recommendations 1. Travel to Riyadh, Dammam, and Jeddah can continue as normal while adhering to basic security precautions and adherence to cultural norms. 2. Maintain heightened vigilance in central areas in major cities, including Jeddah, including popular public areas and shopping centers, as well as Western institutions and places frequented by Westerners. page 3 / 3 Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org).
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