DOCSLIB.ORG

The Origins of the Rivalry Between Philopoemen and Flamininus*

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
The Origins of the Rivalry Between Philopoemen and Flamininus* THE ORIGINS OF THE RIVALRY BETWEEN PHILOPOEMEN AND FLAMININUS* According to Plutarch’s life of Philopoemen of Megalopolis, the ambi- tious T. Quinctius Flamininus showed resentment at the love and honour Philopoemen received from the Greeks in consequence of his military successes against Nabis in 1921. As a Roman consul2, he considered himself more worthy of Achaean admiration than an Arcadian, and he believed that in benefactions he surpassed him not just a little, having freed those parts of Greece that had been dominated by Philip and the Macedonians by just a single proclamation3. Philopoemen’s campaign, however, had not been a success all the way. It began badly with a naval defeat, which turned into a true humiliation for him, convinced as he was that his capabilities as an infantry commander would suffice to ensure success at sea4. Philopoemen did strike back immediately, profiting from the enemy’s failure to follow up their naval victory. But Nabis knew exactly where to expect the subsequent invasion of Lacedaemonia and gave the Achaean a hard time, although in this case Philopoemen could secure final victory thanks to his military experience5. The same theme is repeated in Plutarch’s biography of Flamininus, where the latter’s filonikía and hjlotupía towards Philopoemen are mentioned as a possible explanation of why Flamininus brought the war with Nabis to a premature end, leaving the defeated tyrant in control of Sparta. Plutarch says he did so either because he feared that if the war took too long he would have to leave the glory of victory to another Roman * An earlier version of this paper was presented as part of a seminar entitled “Luoghi e forme d’incontro fra etnie nel mondo antica” at the Università degli studi di Bologna. I am grateful to the members of the Dipartimento di Storia Antica for suggestions and encouragement. Prof. G. Schepens has added greatly to the quality of the written version of this paper. Any remaining errors are of course mine alone. 1 All dates are BC. 2 Actually, he was at this stage one of four legates sent to Greece by the Senate: see below p. 000 with n. 41. 3 Plut., Phil. 15.1-2. Citations of Plutarch follow the edition of K. ZIEGLER, Plutarchi Vitae parallelae II.2 (Bibliotheca Scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana), Leipzig 1968. 4 Plut., Phil. 14.4. 5 Plut., Phil. 14.8-9. 260 J. RAEYMAEKERS general6, or because of his feelings towards Philopoemen, who after his actions in the war against Nabis was admired by the Achaeans as much as Flamininus, and was honoured in their theatres. Flamininus held this to be out of proportion for an Arcadian fighting small border wars, though Plutarch adds the formal explanation Flamininus gave to defend his action7. This rivalry between Philopoemen and Flamininus is elaborated in detail8 by Plutarch throughout his parallel lives of the two men. It may even explain why he chose to treat them, making for the first and only time two contemporaries the subject of parallel lives9. Clearly the rivalry between the two men originated during the war of 192 against Nabis of Sparta. It must have been a very well-known theme, since it is also found in Livy’s more circumstantial account of the war. He too ends with the statement that, on returning home, the Achaeans considered Philopoemen to be just as famous as the Roman commander, and as far as the war against the Spartans was concerned even more so10. Not only does Livy elaborate the military events of the campaign, but contrary to Plutarch he also provides us with information on the events leading up to the war as well as on the diplomatic contacts between Achaea and Rome, which shed a more nuanced light on the origins of the rivalry. When Nabis commenced hostilities by attacking Gytheum, the Achaeans, charged by the Romans with the responsibility of safeguard- ing the freedom of the coastal perioecic towns11, sent an embassy to the Roman Senate to inquire how it wanted them to handle the situation. When the envoys returned, the Achaeans called an assembly at Sicyon and at the same time sent another embassy to Flamininus. At the meet- ing in Sicyon all present were in favour of immediate war, until Flamin- inus’ written advice to await the Roman fleet before undertaking any action cast new doubt among the participants. Some wanted to abide by 6 While a recurrent motive, it may not have been a very real danger here, although it fits in the tradition of Flamininus’ ‘selfish ambition’, cf. F.M. WOOD, The Tradition of Flamininus’ “Selfish Ambition” in Polybius and Later Historians, in TAPhA 70 (1939), p. 93-103. 7 Plut., Flam. 13.1-4. 8 See J.J. WALSH, Syzygy, Theme and History. A Study in Plutarch’s ‘Philopoemen’ and ‘Flamininus’, in Philologus 136 (1992), p. 208-233. 9 J. GEIGER, Plutarch’s ‘Parallel Lives’: the Choice of Heroes, in Hermes 109 (1981), p. 90 with n. 19, believes that Plutarch started his composition with the Flamininus, mak- ing the Philopoemen a byproduct; apparently the hostility was greater on Flamininus’ part, see R. ERRINGTON, Philopoemen, Oxford 1969, p. 99-100. 10 Livy XXXV.30.13; cf. also XXXV 47.4 11 Livy XXXV 13.2; cf. XXXVIII 31.2. THE RIVALRY BETWEEN PHILOPOEMEN AND FLAMININUS 261 their initial decision, while others found it difficult to reject advice they themselves had sollicited. All awaited the opinion of Philopoemen, who was at that time ‘praetor’ (i.e. strategos of the League) and superior to all in authority and caution. He referred to the Aetolian League, where the praetor was not allowed to give an opinion in questions of war. He asked them to take a quick decision and assured them that, whatever the out- come, he would execute their orders. This urged them more to decide unanimously in favour of war than if he had openly shown himself to be desiring war. War was ordered, leaving it to Philopoemen to decide when and how. In this connection Livy adds that Philopoemen agreed with Flamininus’ advice to await the Roman fleet, but feared that if he did not act immediately, Gytheum would be lost12. Thus our main sources on the war between the Achaeans and Nabis of Sparta, Plutarch and Livy, agree on the resulting rivalry between Philopoemen and Flamininus, each giving incomplete but complemen- tary accounts of the outbreak and course of the war itself. Also, some minor differences can be shown to exist between the two versions. Oddly enough, Pausanias, our third major source on the role of Philo- poemen in the war against Nabis, does not speak of the rivalry with Flami- ninus. Pausanias does not even mention the Roman in the context of this war. His story13 is restricted to the naval fiasco, the attack on Nabis’ camp a few days later, and Philopoemen’s ability to turn a difficult situation into vic- tory by adapting the deployment of his troops to the nature of the terrain. The aim of the present paper is to determine whether the obvious dif- ferences in these three accounts can be satisfactorily interpreted solely on the basis of their respective authors’ different approaches and meth- ods, or whether they should be explained by the use of different sources. Before considering the sources and their possible influence, however, let us first look at how events can be reconstructed from Plutarch, Livy and Pausanias14. * ** 12 Livy XXXV 25. 13 Paus. VIII 50.6-10. 14 A. AYMARD, Les premiers rapports de Rome et de la confédération achaïenne, Bor- deaux 1938, p. 294-315; E. BADIAN, Studies in Greek and Roman History, Oxford 1964, p. 112-139; G.A. LEHMANN, Untersuchungen zur historischen Glaubwürdigkeit des Poly- bios (Fontes et commentationes, 5), Münster 1967, p. 235-236; R. ERRINGTON, Philopoe- men, p. 90-115; J. DEININGER, Der politische Widerstand gegen Rom in Griechenland 262 J. RAEYMAEKERS T. Quinctius Flamininus, consul in 198, had seen his consulship pro- rogated twice, culminating in his famous declaration of the freedom of the Greeks at the Isthmian games in 19615. Subsequently, he used his powers16 to react against Nabis of Sparta’s occupation of Argos17. Nabis was defeated, and peace concluded in 195, stipulating the loss of his fleet and the coastal perioecic towns, such as Gytheum, to the supervi- sion of Achaea, Rome’s new ally in the region18. Flamininus then returned to Rome, hoping to get his solution for the situation ratified by the Senate. Meanwhile all Roman troops were withdrawn from Greece19. Philopoemen had left Achaea in 200 — two years before Flamininus first came to Greece — upon the election of Cycliadas as strategos for 200/199, returning to Crete as a mercenary for the second time20. At some point before his election as federal strategos for the year 193/192 he returned to Megalopolis. Livy merely says that he headed the Achaean League when it assembled at Sicyon to discuss action against Nabis (is tum praetor erat)21. Plutarch is more specific, stating that he came back to the Peloponnese to find Nabis campaigning against Gytheum (eœre ... tòn dè Nábin üpò t¬n ˆAxai¬n kaì t¬n ¨Rwmaíwn polemoúmenon)22. This is confirmed by Pausanias (êpáneisí te êk Krßtjv kaì ¨Rwmaíouv pólemon katelámbanen êpanjirjménouv pròv Nábin)23, who says he returned because the Arcadians were furi- ous with him for going abroad, adding that Philopoemen also wanted his share of the fighting. 217-86 v.Chr., Berlin–New York 1971, p. 108-118; A. BASTINI, Der achaïsche Bund als hellenische Mittelmacht.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Ancient History Sourcebook: 11Th Brittanica: Sparta SPARTA an Ancient City in Greece, the Capital of Laconia and the Most Powerful State of the Peloponnese
    Ancient History Sourcebook: 11th Brittanica: Sparta SPARTA AN ancient city in Greece, the capital of Laconia and the most powerful state of the Peloponnese. The city lay at the northern end of the central Laconian plain, on the right bank of the river Eurotas, a little south of the point where it is joined by its largest tributary, the Oenus (mount Kelefina). The site is admirably fitted by nature to guard the only routes by which an army can penetrate Laconia from the land side, the Oenus and Eurotas valleys leading from Arcadia, its northern neighbour, and the Langada Pass over Mt Taygetus connecting Laconia and Messenia. At the same time its distance from the sea-Sparta is 27 m. from its seaport, Gythium, made it invulnerable to a maritime attack. I.-HISTORY Prehistoric Period.-Tradition relates that Sparta was founded by Lacedaemon, son of Zeus and Taygete, who called the city after the name of his wife, the daughter of Eurotas. But Amyclae and Therapne (Therapnae) seem to have been in early times of greater importance than Sparta, the former a Minyan foundation a few miles to the south of Sparta, the latter probably the Achaean capital of Laconia and the seat of Menelaus, Agamemnon's younger brother. Eighty years after the Trojan War, according to the traditional chronology, the Dorian migration took place. A band of Dorians united with a body of Aetolians to cross the Corinthian Gulf and invade the Peloponnese from the northwest. The Aetolians settled in Elis, the Dorians pushed up to the headwaters of the Alpheus, where they divided into two forces, one of which under Cresphontes invaded and later subdued Messenia, while the other, led by Aristodemus or, according to another version, by his twin sons Eurysthenes and Procles, made its way down the Eurotas were new settlements were formed and gained Sparta, which became the Dorian capital of Laconia.
    [Show full text]
  • Nabis and Flamininus on the Argive Revolutions of 198 and 197 B.C. , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 28:2 (1987:Summer) P.213
    ECKSTEIN, A. M., Nabis and Flamininus on the Argive Revolutions of 198 and 197 B.C. , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 28:2 (1987:Summer) p.213 Nabis and Flamininus on the Argive Revolutions of 198 and 197 B.C. A. M. Eckstein N THE SUMMER of 19 5 a. c. T. Quinctius Flamininus and the Greek I allies of Rome went to war against N abis of Sparta. The official cause of the war was Nabis' continued occupation of Argos, the great city of the northeastern Peloponnese. 1 A strong case can be made that the liberation of Argos was indeed the crucial and sincere goal of the war,2 although the reasons for demanding Nabis' with­ drawal from Argos may have been somewhat more complex.3 Nabis was soon blockaded in Sparta itself and decided to open negotiations for peace. Livy 34.3lfprovides us with a detailed account of the sub­ sequent encounter between N abis and Flamininus in the form of a debate over the justice of the war, characterized by contradictory assertions about the history of Sparta's relations with Rome and the recent history of Argos. Despite the acrimony, a preliminary peace agreement was reached but was soon overturned by popular resis­ tance to it in Sparta. So the war continued, with an eventual Roman 1 Cf. esp. Liv. 34.22.10-12, 24.4, 32.4f. 2 See now E. S. GRUEN, The Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome II (Berkeley/Los Angeles [hereafter 'Gruen']) 450-55, who finds the propaganda of this war, with its consistent emphasis on the liberation of Argos as a matter of honor both for Rome and for Flamininus, likely to have some basis in fact.
    [Show full text]
  • Art and Royalty in Sparta of the 3Rd Century B.C
    HESPERIA 75 (2006) ART AND ROYALTY Pages 203?217 IN SPARTA OF THE 3RD CENTURY B.C. ABSTRACT a The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that revival of the arts in Sparta b.c. was during the 3rd century owed mainly to royal patronage, and that it was inspired by Alexander s successors, the Seleukids and the Ptolemies in particular. The tumultuous transition from the traditional Spartan dyarchy to a and to its dominance Hellenistic-style monarchy, Sparta's attempts regain in the P?loponn?se (lost since the battle of Leuktra in 371 b.c.), are reflected in the of the hero Herakles as a role model promotion pan-Peloponnesian at for the single king the expense of the Dioskouroi, who symbolized dual a kingship and had limited, regional appeal. INTRODUCTION was Spartan influence in the P?loponn?se dramatically reduced after the battle of Leuktra in 371 b.c.1 The history of Sparta in the 3rd century b.c. to ismarked by intermittent efforts reassert Lakedaimonian hegemony.2 A as a means to tendency toward absolutism that end intensified the latent power struggle between the Agiad and Eurypontid royal houses, leading to the virtual abolition of the traditional dyarchy in the reign of the Agiad Kleomenes III (ca. 235-222 b.c.), who appointed his brother Eukleides 1. For the battle of Leuktra and its am to and Ellen Millen 2005.1 grateful Graham Shipley Paul Cartledge and see me to am consequences, Cartledge 2002, and Ellen Millender for inviting der for historical advice. I also 251-259.
    [Show full text]
  • Herodotus' Athenian Artemisia
    Tyrannos, Rhētōr, and Strategos: Herodotus’ Athenian Artemisia Nick Ackert Harvard University Classical Languages and Literature Class of 2017 Abstract: Portrayed as the charismatic Queen of Halicarnassus, shrewd adviser to the Xerxes, and fearless admiral at the Battle of Salamis, Herodotus' Artemisia boldly transgresses into the traditionally male-dominated spaces of tyrant, orator, and general. While some have interpreted Artemisia’s lack of punctilio as emblematic of a Persia so politically and culturally backwards that even women (viewed by Greeks as the inferior sex) were entrusted with authority, the significance of her narrative may be more complex. In light of recent scholarship about Herodotus’ generally favorable presentation of women, it appears that each of Artemisia’s three appearances - Histories 7.99, 8.68-69, and 8.87-88 – actually serve to liken the Queen to her Athenian foes. An interpretation of Artemisia as fundamentally Athenian reminds us that the rigid, binary association of a “feminine East” and a “masculine West” in Greek historiography should be called into question. Overview† Few case studies have complicated current discussions about the representation of women in Classical Greek literature like the Histories’ portrayal of Artemisia, tyrant-queen of Herodotus’ own Halicarnassus and loyal ally to Xerxes. As roughly contemporary texts like Xenophon’s Oeconomicus suggest, the ideal Greek woman was passive and subservient to the instruction of her older husband; her sphere of influence was relegated to the management of the oikos rather than the political and military affairs of the polis (6.12-7.43, 9.11-10.1). Through Perikles’ misogynistic funeral oration, Thucydides’ Peloponnesian War similarly suggests that during conflict, Athenian wives could be models for all Greek women by serving their embattled husbands as attendants who were never spoken of (2.45.2).Throughout the five chapters of her narrative in the Histories(7.99, 8.68-69, and 8.87-88), however, Artemisia’s characterization and behavior subscribe to no such expectations.
    [Show full text]
  • Plutarch on Cimon, Athenian Expeditions, and Ephialtes' Reform
    Plutarch on Cimon, Athenian Expeditions, and Ephialtes’ Reform (Plut. Cim.14–17) Valerij Goušchin N THE 460S B.C. Cimon played a key role in Athenian politics. But his predominance came to an end in 462/1, I when he was ostracized. Not long before his exile he had clashed with Ephialtes over support for the Lacedaemonians, They had called on the Athenians for help against the Helots and perioikoi, who had revolted. Cimon argued strongly for helping the Lacedaemonians while Ephialtes opposed aiding Sparta. But Cimon’s dominance was still great and he was sent, Thucydides reports, to Messenia (1.102.1, cf. Ar. Lys.1137– 1146). While he was away Ephialtes accomplished his reform (462 B.C.), which deprived the Areopagus of its role as guardian of the laws and diminished the influence of the aristocracy. The Lacedaemonians, frightened by Ephialtes’ reform (or by neo- teropoiia in Thucydides’ terminology), dismissed the Athenian contingent. Shortly after returning from Messenia Cimon was ostracized. This is the generally accepted view, which is based mainly on Thucydides’ account.1 We have in addition Plutarch’s narrative in the biography of Cimon, where he presents the course of the same events differ- ently (Cim. 14–17). In particular, he speaks of two Athenian expeditions to Messenia and of the reform of Ephialtes that was carried out at the time of a certain naval expedition. This version is well known, but is considered untrustworthy. I propose that 1 E.g. P. J. Rhodes, “The Athenian Revolution,” in CAH2 V (1992) 69; S. Hornblower, The Greek World 479–323 BC (London/New York 2002) 23.
    [Show full text]
  • Copyrighted Material
    9781405129992_6_ind.qxd 16/06/2009 12:11 Page 203 Index Acanthus, 130 Aetolian League, 162, 163, 166, Acarnanians, 137 178, 179 Achaea/Achaean(s), 31–2, 79, 123, Agamemnon, 51 160, 177 Agasicles (king of Sparta), 95 Achaean League: Agis IV and, agathoergoi, 174 166; as ally of Rome, 178–9; Age grades: see names of individual Cleomenes III and, 175; invasion grades of Laconia by, 177; Nabis and, Agesilaus (ephor), 166 178; as protector of perioecic Agesilaus II (king of Sparta), cities, 179; Sparta’s membership 135–47; at battle of Mantinea in, 15, 111, 179, 181–2 (362 B.C.E.), 146; campaign of, in Achaean War, 182 Asia Minor, 132–3, 136; capture acropolis, 130, 187–8, 192, 193, of Phlius by, 138; citizen training 194; see also Athena Chalcioecus, system and, 135; conspiracies sanctuary of after battle of Leuctra and, 144–5, Acrotatus (king of Sparta), 163, 158; conspiracy of Cinadon 164 and, 135–6; death of, 147; Acrotatus, 161 Epaminondas and, 142–3; Actium, battle of, 184 execution of women by, 168; Aegaleus, Mount, 65 foreign policy of, 132, 139–40, Aegiae (Laconian), 91 146–7; gift of, 101; helots and, Aegimius, 22 84; in Boeotia, 141; in Thessaly, Aegina (island)/Aeginetans: Delian 136; influence of, at Sparta, 142; League and,COPYRIGHTED 117; Lysander and, lameness MATERIAL of, 135; lance of, 189; 127, 129; pro-Persian party on, Life of, by Plutarch, 17; Lysander 59, 60; refugees from, 89 and, 12, 132–3; as mercenary, Aegospotami, battle of, 128, 130 146, 147; Phoebidas affair and, Aeimnestos, 69 102, 139; Spartan politics and, Aeolians,
    [Show full text]
  • PHILOPOEMEN IMMODICUS and SUPERBUS and SPARTA the Decision Taken by the Achaean League in the Autumn of 192 B.G at Aegium To
    PHILOPOEMEN IMMODICUS AND SUPERBUS AND SPARTA The decision taken by the Achaean League in the autumn of 192 B.G at Aegium to wage war against the Aetolians and their allies was crucial to the Greeks and their future. Greece proper had been divided for generations among several political bodies — and, in fact, had never been united into one state. Yet all those known as Έλληνες felt the natural human desire to avoid the unnecessary violence, bloodshed, and self-destruction engendered by ceaseless competition for preeminence and hegemomy in the domestic arena. The so-called “Tragic Historians” adopted these emotions as the leitmotif of their principal efforts to delineate the deeds and omissions of the Greek leadership and populace.1 Rome’s powerful political-strategical penetration east of the Adriatic sea, into Mainland Greece, particularly during the later decades of the third century B.C, undermined the precarious balance of internal Greek politics. The embarrassment which had seized most of Greece is easily understandable. Yet the Achaeans at Aegium do not appear to have been inspired by the memory of their ancestors’ resistance to the Persians. The Achaean leaders, Philopoemen not excluded, rejected Aetolian pleas for help or, at least, non-intervention in the struggle that they had started in the name of Έλληνες for the whole of Greece. Somewhat surprisingly, the Achaean leaders hastened to declare war on the Aetolians, anticipating even the Roman crossing to Greece2. These are the bare facts available to us (Livy 35.50.2-6). However, the conventional interpretation of these occurrences derived from Polybius 3 tends to be pathetic more than historical, and consti­ tute an embellished portrait of Achaean policy and politicians of those days rather than an honest guide to the political realities of the Έλληνες and Greece proper.
    [Show full text]
  • Pausanias' Description of Greece
    BONN'S CLASSICAL LIBRARY. PAUSANIAS' DESCRIPTION OF GREECE. PAUSANIAS' TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH \VITTI NOTES AXD IXDEX BY ARTHUR RICHARD SHILLETO, M.A., Soiiii'tinie Scholar of Trinity L'olltge, Cambridge. VOLUME IT. " ni <le Fnusnnias cst un homme (jui ne mnnquo ni de bon sens inoins a st-s tlioux." hnniie t'oi. inais i}iii rn>it ou au voudrait croire ( 'HAMTAiiNT. : ftEOROE BELL AND SONS. YOUK STIIKKT. COVKNT (iAKDKX. 188t). CHISWICK PRESS \ C. WHITTINGHAM AND CO., TOOKS COURT, CHANCEKV LANE. fA LC >. iV \Q V.2- CONTEXTS. PAGE Book VII. ACHAIA 1 VIII. ARCADIA .61 IX. BtEOTIA 151 -'19 X. PHOCIS . ERRATA. " " " Volume I. Page 8, line 37, for Atte read Attes." As vii. 17. 2<i. (Catullus' Aft is.) ' " Page 150, line '22, for Auxesias" read Anxesia." A.-> ii. 32. " " Page 165, lines 12, 17, 24, for Philhammon read " Philanimon.'' " " '' Page 191, line 4, for Tamagra read Tanagra." " " Pa ire 215, linu 35, for Ye now enter" read Enter ye now." ' " li I'aijf -J27, line 5, for the Little Iliad read The Little Iliad.'- " " " Page ^S9, line 18, for the Babylonians read Babylon.'' " 7 ' Volume II. Page 61, last line, for earth' read Earth." " Page 1)5, line 9, tor "Can-lira'" read Camirus." ' ; " " v 1'age 1 69, line 1 , for and read for. line 2, for "other kinds of flutes "read "other thites.'' ;< " " Page 201, line 9. for Lacenian read Laeonian." " " " line 10, for Chilon read Cliilo." As iii. 1H. Pago 264, " " ' Page 2G8, Note, for I iad read Iliad." PAUSANIAS. BOOK VII. ACIIAIA.
    [Show full text]
  • Spies (Kataskopoi, Otakoustai)
    ch3.qxd 10/18/1999 2:12 PM Page 103 Chapter 3 Beyond the Pale: Spies (Kataskopoi, Otakoustai) It is almost as dif‹cult to de‹ne a spy as to catch one. The most common word among the Greeks for spies was kataskopoi, but throughout the classical era they did not use this term for spies alone: an author might employ it in one context where we would say “spy,” in another where we would understand “scout,” in a third where we would have dif‹culty translating it at all.1 Otakoustai were consistently used as covert agents, but they were rarely sent abroad.2 Is it then anachronistic to distinguish spies from other agents? The answer to this problem can perhaps be found in a distinction in the social perception of different types of kataskopoi (et al.). Some kataskopoi (i.e., spies) were perceived by their victims as treacherous and seem to have been subject to legislation concerning treachery; others (i.e., scouts et al.) were not.3 Whereas spies were normally interrogated under 1. Thucydides, e.g., used kataskopoi for spies at 6.45.1 (they were not named but were distinguished from other sources reporting to the Syracusans) and 8.6.4 (the perioikos Phry- nis, discussed shortly); mounted scouts at 6.63.3; and of‹cial investigators at 4.27.3–4 (Cleon and Theagenes, chosen by the Athenians to investigate matters at Pylos) and 8.41.1 (men appointed to oversee the Spartan navarch Astyochus). The word kataskopos is not found in Homer—he instead used episkopos or skopos indiscriminately for spies, scouts, watchers, and overseers.
    [Show full text]
  • Contesting the Greatness of Alexander the Great: the Representation of Alexander in the Histories of Polybius and Livy
    ABSTRACT Title of Document: CONTESTING THE GREATNESS OF ALEXANDER THE GREAT: THE REPRESENTATION OF ALEXANDER IN THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS AND LIVY Nikolaus Leo Overtoom, Master of Arts, 2011 Directed By: Professor Arthur M. Eckstein, Department of History By investigating the works of Polybius and Livy, we can discuss an important aspect of the impact of Alexander upon the reputation and image of Rome. Because of the subject of their histories and the political atmosphere in which they were writing - these authors, despite their generally positive opinions of Alexander, ultimately created scenarios where they portrayed the Romans as superior to the Macedonian king. This study has five primary goals: to produce a commentary on the various Alexander passages found in Polybius’ and Livy’s histories; to establish the generally positive opinion of Alexander held by these two writers; to illustrate that a noticeable theme of their works is the ongoing comparison between Alexander and Rome; to demonstrate Polybius’ and Livy’s belief in Roman superiority, even over Alexander; and finally to create an understanding of how this motif influences their greater narratives and alters our appreciation of their works. CONTESTING THE GREATNESS OF ALEXANDER THE GREAT: THE REPRESENTATION OF ALEXANDER IN THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS AND LIVY By Nikolaus Leo Overtoom Thesis submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the University of Maryland, College Park, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts 2011 Advisory Committee: Professor Arthur M. Eckstein, Chair Professor Judith P. Hallett Professor Kenneth G. Holum © Copyright by Nikolaus Leo Overtoom 2011 Dedication in amorem matris Janet L.
    [Show full text]
  • Synoikism, Urbanization, and Empire in the Early Hellenistic Period Ryan
    Synoikism, Urbanization, and Empire in the Early Hellenistic Period by Ryan Anthony Boehm A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Ancient History and Mediterranean Archaeology in the Graduate Division of the University of California, Berkeley Committee in charge: Professor Emily Mackil, Chair Professor Erich Gruen Professor Mark Griffith Spring 2011 Copyright © Ryan Anthony Boehm, 2011 ABSTRACT SYNOIKISM, URBANIZATION, AND EMPIRE IN THE EARLY HELLENISTIC PERIOD by Ryan Anthony Boehm Doctor of Philosophy in Ancient History and Mediterranean Archaeology University of California, Berkeley Professor Emily Mackil, Chair This dissertation, entitled “Synoikism, Urbanization, and Empire in the Early Hellenistic Period,” seeks to present a new approach to understanding the dynamic interaction between imperial powers and cities following the Macedonian conquest of Greece and Asia Minor. Rather than constructing a political narrative of the period, I focus on the role of reshaping urban centers and regional landscapes in the creation of empire in Greece and western Asia Minor. This period was marked by the rapid creation of new cities, major settlement and demographic shifts, and the reorganization, consolidation, or destruction of existing settlements and the urbanization of previously under- exploited regions. I analyze the complexities of this phenomenon across four frameworks: shifting settlement patterns, the regional and royal economy, civic religion, and the articulation of a new order in architectural and urban space. The introduction poses the central problem of the interrelationship between urbanization and imperial control and sets out the methodology of my dissertation. After briefly reviewing and critiquing previous approaches to this topic, which have focused mainly on creating catalogues, I point to the gains that can be made by shifting the focus to social and economic structures and asking more specific interpretive questions.
    [Show full text]
  • University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan LINDA JANE PIPER 1967
    This dissertation has been microfilmed exactly as received 66-15,122 PIPER, Linda Jane, 1935- A HISTORY OF SPARTA: 323-146 B.C. The Ohio State University, Ph.D., 1966 History, ancient University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan LINDA JANE PIPER 1967 All Rights Reserved A HISTORY OF SPARTA: 323-1^6 B.C. DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By Linda Jane Piper, A.B., M.A. The Ohio State University 1966 Approved by Adviser Department of History PREFACE The history of Sparta from the death of Alexander in 323 B.C; to the destruction of Corinth in 1^6 B.C. is the history of social revolution and Sparta's second rise to military promi­ nence in the Peloponnesus; the history of kings and tyrants; the history of Sparta's struggle to remain autonomous in a period of amalgamation. It is also a period in Sparta's history too often neglected by historians both past and present. There is no monograph directly concerned with Hellenistic Sparta. For the most part, this period is briefly and only inci­ dentally covered in works dealing either with the whole history of ancient Sparta, or simply as a part of Hellenic or Hellenistic 1 2 history in toto. Both Pierre Roussel and Eug&ne Cavaignac, in their respective surveys of Spartan history, have written clear and concise chapters on the Hellenistic period. Because of the scope of their subject, however, they were forced to limit them­ selves to only the most important events and people of this time, and great gaps are left in between.
    [Show full text]