DOCSLIB.ORG

Russian Withdrawal from Syria: Is the Clock Ticking for Assad?

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Russian Withdrawal from Syria: Is the Clock Ticking for Assad? ASSESSMENT REPORT Russian Withdrawal from Syria: Is the Clock Ticking for Assad? Policy Analysis Unit | Mar 2016 Russian Withdrawal from Syria: Is the Clock Ticking for Assad? Series: Assessment Report Policy Analysis Unit | Mar 2016 Copyright © 2016 Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies. All Rights Reserved. ____________________________ The Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies is an independent research institute and think tank for the study of history and social sciences, with particular emphasis on the applied social sciences. The Center’s paramount concern is the advancement of Arab societies and states, their cooperation with one another and issues concerning the Arab nation in general. To that end, it seeks to examine and diagnose the situation in the Arab world - states and communities- to analyze social, economic and cultural policies and to provide political analysis, from an Arab perspective. The Center publishes in both Arabic and English in order to make its work accessible to both Arab and non-Arab researchers. Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies PO Box 10277 Street No. 826, Zone 66 Doha, Qatar Tel.: +974 44199777 | Fax: +974 44831651 www.dohainstitute.org Table of Contents Introduction 1 The Context of Russia’s Military Campaign 1 Conflicting Priorities and Motives Behind Russia’s Overture 3 Russia’s Gambit and the Impact on Negotiations 4 RUSSIA’S WITHDRAWAL FROM SYRIA Introduction Russian President Vladimir Putin surprised onlookers with his announcement on Tuesday, March 15, that he would withdraw most of Russia’s combat forces from Syria, stating that Russia’s military campaign had “achieved most of its aims” in Syria. Although he denied that the withdrawal of Russian forces was a measured aimed at pressuring Bashar Al Assad into being more cooperative with the peace process, Putin press spokesman Dmitry Peskov did point out that Russia’s immediate aims in the Syrian conflict involved “intensifying [Russian] efforts to achieve a settlement in Syria”1. The Context of Russia’s Military Campaign While the stated aim of Russia’s military intervention in Syria was to quash ISIL before it “could carry out operations in Russia itself” – a reasonable proposition given the hundreds of Russians nationals reported to have joined the group – an examination of the targets chosen by Russian airstrikes reveals that Moscow’s main military operations in Syria primarily targeted (moderate) armed Syrian opposition. This suggests that throughout its military campaign, Russia’s prime objective was to address the balance of powers and, ultimately, prevent the total collapse of the Syrian Army. This would, in turn, allow the Assad regime a chance to engage in negotiations without having been completely defeated. Yet the Russians would soon discover the enormity of the task they took upon themselves: five years of continuous fighting had taken a massive toll on the Syrian Army, which had found itself incapable of securing even the smallest strips of territory seized by the opposition, even with the aid of intensive Russian bombardment. The Russian military was put to the test soon after the launch of its military campaign, during the battle for the Hama countryside in October 2015, when Syrian rebels managed to stop the advance of Russian tanks with the aid of US-made TW shoulder launched missiles. So painful was Russia’s humiliation that Assad was quickly called to Moscow for consultations. 1 See “Putin says Russians to start withdrawing troops from Syria, as peace talks resume”, Denis Dyomkin and Sulieman and Khaldi, Reuters, Tuesday, March 15, 2016: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast- crisis-syria-russia-pullout-idUSKCN0WG23C 1 ARAB CENTER FOR RESEARCH AND POLICY STUDIES In parallel to its push to drive back the Syrian opposition, the Russians simultaneously undertook a political charm offensive that would both prevent them from becoming embroiled in a war of attrition and ensure that they had clear channels of communication with the United States. Dialogue with Washington would secure Russia’s position as a vital partner on a number of issues related to the Middle East. Indeed, the Vienna peace talks for Syria, to which Russia was a party along with 16 other nations, was launched within a month of Russia’s first involvement in the Syrian conflict. Multilateral negotiations rapidly evolved into bilateral talks between the United States and Russia, which saw all of the other parties sidelined—including the major European powers US’s European allies, and Iran, which had always pressed Russia had previously insisted on it being involved in any peace settlement over Syria. The result of these discussions eventually took the shape of the Vienna Accord, a communique which included a roadmap to resolve the conflict in Syria, and which was adopted by UN Security Council Resolution 2254 (December, 2015). The communique included demands for a non-sectarian governing body; a ceasefire/cessation of hostilities; an amendment of the Syrian constitution; and the holding of UN-supervised legislative elections within 18 months of the ceasefire. In spite of the failed Geneva III peace talks, which only served as a cover for Russia to continue its bombing campaign while its allies in Damascus capitalized on their military gains, the White House and the Kremlin eventually managed to come to an agreement. On February 11, 2016, on the fringes of the Munich Security Conference, Russian and US representatives came to an in-principle agreement on the broad outlines of a peace settlement in Syria. The final details covering the scope of the ceasefire and, in particular, those opposition groups which would not be covered by its terms, were ironed out in a phone call between presidents Obama and Putin on February 22, paving the way for the ceasefire to take effect on February 27. Notwithstanding multiple major infractions by the regime and its allies, the ceasefire has stood strong in the days since. This reflects Russia’s determination that this ceasefire holds, something which France’s Defense Minister recognized when he noted that Moscow’s planes were no longer targeting sites controlled by Syria’s moderate opposition2. 2 “Russia has ‘practically’ stopped hitting moderate Syrian rebels: Le Drian”, Reuters, March 14, 2016: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-france-idUSKCN0WG2ED 2 RUSSIA’S WITHDRAWAL FROM SYRIA Conflicting Priorities and Motives Behind Russia’s Overture The decision to partially withdraw from Syria coincided with the resumption of talks in Geneva. Putin’s decision to inform Assad of the move with an unceremonious telephone call is further evidence of Russia’s discontent with the Syrian regime’s seeming disdain for a series of US-Russian agreements which culminated in UNSC 2254 and UNSC 2268 (February 26, 2016), both of which specified mechanisms for the monitoring of ceasefire in Syria. For some time now, increased tensions between the Kremlin and its allies in Damascus have been increasingly visible. Russia’s UN ambassador, Vitaly Churkin, described Moscow’s irritation with the Syrian president’s stated wish to reclaim all of the territory lost during the past five years of conflict. He pointed out that Russia “has invested very seriously in this crisis, politically, diplomatically and now also in the military sense. Therefore, we would like that Bashar Al Assad should take account of that.3” Making matters worse, the Syrian regime announced their unilateral decision to hold parliamentary elections in April 2016, going against UNSC 2254, which envisages all elections be part of a final resolution of the Syrian crisis. Iran’s seeming support for Assad’s plans to hold elections in April—communicated to Moscow’s Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhal Bogdanov during his latest visit to Tehran—only served to further irritate the Russians, exposing how Assad was willing to play his two main international backers against each other4. Combined, these developments suggest that Putin’s decision to partially withdraw Russian forces from Syria on the eve of the recommencement of the Geneva process was a consequence of growing discrepancies between Russia and its allies in the Syrian conflict over what to expect from the negotiations process. Abetted by Iran, the Syrian regime is categorically against a final peace plan which removes Assad from power. This was clearly expressed by Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Muallem, who offered the regime’s interpretation of the clauses of UNSC 2254, suggesting that the transitional period entailed only “replacing one constitution with another” and conceding that the 3 “Russia warns Assad not to snub ceasefire plan”, Alexander Winning and Christian Lower, Reuters, February 19, 2016: http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-mideast-crisis-russia-syria-idUKKCN0VR287 4 For a discussion of the visit and Russia-US cooperation on Syria, see “Russia satisfied with cooperation with US on Syria”, TASS Russian News Agency, March 7, 2016: http://tass.ru/en/politics/860988 3 ARAB CENTER FOR RESEARCH AND POLICY STUDIES Syrian opposition would be allowed to join a government while emphasizing that Bashar Al Assad’s presidency was a “red line”. Muallem also attacked UN envoy for Syria, Staffan De Mistura, for the demand that free parliamentary and presidential elections take place within 18 months of the formation of a comprehensive, non-sectarian governing body5. These differences of opinion reflect a deeper, fundamental divergence in the aims of what the various parties backing the Syrian regime hope to achieve during this stage of the conflict. While Damascus and Tehran are committed to an outright destruction of the Syrian opposition militarily and politically, Moscow’s actions are rooted in its desire to remain an effective and critical player in the Syrian arena. This means, in effect, that Russia must prove its willingness to cooperate with the United States in stabilizing the region, even if its role is to be that of a junior partner to Washington.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • The 2021 Syrian Presidential Election
    July 2021 The 2021 Syrian Presidential Election Political deadlock and Syrian Burnout Hadia Kawikji Introduction The legitimacy of any position is based on two main elements, first the manner in which the individual attained the position, and second is the ability of the individual to fulfill the related responsibilities. For the first point, Bashar al-Assad’s Presidency in Syria was attained through heredity within a ludicrous system following his father who seized the power via a military coup. Both father and son ruled Syria for the last half a century with de-facto legitimacy, through nominal referendums completely dominated by the Ba’ath party. This was instead of an election that reflects the Syrian people’s will. In terms of the ability to fulfill the responsibilities of the presidency, many indicators showcase the regime’s failures to the Syrians. The recent years have witnessed the collapse of the Syrian pound to unprecedented levels, along with the displacement of more than half of the Syrian population,1 and the rise of extreme poverty to 82%,2 with the fact that 37% of the Syrian territories are outside of the regime’s control. Additionally, the violation of the Syrian decision is evidenced by the control of the Lebanese “Hezbollah”, Iranian militias, and Russian troops controlling over roughly 85% of the Syrian borders, finally yet importantly, the Syrian regime’s inability to protect its territory is illustrated by the haphazard attacks by Israel on Syrian land at any given time. In March 2011, the majority of the Syrian people called for the removal of the Assad regime and the transition to a democratic country.
    [Show full text]
  • Transformations in United States Policy Toward Syria Under Bashar
    Nova Southeastern University NSUWorks Department of Conflict Resolution Studies Theses CAHSS Theses and Dissertations and Dissertations 1-1-2017 Transformations in United States Policy toward Syria Under Bashar Al Assad A Unique Case Study of Three Presidential Administrations and a Projection of Future Policy Directions Mohammad Alkahtani Nova Southeastern University, [email protected] This document is a product of extensive research conducted at the Nova Southeastern University College of Arts, Humanities, and Social Sciences. For more information on research and degree programs at the NSU College of Arts, Humanities, and Social Sciences, please click here. Follow this and additional works at: https://nsuworks.nova.edu/shss_dcar_etd Part of the Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons Share Feedback About This Item NSUWorks Citation Mohammad Alkahtani. 2017. Transformations in United States Policy toward Syria Under Bashar Al Assad A Unique Case Study of Three Presidential Administrations and a Projection of Future Policy Directions. Doctoral dissertation. Nova Southeastern University. Retrieved from NSUWorks, College of Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences – Department of Conflict Resolution Studies. (103) https://nsuworks.nova.edu/shss_dcar_etd/103. This Dissertation is brought to you by the CAHSS Theses and Dissertations at NSUWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Department of Conflict Resolution Studies Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of NSUWorks. For more information, please contact [email protected].
    [Show full text]
  • Economic Sanctions Case 2011-2: EU, US V. Syrian Arab Republic (2011
    Case Studies in Economic Sanctions and Terrorism Case 2011-2 EU, US v. Syrian Arab Republic (2011– : human rights, democracy) Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Peterson Institute for International Economics Jeffrey J. Schott, Peterson Institute for International Economics Kimberly Ann Elliott, Peterson Institute for International Economics Julia Muir, Peterson Institute for International Economics July 2011 © Peterson Institute for International Economics. All rights reserved. See also: Cases 86-1 US v. Syria (1986– : Terrorism) Additional country case studies can be found in Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, May 2008 Summary Post‐2000 the United States has imposed three rounds of sanctions against Syria, in response to: (1) Syria’s support for terrorist groups and terrorist activities in Iraq; (2) its pursuit of missiles and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs; and (3) the occupation of Lebanon. In May 2004, President George W. Bush issued Executive Order 13338, implementing the provisions in the Syria Accountability Act, including a freeze of assets of specified individuals and a ban on munitions and dual use items, a ban on exports to Syria other than food and medicine, and a ban on Syrian aircraft landing in or overflying the United States. Sanctions also required US financial institutions to sever correspondent accounts with the Commercial Bank of Syria because of money laundering concerns. In April 2006, Executive Order 13399 was implemented, which designates the Commercial Bank of Syria, including its subsidiary, Syrian Lebanese Commercial Bank, as a financial institution of primary money laundering concern and orders US banks to sever all ties with the institution. In February 2008 the United States issued Executive Order 13460, which freezes the assets of additional individuals.
    [Show full text]
  • The Russian-Syrian Connection
    The Russian-Syrian Connection: Thwarting Democracy in the Middle East and the Greater OSCE Region Wednesday, March 9, 2005 1:00 PM - 3:00 PM 226 Dirksen Senate Office Building Statement for the record of Prof. Walid Phares, Florida Atlantic University and senior fellow, Foundation for the Defense of Democracies Mr Chairman, Mr Ranking member, members of the United States Helsinki Commission. I am pleased to participate in this timely hearing on the subject of Russian involvement with Syria. I shall focus my remarks upon the impact of Russian-Syrian relations on Lebanon. I am a professor of international relations, an expert on terrorism and am originally from Lebanon. I am the Secretary-General of the World Lebanese Cultural Union, and in that capacity I have just been in New York where I met seven ambassadors to the UN Security Council (Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, France, Greece, Russia, US) and the Deputy Secretary General for Middle Eastern affairs. While I am not an international lawyer, I shall draw your attention to international legal standards which I sincerely believe Russia is not meeting. As you know, the present turmoil in Lebanon stems from the assassination of the former prime minister, Rafiq Hariri, on February 14, 2005. Mr Hariri’s murder was, however, not a bolt from the blue. Rather, his brutal removal from the political scene followed months of threats by Syria and its proxies against Lebanese who have sought the end of the Syrian occupation of Lebanon in compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 1559 of September 2, 2004 (UNSCR 1559/2004).
    [Show full text]
  • London School of Economics and Political Science
    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by LSE Theses Online London School of Economics and Political Science Understanding and Explaining US-Syrian Relations: Conflict and Cooperation, and the Role of Ideology Jasmine K. Gani A thesis submitted to the Department of International Relations of the London School of Economics for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, London, November 2011. 1 Declaration I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it). The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without the author's prior written consent. I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third party. I declare that my thesis consists of 114,900 words. (Approved word limit: 115,000). 2 Abstract This thesis is a study of US-Syrian relations, and the legacy of mistrust between the two states. While there has been a recent growth in the study of Syria’s domestic and regional politics, its foreign policy in a global systemic context remains understudied within mainstream International Relations (IR), Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), and even Middle Eastern studies, despite Syria’s geo-political centrality in the region.
    [Show full text]
  • Statement of Unrwa Commissioner-General to the Virtual Advisory Commission – 23 November 2020
    STATEMENT OF UNRWA COMMISSIONER-GENERAL TO THE VIRTUAL ADVISORY COMMISSION – 23 NOVEMBER 2020 Mr. Chair, Mr. Vice-Chair, Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, I am pleased to be with you here today, at this Advisory Commission meeting. Let me start by thanking the Chair, Mr. Sultan Mohammed Al Shamsi - Assistant Minister for International Development Affairs of the United Arab Emirates. I would like to acknowledge with appreciation the important role as Vice-Chair of Dr. Hassan Mneymneh - President of the Lebanese Palestinian Dialogue Committee. And from the Subcommittee: I thank Ms. Jessica Olausson, Consul General of Sweden, Vice-Chairs: Mr. Jason Tulk, Head of Cooperation, Representative Office of Canada, Palestine, and Engineer Rafiq Khirfan, Director-General of the Department of Palestinian Affairs, Jordan. We are also honored by the presence of India and China as guests: Ambassador Sunil Kumar, the Representative of India to the State of Palestine, and Ms. Wang Xi, Counsellor at the Representative Office of China to the State of Palestine, are attending this Advisory Commission meeting. Finally, I wish to express my deep condolences on the passing of Mr. Saeb Erekat, a greatly respected Palestinian leader and tireless advocate for a just peace. I also wish to offer my deep condolences on the passing of Mr. Walid Muallem, the long-serving Foreign Minister of the Syrian Arab Republic, and a supporter of UNRWA Excellencies, distinguished delegates, On 10th November, I informed the Advisory Commission during an Extraordinary meeting that UNRWA’s core budget had run out of cash. I emphasized that the Agency faced this year a shortfall of 115 million Dollars, of which 70 million Dollars in new contributions are needed to cover November and December salaries of over 28,000 staff.
    [Show full text]
  • Should Europe Help Syrian Refugees Return Home?
    POLICY BRIEF THE DISPLACEMENT DILEMMA: SHOULD EUROPE HELP SYRIAN REFUGEES RETURN HOME? Jasmine M. El-Gamal March 2019 SUMMARY European governments must decide when and how to protect Syrian refugees who are voluntarily returning home They should do so using their remaining levers of influence in Syria, in line with European interests and UNHCR protection parameters. European engagement on voluntary refugee returns should be limited, cautious, and conditional. Europe must work with Middle Eastern host countries to prevent forced refugee returns. European governments must talk to all relevant stakeholders in the Syrian conflict, particularly Russia. Introduction After eight years of fighting and destruction resulting in the largest humanitarian and refugee crisis of our time, the government of Bashar al-Assad has all but won Syria’s brutal war. As his regime tightens its grip on Syrian territory and as conditions for refugees in their host countries become increasingly unbearable, European governments now face the challenge of when and how to protect those who fled the conflict and now wish to return home. With donor fatigue increasingly palpable,[1] many EU member states unwilling to expand their resettlement quotas, and states such as Lebanon and Jordan facing difficulties sustaining adequate conditions for their refugee populations, the European Union should adopt a more humanitarian- focused policy that seeks to improve the living conditions of voluntarily returning refugees. In reality, some Syrian refugees in the region have already begun returning home – be it voluntarily or, in the case of Lebanon, under pressure from their hosts. And while Europe should clearly not actively encourage returns given that overall conditions are not yet safe for them to do so – and should work with regional host countries to prevent forced returns – this paper argues that the potential benefits of limited, cautious, and conditional European engagement on returns are worth the risks.
    [Show full text]
  • Iraq Study Group Consultations
    CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF THE PRESIDENCY IRAQ STUDY GROUP Iraq Study Group Consultations (* denotes meeting took place in Iraq) Iraqi Officials and Representatives * Jalal Talabani - President * Tareq al-Hashemi - Vice President * Adil Abd al-Mahdi - Vice President * Nouri Kamal al-Maliki - Prime Minister * Salaam al-Zawbai - Deputy Prime Minister * Barham Salih - Deputy Prime Minister * Mahmoud al-Mashhadani - Speaker of the Parliament * Mowaffak al-Rubaie - National Security Advisor * Jawad Kadem al-Bolani - Minister of Interior * Abdul Qader Al-Obeidi - Minister of Defense * Hoshyar Zebari - Minister of Foreign Affairs * Bayan Jabr - Minister of Finance * Hussein al-Shahristani - Minster of Oil * Karim Waheed - Minister of Electricity * Akram al-Hakim - Minister of State for National Reconciliation Affairs * Mithal al-Alusi - Member, High Commission on National Reconciliation * Ayad Jamal al-Din - Member, High Commission on National Reconciliation * Ali Khalifa al-Duleimi - Member, High Commission on National Reconciliation * Sami al-Ma'ajoon - Member, High Commission on National Reconciliation * Muhammad Ahmed Mahmoud - Member, Commission on National Reconciliation * Wijdan Mikhael - Member, High Commission on National Reconciliation Lt. General Nasir Abadi - Deputy Chief of Staff of the Iraqi Joint Forces * Adnan al-Dulaimi - Head of the Tawafuq list Ali Allawi - Former Minister of Finance * Sheik Najeh al-Fetlawi - representative of Muqtada al-Sadr * Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim - Shia Coalition Leader * Sheik Maher al-Hamraa - Ayat Allah
    [Show full text]
  • Syria's Historic Decision to Establish Diplomatic Relations with Lebanon
    Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Israel Intelligence Heritage & Commemoration Center (IICC) November 5, 2008 Syria’s historic decision to establish diplomatic relations with Lebanon and an analysis of its implications President Bashar Assad announcing Decree No. 358, which establishes diplomatic relations between Syria and Lebanon (Syrian TV, October 14). OOOvvveeerrrvvviiieeewww 1. On October 14, 2008, Syrian president Bashar Assad issued Decree No 358, ordering the establishment of diplomatic relations between Syria and Lebanon, and the opening of a Syrian embassy in Lebanon (Syrian News Agency, October 14, 2008). The announcement of the decree was preceded by the joint agreement of the presidents of Syria and Lebanon, Bashar Assad and Michel Suleiman, during Suleiman’s visit to Damascus on August 13, 2008. After the visit, Lebanon issued Decree No. 268, for setting up a Lebanese embassy in Syria (September 13, 2008). 2. The day after the Syrian decree, Lebanese foreign minister Fawzi Salukh arrived in Syria for a visit. He met with Bashar Assad and the Syrian foreign minister, Walid Muallem. On the morning of October 15 the two ministers signed a joint announcement to the effect that diplomatic relations would be established. They said that Syria and Lebanon desired to strengthen the “excellent brotherly relations between two sister countries [sic],” based on mutual respect for the sovereignty and independence of each. In answer to a reporter’s question, the Syrian foreign minister said that an ambassador to Syria would be appointed before the end of 2008 (Syrian and Lebanon news agencies, October 15, 2008). 3. Lebanese foreign minister Fawzi Salukh: “We are pleased to announce…the The foreign ministers of Syria and Lebanon sign the establishment of diplomatic relations documents establishing of diplomatic relations (Syrian News between two sister countries.” (Syrian Agency).
    [Show full text]
  • A Turkish Perspective on Syria
    A Turkish Perspective on Syria Ercan Çitlioğlu Introduction The war is not over, but the overall military victory of the Assad forces in the Syrian conflict — securing the control of the two-thirds of the country by the Summer of 2020 — has meant a shift of attention on part of the regime onto areas controlled by the SDF/PYD and the resurfacing of a number of issues that had been temporarily taken off the agenda for various reasons. Diverging aims, visions and priorities of the key actors to the Syrian conflict (Russia, Turkey, Iran and the US) is making it increasingly difficult to find a common ground and the ongoing disagreements and rivalries over the post-conflict reconstruction of the country is indicative of new difficulties and disagreements. The Syrian regime’s priority seems to be a quick military resolution to Idlib which has emerged as the final stronghold of the armed opposition and jihadist groups and to then use that victory and boosted morale to move into areas controlled by the SDF/PYD with backing from Iran and Russia. While the east of the Euphrates controlled by the SDF/PYD has political significance with relation to the territorial integrity of the country, it also carries significant economic potential for the future viability of Syria in holding arable land, water and oil reserves. Seen in this context, the deal between the Delta Crescent Energy and the PYD which has extended the US-PYD relations from military collaboration onto oil exploitation can be regarded both as a pre-emptive move against a potential military operation by the Syrian regime in the region and a strategic shift toward reaching a political settlement with the SDF.
    [Show full text]
  • Sanctioning Assad's Syria
    DIIS REPORT 2012:13 DIIS REPORT SANCTIONING ASSAD’S SYRIA MAPPING THE ECONOMIC, SOCIOECONOMIC AND POLITICAL REPERCUSSIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS IMPOSED ON SYRIA SINCE MARCH 2011 Rune Friberg Lyme DIIS REPORT 2012:13 DIIS REPORT DIIS . DANISH INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 1 DIIS REPORT 2012:13 © Copenhagen 2012, the author and DIIS Danish Institute for International Studies, DIIS Strandgade 56, DK-1401 Copenhagen, Denmark Ph: +45 32 69 87 87 Fax: +45 32 69 87 00 E-mail: [email protected] Web: www.diis.dk Cover photo: Protests in Damascus against EU sanctions. © bassim/Xinhua Press/Corbis Layout: Allan Lind Jørgensen Printed in Denmark by Vesterkopi AS ISBN 978-87-7605-519-6 (pdf ) ISBN 978-87-7605-520-2 (print) Price: DKK 50.00 (VAT included) DIIS publications can be downloaded free of charge from www.diis.dk Hardcopies can be ordered at www.diis.dk This report was commissioned by the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but its findings and conclusions are entirely the responsibility of the author. Rune Friberg Lyme, Research Assistant [email protected] 2 DIIS REPORT 2012:13 Contents Executive summary 5 1. Introduction 11 1.1 About this report 12 1.2 Structure of the report 12 2. The Syrian economy and power structure reconfiguration in the 2000s 14 2.1 Selective liberalisation process during the 2000s 14 2.2 The basic structure of the Syrian economy 16 2.3 Increasing social and regional inequalities 18 2.4 Reconfiguring the authoritarian powerbase 20 2.5 A decade of shifting power alliances and increasing socioeconomic inequality 23 3.
    [Show full text]
  • US Move Towards Brotherhood Ban Could Upend Turkish-Qatari Strategies
    UK £2 Issue 204, Year 5 May 5, 2019 EU €2.50 www.thearabweekly.com Hope after Baghdadi’s Corruption- Spanish first video fuelled unrest elections in five years in the Arab world Page 17 Pages 6,7-9 Page 4 US move towards Brotherhood ban could upend Turkish-Qatari strategies ► Support to Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated groups is a major pillar of Turkey’s and Qatar’s influence strategies in the region. Thomas Seibert in its relations with the United States. Ties are under strain by US support for Kurdish militants in Istanbul Syria, Ankara’s wish to buy Rus- sian military hardware and by plan by members of the Turkey’s determination to pursue US administration to close relations with neighbour designate the Muslim Iran despite the threat of US sanc- A Brotherhood an interna- tions. tional terrorist organisation is ex- Gunter Seufert, a Turkey expert pected to be yet another irritant at the German Institute for Inter- in troubled relations between An- national and Security Affairs, a kara and Washington. think-tank in Berlin, said a desig- The move could also put fresh nation of the Muslim Brotherhood pressure on ties between Wash- as a terrorist group would be “an- ington and Doha. Like Turkey, other point of conflict” between Qatar is a major backer of the Turkey and the United States. Muslim Brotherhood. It is also the “This would harden fronts fur- site of the largest US military base ther,” Seufert said by telephone. in the Middle East. Both Turkish US President Donald Trump’s and Qatari strategies in the region decision to consider putting the could be upended.
    [Show full text]