DOCSLIB.ORG

On-Anthropological-Knowledge.Pdf

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
On-Anthropological-Knowledge.Pdf Contents Introduction 1 1 Interpretive ethnography and theoretical anthropology 9 2 Apparently irrational beliefs 35 3 Claude Lévi-Strauss today 64 Notes 95 References 99 [Page numbers are as in the printed book] ON ANTHROPOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE Introduction What is anthropology? A philosophical tradition going back to classical antiquity, an academic discipline established in the nineteenth century, a method developed in the last few decades. The Sophist Protagoras claimed that his teaching would make good citizens. Socrates wondered: can virtue really be taught? Is it, we would ask today, innate or acquired? Protagoras first answered by means of a fable. The gods, having shaped the mortal species, gave Prometheus and Epimetheus the job of dividing all desirable qualities among these species. Epimetheus took charge. He gave each species the means to survive: to some he gave strength, to others speed; to some he gave claws or horns, to others wings to flee or underground shelters to hide. He protected them against the weather by means of hides, furs, and hooves. To each species he assigned its own food. He made some species carnivorous, and endowed their prey with great fecundity. Alas Epimetheus - whose very name evokes lack of foresight - forgot the human species. Prometheus arrived too late: while all other animals were well provided for, man stood naked and defenseless. In desperation, Prometheus stole from the gods fire and crafts and gave them to man. Thereafter, humans honored the gods, acquired speech, and learned to build houses, make clothes, and till the soil. But they were scattered on the surface of the earth and were prey to wild beasts. They still lacked the political skills required to form cities. Zeus, eager to ensure the survival of the species, ordered Hermes to give all humans the necessary sense of respect and justice. Protagoras's fable nicely exposes a paradox which, since the Sophists, has been at the core of Western anthropological thought:1 humans are, by nature, deprived of natural qualities. Other animals are naturally equipped to survive. Humans owe their survival to empirical, technical, and moral knowledge which they acquire progressively. Other animals live naturally in what we would call today an ecological equilibrium. It is by becoming civilized 1 that humans, for their part, adapt to their natural environment and establish harmonious mutual relationships. If virtue may appear to be natural, if it may seem to Socrates that there are no teachers of virtue, it is, on the contrary, argues Protagoras, because everybody helps to teach it: "just as if you were looking for a teacher of Greek, you wouldn't find one" (Plato, Protagoras, 328a). In this respect, language and virtue which are transmitted by society as a whole, contrast with arts and crafts which have appointed masters. It is, however, not a contrast between nature and culture, but one between shared culture and special knowledge. Today's anthropologists echo Protagoras when they insist: "everything is cultural." What are the common and specific attributes of humans? This question, central to anthropology, can only be answered in a speculative fashion. Human languages, cultures, and social systems are specific to the species, but they are not universally shared: they are, on the contrary, the main source of differences among humans. If humans share specific attributes beyond anatomy, these must be the mental capacities which make possible the development of a variety of languages, cultures, and social systems. But what are these capacities? This has been the central issue of philosophical anthropology. For empiricists such as Locke, these capacities amount to an indefinite malleability and receptiveness, so that knowledge owes all its content and structure to experience and to the environment. For rationalists such as Kant, human cognitive capacities comprise innate categories and principles which structure human knowledge and limit its variability. From the fifteenth century onwards, the rediscovery of Classical Antiquity and the discoveries of the great travelers brought about a much greater awareness of the diversity of cultures. Philosophers however showed limited interest. In 1799, a Society of Observers of Man was founded in Paris. Although short-lived, it foreshadowed modern anthropological associations. Joseph-Marie Degerando contributed some "Considerations on the Diverse Methods to be Followed in the Observation of Savage Peoples"2 in which he pointed out, not without reason, that "philosophers spent time in vain disputes in their schools about the nature of man, instead of uniting to study him in the area of the universe" (Degerando, 1969: 65). It took until the middle of the nineteenth century for philosophical anthropology to give birth to two well-established empirical disciplines, with their chairs, their associations and their journals: psychology, which studies mental capacities through their manifestations in individual behavior, and anthropology, in a new and more restricted sense of the term, which aims to throw light on what humans are by studying who they arc. The new anthropology had two main branches: physical anthropology, 2 partly discredited since because of the racist and eugenist theories that developed within it (but, thanks to advances in biology, it has now taken a new start), and cultural anthropology, which has become so prominent that it is commonly referred to as simply "anthropology."3 Cultures are the collective output of human mental abilities. In principle, then, cultural anthropology and psychology should have a close and fruitful relationship. They deal with different outputs of the same general device: the human mind. This was self-evident for people such as Wilhelm Wundt and Edward Tylor. Wundt, the founder of experimental psychology, also wrote a ten-volume anthropological treatise. Tylor, often considered the founder of modern cultural anthropology, was guilty, in the eyes of his successors, of the sin of "psychologicism." Actually, the two disciplines soon parted company. They did so on theoretical and on methodological grounds. Anthropology and psychology developed in an empiricist atmosphere which they themselves helped perpetuate. From an empiricist point of view, the study of mental mechanisms sheds no light on the content of cultures: the mental malleability of humans is thought to be so great as to allow cultures to vary without any constraint other than those imposed by the social or natural environment. Conversely, the study of cultures sheds no light on mental mechanisms apart from the fact that their diversity is taken to illustrate the malleability of the human mind. For a psychology and an anthropology sharing such empiricist foundations, there was little left to do in common. After Tylor and until Lévi-Strauss, anthropologists showed little interest in the psychology of the intellect. Some of them, Malinowski or Ruth Benedict for instance, did pay attention to the psychology of emotions, which had hardly been touched by the debate between empiricism and rationalism and which had benefited from the contribution of psychoanalysis. Today, most anthropologists acknowledge the legacy of Durkheim, Max Weber, or Marx rather than that of William James, Wundt, or Freud, and going further back, that of Hobbes or Montesquieu rather than that of Hume or Kant. Such acknowledgments are beyond dispute: in matters of intellectual filiation, it behooves the descendants to appoint their ancestors. By the same token, it is not inconceivable that the next generation of anthropologists will take its inspiration from psychology rather than from sociology, from the philosophy of mind rather than from the philosophy of law. It is not absurd either to hope that, rather than having a mere reversal of allegiances, a fruitful balance might be struck between the two traditions. The split between psychology and anthropology is not only due to a theoretical bias, but also, and perhaps more importantly, to a primacy given to methodological issues. Most experimental psychologists have acknowledged 3 as psychological only facts and assumptions that come out of laboratory experiments. Most anthropologists have been exclusively concerned with problems encountered in collecting, presenting, and classifying cultural data: "anthropology" for them is just a better sounding synonym of "ethnography". Bronislaw Malinowski, a young Polish anthropologist living in Britain, happened to be visiting Australia when the First World War broke out. Because he was an Austrian subject, and therefore, technically, an enemy, he was forbidden to go back to Europe till the end of the war. He took advantage of this forced exile to study the inhabitants of the Trobriand Islands. For two years, he set his tent in their midst, learned their language, participated as much as he could in their daily life, expeditions, and festivals, and took everything down in his notebooks. In 1922, he published Argonauts of the Western Pacific, which became a model for ethnography and which still is, in spite of criticisms and revisions, one of its masterpieces. Actually, well before Malinowski, missionaries and colonial officers lived for long periods of time among faraway peoples and learned their language. Some of the descriptions they published are of a quality and wealth of detail not always matched by today's professionals. Among anthropologists themselves, Morgan, Boas, Rivers and others already had done fieldwork in the nineteenth century. What
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Modularity As a Concept Modern Ideas About Mental Modularity Typically Use Fodor (1983) As a Key Touchstone
    COGNITIVE PROCESSING International Quarterly of Cognitive Science Mental modularity, metaphors, and the marriage of evolutionary and cognitive sciences GARY L. BRASE University of Missouri – Columbia Abstract - As evolutionary approaches in the behavioral sciences become increasingly prominent, issues arising from the proposition that the mind is a collection of modular adaptations (the multi-modular mind thesis) become even more pressing. One purpose of this paper is to help clarify some valid issues raised by this thesis and clarify why other issues are not as critical. An aspect of the cognitive sciences that appears to both promote and impair progress on this issue (in different ways) is the use of metaphors for understand- ing the mind. Utilizing different metaphors can yield different perspectives and advancement in our understanding of the nature of the human mind. A second purpose of this paper is to outline the kindred natures of cognitive science and evolutionary psychology, both of which cut across traditional academic divisions and engage in functional analyses of problems. Key words: Evolutionary Theory, Cognitive Science, Modularity, Metaphors Evolutionary approaches in the behavioral sciences have begun to influence a wide range of fields, from cognitive neuroscience (e.g., Gazzaniga, 1998), to clini- cal psychology (e.g., Baron-Cohen, 1997; McGuire and Troisi, 1998), to literary theory (e.g., Carroll, 1999). At the same time, however, there are ongoing debates about the details of what exactly an evolutionary approach – often called evolu- tionary psychology— entails (Holcomb, 2001). Some of these debates are based on confusions of terminology, implicit arguments, or misunderstandings – things that can in principle be resolved by clarifying current ideas.
    [Show full text]
  • In Defense of Massive Modularity
    3 In Defense of Massive Modularity Dan Sperber In October 1990, a psychologist, Susan Gelman, and three anthropolo- gists whose interest in cognition had been guided and encouraged by Jacques Mehler, Scott Atran, Larry Hirschfeld, and myself, organized a conference on “Cultural Knowledge and Domain Specificity” (see Hirsch- feld and Gelman, 1994). Jacques advised us in the preparation of the conference, and while we failed to convince him to write a paper, he did play a major role in the discussions. A main issue at stake was the degree to which cognitive development, everyday cognition, and cultural knowledge are based on dedicated do- main-specific mechanisms, as opposed to a domain-general intelligence and learning capacity. Thanks in particular to the work of developmental psychologists such as Susan Carey, Rochel Gelman, Susan Gelman, Frank Keil, Alan Leslie, Jacques Mehler, Elizabeth Spelke (who were all there), the issue of domain-specificity—which, of course, Noam Chomsky had been the first to raise—was becoming a central one in cognitive psychol- ogy. Evolutionary psychology, represented at the conference by Leda Cosmides and John Tooby, was putting forward new arguments for seeing human cognition as involving mostly domain- or task-specific evolved adaptations. We were a few anthropologists, far from the main- stream of our discipline, who also saw domain-specific cognitive pro- cesses as both constraining and contributing to cultural development. Taking for granted that domain-specific dispositions are an important feature of human cognition, three questions arise: 1. To what extent are these domain-specific dispositions based on truly autonomous mental mechanisms or “modules,” as opposed to being 48 D.
    [Show full text]
  • Structuralism 1. the Nature of Meaning Or Understanding
    Structuralism 1. The nature of meaning or understanding. A. The role of structure as the system of relationships Something can only be understood (i.e., a meaning can be constructed) within a certain system of relationships (or structure). For example, a word which is a linguistic sign (something that stands for something else) can only be understood within a certain conventional system of signs, which is language, and not by itself (cf. the word / sound and “shark” in English and Arabic). A particular relationship within a شرق combination society (e.g., between a male offspring and his maternal uncle) can only be understood in the context of the whole system of kinship (e.g., matrilineal or patrilineal). Structuralism holds that, according to the human way of understanding things, particular elements have no absolute meaning or value: their meaning or value is relative to other elements. Everything makes sense only in relation to something else. An element cannot be perceived by itself. In order to understand a particular element we need to study the whole system of relationships or structure (this approach is also exactly the same as Malinowski’s: one cannot understand particular elements of culture out of the context of that culture). A particular element can only be studied as part of a greater structure. In fact, the only thing that can be studied is not particular elements or objects but relationships within a system. Our human world, so to speak, is made up of relationships, which make up permanent structures of the human mind. B. The role of oppositions / pairs of binary oppositions Structuralism holds that understanding can only happen if clearly defined or “significant” (= essential) differences are present which are called oppositions (or binary oppositions since they come in pairs).
    [Show full text]
  • Review of Sperber & Wilson 1986. Relevance: Communication And
    Review of Sperber & Wilson 1986. Relevance : Communication and Cognition Daniel Hirst To cite this version: Daniel Hirst. Review of Sperber & Wilson 1986. Relevance : Communication and Cognition. Mind and Language, Wiley, 1989, 4 (1/2), pp.138-146. hal-02552695 HAL Id: hal-02552695 https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02552695 Submitted on 23 Apr 2020 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents entific research documents, whether they are pub- scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, lished or not. The documents may come from émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de teaching and research institutions in France or recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires abroad, or from public or private research centers. publics ou privés. Review of Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson (1986) Relevance : Communication and Cognition. (Blackwell's, Oxford) Daniel Hirst - CNRS Parole et Langage, Université de Provence. One of the examples Sperber & Wilson ask us to consider is the sentence : "It took us a long time to write this book" (p 122) In case the reader misses the point, they explain in the preface that the book developped out of a project begun over ten years ago to write "in a few months" a joint essay on semantics, pragmatics and rhetoric. The resulting book has been long awaited, having been announced as "forthcoming" since at least 1979 under various provisional titles ranging from The Interpretation of Utterances : Semantics, Pragmatics & Rhetoric (Wilson & Sperber 1979) through Foundations of Pragmatic Theory (Wilson & Sperber 1981) to Language and Relevance (Wilson & Sperber 1985).
    [Show full text]
  • CLAUDE LEVI-STRAUSS: the Man and His Works
    University of Nebraska - Lincoln DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln Nebraska Anthropologist Anthropology, Department of 1977 CLAUDE LEVI-STRAUSS: The Man and His Works Susan M. Voss University of Nebraska-Lincoln Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nebanthro Part of the Anthropology Commons Voss, Susan M., "CLAUDE LEVI-STRAUSS: The Man and His Works" (1977). Nebraska Anthropologist. 145. https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nebanthro/145 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Anthropology, Department of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Nebraska Anthropologist by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. Published in THE NEBRASKA ANTHROPOLOGIST, Volume 3 (1977). Published by the Anthropology Student Group, Department of Anthropology, University of Nebraska, Lincoln, Nebraska 68588 21 / CLAUDE LEVI-STRAUSS: The Man and His Works by Susan M. Voss 'INTRODUCTION "Claude Levi-Strauss,I Professor of Social Anth- ropology at the College de France, is, by com­ mon consent, the most distinguished exponent ~f this particular academic trade to be found . ap.ywhere outside the English speaking world ... " (Leach 1970: 7) With this in mind, I am still wondering how I came to be embroiled in an attempt not only to understand the mul t:ifaceted theorizing of Levi-Strauss myself, but to interpret even a portion of this wide inventory to my colleagues. ' There is much (the maj ori ty, perhaps) of Claude Levi-Strauss which eludes me yet. To quote Edmund Leach again, rtThe outstanding characteristic of his writing, whether in French or in English, is that it is difficul tto unders tand; his sociological theories combine bafflingcoinplexity with overwhelm­ ing erudi tion"., (Leach 1970: 8) .
    [Show full text]
  • Why We Play: an Anthropological Study (Enlarged Edition)
    ROBERTE HAMAYON WHY WE PLAY An Anthropological Study translated by damien simon foreword by michael puett ON KINGS DAVID GRAEBER & MARSHALL SAHLINS WHY WE PLAY Hau BOOKS Executive Editor Giovanni da Col Managing Editor Sean M. Dowdy Editorial Board Anne-Christine Taylor Carlos Fausto Danilyn Rutherford Ilana Gershon Jason Troop Joel Robbins Jonathan Parry Michael Lempert Stephan Palmié www.haubooks.com WHY WE PLAY AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL STUDY Roberte Hamayon Enlarged Edition Translated by Damien Simon Foreword by Michael Puett Hau Books Chicago English Translation © 2016 Hau Books and Roberte Hamayon Original French Edition, Jouer: Une Étude Anthropologique, © 2012 Éditions La Découverte Cover Image: Detail of M. C. Escher’s (1898–1972), “Te Encounter,” © May 1944, 13 7/16 x 18 5/16 in. (34.1 x 46.5 cm) sheet: 16 x 21 7/8 in. (40.6 x 55.6 cm), Lithograph. Cover and layout design: Sheehan Moore Typesetting: Prepress Plus (www.prepressplus.in) ISBN: 978-0-9861325-6-8 LCCN: 2016902726 Hau Books Chicago Distribution Center 11030 S. Langley Chicago, IL 60628 www.haubooks.com Hau Books is marketed and distributed by Te University of Chicago Press. www.press.uchicago.edu Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper. Table of Contents Acknowledgments xiii Foreword: “In praise of play” by Michael Puett xv Introduction: “Playing”: A bundle of paradoxes 1 Chronicle of evidence 2 Outline of my approach 6 PART I: FROM GAMES TO PLAY 1. Can play be an object of research? 13 Contemporary anthropology’s curious lack of interest 15 Upstream and downstream 18 Transversal notions 18 First axis: Sport as a regulated activity 18 Second axis: Ritual as an interactional structure 20 Toward cognitive studies 23 From child psychology as a cognitive structure 24 .
    [Show full text]
  • Descent Systems and Ideal Language Rodney Needham Philosophy of Science, Vol
    Descent Systems and Ideal Language Rodney Needham Philosophy of Science, Vol. 27, No. 1. (Jan., 1960), pp. 96-101. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8248%28196001%2927%3A1%3C96%3ADSAIL%3E2.0.CO%3B2-F Philosophy of Science is currently published by The University of Chicago Press. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/journals/ucpress.html. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. The JSTOR Archive is a trusted digital repository providing for long-term preservation and access to leading academic journals and scholarly literature from around the world. The Archive is supported by libraries, scholarly societies, publishers, and foundations. It is an initiative of JSTOR, a not-for-profit organization with a mission to help the scholarly community take advantage of advances in technology. For more information regarding JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. http://www.jstor.org Tue Mar 25 07:12:03 2008 DISCUSSION DESCENT SYSTEMS AND IDEAL LANGUAGE* RODNEY NEEDHAM University of Oxford This note is written in response to Gellner's "Ideal Language and Kinship Structure" (l).l In that article he tries to shed some light on the notion of an ideal language by constructing in outline an ideal language for what he calls "kinship structure theory".
    [Show full text]
  • Examining Deaf Students' Language Ideologies Through English-To-ASL
    Languages, Literacies, and Translations: Examining Deaf Students’ Language Ideologies through English-to-ASL Translations of Literature by Ruth Anna Spooner A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (English and Education) in the University of Michigan 2016 Doctoral Committee: Professor Anne Leslie Curzan, Chair Professor John Anthony Albertini, National Technical Institute for the Deaf Professor Anne Ruggles Gere Professor Elizabeth Birr Moje © Ruth Anna Spooner 2016 Acknowledgements First of all, I must thank my brilliant and wonderfully supportive committee— particularly Anne Curzan and Anne Ruggles Gere, who were also the co-chairs of my program—who invested hours upon hours teaching me, reading my work, asking questions, talking through ideas, offering feedback, and challenging me to grow as a teacher-scholar. I am especially indebted to Anne Curzan, who in her capacity as committee chair, patiently and intrepidly mucked through all of the drafts for each chapter of this dissertation (including the earliest, messiest ones), always making the time to offer thorough, thoughtful feedback. Your encouragement and guidance has helped to shape this project into what it has become; I could not have done it without you. Also, the ongoing conversations that I have had over the past five years with Anne Curzan and Anne Gere about my research work, about composition and literacy, about all things teaching, and about what it means to be a teacher and a scholar—I cannot describe how valuable your guidance and wisdom have been for me. Thank you. Elizabeth Moje, you were one of the first professors I worked with here at Michigan, and right from the start, you were exuberantly enthusiastic about my ideas and my work, and I am deeply grateful for your unfailing encouragement and your willingness to make space for me in your schedule even as you took on the time- consuming responsibilities of being an Assistant Dean (and later Dean) of the School of Education.
    [Show full text]
  • Implications and Explications of Police Translation of Complainants' Sworn
    IMPLICATIONS AND EXPLICATIONS OF POLICE TRANSLATION OF COMPLAINANTS’ SWORN STATEMENTS: EVIDENCE LOST IN TRANSLATION? BY MONWABISI KNOWLEDGE RALARALA BA Hons, HDE (Arts) (UWC); PGD ALS (Ed) (UCT); MA, DLitt (Stell) Dissertation submitted in accordance with the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy (PhD): Publishable articles, in the Faculty of Humanities, for the Department of Linguistics and Language Practice, at the University of the Free State. Date of submission: 01 July 2015 Promoter :Professor Kobus Marais Co-Promoter: Professor Russell Kaschula ii DECLARATION “I declare that the dissertation hereby submitted by Monwabisi Knowledge Ralarala for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (PhD): Publishable articles at the University of the Free State is my own independent work and has not previously been submitted by me at another University/Faculty. I furthermore cede copyright of the thesis in favour of the University of the Free State.” Date: 01 July 2015 Copyright © (YEAR) University of the Free State All rights reserved iii ABSTRACT This interdisciplinary case study demonstrates that ‘retelling and rewriting’ of complainants’ legal narratives constitutes translation. The police officers’ (hereafter referred to as transpreters) exercise of translating such narratives from isiXhosa (ST) into English (TT) is quite essential in the administration of justice in a multilingual and multicultural environment such as South Africa, and specifically in the South African Police Service. The challenge (amongst others) in the current system is that traspreters are neither accredited nor posses the necessary credentials to perform this fundamental role and function. The key objectives of this study were investigated by means of scientific papers – both publishable and published as book chapters as well as journal articles in both international and accredited journals.
    [Show full text]
  • A Utopian Journey in Turkish: from Non-Translation to Retranslation Ceyda Elgül Boğaziçi University 2011
    A UTOPIAN JOURNEY IN TURKISH: FROM NON-TRANSLATION TO RETRANSLATION CEYDA ELGÜL BOĞAZİÇİ UNIVERSITY 2011 A UTOPIAN JOURNEY IN TURKISH: FROM NON-TRANSLATION TO RETRANSLATION Thesis submitted to the Institute for Graduate Studies in the Social Sciences in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Translation by Ceyda Elgül Boğaziçi University 2011 Thesis Abstract Ceyda Elgül, “A Utopian Journey in Turkish: From Non-Translation to Retranslation” This study explores the role of translation in the evolution of new contexts for foreign works. It classifies non-translation, initial translation and retranslation as the three existential forms in which translation appears and proposes that each of these forms attributes the foreign work a different translational context. Benefiting from the favorable grounds provided by the journey of Thomas More’s Utopia in the Turkish literary system, this diachronic study embraces the pre- and post-translation periods synchronously with the period in which the translation first appeared.The study firstly investigates Utopia in the Turkish literary system as a work that appeared in the form of non-translation in the period between the Tanzimat and 1964 and questions what type of a culture repertoire this non-translation contributed to. Then, it focuses on the initial translation and seeks a position for this first translation in the context of the 1960s, referring to the social dynamics of the period in which the translation first appeared after a long phase of resistance. Here, the study touches on the agency factor and explores the historical significance of the first translation in relation to the external factors that concern the agents of the translation.
    [Show full text]
  • Anthropology and Folklore Studies in India: an Overview
    International Journal of Science and Research (IJSR) ISSN: 2319-7064 ResearchGate Impact Factor (2018): 0.28 | SJIF (2019): 7.583 Anthropology and Folklore Studies in India: An Overview Kundan Ghosh1, Pinaki Dey Mullick2 1Assistant Professor, Department of Anthropology, Mahishadal Girls‟ College, Rangibasan, Purba Medinipur, West Bengal, India 2Assistant Professor, Department of Anthropology, Haldia Government College, Haldia, Purba Medinipur, West Bengal, India Abstract: Anthropology has a long tradition of folklore studies. Anthropologist studied both the aspect of folklore i.e. life and lore. Folklore became a popular medium in anthropological studies and using emic approach researchers try to find out the inner meaning of different aspects of culture. This paper focused on the major approaches of the study of Anthropology and Folklore. It is an attempt to classify different phases of Anthropology of Folklore studies in India and understand the historical development of Anthropology of Folklore studies in India. It is observed that, both theoretical and methodological approaches were changed with the time and new branches are emerged with different dimensions. Keywords: Folklore, emic approach, lore, Anthropology of Folklore, culture. 1. Introduction closure term „folklore‟. Folklore includes both verbal and non-verbal forms. Oral literature, however, is usually Of the four branches of Anthropology, Cultural includes verbal folklore only and does not include games Anthropology is most closely associated with folklore and dances. Different cultures have different categories of (Bascom, 1953). The term folklore was coined by W. J. folk literature. Dundes is of the opinion that contemporary Thoms in the year 1846 and was used by him in the study of oral literature tends to see folklore as a reflection of magazine entitled The Athenaenum of London.
    [Show full text]
  • The Application of Functional Theory in Advertisement Translation
    Sino-US English Teaching, January 2021, Vol. 18, No. 1, 13-16 doi:10.17265/1539-8072/2021.01.003 D DAVID PUBLISHING The Application of Functional Theory in Advertisement Translation TAN Huining Zhoukou Normal University, Zhoukou, China Functional theory provides a theoretical basis for applied translation. In order to realize the inductive function of advertisement translation, this paper, based on the differences between Chinese and English advertisement texts in terms of genre conventions, puts forward some methods of advertisement translation from the perspective of function in view of cultural exclusive items and cultural default. As for the different genre conventions between English and Chinese advertisements and the phenomenon of cultural specific and cultural default, the author suggests strategies from the functionalist approach. Keywords: appellative function, genre convention, translation of advertisements The functionalist translation theory holds that the reference frame of the translator in the whole process of translation should not be the original text and its functions, but one or more communicative functions expected to be achieved by the target language in the cultural environment of the target language, and various translation strategies should be flexibly adopted according to the norms of the target language culture. Therefore, due to the objective language and cultural barriers, translation cannot be carried out smoothly (Zhang & Wang, 2005， p. 106). Skopos rule means that translation behavior depends on the purpose of translation, and the result determines the method. Because the occurrence of any behavior has a certain cultural background and different cultures have different customs and values, translation is not a one-to-one language conversion activity.
    [Show full text]