MD-83 Clips Approach Lights on Departure Errors, Omissions Affected the Flight Crew’S Takeoff Calculations
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ONRecord MD-83 Clips Approach Lights on Departure Errors, omissions affected the flight crew’s takeoff calculations. BY MARK LACAGNINA The following information provides an aware- commander, 38, had 9,260 flight hours, includ- ness of problems in the hope that they can be ing 8,160 hours in type. The copilot, 32, had avoided in the future. The information is based 2,060 flight hours, including 1,820 hours in type. on final reports by official investigative authori- Night visual meteorological conditions (VMC) ties on aircraft accidents and incidents. prevailed for the departure. The weather condi- tions were the same that the crew had experienced JETS an hour earlier, when they landed the aircraft on Runway 12 at Åre/Östersund while complet- ‘Pressured by the Production Target’ ing the positioning flight from Antalya. Surface McDonnell Douglas MD-83. No damage. No injuries. winds from 130 degrees at 8 kt favored takeoff he flight crew’s emphasis on “production” — from Runway 12, but the crew planned to depart getting the job done — influenced takeoff in the opposite direction, from Runway 30, which Tperformance calculations that failed to show provided “a more favorable climb-out profile from the aircraft was too heavy to depart safely from a performance point of view, as there were no ob- the chosen runway, said an incident report pub- stacles in the climb-out direction,” the report said. lished recently by the Swedish Accident Investi- However, the crew did not correct their gation Board (SHK). takeoff performance calculations to account for The MD-83 lifted off near the end of the the 8-kt tail wind that resulted from their choice runway and struck several approach lights while of Runway 30. The takeoff performance calcula- struggling to become airborne. None of the 169 tions and the weight-and-balance calculations passengers and six crewmembers was injured, were performed by the copilot and checked by and there was no damage to the aircraft, accord- the commander. “The copilot stated that he — ing to the report. without remembering why — had used zero The incident, classified as “very serious” by wind as a base value when he was calculating SHK, occurred the night of Sept. 9, 2007, during the various takeoff alternatives,” the report said. departure for a charter flight from Åre/Östersund Investigators found several discrepancies (Sweden) Airport to Antalya, Turkey. The charter in the crew’s calculation of the MD-83’s takeoff flight had been arranged by a Swedish travel weight. The load sheet prepared by the crew agency and contracted to a Turkish charter airline, indicated that the takeoff weight was slightly be- which in turn had entered an agreement with an low the 155,620-lb (70,589-kg) limit for takeoff Austrian company to lease the aircraft and crew. from Runway 30 under the existing conditions. The contract flight crew, former employees However, investigators’ calculations showed that of the Turkish airline, held Turkish pilot certifi- the aircraft’s actual takeoff weight was 6,940 lb cates that had been validated by Austria. The (3,148 kg) greater than the limit. WWW.FLIGHTSAFETY.ORG | AEROSAFETYWORLD | NOVEMBER 2009 | 57 ONRECORD Among the discrepancies on the load sheet master warning sounded and a message on the was the omission of 29 bags in the forward cargo electronic centralized aircraft monitor (ECAM) compartment. The report said that the most indicated a discrepancy with the no. 2 engine’s significant consequence of this omission was the exhaust gas temperature (EGT). miscalculation of the aircraft’s center of gravity “The copilot continued to fly the aircraft on au- — and, thus, the required horizontal stabilizer topilot while the commander reviewed the ECAM and flap settings. checklist action items,” said the report by the U.K. The crew used the full length of the runway Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB). — 2,500 m (8,202 ft) — for takeoff, applying full Shortly after generating the first caution power before releasing the brakes. Both pilots told message, the ECAM warned that the no. 2 en- investigators that the MD-83 seemed to acceler- gine EGT was above the limit. “The action items ate normally. The commander said that he rotated for this condition required the no. 2 (right) the aircraft slowly to avoid a tail strike and that the engine thrust lever to be moved to idle and the aircraft felt “nose-heavy” during rotation — a con- engine to be shut down,” the report said. “The sequence of mis-setting the horizontal stabilizer. commander retarded the thrust lever and was “Neither the crew “Data from the flight recorder showed that considering the implications of shutting down nor air traffic control the aircraft rotated at about two degrees per the engine when the ‘ENG 1 EGT OVER LIMIT’ second, against the recommended rate of about caution message appeared.” reported anything three degrees per second,” the report said. The The displayed engine parameters, however, data also showed that the main landing gear were normal. The commander concluded that abnormal during lifted off the runway 30 m (98 ft) from the the warnings likely were false, and he restored the takeoff.” departure threshold and crossed the end of the cruise power on the no. 2 engine. runway at a height of less than 30 cm (12 in). Meanwhile, the aural master warning “Neither the crew nor air traffic control continued to be generated about four times a reported anything abnormal during the takeoff, minute. The normal indications on the pilots’ and the flight continued as planned to Antalya,” primary flight displays and navigation displays the report said. “Afterward, it was established were replaced with messages similar to those that that the aircraft had collided with the approach appear during alignment of the inertial reference lights for the opposite runway. Damage had systems. Other messages appeared, as well, warn- been made to lights and reflective poles up to a ing the crew to use manual pitch trim only and to distance of 85 m [279 ft] from the runway end.” check the aircraft’s attitude, for example. The report said that, when planning the The commander informed air traffic control departure, the crew likely knew that some (ATC) of the situation, declared an emergency passengers and/or baggage would have had to and requested direct routing to London Stansted be offloaded to meet weight limits and perfor- Airport, which had better weather conditions mance requirements but were “pressured by the and longer runways than Liverpool. production target — the ambition to take all the The controller advised the crew that Runway passengers and baggage — in the belief that the 23 was in use at Stansted, and the commander deviations would not have any consequences in programmed the flight management system terms of the takeoff.” (FMS) for the approach to that runway. After being handed off to another controller, however, Spurious Warnings Plague Flight Crew the crew was told that Runway 05 was active. Airbus A319-111. No damage. No injuries. The requirement to reprogram the FMS added n route with 78 passengers from Barcelona, to the commander’s workload at a critical time, Spain, to Liverpool, England, the afternoon the report said. Eof Feb. 6, 2007, the A319 was crossing “The ECAM continued to produce various the southern coast of England when an aural cautions and associated aural tones throughout 58 | FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | AEROSAFETYWORLD | NOVEMBER 2009 ONRECORD the rest of the flight, too frequently to be read, Deflated Strut Causes Nose Gear to Jam acted upon or canceled,” the report said. “The Bombardier Challenger 601. Substantial damage. No injuries. commander briefed the senior cabin crewmem- he flight crew was completing an emergency ber and informed the passengers of the inten- medical services flight to Québec City/Jean tion to divert, a task complicated by the frequent TLesage International Airport the morning of sounding of aural tones.” March 20, 2008, when they received visual and au- The copilot armed the autopilot approach ral warnings that the nose gear had not extended. mode while flying an assigned heading to “The flight crew did a low fly-pass, and the intercept the instrument landing system (ILS) tower controller and an aircraft maintenance final approach course. However, the commander engineer confirmed the nose gear anomaly,” determined that the aircraft would overshoot said the report by the Transportation Safety the extended runway centerline. He took control Board of Canada. The gravel deflectors and hand flew the final approach and landing The crew conducted the appropriate check- without further incident. “The commander lists and made three unsuccessful attempts had jammed inside the commented that the aircraft flew normally un- to correct the problem using the normal and der manual control,” the report said. emergency landing gear extension procedures. wheel well, preventing Investigators examined engine trend- The crew then prepared the six passengers — gear extension. monitoring data recorded before the incident three patients, a physician and two nurses — for and found no sign of a developing engine prob- landing with the nose gear retracted. lem. Data recorded during the incident flight VMC prevailed at the airport when the crew showed no engine faults. These findings con- landed the aircraft. “Damage was limited to the firmed that the warnings generated during the nose landing gear doors and the nose landing incident flight were false. gear well structure,” the report said. Extensive testing of the A319’s electronic Investigators determined that the gear- instrument system (EIS) pointed to an inter- extension problem was related to a modification mittent fault in one of the display management of the Challenger for operation on unpaved computers (DMCs) as the likely cause of the runways.