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Britain's Native Agents in Arabia and Persia in the Nineteenth Century1

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Britain's Native Agents in Arabia and Persia in the Nineteenth Century1 Britain’s Native Agents in Arabia and Persia in the Nineteenth Century1 JAMES ONLEY This paper examines British imperial involvement in Native Agent Indian 1810–40 the Gulf region. It analyzes the infrastructure that en- Native Agent Arab, Persian 1843–61, 1866–7 abled Britain’s Political Resident in the Gulf and his Bushire, Gulf Residency HQ (Persia): Native Resident Persian 1798–1803 small cadre of British officers to manage political rela- Munshis (1–2) Arab, Persian 1822–1946 tions with dozens of rulers and governors in Eastern Native Assistant Indian 1882–99 Arabia and Southern Persia, to maintain the Pax Britan- Shiraz (Persia): nica on the waters of the Gulf, and to protect British Native Agent Indian 1800?–1903 interests throughout the region. This analysis reveals a Bahrain (Arabia): significant difference between the traditional view of Native Agent Indian 1816?–34 Britain’s informal empire in the Gulf and the reality of Native Agent Persian, Arab 1834–1900 Qatif (Arabia): how it actually functioned during the nineteenth century. Native Agent Arab 1820?–3 The secret to the Gulf Residency’s effectiveness was Mughu (Persia): the extent to which its infrastructure worked within the Native Agent Arab 1823–30 indigenous political systems of the Gulf. Arab rulers in Sharjah (Arabia): need of protection collaborated with the Resident to Native Agent Arab, Persian 1823–1949 maintain the Pax Britannica, while influential men from Lingah (Persia): affluent Arab, Persian, and Indian merchant families Native Agent Arab, Persian 1830–1910 served as the Resident’s “native agents” in over half of Kirmanshah (Persia): Native Agent Arab 1840s?–1903 the political posts within the Gulf Residency. The result Basidu (Persia): was a collaborative power triangle between the Resident, Slave Agent Arab 1860–74 his native agents, and the rulers that sustained Britain’s Native Agent Indian 1872–82 informal empire in the Gulf during the nineteenth cen- Coal Agent Arab 1872?–1911 tury. This paper employs a neutral definition of col- Gwadar (an Omani enclave in Pakistan): laboration: either ‘working with another’ in the case of Native Agent Indian 1879–1951 ruler–Resident and ruler–agent relations, or ‘working for Consular Agent Indian 1952–8 another’ in the case of agent–Resident relations.2 Kuwait (Arabia): Examining two of the three sets of relations within Native Agent Arab 1899–1904 Native Agent Indian 1905 this collaborative triangle — those of agent–Resident and agent–ruler — the paper shows how the Resident was able to effectively employ affluent Gulf merchants Until now, these agents have gone largely unnoticed in as his political agents throughout the region. Table 1 the history of the Gulf.3 To correct this imbalance in illustrates how extensive Britain’s employment of native the historiography, this paper draws upon the private agents was: papers of four native agents and interviews with the descendants of three native agents: Table 1: Britain’s native agents in Arabia and Persia 4 LOCATION / OFFICE IDENTITY DATES Table 2: Private paper collections in Bahrain Kirman (Persia): PRIVATE PAPERS OF / POSTS HELD Native Agent Persian, Arab c.1720s, 1840s?–94 Hajji Mirza Muhammad ‘Ali Safar (1778–1845): Muscat (Arabia): British Agent in Bahrain, 1834–42 Native Broker Indian c.1758–1800 Hajji ‘Abd al-Nabi Khan Safar (c.1803–84): © Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, 24:1 (2004) 130 Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, 24:1 (2004) British Munshi (Political Assistant) in Bushire, 1850s–71 In order for empire to be affordable and sustainable for British Agent in Bahrain, 1872–84 the imperial metropoles, costs had to be either reduced Agha Muhammad Rahim Safar (c.1830s–1900): British Munshi in Bushire, 1860s–93 or passed on to the colonized. Most European powers British Agent in Bahrain, 1893–1900 maintained a policy that, “if empire could not be had on Agha Muhammad Khalil Sharif (c.1870–1940): the cheap, it was not worth having at all.”6 Because im- Deputy British Agent in Bahrain, 1893–1900 perial governments were reluctant to commit metro- British Munshi in Bushire, 1900–4 politan resources to their empires, European proconsuls British Munshi in Kuwait, 1904–9 British Dragoman (Head Munshi) in Bushire, 1909–24 such as the Gulf Resident had fairly limited means with which to operate.7 They had relatively small military Table 3: Oral histories in Bahrain forces at their disposal and imperial governments were ORAL HISTORIES OF / POSTS HELD reluctant to send reinforcements, the need for which was regarded as a sign of administrative incompetence. Hajji Ibrahim bin Rajab (c.1820s/30s–?): Bahrain Agent in Bahrain, 1862–4 Coercion was expensive and regarded as counter- Hajji Mirza Ahmad Khan Safar (c.1820s/30s–91): productive, except in case of emergencies.8 The less British Munshi (Political Assistant) in Bushire, 1857–72 proconsuls interfered with traditional authority and in- Deputy British Agent in Bahrain, 1872–84 stitutions, therefore, the safer they were.9 The scarcer British Agent in Bahrain, 1884–91 the imperial resources and the less formal the imperial Agha Muhammad Khalil Sharif (c.1870–1940): Deputy British Agent in Bahrain, 1893–1900 arrangements, the more the proconsuls had to work British Munshi in Bushire, 1900–4 within indigenous political systems to achieve imperial British Munshi in Kuwait, 1904–9 ends, and the more they depended upon local interme- British Dragoman (Head Munshi) in Bushire, 1909–24 diaries. Robinson argues that the form and extent of imperi- Native agents not only had an extensive knowledge of alism was determined as much by non-European col- local cultures, languages, and politics, which anyone re- laboration and resistance as it was by European activity cruited from outside the Gulf could not possibly pos- and Europe’s political economy. He sees it as a “politi- sess, but also could obtain, through their family, social, cal reflex action” between two European and one non- and business networks, the intelligence the British European components: (1) the economic drive to inte- needed to operate their informal empire in the Gulf. As grate newly colonized regions into the industrial econ- wealthy merchants, these agents also enjoyed consider- omy as markets and investments; (2) “the strategic im- able influence with local rulers and governors. The perative to secure them against rivals in world power contacts and influence of the agents enabled the Gulf politics”; and (3) “indigenous collaboration and resis- Resident to tap into local political systems to an extent tance.”10 Much of imperial historiography is unbal- that would have been otherwise impossible, while at the anced, he believes, because it has traditionally focused same time the British connection allowed the agents to on only the first two components. By giving full recog- increase their wealth and their political influence. These nition to the non-European elements of imperialism, native agents played a crucial role in Arabia and Persia: Robinson aims to replace the traditional Euro-centric without them, the British would have been unable to (metropole) view with an ex-centric (peripheral, non- maintain the Pax Britannica in the Gulf in the nine- metropole) approach. Imperialism’s controlling mecha- teenth century. nism, he explains, was made up of relationships be- tween the European agents of external expansion on Robinson’s theory of collaboration the one hand, and indigenous agents of internal col- Britain’s employment of native agents is best ex- laboration on the other.11 Without the voluntary or en- plained by Ronald Robinson’s theory of indigenous forced collaboration of the élites within a local indige- collaboration.5 More than thirty years after its first pub- nous society, “economic resources could not be lication in 1972, this ground-breaking theory is still the transferred, strategic interests protected, or xenophobic most comprehensive explanation of how European im- reaction and resistance contained.”12 It was the collabo- perialism worked on the ground. Robinson uses the ration and mediation of indigenous élites in the invaded word ‘collaboration’ in its original, neutral meaning of countries themselves that provided the imperial admini- ‘working jointly with another’, as it is used in this paper. strations with their military and administrative muscle. His intention is to explain the non-European founda- Imperialism’s central mechanism was the system of tions of European imperialism, not to imply a value collaboration established locally to integrate imperial judgement. interests with indigenous politics, achieving a balance Robinson explains how Europeans in imperial bu- between the two.13 reaucracies and supporting institutions overseas were Imperial actors and historians have downplayed the expensive for the European imperial powers to employ. extent to which imperialism depended upon the work of - Onley: Britain’s Native Agents 131 local collaborators. In the case of South Asia, for ex- protection for themselves, their businesses, and their ample, British India has been portrayed as an empire families, members of merchant families frequently allied run by Britons, rather than an empire run by Indians for themselves with European governments or companies Britons14 — a type of misportrayal Robinson calls the by working as “native agents” or “native assistants” “grand illusion.”15 The more limited an imperial (munshis). When referring to these agents, the Europe- power’s resources, the more extensive its dependence on ans used “native” to indicate that they were indigenous indigenous collaboration and mediation. In the Gulf to the general region and were, therefore, non- region, the British were so light on the ground that they European.22 Today, native agents are known as honor- had no alternative but to rely heavily on native political ary consuls, but their role is now confined, for the most agents. Yet this reliance is not reflected in Gulf histori- part, to non-political duties.23 The British employed ography.
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