Persian Gulf States

1390_A8-A13 11/4/08 5:11 PM Page 226 330-383/B428-S/40005 Persian Gulf States 72. Memorandum of Conversation1 Washington, March 11, 1969. SUBJECT US–UK Talks—Persian Gulf PARTICIPANTS (Morning Session) UK US John Freeman—British Ambassador Joseph J. Sisco—Asst. Secretary, Geoffrey Arthur—Asst. Under Secretary, NEA Foreign Office Richard Pedersen—Counselor Sir Leslie Glass—Ambassador, Deputy Ambassador William Buffum— Permanent Rep., UKUN USUN Edward Tomkins—Minister, UK Embassy Rodger P. Davies—Deputy Asst. John Thomson—Counselor, Foreign Secretary, NEA Office Harold Saunders—White House Michael Wilford—Counselor, UK Elizabeth Brown—IO/UNP Embassy William Brewer—NEA/ARP Alan Urwick—First Secretary, UK Theodore Eliot—NEA/IRN Embassy Arthur Day—IO/UNP Stephen Egerton—First Secretary, John Gatch—NEA/ARP UK Embassy Mr. Arthur said that there was such a short time left during the morning session to discuss the Persian Gulf that he was prepared to come back in the afternoon with whomever was interested and con- sider the rest of the agenda. Mr. Sisco said he was extremely sorry that he could not come back in the afternoon but asked Mr. Arthur to give him a succinct statement on the Persian Gulf, which Mr. Arthur could expand on in the afternoon session. Mr. Arthur said he would be glad to do this, noting that the UK had only three specific questions it wanted to have answers to. These concerned: 1) US plans for MIDEASTFOR; 2) US views on Saudi policy; and 3) US plans for diplomatic representation in the Gulf. Mr. Arthur then said that the important thing to remember about the Persian Gulf is that it is the dividing line between the Persians and 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL UK–US. Secret; No- forn. Drafted by Gatch on March 17. Sisco provided Rogers a brief account of this conversation in a March 17 memorandum. (Ibid.) 226 1390_A14-A23 11/4/08 5:13 PM Page 227 330-383/B428-S/40005 Persian Gulf States 227 the Arabs. The British have been there in some force for 100 years and have, in effect, frozen the situation at minimum cost. By the end of 1971 the British will have gone and there will be a serious danger of a confrontation between the Arabs and the Iranians. The main problem lies not on the mainlands of either side but is represented by the islands in the Gulf—Bahrain and the other smaller islands. Mr. Arthur said that if we can settle the problem of Bahrain, we can avoid a confrontation between the Arabs and the Iranians that could prove disas- trous. Also, if we can settle the Bahrain question, the question of the other islands would be much easier to dispose of. The main British aim is to do what we can to avoid an Arab/Persian confrontation. The British believe the Soviets will not be able to penetrate the Gulf effec- tively if the Bahrain question is solved, because such a solution would foster Iranian cooperation with the Arab side and this cooperation would be an effective block to Soviet efforts. Otherwise, the Soviets would be able to play both sides of the Gulf and undoubtedly would be able to establish a position of some influence on the Arab side. Mr. Sisco asked what the British can do to ensure that a settlement of Bahrain is reached prior to 1972. Mr. Arthur replied that the UK could not “produce” either side. He noted the Shah’s previous insistence on a plebiscite2 and British and Bahraini views of the dangers of a plebiscite. Mr. Sisco asked how a plebiscite would come out. Mr. Arthur said that perhaps a bit of background was necessary here. He said that the Shah does not really want Bahrain—it has a stagnant econ- omy with small and diminishing oil resources. But the Shah regards Bahrain as a “jewel in his crown,” and he doesn’t feel he can give it up unless a way is found to save Iranian face. His first thought had been a plebiscite in which Bahrainis were simply asked whether they wanted to be a part of Iran or not. The British had discussed this with the Bahrainis who rejected it, as indeed had the Kuwaitis3 and as indeed would all Arabs. This rejection is based on both formal and practical grounds. The formal grounds are that, for the Ruler of Bahrain to al- low a plebiscite, would be to admit that the Iranian claim had some validity. The practical grounds are that the social fabric of Bahrain is very fragile, made up as it is of about half Sunni and half Shia Moslems, between whom feeling often runs high. To hold a plebiscite would undoubtedly cause serious intercommunal disturbances in Bahrain. More- over, Bahrain has never had any representative body in its history. A 2 Apparently a reference to a statement by the Shah at a January 4 press conference in New Delhi. 3 In airgram A–047 from Kuwait, March 18, Ambassador Cottam stated that the Amir of Kuwait, Sheikh Sabah, believed a plebiscite was not a good alternative and that perhaps the UN was a better one. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL KUW–US) 1390_A14-A23 11/4/08 5:13 PM Page 228 330-383/B428-S/40005 228 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XXIV serious security situation could arise if a plebiscite were held. Added to this is the fact that the al-Khalifa ruling family is not basically strong. Mr. Arthur went on to say that the Shah had backed away from his insistence on a plebiscite, and efforts involving the UK, Kuwait, Bahrain and Iran but not Saudi Arabia have been going on to find some other solution. One thing that has been suggested is to involve the UN, through the SYG, and appoint a representative to ascertain the wishes of the people of Bahrain. The real crunch, according to Mr. Arthur, is that the manner in which this representative would ascertain such wishes would have to be acceptable both to the Shah and to Shaikh ‘Isa, the Ruler of Bahrain. Mr. Arthur said that, before the Shah went on his skiing vacation, this approach (through the SYG) had appeared to be pretty much on the rails but, during the Shah’s absence, both Af- shar in Tehran and Vakil4 in the UN had taken some backward steps, at least in the UK view. They both had talked about taking the Bahrain issue directly to the Security Council, a procedure which the British opposed. Mr. Arthur noted the British were very gratified for the line taken by Secretary Rogers and Deputy Assistant Secretary Rockwell with Iranian Ambassador Ansary when the latter had raised this pos- sibility here.5 Mr. Arthur said that the British had not seen the Shah since his return from Switzerland on March 6 and had hoped that the Bahrain issue could be discussed before the Oil Consortium issue. The British are afraid of interaction between these two problems. Mr. Arthur charac- terized the position at present as not too bad, with the “crunch” not yet reached. The UK realizes that it is going to have to exert pressure on Shaikh ‘Isa, even to persuade him to accept a representative from the SYG to ascertain Bahraini wishes. Mr. Sisco asked whether a conference of all groups on Bahrain could not be convened to express such wishes. Mr. Arthur said that such a conference would be accused by unfriendly elements as being an instrument either for the Bahrain ruling family or for the British and would not be regarded as representative. 4 Amir Aslan Afshar, Iranian Representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna (and future Iranian Ambassador to the United States), and Mehdi Vakil, Iranian Representative to the UN General Assembly. 5 Telegram 28291 to Tehran, February 22, relayed the information that Iran might take the Bahrain issue to the UN. Iranian Ambassador Ansary also asked for U.S. sup- port in whatever steps Iran might take to solve the dispute. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 33 PERSIAN GULF) The State Department informed Middle Eastern posts: “Now that Iran has involved us directly by reason Ansary’s approach (State 28291), we informed UK we believed time had come put our principal officers in field more fully in picture.” (Telegram 29573 to Jidda, February 25; ibid.) 1390_A14-A23 11/4/08 5:13 PM Page 229 330-383/B428-S/40005 Persian Gulf States 229 Mr. Eliot asked Mr. Arthur to elaborate on the relationship between the Bahrain problem and the problem of the other islands—i.e. the Tunbs and Abu Musa. Mr. Arthur said these islands had historically been pirate islands used by the Qawassim. The Qawassim still are in control in Ras al-Khaimah and Sharjah. As far as he knew, Iranians have had nothing on the islands, at least in recent times. Nonetheless, the UK presently regarded Iranian claims to these islands as having more validity than the Iranian claim to Bahrain, although of course they could not admit this to the Iranians. In fact, last summer the British, as we knew, had been trying to arrange a package deal under which the Iranians would give up their claim to Bahrain in return for the Tunbs Islands, as part of a median line settlement. Iran had finally said no. Iran had subsequently been negotiating with Ras al-Khaimah about the Tunbs.

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