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REPORT: WESTERN BALKANS IN 2020
Elections in Serbia, Croatia, North Macedonia and Montenegro
Žiga Faktor, Jana Juzová
Contents
Foreword (by Christian Kvorning Lassen) ...... 2
2020 Serbian elections: State capture in the daylight ...... 3
Parliamentary elections in Croatia: Another dominant performance of HDZ as the opposition struggles to address critical weaknesses that shackle further progress of Croatia ...... 8 2020 North Macedonia elections: The country’s European future hanging by a thread ...... 13
Parliamentary elections in Montenegro: The first transition of power ...... 18
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Foreword Member States – do not offer a credible path towards actual membership. Despite monumental challenges such as climate change, the pandemic and Rule of Law violations, To say 2020 was an eventful year seems inadequate; the losing the Western Balkans to foreign influences, such as COVID-19 pandemic and the chaos it has wrought will China and Russia, would present another challenge further forever define this year. This holds true in the Western down the road. Balkans as well, yet 2020 was also a year in which political upheaval – in some cases hopefully for the better, in other In this report, EUROPEUM’s two researchers – Jana Juzová cases possibly less so – began manifesting on a wider scale. and Žiga Faktor – analyze each of the four elections from Four elections – Serbian, North Macedonian, Montenegrin these perspectives in four policy papers, offering succinct and Croatian – were held in the shadow of the pandemic, dissections of the elections themselves, as well as what they yielding a mixture of novel political constellations and portend for the future of the region and the EU’s consolidation of old. For the three countries aspiring to enlargement policy. Based on their analyses, they offer European membership, the elections were vital indicators policy recommendations designed to strengthen the EU not only for their respective future paths, but also for the enlargement policy in a tailor-made approach rather than EU Enlargement policy; for years the Enlargement policy the hitherto “one size fits all”-approach that has proven has stagnated or even deteriorated, making newfound dysfunctional not only from the perspective of future momentum from political upheaval all the more crucial for enlargement, but also retrospectively during the last the region. enlargement wave in 2004.
It is an enduring testament to the EU’s strength that The enlargement policy may be seen as marginalized today, membership is still the fulcrum around which these yet the enlargement policy is not solely a policy of countries’ reforms revolve. For decades, the EU was steadily enlargement; it is a window into the state of the EU, as well enlarging, owing to the shared history, vision and prosperity as the soul of Europe itself. It is therefore my pleasure to that was recognized as our shared European fate. Over the invite interested readers to read more about the 2020 past decade, this image has been marred by crises, argued developments in the Western Balkans, offering both by some to be the result of growing too large and unwieldy valuable insights about the region itself, and an opportunity to be able to respond effectively to crises. Another aspect, to thoughtfully consider what role the EU and Europe should of course, is the deteriorating state of democracy within play in a changing world marred by instability and upheaval. some EU Member States, most notably recent members Poland and Hungary. The politicization of politics have Christian Kvorning Lassen, Deputy Director of EUROPEUM widened the gulf between people and policies, latest Institute for European Policy exemplified in the EU budget debacle. Policy has in many ways become structured around crisis management and short-term gains, and less around strength in diversity and long-term visions.
None feel this more than the Western Balkans. As the appetite for enlargement has waned amongst many EU Member States, so has the EU’s attractiveness to the political elites in the Western Balkans, often entrenched and corrupt. Yet the populations’ desire for a European future remains unabated, and while some countries have backslid, others show promise. Yet their hope and progress will turn to disappointment and regression if the EU – or rather, EU
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2020 Serbian elections: State capture The 2020 elections as the result of a long-term decay of democracy in the daylight The political regime in Serbia is by some experts classified 2 The 2020 Serbian parliamentary elections were the most as a “competitive authoritarian” regime , a regime in which controversial since the fall of the Milošević’s authoritarian a political plurality exists and multi-party elections take regime. The elections were highly uncompetitive with the place but the entire system is rigged in favour of the ruling governing coalition and mainly the dominant Serbian elites. Apart from the widespread corruption and Progressive Party (SNS) enjoying a strongly advantaged dysfunctional democratic institutions, the freedom of media position, due to the party’s control over mainstream media, is under attack continuously for several years, with most of general ban on rallies amid the coronavirus pandemic, and the media being controlled either by the government or the abuse of public resources and political positions for pre- SNS, the SNS regularly uses its majority in the parliament election campaigning, and majority of the opposition to block discussions of legislative proposals and the boycotting the elections. discourse around critics of the government from the opposition, civil society or independent media is framed in Overall, the elections took place in a highly polarized a very inflammatory rhetoric bordering hate speech.3 The atmosphere and heightened tensions after anti-government problematic conduct of this year’s elections was just a protests organized by civil society and political opposition in product of the long-term decline of democracy in Serbia. In the late 2018 and early 2019. The main cause of the the Freedom House report ‘Nations in Transit’ from 2020, protests was the undemocratic and illiberal rule of the SNS- Serbia has received the lowest democracy score since led government and the regular attacks on opposition 2001. 4 Furthermore, the annual scores show that ever politicians, civil society and independent media from the since the SNS came to power in 2012, and especially after government officials as well as from the mainstream – Aleksandar Vučić became the Prime Minister in 2014, the government-controlled – media. The protests were sparked state of democracy in the country has been steadily by the physical assault on a small opposition party leader, worsening.5 Borko Stefanović, which the opposition claimed the President Aleksandar Vučić, leader of the SNS, to be The increasing authoritarian tendencies of the current SNS- involved in.1 The most visible political actor in the protests led regime resulted not only into a general dissatisfaction was the Alliance for Serbia, a joint bloc of very diverse with the lacking democratic governance, rule of law and opposition political parties – the Democratic Party, the respect for fundamental rights in Serbia but also into the People’s Party, the Party of Freedom and Justice, and Dveri. massive protests of 2019. The elections, originally The common denominator of the parties ranging from the announced for 26 April 2020 but postponed until 21 June centre-left to right-wing nationalists was the opposition to 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic, were to take place in the government, demands for fair and free elections and for conditions which would be far from fair and equal. The restoration of the rule of law. governing coalition and mainly the SNS, whose leader Aleksandar Vučić holds the Presidential office despite international recommendations against this double function,
1 Thousands protest in Serbia over attack on opposition politician, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2019/637 Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-serbia-protests- 944/EPRS_BRI(2019)637944_EN.pdf. idUSKBN1O70S7. 4 Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2020 – Serbia, 2 Florian Bieber (2018) Patterns of competitive authoritarianism in https://freedomhouse.org/country/serbia/nations-transit/2020. the Western Balkans, East European Politics, 34:3, 337-354. 5 Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2020: Dropping the 3 European Parliamentary Research Service, Serbia at risk of Democratic Facade, Freedom House Index, p. 25, authoritarianism?, https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2020- 04/05062020_FH_NIT2020_vfinal.pdf.
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used the advantaged position to promote the government the SNS politicians was crucial especially in the context of policies and gain support from the voters. The mainstream the state of emergency when political rallies were banned media provided highly incomparable space to the ruling and opposition parties therefore could not approach the parties and the tone of the reporting on the government public as the officials could. There were also accusations of and the opposition was very imbalanced. Local NGOs’ abuse of public resources for campaigns by ruling parties’ monitoring showed that during the campaign period before officials, further favouring the government parties in the the original date of the elections the ruling parties had a elections. Furthermore, there were suspicions raised about representation of 91% of the time on national television an outdated electoral roll and pressure on voters, especially programs.6 During the introduced state of emergency in those employed in the public sector.10 Serbia, in a period before the postponed elections, it was expected that the government parties would appear in the media more. However, the monitoring showed that Vučić, The unsuccessful mediation and the way towards a the leader of the SNS, appeared on the television channels comprehensive dialogue with national coverage and cable television N1 147 times more than the most covered opposition politician, Dragan After the demands from the protesters and opposition Đilas, the leader of the Freedom and Justice Party. 7 towards the Serbian government for providing for a fair and Additional research showed that Aleksandar Vučić was by free elections remained unaddressed, the frustrated far the most dominant actor also in national and regional opposition parties decided to withdraw from the elections. newspapers, appearing in over 80 % of the cases in a The boycott was the last option how to draw the attention positive context. On the other hand, Dragan Đilas, as the of the foreign stakeholders, namely the EU, to the situation second most covered politician, appeared in 90 % in a in Serbia and at least to undermine the legitimacy of the negative context (and in coverage of one third of that of elections. The European Parliament representatives got Aleksandar Vučić).8 engaged with the ruling and opposition parties in an attempt to find a solution allowing the opposition parties to The position of Aleksandar Vučić was in general problematic run in the elections. The most visible and intensive efforts – while he was not officially a candidate in the elections, the were demonstrated by S&D MEP Tanja Fajon and EPP MEP entire SNS campaign revolved around his personality and Vladimír Bilčík, who were facilitating the dialogue between used his popularity to promote the party. The President was the government and the opposition in the last months of the key figure in political advertising and his name was used 2019. However, even their efforts were not successful. The also on the candidate list of the SNS as “Aleksandar Vučić – only result from the mediation on the side of the For our Children”. 9 The organizations monitoring the government were abrupt changes to the electoral system in campaign and the elections also noted that there were only 2 months prior to the elections, violating thus the blurred lines between the appearances of the officials as a principles of the Venice Commission. 11 Furthermore, the part of their duty and political campaigning. This visibility of changes did not reflect any of the raised issues and
6 https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/wp- 2/saoptenja/11499-intenzivna-funkcionerska-kampanja-odnela- content/uploads/2020/09/11-Serbian-Election-2020.pdf, p. 5-6, primat-nad-predstavljanjem-izbornih-lista. cited from CRTA: Long-Term Observers Report 25. 5 – 14. 6. 2020, 9 Ibid. p. 8, https://crta.rs/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Izbori-2020- 10 Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, ODIHR Izvestaj-dugorocnih-posmatraca-za-period-25.maj-14.jun- Special Election Assessment Mission Final Report, Republic of CRTA.pdf. Serbia: Parliamentary Elections, 21 June 2020, online at 7 Ibid., cited from BIRODI: Monitoring of prime-time news slots, https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/a/3/466026.pdf. http://www.birodi.rs/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Press-BIRODI- 11 This year’s election in Serbia was the most controversial in the 26.6..pdf. last 20 years, a new report finds, European Western Balkans, 8 Ibid., cited from Transparency Serbia: Intensive public officials’ https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2020/09/02/this-years- campaign overshadows the presentation of the electoral lists, election-in-serbia-was-the-most-controversial-in-the-last-20-years- https://www.transparentnost.org.rs/index.php/sr/aktivnosti- a-new-report-finds/.
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demands, nor were discussed in the dialogue on electoral called the new Serbian parliament a “mockery of democracy” conditions. Most notably, these changes included the and called upon the EU member states to de-facto freeze lowering of the election threshold from 5 to 3 %, enabling the accession negotiations with Serbia until democracy is more small parties to enter the parliament and providing restored in the country. 15 However, once again the thus the illusion of legitimacy to the elections, and allowing European Parliament families’ loyalty came into play. municipal and city administrations (and not only notaries) Despite the context of the elections, the EPP President to verify the signatures of support of citizens needed by the Donald Tusk openly endorsed President Vučić ahead of the parties to participate in the elections. elections and congratulated him afterwards.16 Before the elections, Tusk wrote on his Twitter account: “Dear These hasty and suspicious changes did not ameliorate the President, you have full right to be proud and satisfied with atmosphere between the government and the opposition what you have done for Serbia during your term. Economic and most of the opposition parties thus refrained from success and strong leadership constitute the trademark of running in the elections. The elections saw the lowest your rule. Good luck on Sunday”. 17 The European turnout in Serbia’s parliamentary history12 (48,9 %)13, with Commission carefully took a position in the middle, the SNS winning with over 60 %, followed by their coalition acknowledging the problems related to the elections and partner Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) with 10 %. The only calling upon the new parliament to continue in the EP- other party which entered the parliament thanks to the mediated dialogue but respecting the results.18 lowering of the threshold was the right-wing Serbian Patriotic Alliance, with 3,83 %. The election day itself was Regardless, the legitimacy of the current parliament marked by a record number of irregularities, and in the composition remains challenged and the Serbian leaders are following days also the highest number of annulled results. very well aware of that. Even before the new government Apparently, the violations were generally aimed towards was appointed, President Vučić rushed to announce the new increasing the registered turnout or the result of some parliamentary elections, in April 2022 at the latest.19 This minor parties in order to achieve more plurality in the step is viewed by experts and media not only as an parliament and therefore make the elections seem more opportunity to regain the legitimacy for the SNS rule but legitimate.14 also to strengthen its position and control over institutions, as the elections will be held in the same time as the Despite the attempts of the SNS to achieve at least some Presidential elections and possibly also local elections in the level of democratic impression, the elections received harsh capital Belgrade.20 criticism from international actors, mainly the European Parliament. The S&D group of the European Parliament
12 Serbia’s ruling party just scored a landslide victory. Here’s why 16 Donald Tusk’s Twitter account, the opposition boycotted the election. Washington Post, https://twitter.com/donaldtuskEPP. https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/06/30/serbias- 17 ruling-party-just-scored-landslide-victory-heres-why-opposition- https://twitter.com/donaldtuskEPP/status/1272516480370868224 boycotted-election/. 18 European Commission, Serbia: Joint Statement by High 13 Council of Europe, https://www.coe.int/en/web/electoral- Representative/ Vice-President Josep Borrell and Neighbourhood assistance/elecdata-serbia. and Enlargement Commissioner Olivér Várhelyi on the elections, 14 Serbian Opposition Voices Suspicion About Repeat Election https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2019- Votes, Balkan Insight, 2024/varhelyi/announcements/serbia-joint-statement-high- https://balkaninsight.com/2020/06/26/serbian-opposition-voices- representative-vice-president-josep-borrell-and-neighbourhood- suspicion-about-repeat-election-votes/. and_en. 15 S&Ds: The new Serbian parliament is a mockery of democracy, 19 Vucic Announced New Elections Even Before New Government this has impact on the enlargement process, Constitution, Balkan Insight, https://www.socialistsanddemocrats.eu/newsroom/sds-new- https://balkaninsight.com/2020/10/21/vucic-announced-new- serbian-parliament-mockery-democracy-has-impact-enlargement- elections-even-before-new-government-constitution/. process. 20 Ibid.
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Serbia’s EU accession process: Where do we go from representatives see the SNS and President Vučić as crucial here? for stabilization of the region. Vučić’s high popularity in the country, widespread influence and nationalist background The June parliamentary elections drew the international indicate that he could be the one politician able to gather attention to the failures of Serbia’s parliamentary the popular support needed for reaching a deal with Kosovo. democracy, putting into question its position as one of the The EU is now betting all its credit on Vučić to be the one most advanced countries in the EU enlargement process. who will be able to lead Serbia towards an agreement with There had been a discrepancy between the progression of its former province Kosovo. A lasting settlement of relations Serbia in the EU accession negotiations, although only in between the two countries is crucial for stability and more “technical” chapters, and the continuously prosperity in the region and is necessary in order to unblock deteriorating state of democracy in the country. However, the prospect of European integration of both.. However, in in the past year Serbia was not able to open any new doing so the EU stands in a contradictory position, seeking negotiating chapter and achieved only little progress in stability in the Western Balkans at the cost of sacrificing its previously unproblematic areas21, indicating even further core values and requirements towards EU membership the lack of political will to actually approximate the country candidates, such as democratic governance, rule of law and to the EU. respect for human rights. In the wider context of the EU enlargement, the decline in democratic standards and rule of law in the “frontrunning” countries, Montenegro and Serbia, and the progress of Conclusion North Macedonia and Albania, which are aspiring for With the new date of the next elections announced and with opening of the accession negotiations with the EU, seems even more at stake for the SNS, it is the high time for an to be closing the gap between those already negotiating and intensive EU engagement. For a long time, the SNS and those waiting for a green light to start the process. This not Aleksandar Vučić personally have enjoyed the support from only puts into question the credibility of the proclaimed the EU despite the obvious disrespect for democratic and “merit-based approach” in the EU enlargement policy but European values. The position of Serbia as one of the also the principles upon which this policy stands, as it allows frontrunners of the EU enlargement process, together with the negotiating countries to drift away from the core Montenegro, and the appraisement of Vučič’s leadership by European rules and values. various European leaders have been in a striking contrast Furthermore, the steady democratic decay in Serbia is a with the realities on the ground reported by the non- cause for concern about the country’s political tendencies governmental sector and independent media. However, in and behaviour once it would join the EU. With the current the past two years, the European Commission and the situation regarding the rule of law in some EU member European Parliament have been more and more critical states, mainly Hungary and Poland, there are worries towards the situation in Serbia and the government’s among Brussels officials as well as some EU countries’ practices. The June elections revealed all the underlying leaders that this “illiberal club” inside the EU would only be issues which had been in making during the SNS rule strengthened with countries like Serbia joining the EU. This already since 2012 and it is clearly not possible for the EU would threaten to further undermine the values the EU was to remain silent. built on and to deepen the internal crisis the EU finds itself The dialogue between the government parties and the in. However, at the same time it is obvious that the EU opposition requires a more intensive and constant
21 Stojić, M., EU membership of the Western Balkan states in times Institute for European Policy, of crisis: From a strategic choice to protracted inertia, EUROPEUM https://www.europeum.org/data/articles/markostojic-pp-2.pdf.
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engagement from the European Parliament leading to objectively assess the implementation of the tangible results, which would allow for a real and fair agreed steps and reforms. • The EP-facilitated dialogue should be tied directly competition in the upcoming elections. The EU will have to to Serbia’s EU accession process. No new chapters be more vigilant because due to the combination of a re- should be opened with Serbia under the current legitimizing parliamentary elections, presidential elections, government unless an electoral reform is agreed and local elections in the capital (where the anti- and implemented, providing for a truly free and government protests were the fiercest), a lot is at stake for fair elections. • The European institutions – the Parliament, the the SNS. It can be expected that the government will try to Commission as well as the EU member states – tilt the system even further to its advantage. For that reason, need to work together in order to create a a stronger engagement by the European Parliament has to sufficient pressure on Serbian government to be accompanied by strict monitoring by the European implement the necessary reforms. This does not Commission and the dialogue must be tied to Serbia’s EU apply only to the progression of Serbia on its EU accession path, but also to public endorsement of accession process. In terms of the dialogue, the European the current Serbian leadership. The serious threats Parliament does not have to search far for a good example to Serbia’s democratic development and European – in North Macedonia, the EP-led mediation under the Jean future must be openly acknowledged, and the Monnet Dialogue methodology 22 between the governing European Commission has to identify very VRMO-DPMNE and Social Democrats led to an electoral concrete steps that have to be taken immediately in order to reverse this trend. reform and new elections resulting in a democratic overthrow of the Gruevski’s authoritarian regime. Similar endeavour was initiated in Serbia in 2019 and the EP’s lasting commitment has been reconfirmed in last months but the dialogue has to resume sooner rather than later. To end the undemocratic regime in Serbia and allow the citizens to choose freely in a fair election, a substantive electoral reform with a proper monitoring is necessary. However, at this point the EU is the only actor with enough leverage to provide the conditions for this change in Serbia.
Policy Recommendations
• The European Parliament must engage in the facilitation of the dialogue between the ruling parties and the opposition in a structured, lasting and intensive way. Tangible outcomes, ideally in
the form of a mutual agreement between the government and the opposition parties providing
acceptable conditions for the upcoming elections, must be set and a substantive electoral reform should be the long-term objective. • The European Parliament’s efforts need to be accompanied by an engagement from the European Commission, which should provide its monitoring and expert capacities in order to
22 European Parliament, Carrying on a legacy of peacemaking - https://www.europarl.europa.eu/globaldemocracysupport/en/med Jean Monnet Dialogues for peace and democracy, iation-&-dialogue/jean-monnet-dialogues.html.
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Parliamentary elections in Croatia: momentum and a significant rise in the public support26 that the government gained during the first wave of COVID-19 Another dominant performance of pandemic, to call for an earlier date of the elections, which HDZ as the opposition struggles to were originally planned for autumn. On contrary, SDP was not able to implement progressive leftist policies into their address critical weaknesses that agenda to attract younger generation voters. The earlier shackle further progress of Croatia date was also seen as a safer solution given the expected second wave of the pandemic in the fall. However, by the early July, Croatia experienced a rapid surge in the amount For the third time after its accession to the European Union, of daily infections and the elections were held under very Croatia held its parliamentary elections on July 5, 2020. strict hygienic measures. This resulted in the lowest turnout While most of the opinion polls expected a very tight race in the history of parliamentary elections in Croatia, with a between the ruling Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) and mere 46,9% turnout.27 its biggest rivals and only serious competitors Social Democratic Party of Croatia (SDP), the elections turned into By obtaining 61 out of 151 seats in the parliament, HDZ a landslide victory for the HDZ-led center-right coalition, became a clear winner of the elections as it not only heavily which managed to obtain 37% of popular vote, 12% more defeated the opposition, but it was able to form a minority than center-left Restart Coalition led by SDP. While there government without being forced to seek support from far- 23 were various factors involved in the success of HDZ, the right Homeland Movement of Miroslav Škoro (DPMŠ). discrepancy between pre-election opinion polls and actual Although DPMŠ succeeded in the elections and emerged as 24 election results was remarkable. The results could only the third strongest party with over 10% of votes, its leaders deepen gradual democratic backsliding witnessed in the believed they would play a key role in the post-election case of the newest EU Member State during the previous negotiations; instead, HDZ managed to form a government government of HDZ. Although Croatia being often hailed as with only one coalition party – Independent Democratic an example for the other candidate countries, the lack of Serb Party (SDSS), while counting on the support of few significant progress after its accession and exacerbation in smaller parties and also two independent MPs representing the fields of media freedom is a worrisome sign that can minorities in Croatia. 28 It was yet another confirmation further scrutinize the process of EU Enlargement and HDZ’s political dominance and clout in Croatian politics, as effectively brings it into a dead alley. the party managed to win 8 out of 10 parliamentary elections from the establishment of multi-party system in While most of the opinion polls before this year’s election 1990. HDZ, the main driving force behind Croatian War of showed a close race between HDZ and SDP, the popularity Independence, still capitalizes from its achievements of the of its leaders indicated the final outcomes, as Andrej past, its close connection with Catholic Church, which plays Plenković, leader of HDZ was seen as a positive figure by a major role in Croatian society and its large structure of 57% of Croats while his counterpart from SDP Davor local party branches built throughout the 1990’s. Bernardić only by 37%.25 Prime Minister Plenkovič used the
23 For example lower turnout favouring more disciplined HDZ stecenu-u-koronakrizi-u-padu-i-milanovic-i-plenkovic-i-skoro- voters, or lack of trust to the leader of SDP among party members 1405305 – https://www.jutarnji.hr/naslovnica/najveci-problem-sdp-a-je- 26 Crobarometar NOVA TV, 24 April 2020, available at: davor-bernardic-tesko-ce-uvjeriti-birace-da-je-predsjednik- https://dnevnik.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/crobarometar-popularnost- najvece-oporbene-stranke-covjek-koji-ce-rijesiti-njihove-probleme- stranaka-i-politicara-u-vrijeme-korona-krize---602923.html 10317007 27 https://www.izbori.hr/site/izbori-referendumi/izbori-za- 24 Politico Poll of Polls, Croatia 2020, zastupnike-u-hrvatski-sabor/izbori-za-zastupnike-u-hrvatski-sabor- https://www.politico.eu/europe-poll-of-polls/croatia/ 2272/aktualnostii/rezultati-2276/2276 25 Crobarometar, NOVA TV, 26th May 2020, 28 8 seats in the parliament are reserved for the representatives of https://www.vecernji.hr/vijesti/politicari-gube-popularnost- minorities
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Another clear winner of the elections is newly established license to a TV channel that disrespected ethics and progressive-left party Možemo!, whose strong support for standards of journalism, explicitly for a nationalistic hate green and sustainable politics has the potential to fill this speech by one of its journalists. Instead of respecting the vacuum in the Western Balkans. In coalition with few decisions of an independent body, right-wing coalition smaller parties called Green-Left, it managed to attract 7% partners called for a resignation of the director while HDZ of voters, mostly siphoning votes from SDP. The elections leaders did not comment on the situation. 30 That is yet in Croatia were concluded in a transparent and fair manner another sign of still deeply rooted nationalism within some as seen by the election observers. The report of ODIHR groups of HDZ representatives, that transcends into inability Election Assessment Mission does not denote irregularities to take a stance against such tendencies. By not openly during the election process, it only mentions minor condemning nationalistic and far-right views, that go irregularities or that the smaller media outlets were affected against the basics of European values, HDZ can be seen as by the lack of funds due to the outbreak of the COVID-19 a silent culprit of the political environment, in which far right pandemic.29 representatives still have large audience. Moreover, institutions that are critical to the government and manage
to retain its independent status are often marginalized or Post-accession Stagnation and Areas of Backsliding undermined by bureaucratic and judicial pressure or by a creation of alternative institutions, such as in the case of Although Croatia is often praised as a success story of the often critical Croatian Journalist’s Association. To diminish EU Enlargement Policy and shown as an example to the its voice, representatives of HDZ and its allies established other Western Balkans countries, which are still pursuing its an alternative institution, Croatian Journalists and Publicist, EU Membership, lack of plurality on the political field and that is supportive of right-wing views. Financial support to the dominance of HDZ in sectors of political and public life the non-profit media outlets provided in accordance to the is concerning. From the return to power in 2015, HDZ took law adopted by previous SDP government, is often an aim in capturing state media and institutions that are stagnating due to the lack of willingness from Ministry of controlling media plurality and independence. As a result of Culture, who is charge of managing the funds. By winning a law change adopted in 2012 with a bipartisan support and the elections, it is expected that the grip of HDZ on state against recommendations of the European Commission, media will only strengthen, which will further deteriorate its parliament was given the right to appoint director of plurality and diversity. national broadcaster Hrvatska radiotelevizija (HRT). That allowed HDZ to dismantle the efforts of the EU during the Yet, Plenković and other state officials are able to keep a accession process to establish and support independence of moderate, centrist profile on the European level and are state media. After pressure from government officials, HDZ able to avoid potential criticism over some of the was also able to appoint a new director of Agency for deficiencies in the country, while being able to present Electronic Media (AEM), an independent regulatory body, Croatia as a role-model country in comparison to candidate which should foster media freedom and plurality while countries or even some other EU Member states. As a result, protecting the democratic values. Escalation of tensions that HDZ and its government is not only often praised by the resulted in a dismissal of previous director was caused by European institutions, it has a firm support from other Agency’s decision to use its power to suspend broadcasting representatives of the EPP party. That was best seen in a campaign video31, in which various European leaders from
29 OSCE ODIHR Election Report 31 Available at HDZ Facebook page - https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/b/4/465120_0.pdf https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=2016459448530455 30 Čepo D., Structural weaknesses and the role of the dominant political party: democratic backsliding in Croatia since EU accession, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 2020, p.146-147
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the EPP support HDZ by reading a pre-election motto Lastly, one of the major obstacles over Croatia’s “Sigurna Hrvatska.” While the support of other EPP leaders membership in the EU was its dispute over the border with can be seen as reasonable, the shocking element of the Slovenia, particularly when it comes to the maritime video was the appearance of Ursula von der Leyen, boundaries on Bay of Piran. Decades lasting dispute was a president of the European Commission. Not only did such reason for Slovenian veto of the Croatian accession process, support provide HDZ with unprecedented legitimacy at before both countries agreed to send the case to the national and domestic level, further diminishing the level Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague and playing field for the opposition parties, it also significantly committed themselves to respect the ruling of the Court. calls the Commission as an independent and unbiased actor That lifted the Slovenian veto and enabled Croatia to enter into question. While the ruling party is being praised at the EU. However, two years after its membership was European level, some of its members still share confirmed, Croatia decided to unilaterally withdraw from the controversial, often far-right opinions when it comes to the proceedings and stated that it will not honor the final topic of “national pride”, either connected with acts during decision of the Court. The Croatian government explained Croatian War of Independence or downplaying the crimes that the reason for such a decision was illegal contacts committed by the Ustasha regime during the WW2. The between Slovenian government and Slovenian member of Croatian political system still did not fully transition from the the Court. Although the leaked records of the conversation autocratic regime of HDZ under the lead of its founder among the judge and Slovenian representative did not show Franjo Tuđman and insults such as “Serb” or “Communist”32 any irregularities, the Croatian government saw such an act are still part of political narrative of right wing parties in as fraudulent. Hence, the border dispute is still not resolved Croatia, still affecting its audience as in the 1990’s.33 7 years from Croatia entering the EU, while there are no signs that Croatia is willing to negotiate over the matter. Close connection between HDZ and Catholic Church is also very often overlooked or seen as institutionalized relationship by external actors. However, Catholic Church Conclusion and its lobby has a very strong position among the main political actors, often supporting and pushing for highly Croatia is an apt example of how shortsighted the EU conservative measures. Governmental support of accession process is in general, not only from the conservative civil society organizations, driven by the clergy, perspective of the candidate state, but also from the directly affects and threatens freedom of expression and perspective of the EU. The deficiencies in the process, that human rights in regard towards sensitive topics such as are seen not only in the case of Croatia, but also some LBGT rights or abortion rights. Ratification of the Istanbul countries that joined the EU in 2000’s, need to be address convention was heavily criticized by various conservative for the current and future accession processes. Candidate actors and caused a dispute even among the members of countries usually do not adopt policy-perspectives beyond HDZ. In comparison, civil society actors leaning to more the immediate goal of accession, and have therefore neither liberal opinions are often limited and marginalized. All of the policy plans nor interests in keeping momentum in the mentioned above shows signs of deterioration or stagnation reform process once EU membership has been secured and also in the field of human rights.34 the incentives are no longer present or as enticing.
32 Words that are often used as synonyms to unpatriotic or military conflict that lasted from 1991 to 1995, during which treasonous in Croatia provisions on human rights were often neglected or violated by 33 HDZ was founded in 1989 with a strong nationalistic, ethnically both sides. homogenous discourse emphasizing Croatian identity which is 34 Nations in Transit Croatia 2020 Report, Prelec T., interlinked with Catholic religion. HDZ was leading the efforts for https://freedomhouse.org/country/croatia/nations-transit/2020 Croatian independence on Yugoslavia, which escalated into a
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The case of Croatia underlines the need to resolve border that are dominated by one political party, such is the case disputes before the candidate country enters the Union. of Croatia, to assure democratic plurality and proper Although it was a precondition of the accession process, the understanding of the situation in the candidate country. EU settled for “honest commitment” in the case of Slovenia This would also have an effect on more efficient tackling of and Croatia, which ended in failure. The current situation corruption and clientelism, which is one of the biggest over the dispute between Croatia and Slovenia, two Member threats to democracy in the Western Balkans. The states, not only shows the lack of willingness for domination of HDZ on local and regional level is even larger cooperation among the states, but also a lack of interest to than on the national level, and it is deeply rooted in the resolve the issue from the side of the EU, whose history of the formation of independent Croatia. commitment to resolving the dispute has waned once One of the major flaws of the current accession process accession was no longer at stake. The current situation can seen in the Croatian case is that there is no post-accession become politicized in the future if Italy and Croatia decide period in which countries would be monitored in specific to declare exclusive economic zones in the Adriatic, which areas, such as human rights, media freedom or political are disobeying the decisions of the Court, without plurality. In that sense, Croatia follows a not entirely consultations with Slovenian government. Slovenia can dissimilar trajectory as Hungary and Poland, despite macro- decide to use its veto power and can affect decision making level differences. Interim benchmarks that are used for the ability of the European Council on any particular matter pre-accession period could be kept within post-accession needing a unanimous decision, if the EU Members States period to ensure that the country is willing to continue its will continue to palliate the dispute. Therefore, the EU commitment to the European future. This monitoring would should insist on resolving any cross border issues before the prohibit governments from changing its course immediately accession of the country, while exercising its utmost efforts after the accession to the EU, as seen in the case of media for a constructive dialogue. This particular issue is touching freedom in Croatia. Although a monitoring system was upon disputes among various Western Balkan countries and applied in Romania and Bulgaria (CVM) in the areas of its resolution is of an utmost importance for the future judiciary, corruption and organized crime, it does show only relations in the region, such as similarly unresolved issue partial improvements and it should be enhanced to assure over Croatia-Montenegro sea border or Serbian border ability of the EU to enforce progress or react to backsliding. disputes with Croatia along the river Danube.
The Accession process needs to depoliticize itself in order to assure that it is beneficial for the EU in a long run and the Policy Recommendations deficiencies need to be addressed in a constructive manner. Although this is not directly linked to the situation in Croatia, • To enforce the commitment of candidate countries to undertake reforms and prevent from future comments such as the one of President von der Leyen backsliding, the EU Enlargement process should openly supporting one political party should be avoided both be enhanced by a compulsory post-accession for the sake of the legitimacy of the Commission in what monitoring, that could be tied to the access of should be a pluralist political environment, as well as for the European funds and which would ensure that the countries continue its efforts in the integration of sake of the Commission itself given changes in power within their legislations. the country in which its President chooses a side. • The representatives of the European Commission should avoid any future engagement in electoral The EU should deepen its capacity-building of campaigns on national level. Such appearances administration onto regional and local levels, outside of the only undermine the reputation of the Commission capitals of the countries, and strengthening dialogue among as an unbiased institution and the credibility of its political parties while also building a deeper understanding leaders. of the regions as such. It is crucial especially in countries • The European Commission should be more active in seeking mediation of disputes among its
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member states such as in the case of border dispute between Croatia and Slovenia. By not addressing current deficiencies, the Commission is passively tolerating Croatia’s decision to disrespect the ruling of international arbitration court, which in the result leads into further escalation of the conflict. Successful mediation of the conflict could provide a precedent for any similar dispute that would arise in the future.
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2020 North Macedonia elections: The hitherto insurmountable obstacle on its way towards an EU membership. 38 Although being praised by the EU for country’s European future hanging by reaching a historical agreement, this concession, which was a thread called treasonous by the opposition party, was heavily criticized also among citizens. Therefore, the polarized issue over the name of the country became one of the main topics The parliamentary elections in North Macedonia, that took of the pre-election debates and some leaders of the place on July 15, presented a decisive moment for the opposition VMRO-DPMNE party even promised to revoke future of the country and its foreign policy direction. North the agreement with Greece and overturn the decision to Macedonia is currently in the position of a potential dark rename the country, thus disregarding the progress made horse of the EU enlargement race, albeit still waiting for the along the perspective of European future.39 official start of the EU accession negotiations. The previous 35 government of North Macedonia emerging from the 2016 parliamentary elections, was able to progress with numerous reforms and set a pace towards the EU accession From the state capture to a positive example for the that is unprecedented in the region. Winning the elections region would enable Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM) Only a few years ago, North Macedonia was characterized and its leader Zoran Zaev to continue its work, which was as a captured state by the European Commission40, often lately rewarded with NATO membership and the decision of then used as a case study of what the ‘state capture’ means the European Council to open the accession negotiations also in academic literature. The governing party VMRO- with North Macedonia. However, by its willingness to DPMNE, under the leadership of the Prime Minister Nikola compromise on sensitive topics, while allowing the country Gruevski, controlled and exploited a large proportion of to progress rapidly on its EU path, the government also public resources as well as media, the corruption was faces a significant dismay from many of its voters, namely reaching systemic levels and democratic institutions were those newly gained before the 2016 elections from the fundamentally dysfunctional. However, much has changed VMRO-DPMNE36 camp.37 since the transition of power in 2017 when SDSM was given Overall, the elections were expected to be a close race the opportunity to form a government. North Macedonia between the center-left SDSM and the main opposition was in a difficult position in terms of EU enlargement – while party, conservative right-wing nationalist VMRO-DPMNE. It it was the first Western Balkan country to obtain the EU was the first elections carried out after the 2018 membership candidate status, the opening of accession Macedonian referendum which effectively changed the talks was blocked by Greece over the name dispute for name of the country from Macedonia to North Macedonia. decades. Furthermore, under the rule of Nikola Gruevski By changing the name of the country, the North and with the growing frustrations over the Greek veto to its Macedonia’s government was able to settle a decades-long European integration path, the state of democracy and the dispute with its southern neighbor Greece and removed the rule of law started deteriorating rapidly. The new
35 A coalition of Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM) and 38 Greece had repeatedly vetoed the country’s progression into Democratic Union for Integration (DUI) NATO and EU due to the unresolved name issue 36 The second largest party in North Macedonia, Internal 39 Daventry M., Jovanovski B.; North Macedonia prepares for first Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Democratic Party for election since name change Macedonian National Unity https://www.euronews.com/2020/07/14/north-macedonia- 37 Kingsley P., He Who Changed his Country’s Name. Will North prepares-for-first-election-since-name-change-and-it-s-going-to- Macedonia Punish Him? be-close https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/14/world/europe/north- 40 2016 Report on Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia macedonia-election-zoran- https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_16 zaev.html?action=click&module=RelatedLinks&pgtype=Article _3634
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government led by the SDSM thus did not have an easy task. negotiations with the country back in October 2019, as Not only did it have to solve the disputes with its neighbors, France together with two other states decided to veto the allowing it to unblock its EU integration process, but it also proposal, which led to the Prime Minister Zaev’s resignation had to show real efforts and results in dismantling the and call for an early elections. However, after settling the existing state capture. The rapid repair of the relations with disputes among the EU member states regarding the EU the country’s neighbors is still perceived as the most vivid enlargement and adoption of a new enlargement success of Zaev’s first government. By signing the Prespa methodology, North Macedonia received a green light on Agreement in 2018, officially changing the name of the starting its accession negotiations only few months later, in country to North Macedonia, the government was able to March 2020. finally settle the long-standing dispute allowing North
Macedonia’s accession into NATO and the progression towards the start of the accession negotiations with the EU. Elections amidst the COVID-19 pandemic Another positive step was rapprochement with Bulgaria, another neighbor with whom the previous government had Obligation to form a technical government that serves for a very tense relation, especially in the matters of national 100 days before the elections, proved to be rather identity and interpretation of historical events. The two unfortunate in regard to the COVID-19 pandemic as the countries signed the Treaty of Friendship, Good- elections originally planned for April 12 needed to be neighborliness, and Cooperation. The agreement foresaw postponed for summer period. While the technical the establishment of the Joint Expert Commission in order government, nominated by the previous ruling party but to settle the historical disputes and Bulgaria’s support to including also representatives of the opposition, serves to North Macedonia’s Euro-Atlantic integration. 41 This protect the electoral processes, it does not possess the resolution of the bilateral disputes and improvements in same legal powers to effectively respond to crisis such as regional relations, unprecedented in the Western Balkans, COVID-19 pandemic. Therefore, the postponement of the enabled the new North Macedonian government to provide elections was later questioned and resulted into holding the its citizens with a positive European perspective after more elections when the pandemic had even worsened. than a decade of stagnation. Results of the postponed parliamentary elections confirmed
As a result of these efforts and the willingness to commit to most of the pre-election polls that were predicting a tensed much needed reforms, North Macedonia was able to hastily battle between SDSM-led “We Can” coalition and “Renewal” progress with European integration and was provided with coalition led by the VMRO-DPMNE. In the end, the Social more substantive support from the European institutions. Democrats were able to win the elections with 36,13% of According to the latest Nations in Transit report by Freedom the votes, while the VMRO-DPMNE obtained 34,65%. The House, the country has shown progress in independence of Albanian minority party DUI finished third with over 11%, media, human rights or fight against corruption. However, fulfilling their goal of playing a junior partner in a future 43 some key liberal-democratic reforms are still lacking, also coalition. Generally, the elections were carried out without due to unwillingness of the opposition VMRO-DPMNE to any serious deficiencies although being organized during support them. 42 Although being praised for substantial the peak of the COVID-19 pandemic, which resulted into a progress over the previous years, this did not result in a limited pre-election campaign and a lower turnout, as 44 positive decision of European Council to open the accession reported by the OSCE observation mission. The reports
41 Treaty of Friendship, Good-neighborliness, and Cooperation 43 https://www.rferl.org/a/north-macedonia-election-zaev- https://mfa.gov.mk/en/document/1712 coalition/30732551.html 42 Bliznakovski J., 2020 North Macedonia Report, Nations in Transit 44 https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/b/e/465648_0.pdf https://freedomhouse.org/country/north-macedonia/nations- transit/2020
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also confirmed the improvements in the electoral process as The most urgent issue complicating the country’s European a key component of a functioning parliamentary democracy, prospects is, however, the current re-escalation of the as previously stated in the Freedom House report. disputes over historical narratives with Bulgaria. Prime Minister Boyko Borisov and other leading representatives of Within one month after the elections, the SDSM was able to Bulgarian government reverted its previous support to the reach an agreement to form a majority coalition45 with the accession process of North Macedonia due to a “lack of Albanian DUI, that was part of the government also in the interest” in resolving the historical disagreements over previous mandate. This is a positive sign for the Macedonian language and history through the Joint Expert continuation of a productive dialogue between Skopje and Commission. The official position of Bulgaria is now that it Brussels and for future strengthening of the democratic cannot allow the continuation of the EU accession process principles in North Macedonia. With a slim majority, the for North Macedonia. Bulgaria has put forward a set of government should strive to maintain the pace of the demands on the North Macedonian government, reforms, while enhancing their efforts for a constructive conditioning its support to the official start of the EU dialogue with the opposition on the topics of key importance accession negotiations with the country. Bulgaria is for the democratic consolidation in the future. Although demanding that the Macedonian government would stop there is still much space for improvements, by the results of referring to its nation and language as “Macedonian” and the elections, it is clear that Macedonians still support the rather use the collocation “People of North Macedonia” and actions of the government on its European path. Moreover, “Language of North Macedonia” and also the changing of it is visible also from the behavior of the opposition which is the interpretation of some historical events connected to the less vocal to the topics that are connected with the Bulgarian fascist regime that collaborated with Nazis during European integration of the country. the Second World War.47 While it is understandable that these conditions cannot be accepted by North Macedonia as they are undermining the basic rights of self-determination A thorny path forward adopted by the United Nations Charter, they are once again Over the past years, North Macedonia portrayed itself as a stalling the accession process of the country into the EU. proactive candidate country with a good track record. Furthermore, the North Macedonian government is not in a Reforms in the field of judiciary should be among priorities situation where it could allow for any more concessions to of the current government, especially after the bribery its neighbors. Already the name-change due to the dispute scandal of Head of Special Public Prosecutors’ Office Katica with Greece met with a hard criticism and opposition from Janeva that was responsible for working on cases of the Macedonian population and was seen as an attack on corruption of a previous VMRO-DPMNE government. Her the Macedonian identity. Now when the Macedonian corruption scandal not only casts doubts over the years of identity itself is the subject of the dispute, it is hard to her chairing of the institution, but also puts the whole imagine the Zaev’s government would be able to gather the judicial system under scrutiny.46 As a result of the actions public support to appease the Bulgarian demands. of Ms. Janeva, the Special Public Prosecutors’ Office Bulgaria, and by proxy the whole EU, is now playing a terminated its activities and transferred its cases to the dangerous game. The region of Western Balkans is a very Public Prosecutors’ Office. However, the issue remains one competitive field where various foreign powers exercise staining the North Macedonia’s reform track record and has their influence. The previous government of Nikola Gruevski to be resolved moving down the EU accession path. was rather sympathetic to Russia and did not shy away from
45 Currently, both parties have 62 out of 120 seats in the parliament 47 https://neweasterneurope.eu/2020/12/14/north-macedonias- 46 https://www.rferl.org/a/north-macedonia-s-former-organized- eu-challenges-the-bulgarian-ego-and-mechanisms-of-defence/ crime-prosecutor-jailed-in-bribery-scheme/30678210.html
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pursuing a “balanced” foreign policy in reaction to the time in favor of the VMRO-DPMNE. As indicated by the blocking of the EU integration of his country. On the other recent statements from the party’s representatives as well hand, Russia watches the current developments closely and as the persisting activity of Russia and China in the Western can be expected to use any opportunity to fill the vacuum Balkans region, this change could have dire consequences, provided by the EU’s future failures. A clear example of this such as a dramatic worsening of the regional relations, Russian policy towards the Western Balkans was the renewed interethnic tensions between Macedonians and invitation into the Eurasian Economic Union offered to North Albanians in North Macedonia, and a foreign policy turn Macedonia and Albania following the veto to open the towards East. Based on the track record of the VMRO- accession negotiations with the two countries in October DPMNE previous rule, it could be also expected that the 2019. Therefore, it is in the utmost interest of the EU to recent democratic reforms would be reversed, causing closely cooperate with the unequivocally pro-European irreparable damage to the country’s European future. The leaders in the region and them staying in power. EU leaders thus have to act smarter and beware of threatening the truly significant progress which has been
achieved in North Macedonia and in mutual relations Conclusion between the country and the EU.
The second Zaev’s government in North Macedonia is now very dependent on the EU and on achieving a clear success Policy Recommendations in the EU integration process. Precisely because of the sacrifices the government has made in its previous term in • The opening of the accession negotiations with order to progress towards the opening of the EU accession North Macedonia and Albania have to be unblocked as soon as possible. Bulgaria should not negotiations, the settlement of relations with its neighbors, subject this decision to long-lasting historical it now finds itself in a very fragile position with only a thin disputes and the dialogue between the countries margin of popular support. The question is how far the could be continued parallel to the accession current government go in making concessions to its negotiations. neighbor’s demands before it will result into a political • The EU representatives should maintain their engagement in the mediation between North suicide. Macedonia and Bulgaria, as set by the German EU At the same time, Zoran Zaev has managed to pull his Presidency. A real compromise, resulting into a concession on both sides, not just one, should be country from a captured state lagging behind in the region’s pursued. EU accession race to an often-cited positive example for the • The government of North Macedonia needs to whole region, both in terms of domestic reforms and demonstrate extraordinary efforts – both in the improvement of neighborly relations. While there are more pursuit of a settlement with Bulgaria but also in results needed to be seen, especially in the area of public other democratic reforms – to avoid providing the EU member states with any more reasons to block prosecution, it cannot overshadow the progress the country its accession negotiations. With regard to the has achieved and the unprecedented political will it has dispute with Bulgaria, North Macedonia first has to demonstrated. The EU has recognized this progress in its meet its part of obligations set up in the Treaty of own progress reports released by the European Commission. Friendship, Good-neighborliness, and Cooperation. The Council of the EU should follow the recommendations • To avoid similar situations in the future in which one EU member states blocks the (potential) of the European Commission and the European Parliament candidate countries on their EU accession path, and put now these words into action by official start of the the European Council should consider the accession negotiations with North Macedonia. If failing to introduction of the QMV in the EU enlargement do so, the tide could turn in North Macedonia and the next policy, at least in some stages of the EU accession elections could bring another change of government, this process. If this underlying problem is not dealt with, more vetoes like this will result only in losing
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of the momentum in the EU enlargement, growing frustrations of both elites and populations and potential backlash in the democratization and European integration in the region.
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Parliamentary elections in were not met. In December of 2019, the government was met with another wave of mass protests, this time sparked Montenegro: The first transition of by the adoption of a controversial religion law, threatening power to seize assets of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Montenegro. The Serbian Orthodox Church is the largest church in the country as the majority of Montenegrins The tiniest Balkan nation of Montenegro experienced on 31 identifies with it. The protests over the law on religion were August what arguably could be one of the most game- marked by clashes between the demonstrators and police changing elections held in 2020. Rather unexpectedly, the and arrests of a number of people including opposition ruling Democratic Party of Socialists of Montenegro (DPS) politicians 48 and continued until the introduction of the was ousted by a coalition of diverse opposition parties, coronavirus pandemic restrictions in March 2020. representing the first real transition of power from the hands of the DPS. The DPS is a successor of the League of Communists of Montenegro which ruled the country under the Yugoslav federation ever since the establishment of New government: Unpredictability and a challenge Yugoslavia in 1945 and has dominated unchallenged the to Montenegro’s Euro-Atlantic integration? Montenegrin political scene ever since. Although the DPS The winning coalition was met with only a lukewarm won a thin majority of the votes (35,06 %) in the election, response from the Western partners and caution from it was not able to form a coalition and was thus replaced by experts. The rule of the DPS and the authoritarian leader a coalition of three strongest opposition parties – For the Milo Djukanović was clearly problematic as despite its Future of Montenegro (ZBCG), Peace is Our Nation (MNN) demonstrated determination to achieve integration into and Civic Movement United Reform Action (URA) – which, NATO (which the country joined in 2017) and the EU, the together, have the majority of 50,62 %. While the DPS has nature of the regime suffered serious flaws with regard to lost the opportunity to form a government, the party’s the rule of law and democratic standards. According to the authoritative leader Milo Djukanović remains in the position Freedom House’s Nations in Transit reports49, Montenegro of the President of Montenegro and therefore the DPS still has seen a steady decline in its democracy score in the past exerts significant influence in the country. ten years, with a minor improvement only in 2017 and The election took place in a very controversial context and another drop in the following year. The result of the decay not only because of the COVID-19 pandemic and resulting of democracy in Montenegro and growing authoritarian curbing of freedom of information and media. In 2019, the tendencies, widespread corruption and abuse of power, was political stability in Montenegro and the rule of the DPS was the drop of the country, previously classified as a shaken by several protests. In the first half the year, the democratic system, into the “hybrid regime” category in 50 country has witnessed protests organized by civil society 2019 and 2020 according to the Freedom House. Also the together with some opposition parties and targeted the fact that the entire system of the tiny Mediterranean nation governing party and the President Milo Djukanović and PM (with the population of only over 620,000) is controlled by Duško Marković for widespread corruption in the the DPS and Djukanović, through the decades of staying in government, authoritarian practices, media censorship and power and corrupt practices, without any real political alleged electoral fraud. Despite the long protests, the demonstrators were not successful, and their demands
48 Montenegro MPs arrested in clash over religious freedom law, 49 Freedom House, https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations- BBC News, 27 December 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world- transit. europe-50923647. 50 Ibid. https://freedomhouse.org/country/montenegro/nations- transit/2020.
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transition after the fall of communism does not help the party, the For the Future of Montenegro, who will be able Montenegro’s case as a country whose place lies in the EU. to form a coalition. Another serious reason for the lack of enthusiasm about the result coming from the West was the However, for the West, Djukanović and his party dominance of the pro-Serbian and pro-Russian Democratic represented a guarantee of stability and a predictable leader Front, leading the For the Future of Montenegro coalition. to deal with. Furthermore, in the context of the growing Even after it has become clear that the three opposition Russia’s assertiveness in the EU’s Eastern and South- parties (ZBCG, MNN and URA) would be able form the eastern neighbourhoods, Djukanović who was pursuing the government, it is still dubious whether the civic-oriented pro-Western path for his country and independence from coalition partners will be able to mitigate the potential turn Serbia and Serbian Orthodox Church, traditionally very towards the East in Montenegro’s foreign policy. closely connected with the Russian Orthodox Church, logically was the preferred ally. For the sake of stability and However, these worries have been immediately addressed the geopolitical interests, the West including the EU leaders by the winning parties’ leaders, including those previously often seemed to turn a blind eye on the undemocratic very critical of Montenegro joining NATO and breaking ties practices of the DPS. Montenegro opened its accession with Russia, stating that accession into the EU remains the negotiations with the EU in June 2012 and has since been country’s strategic priority and the new government will not given the label of the frontrunner of the EU integration divert from the course established under the previous process of the Western Balkans (after Croatia joining the EU leadership. 53 The coalition reacted also to the fears in 2013). 51 The country’s steady progression on its EU expressed across the region that the strong position of pro- accession path and the frequent praise from the EU Serbian parties will lead to a revival of Serbian nationalism representatives despite the fact that the party stayed in and the idea of the “Greater Serbia” connecting Serb- power due to state capture and pressure on citizens was dominated areas in the Western Balkans. This perspective one of the arguments in criticism from the civil society and was mostly present in Bosnia and Herzegovina, with its experts against the EU for hypocrisy and problematic separatist Bosnian Serb populated part, Republika Srpska, credibility of the enlargement process.52 and in Kosovo. Some leaders in Kosovo worry about potential unrecognition of the new state by the new In contrast to the comfortable blind-sided predictability of Montenegro’s government and worsening of mutual Djukanović and the rule of the DPS, the election results relations.54 However, the leaders of the coalition parties apparently caught the EU unprepared. The reactions also reassured Kosovo and the EU that the question of coming after the elections were very careful. One of the unrecognition is not on the table.55 Most experts are also reasons was the very narrow victory of the DPS, which was mitigating the fear of Serbian nationalism in Montenegro expected to be supported by the minority parties in after the elections, stressing that the pro-Serbian parties are Montenegro, as was the tradition, and the uncertainty only some of the partners in the new coalition and these whether it will be in the end the DPS or the second-largest
51 European Parliament, Montenegro – a lead candidate for EU 53 Montenegro Opposition Pledges to Maintain Country’s EU Path, accession, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/EPRS/EPRS-AaG- Balkan Insight, 1 September 2020, 628238-Montenegro-lead-candidate-for-EU-accession-FINAL.pdf, https://balkaninsight.com/2020/09/01/montenegro-opposition- European Commission, Montenegro, pledges-to-maintain-countrys-eu-path/. https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood- 54 Montenegro’s Change in Power has the Region Worried, Balkan enlargement/countries/detailed-country- Insight, 8 September 2020, information/montenegro_en. https://balkaninsight.com/2020/09/08/montenegros-change-in- 52 The problematic relation between EU integration and state power-has-the-region-worried/. capture is described for example in Solveig Richter & Natasha 55 Mesežnikov G., “Time Will Tell”, Visegrad Insight, Wunsch (2020) Money, power, glory: the linkages between EU https://visegradinsight.eu/montenegro-elections-russia-time-will- conditionality and state capture in the Western Balkans, Journal of tell/. European Public Policy, 27:1, 41-62.
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sentiments will be tamed by more civic-oriented coalition on the orderly and competitive conduct of the elections, partners. largely ignoring the fact that the country is experiencing its first democratic transition. The fears surrounding the Montenegro’s incoming Prime Minister, Zdravko Krivokapić, success of the pro-Russian and pro-Serbian parties in the the leader of the For the Future of Montenegro alliance, elections show a problematic point. While the EU clearly vowed to form an expert government. The government is supports freedom and democracy in its neighbourhood, the still in making but if successful, this would be the first expert result of the democratic processes sometimes might not be government in Montenegro’s history. However, the new PM exactly what the West would like to see. The first misstep has a difficult job to reconcile the coalition parties with of the EU leaders in the aftermath of the elections and the extremely different views with whose support he got into agreement between the parties to form a coalition was the the position. While an expert government is a must in the lack of acknowledgement of the first democratic transition current context, with such a polarized government coupled of power Montenegro has experienced, through a relatively with the region as well as the EU fearing potential rise of free, fair and competitive elections (despite the ruling party Serbian nationalism in Montenegro and divergence from the abusing the state resources and control over media). country’s European path, it is not sure that all winning parties will accept having no influence over the crucial The best way to mitigate the worries and uncertainty about resorts. the formation of the new government would be through a faster and more engaged action in establishing a dialog with Even if the government will be successfully formed soon, it the winning parties’ leaders. It is also a question to what will find itself in a difficult position. Apart from the ongoing extent the experts inside EU institutions were familiar with COVID-19 crisis, high expectations are being put on the new the opposition parties succeeding in the elections and their government, replacing the decades-long autocratic rule of leading personalities. Moving forward, the EU enlargement the DPS. With such a weak majority in the parliament (the policy would only benefit from a wider and more intense parties won together 41 seats from the 81 seats in the dialog between the EU and the actors in the candidate parliament56) and diverse views of the coalition partners, it country. The engagement of the EU needs to reach further is doubtful whether the government will be actually able to than to the ruling party or the biggest opposition bloc – the implement any substantial reforms leading to the European Parliament and European Commission dismantling of the state capture and increasing fundamental representatives should communicate in a more frequent and freedoms. Furthermore, it is important to realize that none coordinated manner also with other opposition parties and of the coalition partners has any experience with leading the civil society. So far, the communication with the opposition country and has always been only in the opposition. For the is typically reserved only to the European Parliament government to last, it will need a strong political will to find rapporteurs and EP political groups the parties ideologically common voice, acceptance of compromise, and all the belong to. support from the EU institutions and member states it can get. The unprecedented change of the government in Montenegro also showed the need for a more tailored and
flexible approach of the EU to the candidate countries. The Lessons for EU and the EU enlargement policy new government has an entirely different or rather no experience not only with running the country, but also with The reaction from the EU representatives to the election the EU accession process than the DPS political elites. In results was very lukewarm and vague, commenting mostly the context of the existing state capture and dominance of
56 Montenegro state election commission releases final results, N1, http://rs.n1info.com/English/NEWS/a639564/Montenegro-state- 14 September 2020, election-commission-releases-final-results.html.
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the DPS influence across all sectors in Montenegro, the region, who appear to be a safeguards of stability in especially with the DPS’s leader Milo Djukanović still in the EU’s backyard but simultaneously undermine the core position of the President, it will face serious obstacles in the European values. The lack of a flexible and timely reaction hoped for pursuit of democratizing reforms. It will also very to the changing situation and performance of the candidate likely suffer from the lack of experts and people experienced countries lead to further undermining of the credibility of in dealing with the EU and the technical nature of the the EU across the region – among the populations, civil accession negotiations. For the accession process to be re- societies and also the political opposition. So far, the EU has started after a stalemate in the last year, the new political been too rigid in its support to the autocratic leaders in leadership will need not only enough will and political skills belief it will be them who will lead their country into the EU. but also all the support from the EU institutions as well as The cases of North Macedonia and now perhaps individual friendly member states it can get. The existing Montenegro showed that the dissatisfaction of the plans and roadmaps for the EU path of Montenegro, population with the undemocratic and illiberal rule of these specifying necessary steps to be undertaken in order to leaders might lead to their replacement. The EU should be progress in the EU accession process, should be revised and aware of this possibility and better prepared to revise its tailored more to the changed realities in the country. The approach and work effectively with the new leaders. EU should provide the new government with a more However, this improvement will not be possible without a concrete set of objectives which should be achieved and more frequent and more intense presence of the EU steps leading to them, especially in relation to the representatives in the region or an increased engagement dismantling of the state capture present under the DPS rule with other actors beyond the elites currently in power. and establishing a functioning system of checks and A more intense communication and cooperation between balances. This experience of leaders the EU is used to the EU actors and the opposition is vital to the enlargement dealing with being replaced in power should be a lesson for process for several reasons. It would address the critique the EU enlargement policy to be more flexible, work with a that the accession negotiations are not very transparent and wider spectrum of actors in the candidate country, and to are exclusive only to the governmental negotiating team timely update its approach in response to the changing and would help to promote the idea of the EU accession and situation on the ground. gain the support across the political spectrum. Furthermore, Furthermore, the elections and the formation of the new a better communication with the opposition parties in the government could have consequences on the position of scope of the accession process would help to avoid different Western Balkan countries in the enlargement disruptions in negotiations in case of change of the process. Based on the developments in the past years, the government. Overall, a better inclusion of the political decline in democratic standards and potential re-orientation opposition as well as civil society into the process would of the foreign policy priorities eastwards, the position of contribute to the visibility of the EU accession process in the Montenegro and Serbia as the frontrunners of the public debate in the candidate countries, thereby providing enlargement process could be challenged. According to all agency to both policymakers and population. indexes assessing freedoms and the state of democracy as well as the European Commission’s annual progress reports on the countries striving for the EU membership, North Policy Recommendations Macedonia demonstrated in the past two years a much better track record in strengthening democratic governance • The EU representatives have to stop turning a blind eye on autocratic and illiberal tendencies of and rule of law than both current leaders in the EU some of the candidate countries’ leaders. accession process. This fact should be openly acknowledged Especially in the context of the rule of law decay by the EU representatives instead of the present praising of in some EU member states, the EU must make it the frontrunners and showing support to the strongmen of clear already throughout the accession process
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that no violations to the rule of law, democratic principles and EU values in general will be tolerated. First and foremost, they have to avoid any praise for the progress and cooperation with the government without mentioning the problematic aspects and shortcomings. In doing
so they legitimize the regime and its practices which go against the principles of the EU accession.
• The European Commission should better include the political opposition in the candidate countries
into the enlargement process. New channels of communication need to be established, engaging
all political actors together with the civil society in a regular and comprehensive manner. The project
of National Convention on European Integration is an initiative towards a positive direction but would
need a bigger endorsement and engagement from the domestic political actors as well as the EC
representatives. • A better monitoring of the situation and political constellations in the candidate countries by the European Commission and European Parliament is necessary in order to avoid surprises and uncertainty in case of change of the government. A better engagement with actors across the political spectrum, beyond the ruling parties or the strongest opposition party, would be helpful in this regard. It would help not only to better predict the developments and allow for a faster and more flexible course of action but also contribute to the
promotion of the idea of EU accession in the country.
• With the new enlargement methodology in place and a stronger emphasis on the fundamental
principles of the EU accession process – the rule of law, democratic governance and fundamental rights and freedoms – the EC’s evaluations and recommendations should have more weight in deciding on the progress of individual countries. The EU member states should be guided more by the objective reports provided by the EC experts than by political interests for the enlargement process to be truly merit-based and regain its The European Commission support for the production of this publication credibility. does not constitute an endorsement of the contents which reflects the views only of the authors, and the Commission cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained therein.