ReportNo. 7419-AL Algeria Agriculture:A New Opportunityfor Growth Public Disclosure Authorized April5, 1990 AgricultureOperations Division CountryDepartment II Europe,Middle Eastand North Africa RegionalOffice FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Documentof the WorldBank
This documenthas a restricteddistribution and may be usedby recipients only in the performanceof their official dut;es.Its contents may not otherwise be disclosedwithout World Bankauthorization. CURRENCY AND EQUIVALENT UNITS
Currency Unit Algerian Dinar (DA) US$1.00 DA 7.5 (1989 average) DA 1.00 US$0.13 (1989 average)
FISCAL YEAR
January 1 - December 31
GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS
APF - Accession A la Propri6t6 Fonciere BADR - Banque de l'Agricultureet du D6veloppementRural CCLS - Cooperativesdes Cer6ales et des Legumes Secs DAS - bomaines Agricoles Socialistes EAC/EAI - ExploitationsAgricoles Collectives/ ExploitationsAgricoles Individuelles EEC - European Economic Community INRAA - InstitutNational de la Recherche Agronomiqued'Alg6rie LSI - Large Scale Irrigation ME - Minist6re de 1'Equipement OER - Official Exchange Rate OAIC - Office Alg6rien Inter-professionneldes C6r6ales O&M - Operation and Maintenance OPI - Offices des P6rimetresd'Irrigation. SER - Shadow Exchange Rate SSI - Small Scale Irrigation UNDP - United Nations DevelopmentProgram FOR OFfICLALUSE ONLY
ALGERIA
AGRICULTURE:A NEW OPPORTUNXTY FOR GROWTH
Table of Contents
Page Number
EXECUTIVE-SUMMARY ...... i
PART I. ALGERIAN AGRICULTURE: THE PAST IN PERSPECTIVEAND POTENTIAL FOR GK3WTH
I. BACKGROUND ...... 1
A. General Economic Framework ...... 1 B. AgriculturalOverview ...... 2
II. PAST AGRICUTURAL PERFORMANCE ...... 8
A. Introduction ...... 8 B. Level of Food Self-Sufficiency ...... 9 C. Yields ...... 10 D. The Dual Nature of the Agricultural Sector . .11
III. SOURCES OF PAST GROWTH.14
A. Overview ...... 14 B. Changes in Area Cultivated ...... 15 C. Yield Changes...... 16 D. Growth in Production ...... 18
IV. SOURCESOF FUTURE GROWTH ...... 19
A. Introduction .19 B. Lower Case Scenario ...... 20 C. Sources of Future Growth ...... 21 D. Quantifying Future Growth Rates ...... 25 E. Projections of Algeria's Food Gap ...... 27 F. Conclusions on FuturA Growth Rates ...... 31
This report was written by Laurie Effron and NicholasKrafft collectingdata from a number of missions to Algeria. Susan Simonelli and Katherine Kotellos (consultants)assisted with data compilation and analysis. Philippe Ardouin- Dumazet (FAO/CP - livestock specialist) and Loretta Sonn (FAO/CP - economist) wrote selected technical background papers.
This document has a restricted distributionand may be used by recipientsonly in the performance of their officialduties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosedwithout WorldBank authorization. AGRICULTURE:A NEW OPPORTUNITY FOR GROWTH
Table of Contents (continuedl
Page Number
PART II. KEY ACTIONS: MAKING THE AGRARIAN REFORM WORK
V. THE LARGER SETTING: MACROECONOMICREFORMS ...... 32
VI. TRANSFORMATIONOF THE AGRICULTURALSECTOR ...... 33
A. Introduction ...... 33 B. The Reform...... 33 C. EACs: Will They Perform? ...... 35 D. Making the Tools Available ...... 39
VII. REFORMING THE INSTITUTIONS ...... 40
A. Introduction ...... 40 B. Improv:ingthe Crop Extension and Research Services ...... 41 C. Improving Input Supplies and Delivery . . . . . 43 D. Liberalizingthe Marketing Systems ...... 46 E. A New Role for the Ministry of Agriculture . . 47 F. Livestock-RelatedIssues ...... 49
VIII. PRIVATE AND PUBLIC INVESTMENTS: PRIORITIES FOR THE FUTURE ...... 51
A. Introduction ...... 51 B. Expanding Private Investmentthrough Credit . . 51 C. The Future Role of Public Investment . . . . . 53
TX. INTRODUCINGAN EFFECTIVE PRICE AND INCENTIVE FRAMEWORK...... 64
A. Introduction ...... 64 B. Crop Prices ...... 65 C. Input Pricing ...... 66 D. Livestock Pricing ...... 66 E. Comparison with World Market Prices ...... 67 F. The Need to Rethink Future AgriculturalPricing Policy ...... 69 G. IncreasingIncentives for Agricutural Exports . 71 H. Consumer and Producer Prices and Subsidies . 72 I. Impact of Macroeconomic Policy on Agriculture . 75
X. CONCLUSION ...... 76
List of Working Papers and Annexes . . .78
StatisticalAppendix ...... 79
Map No. IBRD 21310 EXECUTIVESUMMARY
PART I: ALGERIANAGRI JLTURE: THEiPAST IN PERSPEC'CIVE AND POTENTIALFOR GROWTH
Background.Past Performanceand Sourcesof Past Growth
1. The Governmentof Algeriahas undertakena series of fundamentaland far-reachingreforms, aiming to increasethe economy'sefficiency through better use of existingcapacity and placinggreater reliance on the growingprivate sector. The new orientationfocuses on: (a) developingthe instrumentsof macroeconomicmanagement including monetary and fiscal policy; (b) greater autonomyand flexibilityof publicenterprises; (c) reformingthe agricultural sector;(d) restructuringthe financialsystem; and (e) liberalizingtrade, price and incentive regimes. The reforms have been most fundamentalin the agriculturalsector where Governmentdismantled the state farm sector and replacedit with about 27,000private farms (groupsand individuals).
2. The longer term objectivesinvolve establishinga system in which enterprisesare autr ,mousand competitive,the bankingsystem acts as financial intermediaryin channelingresources to the most highlyprofitable activities, quantitativerestrictions are limited or removed, and price controls are restrictedto a few "scrategic"activities or goods. The reformsunderway in other sectorsw'Ll thus serveagriculture by allowinga more efficientdelivery system for inputs and agriculturalequipment, ensuring better after-sales serviceand supplyof spareparts, providing greater incentives for exports,and allowinga greaterflow of resourcesto the most productiveactivities.
3. Agricultureis, and will remain,a key sectorof the economy,accounting for 8% of GDP and 25% of employment.Mowever, food importsnow accountfor up to 20% of merchandiseimports and are growingrapidly. The growing"food gap" is a major issuefor Algeria. With soil and climaticconditions similar to its neighbors,Algeria probably has a comparativeadvantage in a number of major cerealsand some fruitsand vegetables. A drive to improveproductivity and increaseself-sufficiency of thesecrops can thereforebe justifiedon economic grounds. In addition,considerable potential exists for increasingagricultural exportsto expandand diversifythe exportbase.
4. The state farms,which accountedfor about60% of Algeria'sagricultural potential,were formedimmediately after Independencein 1962 on the best land in the country - - the narrow coastal strip in the north - - that had been operated by Europeans.'During the 1960s and 1970s,most of Government'sinvestments in agriculturewere directedtoward this sector.The privatesector comprising some
Only 7.5 mn ha, or 3% of Algeria'sland area is suitable for agriculture.The best land was operatedby the state farm sector. The land south of the coastal strip, mainly operated by the traditionalprivate sector,has lower and more erratic rainfall; consequentlyit has a higherproportion under fallow. Overall,40- 45X of the 7.5 mn ha availablefor agricultureis left fallowin any year. - ii -
700,000-1,000,000farmers was, until the early 1980s, largelyneglected. During this period, Government also carried out numerous reforms of the state farm sector: an agrarian revolution which expropriated additional land from the private sector, the formation of a new "collective-farm"sector, the creation of Government-runcooperatives to handle inputs and output marketing, and the decentralization of decision-making. Despite these and other reforms, the majority of state farms had deficits that accumulatedfrom year to year and were kept operational only by a constant injection of Government funds to offset losses. Despite better resource endowment and access to inputs, the state farm sector performed only marginally better than the private sector in terms of yields of the major crops. Yields of private farmers were considerablyhigher than those of the state farms in pulses and most vegetables despite lower input use.
5. Since 1964, agriculture has grown at about 3% p.a. in constant 1986 prices, about equal to the growth rate of the population, and since 1979, at 5.5% p.a. which, by most indicators,is a good performance. While the important cereals sector has remained stagnant, the main soLrce of this growth over the past twenty years, and more especially in the last ten, has been the result of a shift into higher value, higher yielding vegetables and selected fruits and an increase in livestock production, particularly red meat and poultry. The increasedsupply of these commoditieshas been in response to increased producer prices resulting from the liberalizationof marketing and prices in the early 1980s, and has been largely demand driven. In spite of this high growth rate, with a population growth rate of 3.1% p.a. and a per capita income growth rate of 1.7% p.a. in real terms, the increase in agricultural production has been insufficientto prevent Algeria from becoming increasinglydependent on imports of basic foodstuffs: the self-sufficiencyratio for cereals has fallen from about 90% in 1962 to 25% in recent years and the value of food imports as a percentage of total imports has increasedfrom 11% in the 1970-72 period to over 20% in 19S8. The value of agriculturalexports has decreased continuouslysince 1970-72, falling steeply from abcut 12% of total exports to less than 1% (comparedto 16% in Morocco and 7% in Tunisia) in 1987, although this has been partly due to the sharp rise in the value of hydrocarbon exports.
6. Yields are low in comparisonwith other countries and have been generally stagnant in the twenty-fiveyears since Independence,a major cause for concern given that input and agricultural equipment use are more intensive than in neighboringcountries. The low level of yields has been primarily attributable to the dominance of socialist farms, to the weakness of supporting institutions such as research and extension, and to problems in input and equipment distributionand repair facilities.
7. Because of the relatively weak performance in productivityterms of the agriculturalsector and more particularlyof the state farm sector, Government instituted a series of reforms starting in the early 1980s. The principal reforms were: (a) the liberalizationof the marketing arrangementsand pricing of most fruits and vegetables; (b) the decentralizationand restructuringof the cooperative agencies responsiblefor the provision of inputs and for marketing; and (c) the creation of an agriculturalbank, BADR, to channel resources to agriculture. In 1987, Government undertook the most profound reform to date, - iii -
the breakup and dissolution of the 3,400 state farms, averaging about 700 ha each, into groups of about 6-7 private farmers, each group with some 80 ha. This reform fundamentallychanged the structure of the agriculturalsector from one with centralized control of investment allocarion decisions, productive plans and prices, to one that relies on market signals and incentives. Although the two cropping seasons following the reform, 1988 and 1989, have been difficult ones because of the profound change in ownership patterns compounded w4:h two successive years of drought, the reform has laid the foundation for a more responsive and dynamic agricultural sector which could, if the appropriate strategy is followed, lead to substantialgrowth in the future.
Future Growth
8. Government's agricultural strategy can significantly influence future growth by taking full advantage of the reform already in place. This report has identified four specific sources of growth for the future: an increase in productivityand yields in existing agriculturalareas; a decrease in land left to fallow so that the area under cultivationcan be increased; increases in the area under irrigation; and development of the South. The increase in yields could comprise two parts. First, a jump to bring Algerian yields in line with those of Morocco and Tunisia, requiring increases of 20-70%. And thereafter, further increases of up to 3% p.a. which would equal the impressivegrowth rates achieved in Turkey. A decrease in fallow involves developing suitable technical packages and appropriate incentives. Increasingthe area under irrigation and developing the South both involvesubstantial public investments. These sources of growth can only bc devclcped if a number of actions and policy measures is taken by Government, including improving the input and equipment supply and servicingnetworks, strengtheningthe planning capacity for public investments, and developing research and extension services.
9. Unlike the past, where growth was essentially demand driven, the projections on both population growth and per capita income increases suggest a slowdown in the increase in the demand for food. Future growth will therefore be more geared to import substitutionor increased agriculturalexports.
10. Three growth scenarioshave been identified,using different assumptions on investmentrates, policy changesand rate of institutionaldevelopment. These scenarios are:
- the lower growth case in which no new major actions are taken by Government. Irrigationis projected to increase at a modest 4,000 ha/yr, and the South to be developedmore gradually. Policies and services are projected to remain as they have been, and inputs would be in relatively short supply. As a result, the recentlyprivatized farms may not be able to realize a significant increase in yields. The result of this situation would be a growth rate of less than 3% p.a. between 1990 and 1995, compared to 3% over the past 20 years, and 5.5X over the past 10 years. - iv -
a middle growth case with policy changes to ensure a better distribution of inputs, equipment and spare parts, resulting in gradual yield improvementsto the year 1995; establishmentof extension and research services that enables yield growth at 1Z thereafter; development of incentives as well as environmentallysound farm management practices that would encourage a gradual reduction over the next twenty years of about 25X of the area under fallow; investmentsin irrigationat a rate of 12,000 ha per year, and development of the irrigation in the South at an additional 4,000 ba per year. This scenario gives a growth rate of 4-5X p.a. for the 1990-95 period, and is considered to be the most realistic of the three, as it takes into account the possibilities and the constraints of Algerian agriculture
a higher growth case in which Algeria: (a) moves rapidly in ensuring adequate input supply and ir reformingthe input delivery system so that much of the yield gap with neighboring countries can be closed by about 1993; (b) quicklyestablishes an effectiveresearch and extension system so that yield increases are maintained at 31 p.a. after 1992; (c) increases the irrigated area by 20,000 ha/yr; and (d) establishes technical packages and incentives so as to reduce land under fallow by 1.3 mn ha., or about 451 of the area, over a twenty year period. The result is a growth rate of 6-7X p.a. for the 1990-95 period and should be considered the upper limit of what Algeria can expect to achieve in the near to medium term.
11. Under optimalconditions, Algeria could reduce dependenceon imports for selected items and modestly diversify exports. For wheats, the self-sufficiencyratio could be as high as 331 in the best case scenario or only 171 in the lower case, compared to 26X in the 1983-87 period. The projected food import bill in the year 2000 is 141 of the total merchandise imports in the higher growth scenario and 161 in the lower growth scenario, the difference representingsome US$ 600 million (in current terms)in foreign exchange.' The relative insensitivityof the results on the proportion of imports to be used for food is due to the fact that about one third of the food import bill is for items not produced in Algeria (such as sugar and coffee) and because much of the growth projected here would be from fruits and vegetables which are not now imported. This underlines the importanceof tackling issues that deal with both the demand and supply side of the issue of food self-sufficiency. While agricultural growth could lead to increased exports, this is difficult to quantify,as it depends on findingand satisfyingmarkets with suitable quantity, quality, timing and packaging of the products.
'/ This estimate excludes imports of maize, barley, and other agricultural items used as inputs, primarily for livestock. It should be noted that Algeria's food importscurrently representover 201 (in 1988), and up to 301 (in 1989) of total merchandise imports, but these were exceptionallypoor years for agriculturalproduction. II. PART II: KEY ACTIONS:MAKING THE AGRARIANREFORM WORK
12. Part II of the reportaddresses the issuesthat Governmentwill need to resolveto tap the four sourcesof growthdiscussed above. Economy-widereforms that directlyor indirectlyaffect the performanceof agricultureare discussed in ChapterV and includethe need to liberalizeregulations governing private investment,increased autonomy and reducedprotection of nationalenterprises, liberalizationof prices,an exchangerate reflectingthe opportunitycost of foreign exchange to the economy, and a ma: et-based allocationof foreign exchange;these reforms would serve to imt,ove farmers' access to better equipmentand spare parts and to increaseincentives to agriculturalexports. In addition,a numberof actionsaimed specifically at agriculturecan be taken. These would serve to develop those commoditiesfor which Algeria has a comparativeadvantage. These actions fall into four categories:those relating directlyto the breakupof the state farm sector,to institutionalreform, to the role of privateand publicinvestments, and to pricingand incentives.The followingsuzmmarizes the recommendationscontained in ChaptersVI-IX of the reportwith referencesto the main text.
Transformationof the AgriculturalSector (Chapter VI and VolumeII, Annex 2)
13. The poterttialfor agriculturalgrowth in the near term is closelyrelated to the impacton yieldsof the transformationof the socialistfarm systeminto a nrivatized svstem; estimates of growthrates are sensitiveto the assumptions on the abilityof the privatizedfarms, ExploitationsAgricoles Collectives (EACs),to increaseyields in a short time. The speed and magnitudeof the reform involvesconsiderable risks for the near future. These includethe managerialcapacity of the EACs, where the farmersare having to adjust from being wage-earn-ersto entrepreneurs(para. 6.06). Other risks relate to the availabilityof inputs (para. 6.15), the level of indebtednessof farmers (para.6.14), the abilityof Governmentto strengthensupport services (para. 6.16and ChapterVII), and the possibilityof a majorshift in croppingpatterns, overproductionof certaincrops, and a sharp drop in prices (para.6.17). The refora took place in the midst of the 1987-88crop season,which was also a droughtyear; the following1988-89 season was also a poor year for rainfall. So it is still difficultto assess the short term impact of the reform on productionand yields. It appears,however, that EAC farmersare workingharder than ever, thatyields in irrigatedareas are up and that the potentialbenefits from increasedproductivity far outweighthe risks. Nevertheless,the reform needs to be monitoredclosely (para. 7.23).
14. The law settingup the EACs requiresthat they be farmedcollectively and not dividedinto smallerunits. Experiencein othercountries suggests that flexibilityin the applicationof this law would be advantageous,as collective decision-makingfrequently results in sub-optimalinvestment decisions. The legislationshould be relaxedto allow subdivisionof EACs on a case-by-case basis (para.6.09). Governmentshould also considerthe creationof a market in land-userights which would permitfarming on a largerscale in those cases where economiesof scaledictate and would also allow the purchaseor rentalof - vi - additionalland by more successfulfarmers. ihis is likelyto encouragefarmers to developfully their land. This shouldbe consideredin conjunctionwith a ceilingon the holdingof land use rights (para.6.13). The decisionson farm size and the creationof a market in land or land-userights should be made in the contextof an overallland-use policy (para6.12).
15. EACs have been establishedat an averagesize of 80 ha, a size thought to be farmedefficiently by a tractor;hence their indivisibility.It is not evident,however, that all farmsneed to be this large to be farmedby suitably adaptedfarm equipment. Indeed,labor-intensive crops can oftenbe farmedmost productivelyon small farms. In additionto allowingsubdivision where there are diseconomiesof scale,development of privaterental markets for equipment shouldbe encouragedto permitfull utilization of equipmentwhere farmsare too small to justifymajor investmentsin equipment(paras. 6.09 and 6.11).
16. Algeria'shistory of major agriculturalreorganization is such that fac-mersmay not be convincedthat the currentright to use the land will be any more permanentthan previousreforms. If so, investmentin land improvements will be sub-optimal.In the absenceof title to their property,farmers need to be assuredthat usufructrights are guaranteedfor at least 15 years. Also, the provisionsof the law should be clarifiedto state. except where new irrigationschemes have alreadybeen identified,that no EAC farms will be subdividedby Governmentfiat (para.6.12).
Reformingthe Institutions(Chapter VII)
17. Changesin institutionssupporting agriculture will have a rsjor role to play in enablingfarmers to realizetheir potentialand, in the lo-gerterm, to expand that potential. The abilityof the supportingservices to deliver technicalpackages, of the bankingsystem to providecredit, and of the marketing networksto deliverthe inputswill determinein the longerterm at what pace growthcan be realized. ChapterVII focuseson the importanceof the extension and researchservices, on the need to improvesupport services for inputsupplies and marketing,the new role for the Ministryof Agriculture,and on issuesin the livestocksubsector.
18. Improvingthe CroR Extensionand ResearchServices. Governmentshould simplifyand clarifythe extensionorganization, divest staff of non-extension tasks,improve the commandstructure and providestrong technical support for the extensionworkers (para.7.06). Governmentsimilarly needs to streamline the researcheffort and rationalizethe work programsof the researchinstitutes. Along these lines,Government closed more than 20 researchstations in 1987 and 1988 and reallocatedresources to the key effortunderway. To strengthenthe organizationalframework, INRAA's role as the centralcoordinating agency should be strengthenedby putting into effect a new statute already drawn up; extension-researchlinkages should also be strengthened. Finally,terms and conditionsof researchservice should be revisedto providean adequatecareer path for technicalstaff (paras.7.07 and 7.08). - vii -
19. ImnrovingInput Supplies and DeliveU. SinceAlgeria's state fatmshed relativelygood accessto inputs,shortage3 of inputswere not, until recently, a major constraint.With the break-upof state farmsand the creationof many, smallerunits and with increasedincentives to use inputs,the demandhas likely increased.For the successof the agriculturalreform, Government should ensure that sufficientforeign exchange is availableto importagriculture inputs. The means to improvethe qualityand deliveryof seeds also needs to be examined further.A fertilizerstudy is being carriedout in 1990,financed by UNDP,with the World Bank as ExecutingAgency, to examineways of improvingdistribution and to make recommendationson pricingpolicy. It would improveefficiency if EACs could purchaseinputs from the least costlysource, and privatetraders couldstock and sell inputs,including inputs for livestock,at marginsthLat make them attractive. In this respect,formerly state-run "cooperatives" are being convertedto farmer-ownedcooperatives. It is recommendedthat Government allow the full privatizationof the cooperatives(para 7.11). It might also increase efficiencyif enterprisesother than the statemonopolies were allowedto import inputs(para. 7.12).
20. Mechanizatiot1. As a result of a deliberatepolicy to distribute equipmentto the staterarms, Algeria's official statistics indicate that it is relativelywell-endowed with tractorsand combineharvesters compared to its neighbors.Because of problemsof spare parts and repairfacilities, however, the data may not representthe real availabilityof functioningequipment. The future ability of Algeria to continue to mechanize depends on Algeria's industrializationpolicy, which currentlyprovides absolute protection to Algeria'sstate industries.To allow farmersto purchaseappropriate equipment at or near world prices, it shouldbe manufacturedor importedby efficient industries. It is thereforedesirable to: (a) cnsure sufficientsupplies of spare parts by ensuring availabilityof foreign exchange to importers; (b) liberalizethe purchase,sale, and distributionof new equipmentand spare parts at margins that encouragethe privatesector; (c) set prices of spare parts at a level that encouragesrepair of old equipmentrather than its replacementby now equipment; and (d) encourage farmers and small scale entrepreneursto set up equipmenthire services(para. 7.15).
21. Liberali.ipg the MarketingSystems. Marketingis the responsibilityof a plethoraof bureaus and cooperatives,which shouldbe rationalized. More recently,with the liberalizationof marketingarrangements of fruits and vegetables,the privatesector has begun to play a significantrole in marketirg these crops (in additionto their role in ailk and meat marketing). It is recommendedthat Government consider further liberalizationof marketing arrangements,especially for barleyand othercereals produced for the livestock sector,and for exportcrops. The decreeson privateinvestments should also be reviewedas should the complex system of licensingprivate traders and investors(para. 7.18).
22. A New Role for the Mlnistryof Agriculture. In the past the role of the Ministrywas orientedtoward planning, supporting and monitoringthe state farms. The near term work program of the Ministry might now include: (a) building up and maintaininga viable research and extension service; - viii -
(b) strengthening its planning capacity to establish sectoral objectives and priorities; (c, creating a system of pxices and incentives that sends signals to farmers and maximizes economic returns to the country, and, if required, maintaining control of a limited number of what Government considers to be strategiccrops (hardwheat, in particular);(d) building up its review capacity to screen all public investments of a certain minimum size for technical, financial,economic, social and environmentalacceptability; (e) undertaking a public sector investment/expendituresreview to drop all low priority projects; (f) reviewing existing input-surply and marketing arrangements to make recommendationsto improve their efficiencyand reduce the burden on Government; (g) strengthening its capacity to monitor the performance of the agricultural sector, including data collection and analysis; and (h) strengthening its capacity to monitor, analyze and recommendprices for those crops that are still controlled to provide adequate incentives for farmers (paras. 7.19-7.23).
23. Livestock. Responding to high milk and meat prices, livestock performance,especially poultry, has generally been good. This has encouraged the import of exotic animals for milk production which raises a number of technical issues that need further study (para. 7.25). As with crop services, livestockextension services need to be strengthenedand private and cooperrstive veterinarians should be promoted to reduce the burden on Government. Finally, both the private sector and cooperatives should be encouraged to set up milk collection centers (para. 7.26).
Private and Public Investments: Priorities for the Future (Chapter VIII)
24. Exoanding PXivate Investment through Credit. In addition to gzowth rates engenderedby a jump in farmers' productivity from more efficient use of resources and inputs, a second major source of growth is investment, either through private means or through public investments. Governmenthas moved away from centrallyplanned public investmentstowards relyingon private investments. As a result, availability and efficiency of agricultural credit are keys to future investmentsin agriculture. Aside from the dissolution of the DAS, the most importantchange introducedby Government is the passage of the Banking Law (1986auid amendments in 1988) making banks, includingthe agriculturalban'k BA')R, autonomous. Their autonomy went into effect in early 1989 and BADR has had to deal with a large demand for agriculturalcredit occurring in two successive drought years; BADR has twice allowed a moratorium on loan repayments. The impact of this on BADR's financial position will have to be closely monitored. This transition to autonomy will not be easy and, to prevent BADR's immobilization,Government should be prepared to provide support to BADR, on a declining basis, for a period of up to five years (para. 8.05). Govrernmenthas indicated its intention to establish positive real interest rates within three years (para. 8.07). In addition, although access to foreign exchange is still rationed by bureaucratic procedures, Government has simplified licensing requirementsand eased access to imports for private investors,and has removed the ceilings on the value of the investments allowed for private investors (para. 8.06). - ix -
25. The FutureRole of PublicInvestment. Most publicinvestments have been decentralizedto the wilaya,except for large-scale,mostly infrastructure- relatedprojects. These centrally-plannedinvestments do, however,have an importantrole to play as a sourceof futuregrowth. The most importantof these centrally-plannedinvestments is irrigation.
26. Investmentsin Irrigation.Until recently,the area under irrigation was more or less static(at about 3-400,000ha out of a potentialof 8-900,000ha), with new irrigationabout offsetting schemes that had falleninto disrepair. The major constraintsto furtherexpansion are: (a) lack of water and competitionwith urbanand industrialusers -- an issuethat will becomemore acuteover time; (b) the high cost of irrigationdevelopment and the consequent financialburden on Government;(c) the implicationof low economicprofitability in those schemes with low yields and/or cropping intensities;(d) slow implementationcapacity, and the absenceof a clearstrategy and soundinvestment program;and (e) the risk that waterdevelopment may not be sustainablebecause major water sourcesmay be lost to pollutionor to reservoirsedimentation. Measuresshould be introducedto conservewater, including inter alia, setting realisticwater charges, taking steps to recharge the aquifers by using unregulatedwater resourcesand to recyclewaste water for irrigation. In addition,a long-termplan for integrateduse of watersources by the end-users shouldbe developed.For the issuesrelating to budgetaryand economicaspects, and to addressthe lack of a clear strategyand long-termplan, it would be useful if the Ministryof Equipmentcould: (a) seek lower cost solutionsthan have been found in the past; (b) strengthenits overall planningcapacity, includingits capacityto assessthe economicviability of investmentsin the irrigationsector; (c) make a carefulassessment of the relativepriority of projects;(d) draw up the ten year irrigationdevelopment plan, alreadyagreed to under a Bank-financedproject (paras. 8.21-8.26). Finally, a major issue is the growing gap between completeddams or dams under constructionand the constructionof associatedirrigation and watersupply infrastructure. Priority shouldbe given to the completionof existingprojects by speedingup planning and constructionof irrigationand water supplyinfrastructure associated with dams. If necessary,the constructionof new dams shouldbe delayed. Several of theserecommendations are alreadybeing implemented.
27. In 1985, Government establishedindependent agencies (OPI) to be responsiblefor irrigationmaintenance. It is Government'sintention that these agenciesand thereforeall operationand maintenancecosts be funded solely throughthe recoveryof watercharges. Charges have been increasedsignificantly since1985 and Governmentis studyingthe issuein detail(para 8.21). Execution of irrigationprojects is constrainedby lack of coordination(particularly betweendam constructionand constructionof associatedirrigation and water supplyinfrastructure), shortage of trainedstaff, and shortageof essential materials required in the construction of large scale irrigation works. In addition to measures to strengthen planning, steps should be taken to upgrade staff skills and adopt a more feasibleapproach to the import of irrigationpipes (para 8.24).
28. To deal with the issue of the potential loss of water supplies due to pollution or reservoir sedimentation,greater priority needs to be given to environmental issues associated with water development, including appropriate use of fertilizersand pesticides,over-exploitation, overgrazing of watersheds, and deforestation. Monitoring and control of surface and groundwaterresources should also be strengthened. All these issues have particular relevance for the South (see below and paras. 8.25-26).
29. Development of the South. For social reasons and to stem the flow to the already densely populated North, Government has recently given increasing emphasis to the developmentof the South, where some 7-8% of Algeria'spopulation reside. Three approaches are being used: land distributionto private farmers, rehabilitating existing plantations in oases, and drilling deep wells for large-scalecereals production. Water resources in the South are, for the most part, non-renewable. It appears that full development of the areas already distributed to farmers (200,000 ha as of end-1989) would exceed the estimated potential water resource which could lead to serious social and conservation problems in the future. In addition, given the lack of infrastructurein the South, the costs of developmentare high so that economic viability is an issue. Third, the region is ecologicallyfragile, the soil is short in organic matter, and hot summer winds are a threat to cultivated areas. Given these environmental,cost, and other considerations,a comprehensivedevelopment plan for the South should be drawn up which takes a realistic account of the natural resourcesof the area and the feasibilityof development;in addition,monitoring and control of the water resources should be strengthened (paras. 8.27-8.30).
30. Forestry. Forestry plays an important role for agriculture through protecting watersheds and safeguarding irrigation systems, water supplies, agricultural production, and wildlife. In addition, since Algeria currently imports some $2-300 M of wood products per annum, increasedwood production can be an important source of import substitution. Forest range lands are also a major factor in Algeria's fodder production. Algeria has a considerably underdevelopedpotential. To protect Algeria's soils and water catchments and to increase wood and fodder production, there is a need to strengthen the planning framework, to define priority areas for erosion control works in the watershed areas, to prepare forest management plans, and to develop management and exploitation techniques to increase productivityat lower cost. The Bank has been requested to assist in this subsector and is preparing a forestry project as a first phase in a long-termintegrated development effort of forestry resources in Algeria (paras 8.31-8.32).
31. EnvironmentalConcerns and SustainableAgricultural Growth. Relying on the various sources of agricaltural growth implies greater reliance on more intensive use of fertilizersand pesticides,which in turn will have an impact on the environment, on the quality of the water in particular, and on the long-termsustainability of the sectorIs growth. In this vein, UNDP has financed - xi - a firstphase of technicalassistance to developand help with the adoptionof technicalpackages for integratedpest managementsc as to minimizelong-term hazards. Monitoringthe impactof inputuse, and particularlypesticide residue on agriculturalexports to the EEC, will be receivinggreater attention than in the past (para. 8.33). To improve the monitoringof public investments, particularlyirrigation development and investmentsin the South,it is important thatGovernment ensure adequate staffing, training and financingof the existing environmentalunit currentlylocated in the Ministryof Equipment;it is also importantthat staff in the Ministryof Agriculturebe trainedin environmental aspectsof agriculturalactivities (para 8.34). To ensurethat developmentof Algerianagriculture is sustainablein the lon.g-term,ongoing operations and new investmentsshould be examined in the contextof integratedland and water resourcemanagement plans that examine the impact onigroundwater recharge, pollution,erosion, and long-termsustainability (para. 8.35).
Introducingan EffectivePricing and IncentiveFramework (Chapter IX)
32. If the agriculturalsector is to achieve the higher growth rates indicatedabove, it is essentialthat Government has in placea systemof prices and incentivesthat encouragesfarmers to increaseproductivity. Agriculture has generallyreceived favorableprice treatmentover the past 15 years. Cereals,pulses, wine grapes,olives and industrialtomatoes are sold at prices fixed by Government,while all othersare essentiallydetermined on the free market. For severalof the "controlled"crops, the wheatsand barley,a parallel marketexists which handlesup to 50-60%of the productionvolume. Crop prices were more or less static until 1974, but prices of both controlledand free-marketcommodities have recentlyrisen sharply. Producerprices for most crop and livestockproducts are considerablyabove importparity prices even using a shadowexchange rate (paras.9.02-9.03 and 9.09-9.10).
33. Following many years during which input prices were subsidized, Governmenthas adopteda policyof bringinginput pricescloser to "production and marketingcosts", a policyof veritedes nrix. As a result,input prices have more than doubledin the past fiveyears (whilethe GDP deflatorincreased by about 15% over the sameperiod). Governmentintended to removeall financial subsidiesby 1989 and it is possibleto state (at the end of 1989)that, starting from the ex-factoryprice (whichdoes not cover costs of production),most marketingsubsidies have been eliminated.These price increaseshave moved input pricestowards their economicprices. For inputsmanufactured in Algeriaunder inefficientconditions, the policyof removingaIl financialsubsidies, including those on production,means that farmerswould be paying the costs of these inefficiencies.It would thereforebe more consistentto move towardsa system of linkinginput prices to world prices,therebv insuring that they reflected economic,rather than financial,value (para 9.05).
34. Milk and meat prices are betweentwo and four times the world market price at the currentexchange rate, partlybecause of restrictionson trade; these pricesprobably cannot be maintainedin the long run in the absenceof subsidies. In addition,an FAQ report suggests that the relativelyhigh livestockprices have encouragedfarmers to grow low yieldingcereals for the - xii - straw and stubblevalue for livestock. If internalprices were to adjustto world market levels, the modern livestockindustry might collapse. Should furtheranalysis confirm it, consideration should be givento increasingemphasis on meat productionfrom sheepand goats,to liberalizingthe importof beef, and to freezingthe controlledproducer price of milk (paras.9.06-9.08).
35. All pricesshould be set at levelsthat reflectthe economiccosts to the countryof producingimport substitutes or exportcrops; that is, in relation to world marketprices. A study is to be carriedout of pricesand incentives similarto studiesundertaken in Tunisiaand Morocco (paras.9.12-9.16)
36. With favorable prices and a conducive institutionalframework, agriculturalexports can be increased,although the impacton totalexports will initiallybe small. An analysisis needed,however, of Algeria'scomparative advantageof variousexport crops. In addition,to providebetter incentives to exportersof thosecrops that Algeriawould like to encourage,the exporters could be allowedto retain a higher portionof t'neforeign exchange surplus earnedthan the 10 they are allowedat presentto retain (paras.9.17-9.18).
37. .onsumerprices of most "essential"food items,such as bread and other wheat products,have been controlledand set at levelsto providefood at low cost to consumers.While subsidieson importedwheat declinedbetween 1982 and 1988, the subsidiesfor locallyprocured wheat have increasedconsiderably becauseof the recentincrease of producerprices. Based on the 1989 producer prices,Government can expectto pay up to DA 2 bn (US$250mn) a year in cereals subsidies. This represents2.5X of Government'scurrent account expenditures. If the recent increasein producerprices (fromDA 2,700/tonto DA 4,000/ton for hard wheat) inducesa supplyresponse, and/or there is furtherdevaluation that would increasethe dinar cost of importedcereals, the subsidiesrequired would becomea furtherburden on the budget. While it is importantto provide basic foodstuffsat affordableprices, the drain on Government'sbudget would be reducedif subsidieswere targeted. Consumerprices and subsidiesalso need to be examinedin the contextof the proposedstudy on pricesand incentives (paras.9.19 - 9.25).
38. The likely impactof devaluationwould be to reduceprofitability of the agriculturalproduction through the impacton input prices. Most output prices,now determinedby either internalmarket forceswhere the market is protected,or by Governmentfiat, would not be affectedby devaluation. If quantitativerestrictions on importedfood (mainlymeat, fruitsand vegetables) were removed at the same time, however,this would counteractthe impactof devaluationon producerprices by puttingdownward pressure on them. Since agricultureis alreadya profitableactivity, and for fruitsand vegetablesa highlyprofitable one, this would be unlikelyto cause a major shift away from farming. The other major impact of devaluationwould be in the level of subsidiesrequired, which would increasesub.:antially, unless consumer prices are increasedcommensurately with the rate of devaluation(paras. 9.26-9.32). - xiii -
Conclusion (ChapterX)
39. Provided that Governmentputs in place an appropriatepolicy environment, Algeria's agriculturalsector has the potential to grow at 6-7% p.a. over the next five years. Alternatively,if few policy improvementsare introduced, it can be expected to grow at less than 3.0% p.a. In the higher growth scenario, Algeria could realize a 33% rate of self-sufficiencyin wheats, its staple food, versus only 17% in the lower case scenario. Agricultural exports could grow significantlyover the present modest levels, or they could remain at less than 1% of total merchandiseexports. Government'scommitment to resolve the issues described in this report will determine the success of the sector in realizing its objectives.
40. The major recommendationsof this report can be summarized as follows:
(a) The key to success for the sector in the future will be making the new land reform work. To achieve this, it is desirable that the Government be pragmatic and flexible in applying the law setting up the EACs. Both subdivision of the EACs and land rental markets should be allowed.
(b) The new farmers will require a greatly improved system of support services. To achieve this, the marketing systems for inputs and output should be liberalized, cooperatives should be taken over either by farmers or private entrepreneurs,and rental markets for mechanization services should be allowed to develop. The research and extension services also need to be strengthened.
(c) If stable longer term growth is to be achieved without a major drain on the Governmentbudget, an improvedprice and incentivesstructure must be put into place that reflects economic values. To help achieve this, a pricing and incentives study needs to be carried out. In addition, it would be desirable for the Ministry of Agriculture to establish sectoral priorities for public investments that take account of financial, economic, technical and environmentalfactors.
(d) Since the credit system will handle much of the new investment in the rainfed areas, public investment will emphasize irrigation, development of the South, and forestry. It is important that the Ministry of Equipment together with the Ministry of Agriculture strengthen its planning capacity to coordinatethe use of water resources to ensure timely construction of both dams and irrigation and water supply infrastructure,and to develop area master plans for regional land use and water development; such planning should be followed by monitoring, particularlyfor environmentalaspects, to ensure that the development is sustainable. AGRICULTURE: A NEWUPPORTUNITY FOR GROWTH
PART I
ALGERIANAGRICULTURE: THE PAST IN PERSPECTIVEAND POTENTIALFOR GROWTH
I. BACKGROUND
A. GeneralEconomic Framework
1.01 At lndependencein 1962,Algeria was predominantlyan agrariansociety with a limitedindustrial base. The basis of independentAlgeria's economic strategywas thepromotion of industrializationand reduceddependence on foreign investmentsand imports. The major elements of this strategy were the applicationof centralizedplanning to the economy, reliance on public enterprisesin industryand services,an agrarianrevolution which included creation of socialist sector farms, and a shift from the narrow export orientationof the colonialperiod to a strategyof domesticself-sufficiency. The strategywas fueledby the exportof hydrocarbonproducts which generated nationalsavings for investmentand avoided excessiverecourse to external borrowing.The strategymet with some success. The investmentto GDP ratiowas maintainedat about 40X until the early eighties,one of the highestlevels in the world, and the economy,driven by these high investmentrates, grew at an averageof 6X per year in the 1970s comparedto 3X p.a. for othermiddle income countriesas a group. Most socialindicators also registeredimprovement.
1.02 These impressiveachievements were, however, accompaniedby serious disequilibria.Economic and socialinfrastructure in many sectorsremained well below planned targets,hampering the efficiencyof the productivesectors. Consumptionrates were low; unemploymentrates were in excessof 15X and have now risen to around22X. Overall,the pace of development,while rapid,was not commensuratewith the enormouslevels of investment.
1.03 In the early 1980s,Government moved to eliminatesome of the constraints developingin the economywith more emphasisbeing given to improvedmanagement and efficiency.This becameall the more importantas most economicindicators turnedsharply unfavorable in responseto the 1986 drop in oil priceswhen the averageprice per barrelof Algerianoil fell by half. Exportrevenues fell by 36X -- a problemthat was aggravatedby the fall of the dollar. The country's terms of trade fell by some 60X between1985 and 1988. The debt serviceratio (as a percentageof exports)rose from 33X in 1985 to over 60X in 1988;and this was accompaniedby a sharp jump in medium-and long-termexternal debt. The currentaccount, which showeda surplusof some US$ 190 milliona year in the -2 - period1980-85, moved sharply into a deficitof US$ 2.2 billionin 1986. In 1986 and 1987, a stringentimport cut-back program and reducedinvestments brought it into approximatebalance. As a resultof the cut-back,however, the valte of importsin dollarterms fell between1985 and 1987 by 27%. This has been of particularconcern to agriculturebecause of the sharpdrop in availabilityof agricu'lturalinputs. The actionsto limit importsalso reducedoverall growth substantiallyfrom 3.9% p.a. over the period 1980-85to 1.0% in 1986, and to between -1 and -2% in 1987 and 1988. After socialunrest towardsthe end of 1988,Algeria again increasedits importsand its currentaccount moved into a deficitof aboutUS$2 billion;growth of GDP is projectedat 2.8% for 1989. With populationgrowth of some 3.2% p.a., GDP per capitahas declinedfor four years in a row.
1.04 The shift in economic polic- referred to above has led to the introductionof a seriesof reformsthat coverspractically all areasof economic activity. These reforms aim to decentralizethe economy, make it more market-oriented,increase its efficiencythrough better utilization of existing capacity,and place greaterreliance on the smallbut growingprivate sector. The new policy orientationfocuses on (i) developingthe instrumentof macroeconomic managementincluding monetary and fiscalpolicy; (ii) greater autonomyand flexibilityto publicenterprises, (iii) reforms in theagricultural sectoras describedlater in this report,(iv) restructuring the financialsystem and (v) liberalizingtrade, price and incentiveregimes. The firstsignificant reformoccurred in 1983 vith the breakupof about 60 largePublic Enterprises into 300 smaller ones. Other reforms have followed: in 1986 Government establishedgreater autonomy for the banking sector, and in 1987 public enterpriseswere grantedmore autonomy;the Ministryof Plan was abolishedand, with it, the conceptand functionof a priori controland centralinvestment allocation.In the agriculturesector, the most imporrantof the reformsis the recentprivatization of the state farmingsector which accountedfor about60% of the agriculturalpotential of the country. The paragraphsbelow describe the agriculturalsector and the recentreform program in more detail.
1.05 The economicreforms in Algeriaare beingcarried out with the long term objectivesof establishingan economicsystem in whichenterprises are autonomous and competitive,where monopolies are the exceptionrather than the rule,where the bankingsystem plays its functionof financialintermediary in channeling resourcesto the most highly profitableactivities, and where quantitative restrictionsand price controlsare no longerso pervasiveand integralto the system. Thesereforms will thus serveagriculture, directly and indirectly,by allowing a more efficientdelivery system for inputs, making availableat economiccost agriculturalequipment, ensuring a betterafter sales serviceand spare partsavailability, providing greater incentives for exportsand allowing a greaterflow of resourcesto the most productiveactivities.
B. Agricu.lturalOverview
1.06 Agricultureis now, and will remain,a key sectorof the economy,because it accountsfor about8% of GDP and 25% of employment(para 2.01). Increasing agriculturalproduction will remaina centralfocus of reformmeasures because food importsnow accountfor as much as 15 - 20% of totalmerchandise imports (para 2.03) and are growing rapidly,while much of Algeria'spotential for -3- agriculturalproduction remains undeveloped. Without specificmeasures to promoteproduction, Algeria will continueto use about16% of merchandiseimports to buy foodstuffsby the year 2000 (para 4.31) and Algeria'sself-sufficiency levelsin basic foodstuffscould fall even further(from 26% for wheatsin the 1983-87 period, for example, to only about 17% by the year 2000 -- lower case scenario-- Table 12). It is likelythat Algeria, with similarsoil and climatic conditionsto its neighboringcountries, has comparativeadvantage in a number of itsmajor cereals,so that the drive to improveproductivity and increasefood self-sufficiency,particularly for hard -'eat, can be justifiedon economic grounds (para 9.15). In addition,with a Aisiblelimit to the potentialfor hydrocarbonexports, the potentialfor increasingagricultural exports in order to diversifyand expandthe exportbase shouldbe explored.
PhysicalCharacteristics
1.07 Algeria,after the Sudan, is the largestcountry in terms of area in Africa and the Arab-Moslemworld. It covers some 2.4 million km2 , divided essentiallyinto three zones roughlyparallel to the MediterraneanCoast, and dividedby mountainranges: (a)a northernstrip, with relativelygood rainfall, dividedby the TellianAtlas Mountainsfrom: (b) a relativelymountainous, pre-desertsteppe (one-thirdof the countryhas an altitudeover 1,000 m; the averagealtitude is 900 m); these two zones cover 15X of the country;and (c) south of the Saharan Atlas Mountains, comprising slightly over 2 million km2 , is the Sahara desert,with a harsh climate,which, apart from the oases, is not inhabited or cultivated. Most of the population,91%, live along the Mediterraneancoast on 12% of the land area; only 7-8% (or about 1.8 million), mainlynomads and semi-settledBedouins, live in the Sahara.
1.08 Given the limitedamount of rainfallin the country,only 7.5 million ha, or 3%, is suitable for cultivation',while some 40 m ha are considered suitablefor grazing,forests, esparto scrub and shrubs. Becausesome 2.5-3.5 m ha of the land suitablefor cultivationare usuallyleft fallow, the area actuallycultivated in any given year is, however,only 4 to 5 m ha, 1.7% of Algeria'stotal land area. The area left fallowrepresents 40-45% of total cultivableland, compared to 28% in Moroccoand 10.5%in Tunisia. Detailedland use is shown in the StatisticalAppendix, Table 2.1, and summarizedin Table 1 below.
/ With a populationof about 24 million(end 1988),this translatesinto a per capitacultivable area of 0.32 ha, comparedto 0.35 ha per capita in Moroccoand 0.63 ha in Tunisia. -4 -
Table 1: LANDUSE IN ALGEK'A1986
('000 ha)(X TOTALUSE OF LAND Cultivable Land 7,528 3 Forest, Shrubs 4,252 2 Esparto Grass 4,463 2 Prairie 31,155 13 Land not Used for Agriculture 191.183 80
Total Land Area A38,174 100
USE OF CULTIVABLELAND Cereals 2,871 38 Fallow 2,907 39 Fruit Trees 436 6 Vineyards 130 2 Forage 716 10 Vegetables 259 3 Pulses 156 2 Industrial Crops 24 - Other 29 _
Total 7.528 100
1.09 The 7.5 millionha of arable land can be divided into five zones, as shown in Table 2 below. Zone A is liotand well-wateredand is intensively cultivatedwith citrusand early vegetables. Zones B and C cover 66X of che cultivableland and includethe plateauareas where winters are cold, crops subjectto late frosts,and rainfallfluctuates sharply. Croppingin Zone B is mainlya wheat/fallowrotation and in Zone C, where rainfallis less certain, a barley/fallowrotation. In Zone D, between the dry south and the desert, cerealcropping is irregular. Zone M, in the mountains,is well-wateredbut, with steep slopes,is subjectto erosion. The area that can be consideredof rood rainfedagricultural potential is in fact extremelylimited, i.e., on the order of 1.1-1.4mha, while the area that is of marginaland/or highly variable rainfallaccounts for the vast majorityof arableland. This is reflectedin the increasingproportion of the arableland left fallowas one moves southward, from 20-25X in Zone B to at least 50-60% in Zone D. Irrigationcurrently accountsfor roughly3-400,000 ha', mainly in Zones A and B and in the southern oases,representing 4.21 of the arableland, comparedto 10 in Moroccoand 4X in Tunisia.
1.10 Any discussionof potentialfor growthand agriculturaldevelopment in Algeriamust confronta numberof physicalconstraints: (a) the high proportion of land unusablefor agricultureand of rangelandsas yet difficultto improve; (b) the high proportionof land thathas shallow,erodable soils and low organic content;(c) climaticfactors, including erratic and low rainfall,cold winters coincidingwith the rainy seasonwhich inhibitgrowth when water is available,
1/ The areaunder irrigationis estimatedat 60,000ha underlarge scale irrigation and some 240,000 to 340,000 ha under small scale irrigation,including flood-irrigation, which is highlyvariable. -5 -
and hot summers, requiring irrigation for crop growth'; and (d) limited availabilityof water for irrigation,competition with domestic and industrial use, and problems of salinity.
Table 2: CLASSIFICATIONOF ARABLE LAND IN ALGERIA
Area Fallow Zone Slope Rainfall ('000 ha) (X) (X)
A < 12% > 600 mm 331 4 minimum B < 12% 450-600 mm 1,461 20 20-25 C < 12% 350-450 mm 3,507 46 40-50 D < 12% 200-350 mm 1,100 14 50-60 M > 12% > 300 mm 820 11 na Irrigated j/ 220 3 Oasis 1/ 62 1 Total 7,500 100
Classificationby zone is approximate (source BNEDER) . Area under irrigation is approximateand excludes area under flood (spate) irrigation.
The agriculturalsetting: from Indenendenceto the present
1.11 At Indepei'dence,Europeans operated about 20,000 properties covering 2.4 million ha. Algerians owned some 650,000 farms covering 4.4 million ha of arable land. The European farms covered most of the better land, often in valleys and in the higher rainfall areas within the narrow strip of northern Algeria. These farms used modern farming techniques, considerable machinery and inputs. Production was oriented toward the export market, specificallyfor wheat, wine and citrus exports. Land farmed by Algerians was generally of lower quality, in more hilly terrain, fragmented, in lower rainfall areas, and farmed using traditional methods.
1.12 Following Independence, the land farmed by Europeans was nationalized and consolidated to create about 2,000 "self-managed" farms, averaging some 1,000 ha each, almost 10 times larger than the average European ferm of 120 ha. These "self-managed"farms were in reality state farms implementingthe centrally planned objectives provided by the Government. In the early 1970s, under the "Agrarian Revolution",Government created 6,000 collective farms, covering 1.2 million ha, from state and communal land, as well as land expropriated from absentee land-owners and from the largest private farmers. Government also established monopoly marketing agencies for agriculturalinputs and outputs.
'/ Algeria has one of the highest coefficients of variation of production in the world due mainly to the erratic rainfall in Algeria (Table A.9 in the StatisticalAppendix). -6 -
1.13 During the 1960s and 1970s, most of Government'sinvestments in agriculturewere directedat the self-managedand collectivefarms which made up the socialistsector. The sectorfailed to performas expectedand Government attemptednumerous measures to improveproductivity, including the creationof Government-runcooperatives to overcomeinput and marketingbottlenecks and the partial decentralizationof the planningprocess to the wilaya (provincial) level. But farmplans and investmentswere stilleffectively determined by civil servantswith littleknowledge of actualneeds. Most farms in the socialist sectorhad annualdeficits that accumulatedfrom year to year (para.2.10) and were kept operationalonly by injectionsof new "credit"from a "bankingsystem" which acted as a conduitfor the channelingof Governmentfunds, 96X of which were to the socialistsector. In fact, since the credit was implicitly guaranteedby Governmentand no penaltywas chargedfor non-repaymentof these "loans",there was littleincentive to improveperformance either at the farm levelor at the levelof the individualfarm worker who was assured,in any case, of a guaranteedminimum wage.
1.14 As part of the country-widereform of the early 1980s, the 1980-84 DevelopmentPlan proposed major reforms for agriculture.The AgrarianRevolution collectivefarms were abolished,either merged into the state farm sector (DomainesAgricoles Socialistes--DAS) or convertedto privatefarms; some 700,000 ha were allocatedto privatefarmers, reversing past tendenciesto increasethe size of the socialistsector. The statefarms were increasedin numberto about 3,400 and reducedin averagesize to make them efficientunits. Overall the total area within the socialistsector was reducedfrom 3.5 millionha to 2.4 millionha. The privatesector, representing some 740,000farms, then stoodat about5 millionha. At the same time,Government aimed to grantfurther autonomy to the socialistfarms and to improvetheir technicalcompetence by appointing a directorfor each farm. In practice,little changed, and productiontargets and farm plans remainedcentrally determined.
1.15 Governmentdid, however,embark on other reformsas part of the 1980-84 Plan,to addressa numberof constrainingaspects of Government'sstrategy, most notably: a continued,almost total neglectof the substantialprivate sector, inadequateproducer prices, overinvestment in infrastructureand the need for reallocationof creditto privatefarmers, and an interestrate structurethat discouragedthe mobilizationof privateresources. Duringthe 1980-84period, the major reformsaffecting the agriculturalsector, described in the matrix found in Annex 1, can be summarizedas follows:
(a) marketing of most fruits and vegetables,which had been controlled by Government marketing bureaus and parastatal cooperatives,was liberalizedand the prices of these commodities were allowed to be freely determined;while prices increased dramatically,increased production also followed; -7 -
(b) Governmentdecentralized and restructureda numberof official marketingagencies and cooperativesto improvethe distributionof inputsand the marketingof those commoditiesthat continuedto be controlled/andor handledby parastatalmarketing agencies (mainly cereals,pulses, wine, citrus,dates, and some milk production);a few private traders were licensed to market inputs (except fertilizers),at the officialprices and margins,and to provide spare parts and repairservices for agriculturalequipment; and
(c) an agriculturalbank, BADR, was established,whose principal mandatewas to channelGovernment funds as well as its own mobilized resourcesto agriculture,including to the privatefarmers.
1.16 After 1985, Governmentcontinued to introducevarious reforms,which included: increasesin interestrates for agricultureincluding a 50X increase in 1986 and a 30-40Xincrease in 1989 (para.8.07), and a statementof intention to move towards positive real interestrates; introductionof programs to encourageprivate farmers,such as provisionof credit for poultryand other livestockactivity and for developmentof the South;a cerealsintensification program,to provideinputs and technicaladvice to increasecereals production; the appointmentof technicaland accountingstaff to assistthe DAS, in an effort to increasetheir productivityand reducetheir losses;a streamliningof the agriculturalresearch network of stationsand institutes;and developmentof a policy for the build-upof an effectiveagricultural extension system. While all the reformsintroduced since 1980 had a positiveimpact in reducingthe lossesexperienced in the DAS and in providingincentives to the privatesector in agriculture,the socialist farms continued to be characterizedby overstaffing,unpaid debts, continued operating deficits, and low productivity (see paras 2.09-2.13for details).
1.17 Finally,in 1987,within a largercontext of economicreform and movement towardsstate enterprise autonomy, Government undertook the most significantand far-reachingreform in agricultureir. over twentyyears: it dissolvedthe socialistfarms and distributedthe land and the associatedassets to groupsof privatefarmers. The attemptsthat had been made sinceIndependence to establish viable state farms were finallyabandoned, and the private sector given the chanceand the responsibilityto increaseoutput and productivity.The break-up of the DAS, whichwas carriedout in a remarkablyshort time between October 1977 and May 1988, involved the distributionof land and assets to voluntary associationsof no less than three farmers(see paras 6.02-6.05and Annex 2 for furtherdetails). The immediateimpact of thisprofound change on agricultural productionhas been mixed,as the farmersand associatedinstituations adjust to their new autonomy,and as the sector has been affectedby severe drought (ChapterVI). The drain on Government'sbudget from continuedoperating losses has, however,been stopped. In the medium-termand beyond,this restructuring shouldlead to a more responsiveand dynamicagricultural sector, which should benefitthe entireeconomy in termsof higheragricultural production and reduced imports,providing the sectorwith a new opportunityfor growth. -8 -
II. PAST AGRICULTURALPERFORMANCE
A. Introdu_tion
2.01 Agricultureremains one of the dominantsectors in the economy. About half of Algeria'spopulation of 24 million (end 1988) live in rural areas and about 25X of the labor force is still employedin agriculture. Becauseof unattractiveprospects in the agriculturalsector in the past, there has been considerablerural to urbanmigration since Independence with a resultthat rural populationgrowth has been only about1.2X p.a. While agriculturehas benefited from Government'-investment program, it has done so on a decliningbasis, from 25X of total investmentsin the late 1960s to about 61 more recently. For this and other reasons,for example,the dramaticincrease in importanceof thleoil and gas sectors,the sh;ireof agriculturein aggregatevalue added declinedfrom about 13X in the early 1960sto about 71 in the mid-1970s(in 1980 terms). Since then,it has remainedrelatively constant at 6-9X, showingthat agriculturehas grown at the same rapid rate as the rest of the economy(Table 3). In current terms,the share of agriculturein GDP has recentlyincreased to 12-131. Over the 1964-88period, the gross value of agriculturein constant1986 terms has grown at about 3.11 p.a., about equal to the growthrate of the population,but since 1980, at about 5.51 p.a., which, by most indicators,is a good performance'.As discussedlater in this chapter,however, production and yields in the crucialcereal sector, which covers60X of the land under crops in any year, has been more or less stagnantfor 25 years. Most of the growth in agriculturehas resultedfrom a shift from low to high value crops and from an increasein livestockproduction.
Table 3: AGRICULTURALVALUE ADDED AND GDP, 1969-1988 1980 TERMS
1969 1978 1988 DA million
Agriculturevalue added 6,156 10,436 17,392
GDP 83,516 149,961 205,540
Agriculturevalue added as X of GDP 7.4 7.0 8.5
These figuresare a proxy for growthrates of value added. In the absenceof detailedinformation on the evolutionof value added, however,we use growth rates of gross value. There is also some differencein growth rates if a differentchoice is made for the constantprice year. -9
B. Level of Food Self-sufficiency
2.02 Given a populationgrowth rate of 3.1% per year and a high per capita income growth rate (1.7% p.a. in real terms), the growth of agricultural productionof some 3.1% p.a. over the last 25 years has not been sufficientto prevent Algeria from becoming increasinglydependent on imports of basic foodstuffs(Table 4). The growthof agriculturalproduction has been mainlyin the vegetable and livestock subse'tors,where the output has high income elasticitiesof demand,so that demandkept pace with or generallyoutstripped productionincreases. Productionof cerealsand pulses, on the other hand, stagnated. In addition,the year-to-yearvariation in cerealsproduction has been considerable,the resultof uncertainand/or marginal rainfall over most of Algeria'sarable land (para 1.09);this variabilityhas major implications for expectationsregarding the potentialfor futuredevelopment of a securefood supply.
Tabke 4: SELF SUFFICIENCYRATIOS IN ALGERIA, 1966-70 TO 1983-87
Wheats Barley Red Milk gI Pulses Potatoes Meat ______---- '000 tons ------
1966 i97
Domestic Output 1.238 409 83 485 38 226 Net Imports 558a 4 205 Domestic Supply g/ 1,796 87 290 Self-sufficiency(5) 70 na 95 70 na na
1976-1980
Domestic Output 1,226 4779V 117 695 52 506 Not Imports 2,:186k 3079/ 14 587 67 69 Domestic Supply g/ 3,412 784 131 1,282 129 575 Self-sufficiency(S) 36 61 90 54 i8 a8
1903-1987
Domestic Output 1 112 838 169 778 55 769 Net Imports 3,2 3 11 315 37 1,2FPZ 125 187 Domestic Supply A/ 4,343 1,151 208 2,c00 180 956 Self-sufficiency(X) 28 73 82 36 31 80 p/ Abstracting from changes in stocks. / Net imports includes cereal products; milled products converted to grain equivalent assuming a millins conversion factor of 80S. S/ Imports of milk powder, condensed milk and cream, and cheese converted to whole milk equiv6lent (WM). All milk Lmports converted at an average conversion of 1:4 and cheese imports at 1:10 to WME. A/ For 1977-80 only
2.03 The rapidlygrowing food gap is a major issue for Algeria. Becauseof the stagnationin cereals production,and in spite of the unusuallyhigh productionlevels achieved in the 1985-87period, cereal imports increased sharplyfrom an averageof 2.2 m tons per year in 1976-80to 3.2 m tons per year in the 1983-87period (Table 4). As a result of the growing per capita consumptioncombined with the rapid increasein the population,self-sufficiency ratios for cerealshave droppedfrom 90% in 1962 to 70% in the 1966-70period and to about 25% in more recentyears. For red meat, becauseof its growing -10 - importancein the Algerian diet, the consistent growth rates in production (at least 4.5% p.a. in volume terms -- see para 3.'3 and Table 9) have not quite managed to keep pace with growing demand and imports of red meat represent over 15% of total requirementscompared to 5% in the 1966-70 period'. For milk and related dairy products, per capita demand has almost doubled since 1975, and this must be due at least in part to a pricing policy which has kept milk prices to consumers relatively low. Self sufficiencyratios for milk have decreased from 70% during 1966-1970 to under 40% in the 1983-87 per'od. Food imports as a percentage of total importshave increasedin the last fifteen years, from about 11% to 17% (Table 5) and exceeded 20% in 1988; these figures exclude imports destined for use in agriculturalproduction, such as maize, barley and soybean cake used in livestock feed. If these items are included, the proportion of total imports accounted for by agriculturalinputs and feedstuffsover the 1985- 87 period goes up to around 23%. Unless production can be increased significantly,the food gap in cereals will double over the next 20 years and become a serious burden on the balance of payments (see Chapter IV, Table 12).
Table 5: AGRICULTURAL IMPORTS AND EXPORTS AS % OF TOTAL, SELECTED YEARS 1970-72 1977-79 1985-87 ---- annual average - value in mn DA ----
Food Imports - Value 724 4,644 7,350 As % of Total Imports 11% 15% 17% AgriculturalExports - Value 590 483 184 As % of Total Exports 12% 1.6% 0.3% Source: Tables A.34 and A.35 in the StatisticalAppendix
2.04 The value of food exports (primarilywine, fruits, and vegetables) has also fallen dramatically from over DA 590 m in 1970-72 to around DA 185 m in 1985-87. This can be seen in Table 5. Because of he dramatic growth in the value of 'iydrocarbonexports, agriculturenow accounts for less than 1% of total exports (compared to 16% in Morocco and 7% in Tunisia). It is Government's objective to increase agriculturalexports to help diversify exports and reduce dependenceupon hydrocarbons.
C. Yields
2.05 The absolute level of yields in Algeria is low in comparison with other countries,with the one exception of barley. This can be seen in some detail in Tables A.31 - A.32 in the Statistical Appendix and in summary in Table 6 below. These yields, which have increased either slightly or not at all since Independence,are cause for concern as Algeria has similar climatic conditions as its neighbors, is relativelywell endowedwith agriculturalequipment and has a relatively intense use of inputs (see Table 13). The low average yields are most likely the result of four major factors: (a) the structure of the
'/ Imports of red meat are subject to quantitativerestrictions, and thus the self-sufficiency ratios for the recent past are not true indicators of the ability of local production to satisfy demand for red meat. -11 - agriculturalsector, notably the socialistfarms and centralizedplanning which served mainly to reduce or suppress responsivenessto incentives and resulted in continuous losses; (b) quality and quantity of inputs and of input delivery, especially certified seeds and fertilizers;(c) effoctiveness of mechanization and the impact of the mechanization policies on farm efficiency; and (d) the weakness of the supporting institutions,particularly extension and research. These factors are discussed further below.
Table 6: COMPARISON OF YIELDS OF MAJOR CROPS, 1984-88 AVERAGE kg/ha
Algeria Tunisia Morocco a/
Durum Wheat 745 856 1,300
Bread Wheat 732 1,295 1,400
Barley 755 569 1,057
/a For 1984-86. For more detailed data see Tables A.31 and A.32, StatisticalAppendix.
D. The Dual Nature of the AgriculturalSector
The DAS and the private sector
2.06 Until 1987 when the socialist state farms were dissolved, Algerian agriculturewas characterizedby two distinct sectors, representingthe classic dual economy: one sector consisted of socialist or state farms, relatively large-scale and capital intensive, on the more fertile land in the higher rainfall areas, and the other sector of private, small-scalefarmers on the more marginal land, with lower and more variable rainfall. While the exact number of DAS and the area they occupied changed from year to year, in 1987 the DAS numbered about 3,400, had an average size of 700 ha, and covered a total area of 2.4 m ha, or about 30X of total arable land. Because the farms were in the more fertile area, however, the proportion of their land left fallow was much smaller than in the private sector, so that land cultivated by the DAS represented40X of total area cropped in any year. This sector contained about 60X of Algerian production potential. It employed about 150,000 people as full time DAS members and hired part-timeworkers totalling about 180,000 (full-time equivalent).
2.07 By contrast, the private, small-scale sector consisted, and still consists, of some 700,000 to 1,000,000farmers, covering about 5.2 m ha, or 70X of t!".arable area, and has many small and highly fragmented farms. About 60X of the farms are less than 3 ha, although it is likely that many farmers operate -12 - more than one farm'. Accounting for about 70% of the arable area and 80-85% of the agriculturalpopulation, this sector cultivates only about 60% of the area under crops because much of the land falls in marginal areas and is left fallow. In the livestock subsector, by contrast, which plays an important and growing role in the value of agriculturalproduction (para. 3.12), the private sector dominates, with ownership of about 95% of the animals. A breakdown of land use and livestock ownershipby farming sector is found in the StatisticalAppendix, Table A.29.
Comparativeperformance of the two sectors
2.08 Government central planning gave the DAS priority access to inputs, equipment,credit, and technicaladvice. During the early 1980s, the state farms received over 65% of the fertilizers and 75% of the number of tractors to cultivate about 40% of the land cropped in any given year. Around 1984, in an effort to redress the balance in the distributionof inputs and equipment, the proportions going to the private farmersbegan to increase, so that by 1986/87, state farms were receiving only about 55% of the fertilizersand less than 30% of the tractors. Details are in the StatisticalAppendix, Tables A.37 - A.40.
2.09 In spite of their advantages, the DAS performed only marginally better than the private sector in terms of yields in the major crops, the cereals, and wine grapes and not as well as the private sector in the bulk of the other crops, i.e. pulses, fruits and most of the vegetables. Over the period 1980 to 1986, cereal yields averaged around 100-200kg/ha more for the DAS than for the private sector, representing a yield difference of 15-25%. During the same period, yields of the private farmers were about double those of the DAS for pulses and were generally 20 to 40% higher for most vegetables (with the exception of tomatoes) (Table 7), and this was accomplishedusing about half the amounts of fertilizer per ha as those used by the DAS. While average yields are not impressive by comparison with those in other countries (para 2.05), it is neverthelessnoteworthy that the sector that benefited less from access to the essential factors of production (includingrainfall and fertile soils) was able to surpass the more favored sector in its performance in a number of crops.
2.10 The performanceof the DAS can furtherbe measured by their profitability. Aggregate income statements for the DAS show losses year after year until 1987, although in decreasing amounts; the majority of the DAS realized losses every year until 1987, the first year that the aggregate income statementshowed a net profit. In this year, about 50% of the DAS made a loss. See Statistical Appendix, Table A.30 for details. The DAS were able to continue to operate during these years only because the Government channeled funds to the DAS every year, as subsidy and as credit. The credit generally was not repaid, and was allowed to roll over into an ever-increasingoverdraft, which the Government eventually took over from BADR once the DAS were dissolved.
In fact, the population census of 1966 showed that there were 531,000 farmers; in 1977, there were only 403,000; yet today the estimate is that there are about .'oublethat number of farmers. -13 -
Table 7: YIELDS OF MAJOR CROPS BY FARMING SUB-SECTOR, 1980-1986
1980 1983 1986 State Private State Private State Private
k&/ha Cereals Hard wheat 745 656 665 478 914 748 Soft wheat 850 723 673 439 900 680 Barley 946 792 786 549 1,022 856
Pulses 307 658 211 426 291 621
tons/ha
VeRetables Potatoes 7.1 8.3 5.1 7.3 7.3 9.0 Tomatoes 11.0 8.8 9.6 10.2 28.2 13.7 Melons 5.4 6.6 4.1 7.4 5.9 8.4 Onions 8.5 8.4 5.0 8.8 5.6 8.1 Citrus 10.0 8.9 6.3 6.8 n.a. n.a. Other Fruit 1.9 2.0 1.9 2.0 n.a. n.a. Table Grapes 2.1 3.8 2.4 4.0 2.6 4.4
Hl/ha
Vineyards 18 7 13 11 11 9
For details, see Table A.27 in StatisticalAppendix
2.11 in 1987, the improved financial performanceof the DAS can be attributed to a combination of exceptionallygood weather and higher than normal yields, to particular efforts made to intensify appropriate use of inputs on cereals, and to a 23% increase in the price of durum wheat, the principal crop grown on the DAS. In addition,efforts were made to have the DAS reduce their wage costs, and the impact of this effort also appears in the comparison of the income statements of 1986 and 1987.
2.12 The poor performance of the DAS can be explained by a combination of factors. DAS farm workers were guaranteed the minimum industrial wage, regardless of the profitability of the farm. They were not responsible for losses incurred, nor did their annual losses prevent the farms from receiving credit and subsidies in subsequentyears. Half of any profits were in principle to be divided among the DAS members, but it is not clear whether this was ever actually practiced. And finally, the DAS were in any case subject to following centrally determired production plans and were not free to cultivate the crops of their choice, nor were they able to sell their fruits and vegetables to private traders at the considerablymore attractive prices because they were often obliged to sell to the state marketing agency. Under the combined system of guaranteedwages and centrallydetermined directives, there was little reason for the DAS to respond to incentives.
2.13 It was clear from their poor performance on yields and the cumulative and continuous operating deficits that there were serious structural problems with the DAS. As the momentum of the economic reforms increased in Algeria, there was ample justificationfor dissolving the DAS in an attempt to revitalize the agriculturalsector. -14 -
A word of caution
2.14 The transferof the DAS resourcesto a privatizedsector has not, however, createda single,undifferentiated private sector. The newly createdgroups of farmershave farms that are, on average,about five times largerper farming familythan in the small scalesector, and have acquiredmore capital-intensive and modernoperations. As successorson the more fertileland to farms thathad preferentialtreatment in theiraccess to seasonalinputs, they may continueto exert a politicalpressure for favoredtreatment. While the reformis sure to have a positiveimpact in the futureon agriculturalproduction and productivity, it has not removedthe dual natureof agriculturein Algeria. Governmentwill need to pay particularattention to how its policiesaffect the majorityof small-scalefarmers.who have to date providedmuch of the sourceof dynamismin the sector.
III. SOURCESOF PAST GROWTH
A. Overview
3.01 Growthrates of the value of productionover the past twenty-fiveyears, measuredin constant1986 prices,have not been highlyimpressive at 3.1X p.a., althoughsince 1980 the growthrate has been much stronger,at 5.5% p.a. The high growthrate for the last ten years is partly the resultof the unusually strongresults in 1985, 1986 and 1987, partlydue in turn to exceptionallygood weather'. This performancecompares favorably to that of neighboringTunisia and Morocco2.
3.02 An analysisof the sourcesof past growthin grossvalue was carriedout for this reportby examiningchanges in area planted,yields, and production levels. This analysisshows that the main sourceof growth cver the entire period,and more especiallyin the last ten years,was due to a shiftinto higher value,higher yielding vegetables and certainfruits, by replacinglower value crops, such as wine and citrus, and an increase in livestockproduction,
A cerealsintensification program was aJ.soundertaken by the Ministry of Agriculture,and this too had a positiveimpact on production levels. Becausethe value of cerealsproduction as a proportionof totalvalue of productionis rathersmall (at about 7X, comparedto 25X for vegetables and 45X for livestock products for gross production,and probablya smallerproportion of value added),this successhad a relativelyminor impacton overallgrowth rates.
2/ Official Government figures for the three countries are for growth rates of value added in constant prices and can be compared as follows: Algeria Morocco Tunisia 1977-88 1975-85 1278-87
4.9X 2.6X 3.6X -15 - particularlyred meat and poultryproduction. The increasedsupply of these commoditieswas the result of increasingrelative producer prices following liberalizationof markets for fruits and vegetablesin 1982, which induced farmersto switch resourcesinto more profitableactivities (see Statistical Appendix,Tables A.41 - A.42, for producerprices). Accordingto the data discussedbelow (paras3.04-3.13), the increasein value addedwas not due to increasingproductivity, or improvedyields; nor was it the resultof investment programs in irrigation,for example,as the area under irrigationdid not increasesignificantly over this period.
3.03 This is importantfor the implicationsfor futuregrowth: the degreeof substitutionbetween crops and livestockactivities is obviouslylimited by the scarcityof good arableland, the limitedavailability of water and potential for irrigation,and the limit on the area and qualityof pastureland. The sectorcannot therefore continue to grow indefinitelyat the pace of the recent past unless effortsare made to increaseirrigation, reduce fallow,and most importantly,increase productivity and yields. A secondimportant factor of the increasedagricultural production is that recentgrowth has been highlydemand driven. Fueledby a combinationof a growingpopulation and increasingincomes, particularlyafter the oil price hikes,per capita incomesincreased and food consumptiongrew rapidlyduring the 1970s and early 1980s. In spite of the increasedsupplies, however, self-sufficiency rates continued to fall (seepara 2.02 and Table 4). In the future,as a result of the projectedslowdown in hydrocarbonearnings, growth in per capita incomes (estimatedat 1.5X p.a. between 1990 and 1995) will be slower than in the past so that demand for foodstuffsis also likely to grow more slowlythan in the past. Futureincreases in agriculturalproduction will have to be more gearedto importsubstitution or increasedagricultural exports.
B. Changesip Area Cultivated
3.04 Table 8 below shows the evolutionin the area under variouscrops from 1964/66to 1985/87. Within the cereals,which are the dominantsubsector in termsof area planted,accounting for about60X of the cultivatedarea, barley has takenon increasingimportance, mostly by replacinghard wheat,and to some extent by reductionof fallow (between1964 and 1974, fallow land decreasedby about 800,000ha). The incentiveto grow barleyhas been doubly strong: first,it is a bettercrop than the wheatsfor droughtresistance, and with the high variabilityin the rainfallover much of Algeria'scultivated area, farmers can reduce their risk by switchingto barley. Second, with the increasingattractiveness of livestockproduction because of the increased producerprices for red meat,barley has been in high demandas animalfeed.
3.05 The area under foddercrops, mainly non-irrigatedvetch oats and other drylandfodder crops (irrigatedfodder accounts for a small proportionof the totalarea devotedto fodderproduction), has also increaseddramatically, most particularlyin the past ten years. In fact,in the last two to threeyears, between1984 and 1987,the area under fodderis recordedas having increasedby 60%, at leastpartly by reducingthe fallowarea. -16 -
3.06 Table 8 also shows that the area undervineyards (excluding table grapes) has decreasedsteadily; this area has likelybeen replacedby vegetablesand other fruitsrequiring irrigation. The uprootingof vineyardsthat occurred after Independencemay have been partlypolitically motivated, as the vineyards were the symbolof the formercolonial rule. Since the mid-1960s,however, the uprootinghas continued,while the area undercitrus trees remained constant as the incentives(i.e., the producerprices) to produce these crops weakened relativeto the incentivesfor vegetableand stone fruit production.
Table 8: AREAS UNDER MAJOR CROPS, 1964-1987
Growth Rate 1964 1974-76 1985-87 l/ 1965-87 X p.a. 2/
Cereals 2.525 3.100 2,930 0 (Hard Wheat) (1,503) (1,448) (1,024) -2.1 (Soft Wheat) (452) (693) ( 547) 0 (Barley) (530) (842) (1,230) 2.8 Fodder Crops 141 223 745 7.5 Vegetables 82 165 258 5.2 Industrial Crops 18 17 22 1.5 Pulses 62 95 160 4.0 Vineyards 334 218 112 -5.9 Olives 96 176 163 3.2 Citrus 46 49 43 0 Dates 42 71 72 2.7 Other fruits 20 81 78 7.7 Figs 33 38 38 0.9 Total areaunder crops 3,400 4,230 4,621
}/ Althoughdata on 1988 exist (see Table A.2, StatisticalAppendix), the areas planted in 1987/88were probably affected by the dissolution of the DAS and are, therefore,not representativeof an overall trend. Z/ Based on regression analysis.
C. Yield Changes
3.07 As noted in para. 2.05, the absolutelevels of yields in Algeriaare low in comparisonwith other countries. In addition,for the entire period 1964-1988.available Government statistics indicate that yields of all crops exceptfodder remained unchanged. grew modestly(hard wheat and vegetables),or decreasedsteadily (see Table 9 below). This is the resultof severalfactors, of which the variabilityof the weatheris a major one, affectingneighboring countriesas well. With the notableexception of soft wheat yieldsin Tunisia, yieldsof cerealsin neighboringMorocco and Tunisiahave shown no significant upward trend over the 1973-86period. The agriculturalgrowth in these two countrieshas come mainlyfrom irrigationdevelopment (and in Tunisiafrom growth of the livestocksubsector). The variabilityof the climate in the region introducesa risk factor,reducing both the willingnessof farmersto investin higherinput use and the effectivenessof such investmentsand this is a critical element in assessingpotential for future growth (discussedbelow - paras. 4.08-4.12).
3.08 Most of the plantationcrops (winegrapes, olives, citrus fruit) actually suffereddecreases in yields,as did the pulses,and this is likelythe response to decreasingrelative producer prices for these crops compared to those of - 17 - vegetables and certain fruits. For those plantationsthat were not uprooted for replanting, it is likely that labor and input use decreased, if indeed these plantations were not abandoned completely. For the future, therefore, the extent to which yields will be increased on these crops will depend not only on the availabilityof technicalpackages, but most particularlyon the incentives that can be offered to introducebetter cultivationpractices.
3.09 A major factor in the general stagnationof yields was the lack of interest on the part of the state farms to make efficient use of the increasing amounts of equipment and inputs at their disposal. This in turn was due to the lack of responsiveness to incentives: with guaranteed minimum wages and virtually guaranteed membership in the DAS, and no liability for losses incurred, incentives to make profits were weak. This was the root of their inefficiency. An analysis of growth rates of yields in the state farm sector compared to private farming sector shows that almost without exception, yield increases across virtually all crops were either higher or less negative in the private sector than in the state farm sector. Now that the DAS have been broken up into groups of private farmers, the potential for responding to incentives (availabilityof inputs, equipment, credit, technicaladvice, price signals) to improve yields is much greater than in the past.
3.10 Table 9 also shows some differences for the entire period 1964-87 versus the more recent period 1979-87. For the cerealssubsector, in particular,yields have been essentially stagnant when measured over twenty-four years, although they show a slight upward trend in the period 1979-87. This is mainly due to the highly favorable harvests in 1985, 1986, and 1987. When these three years are removed from the trend, the yield growth falls back to zero. Similarly, for other fruits (stone fruits) yields show negative growth over the whole period and growth at 3.2X p.a. over the more recent decade. This illustrates, in a situation of high variability in yields and production, the importance of examining trends over a long period of time. -18 -
Table 9: GROWTH RATES OF AREA, YIELD, AND VOLUME OF PRODUCTION BY MAJOR CROP, 1964-1987AND 1979-1987
1964-1987 1979-87
Area Yield 4/ Production Area Yield 4/ Production ------X p.a. ------X p.a. -----
Cereals 1/ 0 0 0 0 2.0 0 Hard wheat -2.1 1.2 a -4.0 0 0 Soft wheat 0 0 0 -2.9 0 0 Barley 2.8 0 4.3 5.1 0 0 Fodder crops 7.5 3.2 11.1 12.3 -4.9 6.5 Vegetables 5.2 0.9 5.9 0 5.8 10.1 Pulses 4.0 -2.0 3.31 5.1 0 0 Vineyards (wine) -5.9 -5.5 -11.4 -11.6 -5.5 -16.6 Olives 3.2 -3.1 0 -1.6 0 0 Citrus Fruit 0-2/ -2.2! -2.5 0 -5.1 -7.3 Dates 2.7 0 2.2 0 0 0 Other fruits 7.7 -3.3 4.0 5.6 3.2 8.8 Figs 0.9 0 0 0 0 0
Livestock products 4/
Red meat 4.9I2 5.8 Poultry meat 12.3!' 12.4 Eggs 13.11' 32.6 Milk 2.8! 3.1
1/ The growth rate in production is normally the product of the growth in area and the growth in yield. When either area or yield shows large year-to-yearvariation, however, production will similarly show such variation. Unless there is also a consistentlystrong upward (or downward)trend, the variability will dominate,and the result will be a production growth rate that is not significantlydifferent from zero. This is the situation for cereals,where overall productionshowed no significanttrend, although yields did show a significant trend. _/ From 1967. v/ From 1968. A/ To and including 1988. For area and production,see Footnote 1/ to Table 8.
D. Growth in Production
3.11 The changes in crop production are also shown in Table 9. Except for the crops used as animal feed, the only significant growth came from vegetables, stone fruit production (apples, peaches, plums, etc.), and to a modest degree, dates. And this in turn was due primarily to the shift into these crops at the expense of other crops. Because staple food crop production stagnated, Algeria became increasingly dependent on imports (Table 4). At the same time, as domestic consumption of traditionally exported crops such as citrus, dates and wine grew, the amounts of these crops available for export decreased even more dramatically than production levels. In volume terms, for example, citrus exports decreased from an average annual level of 132,000 tons in 1977 and 1978 to virtually no exports in 1983 through 1987.
3.12 The other major source of growth in agriculture has come from the livestock subsector, which has always accounted for a large share in the value of agricultural production. In 1986, the share of the gross value cf agricultural production coming from livestock activities (red meat, milk, poultry meat, and eggs) was estimated at 45X. Table 9 shows that poultry production in particular (poultry meat and eggs) experienced high rates of growth; the extraordinary growth in egg production in the more recent past is the consequence of an explicit Government policy, started under the 1980-84 Plan, to promote this -19 - activity through the channeling of credit to private farmers for investment in imported equipment for capital-intensive egg production. This has been accompanied by large increases in the quantities of maize and soybean meal imported as animal feed (the annual rate of increase in the volume of maize imported between 1977 and 1987 was over 20X). To have an accurate idea of what the real growth of poultry production has been, it would be useful to have estimates of changes in value added, but this information is not available.
3.13 Red meat productionhas also increasedsteadily, in response to increased relative producer prices. Data are not available on milk yields and technical parameters of sheep and cows (fertility rates, mortality rates, and average liveweight at slaughter) over time, but comparisons of these parameters with those in Tunisia and Morocco suggest that Algerian livestock is slightly less productive than its neighbors. While a source of livestockgrowth in the future could come from imprcvedhusbandry practices, this might be difficult to achieve for sociologicalreasons (see Volume II, Annex 3 on the livestock subsector).
IV. SOURCES OF FUTURE GROWTH
A. Introduction
4.01 Agricultural growth in the future will not be as strongly demand-led as in the past, both because the population growth is expected to slow down somewhat, from 3.1% p.a. to 2.7X p.a. after 1990, and because per capita income growth is also likely to slow somewhat compared to the past'. Future increases in production should, therefore,be able to contribute more to reducing imports for some crops and lead to increasedexports for others.
4.02 Assessment of the potential for agriculturalgrowth should be predicated on crops for which Algeria has some comparativeadvantage. While it is not yet possible to identify in detail which crops in which zones can be produced relatively efficiently by world standards, regional comparison suggests that Algeria has a comparativeadvantage in its major cereals, wheats and barley, as well as in citrus, dates, olives, and vegetables. A study of comparative advantagewould likely find that results varied by agro-climaticzone and by the farming system to be adopted.
4.03 Potential growth rates discussed in this chapter are based on the existing relative prices, rather than on undistorted relative prices based on a study of (marginal)domestic resource costs by crop, which would be the ideal. In the absence of a set of relativeprices reflectingeconomic value, the growth rates estimated in the following sections should be taken as rough orders of magnitude of the range of possibil'tiesfor agriculturalgrowth under different scenarios.
'/ In the 1970s, the growth in per capita GNP was 3.2X; up to 1985, it was around 2.3X. In recent years, it has been negative, but is projected to be around 1.51 for the 1990-95 period. -20 -
B. Lower Case Scenario
4.04 Before turning to a discussion of potential sources of future growth resulting from Government investments,policies, and actions, it is necessary to consider what a "lower case scenario" for growth in the agriculturalsector would look like. The lower case would result from a situation where new actions were taken by Government and include: (a) continuation of present macroeconomicpolicies, which affect in particularboth the demand for and supply of equipment and spare parts, delivery of seasonal inputs, and the incentives to produce crops for export; (b) continuationof present policies on incentives; (c) continued investments to increase irrigated area by about 4,000 ha/yr and a modest pace of development (at a rate of 2,000 ha per year) for the 185,000 ha distributed in the South as part of the program to develop the northern part of the Sahara; (d) no additionalinstitutional changes; and (e) no major impact on agricultural productivity from restructuring the DAS into Exploitations Agricoles Collectives (EACs) (paras.6.02-6.05); this is conceivableif the EACs do not have access to sufficient inputs, equipment, and credit. In addition, with the recent cutback in imports (para 1.03), Governmentmay have difficulty ensuring an adequate supply of inputs. This lower case scenario would result in future growth rates lower than those of the recent past. There are several reasons for this.
4.05 First, the extent to which areas cultivated with the lower value crops can be substituted for cultivation of higher value crops is obviously limited by availability of irrigated land on which to grow the vegetables and other fruits. Thus a major past source of growth among crops, substitutionof area and resources Into higher value crops, is likely to slow in the future. Second, in the livestock subsector,unless husbandry practices change through intervention on a wide scale by appropriate extension advice and improved veterinary practices, the growth in red meat production will eventually be limited by availabilityof pasture land. For poultry and egg production, the Government's program of actively encouraging investment in these activities through provision of credit and equipmentwas stopped entirely in 1987 because plan production targets had been reached. A cutback on imports would also dramatically affect this sector as it relies almost entirely on imports for inputs (feedstuff). Even a resumptionof the program in later years would not be at the pace of the early 1980s (with relativelyfree entry, the profitability of these markets has decreasedover the years, and BADR is increasinglyreluctant to lend for these activitiesin certain parts of the country). Thus, growth from the livestock subsector is likely to slow. Third, since the past performance in cereals was essentially stagnant, there is no reason to assume that cereals production would provide a source of growth. Finally, in the absence of overt actions or policy measures by Government to change the incentives to wine, citrus, and olive production, the negative growth rates of the past would be likely to continue as farmers switched land and other resources,to the extent practical, to more profitable activities.
4.06 The result of these considerationsis a projected growth rate for the value of production for the lower case scenario between 1990 and 1995 of 2.9Z p.a., increasingslightly between 1996 and 2010 to 3.0% p.a. This compares to -21 - a growth rate for the 1979-1988 period of 5.5X p.a'. The implicationsof this growth rate on food self-sufficiency,on the burden on the balance of payments from imported foodstuffs, and on the budget from increased subsidy levels are discussed below (paras. 4.27-4.32 and 9.21).
C. Sources of Future Growth
4.07 Both Government and the EACs can significantlyinfluence future growth in a number of ways. First, institutional changes combined with adequate incentives could result in increasedproductivity and increased yields and, if the incentive structure is adequate, reduction of fallow area. Second, public sector investments could increase the area under irrigation and could develop the South, which also invol'es expanding the area under irrigation, but is consideredas a separateinvestment/development program. Each of these potential sources of increased growth is described below, and in each case an optimistic or high growth scenario is developed as well as a less optimisticor middle case scenario. Both of these scenarios lead to higher growth rates than the lower case scenario described above (para 4.04).
Increases in productivity
4.08 The increases in productivity could come from several sources. With the dissolution of the DAS and the establishment of private group farming, incrementalinvestment/output ratios, ICORs, which were high in the past (yields in the DAS did not respond to substantialinvestments), should decrease sharply as the EAC farmers now have incentives to make efficient use of all previous investments in equipment, irrigation, stables, poultry houses, and other infrastructure. They should also be motivated to improve crop and livestock husbandry techniques in an effort to increase yields. Thus changing the structureof the producingunits should result in a noticeableincrease in yields and/or more efficient consumption of inputs.
4.09 Beyond this immediatechange in yield levels, increases in productivity in the sector as a whole would come from improved quality and quantity of inputs and equipment, including improved availabilityof spare parts, repair services, and contract services for farms that do not own their own equipment. A critical factor for the medium term will be the effective functioning of an extension service that is able to rely on useful results from the research network. In addition, for the long-term development of livestock in Algeria, organization of grazers groups for use of the steppes will probably be needed. Finally, efficient marketing networks will have to be established for the increased output. Improvements in the institutionsserving agriculture will involve a
1/ Because of a lack of reliable data on average input/output relationshipsby crop, the analysis is done on growth rates of gross values. This is a valid proxy for growth rates of value added, unless there are: (a) changes in productivityof either labor or capital; and/or (b) shifts from crops with lower (higher) value added to crops with higher (lower)value added. To the extent that either of these elements is relevant, the estimates of growth of gross value may under- or overestimaterates of value added. -22- concerted effort by Government both to introduce improved policies on how the services are delivered and to invest in training and the development of human resources within the institutions. This is discussed further in Chapter VII. In any event, however, changes in yields beyond those that may be expected in the immediatefuture from the privatizationof the DAS will come only slowly with the gradual build-up of institutionscapable of delivering the necessary inputs and services.
4.10 The potential for yield increases in Algeria is considerable. If Tunisia and Morocco are used as examples of the yields Algeria could achieve, its yields of wheats, vegetables and citrus could be increased by up to 50% of existing levels. Although the climatic conditions in Algeria are harsher than in the neighboringcountries, Algeria alreadyhas a more intense use of inputs and more equipment available on a per hectare basis'. The optimistic,or higher growth. scenario supposes that all conditions are favorable for the EACs to make this leap into higher productivity quickly, that is by 1993, if the weather cooperates. If, at the same time, institutionsare being established to provide technical advice to the EACs, yields could continue to increase gradually, as more EACs adopted better practices. Again, using an optimisticapproach to this potential, it was supposed that after closing the yield gap by 1993, Algeria could achieve a steady yield increase across these crops of 37.per year, which would equal the impressiveperformance of Turkey, which has sustained this rate of yield increases for major crops over a recent fourteen year period.
4.11 The less optimisticapproach would suggest that the yield jump would occur somewhat more gradually, as EACs graduallyadopted better techniquesand learned both to manage large farms and to work together as a group. Thus, the gap might be closed by 1995, over a five year period. This middle growth scenario, taking into account the variability of climate and a number of other institutional constraintsthat might affect growth, further suggests that the subsequentyield increases would also be more modest, as research and extension take longer to become effective, and as the EACs continue to experience some difficulties in collective management. A yield increase after 1995 of 1% per year would be a reasonable guesstimate for a more modest growth rate.
4.12 The potential for yield increases in Algeria is an important source of growothfor the future, as the estimatesbelow will show. It will depend heavily, however, on the abilities of the EACs to manage, on their technical expertise, on the incentives to produce, and on their access to timely and sufficient inputs, credit, equipment, spare parts, repair services, and marketing activities. Actions needed to ensure that this is achieved are discussed in detail in Chapter VI.
A 1988 FAO report on the cereals sector estimates that yields of major cereals could be doubled. While this may be technically feasible, it is unlikely that Algeria could surpass the performance of its neighbors on a consistent basis, given the number of constraints in the Algerian context. - 23 -
Decreasein fallow
4.13 A secondpotential source of growthis a decreasein the area underfallow, which now representsabout 40% of what is consideredto be cultivableland. The area under fallowincreases as a percentageof arableland as one moves south and as the area and climatebecome increasingly harsh. The greatestpotential for fallowreduction in terms of total area is in Zone C (para1.09 and Table 2), where the rainfallis marginalat 350-450mm/yr and uncertain. Under such conditions,the inclinationof farmersto reducetheir fallowarea would depend on the availabilityof seeds for improvedvarieties of crops such as barleyand medics or new crops such as triticalethat are droughtresistant, and on the incentivesand know-howto use them. Most of the crops that couldbe introduced to encourage fallow reduction would serve as livestock feed, so their attractivenesswould dependon the incentivesto increaselivestock production. Land tenureproblems may play a role in the potentialfor fallowreduction, as livestockowners may not be ownersor occupiersof the farmsand may be content to graze,or to overgraze,the pastures.
4.14 Thus decreases in the area under fallow face constraintsthat are technical,economic, and socialin nature. Governmentmay have some control over the first aspect, the ability to introducesuitable crop varietiesfor drought-proneareas, but it shouldnot be overly optimisticon the potential for reducingfallow on a large scale in a short time. Under the optimisticor higher growth case scenario,with all technical,economic and sociological constraintsreduced to a minimum,it was consideredthat a gradualreduction of up to 1.3 mn ha of fallow,which representsabout 45% of the totalarea currently fallow,could be achievedby the year 2010;under the middlecase scenario,it was consideredthat only 750,000ha of fallow reductionwould be achieved. Certainenvironmental concerns may be relevantto reducingfallow, particularly the threatof overgrazingon the remainingfallow, and the consequentdamage to watershedareas, and thesewould need carefulevaluation before fallow reduction programswere introduced.
Increasesin the area under irrigation
4.15 The thirdpotential source of growth,and one thatwould result from direct publicinvestment (as opposedto farmerinitiatives) involves increases in the area under irrigation. This would resultfrom developmentof new irrigation schemesand rehabilitationof existingschemes, where i:rigationcan no longer be effectivelyused becauseof deteriorationin the infrastructure.Algerias potentialirrigated area, based on water availabilityand estimatesof area suitablefor irrigation,is estimatedat 8-900,000ha, includingboth large-scale schemes(LSI) and small-scale(SSI) schemes, compared to an estimatedactual area under irrigationof 3-400,000ha (60,000ha LSI and 240-340,000SSI).
4.16 Governmenthas plans to developadditional irrigation areas at a rate of 20,000ha per year, startingaround 1990. This would be the ontimisticpace for development,but not out of reach if a number of technical,logistical, economic,and budgetaryconditions were met. A more conservativeestimate, used as input into the estimatesof the ml scenario,supposes a rate of developmentof 10,000ha per year. In quantifyingthe growththat would come -24 - from this development (paras 4.21-4.26) it was necessary to estimate the number of hectares that would be developed (rehabilitatedor expanded) each year, the changes in cropping patterns, and the increase in production. The details of these estimates are in Working Paper 1.
4.17 Expansion of the area under irrigationwould have several effects. It would provide an element of drought-proofing,thereby stabilizing the large fluctuationsin production that characterizethe agriculturalsector at present. Since some 30-40% of the gross value of agriculturalproduction come from the 3-400,000 ha currently under irrigation,this is obviously an important factor in stabilizingproduction. Second, cropping intensitieswould increase,thereby increasing the area under cultivation. Third, a shift to higher value crops would occur (out of cereals into fodder and vegetable production). And finally, and perhapsmost import,.nt,an increase in yields would result. For the purposes of quantifying these elements, the specific estimates of increased production were taken as an average of the estimates made for the Cheliff and Mitidja Irrigation projects (Working Paper 1). Irrigation expansion also involves a number of issues touching on technical, logistical, economic, budgetary and environmentalconsiderations, that are discussedin some detail in Chapter VIII.
Development of the South
4.18 Finally, the fourth source of growth could come from development of the South, a program on which Government places a high priority for a number of reasons. It is an area sparsely populated, with both land and water resources available to be developed. The area could serve both as a pole of attraction for the densely populated North and as a source of food supply for the import-dependentcountry. The developmentprogram involves public investment to rehabilitateand expand areas in the Sahara currentlyunder irrigationwithin existing oases and allocation of subsidized credit to individual farmers to develop currently unused land, not in the oases, by investing in wells and irrigationequipment and undertakingland reclamation. Finally, it may involve the developmentof relatively large-scalecereal farms, which has been explored on a pilot basis, the organizationand management of which are not yet planned in detail. All the development of the South depends on making use of several aquifers that are shared with Tunisia. The program involves a number of serious and complex issues similar to those raised for irrigation,and are discussed in paras 8.27-8.30below.
4.19 Since the developmentwould rely entirely on irrigation,areas that are now not cultivated at all could realize cropping intensities that exceed 100%, provided sufficient water of acceptable quality can be found and exploited without damage to the water supply. For the rehabilitatedareas in the oases, it would involve an improvement in yields, mainly for date palm production, and an increase in cropping intensity (date palms are often intercropped with vegetables). To what extent the increasedand improvedareas in productionwould be devoted to cereals would depend mainly on the incentives and marketing arrangementsavailable, but experiencesuggests that cereal cultivationin these area.sis unlikely to be economicallyviable on a large scale basis. It is likely that in the foreseeable future most of the incremental production from developmert of the South would be dates, vegetables and some fodder. - 25 -
4.20 Estimating the rate of development of the South is difficult, since no overall plan of developmenthas been drawn up, and the technical Ministry has not yet set targets commensuratewith the assured availabilityof water supplies as it has for development of irrigation in the Northern part of the coantry. The oRtimistic scenario could include expansion of new areas in Government financed irrigation schemes at a rate of 4,000 ha per year starting in 1995, after adequate development planning and a monitoring system had been put in place; rehabilitationcould begin earlier, in 1992, at a rate of 1,000 ha per year. Because of the determination of Government to develop these areas, the middie case scenario could still involvean expansion rate of 3,000 ha per year, and 1,000 ha per year for rehabilitation. The program of distributingland and low-cost credit has been underway for some time, and as of erid-1988,roughly 200,000 ha had been distributed. Little of the land is being developed and unless an aggressive program of credit distributionand technical assistance is provided for land preparation and for diggingwells, the rate of developmentmay be quite slow. However, major risks of overpumpingscarce water supplies exist (para 8.28). Under the most oRtimistic scenario, it could be envisaged that up to 4,000 ha would be put into production each year by the private sector. With less aggressiveefforts, about 2,000 ha might be brought into production directly by private farmers.
D. Quantifying Future Growth Rates
4.21 The effects of realizing the potential for growth from the various sources discussedabove were translated into growth rates of agriculturalproduction for the period 1990-1995 and 1996-2010 and examined for the implicationsof food self-sufficiencyand of the size of the import bill up to the year 2000. The results for the growth rates are presented in Table 10. The lower case is an adjusted extrapolation of the past, taking into account affects of reduced imports and restricted investments in certain subsectors. The higher case scenario results from using the most optimistic assumptionson what could happen under the best possible circumstances,and the middle case scenario takes into account the various possibilities for growth, given the recent reforms and intended Government investments, but under somewhat more constrained circumstancesthan in the most optimistic scenario. Details of the assumptions and calculations for each source of growth and the impact on various crops and livestock production are in Working Paper 1. -26 -
Table 10: GROWTHRATES OF AGRICULTURE UNDERVARIOUS SCENARIOS
1990-1995 1996-2010 _-_ ------p.a.
Lower case scenario 2.9 3.0
Middle case scenario: all uources 4.6 3.5
Contribution to growth of: (S) (2) (1) YLeld increases 51 17 (2) Fallow reduction 8 9 (3) Irrigation investment 41 48 (4) Development of the South - 26
Higher case scenario: all sources 6.6 4.7
Contribution to growth of: (X) (X) (1) Yield increases 56 27 (2) Fallow reduction 9 5 (3) Irrigation investment 35 55 (4) Development of the South - 13
4.22 Under the higher growth scenario, the growth rate of agricultural productionwould be 6.6% between1990 and 1995,which shouldbe consideredthe upper limit of growththat Algerianagriculture could expectto achieveif all conditionscombined in an optimalfashion. The middle case scenarioof 4.6% could be consideredthe more realisticpossibility, as it takes into account the impact of existingconstraints in the sector. Finally,the lower case scenarioof 2.9% over the next five yearscan be consideredthe lower limitof growththat can be expected,given the recentreforms and Government'sintention to continueto build on these reforms.
4.23 Irrigation developmentand yield increases are the two largest contributorsto the growthrates in the 1990-1995period, while developmentof the South and fallowreduction contribute less (Table10). The resultson the developmentof the South are partly because the speed anidscope are quite limited,and partlybecause Government's irrigation program was assumedto start in earnestonly after 1995, to allow for sufficientplanning and build up of institutionsto monitorthe development.
4.24 For years beyond 1995, the overall growth rate will probably slow somewhat,except in the lower case, where the limits on switchingto higher value crops and on availablegrazing lands would be partiallyoffset by a continuedinvestment in irrigationat the rate of 4,000ha per year. This would allow the sectorto realizea growthrate of 3.0% per year,slightly higher than projected populationgrowth. Under the other two scenarios,growth is particularlyhigh up to 1995 becauseof the impact of "closingthe gap" on -27 - yields;thereafter, growth would most likelycontinue at a regular,slower pace. In the later years, irrigationdevelopment makes the largestcontribution to growthrates in both the higherand mediumgrowth scenarios; this is due in part to the fact that the benefitsfrom investmentin irrigationstarting in 1990 do not reach full developmentuntil four years later. Thus the full impactof irrigationdevelopment will be realizedonly afteraround 1995 anyw.y, while the impactof any largejumps in yieldsup to 1995would giveway to slower,steadier increases.
4.25 The programto developthe Southhas some impacton nationalgrowth rates after 1995 through the impact on date production. There may also be a considerableimpact on vegetableavailability and pricesat a localor regional level. While Governmenthopes that the Southwill becomesomething of a granary for the country,large-scale wheat productionhas not been foreseenin this analysis,as the incentiveto grow cerealsunder irrigatedconditions is likely to be, in the foreseeablefuture, less than that to grow other crops,ard the economicviability of such schemes is, in any case, doubtful (para.8.29). Fallow reductionafter 1995 has limitedimpact on growthrates, since greater availabilityof these crops may simply replacepasture grazingrather than increasemeat production.
4.26 These resultsare based on data availablein Algeria,on guess'imates as to how the EACs might respondto incentives,on assumptionsas to t..epace of Governmentinvestments, and on a numberof assumptionson the responseof farmersto these investments.They are ordersof magnitudethat serve mainly to indicatethe relativeimportance of the varioussources of growthand the upper and lower limitsto growththat can realisticallybe achievedby Algeria. The importanceof these growthrates for food self-sufficiencydepends on the impacton the supplyand demandof specificcrops that form the staplediet for Algerians. This is examinedin the next section.
E. Projectionsof Algeria'sFood Gap
4.27 To projectAlgeria's food gap, the impactof growthon specificcrops was comparedto the estimateddemand for these crops in the year 2000, for each of the three scenarios. Detailsof the demandestimates are in WorkingPaper 1, and are based on projectedgrowth rates of the populationand per capita income and on estimatesof the income elasticity of variousproducts. The demandfor the variouscrops is projectedto evolvefrom average1983-87 levels as follows: -28 -
Table 11: PROJECTED DEMAND FOR SELECTED FOOD ITEMS '000 tons
Year 1983-87 1995 20Q0
Wheats 4,343 5,639 6,684 Pulses 180 210 228 Milk 2,060 2,330 2,752 Red Meat 206 241 286
4.28 The estimates in Table 12 below show that under the lower case situation, given the continuing high expected growth in the demand for food and, with no dramatic increase in investmentsor changes in policy and no perceptible impact from the DAS restructuring,Algeria will be dependenton imports in the year 2000 for as much as 83% of its wheat, 77% of its pulses, 64% of its milk, and 8% of its red meat requirements (since imports are controlled, particularly for red meat, it is likely that the real demand for red meat is underestimatedhere, and the self-sufficiency ratio is therefore overestimated). Since reducing dependence on imports to satisfy food requirements as much as economically possible is a major goal of the Government, it is thereforeobvious that a more pro-active set of policy and actions is necessary to achieve the objective. -29 -
Table 12: FOOD GAP PROJECTIONS,2000
'000 tons
Current Ratio Lower Case Middle Case HiRher Case 1983-87
Wheats Domestic Supply 1,115 1,648 2,221 Consumption 6,684 6,684 6,684 Self-sufficiency ratio (X) 17 25 33 26
Pulses Domestic Supply 52 88 118 Consumption 228 228 228 Srlf-sufficiency ratio (Z) 23 38 52 31
Milk Domestic Supply 990 1,033 1,330 Consumption 2,752 2,752 2,752 Self-sufficiency ratio (1) 36 38 48 38
Red Meat Domestic Supply 264 267 267 Consumption 286 286 286 Self-sufficiency ratio (1) 92 93 93 82
4.29 Under the higher growth case, with increasingyields, rapid development of irrigation,and successfulreduction of fallow,Algeria can modestly increase its self-sufficiencyratios above current levels for several of its major crops. This should be considered the best case scenario,and represents the upper limit of what Algeria can probably achieve over the next twenty years. Under the middle case scenario,which still involvesconsiderable investments in irrigation and increases in yields, and which should be considered the most realistic of the scenarios,Algeria's current level of dependenceon importswould be affected very little (except for red meat, which as noted above, is probably already understated because of the quantitativerestrictions on imports).
4.30 A number of other factors could have a major impact on the food gap. On the demand side for cereals, a policy of reducing subsidies to consumers and increasing the final price of bread products could reduce demand and eliminate waste of bread products, thereby decreasing the need for imports. This policy would be the least costly way (and in fact, would result in significanteconomies for the Government's budget) to increase food self-sufficiencyof the staple crops. On the supply side, changing market conditionsand relative prices could result in shifting cropping patterns other than projectedhere and substitution, for example, of barley for wheat, or vegetables for citrus and vineyards. This might improve the self-sufficiencyratio for barley, but it would be at the expense of increased imports of wheat; it would increase the domestic supply of vegetables, leading possibly to lower prices and even some exports, at the expense of wine exports. Second, changing relative producer prices would affect - 30 -
incentivesto use high-costfactors of productionon certain crops, thereby affecting their yields. Diversificationinto other crops not explicitly consideredhere is also a strongpossibility: these could includeindustrial crops such as sunflowerand colza,or other oilseeds,or industrialtomatoes (thesecrops are at present includedin the categoryof vegetables). These products,if produced in substantialquantities, could reduce future import levels.
4.31 The importsas projectedhere would continueto be a large factorin Algeria'suse of foreignexchange, whichever scenario prevails. This is because of the importancewithin the food importbill of food itemsthat are not produced in Algeria,such as sugar,coffee, tea, and certaincooking oils, which together accountfor about one third of total food imports. In the absenceof pricing policyto dampendemand, imports of theseitems will continueto grow with the populationand with incomes.The ratioof the projectedfood importbill in the year 2000 to the projectedtotal merchandise import bill variesbetween 16X of totalprojected merchandise imports in the lowercase scenarioand 13.5X in the higher case scenario. These estimatesexclude importsused as inputs into agriculturalproduction, such as maize,barley, and soybeancakes, which could accountfor another4-6% of total imports. The differencein foreignexchange savings,however, from achievingthe highergrowth rates as opposedto the lower growthrates, would come to aboutUS$600 million equivalent (in currentterms) on an annualbasis. For detailsof these estimates,see Working Paper 1 in Volume II'.
4.32 In a situationwhere the countrywill need its foreignexchange to financeimports for investment,Algeria should make a concertedeffort to reduce its dependenceon importedfood by increasingdomestic production, subject to economicand otherfinancial considerations and by usingpricing policy to dampen demand. It is importantto recognize,however, that policiesand investments aimed at increasingdomestic production will have less effect on the overall importbill than will policiesaimed at decreasingdemand through increased consumerprices. Given the politicallysensitive nature of increasingprices of what are consideredbasic food items,this couldonly be done graduallyand duringa periodof relativeeconomic stability. This is discussedfurther in ChapterIX.
'/ Algeria'sfood import bill in 1988 already exceeded 20% of total imports;for 1989, it was estimatedat around 30% of total imports. These years were exceptionallypoor for agriculturalproduction; however,in addition,the situationwas compoundedby the political sensitivityof food shortagesand the need to compressoverall imports (the denominator)to limit the outflow of foreign exchange. This illustratesAlgeria's vulnerability with respect to imported food requirements. - 31 -
4.33 In additionto decreasingimport requirements,these various growth ratesimply potential for increasingexports. Quantifying this potentialis more difficult,because it dependson findingsuitable markets and being able to satisfythem with the quantity,quality, timing and packagingrequirements. It is likely,however, that if exportsof such crops as dates,olives, citrus, and early vegetables,as well as non-traditionalitems such as duck, turkey,and other small livestock,are liberalizedand privateproducers, traders, and/or exportersare able to seek out their own markets,agricultural exports could increasenoticeably.
4.34 Finally, these growth rates in agriculturehave implicationsfor employmentand incomegeneration and for stemmingthe flow of rural to urban migration,which are difficultto quantify. More intensivecultivation and higheryields imply a greaterdemand for labor,and the recentflow of Government employees,from urbancenters as well as from localoffices, to the newly created EACs testifiesto abilityof profitableagricultural opportunities to attract and maintainan economicallyactive population in rural areas.
F. Conclusionson FutureGrowth Rates
4.35 The resultsof these considerationsshow that without a pro-active policy of support by Governmentto take advantageof the recent reforms, increasesin the value of agriculturalproduction can be expectedto be less than 3% p.a. over the next five years,considerably lower than the 5.5% growth enjoyedover the previousten years,or it could be as high as 6.6% p.a. if a major effortis made to reducecurrent constraints. The resultsare sensitive to assumptionson the speedand abilityof the EACs to realizeproductivity gains and on the speed,magnitude, and successof Government'sintervention. Both the higherand mediumgrowth scenarios, involving considerable response by the EACs and investmentby Government,result in growthrates that exceedthe projected growthvate for the economyas a whole. GDP is projectedto grow at an average of 3.9% p.a. for the entire1990-95 period, starting at 3.5% p.a. and gradually increasingto 4.2% by 1995 if the price of oil remainsstrong. Thus agriculture may providean engineof growthfor the economy.
4.36 In addition,these resultsshow that if all optimalconditions combine for Government -- investment, institutionalchanges, and incentive framework -- Algeriacould move towardsits objectiveof reducingdependence on importsto meet food requirementsand of havinga modestincrease in agriculturalexports. Thesehigher growth and self-sufficiencyrates are criticallydependent, however, on both the EACs' ability to function as autonomouscollectives and on Government'sability to handle the issuesfacing the agriculturalsector. In order to have a significantreduction in dependenceon imports,furthermore, Governmentwill have to addresspricing policy issues in an effort to dampen demandand reducewaste. These issuesare discussedin the followingchapters. - 32 -
PART II KEY ACTIONS: MAKINGTHE AGRARIANREFORM WORK
V. THE LARGERSETTING: MACROECONOMICREFORMS
5.01 Government'sobjectives for the agriculturalsector as describedin the NationalDevelopment Plan are, interalia, to: reducedependency on agricultural imports,especially for cereals;increase rural incomes; and stem rural to urban migration. In the previoussection of the report, estimatesof the future potential growth rates and projectionsfor the scope of reducing import deperdencewere presented.In addition,Chapter IV presenteddetails on the main sourcesof growthfor agriculturethat canbe expectedto be tappedin the coming years, and indicatedthat for the immediatefuture, in the next five years, increasingproductivity of agricultureoffered the greatestscope for generating growth. This second sectionof the reportdiscusses potential constraints, issues,actions, and recommendationsacross various aspects of agricultural reforms,investments and policiesthat would affect the extent to which the potentialfor growthcould be realized.
5.02 Governmentactions in agricultureshould be consideredin the lightof recentpast and potentialfuture reforms, both in the agriculturalsector and in the larger contextof the macroeconomy. In the early 1980s,Government started to shift the economy from central planning to one that was more market-determined,although the main impetustook place in the late 1980's. These reforms translatedinto the passage of a banking law increasingthe autonomy of banks, the granting of greater autonomy to enterprises,the liberalizationof regulationsgoverning private investment,liberalir%ation in pricesand marketingarrangements in the agriculturalsector, and the dramatic land reformof the statefarm sector. In the future,as Governmentcompletes the shift from the centrallyplanned economy that has prevailedfor the past twenty years, towards a more liberalizedeconomic system, the changes will continueto affectagriculture.
5.03 On the macroeconomicfront, in particular,the increasedautonomy of enterprisesand the reducedrole of monopolieswill introducecompetition and greater efficiencyinto the services and marketing activitiessurrounding agriculture.Specifically, a decreasein the protectionof Algerianindustry, throughremoving absolute quantitative restrictions on importsof substitutes, will pirovidea greaterrange of agriculturalequipment and an improvedsupply of spare parts. In addition,the encouragementor reduceddiscouragement of privateenterprises should enable agro-industrial activities to expand,thereby increasingthe market for agriculturalproducts. An importantchange for agriculturecould be continueddevaluation of the dinar. This, combinedwith the removalof state monopolyexporters and changesin the accessof private exportersto foreign exchange,should provide the incentiveneeded to spur agriculturalexports; it may,however, also resultin sharplyincreased subsidies to producersunless prices are realigned.Finally, reforms of the financial - 33 -
sector and introductionof autonomyand competitionamong banks may permit greaterresources to be channelledto agriculturethan was the case under the centrallyplanned allocation system.
5.04 While a number of actionsand policy measuresaimed specificallyat agriculturecan greatly affect the productivityand growth of the sector, macroeconomicmeasures will obviouslyplay a dominantrole in determiningthe overallenvironment, and ultimatelythe incentivesand constraintsthat will determinethe sector'slong-term ability to maintaingrowth. For agriculture in particular,realizing the potentialfor growth will involveactions and policiesthat fall into four major categories:
(a) the transformationof the state farm sectorunder which state farms have been eliminatedand replacedby smallgroups of privatefarmers;
(b) strengtheningsuMM,rt institutionsfor credit, extension and research,input supplies and marketingincluding, where appropriate, liberalizationand/or measures to allow private enterprisesto functioneffectively;
(c) Rrivateand publicinvestments, especially those involving credit to farmers;and
(d) introducingan efficientgricing and incentiveframework to provide a favorable environment to encourage farmers to increase productivity.
These four areas, their impact on growth, the issues involved, and the recommendationsfor each, are presentedin the followingfour chapters.
VI. TRANSFORMATIONOF THE ACRICULTURALSECTOR
A. Introduction
6.01 The potentialfor growth of Algerianagriculture in the near term is closely related to the impact of the transformationof the socialiststate farming sector into groups of private farmers. As noted in Chapter IV, projectionsof growth rates are highly sensitiveto assumptionsabout the responsivenessof these groupsto their new situationand to what extentthe needed inputs,credit and equipmentwill be available. This sectionof the report explores aspects of the recent restructuring,in particularrisks associatedwith the reform, and, where relevant,makes recommendationsfor action.
B. The Reform
6.02 The most profoundsingle reform in Algerianagriculture in decadesis the breakupand dissolutionof the DAS, completelyrestructuring the means of production. In a dramaticmove, Governmentdecided in July 1987 to abandon - 34 -
its attempts -- lasting over 20 years -- to make a go of the state-owned farm sector. The decisionwas in line with the trend startedin the early 1980sto relymore on the privatesector and to giveproductive enterprises full autonomy, making them responsiblefor productiondecisions, profits and losses. The Governmenthas thus introducednew incentivesfor producersto increaseoutput and productivity. In the past, DAS membersreceived a fixed and relatively attractivewage that was not relatedto productivity.
6.03 In December1987, Governmentpassed a law'providing for the division of the DAS into autonomousgroups of private farmers,Exploitation Agricole Collective(EAC) and, in certaincases, into singlefarmer units, Exploitation Agricole Individuelle (EAI)2. The law specified that each EAC must have at least threeindividuals; they couldbe from the same affinityor familygroup. Where therewere smallparcels of land left over, generallytoo small for the formationof EACs, these could be allocatedto individualfarmers as EAIs. EAC/EAIswould be givenusufrtct rights to land. EACswould operate like private farms to the extent that they would be responsiblefor their own planningand management.To avoidextreme parceling of holdings,EACs have been established with sufficientsize to be farmedby tractorsand other equipment. To ensure the futureviability of thesefarms, the land is to be held indivisibly,although individualfarmers have the right,after a periodof five years, to pass their land to theirchildren and to transfertheir sharesto other members.
6.04 The processof sub-dividingthe DAS, formingthe EAC/EAIs,and valuing existingassets for transferto the new EAC/EAIsstarted in October1987 (before the law was ?assed,the transferwas consideredto be on a pilot basis). It was expected thaLtthis process would take until the end of 1988. Instead,by end-April 1988 -- well ahead of schedule -- the bulk of the work had been done. About 22,000 EACs were established,each occupyingan average of 70 ha of cultivableland with 6-7 members3; 5,100 EAIs have also been established,each with an averageof about 6 ha. In irrigatedareas, the averageEAC farm size is eithersmaller or the numberof groupmembers has been increased;Government reservesthe right,under certaincircumstances, to add additionalmembers to EACs, for example, when dryland farms are converted into irrigatedfarms followingGovernment investment in irrigation.
6.05 The sheerspeed and magnitudeof the changeinvolves substantial risks, particularlyin the immediatefuture; such a radicalchange in ownershipand means of productionis boundto involverisks. The potentialbenefits, however, are also great -- far greater than continuing the tinkering at the margin that
'/ Loi No. 87-19 of December 8, 1987.
2/ The few remainingDAS, for exampledairy farms and pilotor demonstration farms,would continueto operateas state farms.
3/ The actualarea distributedto each EAC was about 90 ha. This, however, includesthe area underroads, buildings, swamplands, etc. not suitable for cultivation. - 35 -
has characterizedpast effortsto improvethe performanceof the DAS. Certain issuesmust be resolvedduring the courseof implementationand monitoringof the reform program will be vital (para. 7.23). These issues need to be consideredin the contextof a comprehensiveland policy that has yet to be developed(para. 6.12). The sectionsbelow summarizethe major issuesthat are likelyto em-.rge;these are discussedin more detailin Annex 2, Volume II of this report,wihich examines experiences with land reformsin other countriesto assess the extent to which futureproblems can be predictedand, therefore, avoided.
C. EACs WillThev Perform?
6.06 ManagerialCapacity of EACs. The growthrates that can be achievedin the immediatefuture depend more on this single issue of EAC/EAImanagement abilitythan on the other issuesdiscussed belowt, which relate to the longer term. The extent to which the EAC/EAIswill increaseproductivity in the immediatefuture will determinewhether Algeria can attainthe 6-7X growthrate estimatedto be the upper limit of growth for the sector. Members of the EAC/EAIs comprise former DAS members, managers and extension agents who previouslyworked on the DAS, and others with experienceand training in agriculture.A largenumber of seniorstaff of the Ministryof Agricultureleft the Ministryas did many extensionstaff at the provinceand districtlevels to join EAC/EAIs,which testifiesto the expectedprofitability of farming in Algeria. However, in contrastto the 700,000-1,000,000individual, private farmerswho have been farmingfor generations,most of the new EAC/EAI farmers have little, or often no, experience in operating their own farms -- in farm planning,deciding appropriate cropping patterns, planting, applying appropriate levelsof inputsat the right time,or in cattleor poultryoperations. EAC/EAI farmers are, therefore,having to adjust from being wage-earnerswith no experienceof managingfinances, credit or repayments,no responsibilityfor maintainingassets, farm machinery, and livestockto being fullyresponsible for both managementdecisions and day-to-dayoperations.
6.07 Roughlytwo years after this restructuring,it is still difficultto assessthe likelyimpact of the establishmentof the EAC/EAIs:the changeover took place in the midst of the 1987/88crop season,and officialstatistics show that the area plantedfell dramatically(by 38X) from the 1985-87average. It was also a year of severe drought. The followingyear, 1988/89,has been a droughtyear as well, althoughdata are not yet availableto measureits overall impact. Bank missionshave noted,however, that farneersappear to be working harderthan beforeon these lands and yieldsare higheron irrigatedareas with sufficientwater. The experienceof the EAC/EAIswill undoubtedlyprove to be highly variable. Some groups have been formed by well-educated,dynamic individualswho have alreadyinvested substantially in their farms and who are seekingto producehigh-value crops or livestockfor which they have identified niches in domesticor overseasmarkets (spices,turkeys, ducks, etc.). Such groupsdemonstrate the latentenergy and entrepreneurialspirit in Algeriathat could lead to the rapid developmentof "new" commodities. This would have a marked demonstrationeffect for other, less entrepreneurialfarmers. At the - 36 -
other end of the scale,some groupshave been formedsolely from previousDAS farm workers;many such farmersare older,less dynamic,and illiteratewhich may hamper,for example,their ability to obtainloans. Even thesegroups speak positivelyof the change and the chance to work for themselvesand their children. In aggregate,there has alreadybeen an encouraginglevel of on-farm investment,some of which is entirelyself-financed although some farmersnote a shortageof equipmentand inputs. To ensure that all EAC/EAIshave the necessarysupport to enablethem to succeed,it is importantthat Government: (a) ensurethat there are adequateequipment repair shops and spare parts;(b) encouragethe establishmentof contractingservices for equipmentrental; and (c) establishan effectiveextension service, making technicaland financial adviceavailable to EAC/EAIs. These aspectsare discussedin more detail in ChapterVII.
6.08 While the growthrates in the next few years dependon this singleissue of EAC,'EAIability to manage, the other issues discussedin the followinp paragraphs,concerning various aspects of the recentreform, will likelyaffecL the EAC/EAIinvestment rates and levelsof efficiencyand, in the mediumto long term, their abilityto sustainhigher growth rates.
6.09 CollectiveManagement and Sub-divisionof Land. The law requiresthat the EACs be farmedcollectively. Experience from other countriessuggests that farmingon a fully collectivebasis may dilutemany of the potentialbenefits of land reform because of the difficultiesof collectivelydeciding on investments,indebtedness, division of labor,and allocationof profits. For example,sub-optimal investments can resultif the decisionto investis made at the levelof the memberof a groupwho is willingto investleast. Experience from other countries shows that (a) production generally has increased significantlywhen collectivefarms have been convertedto privateplots and (b) there may be considerablepressure from farmers to sub-dividetheir plots. Indeed,there is, in some parts of the country,an increasingpressure to allow sub-divisionand the takeoverof the lessefficient farms by the more efficient. The issuesfor Governmentare the extentto which the"indivisibility"rule that presentlyprevents sub-division will be adhered to and the extent to which Governmentwill allow concentrationof ownershipby the more successfulfarmers (para.6.10). Experienceelsewhere suggests that to maximizegains from the reform,farmers should be allowedto make theirown savings,investment and work allocationdecisions. Accordingly, it is recommendedthat considerationbe given to relaxingthe legislationto allowsubdivision of EACs on a case-by-casebasis (Anne-t2).
6.10 Farm Size. The issue of allowingsub-division of EACs leads directly to the issue of farm size. An implicitassumption of the law is that the EACs shouldbe of sufficientsize to be farmedefficiently by a tractor;hence their indivisibility.Extensive, relatively low inputcropping systems such as wheat and barleythat predominatein Algeriaare bettersuited to large,rather than small,farm situationssuggesting that, in certaininstances, efficiency gains could be obtainedby allowingfor the "purchase"or rentalof additionalland by the better farmers. At the other end of the scale,it is not evidentthat farmsalways need to be as large as 70-90ha; farms of 15-25ha could be farmed - 37 -
as efficientlyas the larger farms, particularlygiven: (a) the availabilityof modern, smaller, better-adapted farm equipment, and (b) the possibility of renting farm machinery. Evidence from other countries suggests that for high value, labor-intensivecrops such as vegetables, smaller farms (even as small as 2 ha) can be as efficient as larger ones. It is recommendedthat a flexible approach to farm size be adopted so that (a) sub-divisionof EACs is allowed where justified and (b) developmentof a land rental market ts allowed to permit farming on a larger scale in cases where economies of scale dictate (Annex 2). The policies on farm size should be developed in the context of an overall land policy (para. 6.12).
6.11 Mechanization. Allowing greater flexibility in the evolution of farm size has further implicationsfor mechanizationof these farms. To ensure tnat the newly created smaller farms have sufficientaccess to mechanizationservices, even where equipment ownership may not be efficient, it is recommended that Government encourage the development of a private rental market for equipment; and that credit be provided to collectivesor to private entrepreneursto enable them to specialize in machinery services and rentals. It is also recommended that Government strengthen its research on selection of equipment suitably adapted to Algeria's new farming conditions (paras. 7.13-7.15).
6.12 Land Policy and Permanence of Land-Use Rights. The law provides for the transfer of usufruct rights in the event of death of an EAC farmer but it is not clear whether this transfer can be to more than one farmer. Nor is it clear whether EAC members are allowed to buy out other members. It appears that, as a general rule, changes cannot be made that affect the existing farm size or boundaries. An important issue is whether the usufruct rights are permanent,and, more importantly,whether farmersare convincedthat these rights are permanent. Algeria'shistory of major agriculturalreorganizations over the past 25 years with land expropriated from private farmers, then redistributed to other private farmers, is such that some farmers may not be convinced that the inheritable right to use the land will be more permanent than previous reforms. This is a potentially important issue in Algeria. Some private farmers, whose land was taken in the 1970s during the agrarian revolution and distributedto the DAS, are asking for their land back. Why, they argue, should ex-DAS workers or ex-staff from the Ministry of Agriculture be given land that had been in their families for generations? It is recommended that this issue be addressed as a matter of urgency: experience with land reform in other countries shows that if farmers remain unconvincedby guaranteesin the law that the land is theirs, investmentin and maintenanceof land improvementsare likely to remain below optimal levela. In addition,the law leaves room for Government to add new EAC members'or subdivide EACs if, for example, Government develops a new large-scale irrigation scheme on land belonging to an EAC. Responding promptly to some of these concerns, Government has issued an interministerial circular clarifying that if EAC members develop their land by sinking a (private)
'/ Article 24; "In every case, the state can exercise its right of pre- emption", and Article 25: "Except for the state..., any acquirer must be ... agreed to by other members". - 38 -
tube well, Covernmentwill n__ add additionalEAC members. In this situation, EACswill remainthe sole beneficiariesof theirown investments.The situation is less clear if Governmentfinances a large-scaleirrigation scheme that is not currentlyenvisaged in a particularregion. Will Governmentthen subdivide existingEACs therebytaking over investmentsalready made by the EACs? Any expropriationwould undermineinvestments in areas that farmersbelieve may be irrigatedin the future. It is recommendedthat, exceptwhere new irrigation schemeshave alreadybeen identifiedand EACs toldthat farmswill be subdivided, Governmentclarify that no EAC farms will be subdividedby Governmentfiat'. Governmentalso needs to assurefarmers that the usufructrights are guaranteed for at least 15 years,a periodfound crucialin China. Detailsof this issue are in Annex 2. It is recommendedalso that considerationbe given to the introductionof a proper land marketbased on land titles,rather than merely a market in user-rights.If so, steps shouldbe taken to providefarmers with titlesto theirproperties. In this context,it is recommendedthat Government developan overallland policywith clearlydefined objectives so that future changescan be consideredwithin the frameworkof such a policy.
6.13 Transferof UsufructRights. Based on experiencesin other countries, it is recommendedthat creationof either (a) a market in land-useriglhts or (b) a land market be allowed. The presenceof such a market is likely to encouragefarmers to developthe potentialof their land and to assistin the transferof poorlyfarmed, unproductive land to better,more productivefarmers. If such a measurewere considered,it couldbe introducedwith specificceilings on total land area over which one farmer can hold land-userights. Other countrieshave also found that the developmentof rental marketsin land-use rightscan bring many of the efficiencybenefits of a salesmarket without the same potentialsocial costs (see Annex 2).
6.14 Level of Indebtedness.The newly establishedEAC/EAIs have purchased the formerDAS' farm assets,machinery, equipment, livestock, and plantations from Government. These assets (calledthe "patrimoine")have been valued on the basis of formulaedetermined by Governmentreflecting both the cost of the asset and the fair marketvalue. In the Mitidjaarea, for example,the value of the assetstransferred was DA 800,000(US$135,000) per EAC or US$17,000per beneficiary.Credit for the patrimoinewas providedby Governmentthrough BADR on a long-termbasis 2. EAC/EAIfarmers also had to borrowfor subsistenceuntil the next harvestand for seasonalinputs. They also need to investfurther to replaceworn out equipmentor to completeinfrastructure. Many new farmershave thus startedtheir existencewith high levelsof debt. Farmersmay be tempted either to keep requestsfor loans to a minimum,thereby reducingpotential
'/ For equityreasons an improvedcost recoverypolicy for nationallybuilt irrigationschemes would, however, also need to be introduced.
2, Repaymentis over 15 years, with five years of grace for interest paymentsand two years of grace on the principal,at an interestrate of 2 1/2X p.a. Since the funds are paid to Government(through BADR), this shouldnot affectBADR's liquidity. - 39 -
productivity,or at the otherextreme, may mishandletheir financingand become over-indebted. In fact, there has been a rapid increasein the demand for credit,although the majorityis for the purchaseof seasonalinputs. The level of indebtednessdoes not, therefore,appear yet to be a constraintto future investments.Also, farmersseem to differentiatebetween loans from the banks, which they regard as a "legitimate"debt, and loans from Governmentfor the patrimoinefor which they take a more casualapproach. These issueswill need monitoringby both BADR and by the Ministryof Agricultureto ensure that a properbalance is achievedbetween appropriate investment levels and indebtedness and to ensure that Governmentdebts, as well as debts from BADR, are repaid. One way to alleviatesome of the indebtednesswould be to extendthe five year graceperiod on the "patrimoine".
D. Makingthe Tools Available
6.15 Input Supply. This is probablythe singlemost urgentissue concerning the envirornmentin which EAC/EAIsmust perform,and one that will profoundly affectthe abilityof thesenew units to respondto incentivesin the immediate future.Many of the seeds,some finished fertilizers, inputs for the manufacture of some pesticidesand fertilizers,animal feed and some of the agricultural equipmentand spareparts are imported.With the cutbackin imports(para 1.03), the abilityof Governmentto supply the agriculturalsector with sufficient inputshas been threatened.At present,there appears to be an adequatesupply of fertilizeronly in some parts of the country;in other parts,fertilizer is in shortsupply. Animalfeed, veterinary supplies, spare parts, and to a lesser extent,agricultura'l equipment and machinery, are in criticalshortage throughout the countrywith a particularlynegative impact in the livestocksub-sector. It is vital that EAC/EAIsbe adequatelysupplied. This is importantnot only for the EAC/EAIsthemselves, but also for Algeria'aentire reform program, which would be set back if this, the first major reform,were to get off to a bad start. It is thereforerecommended that the Governmenttake measuresto ensure that sufficientforeign exchange is allocatedfor the import of the key agriculturalinputs and equipmentrequired to supportsector demands.
6.16 SupportServices. In the past, the supportservices, including research and extension,input supplies,equipment sales, spare parts, and after sales service,credit and outputmarketing were orientedtoward a smallnumber of large producers,the DAS. In addition,delivery of most inputs,equipment and credit were determinedby centralplanning following centrally established targets for production. The entire system has now changed and the networks of input cooperatives,equipment suppliers, and the systemfor creditdelivery will have to adapt to a new structureand most likelyan increaseddemand from a larger numberof smallerunits. In addition,EAC/EAIs are supposedto be competingon an equal basis with the small-scaleprivate farmers for these services. This raises a number of issues of basic policy on how these servicesare to be strengthenedor changedwhich are exploredlater in ChapterVII.
6.17 Prices. Most new EAC/EAI farmers are optimisticabout profitable opportunitiesfrom farming. At present,vegetables, some fruit and flower productionare highly profitableand many EAC/EAIfarmers are shiftinginto - 40 -
these commodities. This,in turn,may lead to over-productionand a subsequent declinein pricesand profitabilityof thesecrops (vegetable prices have already declinedsomewhat), thus disappointingexpectations. At the same time,and to the extentthat technicalconsiderations allow, farmers will probablyshift out of cereals. Fortunately,three factors will act to minimizethese risks. First, any such adjustmentprocess would be relativelyshort, albeit painful, before new equilibriumlevels of productionand prices are established. Second,a numberof pricesof key staples,such as cereals,are still controlledor have floorprices established by Government,which shouldserve to stabilizeprices and reduce the impactof major short-runfluctuations. And third,production of the vegetablesand fruits is largely dependenton the availabilityof irrigationwhich is quite limited. Thus,while the extentof fallingprices may be limited,the risk of some instabilityin profitabilityand farmers'response must be recognized. While it may be temptingfor Governmentto reintroduce controlledmarketing or fixed pricesfor thosecrops alreadyliberalized, this is not recommended,as the market forces of supply and demand permit more satisfactorychanneling of resourcesand commoditiesfor these crops. It is recommended,however, that the role of the national fruits and vegetable marketingagency (ONAFLA)be monitoredand, ir.the early years,be allowedto provideeffective floor pricesfor selectedvegetables and fruits. The larger issueof pricesand incentivesis discussedin ChapterIX.
VII. Reformingthe Institutions
A. Introduction
7.01 While performanceof the EAC/EAIsprobably ranks as the single most importantdeterminant of increasedproductivity in the agriculturalsector for the near term,and thereforethe most significantfactor in determininggrowth rates,changes in institutionssupporting and servingagriculture will alsohave a majorrole to play in enablingfarmers both to realizetheir potentialand to expandit. For increasingyields and reducingfallow in particular,the ability of the supportingservices to delivertechnical packages, of the bankingsystem to Providecredit for the necessaryinvestments, and of marketingnetworks to deliverthe necessaryinputs, will determinein the mediumterm whetherand at what pace these sourcesof growthcan be realized. Within the largercontext of promotingthe autonomyof enterprisesand encouragingthe privatesector (see paras. 1.04 and 5.03),Government has made a number of institutionalchanges designedto improveservices available to the agriculturalsector. While these past reforms,presented in some detailin the matrixin Annex 1, have servedto improveagricultural efficiency, now that the sector has been fundamentally restructuredand centralizedplanning no longer serves as the motor of agriculturalproduction, further reforms are calledfor.
7.02 The most importantinstitutional reform undertaken so far is that in the bankingsector. Credithas the potentialto becomean importantengine of growthand, in the future,will be the majorsource of investmentin agriculture. Key actionsthat are requiredto realizethis potentialare discussedin Chapter - 41 -
VIII which deals with privateand publicinvestments. This chapterfocuses ou the institutionalactions that need to be taken to provideefficient services to the farm sector. The most crucialof these is the establishmentof sound extensionand researchservices. Actionsalso need to be taken by Government to create an environmentin which non-Governmentsupport servicesof input suppliesand marketing(and credit)can functionefficiently.
B. Improvingthe Crop Exter,sionand ResearchServices
7.03 The ability of farmers to increaseyields in the immediatefuture probablydepends most on their willingnessto apply techniquesand adequate amountsof inputsalready familiar to them. The change in their habits from the recentpast would mainly be the resultof the fundamentalchange in the incentivesthey have to eliminatewaste and increaseyields. Beyond these improvements,however, increasingyields of less well-informedfarmers, and increasingyields through introducing better technicalpackages will dependon an effectiveextension service backed up by a researchsystem responding to the needs of the farmers.
7.04 Privatefarmers were almosttotally overlooked in termsof agricultural servicesuntil 1980. Recognizingthe weaknessof the agriculturalextension service,the 1980-84Plan envisagedthe establishmentof an extensionservice to assistprivate farmers (Delegation d'Agriculture du Daira-DAD).A beginning, albeit slow, has been made in the initiative. Unfortunately,the number of extensionagents remains limited (ratios of as few as 1:4,000farmers) and much of theirtime is taken up with administrativetasks. The previousshortage of extensionstaff has been compoundedwith the departureof many extension(and some researchstaff) to join the EAC/EAIs. Extensionagents also lack transport and funds for extension.The DAS were servedby higherlevel staff groupedinto Isecteursde developpementagricole" (SDA).
7.05 The basic tenetsof a good extensionsystem are the presenceof a simple, preferablysingle line of command,regular farm visits by single-purposeworkers, regulartraining of motivatedstaff and good links to research. The extension servicealso needs to be adequatelyfunded. While much has been done to improve the extensionsystem recently -- in 1985,Government issued a nationalextension policyto put in placeappropriate staffing and management,improve the technical contentof the extensionsystem, improve the farmer/extension/researchlinkages and providebetter support to the privatesector -- none of theseconditions is yet met adequately.Responsibility for implementationof the extensionservice rests at the wilaya (province)level and is based on a highly decentralized systemwith no line responsibilityto the center.
7.06 Recommendationson Extension. The first step in establishinga sound extensionsystem is to: (a) simplifyand clarifythe organizationalstructure that exists and (b) divest those staff who do extensionfrom most of the administrativeand non-extensiontasks. Second,there is a need to developa professionalservice based on a directline of command,strict observance of workingprograms, close cooperation with research,strong technical support from - 42 -
teams of subject-matterspecialists, and an effectivetraining organization. To aid the planningand monitoringof this effort,Government should improve the data on the private sector which is presently weak - - it is not clear, for example,how many farms are in operation. Th'rd, the systemof budgetingfor extensionshould be changedso that agriculturalextension is includedas a line item in the wilayabudget with controlsto ensureadequate and timelyfunding. Fourth,the graduatestaff releasedfrom the breakupof the SDA shouldprovide the basis for buildingup teams of subject-matterspecialists at the wilaya level. These teamsof well trainedand motivatedtechnical staff will be the key link in the transferof existingknow-how from the researchstations to the field. In addition,it is imperativethat technicalmessages be improved, includingmuch needed recommendationson soil conservation,on-farm erosion control,watershed management, and fertilizerand pesticideuse takingaccount of environmentalconsiderations. Government has requestedthe Bank to support an extensionand researchproject designed to establisha strongand responsive extensionservice. In view of the limitedexperience with agriculturalextension in Algeria, the project would be a pilot operation to test extension methodologieswhich could be extendedin a secondphase.
7.0i On research,Government has mounteda programof reformsfor makingthe servicemore effectiveand to redressproblems of a poor and frequentlychanging organization,weak staffing,lack of coordinationbetween research institutes and absenceof managerialautonomy. The main featuresof this reformprogram are,first, stronger central coordination of thework of the technicalinstitutes (para.7.08). Second, in order to streamlinethe researcheffort and avoid duplication,research work will be organizedfrom 7-8 RegionalAgricultural ResearchCenters covering the main agro-ecologicalzones, and the number of outstationswill be furtherreduced (some 20 stationswere closed in 1987 and 1988, reducing the number to 40). Third, research prioritieshave been identifiedand a system of programmingand budgetingby objectivesis to be implemented.
7.08 A number of research issues remain, however. First, the Institut Nationalde la RechercheAgronomique d'Alg6rie (INRAA) which has a coordinating role ut.,erits existingstatute, has sometimesfound it difficultto exercise thisrole against the strongertechnical research institutes. Strengthening this role will be an essentialfirst step in improvingcoordination. To this end, a new statutehas been drawnup for INRAA. Governmentnow needs to confirmits decisionto apply the new statute and to issue the appropriateministerial instruction. A second issue relates to the need to establishmuch stronger research-extensionlinkages with adaptiveand on-farmresearch oriented toward farmers'constraints. This will be particularlyimportant in servicingthe EAC/EAIs.A third issueaffects both the extensionand researchservices. Each servicefaces difficulties due to the lack of a recognizedcareer path for staff; remunerationlevels are not competitivewith othersectors. In research,a clear career path is requiredto attractcapable scientists,while in extension, motivationof fieldstaff is crucial.Revised terms and conditionsof employment are currentlyunder review. It is recommendedthat these termsand conditions be revised as a prerequisitefor establishingsound extensionand research services. The anticipatedBank-supported project aims to addressthese issues, - 43 -
strengthenthe central coordinationof research work, and focus on the implementationof five priority researchprograms (cereals,legumes, forage crops,red meat production,and cereal/livestocksystem). By introducingthese elementsof sound researchand extensionsystems Algeria can put into place the prerequisitesfor longer-termgrowth of productivityin the agriculturalsector.
C. ImRrovingInput Supplies and Deliver,
7.09 Ouantities.Both in the immediatefuture as well as in the longerterm, one of the most criticalelements that will permit Algeria to realize its potentialfrom the varioussources of growthwill be an adequatequantity and good quality of inputs,available to all farmers.In the past, the average quantitiesof inRuts,certified seed and fertilizers,used per hectarein Algeria have been high compared to neighboringcountries, which neverthelesshave consistentlyachieved higher yields (Tables6 and 13). Distributionof inputs was uneven,however, with the nationalmarketing bureaus and local cooperatives focusingalmost entirely on the socialistsector which did not use these inputs efficiently.The DAS, which cultivatedabout 40X of the total plantedarea, received60-70X of availablefertilizer. This situationimproved somewhat so that by 1986 the privatesector received a largershare of inputs(for details, see StatisticalAppendix, Tables A.37-A.40).
Tabe2L: COPBATIVE USE OF INPUTS AND EQIIPMENT, 1984/85
aMeria Tunla uQCCO
Une of seasonal inputs k8/ha
Use of certified cereal seed 28.3 16.5 14.8 Use of fertilisers 54.8 17.2 51.3
MebhanizgAtm ha/unit
Number of bectares cultivated by: Tractors 87 166 324 Ploughs and other equipcut 40 94 n.a. Combine harvesters (cerealhectarage) 503 905 n.a. Fertilizerspreaders 1,203 1,382 n.a. Seeders 803 1,146 n.a. Pesticide sprayers 402 1,175 n.a.
Source: Alerie: Benk estimates;Morocco: AgriculturalSector AdjustmentLoan (World Bank 1985, Technical Annex); Tunisia: World Bank and FAO/CP: Plan directeurdo mdcanisation agricole pour La Tunisie.
7.10 Oualitvand Distributionof InDuts. Cereals and pulses seeds are produced locally. There are, however,problems of quality control in seed multiplication,and in subsequentcertification, storage, and distribution,which are all the responsibilityof the parastatalmarketing bureau and its systemof Government-sponsoredcooperatives, OAIC and the CCLS. One possibilityfor improvingthe supervisionof seed multiplicationand subsequentstages of certificationand storage might be to establish a specialized agency; alternatively,OAIC and the CCLS may need additionallogistical and technical - 44 -
support to carry out this function. The EEC is currently financing a pilot project to test approaches to develop the technical, organizational,and legal framework for the production of quality certified seed. It is expected that lessons learned from this operationcan be replicatedso that Algeria can produce more high-quality seed locally. Fertilizers and Resticides are also mostly produced locallyby a parastatal fertilizerand chemical company, and distributed by a parastatal marketing agency and its network of cooperatives. The timing of the delivery and quality of these inputs need to be further explored, as does the use of certain pesticides and fertilizers, including the impact on the environment;in this regard, stricter guidelines,the ban of certain pesticides and the training of extension staff in the use of pesticides and fertilizersand their proper disposal should be a priority concern (paras. 8.25 and 8.33-8.35).
7.11 Government has carried out a review of some of the many institutions providing inputs to farmers. For the time being, no major change is expected in the role of input delivery to Government-sponsorednational-level "offices," which involves mainly importing supplies. Over time, however, the "offices" would presumablybecome more autonomous,in line with the recent law on autonomy of enterprises. Government did pass a decree regarding agricultural cooperatives: "Decret no. 88-170", dated September 1988. The intention is to transform the existing cooperatives from "top-down" institutions run by Government into "true" cooperat'vesestablished by, and run for the benefit of, farmers. These new cooperativesare free to do most service-relatedactivities in the agriculturalsector, for example, to purchase inputs from the cheapest source,by importingdirectly if they have access to foreignexchange, purchasing directly from the local manufacturer, or purchasing directly from private suippliersif such are allowed to exist. Where no farmers express a desire to take-overor "buy" the cooperatives,a service enterprise can be set up with the right.3of a private company after purchase of the assets. The intention is that the vreal" cooperatives be run like private companies, and, accordingly, the assets of the previous cooperativesare being sold to farmers on credit. It is not clear that 'real", bottom-up cooperativescan, in fact, be established by Government fiat and, in the absence of the significantGovernment support that was forthcomingto the previous cooperatives,some of the new cooperativesmay well collapse financially. The less successful cooperatives can presumably, according to the law, be taken over by ex-employees, individual farmers, or private entrepreneurs and run as private enterprises. It is recommended that Government continue to encourage the formationof these "real" cooperativesbut that Government's financial support be limited and should not go beyond, say, the end of 1990. It is further recommended that the Government not support unviable cooperativesand that, in such instances, it not hinder their takeover by the private sector.
7.12 Regarding input pricing, Government currently has a policy of uniform input prices throughoutthe country. CASSAP and its parent, ONAPSA, the agencies responsible for distribution of fertilizer, thus make larger profits on fertilizerdistributed and purchased near the factoriesand smaller or negative margins at points far from the factory. If EACs or private traderswere allowed to purchase directly from the factories, they could realize profits by virtue of their proximity to the factories. This is unlikely to be condoned. At the - 45 -
same time, it is clearly not in the interests of CASSAP/ONAPSA,which have a monopoly on the distributionof fertilizer,to encourage competition and/or the direct purchase from factories. Nevertheless,to provide inputs to farmers in a reliable manner at the cheapest possible price, competition among input suppliers is desirable. Accordingly, it is recommended that Government allow, in addition to cooperatives,private traders and EAC/EAIs to: purchase inputs from the cheapest possible source, and stock and sell inputs, including inputs for livestock, at margins that make them attractive. To this end, it is also recommendedthat Government liberalizethe import of fertilizerand other inputs, permitting state enterprises other than ASMIDAL (which has a monopoly on importation of fertilizer) and private entrepreneurs to import fertilizer and other inputs. Finally, it is recommended that prices of fertilizers and other inputs be liberalized,at least at the retail level, to encourage enterprises and individualsto market these inputs. Government is about to embark on a major study of the fertilizer subsector financed by UNDP with the Bank as Executing Agency which will, inter alia, evaluate different options for fertilizers including price policy, distribution margins, the role of the marketing cooperatives, the role of the private sector and environmental aspects (para. 8.33).
7.13 Mechanization. As with inputs, the ability to improve the scope and quantity of equipment available to farmers, and especially to improve the spare parts and repair services available, will play a critical role in the ability of farmers to respond to incentives and to participate fully in large-scale investments such as irrigation or development of the South. As with inputs, availabledata on mechanizationlevels for Algeria show that by comparison with neighboring countries, Algeria is relatively well-endowed with tractors and combineharvesters (Table 13). This is the result of (a) the importanceaccorded by Government to the distributionof equipment, particularlyto the DAS; (b) an over-valuedexchange rate that distorts the price of capital relative to labor and encourages over-capitalization;and (c) a pricing policy that kept new equipmentprices low for many years; prices have been increased recently (spare parts have always been sold at relativelyhigher prices). The averages in Table 13 above mask the even more intensive level of mechanizationthat existed in the socialist farms before their break-up and which should now exist in the EAC/EAIs that have acquired these assets. This is because private farmers were able to obtain only a small portion of the equipment distributed. Because of the problems of spare parts and repair facilities,however, these figures may not represent the real availabilityof functioningequipment. In addition, because much of the manufacture of equipment is based on a turnkey arrangement from the early 1980s, the equipment currentlymanufactured and distributed in Algeria is not always well adapted to Algerian conditions.
7.14 The effectivenessof mechanizationin the future in Algerian agriculture is direcLly related to the larger issue of Algeria's industrializationpolicy which provides absolute protection to the nascent parastatal industry manufacturingthe equipment; this issue also affects the import and manufacture of fertilizer and other inputs by existing state monopolies. To allow farmers to purchase inputs at or near world market prices, agricultural inputs should be imported or manufacturedby efficient local enterprises. While Government's - 46 -
industrializationpolicy may achieve its objectiveof replacingimports of finishedmanufactured goods by domesticallymanufactured goods, it increases costs throughlack of competitionand/or inefficiencies in manufacturing.It also limitsfarmers' choice of equipment,limits the availabilityof equipment reflectingthe latesttechnology, and equallyas important,sharply reduces the availabilityof spare parts and after sales service. The monopoly state enterpriseresponsible for importingand maintaininga stock of spareparts has been unableto cope with the huge and complextask of supplyingparts for many differe.tbrands of many typesof equipment;this must work againstthe important effortsmade to mechanizeAlgerian farms.
7.15 The state agency responsiblefor the sale and distributionof farm equipmentand implementsrecently licensed a smallnumber of privateshops to sell spare parts, do repairs,sell small agriculturalimplements, and provide guaranteedafter sales service,subject to pricesand marginsset by Government. Unfortunately,consideration is now being given to abolishingthe right of privatetraders to stock sparesfor resalegiving an exclusivemonopoly to PMA (the nationalmonopoly manufacturer of agriculturalequipment) and the EDIMAs (wilayalevel public enterprisesset up to sell and servicefarm equipment). As with other inputs,it is recommendedthat Government(a) place priorityon allocatingsufficient foreign exchange to importspare parts, and (b) liberalize the import,purchase, sale and distributionof new equipmentand spare parts at marginsthat encourage private sector participation. It is also ecommendedthat Governmentencourage small-scale entrepreneurs to set up hire services,which would lead to better maintenanceand higher utilizationrates of the farm machinery.This may requirechanges in currentlicensing regulations. Finally, it is recommendedthat Governmentset pricesof sparesat a level that does not discouragethe repairof old equipmentin favorof thea,urchase of new equipment; at present,there is a 40X tariffon importof sparesmaking them relativelymore expensivethan new equipment.
D. Liberalizingthe-Marki Ystems
7.16 Until 1982, most agriculturalproducts and foods were marketedby state-ownedand operatednational marketing bureaus, specializing in one of severalcommodities. The marketingbureaus, called Offices, include an office for the marketingof cerealsand pulses,one for red meat, one for milk and milk products,one for poultryproducts, one for wine productsand table grapes,one for dates, and one for olive and other oil seed products. In addition,a nationaloffice exists for the marketingof fresh fruitsand vegetables. The nationaloffices, some of which have been recentlyreorganized into regional offices,operate at the local level through Government-sponsoredmarketing cooperativesso thata farmerwho sellshis producethrough cooperatives may have to deal with, and even belong to, many differententities.
7.17 It is currentGovernment policy that all cereals,pulses, grapes and olivesbe sold throughofficial channels at prices fixed by Government. In fact,between 50-70X of local productionof erealsandpulseins, covering about 60-70X of the cultivatedarea, is handled in a 'parallelmarket" that is - 47 - officiallyacknowledged and allowed to exist; these commoditiesare milled locallyfor farmers'own or neighbors'consumption. Since local production represents about 25% of total consumption -- the balance of 75% is imported -- the amountof cerealsand pulsesactually passing outside official channels is quite small,at 10-15%of totalconsumption. For livestockproducts, including red meat, poultryproducts, and milk products,an activeprivate sector exists alongsidethe officialchannels. A major transformationtook place in 1982with the marketing of fresh fruits and vegetables. Governmentliberalized the marketingrf thesecommodities and privatetraders have becomeactive in all but certainexport crops, such as olives,wine grapes,dates, and citrusfruit. As noted in ChapterIII, the liberalizationof pricesand marketingarrangements of fruitsand vegetableshas had a positiveimpact on the productionof these commodities.Official marketing agencies were still maintainedfor fruitsand vegetablesto buy part of the DAS production;with the breakupof the DAS, their role shouldbecome one of providinga floorprice in the event of excesssupply (see para. 6.17).
7.18 Overall,there has been a clear tendencyto liberalizethe marketingof commodities. This is likely to be acceleratedwith the breakup of the DAS, since it is harder to controlmarkets when there are large numbersof small producersthan with smallnumbers of large state farms. It is recommendedthat Governmentconsider further liberalizing marketing arrangements, especially for barleyand othercereals produced for livestockproduction, most of whichalready pass outsideofficial channels, and for pulses. Second,it is recommendedthat marketingarrangements of exportcrops be furtherliberalized as has recently been done in Moroccoand was alreadythe case in Tunisiafor most crops (except for olive oil, which remainscontrolled)'. Progress has alreadybeen made on this front. In the past, all agriculturalexports had to pass throughstate monopolies,while farmersare now apparentlyfree to exportdirectly, although it is not clear to what extentthey can retainthe foreignexchange (para. 9.18). Finally,it is recommendedthat Governmentreduce the role or, at a minimum, rationalizethe numberand scope of cooperativesand marketingagencies.
E. A Mew Role for the Ministryof Agriculture
7.19 Agriculturalgrowth rates in the near term will not be fundamentally affectedby the role playedby the Ministryof Agriculture,but in the medium and long term the abilityof this Ministryto create a favorableenvironment for growthwill be criticalfor the successof the reformsunderway. This
In Morocco,Government liberalized exports so that exportersno longerhad to pass througha state-ownedmonopoly. Despite the entry of Spain and Portugalto the EEC, the value of Moroccanagricultural exportshas increased,with a shift from citrus to new high-value exports such as flowersand early vegetables. Deregulationhas apparentlyallowed greater flexibility and creativityin findin,gnew marketsand opportunitiesin Europein the faceof strongcompet:.tion from Spain and Portugal. - 48 -
Ministry, togetherwith the Ministry of Equipment,will have to establish prioritiesand criteria for investments,to ensure an adequate incentive frameworkto encourageprivate investments,and to plan and monitor public investments. In the past, a large part of the work of the Ministry of Agriculturewas orientedtoward planning, supporting and monitoringthe DAS in the productionprocess itself. With the dissolutionof the DAS, the role and focus of the Ministry'swork will change. First, the Ministryneeds to build up and maintaina viable researchand extensionservice as discussedabove. Second,it shouldstrengthen its overallplanning caRacity to establishsectoral objectivesand prioritiesfor development,both for privateon-farm developments and for centralizedpublic investments(Chapter VIII). For example,sectoral prioritiesshould be examined,not only in terms of theirability to substitute for importsor maximizeproduction, but in termsof theireconomic and budgetary implications(Chapter IX). These prioritieswill then have to be communicated by use of incentives.Third, therefore,Government should create a systemof pricesand incentivesthat sendssignals to farmersand which maximizeseconomic returnsto the country(Chapter IX). To this end, the Ministrywill need to strengthenits analyticcapacity.
7.20 Fourth, in the contextof a favorableenvironment for agriculture,the Ministryshould allow non-government support services of credit,input supplies, and marketing to function efficientlyto provide services to farmers at reasonablecost. The Ministryshould review existing marketing arrangements and continueto monitorinpu; supplies through the newlycreated "real" cooperatives with a view to increasingefficiency and reducingthe burden on Governmentof operatingthese agencies(paras 7.09-7.15). In the future,the Ministrywill have a continuousresponsibility to monitorthe efficiencyof the systemsfor input deliveryand equipmentservices, identify appropriate consultants and to introducerequired reforms in legislationand/or changes in the applicationof the legislation.To make tne decentralizedsystem work better, the Ministry, togetherwith the Ministryof Equipment,also has a responsibilityto monitor the use of inputs for their environmentalimpact (see para 8.25 for further discussion).
7.21 In accordancewith the move towardsdecentralization, most investments will now be part of the provincial-levelplans (see ChapterVIII), with the largerinvestments still plannedat the centrallevel. As a result,the role of the Ministrieswill changefrom planning the investmentsto monitoringthem. It in thereforeleommended that the Ministryof Agricultureand the Ministry of Equipmentbuild up theirreview capacity both at the wilayaand centrallevels so that all nationallyfunded projects of a certainminimum size can be reviewed against a set of investmentcriteria, includingtachnical, financial, and economicviability, and socialand environmentalimpact. The need to strengthen the economicbasis of decisionsis particularlyurgent in the Ministry of Equipment(para. 8.23).
7.22 Fifth, in additionto introducingcriteria for investmentplanning and decision-making,a public investment/eNeniture review should be undertakento assess fundingcommitments for all incompleteprojects currently underway and - 49 -
to rank these in order of priority. In February 1990, the joint Government/Bank started work on a review of the public investmentprogram. The recommendations of this mission will be discussed in April or May 1990.
7.23 Finally, the Ministry (and the Ministry of Equipment) has the responsibilityfor monitoring perfQrmance of the agriculturalsector, including statistical data collection and analysis, and environmentalmonitoring (paras. 8.25 and 8.33-8.35). The DAS provided selected statistical data on area and production. It is not clear to what extent the reorganization of the agriculturalsector will weaken data collection. It is strongly recommendedthat the Ministry strengthen its capacity to monitor the agriculturalreform program so that it can identify constraints and take corrective action in a timely manner. In this context, monitoring should also focus on the performance of supporting institutions (for example, to ensure the timely availability of fertilizers). It should also focus on the impact of present and future Government policies. In summary, to ensure long-term growth rates for agriculture, the Ministry needs to concentrate on and strengthen its capacity to: (a) plan, evaluate and monitor the sector to ensure a favorable environment for agricultureand (b) ensure the provisionof adequate services and incentives for farmers. This may require strengthening and training staff within the Ministry.
F. Livestock-RelatedIssues
7.24 Government's objective, as it was stated in the 1985-89 Plan, is to expand livestock production and thereby satisfy domestic requirements for poultry, eggs, honey, 70X of the demand for red meat, and 36% for milk and milk products. As noted, growth in the livestock sector has generally been good, especially in the poultry sub-sector and has been an important source of growth for the sector as a whole. This growth has been achieved primarily in the private sector, spurred by high prices, liberalizedmarkets, and availability of credit for investmentsin egg production. The level of prices for livestock products is a major issue in the livestock sector and is discussed in Chapter IX. In addition, there are a number of technical and institutional issues relating to milk and meat production.
7.25 Production of milk, the principal imported livestock product, has increasedslowly: domestic production,mainly from cattle, grew at 2.8% per year between 1967 and 1988. To encouragemilk production,emphasis was placed on the importation of exotic cattle for the socialist sector. This policy has been helped by the EEC farm policy which subsidizescattle in Europe, the over-valued exchange rate making imports of cattle and cattle feed relatively inexpensive (imported cattle cost about 60% that of local cattle), and producer subsidies for milk in Algeria. While it is certainly financiallyviable at present, the policy of importing large numbers of exotic cattle raises two issues. First, Algeria is not self-sufficientin animal feed. Maintaining these exotic animals requires import of feed and an increase in the area under fodder crops. If Government had a pricing policy that reflected import parity prices, it is not sure that either of these options would be economicallyviable (Chapter IX). Moreover, except in certain limited highly favorable areas, Algeria may - 50 -
not have a comparativeadvantage in cattleproduction, while it probablydoes for sheep and goat production. Second,exotic animals requiremuch higher standardsof nutritionand managementthan local or cross-bredanimals. They are also more susceptibleto disease. In brief, a more active program of absorptivecrossing with improvedbulls or, in special cases, artificial insemination(Al) may be more desirablefor Algerianconditions than the import of exotic animals. Farmers should, however,remain free to import exotic animals. If furtheranalysis shows this to be uneconomicfor the country, however,Government should not encourageimportation of exoticbreeds; nor should it provideforeign exchange or creditfor the importation.It is recommended that this issuebe furtherexamined by the Bank and Government.
7.26 As with other inputs,the DAS receiveda disproportionateshare of livestockinputs and services,much of which was providedthrough livestock cooperatives.Unfortunately, relatively few private livestock owners are members of these cooperatives. To reach the privatesector, it is recommendedthat Governmentexpand its extensioneffort to (a) provide technicaladvice to livestockowners; (b) help with the formationof land user groupsin communal grazing areas; and (c) assist in obtaininginputs. In this context,it is recommendedthat privatetraders be allowedto play a more activerole in the supply of livestockinputs (para. 7.12). Regardinghealth services,it is recommendedthat Governmentexpand its capacityto providepreventive public health services through, for example, vaccinationcampaigns and better supervisionof slaughterhouses. With an annual turnout of about 200 veterinarians,Government's requirement for such staff is likely to be fully met within 2-3 years. Governmentplans to encourageveterinarians to set themselvesup in privatepractice; credit would be availablethrough BADR. It is understoodthat some veterinariansmay have already done so but are constrainedby shortage of drugs and other veterinarysupplies. It is recommendedthat Governmentpromote the use of private and cooperative veterinariansby ensuringaccess to sufficientveterinary supplies. Private veterinaryservices are being triedon a pilotbasis in Tunisiaand Moroccowith considerablesuccess. Finally,regarding services, both the privatesector and cooperativesshould be encouraged,possibly along ANAND lines in India,to set up milk collectioncenters with concomitantinput services. A Bank-supported irrigationproject in Mitidjais likelyto spur privateinvestment in livestock in the area. It is recommendedthat this be monitoredcarefully for technical and economicreplicability.
7.27 Finally,now that Governmentis disengagingfrom direct production- relatedactivities, it is importantthat the Ministryof Agriculturefocus on the environmentfor livestockdevelopment: (a) pricingand taxationpolicy; (b) strengtheninglivestock extension and researchservices; (c) training staff; and (d) availabilityof credit,which is the majorinvestment tool in the livestock sector. -51 -
VIII. Privateand PublicInvestments: Priorities for the Future
A. IntrQduction
8.01 As shown in ChapterIV, increasedyields will providethe major sourceof growthin the short and mediumterm. The previoustwo chapterssummarized the issuesthat touch on the reformand the futureevolution of the EACs, and the actions that Governmentwill need to take to ensure that farmers have the necessarysupport services. Price incentivesare discussedin ChapterIX. The other major sourceof growthin agriculture,in additionto increasedyields, which would affectagricultural growth rates in the medium term, before 1995, is investment.The investmentcan take two forms: privateinvestment, financed either through savings or credit, and public investments,usually in larger-scale,infrastructure-related projects that would not be undertakenin the absenceof Governmentintervention.
8.02 In the past,most investmentsin agriculturewere undertakenby the public sectorand were aimed largelyat the DAS and, sinceabout 1983, at expandingthe area under irrigation:most irrigationwas on land operatedby the DAS. Credit to private farmers was a relativelyminor, although growing, source of investment.Government has now changedthis orientation,with most investment being privatelyfinanced. The allocationof creditfor equipmentpurchase and other small-scaleinvestments is now determinedby the bankingsystem and the investors,which placesnew responsibilitieson the nascentbanking sector and on the farmers(discussed below). Indeed,aside from the dissolutionof the DAS and the increasedliberalization of the sector, the most importantreform undertakento date affectingagriculture concerns the bankingsector, which, providedthat inputsare available,should now become an importantengine of growthin agriculture.
B. ExnandingPrivate Investment through Credit
8.03 Until recently,most Algerianbanks acted merelyas conduitsto channel Treasury credits to finance investmentsand operating losses of state enterprises.This was also the case with BADR, establishedin 1982 to channel more resourcesto agriculturein generaland to privatefarmers in particular. BADR's main task became, however, financingand monitoring the financial liquidity of the DAS, the state marketing agencies and the Government cooperatives.Little attention was paid to the creditworthinessof the DAS and publicsector agencies, as theirloans were implicitlyguaranteed by Government. This guaranteewas made good in 1987when the DAS were dissolvedand theirdebts assumedby Government.With the BankingLaw of 1986 (and amendmentsof 1988), the frameworkwas establishedfor BADR to become completelyresponsible for mobilizingits own resourcesand for making loans;with a few exceptionsfor specialprograms or strategicinvestments, BADR can no longerrely on Government to cover deficits. In early 1989, BADR becameautonomous.
8.04 There are longer-termissues of institutionbuilding and financial solvabilityfor the credit-deliverysystem. A beginninghas been made with an agriculturalcredit project supported by the Bank, which is designedto address -52 - the developmentof BADR's capacity to appraise projects, to monitor repayments, to keep detailed accounts, to develop a management information system, and to prepare a medium term plan. For the immediate term, BADR must face the simultaneous challenge of: (a) being transformed from a conduit for Treasury funds to a fully autonomousbank responsiblefor its loans, profits and losses; (b) dealing with 27,000 newly-created EAC/EAIs with no history as farm owners/managersor as borLowers; and (c) continuing to expand its lending to small-scale private farmers, who, by 1989, numbered over 100,000 as BADR borrowers out of 700,000 - 1,000,000 farmers. As noted in para. 6.07 there has been a strong demand for credit from the EAC/EAIs, for livestock, sinking of tubewells, purchase of farm machinery and equipment, and the establishment of orchards, as well as for short term needs.
8.05 Since the agriculturalreform, BADR has met the demand for credit where possible (where the inputs and equipmentwere available for sale), and the amount of lending both for seasonal and investment needs has increased. The last two years have been difficult for repayment, because of the drought, and BADR has twice allowed a moratorium on repayment (in 1988 and again in 1989). It will be important to monitor closely repayment performance and BADR's financial situation in the next several years. The risks are that if BADR suffers low repayment rates, it will quickly grow overly-cautiousand/or become illiquid, which will immobilize the agricultural credit system. It is crucial that Government treat this period as one of transition for BADR as well as for the EAC/EAIs. In spite of the new autonomy of both BADR and the EAC/EAIs, it is recommended that Government be prepared to provide support, in the form of enablingBADR to roll-overdebts and/or providingsupport for the GuaranteeFund, on a declining basis, and only for a transitionalperiod of up to five years. It should be emphasized,however, that this support should not be automatic; it should be based on a case-by-casejustification. In the longer term, BADR may need to address the issue of using land as collateral, the absence of which has proved a constraint to the development of properly fu:ictioningcredit markets in some other countries; the issue is discussed in Annex 2.
8.06 To create a more favorableenvironment for private investment,Government has, since 1982, introduced new legislationto clarify the role of the private sector in the Algerian economy. These reforms have included easier access to imports for private sector investors (introducedin late 1984), removal of the ceilings on the volume of investment undertaken by private entrepreneurs and removal of the ceiling on bank credit available to investors. An attempt has also been made to simplify investment approvals and import licensing by allocatingthis responsibilityto the national and regional Chambers of Commerce, although foreign exchange is still rationed,by bureaucraticprocedures, by the Chamber of Commerce. There is nevertheless,a new optimism in the private sector outside agriculture, which could affect agriculture to the extent that investments in agro-processing and agroindustries are forthcoming, thereby providing an expanded market for fruits and vegetables.
8.07 InterestRates. After seven years (1979 to 1986) of fixed interest rates, Government increased them in October 1986 by about 50%. They were again increasedby 30-40% in May, 1989, and are now 10-12.X. Loans for the production and storage of cereals and pulses are generally up to 8%. While some rates remain negative in real terms (officialinflation has been running at around 10- -53 -
12% p.a.), the increases since early 1986 are significant. Moreover, the Governmentis committed,within the next 6-8 months, to establishinga timetable for the gradual reductionof interestrate distortionsthrough selective cred-t. It has also indicated its willingness to increase rates further over the next three years so that all rates become positive in real terms. The structure of interest rates has, in fact, played almost no role in allocating resources in the past, since this was done by central planning on the basis of allocation of physical investments. Resources to and from the private sector have represented less than 20% of total resource flows in the banking system. While setting up an adequate interest rate stcucture is important both for ensuring a viable financial sector and for sending signals to an increasing number of autonomous enterprises, the structure of interest rates and its impact on allocation of resources must be seen in the larger context of the overall pricing framework and the importance of pricing signals for resource allocation. This applies in agricultureas well, where many, but not all, output prices are liberalized,but where input prices are not (Chapter IX).
8.08 In the medium and longer term, commercial banks other than BADR are expected to play an increasingrole in financinginvestments in the agricultural sector. Thus credit delivery will become more competitive,which should benefit farmers. The extent to which it may be possible to expand the volume of credit to the agricultural sector from commercial banks, and to a lesser extent from BADR, depends, in part, on the availability of 'selective credit" for agriculture. This issue is related to the particular nature of lending for agriculture which has high risks and costs.
C. The Future Role of Public Investment
8.09 In parallel with the expanded role for private investmert, public investmentsare decreasing in relative importance. Furthermore,in response to Government policy to strengthen its regional focus, most public investments -- with the exception of major investmentssuch as dams and large scale irrigation -- have been decentralized to the 48 wilayat so that investments respect local priorities and needs. The shift away from centrally-plannedpublic investments represents a major change and reflects Government's long-term strategy for further autonomy of enterprises.
8.10 Public investments in agriculture, defined to include forestry and irrigation,have, in the past, been financed from two sources:
- the budget, in the f -m of grants from Government, mainly for non- revenue-generatingactivities (concours definitifs) and;
- credits that were channeledthrough the banking system and which were part of Treasury oRerations (concours temporaires). These credits, generallyfor revenue-generatingactivities, were distinct from funds from the budget.
As noted, the decision on which investmentswould be financedby Treasury credits was made by the Government and not by the banks. Since a large part of these funds was not repaid, these credits were frequently treated like funds from the -54 - budget -- in effectbecoming grants that benefitedthe DAS. Given the low, or negligible,return to investmentin the statefarm sector, past publicinvestment in the DAS must be considerednon-productive, or highly inefficient.
8.11 Total public investmentsfor the full agriculturalsector are shown in Table 14. This shows that plannedpublic investmentsfor the sectorfinanced from the budgethave increasedby about 35X in currentterms in the five years from 1985 to 1990 (the start of the last Plan period and the beginningof the currentPlan). In real terms,hogever, this representsa declineof almost20%. This is a reflectionof the declineof almost40% in the overallsize of the budgetin real.terms over the sameperiod. In agriculture(excluding irrigation and forestry)the main changesare twofold. First,the declinein the budgetary allocationas Governmentno longerhas to supportthe DAS and as Government's role changesto one whichaims to providea supportingenvironment for the sector by buildingup services,such as researchand extension. Second,there is a major change in investmentsfinanced by credit. In the past, the amount of investmentsfinanced by Treasury operationscould be predeterminedsince investmentdecisions were made by Government. In future,the now autonomous banks will decide. The amount shown as credit for 1990 is, therefore,only indicativeand will dependupon decisionsby both farmersand banks. Government has attachedincreasing importance to the water sector (includingirrigation) which now consumes14% of the totalbudget against 10% in 1985. It is estimated that about 40X of the budgetary allocationfor the water sector is for irrigation.The forestrysector has also slightlyincreased in importancewhen measuredas a proportionof the totalbudget. The main change,however, has been in the way forestryinvestments are plannedand implemented;they are now much more decentralizedthan they were in the past.
Table14: PlannedPublic rnvestments 1990 (in Hillions of dinars) (in Millions of dinars) Budtet Credit Total Bufdet Credit Total
Total Planned Public 48300 57134 105434 50012 63673 113375 Investmenta (all sectors) of which
Agriculture 1029 3071 4100 800 3200 4000 (I) (2.1) (5.4) (3.9) (1.6) (5.0) (3.5)
Water1 4764 0 4764 7200 100 7300 (x) (9.9) (0) (4.5) (14.4) (0.2) (6.4)
Forestry 815 86 900 1000 30 1030 (X) (1.7) (0.1) (0.8) (2.0) (0) (0.9)
Total 6608 3157 9765 9000 3330 12330 (X) (13.7) (5.5) (9.3) (18.0) (5.2) (10.9)
W/ater invoetmentsinclude those for irrigationand water supplies. In 1990, of the DA 7.2 billion allocated to the sector in the budgot, about DA 2.9 billion are for irrigation (DA 1.7 billion for LSI and DA 1.2 billion for SSI); the balance is for water supply. Information is not available on the amount of investmentsplanned for Irrigationalone in 1985. -55 -
8.12 As publicinvestment decisions are decentralized,the wilayatare playing a key role in investmentplanning and decisions;the exceptionsto this rule are large-scaleinvestments that remaincentralized (paras. 8.13-8.32). This new planningprocess culminates in theWilaya Development Plan (WDP),which includes all investmentsto be implemented,other than those that remaincentralized. It representsa new planningtool which enables local priorities to be takenmore fully into account. However,it makes the implementationof certainnational programs,particularly those in forestry,more difficultto implementand monitor -- an issue that will need to be monitored carefully to see if selected activitiesshould not be recentralized.Within the WDP, investmentsare financed through: (a) the Wilaya'sown budget funded throughlocal taxes and fiscal transfersfrom the Ministryof Interior;or (b) the "budgetdecentralise" which is effectivelythe budgetof the varioussectoral Ministries, allocated to the wilayafor planningand execution.The WDP is preparedby the WilayaExecutive, approvedby the WilayaAssembly (APW) and then, throughan iterativeprocess, is finally agreed with the concernedsectoral Ministries and the Planning Commission.This systemof budgetingis new and is still in a state of flux.
8.13 As noted above, large-scaleinvestments will continue to be funded centrally. This includesinvestments in generalstudies, research stations, large-scaleirrigation, forestry/environment, and certaininvestments aimed at regionaldevelopment, especially in the South. The more importantof theseare discussedbelow.
8.14 Investmentsin Irrigation.Relative to Moroccoand Tunisia,Algeria lags in developmentof irrigation.Under present conditions, about 3-400,000ha are currentlyirrigated in any year, representingless than 40% of the physical potential,tentatively estimated at about 8-900,000ha (includingthe Sahara- para. 8.27). If its full potentialis realized,about 11% of Algeria'sarable land would be irrigatedcompared to 19% in Morocco. Althoughirrigation now covers only 8-10% of the total cultivatedarea in any year, some 30-40% of currentvalue of agriculturalproduction comes from irrigatedland. In addition to its high productivityin the semi-aridMediterranean environment, irrigation also serves an importantsocial and economicaspect as a "drought-proofing" element in a country where most of the agriculturalproduction is severely affectedby erraticrainfall. The impactof irrigationcould even be higherif land and water productivityin the currentlyirrigated areas were at optimum levels,which has not been the case so far.
8.15 There are basicallytwo tvDes of irrigation:the large-scaleirrigation schemes (LSI) and the small-scaleirrigation schemes (SSIV. Large-scale irrigationcurrently comprises eight schemesranging from 3,000ha to 11,000ha each, with a totaleffectively irrigated area of 60,000ha. Water is regulated by large storagedams and suppliedall year round to the farms by modern
'I A third type of irrigation,not discussedin detailhere, is spate irrigation,accounting for an additional100-110,000 ha, causedby occasionalfloods, in the SouthAtlas plateaux. -56 - hydraulic systems. However, most of the LSI schemes were constructed before Independence, and maintenance and operation have become increasingly costly. Until recently,modest budget allocations and low water charge recovery allowed for only minor day-to-day repairs, resulting in frequent shortages of water delivery. At field level, water use has been far from efficient, particularly in the DAS, which occupied most of the LSI schemes. The dissolutionof the DAS into small and manageable EACs should prove to be a critical factor in boosting land and water productivity in the LSI schemes.
8.16 About 230,000ha are coveredby small-scaleirrigation schemes (SSI) which can be modern or traditional and vary in size from a few to several hundred hectares. Water is supplied from traditionalshallow wells (120,000ha), valley springs (8,000 ha), small rivers through traditionaldiversion weirs and modern individual pumps (36,000 ha), and recently state-constructedsmall earth dams (4,000 ha). Also included in SSIs are Saharan oases irrigated by tubewells (60,000 ha). Except for tubewell irrigation,water in SSI is mostly seasonal with virtually little flow in summer. Most of the SSI schemes of more than 100 ha and Saharan tubewells were implemented through public investments before Independence and run by local government since then. They all need rehabilitation. Although reliable data are scarce, the impact of SSI schemes is probably i.mportantas they provide the only source of food and income in the oases, conrribute substantially to the subsistence of rural communities in mountain areas, and produce a significantportion of vegetables and fruit around the large urban centers.
8.17 Potential for expanding SSI is likely to be limited. All existing small rivers and shallow aquiferswere developedlong ago. Expansionwould mostly rely on constructionof small earth dams and tubewells: a program for construction of 1,000 small earth dams is underway and few regions offer many additional sites. Past experience also shows that costs are high and sustainability questionable. Most of the potential of the northern aquifers (over 1.7 billion i 3) is already exploited and additional groundwatercan be found only in limited quantities at increasing depths. Moreover, water supply to rural communities is always given priority over irrigation. In conclusion, pending the results of the ongoing survey undertaken by the Bank-financed Irrigation Engineering Project, it is tentatively estimated that the total SSI area would not exceed 250,000ha. The developmentof Sahara irrigationoutside the oases is discussed separately below (see paras. 8.27-8.30).
8.18 Irrigation development in Algeria would therefore rely mainly on large-scale irrigation for which physical potential exists for 500,000 ha in total (against 60,000 currently irrigated) if 59 dams were to be constructed for irrigation only and 14 dams were to be constructed for water supply and irrigation. For reasons explained below, it may not be possible or desirable to develop all of this physical potential. About 90X of the irrigated area would be concentrated in the coastal strip where suitable soil and water resources are available. In contrast, there appears to be little scope for irrigation in the arid plateaux.
8.19 Government strategy for irrigation developmenthas substantiallyevolved since Independencein response to changing priorities. From the early 1960s to around 1980, considerable funds were allocated to water resources development -57 -
with the primary objective of meeting demands for water, urban and industrial growth. Major capital investments were made in water storage transfer and distributionbenefiting large cities and industrial areas, while irrigationwas given a low priority. During this period, the total irrigated area in Algeria virtually stagnated because the slow development of the newly irrigated areas was offset by the decline in the use of land already equipped by obsolescent systems. This trend was reversed in the early 1980s when Government increased its budget allocation for irrigation and started accelerating rehabilitation work, launching new projects and drawing up physical masterplans. An ambitious SSI program for constructionof 1,000 small earth dams was implemented. Results are not yet visible in terms of additional irrigated areas under LSI due to the priority given to rehabilitationof existing systems and the long project cycle from design to constructionfor any new LSI scheme. However, ongoing programs suggest that an additional 50,000 ha under new LSI schemes could be completed from 1988 to 1995, which would be a remarkable performance. Government has indicated its objective to complete as much as 20,000 ha/year with a view to have the potential 500,000ha under irrigationby 2010 (excludingthe Sahara) but this target is unlikely to be achievedwithin this timeframebecause of implementation and budgetary constraints as discussed below.
8.20 S'gnificant progress has been made by the Government in setting up an adequate institutionalframework for irrigation development. The Ministry of Equipment, formerly the Ministry of Hydraulics, was created in 1980, and with specific departments for SSI and LSI. In 1985, Government established independent "Offices des Perimetres Irrigues" (OPI) at the regional level to be responsible for operation of all LSI schemes. It is Government's intention that these Offices be funded solely through the recovery of water charges, a major commitment to resolve this long outstanding problem. To this end, Government increased charges on water for irrigationby 56% in 1985 and by 100X in 1988. While this covers about 60% of the O&M charges, Government has undertaken to recover 100% of O&M costs and part of the capital costs under recent Bank-financedirrigation projects (Cheliff and Mitidja) -- again an area of profound reform. Government als3 established in 1988 a semi-autonomous agency, "l'Agence pour la Gestion de l'Irrigationet du Drainage" (AGID) with its own budget and staff, to remove bureaucraticbottlenecks in the design and implementationof irrigationprojects. However, AGID is still facing a serious lack of experienced staff and considerableefforts for staff development and training will be required to ensure AGID's implementation capacity for supervising an ambitious expansion program.
8.21 A number of issues relates to the large and rapid expansionof irrigation. These involve water planning and management, budgetary limitations, implementation capacity, economic viability, environmental implications and institutionalrequirements. First is the issue of water availabilityand demand. Total surface water available for all purposes after subtraction for SSI and rural water supply in the upper watersheds is estimated at about 12.4 billion/i3, and an investigationof all potential dam sites suggests that 85 sites exist suitable for dam construction, with 45 of these dams already built or under construction. Given the variabilityof surface flow in rivers in Algeria, the 85 dams could regulate only some 4.8 billion m3 or about 40% of the available water. The balance could be used only marginally for additional seasonal SSI schemes (small earth dams, in particular) and artificial.recharge of aquifers. -58 -
As for groundwater,the northern aquifers with a potential of 1.7 billion m3 are widely tapped, with the result of over-exploitationand continuous fall of the water table in several areas. Projections for 2010 show that water demand and supply would be in balance nation-wide with 500,000 ha LSI and 45 million population (requiring 3.4 and 1.4 billion i 3, respectively), provided no importantwater sources are lost to pollution (para. 8.25). To a'roidregional imbalances,which already exist in certain areas, a strong water planning and management capacity should be established region-wide to limit further water deficits. In short, competition for water between domestic, irrigation and industrialusers is becoming a major issue which will need to be continually reviewed. As all conventionalwater sources will have been fully developed by 2010, it is recommended that a major effort should begin now to introduce measures to conserve water, by setting realistic water charges (Governmenthas recently increasedcharges for water for domestic use by 67%) and by encouraging efficient irrigation methods. Furthermore, Government should implement an aggressive approach to recharging the aquifers by using the large unregulated water resourcesand taking steps to recyclewaste water for irrigation. Finally, a long-termplan should be developed for the integrated use of water sources by the various end users -- agricultural, industrial,and domestic.
8.22 Second, as noted in the paragraph above, Algeria has pushed ahead rapidly with its constructionof new dams. Unfortunatelythe planning and implementation of associated infrastructure such as the construction of irrigation systems, has not kept pace. As a result, a growing gap has developed between dam construction and actual utilization of the water either for irrigation or for consumption. While this may give the appearance that investment in, say, irrigation infrastructureis economic (because dams can then be considered as sunk costs), a project that takes into account all costs may not be economic. Indeed, it will almost certainly not be economic when full account is taken of the resultingdelay in benefits. It is recommended,therefore, that the Ministry (a) put priority on the completion of existing projects -- those in which dams have alreadybeen completed or where dam constructionhas started -- by building the associated irrigation or water supply infrastructure; (b) delay the construction of new dams if necessary to achieve this; and (c) take steps to strengthen its planning capacity to avoid the long gaps between the completion of dams and the completionof associatedinfrastructure so that benefits can be brought forward.
8.23 Third, the cost of developing LSI is high, on the order of $12,000/ha (excluding costs of dams). Small earth dams and tubewells for SSI are also expensive. Given current yields in irrigation schemes in Algeria, irrigation projects may have a low economicprofitability. Fourth, the high investment cost of irrigation would have s.gnificantbudgetary consequences. Government intends to expand the area under LSI at about 20,000 ha/year. Given a base cost of $12,000/ha,this implies an annual investmentcost of $240 million excluding the cost of dam construction,related infrastructureand on-farm development. Given the past rate of implementation(about 5000 ha per year), it not certain that this objective can be achieved (para. 8.24). Nor is it certain that such a high level of investment in irrigation could be funded given that this would be much higher than recent allocationsor that a sufficientnumber of economicallyviable projects can be identified to maintain the planned 20,000 ha/yr. program. Governmenthas drawn up physical (and regional)master plans for water use which -59 - need to be costed and reviewedin the contextof their economicbenefits and costsand budgetaryconsequences. It is recommendedthat theseplans be refined so that they incorporatea 10-yeartime-horizon for irrigationdevelopment that would clarifystrategic options, define irrigation priorities in light of their economiccosts and benefits includingthe developmentof a sound investment program, and review the potential applicationof different technologies. Governmenthas agreed to prepare such a plan as part of Lhe Irrigation EngineeringLoan (2978-ALG).Assistance will, however, be requiredto undertake the necessaryeconomic analysis, including collection of data. Given the high cost of irrigationdevelopment, it is stronglyrecommended that (a) the Ministry of Equipment(ME) strengthenits capacityto assessthe economicviability of investmentsin the irrigationsector; (b) ME seek assistance,in the shortterm, to assessthe relativeeconomic priority of projects;(c) high returnprojects be selectedfirst; and (d) attentionbe given to findinglower cost solutions than have been used in the past.
8.24 Fifth, implementationis hamperedby lack of coordination,shortage of trainedstaff, and shortageof essentialmaterials required in the construction of LSI. As noted above,as a resultof implementationdelays, a growinggap has developedbetween completed dams and the startingof constructionof associated infrastructureto bring water in these dams into use. Coordinationbetween departmentsinvolved in the planningand executionof schemesneeds to be improved-- an issue related to the shortage of trained staff. To this end, it is recommendedthat the Ministryundertake a reviewto estimatethe requirement of trainedstaff by specializationand match this with availablestaff. A detailedtraining program should then be drawnup to upgradestaff skillswhere necessary, as should a detailed recruitmentprogram. Grant funding might then be soughtfor such a program. In additionto manpowershortages, the lack of concreteand asbestospipes for irrigationhas been a major constraintto the completionof irrigationschemes -- shortageslinked to Algeria'sindustrial policy. While appropriatesteps should be taken to remedythis problemin the mediumterm, it is recommendedthat the Governmentadopt a more flexibleapproach to the importof pipes to overcomeshort-term shortages; irrigation authorities should be allowed to import pipes when needed to complete a scheme -- the opportunitycost of delayed benefits would certainlymake it an economic solution.
8.25 Sixth, the sustainabilityof water developmentis at risk b.3causemajor water sourcesmay be lost to pollutionor to reservoirsedimentation. In addition,irrigation development involves a numberof environmentalissues which are exacerbatedby the fact that most of LSI developmentwill take place in the narrowand over-populatedcoastal area. Irrigationbrings with it considerable intensificationof agriculturewhich, in turn, leads to: greater use of fertilizersand pesticideswhich can polluterivers and groundwater,increased risk of water logging in the higher rainfallareas, and increasedrisk of salinizationof soils in low rainfallareas. As discussedin a recent Bank reporton EnvironmentalProblems and Issuesin Algeria,there has alreadybeen a considerableincrease in pollutionof riverswith industriesand urban areas frequentlypumping waste directlyinto rivers. Runofffrom agriculturalareas has addedto pollution;monitoring of groundwatershows heavy buildup of nitrates in water used for drinking. Pollutionmust be controlledto avoid loss of drinkingwater suppliesand to avoid the possibility that some surfacewater -60 - may become unsuitable for irrigation. Pollution can be significantly reduced by use of appropriatefertilizers and pesticides(para. 8.33) and the application of appropriate integratedpest and fertilizermanagement strategies. Apart from pollution to rivers caused by runoff from agriculcural areas, the danger also exists of pollution from the manufacture and disposal of fertilizer and pesticides. It is recommended that Algeria's capacity to wonitor surface and groundwaterquality be expanded. This will need to be linked to institutional, legal and other measures to control pollution -- issues addressed in the recent report on EnvironmentalProblems and Issues. Siltation of dams through erosion of watersheds due to overgrazing,deforestation and overcultivationis also a concern that can only be reduced by: proper land and water resource management (para. 8.34), a strong extension service that can deliver messages to farmers about soil conservation and means to reduce erosion, and a strong forestry service to help protect upper-catchmentareas.
8.26 To deal with these issues it is recommended that the planning capacity at the central level be strengthenedto coordinate, in particular: (a) water supply and irrigation projects; (b) use of groundwater and surface water; (c) infrastructureconstruction and agricultural development in LSI schemes; (d) economic evaluation and setting priorities for irrigation projects; and (e) environment protection and water development. To this end, the Irrigation EngineeringProject includes the preparationby ME of a 10-year irrigationplan which would provide a framework to consider all these issues. It is also recommendedthat regional capacity in water planning and managementbe developed to refine regional land use and water developmentmaster plans and to set up the appropriate mechanism for regional integrated water management; and that it constantly review the environmental implicationof irrigation in each region.
8.27 Development in the South. For social reasons and to stem the flow to the already densely populated northern strip of Algeria, Government has recently given increasing emphasis to development of the South (the area south of the Atlas mountains comprising largely the desert and oases areas). The population of the south is low with 7-8% of the total, and as shown in the estimates in Chapter IV on the contributionof growth rates, the impact of developmentwill be largely self-contained,except for date production, which may be exported. The 1985-89 Plan focused on the agronomicdevelopment of the region,particularly through land distribution, replanting existing date plantations, and drilling deep wells to experimentwith large-scalecereals production. The first of these programs, Accession a la Propriete Fonciere (APF), is aimed at expanding the occupation and utilization of the South and center-southby granting land titles to farmers to develop land in these areas. As of end-1989, about 200,300 ha had been distributed under this scheme. The second program involves public investment,and is essentiallyan irrigationdevelopment program, with extension, research and monitoringaspects to be given some priority. This program is still in the planning phase. The third scheme has involved experimentaldevelopment of large-scale farms. The intentionwas to develop 70,000 ha under this five- year plan, and to date about 10,000 ha have been developed through sinking deep wells. A number of major issues are, however, associated with all of these schemes, which affect developmentof the entire south. -61 -
8.28 The first issue relates to exploitation of the existing fossil-based groundwater resources, which are not renewable. While water resources are estimated to be large, especially in the far south where conditions for development are particularly harsh with extremes of temperature, their exploitationneeds to be prudently and properly controlled. A study (ERESS), updated in 1984, establishes quantitativelimitations by sub-zone on water use that would prevent deterioration of the water resources and avoid increasing operating costs. Development of the area already distributed under the APF program would involve the mining of water which would exceed by far (up to four times) the estimated potential resources in the particular sub-zones. While water could be transferred from the southern part of the South, this would add to the expense. In addition, developmentof the entire area may affect use of the water table by Tunisia. This highlights the critical need to have a comprehensiveplan of developmentwhich preserves the water table and which is strictly adhered to. It is strongly recommended that before any further exploitation of water resources in the South is undertaken, such a plan be established and the necessary monitoring systems be put into place.
8.29 The second issue is that developmentof the South is costly. The region is vast, has limited infrastructurewhich would have to be built up, and lacks skilled labor. This is another reason for a development plan that establishes prioritiesfor development (potablewater over irrigationwater; rehabilitation over expansion, etc.) and establisheseconomic criteria for investments,taking into account social and regional distributionaspects.
8.30 Third, the region is ecologicallyfragile, the soil is short in organic matter, and developmentsneed to be protected from sand intrusion, especially from hot sunmmerwinds. Again, a comprehensiveland and water resourcemanagement plan for the South should take into account these environmentalaspects. Soil studiesneed to be conductedprior to land developmentto identifytracts of land whose developmentwill not result in the excessive leaching of irrigationwater into the groundwater table. Water application rates and techniques need to be determined by applied research to avoid salinization. Since groundwater resourcesplay a fundamentaland almost unique role in developmentin the region, the plan should focus on the special characteristicsof these resources: to what extent they may be renewable, their quality, and regional and international implicationsof development. In addition, and as noted in para. 8.25, it is recommended that the monitoring and control of groundwater resources be strengthened. Government has approached the Bank to support specific developments in the South. This would provide a vehicle to deal with these crucial issues and to ensure that the preparation of a development plan for the South precedes or is parallel to any investment operation.
8.31 Forestry. A third aspect of public investment which would affect the agriculturalsector is developmentand improvementof forest resources to, inter alia, protect the environment,improve vegetative cover particularlyin the upper catchmentareas, and increaseproductivity. Forestry products and environmental protection have not been taken into account in estimating the growth rates in Chapter IV. Nevertheless, investments in forestry and in land improvementsin -62 - upper catchment areas would increaseinfiltration rates thereby adding to groundwateravailability, reduce soil erosionand damageto irrigationsystems, and increaseproduction of wood productsas importsubstitutes.
8.32 The objectivesof publicinvestments in forestryactivities would be to: (a)protect existing forests; (b) reducerunoff and thus increaserecharge while protectingwatershed areas from erosion;and (c) improvethe managementand exploitationof industrialforests. With respectto the first objective,the main threatto the existingforests is forestfire; because butane gas is readily availableat affordableprices, over-use of forestsfor fuelwoodand charcoal is not a problem in Algeria. In recentyears, Algeriahas made progressin reducingforest fires, but additionalefforts are needed. Second,in order to reducerunoff and managewatersheds more efficiently,a studyshould be carried out of the needs and prioritiesto identifythe major areas for erosioncontrol, and to developplans to provideprotection. This shouldinclude an assessment of the potentialimpact of decreasedfallow and possibleovergrazing in selected areas. It mightalso includea pilot land and waterresource management project to assessmeans to betteruse these resourcesin a way that can be replicated in other areas of the country;such a projectcould be financedby the Bank as noted below. Third,to exploitfully the potentialof tl,eindustrial forests, it is necessaryto reviewand possiblyupdate the existingdata and the planning frameworkfor forestryexploitation. It appearsthat productivityof Algerian forestscan be increased,by reducingthe costsof exploitationand increasing the yields. The pricingof forestryproducts needs to be examined,along with the financialsituation of INTF,the Governmentagency responsible for exploiting the forests. Finally,the quantityand value of importsshould be examinedto determinethe scope for importsubstitution. At present,Algeria imports about US$2-300million in wood productseach year. The World Bank is likely to preappraisea projectin May 1990, that would be a first interventionin the forestrysub-sector and which would addressthe issueslisted above; emphasis will be placedon land use management.
8.33 EnvironmentalConcerns and SustainableAgricultural Growth. Throughout the discussionof thepotential for growthin agricultureand the varioussources of growthis a constanttheme of environmentalaspects of this development.It is importantto recognizethat more intensiveuse of fertilizersand pesticides that increaseproductivity and will be an importantsource of growthcan lead to long term hazards. Currentagricultural practices need Lo be improvedto protectsurface and groundwaterquality, workers, and consumers. Both research and extensionprograms need to emphasizethe selectionand applicationof appropriateagricultural chemicals, and the developmentand adoption of integratedpest management techniques should be givenpriority in order to reduce the cost of inputs,the risk of water contaminationand healthrisks to workers. Agriculturalexports to the EEC will require particularpesticide residue monitoringto assurethat shipmentswill not be rejectedfor failureto comply with EEC standards. In addition,intensified red meat and poultryproduction may involvegreater use of antibioticsand other veterinarydrugs, whose safe disposalis of concern. The WorldBank has been workingwith the UNDP on a first phase study on the managementof pesticides(which could be expandedto include veterinarydrugs) in Algeria,Tunisia and Moroccoto addressthese important environmentalconcerns. A followup to this study as well as the study on -63 - fertilizers(para. 7.12) should make specific recommendationson types of acceptableand unacceptablepesticides and fertilizers,on theiruse and proper disposal.
8.34 The various investmentprograms mentioned each involve a number of environmentalconcerns on the competinguses of groundand surfacewater, the preservationof both soil and water quality,and the need to do comprehensive planningand carefulmonitoring to avoidoverexploitation or degradationof the current soil and water resources. To ensure sustainabilityof Algerian agricultureover the long term, it is recommendedthat Governmenttrain and adequatelyfinance the environmentalunit to promoteand monitorenvironment and natural resourcesmanagement'. In addition,the Ministryof Agriculture should train staff in a number of departments(planning; research, extension and training;agricultural development) in environmentalaspects of agricultural activities,and shoulddevelop a close liaisonwith the environmentalunit to develop acceptable packages, techniques and approaches to agricultural developmentthat eliminateor rinimizeany negativeenvironmental impact.
8.35 This reporthas identifiednumerous ways to increaseagricultural growth. It has also emphasizedthat this growthmust be sustainable. To this end, managementof Algeria's land and water resources should be handled in a comprehensive,integrated manner. As an example,intensification of irrigation needs to be examinedin the contextof increasedpesticide and fertilizeruse. Certain investmentscan also aid in the rechargeof aquifers,for example, reforestation,better pasture management, improved soil conservation and cropping practices,and the constructionof small engineeringworks to reduce runoff. In short,growth of agriculturemust be balancedso that its viabilityis ensured in the long-run. It is, therefore,essential that existing agricultural operationsand new investmentsare assessedwithin the contextof carefully preparedland and water resourcemanagement plans that examinetheir impact on, inter alia, groundwater recharge, pollution, erosion and long term sustainability.
Conclusionson the Scoge for PublicInvestments
8.36 As notedabove (para.8.02), in the past most investmentsin agriculture were undertakenby the publicsector and were aimedprimarily at the DAS. For the future,Government intends to changethis orientation,with most investments being undertakenby the private sector. Establishmentof a sound financial policy and the buildingup of viable credit institutionssuch as BADR must, therefore,be a priorityfor the Government.Government, however, still has a crucial role in undertakingpublic investmentthat would not otherwisebe undertakenby private individualsand which are economicallyand socially justified. Projects in these areas may be suitable for financing by internationallending agencies such as the WorldBank. First and foremost amongstthese, given its potentialshort- and medium-termimpact, is the creation of an extensionand researchservice; this includesextension and animalhealth servicesfor livestock.Most otherinvestments have a longerpayoff period or
'/ Given the currentreorganization of Ministeries,it is not yet clear in whichMinistry this existingunit will be located. -64 -
the benefitsare less obvious. Investmentin largeand mediumscale irrigation is crucial. As noted, investmentcosts are high and it is imperativethat all investmentsyield an adequaterate of return. Medium-scaleirrigation, although less expensivethan LSI, oftengenerates benefits that are low in relationto costs;again, all projectproposals need to be vettedcarefully. Generally, it is to be expectedthat investmentsin small-scaleirrigation would be undertaken by the private sector. Priorityalso shouldbe given to understandingthe ecologicallyfragile south before furtherlarge-scale investments are made in that region. Followingappropriate pilot projects and studieswhere necessary, investmeni.sto preservethe environmentshould also be consideredhigh on the priority list. These include investmentsin forestry and land resource management.
8.37 The above is far from an exhaustivelist of potentialareas for public investment. There may be scope for investmentin crop storage,processing plants,including dairy plants, and smaller-scaleinvestments in infrastructure, research,etc. at the local level,although it is expectedthat much of this would be by the private sector. Substantialinvestment also needs to be undertakenin upgrading the stock of human capital and in institutional strengthening.Finally, the Governmentmust give priorityto the provisionof an adequatequantity of farm inputs:seed, fertilizer, farm machinery,spares, and pesticides -- all essentially recurrent inputs for purchase by private farmers. Nevertheless,in additionto providingthe "right"policy environment to ensure that these inputs can flow to farmers (pricingpolicy, marketing policy,and role of the privatesector, etc.), the Governmentneeds to make an adequateprovision of foreignexchange.
IX. Introducingan EffectivePrice and IncentiveFramework
A. Introduction
9.01 If the agriculturalsector is to achievethe highergrowth rates indicated in ChapterIV, it is imperativethat Governmenthas in place a systemof prices and incentivesthat encouragesfarmers to increaseproductivity and production. Over the past fifteenyears, the termsof tradehave generallyfavored Algeria's agriculturalsector. The general level of prices (as measuredby the GDP deflator)increased by 55X between 1980 and 1988, while agriculturaloutput pricesincreased by at least150X over the same period. For those cropswhich are stillcontrolled, producer prices are higherthan importparity prices, even using a shadowexchange rate (para9.10 and Table 16). From the late 1960sto about 1974, however, producer prices for crops were more or less static (StatisticalAppendix, Table A.41); both prices and marketingof crops were controlledby Government. Since then, prices of controlledcommodities have increasedsignificantly while, most importantly,in 1982,Government liberalized pricesof fruitsand vegetables. As a result,these prices, along with fresh milk and meat, are now largelyestablished on the free market. The generally favorabletreatment received by the agriculturalsector had, however,for reasons explainedearlier, little impacton productionof the DAS which were largely immuneto priceincentives. Given the transformationof the meansof production, this is no longerthe case. -65 -
B. Crop Prices
9.02 Crop prices in Algeriaare high in both financialand economicterms: pricesof wheat and barley,the most importantcrops in termsof area, increased by about 300% between1974/76 and 1988;the increaseis around500% if the 1989 price is included.Between 1974 and 1980,however, these prices remained roughly constantin real terms;between 1980 and 1989,the increasehas been about 200% or about 70% in real terms. As shown in Table 15 below,and in more detailin the StatisticalAppendix, Tables A.41-A.42, the controlledprices of vegetables and fruitswere increasedat much the same rate as those of wheat and barley until 1980. Since then, however,the liberalizedfruit and vegetableprices increasedeven fasterthan those of the controlledcereals and pulsesalthough this may have changed in 1989 given tb1 enormousincrease in cereal prices (paragraph9.11); the increasein pricesof fruitsand vegetableswas also due to the quantitativerestrictions on imports. Generally,therefore, there has been a markedshift in the terms of trade in favor of ag-iculture.
Table 15: NOMINALPRICE INDICES FOR AGRICULTURALINPUTS AND OUTPUTS
1974/76 1980 1983 1987 1988 1989 averagO
CroDs Durum Wheat 52 100 112 216 216 320 Bread Wheat 51 100 113 191 191 286 Barley 51 100 100 212 212 286 Potatoes 56 100 173 254 264 Tcmatoes 60 100 375 475 500
Livestock Beef 48 100 160 300 307 Lamb 45 100 153 282 306 Milk 56 100 125 200 210
Inouts Pertilizers (Am. Nitrate) 100 100 100 241 265 Tractor 65hp 100 100 166 330 330 330 Labor 62 100 127 452 452
GDP deflator 52 100 127 147 155 176 Weighted agric. price index 53 100 148 247
9.03 Until the dissolutionof the DAS, it was Governmentpolicy to set producer pricesof controlledcommodities so as to cover the costs of productionof the betterDAS. This had two implications.First, it meant that the majorityof DAS, less efficientthan those selected,necessarily made a loss. Second,since yields on DAS were generallylow by internationalstandards (at 650-900kg/ha for wheat,among the lowestin the world relativeto major cerealsproducers, neighboringcountries, and countries with similar per capita incomes -- StatisticalAppendix, Table A.32), prices had to be high by international standardsto coverthe costs of productionof even the betterDAS. Government's futurepricing policy for cerealsand otheragricultural commodities is discussed in paras.9.12-9.16. - 66 -
C. InRutPricing
9.04 The primaryobjective of Government'sagricultural input pricing policy was, until 1983,to limitthe increasein consumerprices. To this end, prices of agriculturalinputs, fixed by Government,were unchangedfrom 1974 to 1983 (Table15). As a result,the real prices of fertilizers,plant protection chemicalsand equipmentdeclined in real termsby 50X between 1973 and 1980. Sinceproduction costs of farm chemicalsand equipmentrose considerablyduring the period, Governmentincurred sizable subsidy costs. In the case of farm machineryand equipment,purchase prices of new equipmentwere in many casesless than the prices of spare part:s,which were increasedannually in line with productioncosts, therebyencouragtng purchase of new equipmentrather than maintenanceand repairof existingequipment. It also encouragedthe diversion of machinesto non-agriculturalusers (e.g.construction) for whichno comparable subsidieswere available.
9.05 Governmentadopted in 1983 a new approachto input pricing: "vdrit.des prix",aimed to bring pricescloser to "productioncosts". Since 1983, prices of inputshave been increasedsubstantially. It was Government'sintention to eliminateall subsidieson inputsby no later than the end of 1989. At the date that this reportwas being finalized(end 1989),data were not availableto verify whetheror not the object'veshad been met. It is possibleto state, however,that startingfrom fixedex-factory prices, most subsidieshave already been eliminated. Given the continuousadjustment of the exchangerate, input priceswill need to be increasedon a continuousbasis, however. In fact,while all "directsubsidies" have likelybeen removed,Government defines the policy of "verit6des prix" to cover ex-factorycosts and all marketingand handling costs of inputs. I. is not clear,however, the extentto which the ex-factory price includesdirect or indirectsubsidies because of protectionor subsidies on selectedraw materials. Nor is it evidentthat all subsidiesshould be removedsince the farmerswould then pay for inefficienciesof local industry. This issue can best be addressedby linkingprices to the world market as discussedbelow.
D. LivestockPricing
9.06 The level of prices for livestockproducts is the major issue in the livestocksector: meat prices are three to four times the world marketprice at the existingexchange rate; producermilk pricesare also two to threetimes the economicprice (obviouslylower than thisat shadowexchange rates; see paras 9.09-9.11and Table 16 below). Meat pricesremain at these levelsbecause of high demand, restrictionson imports, and inefficienciesin marketing arrangements.Consumption of red and white meat combinedrose from 8.3 kg per personin 1973 to over 21 kg in 1988. The limitedquantities of importedmeat are sold in controlledmarkets at prices that cover costs of importationbut which,because of the over-valuedexchange rate, are low in relationto world marketprices.
9.07 Most milk is importedas powder,reconstituted, and sold at a retailprice of DA 1.7/1,which has remainedunchanged for the past 10 years. Freshmilk is sold by localtraders at DA 5-7/1because consumers are willingto pay a premium -67 - for freshmilk even thoughit is unprocessed.Government also purchasesfresh milk throughORIAC, the Officedu Lait, from localproducers at DA 4/1. Fresh milk purchasedby ORLAC is thenmixed with the importedmilk powderand fats to make reconstitutedmilk containingabout lOX freshmilk. Costsof producingthis milk are aboutDA 2 per literas of mid-1988and are sold ex-factoryat DA 1.35, for a per liter loss of DA .65. Losseshave been somewhatlower per liter in the past. They are financedpartly through profits on s&le of cheeseand other luxurydairy items and partly through subsidiesfrom the Fonds Nationalde Compensation.GoverTnent apparently intends to increasethe producerprice of freshmilk furtherto DA 4.50/1,which would raise the cost of reconstitutedmilk accordingly.ORIAC has proposedto raisethe ex-factoryand henceconsumer price of reconstitutedmilk but no decisionhas yet been made. Pricingis further discussedin paras 9.19 to 9.25.
9.08 Whilethe high levelof producerprices has encourageddevelopment of the livestocksector, the Algerianlivestock industry may be based on prices that cannotbe sustainedin the long-run. In addition,an FAO reportsuggests that the relativelyhigh pricesof livestockproducts have encouragedfarmers to grow low-yieldingcereals (particularly wheat) for the straw and stubblevalue for livestock. If internalprices adjust to world market levels,much of the 'modern"livestock industry could collapse, that is, the livestocksub-sectors that rely heavilyon importedfeed and concentrates-- mainlyexotic cattle and some fatteningprograms. This is probablynot true of the poultrysector because of their high value added (theyare much more efficientfeed convertersthan ruminantssuch as beef, sheepand goats). Preliminaryestimates suggest that Algeriaprobably does not have a comparativeadvantage in cattleproduction for many of the productionsystems currently being used althoughthese estimates need to be verified. If analysisshould conclude that it does not have a comparative advantage,the nationalpolicy towards the encouragementof all typesof cattle production should be reassessed. Governmentpolicy should most likely concentrateefforts on increasingmeat productionfrom sheep and goats. Such a policy would also help to reduce beef prices. It is recommendedthat Government:(a) liberalizethe importof meat to preventthe developmentof an uneconomicindustry behind tradebarriers, which would have high socialcosts shouldthe industrybe subjectedto worldtrade in the future;the meat industry could,however, be providedlimiced protection through the introductionof an importtariff based on the real (unsubsidized)cost of producingbeef on the world market;and (b) freezethe controlledproducer price of milk in nominal terms unti' raleprice is more in line with world market prices (basedon . "shadow' exa_ange rate).
E. Comparisonwith World MarketPrices
9.09 As noted, producer prices, both for controlledcommodities and for commoditiessold on the free market,are high in relationto worldprices when prices are convertedat the officialexchange rate. The comparisonwith internationalprices translatedinto borderprice equivalentsis most easily done for crops traded on the world market: the wheats, barley, pulses and potatoes. I freshfruits and vegetables,international prices are a function primarilyof qualityand seasonand so are not easilycomparable. Table 16 below comparesdomestic producer prices with borderprice equivelentsbased on the -68 - official exchange rate, currently about US$1 - DA 7.5 (OER). The final column gives the border price equivalent based on a shadow exchange rate (SER) of US$1DA 12.0.
9.10 In 1974, producer prices had hardly been increased for seven years and were relatively low. Table 16 shows that in 1974 the economic farmgate prices for crops were considerablyhigher than the producer prices (nominalprotection co-efficients between 0.40 and 0.65). Shadow pricing would have exaggerated these differences. In the mid-1970s,therefore, it could be argued that Algerian farmerswere taxed vis-a-vis the world market and that this partly explains the poor performance of agriculture in these years. Since 1980, however, the trend has reversed so that the NPCs are considerablygreater than one showing that domestic production of these crops frequently enjoys a high level of protection. The differences are less marked using the shadow exchange rate but are still substantial. The economic prices for cereals and for fertilizer are based on projected 1995 prices (in constant 1989 terms) rather than actual 1988/89 prices to minimize the impact of short term fluctuationsin world prices. The average world market price for wheat, for example, was US$161 per ton in 1986, US$134 in 1987, and US$180 in 1988 followingthe drought in North America, demonstrating considerable year-to-year fluctuation. The projected 1995 price (in constant 1989 terms) is US$146 per ton. If the actual 1988 price (which is significantly higher than the projected 1995 price) had been used in estimating the economic price, the economic price so calculated would have been higher, suggesting a lower level of nominal protection. Table 16 shows that hard wheat is presently heavily protected based both on the OER and on the SER of US$1 DA 12.0. In addition, use of the SER shows heavily subsidized inputs.
Table 16: FARMGATE PRICES (DA/TON)
1974 1989 5/ Financial Economic Financial Economic Economic at OER at SER
Durum wheat 540 949 4,000 1,690goI 2,5 3 0V? Bread wheat 480 825 3,300 1 570V 2 3 50 J Barley 317 781 2,300 1 ,120V 1 630& Potatoes 5/ 550 821 3,300 1,340 2,000
Tomatoes 5/ 4,000 2,800 3,400 Beef 5/ 35-46,000 12,6008 20 000oI Milk 5/ 4,200 1,850 2 680V
Fertilizers5/ (Am. Nitrate) 924 1,550V 2,260V Tractors (50-70 hp) 82,400 90,000 160,000
1/ With 10X premium for durum wheat 2/ Based on World Bank's projected price for 1995 (in constant 1989 terms); details are in para 9.10 3/ Includes 20S premium for fresh milk and beef 4/ 1987 price 5/ Prices below are for 1989 with the exceptionof potatoes, tomatoes,beqf, milk, and fertilizer where 1988 prices have been used.
9.11 The considerable short-term fluctuationsin world market prices -- the world market price of durum (hard) wheat increasedby 35X between April and June 1988 -- explain, in part, Government's desire to reduce their dependence on imports of strategic crops. This is an important objective in the agricultural -69 - sector and explains the Council of Ministers' decision, announced in July 1988, to introduce a system of payment of premiums for cereals and pulses -- the strategic crops -- to increase production and thereby reduce dependence on imports. In this context, the price of durum (hard) wheat was increased to DA 4000/ton, made up of a base price of DA 3,200/ton (against a 1988 price of DA 2,700) and a premium of DA 800/ton. This was not accompaniedby a commensurate increase in consumer prices of milled flour products, implying a considerable increase in the already substantiallevel of subsidy (paras 9.19-9.25and Working Paper 2).
F. The Need to Rethink Future AgriculturalPricing Policy
9.12 Setting producer prices depends on the objectives of pricing policy. On the one hand, high prices tend to maximize output and reduce dependence on imports. On the other, low producer prices can assist in a Government objective of low cost food for urban populations. It is recommended that when prices are fixed by the Government,which in the medium-term is expected to be the case for only a few crops considered strategicby Government,prices be set at levels that reflect the economic costs to the country of importing or exporting these commodities'. The same policy is recommendedfor setting prices of those inputs whose prices are fixed by Government,since the subsidizationof inputs distorts production away from products with the highest economic return and results in over-utilizationof inputs. In brief, controlled input and output prices should be set in relation to world market prices rather than ':othe costs of production in Algeria. Based on the exchange rate used and the degree of protection to be provided to the sector (para. 9.14), such a pricing policy may result in slightly reduced farm profitability in some cases -- depending upon the particular crop or livestock activity o" each farm. At present, farming in Algeria is potentially highly profitabie as evidenced by the number of civil servants who left Government service to join the EAC/EAIs. A slight reduction in profitability is unlikely, therefore, to have a significantlynegative impact on production. In the same vein, agriculture is likely to remain relatively profitable even with a modest worsening of agricultural terms of trade brought about by an adjustment of the prices including the exchange rate (Section I below) or a lifting of quantitativerestrictions.
9.13 Certain internationallytraded commodities are subsidized or dumped as part of farm policies of exporting countries. The EEC, for example, and the United States have support programs for milk powder and wheat which result in traded prices below the costs of production in the most efficient exporting countries. In such cases, prices should be set in relation to long run internationalproducer prices followingthe example of Tunisia which has adopted the policy of setting wheat prices in relation to a three year moving average of spot and futures wheat prices on the Chicago Board of Trade. A 15X tariff
'/ In the past, prices were published,by Presidentialdecree in the Journal Officiel, quite late in the crop season. It is also recommended that prices of controlled commodities be announced 2-3 months before the planting season so that prices can affect farmer behaviour. -70 - is then added,which aims to establishan effectiveprotection rate of 25X. In this way, local producers can be protected from dumping and benefit from undistortedworld price levels.
9.14 Given the over-valuedexchange rate, the presenceof quotas/restrictions on imports,and selectedsubsidies in the industrialsector, it is clear that Governmentprovides a considerabledegree of protectionto industry. The issue is whetheragricultural prices, if set in relationto worldmarket prices, should be set at world market equivalentsor whether there shouldbe an elementof protectionto the agriculturalsector as in Tunisia. This would provide a measure of protection to the EACs -- infant industry argument. This issue is also linkedto: (a) the rate used to convertinternational prices to domestic prices;(b) long run expectations;and (c) Governmentobjectives for the sector vis-a-visother sectorsof the economy,employment, farm productivity,rural versusurban growth,and the desireto reducebudgetary outlays and subsidies. Given that, for example,75X of cerealsare importedand half the balance is consumedon-farm, only 10-15Xof Algeria'scereal needs are directlyaffected by incentives. The impactof highly subsidizedproducer or input prices is thereforerelatively small in relationto totalneeds. It might,therefore, be arguedthat cereal prices should not be protected,thereby minimizing Government budgetaryoutlays. If, on the other hand, Governmentplaces high priorityon rural employmentand incomes to reduce urban migrationwith its associated infrastructurecosts (Governmentwould have to provide housing, water, sanitation,etc. in the urban areas), then the "cost" of maintaininghigh producerprices may be perceivedas well worth paying.
9.15 To gain a betterunderstanding and to developa mechanismfor setting pricesand incentives,Government has agreedto undertakea study of pricesand incentivesalong the linesof studiesrecently completed in Moroccoand Tunisia. These studies,which have estimatedDRCs for a number of commoditiesgrown in different ecological zones, have shown that Morocco and Tunisia have a comparativeadvantage in the productionof fruits and vegetables,including citrus. In Tunisia,60-65X of cerealproduction has DRCs of less than one; productionwas uneconomiconly in more marginalareas. Livestock,especially beef production,was also less attractive,as was productionof certain commercialcrops such as sugar. Becauseof the very differentstructure of Algeria'seconomy which, in the past, incorporatedcentralized planning, high investmentin heavy industry,relatively high levelsof mechanizationand high constructionand wage costs,it does not necessarilyfollow that what applies for Moroccoand Tunisiawill apply to Algeria. However,prima facie, it is likelythat Algeriahas a comparativeadvantage in fruitsand vegetables,some cereals,and sheep production.
9.16 The purposeof the proposedstudy on Rricesand incentivesis to analyze the existingsystem of pricing and incentivesin Algerian agriculture,and examinepolicy options aimed to increaseefficiency of resourceallocation. The study shouldlead to a seriesof recommendationson, inter alia:
- methodologiesfor establishingagricultural prices; - the comparativeeconomic advantage of producingvarious agricultural commoditiesin Algeria;and -71 -
- the consequencesand impact of different policy options, including the impact of different rates of protection.
Timing and financial arrangements for the study ha'-estill to be agreed. On the innut side, several studies are already underway, the most crucial of which is the study on the supply and distributionof fertilizers,financed by UNDP with the Bank as executing agency (para. 7.12). This study will, inter alia, make specific recommendationon (a) the structure of fertilizer prices, including margins from point of import or manufacture to distributionat farm level and (b) price subsidy levels necessary to meet Government sub-sectoral objectives within a global objective of improving efficiency in the allocation and use of resources.
G. Increasing Incentives for AgriculturalExRorts
9.17 One of Government's stated objectives is to expand and diversify non-hydrocarbonexports. Agricultural exports, however, now account for less than 1% of the total value of merchandise exports from Algeria and have been in almost continual decline for the last fifteen years. With adequate price incentivesfor export crops -- largely a function of the exchange rate -- and the increases in fruit and vegetableproduction from growth described in Chapter IV, exports can be increased. Increased domestic demand for export crops, particularlydates, citrus fruit, and wine may, however, militate against large increases in exports. In addition, with the recent expansion of the EEC, the difficultiesof exportingto Europe,Algeria's biggest market (more specifically France), and the increased competitionfrom Eastern Europe following the recent liberalizationof their regimes and from other Mediterranean countries with similar products to sell, Algeria faces a difficult task.
9.18 Although the contributionof" sriculture exports to the balance of trade is small, so that major efforts tf: i-rease these exports are unlikely to have a noticepablcimpact on the balance of trade in the near to medium term, efforts should be begun with a view to the longer term benefits, beyond the year 2000. First, it is recommended that an analysis be done of Algeria's comparative advantage for production of various export crops. Second, the incentive structure should be examined: the level of producer prices relative to export parity prices; domestic marketing arrangementsby Government-sponsorednational agencies; trading arrangements and the ability of the marketing agencies to identifyand pursue export marketing opportunities;and the retentionof foreign exchange earnings from exports. As noted in para 7.18, Government has liberalized the export of agriculturalcommodities so that exporters no longer have to pass through state monopolies. Regarding the retention of foreign exchange earnings, it seems that it is linked to the use of foreign exchange in the production of the exports; from industrialexports, for example, exporters can apparently only retain 1OX of the net foreign exchange surplus earned during the previous year. It is recommended that exceptions to this policy be made where strong potential exists for agricultural exports, so that exporters of agricultural products can retain a higher percentage of the foreign exchange earned. The issues of profitability and incentives are closely linked, of course, to the prices at which exporters can sell their products, which in turn depends on the exchange rate. -72 -
H. Consumer and Producer Prices and Subsidies
9.19 While Government has liberalized prices of fruits and vegetables, consumer prices of most "essential" food items such as bread and other wheat products and reconstituted milk are controlled. Government has a policy of providing food to consumers at subsidizedprices. In pursuit of this policy, consumer prices were increasedonly slowly through the 1970s. For example, the cost of bread and milk decreased significantlyin real terms between 1974 and 1987. More recently,Government has attemptedto reduce its financialcommitment partly by increasingconsumer prices for wheat products by about 26% between 1980 and 1984 -- still somewhat less than the rate of inflation -- and partly by purchasingwheat at lower prices. Except for 1988 and 1989, internationalwlheat prices have fallen during the 1980s so that Algeria has had to pay less for its imported wheat. Based on the existing exchange rate, the cost of this imported wheat in Dinar terms has fallen in all years except 1988 and 1989. The combination of these two factors is such that subsidy levels on imported wheat fell from about DA 400/ton in 1982 to negligible levels in 1986; indeed, Government showed a profit on imported soft wheat in 1986. With higher wheat prices in 1988 and 1989, subsidy levels again increased.
9.20 The subsidy for locally-producedwheat, on the other hand, is a function of the high producer and low consumer prices. In 1986, the subsidy on lccally-producedwheat was about DA 1,300/ton,and in 1989 about DA 2,500/ton. Grains purchased by the cooperatives (CCLS) on behalf of the national marketing bureau (OAIC) are sold to the mills, and the differencebetween the price paid to the producers and the base price to the mills, the "prix de base de rdtrocession" is paid directly to OAIC. A similar system exists for milk production, a small amount of which is purchased locally and mixed with lower-cost imported powder, for a production cost above the ex-factory price, Part of the difference is recovered from higher cost dairy products, and part from subsidiespaid to the national milk marketing and processing office. Table 17 below summarizes the major subsidy payments in the agricultural sector to consumers and producers.
9.21 The CCLS generallypurchase, from local producers,around 5-700.000 tons of wheat a year and an additional 150-350,000 tons of barley for a total of 650-1,000,000 tons of cereals. Based on the 1989 producer prices for cereals and pulses, which raised the price of hard wheat from DA 2700/ton to DA 4000/ton, producer subsidies can, therefore, expect to be some DA 1.5-2.0 bn and this assumes no supply response to the new, higher producer prices. With such a response, producer subsidies could exceed DA 2.0 bn (US$335 mn), or about 2.5% of expenditures on Government's current account (excluding expenditures on capital and financial accounts)'. This is not insignificant. As local production increases (Chapter IV), the quantity of wheat and other cereals to be purchased by Government will also increase. Assuming that farmers do not increase the quantity of wheat retained at farm-level, Government may end up purchasing 2.2 million tons of locally produced wheat and other cereals by the year 2000 unless the present policy is changed. Based on existing subsidy
'/In 1988 and 1989 current expendituresamounted to about DA 76 bn. -73 - levels,this would requirebudgetary support of DA 5 bn, representingsome 5X of projectedGovernment recurrent expenditures of aroundDA 100 bn in the year 2000 (in 1989prices). The issueis whetherthe benefitsof the subsidyin terms of (a) supplyresponse and therefore,foreigr. exchange saved, and (b) increased securityare worthwhilein terms of the budgetaryimpact. This will be one of the issuesaddressed in the pricesand incentivesstudy.
Table 17: FOOD AND AGRICULTURALSUBSIDIESI (DA MILLION)
1982 1984 1986 1987
A. Soution des Prix Cereals 2760 1400 1340 2/ Imported flour 560 175 - - Vegetable Oil 530 400 340
Tntal 3850 1975 1680
B. Fonda de ComDensation (i) Consumer items - Cereals - - - 982 - Milk 285 209 116 300 - Sugar - 57 29 100 - Vegetable Oil - - - 265 - Olive Oil - Z 25 Subtotal 285 266 145 1672
(ii) Aariculture Inputs - Animal Feed - 497 225 490 - Fertilizers - 338 309 340 - Equipment and Machinery - 544 181 - - Pesticides - 31 - - Subtotal 285 1410 715 830
Total A + B 6135 3652 2540 2502
1/ The data in this table do not always correspond to lovols of rubaidios shown as received by the concerned parastatal. The data should, therefore, be takon as illustrativoof orders of magnitude. _/ Merged into Ponds de Compensation Source: Planning Ministry
9.22 The high prices of cereals(and other controlled crops), established each year by a Comit6des Prix withinthe Ministryof Agriculture,are maintainedby paymentof subsidiesfrom, in the past, the Soutiendes Prix or, more recently, from the Fonds de Compensation.Allocations under Soutiendes Prix were paid on cereals,imported flour and vegetableoil, with cerealsaccounting for about 50-80% of total subsidies. Resources for the Soutien des prix were made availableby directbudgetary transfer. In 1987 the Soutiendes Prix was merged with the Fonds de Compensation.This can be seen in Table 17.
9.23. The Fonds de Compensationwas started in 1982 to finance.consumer subsidieson otherproducts (milk, sugar, and olive oil) as well as, since 1983, subsidieson major agriculturalinputs (fertilizers, animal feed, agricultural equipmentand machineryand, for one year only, pesticides). The Fonds de Compensationis financedby a specialtax called"taxe compensatoirelwhich is appliedon a whole rangeof largelyluxury goods. Overall,the amountspaid out from the two funds for agriculturalrelated supports and subsidieshave been around DA 2.5 bn (US$415mr.). The amountshave decreasedover time. As discussedin para 9.05, Governmenthas stated its objectiveof phasing out subsidieson agriculturalinputs by the end of 1989. This would reduce the -74 - annualpayments from these funds by about DA 800 mn (US$130mn). However,the introductionof significantpremiums for domesticallyproduced wheat, which will have to be paid from the Fonds,will increasethe annualpayments from the Fonds. This increasewill more than offsetthe reductionfrom phasingout subsidieson inputs,so that increasedfunding will be requiredfor the Fondsde Compensation, unless, of course, the Governmentdecides to reduce the level of consumer subsidies(para. 9.25). Increasedfunding would likelycome from increasingthe range of goods or the tax rate on the imported"luxury" goods.
9.24 These subsidiesare the directresult of Government'spolicy to provide low cost food to urban areas,to "encourage"production of basic staplesthat otherwisehave to be imported,and of the exchangerate. While it is important to ensure that basic foodstuffsbe availableto the populationat affordable prices,it is equallyimportant to ensurethat the subsidiesare servingthis purpose. It has been foundelsewhere, for example,that subsidizedfood programs frequentlybenefit those sectionsof the populationthat need subsidiesleast, the middleclass urban consumer,and do not reach the peoplewho do need support to ensurean adequatefood supply. In addition,given the potentialto reduce waste by increasingprices, particularly of bread products,reduced subsidies might also decreaseconsumption levels and reducethe level of dependenceon imports. With wheat and wheat relatedimports running at about 3 milliontons a year, at an annualcost of about US$450mn, or 5% of total imports,avenues that have scope to reduce importsshould be explored. This is all the more importantgiven that food (wheat)imports could increaseto 5.6 mn tons by the year 2000. At that time, they would represent8% of total imports.
9.25 Moreover,as the dinar is devaluedfurther, Government will eitherhave to raise consumerprices or increasesubsidies. The formerwill reducedemand and the burdenon the budgetbut may be difficultpolitically to implementexcept in a phasedmanner. If consumerprices are not raised and the dinar were to devalueby 60-70%in the near future,for example,the subsidyon importedwheat and wheat related products could amount to another DA 1.0-1.5 bn, 2% of expenditureson Government'scurrent account. This would have to be added to the DA 1.5-2.0bn thatwill be requiredfor subsidieson domesticproduction now that the price of hard wheathas been increasedto DA 4000/ton.While Government may be able to affordto increasesubsidies to this extent,the total impactof producer and consumersubsidies is considerable. Both from efficiencyand budgetarypoints of view, consumerprices should be raisedin a mannerthat takes full accountof povertyand of politicalrealities by better targetingfunds availablefor consumersubsidies. The linkagesbetween producer and consumer pricesand subsidiesand theirimpact on the foreignexchange and domesticbudget need to be betterunderstood. It is recommendedthat the efficiencyaspects of consumerpricing and subsidiesbe studiedin the contextof the pricingand incentivesstudy. Moniesfrom the Fonds de Compensationhave also been used to subsidizeconsumer goods other than those in the agriculturalsector: domestic fuel,cement, soap and detergents.This also has importantramifications on the budget. -75 -
I. ImRactof MacroeconomicPolicy on Agriculture
9.26 The macroeconomicsetting, including relative prices, the exchangerate, interestrates, policies on industrializationand protectionlevels, and the frameworkfor parastataland privateinvestments and operationsall have a major impacton agriculture.Most of these policieshave been reviewedin previous sectionsas has the issue of the linkagebetween high (subsidized)producer prices,low consumerprices, foreign exchange requirements for imports,and the budgetaryimpact of each of thesepolicies. This sectiondeals primarilywith the effectof exchangerate changeson agriculturalproduction and profitability.
9.27 AlthoughAlgeria's dinar has been graduallydevalued over the past three years (1987-1989),it is still,by most estimates,overvalued. The impactof thisrecent devaluation and futuredevaluation on agriculturecan be dividedinto the probableeffect on producerprices and inputprices, and thus on supply,on consumers'purchasing power, and thus on demand,and on the size of the subsidies requiredon importedfood items. For outputprices, most are determinedfreely by internalmarket forces with the exceptionsof the cereals, pulses, and selectedexport fruit crops, which are controlled;the presenceof quantitative restrictions(QRs) on importsplays a major role in determining"free-market" prices. For the cerealsand pulLes,the outputprices are currentlyset without referenceto borderprices, and are, as noted,much higher than borderprices at the officialexchange rate. Thus, in the absenceof liftingexisting QRs on imports,devaluation would have littledirect effecton the nominal level of producerprices and would not serve to increaseproduction incentives.
9.28 Since over 75Z of the wheat and about 30X of the barley productsare imported,the major impact of devaluationon these crops is the resulting increasein purchaseprice to the countryin dinar terms. Devaluationwould serve to increasethe subsidyrequirements unless consumerprices were to be raised. For exportcrops, to the extentthat the producerprices are set with referenceto exportparity prices (this will be followedup by the pricingand incentivesstudy), devaluation would enable parastatalmarketing agencies to increasethe pricesand thus providea greaterproduction incentive.
9.29 The impactof devaluationon inputprices would dependon the extentto which the policy of "veritedes prix" (para 9.05) encompassesthe financial ex-factorycost of the products(fertilizers, tractors). At present,the policy uses an ex-factoryprice which is usuallycontrolled and does not coverthe cost of production.Since devaluationwould mean an increasedcost of intermediate goodsin the productionof inputsand equipmentfor the agriculturalsector, this increasedcost would be passedon to the farmersif "veritddes prix" was meant to coverproduction costs. This wouldreduce the profitabilityacross all crops, and would serve to reducesupply at any givenprice. The extentof this impact on supply would depend on: the proportionof imported material in the manufactureof the inputs and equipmentfor agricultureand the effect of increasingintermediate prices on the ex-factoryprice; the price elasticityof demand by farmers for equipment and input purchases; and the technical responsivenessto changesin the levelsof inputand equipmentuse (production responseto fertilizers,for example). -76 -
9.30 Devaluation, through its effect on the price level, would serve to decrease real incomes and purchasing power, and thus would decrease demand for food. This would be felt in those products whose income demand elasticity is highest (pulses have an estimated demand elasticity of 1.9), and least for products such as milk (with an estimated demand elasticity of 0.8). A change in the price level would also decrease the incentivesprovided by producer prices that remained the same in nominal terms.
9.31 On balance -- in the absence of lifting QRs -- devaluation, whether gradual or sudden,would somewhatreduce profitabilityof agriculturalproduction through the impact on input prices, and would thereby modestly reduce supply, except for export crops, where production might increase if producer prices are tied to border prices. Nominal producer prices for the major crops, cereals, would not be affected. Combined with a reduction in demand from decreased purchasing power, it is difficult to predict the direction of the movement in consumer prices. Subsidy requirements on imported wheat and barley would increase substantiallyunless consumer prices were increased accordingly.
9.32 Currently, the presence of QRs means that the price of fruits and vegetables, for example, is determined by demand and supply from the local market. If QRs were lifted, supplieswould increase. Following a devaluation, the prices of imported commodities would be higher than they are today (if imports were allowed) by the amount of the devaluation plus any protection. Unless both the impact of devaluation and the protection rate are large, the import prices would remain below present "market" determinedprices, especially for beef, so that the lifting of QRs is likely to further lower the price of commodities that are not controlled. As noted in para. 9.12, agriculture in Algeria is highly profitable and a modest decline in the terms of trade for agriculture is unlikely to affect farmer profitability and production significantly.
X. CONCLUSION
10.01 This paper has considered the potential for growth of Algerian agriculture and concluded that growth rates could be as high as 6.6% per year until 1995, under the most optimistic scenario, and 4.7% p.a. thereafter. For this to happen, all the factors would have to come together, with constraints that have existed in the past being quickly removed or minimized. For what is probably a more realistic scenario,a growth rate up to 1995 of about 4.6% could be achieved and thereafter of 3.5%. Whichever of the two scenarios prevails, EAC/EAIs will have to respond quickly and surely to incentives,and all inputs will have to be readily available in a timely manner, and of good quality. For the longer term, Government would have to establish institutions capable of serving the research and extension needs of the farmers, and would have to develop its capacity to establish priorities for investments and see that a proper incentive framework were established for both the private and public sector to direct investmentswisely. Finally, to ensure that this growth were achieved at the least cost and with minimal harm to the environuent,Government would have to carefully consider the options for developmentand would have to change its pricing and incentive structure to orient the development effort. Under less favorablecircumstances (lower case scenario),the growth rates would be considerablylower, at 2.91 p.a. up to 1995 and 3.0X p.a. thereafter. While -77 - this difference may not be large for a given year, the cumulative impact of different growth rates over time is substantialand will have a large impact on the import requirements,self-sufficency ratios, and export capability by the year 2000.
10.02 Which of the scenarios is realized is largely a function of Government's agricultural development strategy -- Government's commitment to resolve the issues discussed in this report. This will determinehow well the EACs will be able to manage their autonomy and their resources. Government'scommitment to improving institutionsthat service agriculture, to increasing the efficiency of the input delivery systems, and to providing adequate incentives will play a critical role in allowing the FACs and the individual farmers to continue to increase their productivity. In addition to further policy and institutional changes, Government has a role to play in carrying out economically viable investmentsthat are well-plannedand executed (paras.8.36-8.37), and thereafter in providing sufficient budget an" manpower to maintain them. Without these necessary ingredients,Algerian dependence on imports for basic foodstuffswill grow, and agriculture exports will dwindle even further. With these elements, by 2000 Algeria may reduce its dependence on imports and increase its agriculturalexports.
10.03 Many issues raised in this report need to be followed up, discussed, and acted upon in the near future to enable Algeria to realize its potential for agriculturalgrowth. Most of the reforms and policy actions discussedhere are independentof one another, that is, for example, reforms on pricing policy do not depend on Government actions to strengthenthe research service. Thus, many of the actions and studies recommended in this report call be implemented simultaneously. To the extent that reforms should be sequenced, it is felt those reforms which contribute to the short-term,quantum jump in yields that can been expected as a result of the dissolution of the DAS should be given priority: availabilityof foreign exchange for the import of agriculturalinputs and spare parts, liberalizationof input suppliesand equipmentrepair and measures related to the availabilityof credit. Work should also start on institutionalreforms and studies. Finally, planning for future developmentsin irrigation and the South should be continuedand strengthened;investment could, however, be delayed should there be implementationor budgetary constraints. - 78 -
LIST OF ANNEXESAND WORKINGPAPERS 1
Annex 1 Matrix of Agricultural Reforms in Algeria
Annex 2 After Land Reform: Implementing the Break-Up of the State Farms
Annex 3 Subsector Note: Livestock
Working Paper 1 Estimated Agricultural Growth Rates and Projections of the Food-Gap to the Year 2010.
Workin& Paper 2 Price Supportsand Subsidiesin Agriculture (Paper1); Linkages between Import Costs, Producer and Consumer Prices - Cereals and Milk (Paper 2)
'j Available separately. - 79 -
STATISTICALAPPENDIX
I. Production.Area and Yields
Production,Area, Yields
A.1 Gross Domestic Product, 1969-88 A.2 Cereals: Area, Production and Yields, 1964-89 A.3 Fodder Crops: Area, Production and Yields, 1964-89 A.4 Vegetable Crops: Area, Production and Yields, 1964-89 A.5 Pulses: Area, Production and Yields, 1964-89 A.6 Vineyards and Orchards: Area, Production and Yields, 1964-89 A.7 Livestock Production, 1967-89 A.8 IrrigatedAreas by Crop, 1980 and 1986 A.9 Variability in Staple Food Production (selectedcountries), 1961-76
Indices of Production
A.10 Cereals: Area, Production and Yields, 1964 - 100 A.ll Fodder Crops: Area, Production and Yields, 1964 - 100 A.12 Vegetable Crops: Area, Production and Yields, 1964 - 100 A.13 Pulses: Area, Production and Yields, 1964 - 100 A.14 Vineyards and Orchards: Area, Production and Yields, 1964 - 100 A.15 Livestock Production, 1967/68 - 100
Graphs of Growth Rates by Crop
A.16 Cereals and Vegetable Crops: Production 1964-89 A.17 Pulses and Fodder Crops: Production 1964-89 A.18 Wine Grapes and Citrus Fruit: Production 1964-89 A.19 Red Meat: Production 1967-89
Summary Growth Rates: Production,Area and Yields
A.20 Growth Rates: Production 1964-89, 1980-1989 A.21 Growth Rates: Area 1964-87, 1978-87 A.22 Growth Rates: Yields 1964-88, 1979-88
Value of Agricultural Production
A.23 Value of Agricultural Production,1964-88 A.24 Graph of Growth Rate: Value of Production,1986 Prices - 80 -
II. Tae o ctors (Socialist/Private)
A.25 AgriculturalArea by Sector: Socialist and Private, 1980-86 A.26 Production by Sector, 1980-86 A.27 Yields by Sector, 1972-86 A.28 Growth Rates of Yields by Sector of Activity, 1973-86 A.29 Land Holding and Livestock Ownership by Sector (Socialist/Private), 1985 and 1986 A.30 Income Statements of the DAS, 1980-87
III. ComoarativeTables
A.31 Comparison of Cereal Yields for Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco, 1973-88 A.32 Comparison of Yields of Principal Crops for SelecLed Cou-ntries,1984-86 A.33 Availibilityof Basic Foodstuffs in the Maghreb, 1982-86, 1976-80, 1966-70
IV. Imports/ExRorts
A.34 Imported Agricultural Inputs and Equipment, 1977-88 A.35 Principal Imports of Foodstuffs,1970-88 A.36 Principal Exports of Foodstuffs,1970-88
V. Distributionof Inputs and Eguipment by Sector (Socialist/Private).1980-87
A.37 Fertilizer Use by AgriculturalSector, 1980-88 A.38 Seed Use by AgriculturalSector, 1984-88 A.39 PesticideUse by AgriculturalSector, 1980-88 A.40 Purchase of AgriculturalEquipment by Agricultural Sector, 1978-88
VI. Production and InRut Prices
A.41 Producer Prices, 1969-89 A.42 Indices of Producer Prices, 1974 - 100 A.43 Prices of Inputs and AgriculturalEquipment, 1974 and 1980-88 A.44 Nominal Index of Input Prices, 1974 and 1980-88 ALGERIA
GROSSDCWESTIC PRODUCT/PRODUIT INTERIEUJR BRUT 1969-1988 GROSSDOMESTIC PRODUCTYPRODUIT INTERIEUR BRUT 1969-1988 (milliorns of dinars, current priceslprix courents) twilLions of dinars,1930 prices/prix 1980)
GDP-AGRICULTURE GDP-TOTAL PERCENT OF TOTAL GDP-AGRICULTURE GOP-TOTAL PERCENT OF TOTAL PIB-AGRICOLE PIB-TOTAL POURCEN'DU TO7AL PIB-AGRICOLE PIB-TOTAL POURCENT Du TOTAL - - - … .
1969 2.216 21,045 10.5 1969 6,156 83,516 7.4 1970 2.428 24,072 10.1 1970 6,652 90,866 7.3 1971 2,617 25.045 10.4 1971 6,941 80,598 8.6 1972 2,828 30.413 9.s 1972 6,966 102,662 6.8 1973 2,728 34*593 7.9 1973 6,404 106,583 6.0 1974 3,874 55,561 7.0 1974 7.987 114,471 7.0 1975 5,820 61,574 9.5 1975 10,283 120,309 8.5 1976 6,685 74.075 9.0 1976 10,068 130,415 7.7 1977 6,744 87,240 7.7 1977 9,354 137,326 6.8 1978 8,422 104,832 8.0 1978 10,436 149,961 7.0 1979 10,776 128,223 8.4 1979 11,396 161,057 7.1 1980 12,923 162,507 8.0 1980 12,923 162,507 8.0 1981 16,253 191,469 8.5 1961 13,014 168,385 7.7 1982 16,107 207,552 7.8 1982 11,947 178,097 6.7 4 1983 16,608 233,752 7.1 1983 11,696 187,713 6.2 CD 1984 19.480 258,207 7.5 1984 12,795 198,225 6.5 1985 27,070 283,945 9.5 1985 16,250 208,929 7.8 1986 33,270 281,162 11.8 1986 17,160 211,383 8.1 1987 38,200 296,966 12.9 1987 18,327 210,329 8.7 1988 38,720 306,973 12.6 1988 17,392 205,540 8.5
Iit ALGEPIA CEREALS: AREA, PRODUCTION AND YIELDS CEREALES: SUPERFICIE, PRODUCTION ET RENDEKENT 1964-1989
Hard Soft Cere&is/ Cereates Wheat/ Ble Dur Wheat/ Ble Tendre BarLey/ Orge
Area/ Prod./ Yields/ Area/ Prod./ Yields/ Area/ Prod./ Yields Area/ Prod./ Yields/ Sup. Prod. Rendement Sup. Prod. Rendement Sup. Prod. Rendeiment Sup. Prod. Rendement ('OOHa) ('QOONt) (Kg/Ha) ('OOOHa) ('O0O0t) (Kg/Ha) ('OOOHa) ('ODONt) (Kg/Ha) ('OOOHa) ('OO0Me) (Kg/Ha)
1964 2802 1488 531 1734 918 529 453 245 541 564 278 493 1965 2870 1734 604 1669 1003 601 527 322 611 630 379 602 1966 1902 776 408 1105 482 436 377 148 393 394 130 330 1967 2601 1642 631 1471 912 620 527 353 670 558 340 609 1968 3019 2128 705 1591 1063 668 632 471 745 723 533 744 1969 3012 1852 615 1501 857 571 697 469 673 736 466 633 1970 3228 2058 638 1554 914 588 743 520 700 855 571 668 1971 2952 1735 588 1382 794 575 766 523 683 728 372 511 1972 3518 2363 672 1652 912 552 819 744 908 948 644 679 1973 3233 1596 494 1541 699 454 806 460 571 786 374 476 1974 2973 1480 498 1413 631 447 788 460 584 690 331 480 1975 3171 2680 845 1483 1181 796 739 667 903 855 743 869 1 1976 3350 2313 690 1560 1036 664 735 594 808 932 589 632 00 1977 2780 1142 411 1302 573 440 605 254 420 741 260 351 1978 2625 1523 580 1234 702 569 630 381 605 666 397 596 1979 2886 1620 561 1317 703 538 628 373 594 809 457 565 1980 3181 2418 760 1344 927 690 727 585 805 945 794 840 1981 2569 1832 713 1195 760 636 618 450 728 871 525 603 1982 2568 1523 593 1118 633 566 520 344 662 815 483 593 1983 2227 1298 583 899 492 547 503 298 592 719 447 622 1984 2669 1460 547 1007 586 582 539 300 557 994 502 505 1985 3198 2918 912 1087 962 885 581 516 888 1390 1330 957 1986 2871 2402 837 978 785 803 543 444 818 1212 1083 894 1987 2720 2062 758 994 777 782 516 398 771 1089 820 753 1988 1806 1034 573 660 415 629 315 199 632 525 390 743 1989 1/ 2030
Source: 1982-86, Statistique Agricole - Serie B; 1973-79, Annuaire Statistique de I'Atgerie 1981; 1962-84, Statistiques - Special 25 Anniversaire;1985-1988, Statistiques Agricoles, Quetques Donnee sur la periode 1985-88, Ministere de t'agriculture. 1/ pretiminary/pretiminaires
0 tO
1,-a 010s ALGERIA FODDER CROPS: AREA, PRODUCTION AND YIELDS FOURRAGES ARTIFICIELS: SUPERFICIE, PRODUCTION ET RENDEMENT
1964-1989
Fodder Crops
Fourrages Artificiels
Area Yields Sup. Prod. Rendement (000a) (CO0OMt) (Kg/Ha)
1964 151 96 636 1965 135 93 689 1966 137 92 672 1967 143 90 629 1968 189 132 698 1969 140 184 1314 1970 145 246 1697 1971 152 246 1618 1972 155 317 2045 1973 145 337 2324 1974 208 539 2591 1975 210 587 2795 co 1976 223 534 2395 1977 235 426 1813 1978 255 510 2000 1979 306 626 2046 1980 353 750 2125 1981 357 720 2017 1982 360 607 1686 1983 390 625 1603 1984 469 745 1588 1985 808 1084 1342 1986 716 1120 1564 1987 709 1168 1647 1988 702 635 905 1989 1/ 700
Source: 1964-1986 Series Statistiques - Retrospective 1962-1986; Rapport sur l0execution du plan anruel 1988, ministere de l'agriculture. Note: The yields appearing in this table will not always correspord to the Algerian statistics because the numbers used to calculate area and production have been rounded off.
N.B. Les rendements apparaissant dans ce tabteau ne corresponderontpas toujours avec les statistiques algeriennes parce que les chiffres de superficie et production utilises dans notre calcul ont ete arrondis.
1/ preliminary/preliminaire > ALGERIA VEGETABLES: AREA, PRODUCTION AND YIELDS, 1964-1989 CULTURES MARAICHERES: SUPERIFICIE, PRODUCTION ET RENDEMENT, 1964-1989
Vegetables Potatoes Tomatoes Melons and Watermelons Cultures Naraicheres Poimnes de Terre Tomates Melons et Pasteques
Area/ Prod./ Yields/ Area/ Prod./ Yields/ Area/ Prod./ Yields/ Area/ Prod./ Yields/ Sup. Prod. Rendement Sup. Prod. Rendement Sup. Prod. Rendement Sup. Prod. Rendement ('OOOHa) ('OONOt) (Mt/Ha) ('OOOHa) ('OGOOt) (Mt/Ha) ('DOOHa) ('ODONt) (Mt/Ha) ('00OHa) ('OOONt) (Mt/Ha)
1964 84 608 7.2 27 188 7.0 8 113 14.1 18 119 6.6 1965 86 684 8.0 35 333 9.5 7 85 12.1 25 158 6.3 1966 77 574 7.5 39 267 6.8 7 82 11.7 17 142 8.4 1967 83 572 6.9 32 203 6.3 8 69 8.6 19 136 7.2 1968 103 709 6.9 40 272 6.8 8 84 10.5 21 178 8.5 1969 109 681 6.2 41 215 5.2 8 93 11.6 21 194 9.2 1970 108 725 6.7 42 262 6.2 9 95 10.6 21 189 9.0 1971 116 768 6.6 44, 274 6.2 9 86 9.6 22 198 9.0 1972 120 713 5.9 50 268 5.4 10 97 9.7 22 156 7.1 1973 124 761 6.1 52 299 5.8 10 118 11.8 19 150 7.9 1974 130 896 6.9 60 395 6.6 11 121 11.0 21 175 8.3 1975 151 1247 8.3 70 575 8.2 12 135 11.3 22 294 13.4 I 1976 162 1004 6.2 70 493 7.0 12 106 8.8 23 153 6.7 oo 1977 182 1034 5.7 75 472 6.3 13 109 8.4 26 138 5.3 4- 1978 172 1034 6.0 73 472 6.5 12 104 8.7 26 142 5.5 1 1979 193 1164 6.0 77 501 6.5 12 104 8.7 27 159 5.9 1980 225 1427 6.3 76 591 7.8 19 182 9.6 28 172 6.1 19S1 229 1298 5.7 83 528 6.4 16 134 8.4 29 179 6.2 1982 153 1237 8.1 74 415 5.6 16 194 12.1 30 193 6.4 1983 163 1366 8.4 77 491 6.4 16 160 10.0 32 207 6.5 1984 202 1546 7.7 72 821 11.4 13 144 11.1 33 243 7.4 1985 249 2182 8.8 97 815 8.4 20 217 10.9 41 318 7.8 1986 259 2339 9.0 97 812 8.4 19 302 15.9 40 318 8.0 1987 267 2567 9.6 107 905 8.5 19 291 15.3 35 360 10.3 1988 258 2420 9.4 90 899 10.0 12 283 23.6 35 232 6.6 1989 1/ 3100 1050
Source: 1985-88, voir ta source dans le Tableau A.2; 1982-84, Statistique Agricole - Serie B; 1973-79, Arruaire Statistique de l'Algerie 1981; toutes autres annees, Statistiques-Speciat 25 Anniversaire Note: The yields which appear in .tis table do not always correspond to alferian statistics because the numbers used for calcuLating area and production have been rounded off.
N.B. Les rendements apparaisstnt dans ce tableau ne corresponderont pas toujours avec les statistiques,algeriennes parce que les chiffres de superficie et production utilises dans notre calcul oni: ete arrondis. 1/ preliminary/preliminaires
II
D > 4 ALGERIA PULSFS: AREA, PRWUCTION AND YIELDS. 1964-1989 LEGUMES SECS: SJFERFICIE. PRODUCTION ET RENDEMENT, 1964-1J989
Putses/ Chick Peas/ Beans/ Legunes Secs Pois Chiches Feves et Feverotles
Area/ Prod./ Yields/ Area/ Prod./ YleldsI Area/ Prod./ Yields/ Sup. Prod. Rendement Sup. Prod. Rendcbnant Sup. Prod. Rendemnent ('OWONa) ('ODO04t) (Kg/Ha) ('OOOHa) ('OOOIt, (Kg/Ha) ('MO) ('OONt) (Kg/Ha)
1964 58 39 672 18 9 500 23 21 913 1965 71 39 549 31 15 484 24 16 667 1966 57 30 526 21 10 476 22 14 636 1967 63 34 540 25 12 480 23 15 652 1968 91 44 484 36 17 472 23 14 609 1969 90 43 478 29 12 414 24 14 583 1970 90 39 433 24 11 458 29 17 586 1971 82 49 598 21 11 524 30 25 833 1972 86 39 453 23 9 391 30 18 600 1973 88 42 477 27 12 444 27 18 667 1974 97 52 536 33 17 515 34 23 676 1975 96 74 771 34 25 735 35 34 971 1976 97 75 773 33 25 758 37 34 919 1977 93 65 699 34 26 765 35 29 829 1978 109 66 606 41 22 537 39 30 769 co 1979 119 53 445 41 17 415 46 27 587 1980 126 52 413 41 16 390 52 28 538 1981 117 51 436 43 17 395 46 26 565 1982 98 33 337 34 9 265 43 19 442 1983 123 36 293 40 10 250 50 21 420 1984 157 45 287 48 13 271 65 26 400 1985 157 57 363 51 16 314 73 32 438 1986 156 68 436 58 18 310 73 41 562 1987 168 63 375 70 25 357 69 33 478 1988 137 36 263 38 17 447 40 19 475 1989 1/ 80
Source: 1987-88, Rapport sur l'execution du ptann amrnuel 1988, Ministere de l'agriculture; 1982-86, Statistique Agricole - Serie B; 1973-79, Annuaire Statistique de l'Algerie 1981; 1962-86,,Statstiqukes - Special 25 Anniversaire U.9. Les rendements apperaissant dens ce tableau rie corresponderont pas toujours avec les statistiques algeriennes parce que les chiffres de superficie et production utilises dans notre calcul ont ete arrondis.
1/pretiminary/pretiminaire
> n - 86 - Table A.6 Tableau A.6
ALGERkIA VINEYARDSAND ORCHARDS:AREA, PROUCTION AND YIELD VITICULTURESET PLANTATIONS:SUPERFICIE, PRoDuCTION ET RENDEMENT 1964-1989
Wine Grapes* Table Grapes Citrus Fruit Vignes a Vin* Vignes a Raisins Olives Agrunes ...... Area"' Prod. Yield Area"* Prod. Yield Area"* Prod. Yield Area" Prod. YieLd sup.". Rendement Sup.** Rendement Sup.** Rendememn Sup.** Rendement ('0Oa) (000OHl) (Hl/Ha) ('OOOHa) ('00?4t) (Nt/Ha) (0O0OHa) (jOOOMt) (Mt/Ha) ('O0OHa) ('0OONt) (Mt/Ha)
1964 315 10477 33.3 S 18 3.6 106 150 1.4 43 464 10.8 1965 352 14057 39.9 5 31 5.2 91 150 1.6 43 415 9.7 1966 335 6843 20.4 6 22 3.7 90 i4O 1.6 43 402 9.3 1967 314 6475 20.6 8 29 3.6 01 138 1.5 44 400 9.1 1968 306 9977 32.6 8 26 3.3 93 172 1.8 44 432 9.8 1969 309 8743 28.3 9 33 3.7 97 119 1.2 46 491 10.7 1910 300 8727 29.1 10 34 3.4 99 1s7 1.4 46 508 11.0 1971 292 9284 31.8 11 36 3.3 125 166 1.3 45 509 11.3 1972 262 5785 22.1 12 32 2.7 146 172 1.2 45 533 11.8 1973 225 5900 26.2 16 40 2.5 151 119 0.8 46 507 11.0 1974 2 3 6200 28.8 8 3t 4.1 166 173 1.0 45 517 11.5 1975 210 4300 20.5 10 38 3.8 176 197 1.1 45 500 11.1 1976 209 4800 23.0 11 45 4.1 184 221 1.2 45 521 11.6 1977 200 2500 12.5 13 56 4.3 167 116 0.7 44 502 11.4 1978 190 1800 9.5 16 61 3.8 171 88 0.5 45 448 10.0 1979 179 2700 15.1 17 48 2.8 182 157 0.9 44 454 10.3 1980 164 2840 17.3 17 62 3.6 180 103 0.6 43 422 9.8 1981 160 2670 16.7 19 66 3.5 176 214 1.2 41 355 8.7 1982 164 1580 9.6 20 62 3.1 177 143 0.8 41 319 7.8 1983 148 1875 12.7 22 77 3.5 184 135 0.7 40 255 6.4 1984 137 13Y 10.2 23 77 3.3 161 102 0.6 40 285 7.1 1985 116 'IC 8.1 36 82 2.3 163 159 1.0 44 244 5.5 1986 90 906 10.1 35 91 2.6 165 201 1.2 46 253 5.5 1987 79 918 11.6 37 112 3.0 162 168 1.0 45 277 6.2 1988 68 605 8.9 38 93 2.4 161 143 0.9 45 312 6.9 1989 175 125
7;,Js Dates Other Fruit Figues Dattes Autres Fruits
Area"- Prod. Yield Area*" Prod. Yield Area* Prod. Yield Sup. Proa. Rendement Sup. Prod. Rendement Sup. Prod. Rerdement tOOOHa) ('0nOft) ('Mt/Ha) ('OOOHa) ('OOOMt) (Mt/Ha) (OCOHa) ('O0ONt) (Mt/Ha)
1964 34 60 1.8 48 177 3.7 22 88 4.0 1965 33 60 1.8 39 110 2.8 19 88 4.6 1966 33 60 1.8 39 115 2.9 19 77 4.1 1967 33 44 1.3 43 156 3.6 19 87 4.6 1968 34 45 1.3 43 148 3.4 21 76 3.6 1969 34 21 0.6 44 161 3.7 21 87 4.1 1970 34 50 1.5 44 79 1.8 24 85 3.5 1971 34 51 1.5 71 144 2.0 27 87 3.2 1972 35 62 1.8 71 160 2.3 30 74 2.5 1973 35 72 2.1 72 144 2.0 27 81 3.0 1974 37 75 2.0 71 167 2.4 29 97 3.3 1975 39 95 2.4 71 181 2.5 35 136 3.9 1976 37 80 2.2 71 137 1.9 44 105 2.4 1977 38 77 2.0 70 118 1.7 49 112 2.3 1978 39 69 1.8 70 196 2.8 50 93 1.9 1979 39 87 2.2 71 208 2.9 53 100 1.9 1980 39 69 1.8 71 201 2.8 55 107 1.9 1981 40 71 1.8 71 195 2.7 65 144 2.2 1982 40 28 0.7 71 206 2.9 63 138 2.2 1983 41 45 1.1 71 182 2.6 69 167 2.4 19C4 38 38 1.0 71 183 2.6 72 183 2.5 1985 38 67 1.8 71 199 2.8 120 183 1.5 1986 38 86 2.3 71 189 2.7 116 184 1.6 1987 38 58 1.5 72 224 3.1 116 204 1.8 1988 36 75 196 2.6 113 189 1.7 1989 200 ...... Source: 1973-80, Statistical Yearbook of Atgeria; 1981-88, Ministry of Agriculture. 'For the years 1963-72. the nit,bers could include some quantities of table grapes. **Area in production
Note: The yields which appear in this table do not always correspond with Algerian statistics because the nurbers for area and production used in our calculation have been rounded off.
Source: 1973-80, Annuaire Statistique de t'Algerie; 1981-88, Ministere de I'Agriculture Pour les annees 1963-72, les chiffres pourraient casprendre des quantites de raisins de table. Superficie en rapport
N.B. Les rendements apparaisssnt dans ce tableau ne corresponderont pas toujours avec les statistiques algeriennes parce que le' chiffres de superficie et production utilises dans notre calcul ont ete arrondis. ALGERIA LIVESTOCKPRODUCTION/PRODUCTION ELEVAGE, 1967-1989
Red Meat Beef Neat Sheep Meat Poultry Neat Eggs Ni(k* Viandes Rouges VianrweBovine Viande Ovine Viande de Votaille Oeufs Lait .u...... t .nt .. -t-ty--uantity-Qua-t-t n. Ouantitv, Quantity Quantity Quantity Quantity Ouantite Quantite Quantite Ouantite Ouantite Quantite (00ONt) (000t) (t0Ot) (caooNt) ('000Mt) ('O0ONt)
1967 89.3 23.4 490.2 1968 65.9 24.0 10.5 498.5 1969 82.3 505.7 1970 92.6 510.8 1971 96.1 528.4 1972 103.6 543.9 1973 t06.1 27.0 12.0 553.2 1974 99.2 634.7 1975 91.6 642.9 1976 98.0 670.8 1977 116.7 70.0 15.0 701.8 1978 118.0 722.4 1979 118.0 70.0 805.0 1980 135.6 53.3 62.3 95.8 15.4 663.0 1981 140.9 55.9 65.0 110.7 20.4 672.7 1982 143.7 57.8 65.9 117.8 20.7 686.0 1983 152.0 60.0 72.0 137.0 34.0 738.9 1984 160.5 62.0 78.5 144.0 49.0 683.3 1985 160.5 63.7 76.8 160.5 86.4 743.1 1986 170.0 210.0 110.0 750.0 1987 206.0 74.0 112.0 225.0 154.0 975.0 1988 220.0 81.0 114.0 225.0 154.0 970.0 1989 235.0 258.0 165.0 970.0
Source:Deportment of Studies anr 'inning (MAP), Livestock Department, Poultry Product on Department, and DocJrwientsof the World Bank. ° For the years 1967-79,the Algerianstatistics express milk volumes in millions of liters. In this series, liters are convertedinto thousandsof tons at a conversion rate of 1000 liters = 1.032.
Source: DirectionGenerale des Etudes et de la Planification (MAP), Direction de I'Elevage, Direction de l'Aviculture, et Documentsde la Banque Mondiale. °Pour les eviees 1967-79, les statistiques algeriennes expriment la quantite de Lait en miLtionsde litres. Dens cette serie, les litresont ete convertis en mitliers de tornnes a un taux de conversionde 1.000 litres = 1.032 tonnes.
-a - 88 - Table A. 1 Tableau A.8
ALGERIA
TOTAL IRRIGATED AREA AS A PERCENTAGEOF TIF TOTAL CULTIVATEDAA (PRINCIPAL CROPS)/ SUPERFICIE TOTALE IRRIGUEE EN TAUT QUE POURCENTAGEDE LA SUPERFICIE TOTALECULTIVEE (PRINCIPALES CULTURES)
1980 1986
Cultivated Irrigatod S IrriSated Cultivatod IrriSated X Irrigated Area/ Area/ of Total Crop/ Areal Area/ of Total Crop/ Superticis Superficie S Irrigu6 Superficie Superficio X Irrigu6 Cultiv6d Irrigu6e de total Cultivo Cultiv68 Irrigu6e do Total Cultive 'OOORa 'OOOHa 'OOOHo '00O0a
CROPS/ZULTURES
Cereals/C6r6alos 3,181 10 0.3 2,870 22 0.8 hard wheat/b16 dur 1,344 978 Soft wheat/b16 tendre 727 543 Barley/Orge 945 1,212 Oat/Avoino 163 137 Corn, Sorghum/Mais.Sorgho 2 0 22.8 1 1 100.0
Pulses/L1g.wineuses 126 156
Treo crops/ Cultures arbustivos 438 189 *3.1 436 135 30.9
Olives/Olives 180 165 Citrus fruits/Agrumes 47 46 Dates/palr.iers dattiore 71 71 ligs/Figues 39 38 Others/Autros 102 116
Grapes/Vl 8nes 195 4 2.3 127 4 2.8 Wine srapes/Visnes A vin 169 90 Table grapes/VignesA 24 35 raisin de table Raisins/Vignes a raisin 3 2 de s&chage
Veoetables/Ltgumes a/ 223 113 50.7 297 165 55.6
Potatoes/Pommes de terre 76 97 Tomatoes/Tomates 19 19 Onions/Oignons 14 21 Melons/Melons 28 40 C4^rots/Carrottes 6 12 Green beans/Harxcots verts 3 4 Otl,ers/Autres 76 104
Industrial Crops/Cultures 32 14 43.9 24 10 4* 7 Industrielles
Tometoes/Tomates 12 16 Tcb.cco/Taba, 4 4 Seed oils/Huiles de graines 12 1 Othera/Autres . 3
Forrage Crops/Cultures 410 716 Fourragares
Others/Autras IC 13
:OTAL/TOTAL 4,604 341 7.4 4,C26 348 7.5
------…------_-_ nurce: Statietiquo Agricole 1980, 1988, S6rio 8 */ Area planted (includes double cropping); physical area is equal to 142.430 ha in 1980 and 258,600 ha in 1986/ Superficie plant6e (inclue cultures successives); superficio physique set 68ale A 142,430 he en 1980 at 258.600 ha en 1986. ALGERIA
VARIABILITY IN STAPLE FOOD PRODUCTION/ LA 'JARIABILITE DE LA PRODUCTION DES DENREES ALIMENTAIRES DE BASE
1961-1976
Probability of Correlation Correlation Actual Production Coefficient Between Coefficient Between StaDle Food Production Instability/ Falling Below Total Staple Food Cereal Production Instabilit6 de la Procution des Denr6es Alimentairso de Base 95 Percent of Trend/ Production & Consumption/ And Total Staple Standard Deviation/ Coefficient of Variation/ Probabilite de la Coeffitient de la Food Production/ Ecart Type Coefficient de la Variation Production Correlation entre Coefficient de la (.) (2) Inf8rieure de 95 la Production at la Corr6lation entre la Poureentage de la Consommation des Denrees Production Cer6aliere Tandance Alimentaires de Base et la Production Totale (3) (4) des Denrees Alimentsires do Base t5) -(DOMT) (porcenttpourcentage) (percqot/pourcentage) (percent/pourcentage) Asia/Asie Bangladesh/Bangladesh 765 6.4 22 0.9C 0.99 India/Indo 68653 6.4 22 0.89 0.99 Indonesia/Indon6sie 1,040 5.4 18 0.92 0.94 Korea. Republic of/ 445 7.1 24 0.20 0.96 Kor6ee R6publique deo Philippines/Philippines 346 5.7 19 0.03 0.99 Sri Lanka/Sri Lanka 107 9.3 29 0.56 0.91 00
North Africa/Middle East/ I Afrique du Nord/Proche Orient Algeria/Alg6rie 531 28.9 43 0.78 1.00 Egypt/Egypte 282 4.5 13 0.29 0.96 Jordan/Jordanie 119 65.6 47 0.63 1.00 Libya/Libye 56 28.0 43 0.62 1.00 Morocco/Maroc 1,156 27.2 43 0.98 0.96 Syria/Syrio 702 38.8 45 0.92 1.00 Sub Saharan Africa/ Afrique Sub Saharienne Ghana/Ghana 121 5.8 20 0.98 0.93 Nigeria/Nigeria 958 5.7 19 0.99 G.92 Senegal/S6negal 325 18.6 39 0.99 0.81 Tanzania/Tanzanie 430 12.7 35 0.98 0.09 Upper Volta/Saute Volta 128 9.8 30 0.95 0.99 Zaire/Zaire 190 4.9 15 0.96 0.21 Latin America/Am6rique Latine Brazil/Br6sil 1,600 5.2 17 0.92 0.60 Chile/Chili 215 11.1 33 0.54 0.99 Columbia/Columbie 126 4.4 13 0.51 0.85 Guatemala/Guatamala 56 6.5 22 0.51 0.99 Mexico/Mexique 1,060 7.7 26 0.53 2.00 Peru/Perou 197 9.8 30 0.37 0.97 r
_0 ALGERIA CEREALS: AREA, PROOUCTION AND YIELDS CEREALES: SUPERFICIE, PRODUCTION ET RENDEMENT index/indice,1964=100 Hard Soft Cereats/Cereales Wheat/ Ste Dur Wheat/ 5te Tendre Bartey/ Orge Area/ Prod./ lietds/ Area/ Prod./ Yields/ Area/ Prod./ Yietds/ Area/ Prod./ Yietds/ Sup. Prod. Rendement Sup. Prod. Rendement Sup. Prod. Rendement Sup. Prod. Rendement ('OOOHa) ('OOOMt) (Kg/Ha) ('O00OHa) ('O0ONt) (Kg/Ha) (OOHa) ('O0ONt) (Kg/Ha) ('ODONa) ('OONt) (Kg/Ha)
1964 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 1965 102 117 114 96 109 114 116 131 113 112 136 122 1966 68 52 77 64 53 82 83 60 73 70 47 67 1967 93 110 119 85 99 117 116 144 124 99 122 124 1968 108 143 133 92 116 126 140 192 138 128 194 151 1969 107 124 116 87 93 108 154 191 124 130 168 128 1970 115 138 120 90 ?00 111 164 212 129 152 205 135 1971 105 117 111 &0 86 109 169 213 126 129 134 104 1972 126 159 126 95 99 104 181 304 168 168 232 138 1973 115 107 93 89 76 86 178 188 106 139 135 97 1974 106 99 94 81 69 84 174 188 108 122 119 97 1975 113 180 159 86 129 150 163 272 167 152 267 176 1976 120 155 130 90 113 125 162 242 149 165 212 128 0 1977 99 77 77 75 62 83 134 104 78 131 94 71 1978 94 102 109 71 76 107 139 156 112 118 143 121 1979 103 109 106 76 77 102 139 152 110 43 164 115 1980 114 163 143 78 101 130 160 239 149 168 286 170 1981 92 123 134 69 83 120 136 184 135 154 189 122 1982 92 102 112 64 69 107 115 140 122 145 174 120 1983 79 87 110 52 54 103 711 122 110 127 161 126 1984 95 98 103 58 64 110 119 122 103 176 181 102 1985 114 196 172 63 105 167 128 2i1 164 246 478 194 1986 102 161 158 56 86 152 120 181 151 215 390 181 1987 97 139 143 57 85 148 114 162 143 193 295 153 1988 64 69 108 38 45 1i9 70 81 117 93 140 151 1989 136
101 ALGERIA FOQDERCROPS: AREA, PRODUCTIONAND YIELD FOURRAGESARTIFICIELS: SUPERFICIE. PRODUCTIONET RENDEMENT index/ indice, 1964=100
Fodder Crops/ Fourrages Artificiels
Area/ Yie(d/ S44. Prod. Renidemo t ('000Nel ('OONt) (Kg/Na)
1964 100 100 100 1965 89 97 108 1966 91 96 106 1967 95 94 99 1968 125 138 110 1969 93 192 207 1970 96 256 267 ° 1971 101 256 d55 1972 103 330 322 1973 96 351 366 1974 138 5611 408E 1975 139 611 "El 1976 148 556 377 1977 156 444 285 1978 169 531 315 1979 203 652 322 1980 234 78I1 334. 1981 236 750 317 1982 238 632 265 1983 258 651 252 1984 311 776 250C 1985 535 1129 211 1986 474 1167 246 1987 470 12117 259 1988 465 661 142' 1989 7i9
0IL
'-aF AkLGERIA VEGETABLES:AREAk, PRCOUCTION AND YIELDS CULTURESNARAICHERES: SIJPERFICIE, PRODUCTIONET REIIDEMENT index/indice, 1964=100
Vegetabtes? Potatoes Tomatoes/ Melons and Watermetons/ Cultures Maraicheres Pomnes de Terre Tomates Melons et Pasteques
Area/ Prod./ Yields/ Area/ Prod./ Yields/ Area/ Prod./ Yields/ Area/ Prod./ Yields/ Sup. Prod. Rendement Sup. Prod. Rernvnent Sup. Prod. Rendewnrit Sup. Prod. Rendeme ('OOOHa) ('OOOMt) (Mt/Ha) ('(OOHa) t'OOOMt) (Mt/Ha) ;'OOOHa) (OOOmt1 (Mt/Ha) ('0OOHa) ('OCONt) (MtlHa)
1964 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 1'0 100 100 100 100 1965 102 113 110 130 177 137 88 75 86 139 133 96 1966 92 94 103 "44 142 98 88 73 83 94 119 126 1967 99 94 95 119 108 91 100 61 61 106 114 108 1968 123 117 95 148 145 98 100 74 74 117 150 128 1969 130 112 86 152 114 75 100 82 82 117 163 140 1970 129 119 93 156 139 90 113 84 75 117 159 136 1971 138 126 91 163 146 89 113 76 68 122 166 136 1972 143 117 82 185 143 77 125 86 69 122 131 107 1973 148 125 85 193 159 83 125 104 84 106 126 119 1974 155 147 95 222 210 95 138 107 78 117 147 126 1975 180 205 114 259 306 118 150 119 80 122 247 202 1976 193 165 86 259 262 101 150 94 63 128 129 101 1977 217 170 78 278 251 90 163 96 59 144 116 80 1 1978 205 170 83 270 251 93 150 92 61 144 119 83 1979 230 191 83 285 266 93 150 92 61 150 134 89 1980 268 235 88 281 314 112 238 161 68 156 145 93 1981 273 213 78 307 281 91 200 119 59 161 150 93 1982 182 203 112 274 221 81 200 172 86 167 162 97 1983 194 225 116 285 261 92 200 142 71 178 174 98 1984 240 254 106 267 437 164 163 127 78 183 204 111 1985 296 359 121 359 434 121 250 192 77 228 267 117 1986 308 385 125 359 432 120 238 267 113 222 267 120 1987 318 422 133 396 481 121 238 258 108 194 303 156 1988 307 398 130 333 478 143 150 250 167 194 195 100 1989 510 559
-3
rNJ ALGERIA
PULSES: AREA, PRODUCTION AND YIELDS LEGUMES SECS: SUPERFICIE, PRODUCTION ET RENDEMENT index/ indice, 1964=100
PuLses/ Chick Peas/ Beans/ Legumes Secs Pois Chiches Feves et Fevero(les
Area/ Prod./ Yields7 Area/ Prod./ Yields? Sup. Prod. Rendement Sup. Prod. Rendement Sup. Prod. Rendement Q'OOOHa) (t000Mt) ONt/Ha) ('DODHa) ('DOONt) (Mt/Ha) ('OOONa) ('OOOMt) (Mt/Ha)
1964 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 1965 122 100 82 172 167 97 104 76 73 1966 98 77 78 117 111 95 96 67 70 1967 109 87 80 139 133 96 100 71 71 1968 157 113 72 200 189 94 100 67 67 1969 155 110 71 161 133 83 104 67 64 1970 155 100 64 133 122 92 126 81 64 1971 141 126 89 117 122 105 130 119 91 1972 148 iCo 67 128 100 ?8 130 86 66 1973 152 108 71 150 133 89 117 86 73 1974 167 133 80 183 189 103 148 110 74 t 1975 166 190 115 189 278 147 152 162 106 1976 167 192 115 183 278 152 161 162 101 . w 1977 160 167 104 189 289 153 152 138 91 1978 188 169 90 228 244 107 170 143 84 1979 205 136 66 228 189 83 200 129 64 1980 217 133 61 228 178 78 226 133 59 1981 202 131 65 239 189 79 200 124 62 1982 169 85 50 189 100 53 187 90 48 1983 212 92 44 222 111 50 217 100 46 1984 271 115 43 267 144 54 283 124 44 1985 271 146 54 283 178 63 317 152 48 1986 269 174 65 322 200 62 317 195 62 1987 290 162 56 389 278 71 300 157 52 1988 236 .92 39 211 189 89 174 90 52
"-Iz 0Ds 0 V0
I-. ALGERIA VINEYARDS AND ORCHARDS:AREA. PRODUCTIONAND YIELDS VITICULTURES ET PLANTATIONS: SUPERFICIE, PRWUCTION ET RENDENENT indice. 1964 100
Wine Grapes Tabte Grapes Citrus Fruit Vignes a Vin Vignes a Raisins Olives Agrumes
Area Prod. Yield Area Prod. Yield Aree Prod. Yietd Area Prod. Yield Sup. RerndeKeft Sup. Rendement Sup. Rerd;ent Sup. Rerdeient (c[OWKa) (0001WH) (HI/Ha) (000ONa) ('0001Nt) (Nt/Ha) ('0O00a) (OaRt) (S4t/He) ('COOsa) (0001t) (Nt/Ha)
1964 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 1965 112 134 120 120 172 144 86 100 116 100 89 89 1966 106 65 61 120 122 102 85 93 110 100 87 87 1967 1i0 62 62 160 161 101 86 92 107 102 86 84 1968 97 95 98 160 144 90 88 115 131 102 93 91 1969 98 83 83 180 183 102 92 79 87 107 106 99 1970 95 83 87 200 13S 94 93 91 98 107 109 102 1971 93 B9 96 220 200 91 118 112 95 105 110 105 1972 83 55 66 240 178 74 138 115 83 105 115 110 1973 71 56 79 320 222 69 142 79 56 107 109 102 1974 68 59 87 160 183 115 157 113 74 105 111 106 1975 67 41 62 200 211 106 166 131 79 105 108 103 1976 66 46 69 220 250 114 174 147 85 105 112 107 1977 63 24 38 260 311 120 158 77 49 102 108 106 1978 60 17 28 320 339 106 161 59 36 105 97 92 1979 57 26 45 340 267 78 172 105 61 102 98 96 1980 52 27 52 340 344 101 170 69 40 100 91 91 1 1981 51 25 50 380 367 96 166 143 86 95 77 80 1982 52 1S 29 400 344 86 167 95 57 95 69 72 1983 47 18 38 440 428 97 174 90 52 93 55 59 J., 1984 43 13 31 460 428 93 152 68 45 93 61 66 1 1985 37 9 24 720 456 63 154 106 69 102 53 51 1986 29 9 30 700 506 72 156 134 86 107 55 51 1987 25 9 35 740 622 84 153 112 73 105 60 57 1988 2? 6 27 760 517 68 152 95 63 105 67 64 1989 2 694
Figs Dates Other Fruit Figues Dattes Autres Fruits
Area Prod. Yield Area Prod. Yield Area Prod. Field Sip. Rendent Sip. Reodment Sup. Renvdent (OWlo a) ('OWONt) ('Nt/Na) ('OWll) (000Flt) (Nt/Ha) ('00014a)('WNt) (Nt/Ha)
1964 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 1965 97 100 103 81 62 76 86 100 116 1966 97 100 103 81 65 80 86 68 101 1967 97 73 76 90 88 98 86 99 114 1968 100 75 75 90 84 93 95 66 90 1969 100 35 35 92 91 99 95 99 104 1970 100 83 83 92 45 49 109 97 89 1971 100 85 85 148 81 55 123 99 81 1972 103 103 100 148 90 61 136 84 62 1973 103 120 117 1SO 81 54 123 9? 75 1974 109 125 115 148 94 64 132 110 84 1975 115 158 138 148 102 69 159 155 97 1976 109 133 123 148 77 52! 200 119 60 r 1977 112 128 115 146 67 46 223 127 S7 1978 115 115 100 146 III 76 227 106 47 1979 115 145 126 148 118 79 241 114 47 1980 115 115 t00 148 114 77 250 122 49 lb 1981 118 118 101 148 110 74 295 164 5S 1982 118 47 40 148 116 79 286 157 55 : > 1983 121 75 62 148 103 70 314 190 61 1984 112 63 57 148 103 70 327 208 64 1985 112 112 100 148 112 76 545 208 38 1986 112 143 128 148 107 72 527 209 40 1987 112 97 85 1SO 127 84 527 232 66 1988 106 156 111 71 514 215 42 1989 113 ALGERIA LIVESTOCK PRODUCTION PRODUCTION ELEVOCE INDICES, SELECTED YEARS INDICES, ANNEES SELECTIONEES 1967/68 5 100
Red Meat Milk Poultry Neat Eggs Viandes Rouges Lait Viande de Volaille Oeufs
Quantite Quantite Quantite Quantite ('00oNt) COOOmt) ('OOOMt) ('ooGNt)
1967 100 100 100 1968 74 102 103 100 1969 92 103 1970 104 104 1971 108 108 1972 116 111 1973 119 113 115 114 1974 111 129 1975 103 131 1976 110 137 1977 131 143 299 143 1978 132 147 1979 132 164 299 1980 152 135 409 147 1981 158 137 473 194 1982 161 140 503 197 1983 170 151 585 324 1984 180 139 615 467 1985 180 152 686 823 1986 190 153 897 1048 1987 231 199 962 1467 1988 246 198 962 1467 1989 263 198 1103 1571
1,-i oioa *10 - 96 - TableA.16 Cereals:Regression of Production TableauA.16 Cdrdales:Droite de Rdgressionde la Production,1964-89
2a~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 0 26
24 -
22 O I~~~~~
a1
1.4 -
1.2
oa o~~~~~~~~~I - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~0
64 85 66 67 8a 69 70 71 72 71374 75 767778 79 0 a1 82 83 a4 8as687 88 89
Vegetablas:Regression of Production
CultureMaraichbres: Droite de Regressionde la Production,1964-89
32 - .1 la 26 a 14 - 22- 2e 1.8
1.4 1.2a
as~ ~ ~ ~ 0
0L4
646866 67 8869 70 7172 7374 75 7877 78 79 808182 8384 88868788i89 -97 - Table A.17 Pulses: Regression of Production Tableau A.l7
Legumes Secs: Droite de Regression de la Production, 1964-89
a
70~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
40 aO
0~~~~
64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 78 7677 7a 79e0 81a2 83 84 5 8E 87 88 89
Fodder: Regression of Production
Fourrages Artificiels:Droite de Regression de la Production, 1964-87
1.2
1.1 '0 o
09°
08~~~~~~~~~~ IA - 0 Q 7 a5 - o 06~~~~~~~~
Q4-
Q2 -U
06 64 88 66 67 G6I69 70 71 72 73 74 78 7877 7879 80 81 82 8W 84 88 86 87 88 89 -98 - Table A.18 TableauA.18 Wine Grapes:Regression of Production
VignesA Vin: Droitede Regressionde la Production,1964-89
Is 14 °0
to IT 4!
4-
2 0 1 00o 0- _ h
64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 78 76 77 78 790 a 82 a 84 as8a6a7a89
CitrusFruit: Regression of Production
Agrumes:Droite de Regressionde la Production,1964-88
540
0~~~
40 480Z \0O0 440 0~~~~~~~~~
4wo 0 o a
380- 340
320 2W - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~00 \
64 65 68 67 68697071 72 73 74 75 767778 79 80 11 82 83 84 8a 6 87 88 - 00 - 99 Table A.19 Tableau A.19
Red Meat: Regression of Production
Viandes Rouges: Droite de Regression de la Production. 1967-89
240
220 O 210 - 200 / 190 o 1701W0 /;a c ISOU8O-/
-J- a 0 - o
. 0 ao 1
67 da 69 70 71 72 73 74 7S 76 77 78 79 80 81 Q2 83 84 8SS 86 87 as 89 - 100 -
Table A.20 Tableau A,20 Page I of 2
ALGERIA GROWTHRATES: PRODUCTION/TAUX DE CROISSANCE: PRODUCTION-- 1964-1989
CROPS/CULTURES GROWTHRATES LEVEL OF sIGNIFICANCE TAUXDE CROISSANCE SEUIL DE SIGNIFICATION
CEREALS/CEREALES 0.6 N.S. HARDWHEAT/BLE DUR A/ -0.9 N.. SOFT WHEAT/BLETENDRE a/ 0.9 N.S BARLEY/ORGE8/ 4.3 52
VEGETABLES/CULTURESMARAICHERES 6.4 5S POTATOES/PC*MESDE TERRE 6.1 5S TOMATOES/TOMATES&/ 4.7 5S MELONSAND WATERMELONS/ MELONSET PASTEQUESa/ 2.8 5S
PULSES/LEGUMESSECS 1.7 5S CHICK PEAS/POIS CHICHES a/ 2.0 10X BEANS/FEVESET FEVEROLLESa/ 3.3 5X
FODDER/FOURRAGE 9.5 51
WINE GRAPES/VIGNESA VIN -13.0 5S TABLE GRAPES/VIGNESA RAISIN 7.0 5X OLIVES/OLIVES k/ 0.1 N.S. CITRUS FRUITS/AGRUMES_/ -2.5 5S DATES/DATTES 2.0 5S FIGS/FIGUES k/ 0.8 N.S. OTHERFRUITS/AUTRES FRUITS k/ 4.0 5X LIVESTOCKPRODUCTS/PRODUITS/D'ELEVAGE 1967-1989 RED MEAT/VIANDESROUGES 4.6 5S MILK/LAIT 2.9 5S CHICKEN/VIANDEDE VOLAILLE 12.3 5S EGGS/OEUFS 13.0 5S
N.S. - THE LEVEL OF SIGNIFICANCE EXCEEDS102 ANDTHUS THE RESULT IS NOT CONSIDEREDSIGNIFICANT./ SEUIL DE SIGNIFICATION DEPASSE 102 ET DONCLE RESULTATN'EST PAS CONSIDERECCME ETANT SIGNIFICANT. fl/ Through 1987 only/Soulanent juaqu&h 1987 b/ Through 1988 only/Soulement jusqu'& 1988 - 101 -
Table A.20 Tableau A.20 Page 2 of 2
ALGERIA GROWTH RATES- PRODUCTION/TAUX DE CROISSANCE:PRODUCTION -- 1980-1989
CROPS/CULTURES GROWTH RATES/ LEVEL OF SIGNIFICANCE/ TAUXDE CROISSANL._ SEUIL DE SIGNIFICATION
CEREALS/CEREALES -1.0 N.S HARDWHEAT/BLE DUR g/ 0.4 H.S. SOFT WHEAT/BLETENDRE q/ 0.7 N.s BARLEY/ORGEfl/ 8.6 10l
VEGETABLES/CULTURESMARAICHERES 10.9 52 POTATOES/POFMESDE TERRE 8.3 52 TOMATOES/TGMATES_/ 10.5 52 MELONSAND WATELtMELOXS/ MELONSET PASTEQUESA/ 10.8 5S
PULSES/LEGUMESSECS 4.2 N.S. CHICK PEAS/FOIS CHICHES _/ 3.8 N.S. BEANS/FEVES ET FEVEROLLESA/ 4.5 N.S.
FODDER/FOURRAGE 1.1 H.S.
WINE GRAPES/VIGNESA VIN -25.0 52 TABLE GRAPES/VIGNESA RAISIN 7.0 52
OLIVES/OLIVES h/ 2.2 N.S. CITRUS FRUITS/AGRUMES/ -7.3 5S DATES/DATTES 0.0 N.S FIGS/FIGUES b 1.3 N.S.
OTME FRUITS/AUTRESFRUITS b/ 8.8 52
LIVsTOC* P-RODUCTS/RODUITSD'ELEVAGE 1980-89 RED MEAT/VIANDESROUGES 6.1 52 MILK/LAIT 4.8 52 CHICKEN/VANDE DE VOLAILLE 11.1 52 EGGS/OEUFS 30.0 52
N.S. - THE LEVEL OF SIGNIFICANCE EXCEEDS102 AND THUS THE RESULT IS NOT CONSIDEREDSIGNIFICANT./ SEUIL DE SIGNIFICATION DEPASSE 102 ET DONCLE RESULTATN'EST PAS CONSIDERECOMME ETANTSIGNIFICANT.
F/From 1979-87/De 1979 A 1987 / From 1979-88/De 1979 A 1988 - 102 -
Table A.21 Tableau-A,21 Page i of 2
ALGERIA GTOWT RATES: AREAWTAUX DE CROISSANCE: SUPERFICIE-- 1964-1987
CROPS/CULTURES GROWTHRATES/ LEVELOF SIGNIFICANCE/ TAUXDE CROISSANCE SEUIL DE SIGNIFICATION
CEREALS/CEREALES -0.1 N.S HARD WHEAT/BLE DUR -2.1 5S SOFT WHEAT/BLETENDRE -0.1 N.S BARLEY/ORGE 2.9 5S
VEGETABLES/CULTURESMARAICHERES 5.2 5S POTATOES/P0MMESDE TERRE 5.2 5S TOMATOES/TOMATES 5.0 5S MELONSAND WATERMELONS/ MELONSET PASTEQUES 3.1 5S
PULSES/LEGUMES8ECS 4.0 5S CHICK PEAS/POIS CBICHES 4.1 N.S. DEANS/FEVESET PEVEROLLES 5.4 5S
FODDER/FOURRAGE 7.5 5S
WINE GRAPES/VIGNESA VIN -5.9 5S TABLE GRAPES/VIGNESA RAISINS 6.7 5S
OLIVES/OLIVES 3.2 5S CITRUS FRUITS/AGRUMES -0.3 10S DATES/DATTES 2.7 5S FIGS/FIGUES 0.9 5S
OTHERFRUITS/AUTRES FRUITS 7.7 5K
------_------_----_-_--_------__-- N.8. - THE LEVEL OF SIGNIFICANCE EXCEEDS 10K AND THU8 THE RESULT IS NOT CONSIDEREDSIGNIFICANT./ SDurL DE SIGNIFICATION DEPASSE lOx ET DONCLE RESULTATN'EST PAS CONSIDERECOMME ETANI SIGNIFICANT. - 103 -
Table A.21 Tableau A. 21 Page 2 of 2
ALGERIA GROWTHRATES: AREW TAUXDR CROISSANCE:SUPERPICIE -- 1978-1987
CROPS/CULTURES GROWTHRATES/ LEVEL OF SIGNIFICANCE/ TAUXDE CROISSANCE SEUIL DE SIGNIFICATION
CEREALS/CEREALES -0.1 N.S HARDWHEAT/BLE DUR -4.0 N.S. SOFP WHEAT/kSUTENDRE -3.0 52 BARLEY/ORGE 5.1 5S
VEGETABLES/CULTURESMARAICHERES 4.0 N.8. POTATOES/POMMESDE MER 4.0 52 TOMATOES/TO1ATES 3.5 a .8. MELONSAND WATERMELONS/ MELONSET PASTEQUES 5.0 5S
PULSES/LEGUMESSECS 5.1 52 CHICK PEAS/POIS CHICHES 6.4 5S BEANS/FEVES ES FEVEROLLES 7.0 52
FODDERXFOURRAGE 12.3 52
WINE GRAPES/VIGNEJ A VIN -11.2 52 TABLE GRAPES/VIGNESA RAISINS 6.2 5S
OLIVES/OLIVES -1.6 5X CITRUS FRUITS/AGRME8 0.3 H.S. DATES/DATTES 0.2 N.S. FIGS/FIGUES -0.6 N.8.
OTHERFRUITS/AUTRES FRUITS 5.6 5S
N.S. - THE LEVEL OF SIGNIFICANCE EXCEEDS10 AND THUS THE RESULT I8 NOT CONSIDEREDSIGNIFICANT./ SEUIL DE SIGNIFICATION DEPA8SE 10 ET DONCLE RESULTATN'EST PAS CONSIDERECOMME STANT SIGNIFICANT. - 104 -
Tableu A.22 Page 1 of 2
ALGERIA GROMTHRATES: YIELDS/ TAUXDE CROISSANCE:RENDEMENTS -- 1964-1988
CROPS/CULTURES GRWThTRATES/ LEVELOF SIGNIFICANCE/ TAUXDE CROISSANCE SEUIL DE SIGNIFICATION
CEREALS/CEREALES 1.1 N.S HARDWHEAT/BLE DUR 1.2 St SOFT WHEAT/BLETENDRE 0.8 N.S BARLEY/ORGE 1.4 10S
VEGETABLES/CULTURESMARAlCHERES 0.9 St POTATOES/POMMESDE TERRE 1.0 10S TOMATOES/TOMATES 0.8 N.S. MELONSAND WATERMELONS/ MELONSET PASTEQUES 0.2 N.S
PULSES/LEGUMESSECS -2.0 5S CHICK PEAS/POIS CHICHES -2.2 51 BEANS/FEVESST FEVEROLLES -3.8 51
FODDER/FOURRAGES 3.2 5S
WINE GRAPES/VIGNESA VIN -5.5 51 TABLE GRAPES/VIGNESA RAISINS -0.1 F.S
OLIVES/OLIVES -3.1 5t CITRUS FRUITS/ASRUMES -2.2 5S DATES/DATTES -0.4 N.S FIGS/FIGUES -0.1 N.S.
OTHERFRUITS/AUTRES FRUITS 3.3 5S
------__-- N.S. - THE LEVEL OF SIGNIFICANCE EXCEEDS102X AD THUS THE RESULT IS NOT CONSIDEREDSIGNIPICANT./ SEUIL DE SIGNIFICATION DEPASSE 101 ET DONCLE RESULTATN'EST PAS CONSIDEREC)MME ETANT SIGNIFICANT. - 105 -
Table A.22 rkalehAA-a Page 2 of 2
ALGERIA GROWTHRATES: YIELDS/ TAUXDE CROISSANCE:RENDEMENTS -- 1979-1988
CROPS/CULTURES GROWTERATES/ LEVELOF SIGNIFICANCE/ TAUXDE CROISSANCE SEUIL DE SIGNIFICATION
CEREALS/CEREALES 2.0 N.3 ARDWHEAT/BLE DUR 3.3 10l SOFTWHEAT/BLE TENDRE 1.0 11.5 BARLEY/ORSE 2.4 R.S. VEGETABLES/CULTURESMARAICHERES 5.8 51 POTATOES/PCMESDE TERRE 4.1 10l TCMI&TOES/TOMATES 8.7 SS MELONSAND WATEIENS/ MELONSET PASTEQiES 7.6 5S PULSES/LEGUMESSECS -0.6 N.S. CHICKPEAS/POIS CUICHIS -1.5 H.5. BEANS/FIVESIT FEVEROLLES -11.3 5X FODDERIFOURRAGE -4.9 51 W-N GRAPES/VIGNESA VIN -5.5 5S TABLEGRAPES/VIGNES A RAISINS 2.2 51 OLIVES/OLIVES 1.6 H.S. CITRUSFRUITS/AUE8 -5.1 5S DATES/DATTES -0.3 N.S. fIGS/FIGUE8 -0.8 11.8. OTHERFRUITS/AUTRES FRUITS 3.2 51
------_------__-- N.S. - THELEVEL OF SIGNIFICANCEEXCEEDS 101 ANDTHUS THE RESULT IS NOTCONSIDERED SIGNIFICANT./ SEUIL DE SIGNIFICATIONDEPASSE 101 ET DONCLE RISULTATN EST PASCONSIDERE COtMM ETIANT SIGNIFICANT. ALGERIA VALUE OF AGRICULTURALPR0lUCT ION, 1964-1968 VALEUR DE LA PR0tUCTION AGRICOLE, 1964-1968 (millions of diner0)/(illions de diners) OTHER VEGE- WINE POTATOES TABLE CROPSN1 PULSES GRAPES%2 HARD WHEAT SOFT WhAT BARLEY OATS POSNESDE TOMATOES ONIONS AUFRES CULTURE LE6UES VIGNES A BLE DWM BLE TENOR! ORGE AVOINE TERRE TOIATES OIGUONS NARAICHERESN1 SECS VIU2
1986 PRICES PRIX 1986: 2.2 2.1 1.55 1.45 2.6 3.5 2.6 4.7 5 0.161 (DA/Kg)
1964 2020 515 431 51 489 396 172 1132 195 1690 1965 2207 676 587 30 866 298 90 1087 195 2268 1966 1060 311 202 9 694 287 106 866 150 1105 1967 2006 741 527 38 528 242 101 1228 170 1017 1968 2339 969 834 60 707 294 77 1519 220 1610 1969 1885 985 722 63 559 326 99 1574 215 1413 1970 2011 1092 885 61 681 333 98 1552 195 1411 1971 1747 1098 577 56 712 301 141 1662 245 Is0 1972 2006 1562 998 79 697 340 172 1324 195 937 1973 1538 966 580 77 777 413 194 1267 210 956 1974 188 966 513 73 1027 424 204 1417 260 1004 ° 1975 2598 1401 1152 115 1495 473 277 2023 370 69B 1976 2279 1247 913 129 1282 371 188 1564 37S 780 1977 1261 533 403 72 1227 382 236 1703 325 412 1978 1544 800 615 81 1227 364 234 1729 330 300 1979 1558 783 708 117 1303 364 296 2093 265 442 1980 2039 1229 1231 160 1537 637 307 2520 260 467 1981 1672 945 814 125 1373 469 327 2398 255 440 1982 1393 722 749 87 1079 679 293 2421 165 26' 1983 1082 626 693 72 1277 560 316 2790 180 314 1984 1289 630 "a 93 2135 504 508 1812 225 237 1985 2116 1084 2062 156 2119 760 427 4633 285 164 1986 1727 932 1679 129 2111 1057 428 4983 345 161 1987 1709 836 1271 99 2353 1019 520 5927 315 173 1988 319 418 605 44 2337 696 520 5006 180 112 1989 2730 400 48
1. Ihe price is calculated as the ron-weighted average of other vegetable crops (cauliflower, zucchini, watermlon, etc.). The price 2. is DA per 'OOOL. For example, wine grapes of 12 in 1986 woutd cost: 12x.0134 A .161. 3. The price for 1986 was calculated by taking a weighted average of the price of olives for oil and table olies. Olives for oit were weighted at 92X and tabte olives were weighted at 82. The 4. 1986 price is derived from MFO statistics and represents an average price for dates. t to 5. The 1986 price is taken from Algerian sources. Ur 6. The 1986 price was calculated by taking a weighted average of the price of beef end sheep meat. M m Beef meat was weighted at 45X and sheep meat at 55X. a 7 The numbers for livestock production were estimated for the years for which data were not available. 0 w CITRUS/ OTHER FRUIT RED ARTIFICIAL ORANGES APPLES%5 MEAT%6 P0ULTRYXT FCDER AGRUDES/ DATES%4 AUTRESFRUITS/ VIANDES VIANDEDE MILK EGGS FOLRRAGES O3IVES\3 ORANGES DATTESN4 PONMES%5 ROUGES\6 VCLAILLEV7 LAIT OEUFS ARTIFICIELS
1986 PRICES PRIX 1986: 2.5 4.3 6 9.1 38.29 15.75 3.5 15 1.6 (DA/K9) TOTAL
1964 368 1995 1062 1347 3140 315 1645 132 154 17246 1965 368 175S 660 1347 3255 331 16U0 135 149 1813 1966 343 172 690 1247 3331 347 1696 143 147 14464 1967 338 1720 936 1192 3419 369 1716 150 144 1612 1968 421 1858 888 1101 2523 378 1745 158 211 1V9I3 1969 292 2111 966 983 3151 387 1770 162 294 17958 1970 336 2184 474 1229 3546 397 1718 167 394 1831 1971 412 2189 864 1256 3680 406 1849 171 394 19260 1972 421 2292 960 1238 3967 416 1904 176 507 20190 1973 292 2180 864 1392 4063 425 1936 180 539 18849 1974 424 2223 1002 1565 3798 S95 m2l 191 662 20157 1975 483 2150 1086 2102 3507 768 2250 203 939 24090 s 1976 541 2240 822 1684 3752 941 2348 214 154 22525 1977 284 2159 708 1720 1.468 1103 2456 225 682 20358 1978 216 1926 1176 1474 4518 1103 2528 227 816 21209 - 1979 385 1952 1248 1702 4S18 1103 2817 230 1002 22884 1980 252 1815 1206 1602 5192 1509 2395 231 1200 25787 1981 524 1527 1170 1957 5395 1744 2430 306 1152 25021 1982 350 1372 1236 1511 5S02 1855 2473 311 971 23439 1983 331 1097 1092 1929 5620 2158 ZJ69 510 1000 24514 1984 250 7226 1098 2011 6146 2268 2468 735 1192 25605 1985 390 1049 1194 2275 6146 2528 2654 1296 1734 33101 1986 492 108B 1134 2457 6509 330S 2709 1650 1792 34S92 1987 412 1191 1344 2384 7888 3544 3522 2310 1869 38684 1988 350 1342 1176 1893 8424 3544 3504 2310 1016 339S4 1989 1200 899m 4064 3395 2475 1120
1. L.e prixi est catcule come inoyemenan-ponreeo des autres prodeits inrafdhers (dimam-fters', cuwgttes,, p5tapms etc.). 2. Le prix estDA Par degre/fO0uL. Par exapIe. vignesa vin de 12 en 1986vaudrait:: 12 x .0134 a .161. 3. Le pri pour ltamee 1986etait calcule en prenant umnenyerme nponderee du prixdes olives a huileet des olivesde tWble. Lesotives a huile etalent pondereesa 922 et les olives de table etalent pondereesa a%. 4. Le prax1986 est derive des statistiquesde FAOet represente un prixmoyen p0mr lesdettes 5. Le prix 1986 est derive de sourcesAlgerienres. 6. Le prix etait catcule en prenant une momyerieporideree du prix de viande bovine et vaiandeovine. ta viandebovine etait pondereea 45X et la viande ovine etait pondereea 552. 7. Les chiffres pour productionelevage etaient estimes pour [es armees dont les donneesaexpmMent.
*0 > - 108 - Table A.24 Tableau A.24
Regression of Value of Agricultural Production (1986 prices)
Droite de Regression de la Valeur de la Production Agricole (prix 1986), 1964-88
40-
.3~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~1
~34 a
0~~~~~~~~~~~~~
24 o
20 -C i8£a o
14 12- 64 6S 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 AIMOIA fa.TSLA AMA: TIE SMIALIST SECTO AS TIl PIVATE SECTOR IRBICIIEARICOLE: LE SETE UOCIALISTEET IE MECTES79t0E (low0 m0)
W j9l 15 1993 196l4 7sS ...... T ...... Go. Pric Tot Sac. Prli Total So. Prl_ Total So. PriW Tolat se . Pric totL RSC. Price Totat S. Prliw TotL eoin 1,371 1,810 3,181 ...... 1,261 ...... 1,308 2.569 1.112 1.056 2,568 914 1,283 2.2V7 1.*SS 1,608 2,669 1,5 2,190 3 108 1,009 1.302 2,871 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~,,,,,,,.,...... @-...... ------Nard Soht/le ow SW6 830 1364 466 729 1,195 429 60 1,118 334 ss5 69 :c a47 1,007 SZ2 765 1,087 322 6a6 971 oIt Vftl 67 260 2 a3s 13 018 375 145 520 330 173 503 31 163 539 32 arleyIOrob 249 s1 361 202 5s 295 650 945 274 597 8n 230 577 715 220 499 79 253 741 994 271 1i,i5 1390 WOWA/hoCM nTm 9g5 1,212 103 60 63 86 64 10S 68 45 113 57 6 tos 77 48 1to a 56 138 69 68 OIoro/hutfO 1 1 0 137 2 (285) (265) 2 0 2 3 0 3 4 0 4 2 0 2 1 0 2 PWMES/ISI ZSCS as 30 126 77 39 116 58 40 95 76 47 lz 10s 51 156 96 61 157 85 65 136 wEM700ifllImO micA2e P9 134 223 78 151 229 68 143 213 71 1s3 24 71 168 39 63 186 249 55 231 Z Potatoaa/0 0 Toer 3S 41 76 33 so 03 29 45 74 32 45 77 32 40 72 35 62 97 1mtoTeeIIO S3 64 97 7 12 19 s 1l 16 s 1 16 5 1 tS 3 10 13 4 16 20 3 16 eel. .dibtd 19 1fI.aiOasat Potoqa 10 l 28 9 20 29 8 22 30 9 23 n 9 2S 33 12 31 41 7 33 40 OniensOi9mcn 2 12 14, 3 13 16 3 SS 14 3 12 Is Ott a/htOrOs 25 51 C 6 2 8 18 19 2 14 16 2 19 21 83s 23 36 79 22 62 a5t 24 78 17 12 62 75 13 69 82 IR12IAL UOPSoATIEs I2S10ELLEs 26 6 32 18s 26 Is 7 22 14 9 2 11 II 22 10 Il 21 10 14 2n TmOoMITStOS 8 4 12 0 4 12 8 4 12 9 5 14 7 6 13 7 79 t rw Ge _tte rerI 3 a 3 2 0 2 2 o 2 1 00 otneret/ao a 0 0 0 1s 2 I7 8 4 12 5 3 5 a 3 r 4 5 9 3 3 6 3 5 8 9FODO 3 ARSE ArTiFICIELI 260 94 334 243 114 337 212 148 360 24 146 SS0 Z4 205 409 as 403 ml m 331 716 Gourn oWnononau soTnsu 39 140 179 25 62 87 23 97 120 l7 62 99 19 112 3l1 21 166 187 II i31 130 vIrnOTIb TlO.TIES 175 28 201 171 25 199 167 28 195 161 27 1 149 31 10 126 31 17 108 28 (in FrfctiVfan 130 rqPl) 118 25 193 157 S2 182 1SS 25 11 1SO 22 172 17 25 168 106 26 1S2 as 21 " Winoc rapuVIgn a Vfn lS 18 169 149 18 167 146 18 164 141 13 16s 127 17 144 103 14 116 7T 11 90 (In pro6ctIrW q*lft3l 147 17 164 u4 17 160 141 IT 158 13u 13 14 120 I 137l 91 13 105 72 9 81 CITUIIASU 43 4 67 43 3 46 42 3 45 41 3 4 61 4 45 41 3 42 4 46 OlVES 6V 119 l80 58 118 176 57 120 177 56 128 UK 39 122 161 38 125 162 ST 127s t OAIIS/DATTIS 16 55 7n 13 56 71 1s 56 F1 10 61 71 4 67 7 4 67 71 6 71 ric/iFES 4 33 39ss s 3 40 4 35 39 4 3? 41 3 56 33 4 335 30 4 38 OT7ERFIIUITS7AUS FRUITS 67 35 102 73 34 107 63 3s 101 66 45 III 53 46 99 61 39 120 5# se 116
CoTlV0TEO LAlDTEMR CUTIVEE 2,239 2,496 4,73 2,067 1,956 6,023 1.836 2,173 1,009 1,721 2,020 3,7 Ia2% 2,457 4,2Z0 1,01 2,333 S.216 1,818 2.92 4,112 FALL/TERRAIII OEELAIS/JACKERES esI 2,058 2.96? 1,046 2,274 3,320 1,181 2,416 3,597 1.126 2,346 3,473 189 ,670 3,2s9 566 1,00 2,430 s97 2.310 2,907 ARABLE AER*/SWIO9CIE OUtTIfE 3.120 4,0lm 7,702 3,113 4,230 7,36 5,017 4,599 7,606 2850 4,366 7,196 2Ž41A 5.12 7,539 2,47 S,220 7.66? 2,415 5,231 7T,4
PASTLAND/P9ARCOLM M 30.863 3s1,61 7e8 30S,63 31,661 646 10,952 31,595 41"I31611 32,052 218 31,533 31,771 231 31.289 s3w1,4 238 30,91? 21.1SS iWPMcTOIY LADS/TIIEMSlWMUTIVES 91 255 36 91 255 346 86 269 BS 71 355 428 5 700 a5s 102 767 066 133 082 9s5 T1AL LANUSED - - o - -- FOR AQRICULrURE/ -a - c------0 tOrAL OEM rERRESV UTILIEES PARLtAG I0C8LrE 4,009 35,70 39,70 4,002 35.34 39,350 ,7W49 33,810 S9,559 3,362 36,332 39,67 2,706 ,46 40.165 2,800 sr,276 40.076 2,70b 37,03S 39,779 *
o.:...... e...... L.i....it...... ; ..Otati ... .qw 1 t -...... I...... ALGO P IA ARICLWaAtWALP ucMlwOg:¶THE 0CIALIST SECTORJUI ¶tNiEPIVATE SECSOR PROMucIOw AGICOLE: LE SE0CIURSOCIALISI Et LE SECIELWRPRI E ('000 411
19el m981 1962 1983 ¶964 1955 196 SM. 9,,n Som. Pri t So. ,o ¶ Soc. lotl S.PPSo. 9, Toal So. Pr.o _rpl SIoC. Prtn Ilat
CE8ALES 1,126 1.29 2.419 93 901 1.82M 707 816 1.522 648 643 1,293 645 81$ 15400 991 1'920 2,918 930 1,472 2.402 moslda t l a Owr 377 SSO 927 334 434 780 273 340 653 223 270 492 242 344 S$6 307 659 962 294 491 185 SOft leftr, 5vTr 397 1St ! 343 ¶s 4SO 252 92 344 222 76 2t 218 82 S0 314 182 516 307 1s7 444 o4rto/r¶g 279 31$ M 203 322 525 142 341 as 173 274 .7 361 930 20? ¶043 1,330 2U2 0s 1,083 Oats Awi:. 72 38 ¶10 4? 39 B6 ST 23 60 26 23 49 59 23 64 68 4*0 'Os 6 43 89 OtIte'A8.jrn I¶ 3 2 1 3 S 0 2 * 0 12 $ 3 a 1 0 2 1 ¶ 2
PIAUL /812. 8 $EC5 27 25 52 26 25 S1 1S 19 33 IS 20 36 19 26 45 23 34 ST 26 42 68
VEGETBLE5c/LTRAIS t-ICtU0O 006 841 1,441 404 an5 1.289 292 ?16 1.003 365 818 "1,14 w80 1,139 1,547 40 1,692 2,1U2 531 1,OO8 2,339 potltoOIPbI da ortC. 249 342 391 201 328 923 149 2e6 41S 194 3Z 491 195 325 5c 244 371 e13 241 571 812 ¶intont¶InI 77 lOS 182 4 946 134 65 129 ¶94 47 ¶12 160 43 101 I4 72 143 217 90 213 302 aelaswe Ws¶nn1n/aelawv72 54 118 40 140 179 36 157 19S 38 172 20? 37 206 2S3 35 203 S1S 43 274 318 1 IT ¶01 118 16 110 126 14 00 II 1S 136 121 13 1I2 195 9 lSS ¶8" II ¶S4 ¶83 Othe,lAgttOs 209 1¶7 378 09 221 322 20 65 163 71 102 204 loO 345 44" 1SO 538 668 146 596 742
1I6011318L C80S90ATLt6S IrDUS¶OIELLES
1a¶onti¶in¶u 6$ SO 95 113 55 168 29 23 52 52 40 92 52 70 ¶22 53 76 132 62 ¶07 ¶70
VlttVIUfSITIOCft¶¶l8S 8 4tWtcRFlvi O""' a Vi. (<000 2,n76 125 2,e87 2,485 218 2,6t9 1,411 ¶03 1,314 1.735 ¶43 1,876 1.249 144 1.93 326 III 938 8!26 so 906 ltabi.SalOt,Vtus aoasinm 31 SO 62 3n SS 168 35 27 62 41 36 77 n8 40 70 34 48 82 SJ SS 91
ClttA F8IRMUAGtfl8 387 a 422 331 24 355 296 2a 319 234 21 25a 2S9 26 289 225 19 24 2#0 253
OLIVES 28 n2 ¶00 52 199 211 4 95 140 22 III 133 21 76 98 16 ¶43 139 is ias 20'
Or6NSMl0tES 32 169 201 30 165 195 29 177 206 39 143 lt, IS 16t 153 '3 ¶86 199 9 179 ¶s8
*¶8/FItI6S 3 6S 69 2 69 71 2 26 20 2 S3 4S 1 37 18 0 59 59 1 70 71
5InDER81OP8tSE irmtncfI¶Es 571 178 749 321 200 701 430 177 607 426 196 624 44S NSO 766 622 A62 1,84 628 492 1,120
...... so,ewet a¶lhstt ON I &y¶CtIlt sta5 sti r 481¶03ote1 - Sc,ri D
N.D. C4rIt*s ttoie r rO oft8 Rl0CtN q INS ttV_ e r tr,,,, d,,I,c t1n WI 1I cmx dirtrflne¶* ¶0413&l 4 ct11 dlCo. WOOrcrp9*t l lOflftOS sr AIIta 9 dIEfdtq¶Ilpt." ' 'IC-.P-WCO 0101-A4,,T diff-RIt- IN~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~*tt ALGERiA YIELDS. THE SOCIALISTAND PRIVATESECTORS: 1972-86 REMDENENTS:LE SECTEURSOCIALISTE ET LE SECTELGPRIVE (qfhlo) CP.S POTATOES TCITOES CEALS NMD IBIEAT SOFTWHEAT BARLEY PULSES VEGITABLE ORGE LEGUMESSECS CULTURESNMAIc8ERES PtWtES DE TERRE TODATES CEREALES BLE OM BLE TENMRE ...... ------...... ------...... Priv. SOC. Priv. SOC. Priv. Sac. Priv. Soc. Priv. S0C. PrIv. Soc. PaIv. SOc. Priv. Sm- 58.20 62.80 46.50 123.40 67.00 1972 10.80 5.46 9.56 *.63 11.88 6.18 11.62 6.40 4.10 5.30 61.00 60.90 62.60 59.10 S4.00 127.10 97.20 1973 7.26 4..5 6.72 4.09 7.52 1.05 7.52 4.60 4.30 5.70 7.48 4.18 7.48 4.21 4.90 6.30 71.50 69.30 72.80 63.40 138.10 92.20 1974 7.55 3.97 7.06 3.69 95.60 9.80 8.37 9.80 8.37 7.20 8.60 7n.so ac.50 87.80 80.40 151.70 1975 10.00 7.96 9.66 7.S6 111.40 76.30 s.ss 10.51 5.52 10.51 5.54 7.50 8.80 3.CD 61.40 72.60 71.00 1976 10.25 s5.6 9.74 99.66 73.30 3.53 4.52 3.45 4.26 3.24 6.34 8.20 53.3? 59.60 56.60 69.40 1977 4.99 3.41 5.68 87.50 6.47 5.11 7.69 5.05 S.s7 7.30 52.63 62.00 62.69 66.70 93.10 1978 6.70 S.00 6.67 4.91 91.71 84.40 6.04 4.93 6.18 5.35 6.64 S.17 3.60 6.20 5!.gd 63.10 61.94 68.30 1979 6.23 s.10 105.75 87.50 7.47 6.56 8.52 7.23 9.46 7.93 3.08 6.58 68.86 66.00 71.14 83.30 1980 8.21 7.14 78.10 7.93 5.74 7."4 5.39 3.42 6.41 46.41 58.60 62.04 65.60 93.92 1931 7.35 s.72 7.17 5.95 53.02 59.11 123.85 117.30 1982 6.36 S.60 6.36 5.22 6.72 6.34 5.97 5.91 2.83 4.75 70.96 70.14 67.s9 75 .- 61.78 72.89 103.04 101.80 1953 6.70 5.01 6.68 4.78 6.69 4.39 7.86 5.49 1.98 4.26 a8.07 80 1 63.23 81.25 138.71 101.0O 198 6.08 5.06 6.70 5.32 5.88 4.88 5.57 4.87 1.81 5.10 7r.7u 90.97 69.38 91.60 205.10 90.11 198s 9.90 8.78 9.53 8.56 10.06 7.31 10.58 9.33 2.42 5.58 92.s5 89.9S 73.18 89.52 282.08 136.57 1986 9.22 7.91 9.14 7.48 9.00 6.80 10.22 8.56 2.91 6.21
OTIIERFRUIT GRAM ( tM) TABLEGPES CITiUS FRUIT OLIVES DATES FIGS ELUAMTEL O1ntE FIGUES AUTRESFRUITS HELUlM 8TPABTESES VIGvES A VIN (MI/MA) VIGidESA RAISIM AGRMS DATTES Priv. Sac. Priv. SOC. Priv. Sc. Priv. SOC. Prlv. SOc. Prfv. SOC. Priv. S0C. Priw. SOC. 25.60 24.10 23.30 24.20 28.70 120.90 97.SO 13.00 13.0O 39.00 2s.0c 15.00 13.00 1972 ^.2 71.50 23.20 35.80 29.70 24.30 34.50 37.20 112.60 91.00 10.00 10.00 33.00 23.00 30.00 18.00 197 68.70 78.00 27.30 27.00 20.00 34.20 32.30 78.40 90.90 30.00 28.60 38.70 40.60 117.40 100.60 14.00 15.00 29.00 27.8 1974 21.00 24.00 41.50 36.60 74.80 186.90 21.70 16.30 43.60 43.50 113.10 99.60 14.00 17.00 '.1.00 28.00 1975 21.00 20.00 25.20 23.00 68.60 18.7o 16.30 33.70 33.90 117.40 103.20 25.00 19.00 50.00 3.00 1976 6i.70 11.11 19.00 21.49 23.90 59.90 13.02 10.70 23.07 37.20 113.05 109.90 8.72 9.00 3S.71 '9.00 1977 4.27 16.57 19.20 74.80 10.29 S.80 14.44 24.00 100.00 93.30 4.98 7.00 3S.71 11.00 8.9s 17.00 1978 35.20 34.00 9.76 21.00 16.56 22.30 1979 49.53 64.90 15.78 10.40 18.04 28.30 102.21 93.90 8.05 12.80 30.00 33.80 9.47 16.90 18.68 20.20 1980 50.00 6T.40 1A.99 7.40 20.53 37.s0 99.74 89.30 4.62 8.70 28.57 32.90 5.12 19.50 18.68 27.30 19M 41.24 70.60 16.47 12.70 20.41 68.75 86.42 79.80 8.83 18.60 24.14 31.73 4.63 7.21 19.49 16.59 1982 46.75 70.57 9.62 6.00 20.41 33.5 77.08 72.59 7.75 8.24 29.69 3A.S5 26.56 4.77 11.60 19.23 194.0 t 19s3 41.30 73.84 12.33 11.00 23.88 40.00 63.24 67.48 S.12 8.8s 2 1 2 7 22.37 . . V 9.92 8.00 22.35 36.36 70.00 70.30 8.38 6.60 S6.59 24.96 1.88 10.53 1984 42.53 85.68 27.76 0.00 16.86 1985 36.04 91.32 9.00 8.00 24.20 36.42 S4.88 63.33 4.21 11.44 32.50 1986 59.32 83.81 11.00 9.00 26.12 44.18 53.10 75.00 4.86 14.4' 37.50 26.32 2.78 24.53
Suce,: A.mmre StatistiqLJ di t'AIsiere 1978-1981; 1972-77 et 1982-86 Stetistlque - Siecal 25 Amivrsairt GROWi RATES/ TAM 3E CoDlSSANCE -- 1973-1988 TmJD: SOCIALST S9U AND PRIVATE W ED!s: IZ 88E SCIALLMS ETr E STM MM
SOCIALIST SECTOR/ PRIVATE SECTCRJ LE SECTEUR SOCIALISTE LE 33CTEUR FRlVE
LEVEL OF LEVEL OF GRoRT RATES/ SIGNIFICANCE/ GRITWh RATES SIGNIFICANCE/ TAUX DE SEUIL DE TAUXDE SEUIL DE CROPS/CULTURES CROISSANCE SIGNIFICATION CROISSARCE SIGUIFICATION
Cereals/C6r6ales -0.1 N S. 2.8 10S Hard Wheat/B16 dur -0.0 .S. 3.2 51 Soft wheat/D16 tendre -0.1 N S. 1.5 .S. Barley/Orge -0.1 N S. 2.5 .S.
Market Crop3/CulturesMaraich6res 1.4 .S. 2.1 55 Potatoes/P ansde terres -1.3 H.S. 2.9 SS Tomatoes/Tomates 2.7 N.S. 1.7 102 Melons & Waterelons/Melons et -3.9 5S -0.1 U.S. Pasteques
Wine grapes/Vignes b vin -7.4 SS -8. S2 Table grapes/Vignes & raisins -2.9 .S. 1.3 S. S. Citrus fruits/Agrumes -6.0 5S -3.3 5S Olives/Olives -8.7 52 -2.1 U.S. Dates/Dattes -0.8 .S. 1.1 U.S. Figs/Figues -1.8 SS -1.8 B.S. Other fruits/Autresfruits -5.2 5S -3.7 5Z (1973-1984)
U.S. - Level of significance greater than 101 and thus the result is not considored significant/ N.S. - Seuil de signification depasse 101 at donc le r6sultat n est pas considerb cine 6tant significant. II& - 113 - ALGERIA TIable A.29 STRUCTUREOF THE PRIVATEFARMS, 1985 Tableau A29 STRUCTUREDES EXPLOITATIONS PRIVEES, 1985 (25 wilayes of the North) (25 wlt&yasdu Nord)
Area Category umbar of Neiebers Percentage area Average area Cloase de SWuerfice Nonbre d'exploltents SuperfIce Correspondbnte Superfice Noyen (No.) (X) (Ha) CX) (Ha) less than/ Moins de 5Ha 668,665 74.05 1,281,638 29.11 1.9 5 - 1ONa 126,104 13.97 875,217 19.88 6.9 10 - 20H 6r,880 7.52 902,673 20.51 13.3 20 - SHae 34,211 3.79 922,171 20.95 27.0 50 - looll 5,288 0.59 319,848 7.27 60.5 More then/ Plus 10OHa 803 0.09 100,496 2.28 125.2
Total 902,951 100.00 4,402,043 100.00 4.9
...... Source:PAP
ALGERIA SUMRAPYOF THE EAC/EAIPRrPERTIES RECAPITULATIONNATIONALE DE LA SITUATIOYFONCIERE DES EAC/EAI
EAC EAI
kNWSEROF UNITS/MOMBREDE UNITES 22,028 5,103
TOTALAGRICULTURAL AREA/ SAT (HECTARES) 1/ 2,300,000 50,000 ARABLEAREA/ I/ - SAU/(HECTARES) 2,000,000 45,000
SAU/UNITE ARAULEAREA/PER UNIT 90.8 8.8 ...... SAT: SuperficieAgricole Totale; Total agriculturalarea SAU: SuperficieAgricole Utile; Total arabtearea
1/ World Sank estiuites/estlmationsde lto Snque Nondilse.
ALGERIA LIVESTOCKPER SECTOR ELEVAGEPAR SECTEUR-- 1986
Socialist Prive Total .'------000. ------.- - - Beef cattle/Bovine 63 1284 1347
local/dont:Race locale 29 729 758 purebred/ Race pure 39 66 105
Sheep/ovins 1155 14675 15830 Goate/Chevres 2514 2514 Camels/Chameaux 121 121 Horses/Chevals 1 79 80 Poultry/ Volaille- egg leayng/Pomoeuees 6800 ieat/Viende 114000
Mules/Mulets 1 130 131 Donkey/Anes 340 340
...... Source:Ministere de l Agriculture ALGERIA HCOSESTATEMENTS Of OAS EVOLUTIONDES RESaTATs DESDAS ('000 DA)
197978 1982/83 1Wf84 1984fl l98/86 198647 ...... ------...... ----...... I------...... -----....-----...----...... ------...... -----....-..-.-... N0. Share S No. Share X Chere No. share S Chewe No. Shere S Change Nto. Share S Chanrge No. Share S Ch
Ezpenses/Chargea 4,763,284 100.0 6,M,278 100.0 31.7 7,239,7M2 700.0 15.4 8,605,206 100.0 18.9 10,637,000 100.0 23.6 8,819,000 100.0 ...... ----..------...... ---- . ------...... ------. -..----...... IwutslApprevisionemnt 839,986 17.6 1,149,075 18.3 36.8 1.492,618 20.6 29.9 1,874,122 21.8 25.6 2,315,000 21.8 23.5 Services 510,095 10.7 244336 3.9 -52.1 265,913 3.7 8.8 402,999 4.7 51.6 591,00 5.6 46.7 Salaries/Farais de persevt 2,893,915 60.8 4,202,600 67.0 45.2 4,387,647 60.6 4.4 5,096,71 S.2 16.2 5,9300DD 55.7 16.2 4,608,000 52.3 Other costa/Autres frat 437,320 9.2 548,718 8.7 25.5 737,568 10.2 34.4 981,490 1t.4 33.1 1,808,0o0 17.0 84.2 Nm-opeaiting costs/Charges hors esploltatfen 81,968 1.7 128,549 2.0 56.8 356,046 4.9 177.0 249,864 ?.9 -29.8
Irtin/Produlto 3,523,499 100.0 4,396,045 100.0 24.8 5,729,053 100.0 30.3 7,553,001 100.0 31.8 9,577,000 100.0 26.8 9,691,000 100.0 ...... --...... - ...... ------.... ------... _. ------_ ---- ... .._...... Crop pr1-ftan/Proc& tion vegetate 2,730,431 77.5 3,386,386 77.0 24.0 4,108,854 71.7 21.3 5,417,195 71.7 31.8 6,204,000 64.8 14.5 4ni0et prectlonPtroictmn n1mte 535,253 15.2 622,499 14.2 16.3 731,273 12.8 17.5 1,293,411 17.1 76.9 1,773,000 18.7 38.6 Isic. preoi ctImvP'e tIon dIws 134,982 3.8 .229,515 5.2 70.0 505,649 8.8 120.3 498,147 6 6 -1.5 1,580,000 16.5 217.2 im.operatlng irce/ProSilt hors-ezptoltatien 122,833 3.5 157,645 3.6 28.3 33,277 6.7 143.1 344,248 4.0 -10.2 4
Not I ncre/ Iutttt NET (1,239,785) (1,877,233) 51.4 (1,510,739) -19.5 (1,052,205) -30.4 (1,06O000) 0.7 872.0 RatIo of Inrc/expes.7/ Ef fic1ene PreOitts/Charges 0.74 0.70 0.79 0.68 0.90 Inci/Nec-tere/RewultUlltNectre -401.4 -658.4 -623.0 -433.9 -437.1
* of DAS0 esber/Nkeb de DAS beneficlalres 427 400 -6.3 689 72.3 1,034 50.1 1,114 7.7 Aunt of profft/Nontant de tLenefce 170,815 229,063 34.1 553,855 141.8 686,658 24.0 n -100.0 * of teos-eking DS/Mbre de DAS det Icitaires 1662 2,617 57.5 2,717 3.8 2,377 -235 2,262 -4.8 Amnt of Loas/Nontent de deflcte 1,110,412 2,106,295 89.7 2,064,655 -2.0 1,73,863 -15.8 no -100.0
Arabia tand1SuperfIce Agricote Utite 3,089 2,851 .7.7 2,425 -14.9 2,425 C.0 2,425 0.0 (1000Ne) K of profitabLe OAS/%des OASReneficiaires 132 201 301 3 Sauto: Uinistere de t'Agricutture it de ta Peche ...... ALGERIA
COMPARISON OF CEREAL YIELDS FOR ALGERIA, TLINISIA,AND MOROCCO, 1973-88 COMPARAISON DE REWOEMENTS DE CEREALES POUR L'ALGERIE, LA TUNISIE ET LE NAROC, 1973-8S
Hard wheat/ Ble dur Soft Uheat/ Ote Tendre Rertey/ Orge
(A) (B) (C) (A/B) (A/C) (A) (B) (C) (A/8) (A/C) (A) (8) (C) (A/B) (A/C) Algerie lunisie Maroc Aigerie Tunisie Plaroc Aigerie TLnisie Naroc Kg/Ha (M) Kg/Ha (M) Kg/Ha (I)
1973 454 620 800 73 57 571 600 698 95 82 476 710 622 67 77 1974 447 660 990 68 45 584 720 890 81 66 480 590 1,210 81 40 1975 796 880 970 90 82 903 1,080 820 84 110 869 800 870 109 100 1976 664 750 1.140 89 58 808 420 1,150 192 70 632 560 1,350 113 47 1977 440 440 740 100 59 420 870 470 48 89 351 320 580 110 61 1978 569 630 1,110 90 51 605 990 950 61 64 596 400 970 149 61 1979 538 570 1,120 94 48 594 910 1,000 65 59 565 420 870 135 65 1980 690 910 1,050 76 66 805 1,610 1,078 50 75 840 720 1,028 117 82 1981 636 980 530 65 120 728 1,690 590 43 123 603 510 47C 118 128 1982 566 1,130 1,270 50 45 662 1,850 1,340 36 49 593 770 1,140 77 52 1983 547 530 960 103 57 592 910 1,060 65 56 622 420 570 148 109 1984 582 740 1040 79 56 557 1,090 1,120 51 59 506 540 660 94 77 1985 885 1,210 1200 73 74 886 1,730 1,310 51 66 957 600 1,070 120 89 1986 803 520 1660 154 48 818 840 1,770 97 46 894 300 1,440 298 62 1987 782 1230 64 771 1930 40 753 790 95 1 1988 629 578 109 632 887 71 416 19- t43
AverageeNoyeWnne 627 774 1041 86 62 684 1,133 1094 71 72 b55 567 918 126 75 in -~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
...... Les daorreesmarocaines 1981-86 sont prises de t'Armwuaire Statistique du Naroc, 1986, 1987. Les doruees tunisiennes sont lu Ninistere de l'Agriculture. ALGERIA CCMPARISON OF YIELDS FOR PRINCIPAL CROPS FOR SELECTED COtUNTRIES/ CCGPARAISON DES RENDEMENTSDE PRINCIPALES CULTURES POUR PAYS SE7SCTIONNES AVERAGE/MOYENNE1984-86 (kg/ha)
I. Countries with levels of comparable income/ Pays aux niveaux de revenu comparable Wheat/ Barley/ Potatoes/ Lentils/ B1e Orge Pommes de terze Leutil.les
EUROPE/EUROPE Hungary/Hongrie 4,894 3,887 19,466 852 Greece/Gr4ce 2,395 2,329 18,970 1,025 Ireland/Irelande 6,792 5,176 22,703 Spain/Espagne 2,427 2,298 17,309 702 Yugoslavia/Yugoslavie 3,663 2,689 8,892 849 NORPIAND SOUTH AMERICA/ AMERIQUE DU NORD ET SUD Mexico/M6xique 4,191 2.075 13,673 974 Argentina/Argentine 1,891 1,728 18191 724 Brazil/Br4sil 1,383 1,439 12,208 ASIA/ASIE Korea/Rep. de Kor6e 2,872 2,388 18,502 Syria/Syrie 1,371 497 16,840 754 AFRICA/AFRIQUE South Africa/Afrique du Sud 1,050 2,263 15.302 Algeria/Al6rie 755 a/ 785 8.001 396 _ II. NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES/ PAYS VOISINS
Tunisia/Tunisie 826 b/ 547 11,262 683 1,220 c/ Morocco/ Maroc 1,344 769 5,418 492 Libya/Libye 647 1,140 6,771
III. CCMPARISONOF WHEAT YIELDS BETWEEN THE LARGEST WHEAT PRODUCERSIN THE AREA AND ACROSS THE WORID/ CCMPARAISONDE RENDEMENTSDE BLE ENTRE LES PLUS GRANtDSPRODUCTEURS DE BLE DANS LA REGION ET A TFAVERS LE MONDE
Algeria/Alg6rie 755 a/ Morocco/Maroc 1,344 Tunisia/Tunisie 820 b/ 1,220 c/ Canada/Canada 1,872 Mexico/Mexique 4,191 United States/Etats-Unis 2,479 Argentina/Argentine 1,891 France/France 5,975 Russia/Russie 1,596 Australia/Australie 1,491 China/Chine 2,968
Source: FAO Yearbook/Annuaire. Algerian data derived from World Bank estimates./Donnees alg8riennes proviennent d'estimations de la Banque. Tunisian data derived from the Ministry of Agriculture./Donn6es tur.xsien:*es proviennent du Ministere de l'Agriculture *-? a/ average hard wheat and soft wheat (hard wheat: 756t; soft wheat: 755t)/moyenne ble dur et bl tendre Ibltr dur: 756t; b1l tendre: 755t). b/ hard wheat/bIe dur c/ soft wheat/blA tendre
> ALGERIA AVAILABILITY OF STAPLE FOODS IN THE COUNTRIES OF THE MAGHEEB.' DISPONIBILITE EN DENREES ALIMENTAIRES DE BASE DANS LES PAYS D- MAGHREB 1982-86, 1976-80, 1966-70
CEREALS/CEREALES MEAT/VIANDE MILK/LAIT LEGUMINEUSES/PULSES POTATOES/POMMESDE TERRE
ASRUAL AVERAGE/ ALGERIA TUNISIA MOROCCO ALGERIA TUNISIA MOROCCOALGERIA TUNISIA MOROCCOALGERIA TUNISIA MOROCCOALGERIA TUNISIA MOROCCO ALGERIE TUNISIE MAROC ALGERIE TVNISIE MAROC ALGERIE TUNISTE kARBC ALGERIE TUWISIE MAROC ALGERIE TUNISIE M?AROC 1982-86/1 Annual production/ ('00OMt) 1,841 1,175 4,869 154 107 294 720 290 689 48 98 320 671 143 325 Production annualle Net imports/ (00OMt) 3,822 879 2,044 34 22 4 1,093 181 54 100 (3) (12) 185 22 (14) Importations nettes a/ Domestic supply/ ('00OMt) 5,663 2,054 6,912 188 129 298 1,813 472 743 148 95 308 856 165 310 Ressources nationales b/ Resources by inhabitant/ (kg) 267 295 329 9 18 14 85 68 35 7 14 15 40 24 15 Ressour"-s Paz habitant Self-sufficiency rates/ (%) 33 57 70 62 83 99 40 62 93 32 103 104 78 S7 105 Taux d'auto-suffisance
1976-80/2 Annual production/ ('00OMt) 1,703 959 4,294 117 81 197 695 26F0 632 62 145 570 506 244 213 Production annuelle Net imports/ ('00OMt) 2,493 691 1,473 14 9 22 587 193 37 67 (4) (160) 69 8 (43) _ Importations nettes a/ Domestic supply/ ('00OMt) 4,196 1.650 5,767 131 90 219 1,282 453 669 129 141 410 575 252 170 Ressources nationales b/ Resources by inhabitant/ (kg) 233 274 304 7 15 12 71 75 35 7 23 22 32 42 9 Ressources par habitant Self-sufficiency rates/ (5) 41 58 74 89 90 90 54 57 94 48 103 139 88 97 125 Taux d'auto-suffisance
1966-70 Annual production/ ('00OMt) 1,647 617 4,054 83 485 181 485 211 470 38 226 Production cnnuelle Net imports/- ('000Mt) 558 395 (31) 4 205 1 205 64 74 Importations nettes a/ Domestic supply/ ('OOOMt) 2,205 1,012 4,023 87 690 182 690 275 54. Ressources nationales b/ Resources by inhabitant/ (kg) 170 216 281 7 147 13 53 59 38 Ressources par habitant Self-suf'ficiency rates/ (1) 75 61 101 95 70 99 70 77 86 Taux d'auto-suffisance
1/ For Tunisia, the data for pulses are for the years 1982-84/Pour la Tunisie, les donnees ds l4gumineuses sont pour les anit6es 1982-84. For Morocco, the 1982-86 figures are adapted from the FAO, World Bank sources and the Fore.zn Exchange Office; Tunisian cdataderive from the Ministry of Agriculture./Pour le Maroc, les chiffres 1982-86 sont adapt4s de la FAO, de sources de la Banque et de l'office des changes; les donnees tunisiennes proviennent du ministAre de l'agriculture. 2/ 1974-76 for pulses and potatoes/1974-76 pour les l4gumineuses et les pommes de terre a/ For Algeria, net imports of barley refer only to the years 1982-85/Pour l'Algerie, les importations nwttes d'orge sont uniquement pour les annees 0 & 1982-05. b/ Excluding variations in stocks/En soustrayant les variations de stccks c/ For Algeria, net imports of barley are only for the years 1977-80/Pour l'Algerie. les imporetLions nettes d'orge sont uniquement pour les annees 3 -118 - a aA2 ALGERIA Tbles £34l 0eGROianttEAL smog ANDoujiPsI: 81153:AND0001A IhIAWIS E1 MTICIEL £516618 iWTtO. 0170110 CT 768AL - 177 (.1tiI,c 0t dim.)
IOw" NM9M110 1950 11 75 00 1986 197 3 utoM ";"cM~ Wt iuity ni.tSIt ot atl 8W. toeOl 51.3 Gm.-,3IV lIt.. it011 boti ttt V1 tatlty! flIts bsmtl1 95w tettit. Itha ta §t7 fal-t LEIsI IOfnWW/0Wt P00A L'U5CIs
amlonic tea"M 61.2 a8.? 107.2 93.6 ¶67.5 108.2 106.6 72.1 276.3 236.4 372.7 209.6 WS.2 ZIA. 899.3 twtqlfls * ¶39.0~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~274 497.4 244.4 133.2 446.0 663.7 536.3 918.3 340.3 846.6 428.8 912.7 627.4 Oi N fiA =M ~n~m da Iads p0s. 177. 8. 0. . 72. 408 4 327.4 3', 8 7.3 613.3 413.0 334.9 so a. * 12.0 3.1 12.4 34.0 14.9 18.1 '13.1 3L.4 370.7 - 3.1 19.3 361.7 311.3 USmiapsis a 19.'4 64. 24.6 49.6 24.9- 49.0 40.4 n5.e 27.6 66.3 18.2 33.2 ~~~~d5 * 34.7 04.0 37.3 61.1 46.9 64.0 16.1 MO. 46.8 104.0 i,.i 31.1- edtUsitgdi p aiumme 96.6 uS.! et1 is.; 1604 lilA 13.1 284.1 273.7 21e.6 138.1I 473.8 7A1 21I 8. I3. 8. I19.9 6.9 33 7.7 31.4 113.2 140.8 1I.8 g7 I gpCflodPwinslt 804 d a kwu '030 milts 1484. 1.9 33 73.4 10.6 73.0 21.2 WA. 7.7 36.3 - 3.1 2730 43C610 80 30. 7.0 490660 II 4 130.3 1.0 333.0 3.1 = .0Embsthinls@0 s 43643.0 39.0 0.4 %M 0 11.1728. 24.3 13025.0 39.8 9709.3 39.6 5040.8 3.2 42776.0 41.1S 59613.0 123. 6608. 62.4 1i40060 oi.r- 9180. 14.4 9503.8 73.1 tubmlq OlioWbPmaSs NOI.O 95.8 954M.0 143.3 110683.1 173.3 19.6 423133.3 M0A. f1s2m6.0 989.6 476.0 "10.0. 436.0 703.8 IGM06. 4319iTwoflOmtMr 113391 PM I'CEi 366 S01 418 479 6 1124 W5 1376 tin1 1143 1234 am I=so a aunainsuo at Mio, Potal nafPomat amw '0W tw 73.4 We4 63.2 94.9 966.3 poomms 147.8 18.1 116.3 83.2 122.3 66.1 117.6 166.8 13346 9.9 104.8 113.3 O:i~~~~~~~~~~~~.2.2 .. 2.8 4.6 0.6 147.8 166. 225.6 112.3 176.8 146.3 24.3 km~~~~~~~~~~icow * 5.0 0.1 0.6 1.5 2.3 6.4 1.4 5. 4.8 31.4 3.3 12.4 1.4 19.2 1.3 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~0.20.4 2.2 80 35 62 11 0. 11 0.I35 0. .5 04 10.6 11.4 4.? 8.6 40.5 tatlflOsiiim * . 0.6 3.3 0.3 2.4 . . . . . 0.2 0.7 6.1 0.7 0.1 0.7 Otmr Wasotmw/AL*M~~~~ 3.8 1343.2 ','40.4 1.3 0.90.9 6.7~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.8Z. nsa.. ~0. 1. 91 .34.6 27.9 - * 17.1 14. 32.2 4.1I 10.111 4. 83. . . 0.3 39195009 . ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~0. 28.1 443 ~~~~~~~~71 ~ ~~7.9 . . . 2.1 4.1 6.0 9. enjoin ~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~4.8 1142-...... 71 1. . 3. i.2 i.e 4.5 39.2 137 10.? 46. 11114=016% ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~0.3 8.5 33.9 6.6 117.1 44 Z2:.7 9.9 393l. 173 6.0 8.3 33...... 3. D. 0.3 0s siin O~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ts 0.1 0.4 D.3 0.5 - 0..4 * * ~~~~~~~~~0.49.3 0.6 10.1 0.3 9.0 0.3 9.3 9.4 .sosm psi-vms 1.2. 3.3 8.3 1.4 10.3 0.0 39.0 0.11 34.3 0.3 40.6 0.1 ¶~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~33.0 14. 394A 4. 36.0 18.0 40.4 14. 29.8 31.0 055139J91A55 S 5 ~~~~0.0 8. I?. 13. 1 30.7 11D13a.1 18. 4. 1.5 64S 3~~~~~~~~~~~~06.6 1.1 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~.113.7 0.1 7.1 0.3 7.3 0.3 1.2 0.1 5.9 0.1 31.0 0.3 7.9 12. 332 07 0. 73 08 2. 0.9 34. SO asO c(ONMW =E it lST ¶66 173 ¶8 337 133 SW9 07 203 M6 "a 'II 18s VA M0 li 2fl ¶62 276 35 346 1M 330 52
Ono slassUtocb Ginm4s 'a0 iso3. 2.7 0.1 0.2 flOem AtWMa9400 Gn mN 7.0 3.8 17.3 13. 0.3 0. 0.6 6. .3 0.3 .0 0.7 230 1.0 2.1 0.1 1.9 1.&6 O'0. 0.1 . . 1.1 0.4-- 0.3 0. O.' 0.3 0.41 0.1 0.1 WOw S - 1~~~~~~~~~~~1..'03S0. 0.2. sslpssnoros ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.7 .. 1.30 1.3 7.6 8. o.7 . 1.2, 1.2, GAO 3? M7. 33.8 166.0 MS. 114.2 126.1t 69.7 07.2 41. S onb stints fstrtotiwAmesae waei s. * 76.3 6.9 4.0 M9. 31.6 . 6.9 3.6 7.5 3.9 5 .40 4.9 -. . ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~33.0 10.0 1.6 6.0 3.1 147.6 151.3 73.3 97.0 8.9 7.7- nintt caIbWWas ad ts*-. ~~~~~~~~~40.3, 19.4 19.9 o..S 49 9. . W1.9 0. 110.2, a6.3 133.7 122.5 meosctstWkOfsw ts Oasis ...... 2.2 12 7.2 - 70.5 33.3' 54.8 26.3 47.4 2.4 47.0 30.2 73.0 73.0 30.4 . . - 0Wj0 w as ew..t-Mclslqa * - 37.6 30.4 34. 95.1 62. 06.6 91.7 71.6 "3.0 105.7 113.9 16.4 2.2' 4.3 6.4 7.6 U2.46 21.2 a642 - 21.5 * 12.7 05.~~~~~~~~~~~~I9.I 07.0 - - 12:.0 12.01 2.0 21 osiswoo~~so.m ssfwatam a Ovnd ~~~~~~~~~~~6111.7 16. i8.* 3.0 6.4 291 422 40.2 42. 11. w1.24 S 6.2 9.3 14.9 tea Fa-¶540S50594in5~~~~~ - flf 114¶ 0. 02 01 04 0 .3, 0.1 0.3 0.4 3. 2. '6.7l ~23' 4.6 tOrn. 14IMnC20 1in 63 "O6 S 446 44 336 364 121 110 07 73 169 149 211 202 24L2 232 230 M5 11.0 PLOT 5227304 VRJTS/t=itt P51884ITA150 .820 te 3.4 3., 2.0 3.0 3.3 7.2 6.3 10.4 4.9 ¶9.0 73006 imstoWoOM 1063918 W0 803 04 12 1139 ¶433 124A 1001 1995 1715 1810 2634
94a0llc ad QStal. cmth.'yjb.-ns Ot q*wels sIls a.b of wit. 144.2 1.0 44.0 0.1 710.0 ¶6.0 7.0 2.4 41222 33. 7 a32.0 CuttiotSawAllstows S 4.6 437.0 33. flMO 9.7 47 29.3 2957.2 22.3 239.2 3.7 46.0 0. 1225 0.9 ¶10.0 0.9 6.0' 247. 7.6 7 0 0.1 OswWisirO * * 21010 3.2 1126:.1 4.2 1314.0 4.0 23732D. ftmw .. .. 75.0 0.4 13.0120:3 2.3 1970787.0 202.0 15:0122.01 36,3.6 70.3 2.33 151.0 2. 34.0 I. 1.00 -. 332.0 3.6 10 106.210 3.4 339.0 424.2 2176.3ZT60 3.a34.0 1751.0?DIO 33.4 314.0: 6.1~~~~~~~~~~~~~0.0 Oflo Urvono9 0¶0.tMsI*Am n Ints aoCWti,etta _O2. :D1. . 19410 21.7 775.3 7.1 652.0 0.0 173'4.0 0.3 401. 4. .a. 19. .1 1595.0 14.4 220.0 1.81 246.3 cotAm metnsj9embews 103.2 1.0 1.4 1066.0 3.9 0O.0 3.2 1034. 10.7 1747.0 9. 112. .4 OOnm 6,20.0 4.8 720.0 2.9 3944.0 12.3 282.0 0. 68.2 2.9 9.0 0. mow~ateom iclavows Ssnassos 20I.0 1.6 39.0 33.0 300 1.7 713.0 2.3 972.0 3.4 1627.5 6.2 Otea 11m0. aWhtflktm41s 123.0 8. 1407.0 77326 384.0 34.4 604.0 00.3 4.2 .. 1.0' AP .d a .6604cAcAM - 730.0 2.7 7689.0 20.6 120.5 1.4' 37153.0 O., 40.2 7.0 137.0 37.3 12.0 2.2 Cpo0 ~1ntjPe de 44.17433.0 21.49 130.0 3.9 179.0 6.2 110.0 3.08 1473.2 6.2 297.0 5asnsm514 23.1 14.3 32.7 11. 2.2 76.0 7.7 73.6 '.0.1 34.3 63 .3 60.6 43.3 an T_trtrsTrn-ta.. O03wtaa Omt 1 .0.4 wi ts 213.0 9.3 0.A Ttwrtonlltctar 293.8 ¶42 ¶0.-0 1.2 ¶35.0 1.0 3338.0 133.91 702.0 29.2 3644.0 7331 5 SchitlIe 61.0 13.0 195. 10.9 1330.0 36.4 123.0 4.3 412.0 22.9 313.0 8.9 T.=mtcu 36eorajOrTapdin 7.0 191.0 ¶3. . 1.0 0. . 7926.0 73.1, 2418.2 131.8 418.00 21.2 2394.0 232.2 0.6 250.0 14.9 Went I stom *a, icr0 mor:aacwnsP 116.3 4995.0 111.1 5649.0 227.4 1706.0 101.4 4021 214.4 1344.2 75.3 138.0 te e.w.n 9. 1.9 7.0 7.3 . . 140.0 36.6 402.0 12.0 1*CGAI' 23.4 3254.0 459 I 1363.0 171.2 2.0 0.6 98.2 77.3 3.3 0.7 94.0 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~363.292.4' 1.000 240.3 142.0 SS.7? 222.0 4. 2 103.8 177.5 13. 44U. 1069 830.0 23. 0. 3. 1. 7. 412 1.,. 0. IonL AMCiOL111t. finmOWnb¶Ai 061033. NOIC.IL 191 493 11 363 604 ¶131 ?19 348 "O4 340 121 133.0
000W6 51..tunt' Of Pin; Pt. Plait pntstta raUL.IS s Mti by 11aEE020 t11100 E4.&ona LSIt- piyt-ts.tioi AlOtWIa... -ltsIgbtst 1 AlsO. Ac re mnrtdo Ublet A. 3S Tsbisau A.35
PRINCiftLlwoats OF FOMMIFS 10 (FCOMr." coamlim IWMTAIIQ13MINCIFALIS eq "lost ALIIURTAIRII. ImAgas 0" LACOnOMI101 .1ttAlUl 'feltil- At C11.146,'111) t")
I01) lm tm 1973 191`4 19" 19T6 1077 lm 1979 igoo igal 199 1953 MA iges 066 1937 lm
Nl:k PI.M.MIPI.Witt L.It-k. V. onel- 154.0 163.0 267.0 118.0 338.0 4119.0 419.0 SZ2.6 673.3 S79.1 1106.3 Im s 17W.6 233?.9 1162S.8 2063.3 1617.0 t6s" 2210.0 amtitylo"tits W.I) 132.0 160.0 112.0 IWO 125.0 01.0 174.6 M.1 IMA 20.5 3U.5 UK. 7 409.4 322.9 411.9 292.0 us.il 234.4
RodN"t"iwdn 40spes IIO.S 0TF.O ".4 I%a.3 2103 2911.9 3?1.4 J". 1 361.1 J19.3 589.0 TWO t4.4 IIJ ii.2 MG 21.0 16.9 33.? 30.6 19.4 MIS 42.0 I'.9
Lt"t (gold Id 90WIl. (0- ot twofs) vsl./Wel, M I 1:! 11:1 11:00 "1:1 0 ;11:0 I ;1:0 0 11:.1 11:'I 11:1 IT ;I I I ?IU:Si Ohoottlty/* tlt* 3301. MNO IT54:01 N:00 M"I 1=941 1'243': SS? 475 9 696 3 934 129 2m 3027 261? 849 U4 att- celftleekt, W.I.- '416:1 2 '4':12 149 72 49:10 I41:'I 1:1 I 1:1 5 1:01 30:? 34:. Z8:1232 2s11:9 (AwwttIty/O'_t1t* I 29 6 Is 21 as 21 4 3? I ceut FlOaxtIMOOLIte Cal"i" Val"V.I" 14 1":I 1:0 1:1 11:'6 111:11 1109:00 1291:0 liss Q,_t1tyfQ tIt* 20I '19':Qo ;,':'I ;6:00 0 lso IT 361 13 It ? 6u 941 ns 0 gm IT 666M ' 03"I "InT 'M4:1, ?"M " ?50"I
W"I .0 $Ws, plodt./9-1. At ?1-1" Mlefful- 266 256 291 430.009.0 128.0$0.0 109.0S74.0 1693:1M 0 11:01 1: .1 1:1 1:,O M:1 926QU:3 6 1236:43749 Q.-tity/0-tit. ;1:10 M . "I ':O I'll '46OS23:0..3462. 4.200 714 636 633 T21
1- i16:00 11:1 11:00 11:00 1:81 392:9 2" 40:4 444:3 623.4 609:1 11:1 11 :1 11:1 1:9 2S9.4 196.1 W S M:1 u 94 ot 89 103 U2 156, 152 6 44 9 206 7 242 ? 276 4 2S,I 23 9 861 S?.6 54.S 101.0 243
P.t.t-/P- d. W1. V.I.lv.t" 45 4 39 2 55:6 ":,I 11:'I 1:'I 11.1, ;1:1 0 11. it 102.41 0-11ty/a,to,tit. 50:9 64:8 96 5 63 33 14 Z41. 61 9; 21200 113.9
fmtm/l-tft plow" VOILAti'l- 1 1:1 1. 1. 1:1 91:1 S9:6 V., 164.4 134.1 11: "I III 1111:1 VW% A 7 a V 0 19.6 41.1 12 3 1, ? I 6 .5
P. fent,potee W. v.:./V.I- 96 # 108.0 326 2 M.? tw 's, Q'_My'Q'_t1t' 42:0 4? 2 !09:0 7 0 76 21:' ?8 9 76:' '4S.8 F,Wt. V. 1. 1- 11:1 1 11:6 1 0 76:6 i14:F 96:5 i41:6 1 $59.4 0 'D t I t,fO,-t I t. 6 z 21 2 ? SO4 29 2 io :":,9 0 a C ff.. et ig.l. v:,/V. 919:6 MCA PAC iNS., ilS..6 664 m 0)1 1 11a.i.10 #Z6.6 n 6 01-1 I v 1. -A a 60.4 694 W.9 tw. (AI ToR O w :1 9, 0 z 9 ig?5 56 9
WI- d W.. Md. di T i.. Wal iso 11:'I 11:'I 125J 79:8 10.7 10 I,:,, I 1:1 ity/al-tit. 99 6 120"'I 68 ?4 ?6 34 it.? A a 0 0
24.3 29.5 45.0 7i.0 61.3 96.4 $1.7 90.0 M. 0 ?O.O i0Q.9 TOTALIPMIS Of MIKIFiL FOMSTUFFS/TOTMOf% IPM"TlCn P211CIPALISOF *El=[$ aliRVIAIRIS W./val- sot FM 9m 996 $M 41SI 2W4 I"? 4se? 4650 n23 Mai rm a643 6923 am 6YA 6231 got
VOTALME11CRAMMIS9 IPMTI/TOTAL DE3 IWMTATIONS kocmwlsE /V.I- 6M 6M 606 SUO 16,621 23,03 22,i22 29,05 54,429 11,43S 40,444 48,S23 49AL2 49,4" SI.257 19,691 43,393 34.152 39.560 IWMIS 01 MMTU' Ft ASFIEROCITTAGI OF IITII OICIAISIU[MPQRT$ (I)/ OR. .TMON' "" 'PUES of Din[[$ iLlIMITAIUS CMM UNPOACFNIAGE 01 TOTAL012 ,PMTATIOn Ot MCRANDIU 8.2 12.0 14.0 11.2 10.1 MS 13.0 14.1 0.5 14.0 V.9 17,9 15.9 17.5 133 M6 IS.i is.2 21.9 WAL EXPORTSAOTALOlt IKPOR'ATIO"Of MARCRANT411 SW 4M MOS 00 20,03 i9,243 23,M 26,20 26, M 39,OSS SMIS 63,337 64,069 66,699 0.005 68,66Z 40.81111 0,016 40,278 ,.t.fv.t- IOMIS Of FOODS1.10%Al A Pt2QNIAU TOTAL'MICUWIU IVMTS (1)/ NS IMPORTATHASMIRCIPALIS Of PMFS Mi 1211AIRESCCM M POLIMBIAOOf TOTALDIS EVMTATIM DE MICUMIU W./val" 9.0 IS.2 15.3 11.9 ICT 21.6 12.4 WO 17.0 11.9 13.2 13.7 12.0 W4 10.3 12.7 WO U.3 10.0 I...... 6_: 11;m.tIV .4 II-; Doc t. AT the Wid Mt, IMIM -ilk. b~. h- efod tW AM 1. tb. SNLI. .'W lo, th. V 19?0-76, oblCh MiWb 'k- b. 'I.. '. "'. d- -t -th" f.-h " "'f'I'A"ot-d "t-t"'. d. Ih. .b., d- t t" ., pic. A_.Aod f-it. W MtdA., th. J.1ty f ohkh .1. t-tOoo. ==1"", Lptloot.. W...d se FW. IM i971 1972 t973 1974 WS 1976 t977 078 1979 1980 i9al 19U 1963 M im ins 087 lm Nitt FOlkot .Mt. L.M.I. ValW/V~ 11:.0 11:.' 1:10 I 1:0 11:10 419:1 Ill:: 11:1 11:'I 1;1:,l IT26:1 1M :6 ZM1:9 I62S:1 2063 5 1166.312 148? 1 2M.O is 32 160 114 IT '21 131 0 IF4 m I ITo 60 314 0 3% 7 4094 3u IT 411:9 M.$ 223:8 1121L.it V. WMAte, VA .5 5% 962 !` 1340 7 Wi.0 6i "96':; 31453P.0 115.7 112.2 i6F.O.6 216.7923 180.6-i 1261.ZM.4S 229 3 soe :0, 317 69 03
39.3 62.5 4?.% 80 3 148.0 102.0 218.9 426 3 Sb. 1 601.2 300.8 4":O 405:0 256 6 M.2 11.1 10.8 it.0 19:3 30.6 26.0 40., 42:1 4?. 66.4 Q .8 665 622 SO:l 45.3
50.4 40.5 $2.4 90 135.? 112.2 W.0 4S 4 51 6 0.3 6.0 12.4 9.3 III ISA TEO M6 "14:6, Fs 4:4 MbW lop 1. th. Shell/At- OWfs a CcpAlla vahe".1- 64.0 154.? 121.4 206.5 240.9 214.2 307.2 Igg.9 149.0 zi. 13.5 F7.4 27.0 41.6 40.6 61.3 6?.O la.? 30.6 N, ALGERIA PRINCIPALEXPORTS OF FOODSTUFFS.1970-198r EiWORTAtlOYSPRINCIPALES DES DEYRES ALIYIEfAIRES. 1970-1987 (miLions of diners, 000 tons)
1970 1971 19 19 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 197 1980 1981 1982 1983 1934 1985 1986 1987
Fish/PoIG#son Yaluh aletarw 6 8 9 13 9 8 22 7.9 2.3 2.2 1.5 1.0 0.2 0.B 0.9 1.D 1.3 1.8 uimtity/Vitte 2.1 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.2 - 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.9 0.1 Potatoes/Pmne d terre Value/Valalw 27.7 9.4 2.2 - * * 1.6 4.1 3.2 16.0 Qantitylwmntito 21.3 8.5 1.7 - - 1.2 - 3.3 2.4 8.6 Dotea/Dattes Value/VaLtur 28.6 35.0 35.0 7.9 18.9 5.4 21.1 30.7 39.2 29.6 23.5 Quentity/euonttto 9.8 13.9 11.8 1.3 2.1 1.0 2.8 4.7 6.7 3.3 2.4 Citruo Fruit/AgrLm Valus/Valear 49.3 41.7 29.7 15.4 13.9 6.6 0.2 * 1.0 1.1 9.6 Otuntity/Guentite 132.0 131.3 S5.9 14.7 10.0 3.6 - 0.8 0.8 7.8
Crot wd Otlves/Capres et Olives ° Value/Valaw 14.0 3.5 5.3 11.5 8 9 6.9 10.1 7.2 4.0 2.1 2.8 ewntl'y/Ouuntfte 4.0 D.? 0.9 2.1 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.3 Frult Juices/Jw dr Fruits Volue/Viceur 6.9 8.1 6.0 5.9 1.8 -- - 4.1 2.2 3.0 muentilty/untite 4.4 S.0 7.4 2.9 0.9 - -- -- 0.3 0.2 0.3
TOTALCITRUS FRUIT AID VEGETABLES(VALUE)f 154 112 164 140 108 125 95 134 10 80 42 45 19 34 39 53 40 57 TOTALAGRIUES El LEGISES(VALEUR)
Wine/Vin VOIuO/VOleur 707 299 334 665 473 486 4C2 355.4 458.1 319.4 377.6 463.6 307.7 143.8 195.9 230.2 84.0 88.1 0entity/Guantite 411.0 365.6 M38.A 217.0 239.3 198.7 83.1 121.4 167.4 49.4 41.5 Other (VOlue)/ivoes (Vateur)
TOJALEXPORTS OF PRINCIPAL FOOSTUFFS(VALUE) 861.0 411.0 498.0 805.0 581.0 611.0 497.0 490.5 558.1 .99.9 419.6 508.1 326.8 177.6 234.7 283.9 123.5 144.8 TOTALEXPORTATIOCS PRINCIPALES DE DENREES ALLENTAIRES (VALEUR)
TOTALEXPORTS CFOB VALUE) 5663 480S 6105 8346 20.633 19.243 23.206 26.255 26,989 39. 05P 54.71R 63.337 64.949 64.699 6?7006 68.662 40o.98 47,016 TOTALDES EXPORTATIOtS(VALEUR FOB)
EXPORTSOF FO0CSTUFFSAS PERCEITACFOF TOTAL 15.2 8.6 8.2 9.6 2.8 3.2 2.1 1.9 2.1 1.0 0.8 0.8 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 EXPORTS(%)I DES EXPOTATIONSPRINCIPALES Of DEYlEES ALINEIlAIRES CME U PQ*UENTAU DE TOTAL EXPORTATI0S(X1)
...... ,...... Source: Miniotry ot Finrce; Docuwents of The world Barck. 1970-1976 D- * N egtigible let5 rd - *loeqpets recorded ratt 020 7 ra0ru 0. r00 0IY o-ft rrmUu momSe
...... ,.,,,,,,,, . .. ,,,,,,,,,,,, ,,,,,,...... ,,,,,, , ,,...... ,!!! ...... _ ...... !!!~ ......
03.34.0 *04.04. 40.13 107.444 15.30 3.,&43 10.W 70*0n,7.r4 ".09 6Y.7r n 3.0 0.7 3092 4_.5 0.03W.7 7O.r 03.44.a.n,r3 105.30S .1 I t 5w o7. *AN *024 130.`u 0. n e0r0 103 a r so. 4.0 ' S7 '.4 04 ' n O , '_ ° 0 0 4O4 X 4 3 2. . - 04.4.02.44 0.002 40.14 7.410 3.04 3.32 04444 403 1.00 70031 0345 1 M4 7.03 2.04 .3 05 244 304 0.3 3.350 3.W30 . .3 0. r.o -0 W.. Sr D,W AS f3 o 3 02.0 3.r00 4,.5 tOY r *17 0 0. 13 34 . . 50.0
040.E 012 0240 001 10 73 .u .0 .11. 103 to., Io3o. Re 003 2.3M I.301 . ..3 04 1,rr. 0.. 43 .o -*.s
02-r 30.0 3.0 41.1 A,e44 3.20 50.312 030an 47.ra 34.30e.3 42_4 3.0 0000 44.33 02.50 l,r0 01.00 14.50 3.244 00.302 3141 03.5 0002 3.
n2.0e0 M 00 .7 . . I7 .i -7 71 7 2. I . 4 D . D. 005. 2.44 4l.0 4.44 2.l3 2s.1M3.13 4o.4 0.0 0. 1..M. 4.0 V3.0 ..3.2s*7.0M 0.5 3.5*.3 4r.0 r 1 . 24.4 03.3 007.277 4.m20 4. . 07 7. 00 t 04.1a.0W9.2 3. 03.7 40. 42.7 17., 02.2 3.2 04.4 40 7.7~~~~~"' 4D.4 4.0D 0.3 3.0 7.2 70 70 * W337 MAP 7.z...... 330. r b3.,0303 40~~~.7 03.3a 3.7f I'.0 3.2 agmem~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~I3.M 104. 3.0 2.4 4.4 4.0. 0.0 '..43 3.7 I'.1 7.M 00.7 44. ,3. km. 0..I 34.4 4A ALGERIA SEED USE BY AGRICULTtURALSECTtR USAGEDE SEEltCES PAR SECTEURAGNICOLE CTons)ICTorr,es)
1983,84 1984/85 1985/86 1986/87 ...... ------T988 ------..---. . . .-.-.-.-. PRORCT/PRfUIl Social Priv. Totat Social Priv. Totat Social Priv. Total Sociat Priv. Totat Prive Totat Prive Prive Prive CEREALS/cEREALES 179,845 99,693 279,s38 150,646 98.431 249,077 157.226 77,238 234,464 161 '.77 95,617 257.294 290,100 Hard wheat/tle Dur 52,643 20,347 72,990 43,197 20,034 63,231 44.101 31.233 75,334 47.677 26,252 73.949 78 800 Soft fet/Bte Tendre 48,203 13,994 62,197 42,618 11,423 54,041 43,106 10,677 53,783 44,903 11,493 56.396 58.200 Bartey/Orge 53,372 53,593 106,96S 39,568 55,133 94,701 41,197 28,531 69,728 40.745 46,759 87,504 109,200 Oats/Avoirne 25,626 11,758 37,384 25,264 11,840 37,104 28,822 6,796 35,618 28,337 11,113 39,450 43,900 PULSES/LEGUIES SECS 11,838 5,192 17,030 11,048 3,958 15,006 12,417 70,023 4,248 14,271 Lentils/Lentittes 2,094 30 2,124 1,192 44 1,236 437 765 115 880 Chilck-peas/Pois-Chiches 227 338 565 3,524 606 4,130 5,010 281 266 547 Beans/Feves 2,917 150 3,067 3,758 1,477 5,735 4,314 5,171 1,120 6,293 Horse beans/Feverottes 6,743 3,286 10,029 932 203 1,135 531 1,106 1,427 Peas/Pois 1,855 1,387 2,533 3,242 1,478 1,056 2,534 1,835 2,69S 1,3t9 4,016
'-
:>3
OD PETCNUSX""IAULUALUTR ouIST.ouci. a 3 ftto maui"ASu em m
lout. ToOt SMid (Ta=)/ MI Pv.no Tot misCCt Wflv f TMo MIS rI. PrI...... j9t Tou MI.t P..jOwb... TouAt-v..boo.M...... ot.is Mste 0 j O sIo. Toot
S,2sl 3,34 9gTcs 8.GC r,36 OwutotOfT.u5ct0 To,075 5,4 4 50,S121 Z,Y S,M n.a G2 .734 6,2206 l17, 6,700 3 ,319 5 009 3 91159 4.3 10,3 4,47 4 555 9,13 6 ,340 as 610 10 456 26 NM 1,13 130SO2 1,2 1 13 IS 13 _SmtioIeOflTtt4 142 p atz 31 22 53 1,s32 2,23 tmmcttol~ItuocttclS 4,314 4,586 0,43 2,446 s3.o a,zS3 2 0 2,6" 4 797 2,2r 3,3s7 S,492 2,44 2,342 4,.4 1.s71 2,320 3.777 2,3W 2,43 4,207 4,60 311 sJo 3n 01 4A7 4 OflotflI 40"4 576 640C 36 2 2,439 0 367 1,227 362 239 50 52 139 32 19 43 ('ou1t) tt 3 eU 1LWo 323 20 243 S7 1 07 3 73 in 53z 243 97 4 131 33 39 PUulidoIwaqcI 14s 16 56 42 6 48 2 1 662 25 4rS 126 "22 63ZsrS5 696 e5 C0 ra77cW6oo.tIol~~~uwt5oIS 433*~~~~~~~423 3 449~~2449 33mf 1*s 350ao2 306 202o m27 2436r Se5 7 ' 4 3 1 0 34 40 37 630" ct,IetWtlOtSSlia 1 1Co 914 3S" 3 346 3 7 70 3s (4 4 575 602 127 73 1791 39 5, 9er otOoflOtffl ~~~~ ~~~1046 510 760 31 77 366 a 393 406 5 A1l 455 Is 430 342 so 410 33 59 447 ¶7 31 3.49 5.214 1,7J07 2,797 6S,3 6,45 3,64 AM (l1teS 2,240 2,3 4,63 2,076 2,202 *4.25 5,02 2,01 3,5V3 1, 7 2,070 S,COP 5,069 2.417 %,Z3 1,a00
utintto (3086 3.36 3.91 3.19 3.25 3.72 3.01 4.30 3.00 2.57 3.17 3.30 3.79 2.48 2.4 1.4" 5.75 2.92 5.35 5.3 1.81 3.18e PnIotOtOcuStd& 4.110 2.39 0. 0.04 0.35 0.33 "t'lioifl t 0.3o 002 e9.40 0 0 0.01 0. R 001 0.12 0.65 0 0. 0.3 0.70 0.R 5. O9 1.t5 *00 OJ7 I.DlI -'t*et...ot 1.90 1.79 1.3 1.56 5.S5 1.55 1.52 1.6 1.21 5.S2 5.04 5.49 3.56 0.96 5.3 0.a6 o03mf roz 0.21 0.02 0.14 5.397 0.3S7 0.57 0.46 0.50 0.31 0.3 0.12 0.15 0.50 0.05 0.7 0.0 0.02 0.04 0.29 0.12 0.TZ 0.15 0.T4 W/LSQIttOI (LOIS) 0.01 0.5 oo 9.01oo310. 0.06 0.56 00 0.3 0.oo 0.3 0.04 0 OD 8.3t 0.04 0.56 0.05 0. 0 0. 0.2 91501t00 0.07 0.1 _b1otofltmiil04 0.T9 0.OZ 0.16 0.01 0. 01 5 .0 0.07 0.24 . 0.1 0. .01 0.12 0.S 0.0 0.13 0. Itu.0lo6h IioTl 4 0.36 0.04 5.39 0.13 0.01 0.OG 0.34 0.05 0.10 0.53 0.05 0.52 0.31 0.03 0.16 0.56 0.03 0.36 0.11 0.3 0.21 0.10 0.20 2 0."0.16 causing o.1 15 0.300o.32 0.36 0.01 0.18 0.20o. 0.00 0.10 o.a 0.35 0.39 0. 0. o0. 0. 3.19 o0. 0.0.
...... ALGERIA PURCHASEOF AGRtAULTURALPACHI WERY BY AGRtICULTURALSECTOR/ MtATERIELAGRICOLE ACHETE PAR SECTEURAGRICOLE (Ltni t/Uni te)
¶975 1979 1980 1981 1982
Sociat Prfv./Prive Totat Social Priv.&Prive Totat Sociat Priv./Prive Totat Social Priv./Prive Total Socr-l Priv./Prive Total theel Tractorm/Trwteurs a Rrues 2,688 1,649 4,337 1,866 1,117 2,983 3,641 1,308 4.949 4,196 4,414 8,610 3,680 4,180 7,860 Track TrectoralTrawteurs a cheite 528 81 609 359 9 368 198 13 211 1,460 43 1,503 315 427 742 CultIvators/Hotoculteura 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 98 271 369 20 327 347 Cobine 8arvestetr/ 427 32 459 314 3 317 1,300 29 1,329 742 0 742 726 34 760 loissoraeusa-tatteta Trucks/Ca-ions 362 10 372 343 6 349 129 4 133 740 20 760 41 0 41 Pasoenger Vhictles/Vehicule tesera 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 604 34 638 832 43 875 Flot Trailersl 1.149 210 1,359 1,347 153 1,500 1,262 257 1,519 1,793 442 2,235 884 1,055 1,939 Reorques a plateau Tank TraiterslCiter.-as 683 218 901 938 152 1,090 1,138 597 1,735 522 395 917 627 514 1,141 PLowshores/Charrues (so3c) 1,443 282 1,725 2,104 378 2,482 2,296 1,161 3,457 2,250 1,355 3,605 1,473 2,400 3,873 Plotughs (dists)/Charrues Cdisq9es) 481 106 587 1,125 151 1,276 481 338 819 1,075 492 1,567 490 303 793 Cover-crps/Cov5fr-crops 2,466 246 2,712 2,850 420 3,270 1,809 769 2,578 3,198 887 4,085 2,317 1,782 4,099 soming drils arJd mmre spreadorF/ 871 99 970 721 83 804 1,010 93 1,103 8S5 38 923 194 19 333 Semoira at Epafneur Weat-Orilllng Equipment/ 2,678 237 2,915 1,502 180 1,682 6,134 1,068 7,202 4,549 931 5,480 3,202 4,856 8,058 Materiel de Recotte Fourrage Twie Cultivator/Materiet a Dent 991 209 1,200 1,052 189 1,241 1,228 731 1,959 864 381 1.245 876 1,019 1,8I' S,orayereAtoinfamira 960 43 1,003 890 77 967 579 5 584 .467 111 1,578 1,106 296 ',402 EnpaackSptmwuJ/Ata.immrs a doe 1.952 448 2,400 561 1i8 719 704 128 832 2,831 478 3,309 1,135 1,615 2.950
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Social Priv./Prive Total Social Priv./Prive Totat Sociat Priv./Prive Totat Sociat Pri.7Prive Total Total Total
Whelt TrsctorgtTrecteurs a Roues 3,321 4,147 7,468 2,032 6,108 8,140 1,885 5,656 7,541 1,535 5,404 6,939 5,266 1,983 Track Trectors/Tracteurs a chenille 1,173 1,236 2,409 1,040 473 1,513 670 165 835 335 59 394 699 307 CultIvatorajMotocul teura 7 20 27 230 582 812 104 717 821 7 216 223 1,873 153 Colbine llarveateraj 562 111 673 589 65 654 504 123 627 693 383 1,076 521 411 Noissoqmeu a-batttes Trucks/Cliortt 401 20 421 383 64 447 96 0 96 340 - 340 35 19 Passenger VhicLes/Veliiitles tegers 138 6 144 724 365 1.089 144 9 153 - - - 230 Flot Tralters/ 1,254 1,557 2,811 960 1,091 2,t51 1,066 1,808 2,874 239 955 1,194 4,018 3,280 ReacrqLss a plateou Tank Traitere'/Citernes 1,036 902 1,938 634 1,303 1,937 768 2,101 2,869 681 1,557 2,238 2,172 2,317 Plowshores/Charrues (socs) 2,093 2,624 4,717 1,926 2,925 4,851 1,467 4,491 5,958 534 2,839 3,373 2,158 3,738 Ploughs (disks)/Charruvs (dislq 1,975 2,003 3,978 485 768 1,253 1,193 2,279 3,472 1,104 1,360 2,464 1,920 2,230 Cover-crcps/Cover.rops 3,380 3,019 6,399 3,076 3,920 6,996 2.054 4,969 7,023 1,859 5,089 6,948 5,648 7,370 Sowing dr*111s a mu a spreaders/ 389 62 451 2,087 220 2,307 2,856 624 3,480 1,521 517 2,038 946 1,806 Setirs et Epmndeus ettl-DriLting Equipment/ 3,157 4,694 7,85, 3,174 5,330 8,504 1,654 7,091 8,745 1,018 5,352 6,370 4,465 Pateriel do Recotte Fourreae Tyne CutativatorINateriel a Dent 817 591 1,408 1,564 1,818 3,382 1545 2,451 3,996 853 2,047 2,900 1,587 SWraye/Atrmiseum 1,504 332 1,836 1,238 591 1,829 1,357 497 1,854 1,469 376 1,845 746 1,129 Knapsack Sprayer/Atniseus a dos 75 1,504 2,219 1,115 2,489 3,604 301 1,740 2,041 2,254 5,024 7,278 289
Sourca:KWP .siteco ."tP...... 81,_ 16~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ALGERIE FROUCtERPORIES, 1969- 1989 PRIG A LA PRODUCTION,1969-1989
1989 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1962 1983 1984 198 5986 1987 1988 198 HMUDELPQICES/FRIX XnIUMM (DA/Wi Nord dbt/etIOL Dwr1 49.80 49.70 49.40 49.00 4.9.40 54.00 68.80 75.80 84.70 180.00 116.60 125.80 125.00 140.80 140.00 160.00 200.00 220.00 270.00 270.00 400.00 Saft Shaet/Dot Teridro 48.00 58.50 68.50 115.80 115.80 130.00 130.80 150.80 10O.00 210.00 220.00 220.80 330.00 Oarioy/tow 31.70 31.70 31.70 31.70 31.70 31.70 40.70 49.70 56.20 63.70 80.80 80.80 80.00 80.80 80.80 100.80 140.00 155.00 170.00 170.80 50.0 aomwvaimw 30.20 30.20 30.20 30.20 30.20 30.20 35.20 35.20 39.00 42.10 49.80 70.80 70.80 70.00 180.80 100.00 130.80 145.00 160.00 160.80 220.00 Putsomeaflesa taco 90.80 90.80 90.00 90.80 90.80 90.00 100.00 185.80 251.20 271.20 290.80 300.80 300.00 300.80 300.00 330.80 430.00 5010.00 60D0.0 600.80 840.00 (DA/Kg) Potatoou/Pin de orlea 0.37 0.40 0.30 0.38 0.59 0.55 0.80 0.70 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.10 1.30 1.60 1.90 1.90 2.50 2.60 2.00 3.30 thalawoiwuo 0.25 0.25 0.34 0.31 0.31 0.45 0.60 0.70 0.70 0.90 1.00 1.04 1.60 1.60 2.00 2.60 2.60 2.60 3.80 3.50 Field lamtaeoltitaato Plain Chmp 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.35 0.50 0.60 0.65 0.65 0.00 0.80 3.00 3.20 3.30 3.50 3.80 4.00 Other Vlgotdaiox2 0.45 0.60 0.73 0.98 3.80 2.57' 4.00 4.70 4.00 4.90 Autree Predite Maralchoros\2 0rsngoa(Thoexn) 0.26 0.28 0.321 0.28 0.30 0.42 0.50 0.70 1.45 3.20 3.25 3.60 4.30 4.50 3.00 Other Fruit 111ari)/ 0.80 0.80 0.86 0.80 1.04 1.10 1.80 1.60 1.96 1.94 3.60 3.60 8. 70 9.10 Autre Frults Ipcmso) Nigh1quatity Oat"MoIatto (bratchatte) 3.30 3.30 3.30 4.50 8.80 8.50 9.50 u. 11.50 Medic quatlity Datae#Dattes (myoen) 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.95 0.96 1.10 1.16 1.37 1.49 2.07 Otives (for *it)/ (a huilefl 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.39 0.40 0.30 0.47 0.55 0.64 0.80 1.50 1.31 1.37 i.17 1.42 1.54 1.95 2.25 2.44 Otlves (table) 2.50 2.75 3.02 4.75 7.00 6.25 (D6/110/3 Wein*Grapaalyigneri a Yin (12-12.5) 3.26 3.26 3.26 3.26 3.26 3.75 4.69 4.86 7.70 8.67 13.41 13.4i 13.41 16.08
(0A/Kg) Oeef catjvlindo de tauriltwt 5.60 6.90 9.80 13.00 18.80 23.50 24.00 25.00 30.00 37.58 43.00 46.800 LCC/AWies 6.30 7.30 9.20 57I.80 24.80 26.00 26.80 26.00 32.00 39.00 40.00 52.00 Pouttry cat/Vicraid do votoilto 7.50. 15.75 17.50 EagrslOeufs 5.16 5.16 5.12 5.12 3.12 3.86 6.21 7.25 8.36 8.89 15.00 ililk/Lait 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.42 0.70 0.75 1.30 1.30 1.5 1.5 1.5 2.00 2.80 2.00 2.50 2.75 3.80 3.50 4.00 4.20 ForLeoCrqn/Fouerrge Artilicieta 0.9 1.6 1.6
AVERAGEVOIGOTED FPRICE OF AG8RICULTURALPRWUCIS (BASEYEAR: 19805
0070101 POWEEE 0ES PRIX 212 256 306 332 393 43 458 563 602 723 766 891 1049 1204 (A111EE00 081;E 1980)
Source: 1969 73 a,,d1977-19, fA0 - - Sttastitis sa the Prices Received by Farriers 1982, 1984; MAP Source: 1969-73 or 1977-79, FAO -- Sta.istiqUe. SiW Leo Pria Roo Par Le- Agricultees . 1982,1984; AP.
I. Foe the flora 1969-73 a-d 1977-79, FAO prices calcuated for i0Aeot -rd olive i. Pour los saoo 1969-f3 ot ¶977-79. le* Prlo de o FAO6CalCules. pour Le bte et les olives n'ort pa5 a wore rit broken do-s for hard abot ari soft abou.t ard table -rd oil oIves . ote deccaoser pour to blo to et lo ble tepndreet tori at I,%es do table et lem olives a huitec. 2. Caltculated as the - weighTed average of other vegetable crop, lwe,zchin. -cu izoerciloc etc.) 2. Calcate cos -oeyaoe ra--'wdaeee des autrer prcokitts aariche. Cctamui-fteu,.a. corgotes, paateq.eso. et..) 3. 00 per 01. icr -arni ac grapes of 12 - '987 avud be o-ti i,i . 16.02 T 193 er hI. 3. DA par degrie/fL. Par .e., vignos a yin do 12 degre en 1987 voudrait: 12ax 16.800 193 per h1. II.4t
r'191S sUS Z15-So £-Wa SZ 6*o A2 Z1 92s-z 9e C9016.* 1o 91 6996 WU 6-1LL S-01 0oL 9ol cUw)i3o wivii. d
'*095 CSS £99 0an L95 m o U a DuZ am WA 9o "z 116 01 0o 9 99 i6 a9 T 0ig 1/Iu ssz 2SI 196 ItI 906 001 0 £0 £0 n U oiG'U SD9 SSZ 661 ISt Clt 19 £lt ISS IYZ 996 911 001_
Su 199 ou9SS629 166ns 95SLV0 91 tilt 191 SDZ191 ault au296 01"99 sn911 0L001 10 toa901 £016 a0 £011(@tIq6 1.z66 *iASI*,A/MSAA(5 JO l1
A A u I W EL 116 ol126~~~~~6 101 00L £9 Its £0 a to (VU-2) '66A s6- 1AMWO Swi £_9Zo1 66£ 01 £ 9 69sWV1us 9 s16 it 19 6LZ 00o SL Ms 0Ws 1£ rLn SOilU el ) MShW ) $ lo
0661 l£0l 9Z06 £10 *U£ Z 9£ 191 £96 61S 001 £ 99 U 9 £9 gA IWOo109ft 6901 £900 910 am 01s 199 06z2 91 116 001oe1)0. 9966.890 JVIA J "91 sg1 oot 19 966 £ss 6oZZ 6zz 99g 996 U6 £9 ac1 6 16 16 66 16 Chow Wid SSO~A~Oll P1*Si 0U £99 oUs lUg lug n99 955 911 1Z ZZZ 002 916 9s SM 001 d 69 91e 9U 9ses"w~PQ 009 601 1u9 SSt S19 S1 L66 91Z 0St 0LZ 912 9Lz £ZI 60l 001 £0L 69 69 £u a9 g.J9 GP19Si"032um
116 WA £9 915 59 £91 11 1t1 msss m 1 ZZ1 LK 61Z 90z 166 oo0 oo1 OOL oo0 oe0 WD ms *_SVSUI6 92S os1 1es 09 o0 LaI Its 212 ZZ1 ZSZ zL96 1 62 £1 A ODL c01 001 o0 oo010o6aw1 eo0 CU Us6 95s Cb zn USi ZS ZSZ ZSZ ZS ZSZ toe U zst Ott oot MoL oft Oft act Oct uSlOAsI W09 919 919 9 9n 1t Ul2 uZ 09 09Z 191 2L o60 PA16ISI1SSo 094 6U ODS eos £09 an1 9oz 602 612 61Z n12 962 SOL 16L C9 £et 000 66 16 tO ?6 ,, , AM *lIh M 0
6"t WI £901 gm Ui 9ca6 1O9L 296 L96L 0066 6AL 96 461 91466 U66 U£6 U1166 2166L UO O 961 UTO$ 0 e1 1
31031MS331 w98331nWa5 J113rd VI toV2SnXla SN33am, 31o00 6180019 ALGERIA
PRICES O; INPUTS AND AGRICULTURAL EQUIPMENT PRIX DES 1NTRANIS ET DU MATERIEL AGRICOLE 1974, 1980-1988
NOMINAL PRICESIPRIX NCU4INAUX 1974 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Fertilizers/Engrais (DA/Ton) Ammonium Nitrate/Amonitrate 349 349 349 349 349 482 706 770 840 924 12-18-18 552 552 552 552 552 690 1,006 1,120 1240 1364 TSP 461 461 461 461 461 590 839 1,000 1120 1232 DAP 622 622 622 622 622 779 1,111 1,250 1360 1496
Plant Protection Products/ Produits Phytosanitaires 2.40 (DA/lt) 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 6.1 11.3 13.5 13.9 Manebe 80 (DA/Ton) 441 441 441 441 441 5,824 9,011 10,273 54,978 Fenthion 40 (DA/m3) 2,209 2,209 2,209 2,209 2,209 24,36i 28,319 33,360 -
Equipment/lateriel (DA/Unit% Tractor/Tracteur - 65cv 24,936 24,936 24,936 24,936 41,500 41,500 51,876 64,844 82,400 82,400 Cover-crop 3,511 3,511 3,511 3.511 8,625 8,625 8,625 10,781 12,400 Combine Harvester/ 60,446 60,446 60,446 60,446 93,000 93,000 116,375 141,468 278,000 Moissonneuse-batteuse
Labor/Main d'Oeuvre (DA/Day) 12.25 19.90 75.00 90.00 90.00 90.00
Seed/Semences Hard Wheat/Ble Our (DA/Kg) 0.69 1.29 1.44 1.72 1.72 2.3 2.60 Potatoes/Pomne de terre (DA/Kg) 0.93 1.80 2.85 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.70 Bears/Feves (DA/Kg) 0.24 1.79 1.79 2.20 2.20 3.08 3.25 Oranges (DA/Plant) 8.00 24.00 40.50 40.50 46.00 47.00 48.50 Olives (DA/Plant) 5.00 9.60 ,5.90 15.90 15.90 16.10 16.60
Animal Feed/ Alimentation pour t'Elevage (DAfKg) Milk Cow/Vache laitiere 0.39 0.62 0.93 0.93 1.07 1.81 1.75 Bull/Tauritlon 0.47 0.8 1.06 1.06 1.22 1.84 1.80 Lamb/Agneau 0.4 0.4 1.03 1.03 1.2 1.09 2.02
Source: Ministry of AgricuLture and mission estimates Source: Ministere de L'Agriculture et estimations de la mission
abt CD H C D ALGERIA
NOMINAL INDEX OF INPUT PRICES INDICE NOMINALDES PRIX DES INTRANTS 1974=100
1974 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 Fertilizer/Engrais Amconium Nitrate/Amonitrate 100 100 100 100 100 138 202 221 241 265 12-18-18 100 100 100 100 100 125 182 203 225 247 TSP 100 100 100 100 100 128 182 217 243 267 DAP 100 100 100 100 100 125 179 201 219 241 Plant Protection Products Produits Phytosanitaires 2.40 10 100 100 100 100 1,386 2,568 3,068 3159 Ianebe 80 100 100 100 100 100 1,321 2,043 2,329 12,467 Fenthion 40 100 100 100 100 100 1,103 1,282 1,510
Equipment/Nateriel Tractor/Tracteur - 65cv 100 100 100 100 166 166 208 260 330 330 Cover-crop 100 100 100 100 246 246 246 307 353 Coabine Harvester/ Noissoneuse batteuse 100 100 100 100 154 154 193 234 460
Labor/Nain d'Oeuvre 100 162 612 735 735 735
Seed/Sememces Hard Uheat/Ble Dur 100 187 209 249 249 333 377 1 Potatoes/Ponnes de terre 100 194 376 376 376 376 398 Beans/Feves 100 746 746 917 917 1,283 1,354 Oranges 100 300 506 506 575 588 606 O0ives 100 192 318 318 318 322 332 Animal Feed/ Alimentation pour l'Elevage Nilk Cow/Vache laitiere 100 159 238 238 274 464 449 Bult/Taurillon 100 170 226 226 260 391 383 Lamb/Agneau 100 100 258 258 300 273 505
Ncminal irdex of the average weighted production price/ Indice nominal de la 100 230 265 322 341 361 420 494 568 moyenne ponderee des prix a ta production
to lb p-
OFhM a > ALGERIA
RELATIVE TO THE AVfRAGE WEIGHTED AGRICULTURAL PRODUCE PRICE INDICE DES PRIX DES INTRANTS RELATIFS A LA NOYENNE PONDEREE DES PRIX A LA PRODUCTION
RELATIVE INDEX/ INDICE RELATIF%1 1974 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Fertitizers/Engrais Ammonium Nitrate/Amonitrate 100 43 38 31 29 38 48 45 42 12-18-18 100 43 38 31 29 35 43 41 40 TSP 100 43 38 31 29 35 43 44 43 DAP 100 43 38 31 29 35 43 41 38 Plant Protection Products/ Produits Phytosanitaires 2.40 100 43 38 31 29 384 611 621 556 Manebe 80 100 43 38 31 29 366 487 472 2195 Fenthion 40 100 43 38 31 29 305 305 306
EquipmentlMateriel Tractor/Tracter - 65cv 100 43 38 31 49 46 50 53 58 Cover-crop 100 43 38 31 72 68 58 62 62 Conbine Harvester/ Moissoneuse batteuse 100 43 38 31 45 43 46 47 81
Labor/Main d'Oeuvre 100 71 170 175 149 129
Seed/Semences Hard Wheat/Ste Dur 100 81 81 84 67 82 Potatoes/Pommes de terre 100 82 109 83 79 74 66 BeanslFeves 100 Oranges 100 87 65 59 56 55 51 Olives 100 56 79 62 54 50 Animal Feed/ Alimentation pour tlElevage Milk Cow/Vache Laitiere 100 60 71 65 69 99 84 Bull/Taurillon 100 63 53 51 49 58 48 Laub/Agneau 100 37 62 62 59 44 66
...... …...... /1 Nominal price of fertilizer, insecticides, equipment, and labor divided by the Index of the average weighted producer price for agricultural output. The nominal index for seeds and animal feed is divided for the price index for the producer price of the corresprnding product. /1 Prix nominal des engrais, prodcits phytosanitaires, mterie, et main d'oeuvre divise par l'indice de la moyenme ponderee des prixzt a ta production des denrees agHicoLes; indice nominal des prix a to production des semences et alimentation pour l'elevage divise par l'indice de prix a la production de La culture ou denree correspondante. mhb
c > 4 EEL) Y]L10
AMe cl i tf e ,o n e oi n f F °- ,e A L G ER I A 2 ;-!. - t"B.i'' 7 AGRICULTURALSECTOR REPORT ou
RAPPORTSLUR LE SECTEUR AGRICOLE OLI_OLI
60 ~~~PLUVIOMETRIE ~
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340
MEAN RAINFALL DISTRIBUTION WET SEASON Of ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~PRECIPITATIONMOYENTNEPENDANT LA SAISONPLUVIEUSE
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0° 2° 40 60