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Submarines and Underwater Warfare William Murray Naval War College Review Volume 67 Article 17 Number 3 Summer 2014 Silent Killers: Submarines and Underwater Warfare William Murray Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review Recommended Citation Murray, William (2014) "Silent Killers: Submarines and Underwater Warfare," Naval War College Review: Vol. 67 : No. 3 , Article 17. Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol67/iss3/17 This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. 156 n AVAL WAR COMurray:LLEGE REV SilentIEW Killers: Submarines and Underwater Warfare These attitudes were encouraged by include the use of a devil’s advocate, the both the misuse of analogies and the institution of formal decision-making personality and style of Bush� The final processes, and expansion of the circle of discussion, on U�s� energy policy, seeks advisers consulted prior to a decision� to determine why the United States, At the end of the day, National Security despite the oil embargo of the early through a Cockeyed Lens is worth a read� 1970s and a continually acknowledged By not overselling his argument, Yetiv need for a long-term, consistently makes a stronger case for consider- applied energy policy, has been un- ing the presence and possible impact able to put such a policy into effect� of cognitive biases� In doing so he also However, national security decisions makes the case, perhaps inadvertently, by their very nature are extraordinarily that rather than being used in isolation, complex� To his credit Yetiv recognizes models of decision making should be and addresses these complicating fac- used in conjunction with one another— tors� In each case he presents, there is and that is a very useful concept� a deliberate attempt at least to identify, RichARD NORTON if not discuss, alternate explanations Naval War College and influential factors not relating to cognitive biases� For example, in the case of U�s� energy policy, Yetiv makes a persuasive argument that a general unwillingness to pay more, the power Delgado, James P� Silent Killers: Submarines and of the automobile industry’s lobby, and Underwater Warfare. New York: Osprey, 2010� a short congressional election cycle 264pp� $33 go a long way in explaining why the G iven the book’s title and the cover United States tends to resemble Aesop’s photo of the Los Angeles–class fast grasshopper more than it does his ant� attack submarine USS City of Corpus That said, the book still leaves questions Christi, readers might reasonably assume unanswered� For example, how can the that James P� Delgado’s Silent Killers: cognitive biases held by Al Qaeda’s lead- Submarines and Underwater Warfare ers become those of all their followers? is focused on modern submarines and In what ways are group biases different undersea warfare� However, this is not from groupthink? How can an analyst the case� Instead, it is a small coffee-table determine the relative importance of book on the overall history of subma- cognitive biases in explaining or, better, rines, with pronounced emphases on predicting a decision? Finally, given all early (pre–World War I) development the other forces acting in the decision and on the archaeology of submarine domain and on the decision maker, how wrecks� A few minutes on the Internet can one determine how important biases readily explains this� In addition to may be in the overall mix? Yetiv does at- having a keen interest in submarines, tempt to offer some methods to combat Delgado is a historian, former execu- the effect of cognitive biases� Surpris- tive director of the Vancouver Maritime ingly, he argues that merely knowing Museum, and PhD in archaeology who such biases exist is not enough to guard has published nearly thirty books� He is against their effect� Better approaches also a cohost of National Geographic’s Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2014 1 Naval War College Review, Vol. 67 [2014], No. 3, Art. 17 BOOK REVIEWS 157 Sea Hunters television series� This work much more credible and likely explana- reflects all his credentials� It is well tions, which this book fails to examine� written, it documents its sources, it is On the other hand, one of the book’s visually compelling, and it entertains� strengths is a thoughtful discussion of Despite these strengths, however, many the development, employment, and Review readers will find that important archaeological recovery and preserva- aspects of underwater warfare are given tion of the Confederate submarine H. short shrift� For example, submarine L. Hunley, lost during the Civil War� aspects of World Wars I and II are dealt Similarly, David Bushnell’s Ameri- with in nineteen and seventeen pages, can Revolutionary War submarine respectively, with illustrations making Turtle receives worthwhile treatment, up approximately seventeen of those including an update on the debate pages� Consequently, the discussion concerning whether Turtle had enough and descriptions lack depth and detail, positive buoyancy to allow boring a which is a shame� Similarly, ballistic- hole in the target ship’s copper-clad missile submarines receive only five wooden hull while submerged� Another pages of what must honestly be said strength is the book’s photos, which is superficial coverage, which mir- will fascinate modern submariners� rors the passing discussion of mod- Many will find this book worth reading, ern nuclear-attack submarines� This and much of it well rewards the time shortfall is compounded by the author’s invested� Like a National Geographic twice relating the questionable, if not television production, this work is bizarre, hypothesis that the nuclear entertaining, lavishly and excellently attack submarine USS Scorpion was illustrated, and it reflects the producer’s sunk on 15 May 1968 by the Soviets “in or author’s passion, which in this case the belief that an American submarine appears to be undersea archaeology� This had collided and sank the Golf II boat book is broad rather than deep, how- K-129 in the Pacific on March 8, 1968�” ever, and as such will probably interest The citation provided for that salacious the generalist more than the specialist� theory is not one that one would expect of careful research� There are other, WILLIAM MURRAY Naval War College https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol67/iss3/17 2.
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