Nikolaus Scholik
Special Series on the Strategic Review of Global Hotspots FOKUS | 12/2021
This special Fokus series on the Strategic Review petrated by China as a violation of the ter- nine-dash line, also known as ten-dash of Global Hotspots consists of seven parts and is ritorial sovereignty of the Philippines “by line and the eleven-dash line, a poorly based on the AIES online discussion on the same interfering with its fishing and petroleum defined demarcation line, originally used topic. The online lectures of the authors are exploration and by constructing artificial by the Republic of China in the period available at: aies.at/global-hotspots islands in those islands,” adding also that 1912-1949. Later this theory was used by “those areas are not overlapped by any the governments of the Republic of China possible entitlement of China”. Despite (ROC, which governs Taiwan) and the In political science, a ‘hotspot’ is often being part of the UNCLOS, Beijing rejected People’s Republic of China (PRC), as a basis defined as a geographic area where dif- this legal act and considered it void, and for their claims over most of the SCS. This ferent political actors and interests clash, this constituted a breach of the maritime disputed area includes the Paracel Islands, which can potentially lead to a global conventional law of the UNCLOS. the Spratly Islands and several other areas turning point. Currently, one of the most including the Pratas Islands, Macclesfield critical hotspots in the Indo-Pacific region The UNCLOS is the international legal Bank and Scarborough Shoal. The claim is the South China Sea (SCS) because of its framework established to regulate globally includes China’s land reclamation known significant strategic dimension. The SCS is all seas related activities, and in particular as the “Great Wall of Sand”. Recently, China located at the nexus of the Pacific and the maritime boundary conflicts. This agree- has started to occupy parts of these terri- Indian Ocean. With two choke points, the ment was concluded in Montego Bay, in tories and has built military facilities such Singapore Strait, and the Malacca Strait, it Jamaica, on 10th December 1982 and as airports and radar stations. This move represents one of the busiest sea-lanes in came into force on 16 November 1994, caused the reaction of other actors such the world. This lifeline is indispensable for one year after the deposit of the instru- as the U.S. and its allies in the region who the transportation of crude oil and other ment of ratification. It is also known as have lodged sharp protests against these raw materials from the Indian Ocean to “UNCLOS III” and has been ratified by 168 actions, once again ignored by Beijing. Up the Pacific, and to ports in China, Taiwan, parties. The works of the UN Conference to this day there have been no clashes, South Korea, and Japan. In the opposite on the Law of the Sea lasted from 1973 to except for a few encounters with U.S. Navy direction, this sea-lane is used by the 1982 being the third of its kind. Preceding ships (e.g., smaller vessels and destroyers), same countries for the transportation of conferences are known as “UNCLOS I and nor has China unnecessarily aggravated their industrial products to the European UNCLOS II”. The Convention summarised the situation, including the withdrawal market and, depending on the goods the previously applicable law of the sea as from their initial decision to establish an and type of transport, the entire Eastern codified in the Geneva Conventions on the overflight zone over the disputed areas. Atlantic. Maintaining free navigation in Law of the Sea (1958), it established the fo- the SCS is a prerequisite for the efficiency regoing disputed breadth of the territorial This excess of precaution might be inter of global trade dynamics as well as for the sea and its contiguous zone, and also de- preted as a sign of “showing the flag” peaceful coexistence and relations among veloped the regulations on the continental and here China admittedly has a lot of the countries in the region. shelf. The convention introduced various catching up to do. At the current state, important concepts in the development China nor any other actor involved in the In recent decades, the SCS has been at the of maritime law: the exclusive economic region is interested in a military escalation, centre of attention – especially since the zone, as an area in which special rights are however, such situations can be rapidly resurgence of China in the early 80s – be- exercised by coastal states, an internatio- and easily ramped up, should domestic cause of the territorial disputes concerning nal regime of the seabed and its subsoil or foreign policy require. This attitude has some of the islands in the area, which are beyond the limits of the continental shelf, a great importance considering Beijing’s largely uninhabited islets and rocky out- and the archipelagic waters. Finally, it also rising power and public claims to global crops. In order to settle these disputes and regulated the protection and conservation leadership. In this regard, it must be noted in light of the claims by China over these of the marine environment, marine scien- that currently, the PRC might not be able territories, the United Nations Conven tific research, and the development and to achieve global military dominance, tion on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) was transfer of marine technology. In addition especially on the maritime sector, because invoked by the involved littoral states (e.g., to the older principle of the freedom of of its military inferiority to the U.S. whose the Philippines, Vietnam, and Brunei) in the seas, the Convention is based on the presence in the region is strong. From a several cases. One of the most remarkable newly introduced principle of the common purely practical point of view, while China is the ruling of the court of The Hague in heritage of mankind. does not have a deployable CSG, the 2016 that upheld the claim by the Philip American navy can draw on three to five pines against China’s view of the nine-dash China’s claims over the islands in the SCS ones simultaneously. Additionally, two of line. The court considered the actions per- are supported by the above mentioned them de facto are permanently based in
1 The South China Sea
Special Series on the Strategic Review of Global Hotspots FOKUS | 12/2021
the Pacific Command area, respectively in the combat power of such highly sensi- conflict is “Not wise or not desirable – that Yokosuka and Guam, and therefore they tive and complex assets. At this point, it does not mean impossible.” The impression are directly and rapidly deployable in both remains to be seen to which extent the is that a new cold war is the most probable the SCS and Taiwan’s and Korea’s neigh- capabilities of China will be used and scenario, with new regulations and new bourhood, the East China Sea. moved quickly in the right direction in the risks, but hopefully without any direct attempt to undermine the absolute leader- military confrontation. At least, until China China has tried to respond to the U.S.’ mili- ship of the U.S. in the seas. The change in will be ready to counter the capabilities of tary presence in the region by developing the U.S. presidency from Trump to Biden the U.S. and constitute a military threat for the island chains in the SCS, which are me- will not significantly alter the approach of the global order. ant to serve as military support points to the American foreign policy towards the prevent any movement directed to China’s PRC. The U.S.’ allies in the region, Japan, Mag. Dr. Nikolaus Scholik, coastal area. This strategy of using all mili- Taiwan, South Korea, Australia, and New AIES Senior Advisor tary means (primarily from the land) near Zealand remain part of a militarily superior the coast to deter any adversary’s maritime “ring” that Beijing has not been able to threats is known as A2AD (Anti-Access counter yet, and it will not have the capaci- Area Denial). On the other hand, the ty to do so in the foreseeable future. country has embarked on an ambitious and expensive naval programme and is Nevertheless, China is strongly bolste- well-aware of the fact that it cannot forgo ring its trade efforts, to strengthen its naval power in its bid for global leadership, leadership position in the region. Of particularly when judging by its unfavou- particular importance, is China’s move to rable geographic position. In the compe- approach the Association of Southeast tition, the U.S. not only has a strong naval Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries, with the tradition, but it is also a well-established aim to portray a new more conciliatory naval power with an advantageous posi self-image and gain new trade partners tion on the map. It has unrestricted access to partially compensate for U.S. military to the Pacific through its West Coast and naval superiority. Notwithstanding, this the island bases strategically positioned strategy is a source of tension, and these close to China, as well as direct access to situations can escalate quickly showing the Atlantic on its East Coast and due to its China’s real intentions. As it was the case in control over the Panama Canal. However, 2001, a U.S. reconnaissance aircraft (EP-3E China’s lifelines are subject to higher secu- ARIES 2), was conducting a reconnaissance rity risks in relation to the transportation of flight from Guam along the Chinese coast vital raw materials and products from and on the 12 nm (22.2 km) boundary, when it to China. For instance, a good produced in was pushed away by two Chinese fighter China must go through the Suez Canal, the aircrafts (J-8s), colliding with one of the Mediterranean, and past Gibraltar, or via fighters. The latter crashed, and the U.S. the Cape of Good Hope, in order to reach aircraft was forced to make an emergency the Atlantic, and China does not have landing on Hainan (an island off the coast control over any of these choke points. with militarily sensitive infrastructure). This is the rationale behind the concept While China spoke of a violation of its air- of a “maritime Silk Road” as a supplement space, the U.S. filed a protest for an attack © Austria Institut für Europa- to the land component, but the result is a on their aircraft in international airspace. und Sicherheitspolitik, 2021 mere expedient and not a demonstration After a long period of quarrelling, the of global leadership power. incident was settled. Alle Rechte vorbehalten. Nachdruck oder ver gleichbare Verwendungen von Arbeiten des Austria Instituts für Europa- und Sicherheitspolitik The answer to Beijing’s lack of naval power Regarding the assessment of this hotspot, (AIES) sind auch in Auszügen nur mit vorheriger Genehmigung gestattet. Die im AIES-Fokus translated to a significant investment in China and U.S. do not seem interested veröffentlichten Beiträge geben ausschließlich die a fleet building programme that envi in engaging in further escalations in the Meinung der jeweiligen Autorinnen und Autoren sages an operational carrier force of three, region, and the possibility of a conflict wieder. perhaps even four battle groups in two with extreme consequences would not Dr. Langweg 3, 2410 Hainburg/Donau or three decades. China has the financial bring advantages to any of the parties Tel. +43 (1) 3583080 resources to achieve its objectives even if involved in the dispute. Nevertheless, E-Mail: [email protected] Website: www.aies.at several problems could rise from their lack as Professor G. Allison from the Harvard of experience in building and producing University once stated, the status of this Layout: Medienbüro Meyer
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