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INTERPRETING SARTREAN ETHICS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF MORAL OBJECTIVE RELATIVISM
Sushain Raina
Research Scholar (PhD) School of Philosophy and Culture, Shri Mata vaishno Devi University Katra, Jammu and Kashmir INDIA, 182320 E-mail: [email protected]
Abstract: There has been a general skepticism regarding the nature of ethics in Jean-Paul Sartre‘s (1905-1980) existentialist ideas. Sartre promised in the concluding pages of his Being and Nothingness (1993) to develop his ethical ideas in a later work which he could not fulfill. However, some scholars (Anderson, 2013; Detmer, 1988; Heter, 2006) attempts to formulate various interpretations of Sartrean ethics (subjectivistic/relativistic, objectivistic and inter-subjectivistic), who recognize the possibility of a coherent, viable ethics though not completely flawless, originating from Sartre‘s later published works. The objective of the present research paper is to formulate and defend a unified version of Sartrean ethics form the standpoint of Moral Objective Relativism (MOR). An effort has been made to show that MOR reconciles the elements of moral relativism and moral objectivism through Sartre‘s notion of Good elaborated in one of his major works, Notebooks for an Ethics (1992, hereafter, NE). It is the thesis that moral values find their origination in subjectivity and thus they have internal obligation, at the same time in their universal essence, they transcend subjectivity and thus they acquire independent status. This study is an effort to show that MOR presents a more comprehensive picture of Sartrean ethics than its various interpretations provided by different scholars in terms of contrasting and mutually exclusive positions of moral relativism or moral objectivism or some form of inter-subjectivism. Keywords: Sartrean ethics; Moral Relativism; Moral Objectivism; Moral Objective Relativism
Introduction Since decades there have been a lot of controversies and debates regarding the nature of ethics in Jean-Paul Sartre‘s (1905-1980) existentialism. The reason for such controversies is Sartre‘s unsuccessful attempt to formulate his ethical thought which he promised in the concluding pages of his Being and Nothingness (1993). However, some significant thinkers (Anderson, 2013; Detmer, 1988; Heter, 2006) proposed different versions of Sartrean ethics (subjectivistic/relativistic, objectivistic and inter-subjectivistic). These scholars argue for the possibility of a coherent, viable ethics though not completely flawless, emerging from Sartre‘s later published works. The main objective of present study is the formulation and defense of a unified interpretation of Sartrean ethics1 in terms of Moral Objective Relativism (hereafter MOR). Through MOR, an effort has been made to reconcile Sartre‘s ethical ideas relating to relativism and objectivism on the grounds of Sartre‘s notion of Good discussed by him in his significant work Notebooks for an Ethics (1992, hereafter NE). Moral relativism is the view that rejects the possibility of any single valid moral system. It reflects that there are different moral standards that are equally valid and conflicting in nature (Wreen, 2018).2The moral concepts such as right, wrong, good and bad are relative to such diverse moral codes. There are different interpretations of moral relativism formulated by various philosophers. Harman (2013) defines moral relativism as logical thesis possessing
1 Since this study formulates a new and unique interpretation of Sartre‘s ethical ideas, therefore the phrase ―Sartrean ethics‖ has been used instead of Sartre‘s ethics. The phrase ―Sartre‘s ethics‖ refers to the original ethical thinking of Sartre, whereas it‘s different interpretation represents Sartre‘s ethical ideas from different perspectives. It is therefore, these interpretations are called as different accounts of Sartrean ethics. However, this study aims to reconstruct Sartre‘s ethics, therefore this version of ―Sartrean ethics‖ can be interchangeably be used with phrase ―Sartre‘s ethics‖. 2 Michael Wreen in his article, ―What is Moral Relativism‖ (2018), attempts to advance and defend a version of moral relativism which contrasts with universalism and nihilism. However, Wreen argues that his definition of relativism is compatible with the views of moral objectivism and moral subjectivism.
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a logical form in which moral judgments are logically related to an implicit moral agreement between people.3 Harman states ―relativism can be formulated as an intelligible thesis, the thesis that morality derives from an implicit agreement and that moral judgments are in a logical sense made in relation to such an agreement‖ (Harman, 2013, p. 43). Rachel (1993) suggests that relativism has three key features. First, one cannot judge the customs of other societies as inferior than one‘s own, merely on the basis of the cultural differences. Second, there is no other criterion for one to judge right and wrong apart from the standards of his/her society.4 Third, relativism cannot lead to moral and social progress.5 On the other hand, moral objectivism is the view that there are certain universal moral standards which are valid for all individuals and for all social structures such as societies, groups, communities (Poujman & Fieser, 2009). Unlike moral relativism which is the position that meaning and validity of moral values is dependent upon the approval of an individual or a particular culture, moral objectivism, Poujman and Fiesher (2009) describe, is immune to such acceptance due to the objectivity of moral principles. Trainer (1993), suggests that moral objectivists believe in the existence of a moral law of nature according to which actions are judged to be morally right or wrong without any consideration of feelings, emotions and preferences of individuals. Trainer states, ―Ethical objectivists assume the existence of a Moral Law of nature whereby some actions or judgments are in fact Morally right and some are in fact Morally wrong regardless of what humans think or prefer‖ (Trainer, 1983, p. 192). Some propose that the moral principles are objective because these principles are grounded in religion and are the words of divine authority (Hunter, 1991). Moral objectivism is closely related with another ethical theory i.e., moral absolutism. However, there are certain differences between these positions which must be elaborated. Moral absolutism is the view that there are certain moral principles which cannot be overridden in any circumstance (Poujman & Fiesher, 2009).These principles are exceptionless and one never ought to violate them in any situation.6 Poujman and Fiesher suggest that objectivism and absolutism share common view that moral principles are universal and objective. However, they argue that the objectivist rejects the view that moral judgments are non-overrideable. The objectivist holds that no moral principle can be considered as exceptionless. Every moral principle must be weighed against other moral principle.7 Some interpretations of moral objectivism adhere to the exceptionless and non-overrideable character of moral principle. However, other versions of objectivism do not agree with such conception and suggests that in some cases one moral principle could be overridden by another more appealing moral principle (Poujman & fisher, 2009).
3 Gilbert Harman in his essay, ―Moral Relativism defended‖ incorporated in Ethical Theory: An Anthology (2013), edited by Russ-Shafer- Landau, attempts to formulate a coherent and viable version of relativism to counter the charges made against the relativism by critics. Harman‘s view of relativism consists of relational inner-judgments which are implicitly made by the speaker and are always relational to certain moral agreement. Moral judgments, Harman suggests, are always made and have meaning only in reference to a common moral understanding among people. Moral agreement as described by Harman is a set of common goals, desires, interests and values which are shared by a group of people and from which morality in general emerges. The inner-judgments are relational in character because Harman argues that these judgments are influenced and made in accordance with certain motivating attitudes and moral considerations. Such motivational factors and moral considerations, Harman holds, are assumed by the speaker to have been shared by him, the agent and speaker‘s audiences. 4 Rachel holds that according to cultural relativism, if one has to evaluate rightness or wrongness of a certain action, one has to consult the moral codes of his/her culture. Since, according to relativism, one cannot criticize the moral codes of one‘s own culture as well as those of others, one could not adhere to the moral standards of other culture, even if one feels that there are some drawbacks or he believes that some reforms are required in his/her cultural moral codes. 5 Rachel asserts that since there is no valid independent criterion according to cultural relativism to evaluate the moral worth of moral codes of a certain culture, it is difficult to achieve moral progress and social change in a particular society. One cannot assert, for instance, that modern era and modern values are superior and better as compared to those of ancient civilizations. This would be a kind of trans-cultural judgment which is impossible according to cultural relativism. 6 Poujman and Fiesher holds that an absolutist believes that the judgment, ‗one ought not to break the promise whatsoever circumstances may be‘, is an exception less and non-overrideable judgment which cannot be violated in any condition. 7 The objectivist would argue, for instance, that the moral judgment, ‗one ought to speak truth always‘ can be overridden by the moral, judgment, ‗one never ought to harm other‘, in a situation where duty to speak the truth may lead to worse consequences.
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MOR steers clear between moral relativism and moral objectivism. It is the thesis that moral values find their origination in subjectivity and thus they have internal obligation, at the same time in their universal essence, they transcend subjectivity and acquire independent status. This study is an effort to show that MOR presents a more comprehensive picture of Sartrean ethics than what has hitherto been attempted in terms of contrasting and mutually exclusive positions of moral relativism or moral objectivism or some forms of inter-subjectivism.
Different Interpretations of Sartrean Ethics There are three different interpretations of Sartrean ethics. They can be classified in the following way: i) Subjectivistic/relativistic interpretation ii) Objectivistic interpretation iii) Inter-subjectivistic interpretation i) Subjectivistic/ relativistic interpretation The subjectivistic/relativistic interpretation is based on the view that the guiding values, whether positive or negative, are created by a person through his/her engagement in a concrete project (such as the aspiration of having good health or job satisfaction). The values are contingent and relative to such concrete projects (Webber, 2009). Sartre does not consider the values as given but as the demands or calls of one‘s chosen project. Sartre puts ―Values in actuality are demands which lay claim to a foundation. But this foundation can in no way be being, for every value which would base its ideal nature on its being would thereby cease even to be a value and would realize the heteronomy of my will. Value derives its being from its exigency and not its exigency from its being‖ (Sartre, 1993, p. 38). For the sake of brevity, we may consider five arguments developed by Detmer (1988) to support the subjectivistic reading of Sartrean ethics. Three arguments are drawn from BN and the remaining two are taken from EH.
The first argument is based on the definition of values as lacks (which are yet to be realized). We perceive facts as what is the case. Facts are on the level of being, however values are felt necessities of what is yet to come. Values can be brought to the level of being by one‘s actions only. Since the feeling of values as lacks is subjective, any ethics involving such values would inevitably be subjective. The second argument is drawn from the distinction between the facts and values. Sartre claims that facts and values have their separate logical domain. Since facts have an objective status whereas the values have their origin in human subjectivity. Such a gap between facts and values highlights the subjective character of ethics. Sartre says, ―ontology itself cannot formulate ethical percepts. It is concerned solely with what is, and we cannot possibly derive imperatives from ontology‘s indicatives‖ (Sartre, 1993, p. 625).The third argument is developed on the basis of different kinds of projects in which a person is engaged. Values are experienced and recognized when one engages oneself in a relevant project. For instance, if a person freely chooses a project of being an obedient worker, he/she would consider the ringing of the alarm clock as an indication of the value-imperative, i.e. one must get up and go to work. However, if the same person decides to leave the project of becoming obedient, then the values associated with the alarm no longer remain relevant to him/her. Thus, the chosen projects beget ethical values relative to them. The fourth argument relates to the non-existence of God. Sartre rejects the existence of God as the transcendental source of values akin to secular moralism. Secular moralism denies the existence of God and considers certain kind of ethical values, principles and norms as a-priori. For instance, honesty, truthfulness, respect for wife, rearing children, not taking advantage of people under duress etc. have fixed status despite the absence of any eternal basis like God. Sartre nonetheless questions the a-priori status of these values. For, ―there would be no infinite and perfect consciousness to conceive of it.‖ (Sartre, 2007, p.28) and human beings are unable to find anything external to accept it as the source of values. He therefore, believes that the source of all moral values remains with human subjectivity and this belief makes his ethics subjective. The fifth argument in this category is linked to the irresolvable moral dilemmas in which no ethical system could provide an appropriate guideline to choose right course of action. Human beings facing moral dilemma have to make their choice. For instance, when one is to choose between serving the country by joining military or staying at home to look after an ailing and grieving mother, one is to first decide one‘s priority to make any rational decision. Sartre, however in a similar situation, advised a student to decide on his own; and thus the student was left
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with no explicit instruction so desperately longed. Such an emphasis on the subjective choice renders ethics subjective.8
Anderson (2013) suggests that the ultimate source of human values in Sartre‘s earlier ethics is human being or human freedom. Since it is an individual‘s freedom from where all the values emancipate, therefore Sartre denies the existence of any such objective system of morality that governs and evaluates ones choices and actions. Regarding the nature and status of the values, Sartre defines them as lacks, imperatives, norms, necessities and so on. These values are felt as lacks and necessities because they are not objectively present in the world. Rather, they are beyond being as a kind of non-being. These are experienced as necessities, imperatives and norms because they urge or prompt one to actualize them through ones concrete actions. Only human freedom has the power to bring them to level of being (Anderson, 2013). The above interpretations arguably make morality completely subjective affair. If the moral worth of an action ensues from free choices and every choice is equally valuable, then it becomes difficult for a person to make a confident choice and also develop a common set of principles or norms applicable to all the members of a society. Morality demands the action-guiding (common) principles. An objectivistic interpretation of Sartrean ethics seeks to derive such norms from the metaphysical ideas of Sartre. Apart from the above difficulty, the subjectivistic/relativistic interpretation is in conflict with the meaning of subjectivism accepted by Sartre in EH. He considers two meanings of subjectivism: (1) ―the freedom of the individual subject to choose what he will be‖, and, (2) ―man‘s inability to transcend human subjectivity‖ (Sartre, 2007, p.23-24). He holds that it is the latter sense, which relates to his conception of existentialism. We may call the first sense ―individual subjectivism‖ and the latter as ―universal subjectivism‖. Whereas individual subjectivism is quite indifferent to the concern for others, universal subjectivism is significantly linked to the other in that the choices are evaluated on the basis of their universal applicability. An ethics developed on the basis of universal subjectivism cannot be subjectivistic in the former sense (individual subjectivism). Moreover, any account of ethics in Sartre must include his later mature ideas depicted in EH, NE,CDR and RL. No doubt, he accepts the subjective origin of the human values, but he also maintains that the ideal of authenticity demands that one‘s subjective choices, creations and values should consider the welfare of the other individuals. These values should be given generously to the other individuals as gifts for their utilization. The consideration of the other in making choices, on the one hand, makes the subjective choices ethical; on the other hand, it creates the scope for rational deliberation in order to arrive at morally agreeable objective choices. ii) Objectivistic interpretation The objectivistic interpretation of Sartrean ethics is based on the consideration of freedom as fundamental value. According to Sartre, human freedom is fundamental in that it is foundational to all other values. He says, ―since freedom is ontologically entailed in all values as their source, the choice of any and all values logically entails the prior valuing of freedom‖ (as cited in Detmer, 1988, p.203-204). The fact of freedom is inherent in human beings and it is self-evidently available to them. It is not only foundational to individual choices but also functions as a promising ground of objectivistic ethics. Moreover, freedom is seen as an objective criterion for moral evaluation of certain choices and actions. Sartre proposed that the moral worth of a choice or action depends on whether it promotes common freedom or not: In willing freedom, we discover that it depends upon the freedom of others and that the freedom of others depends on our own. Obliviously, freedom as the definition of man does not depend upon others, but as soon as there is engagement I am obliged to will the freedom of others at the same time as mine. (Sartre, 2007, p. 51-52) In his later writings, Sartre assumes a moral obligation on the part of every human being to will the freedom of others while willing one‘s own. In this way, the concern for others acquires significant place in the objectivistic interpretation of Sartrean ethics. Furthermore, the fulfillment of one‘s own needs becomes healthier with due consideration of the needs of others. Anderson (2013) argues, Sartre in his later moral thought, also assigns human values the status of lacks, imperatives, exigencies and so on. But these values do not originate from the human freedom, rather their source lies in human need. These values, Sartre asserts are ‗assigned‘, ‗imposed‘ and ‗given‘ to
8 The subjectivistic interpretation of Sartrean ethics can also be understood as relativistic since the choice of individual is crucial for the determination of ethical predicates of a particular act. If morality is dependent on the subjective choices and personal tastes, feelings, and opinions, it can in the same vein be subjectivistic as well as relativistic—subjectivistic due to the influence of subjective elements and relativistic because of its varying nature. Therefore, we treat subjective and relative interchangeably.
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the individual to actualize and follow them. They demand their satisfaction. Since these values are derived from the needs, therefore they cannot be governed by human freedom. Of course, Sartre affirms that human freedom is the fundamental need, but Sartre also talks about other needs (need for food, health, education, love) which are satisfied by the objects which exist in the external world. In this sense, these objects which satisfy these needs are considered as valuable. Since these objects have objective existence therefore values ascribed to them have also an objective status. One cannot freely choose these needs because human beings are born with specific kinds of needs which they have to fulfill. These needs are not governed and controlled by ones freedom. Anderson (2013) holds that by grounding the human values in the human needs, Sartre‘s second dialectical ethics assigns an objective status to the human values. He holds that these values are not affected by human freedom. The basic material needs are valuable for ones survival whether one regards them valuable or not. Since one feels their need as inevitable for ones growth and development, therefore one considers them valuable. The enhancement of freedom and the fulfillment of needs are common objectives of human beings. Whatever is considered valuable must have the potential to satisfy these demands. The commonality of these demands necessitates the objectivity of values leading to their fulfillment. However, since these demands have subjective origination, a purely objectivistic interpretation of Sartrean ethics would be problematic. The collective need of any society is determined by the freely chosen projects of its individuals. The choice of project is always in conformity to particular hopes and desires of individuals and these, in turn, lead to harnessing of the material resources in tune with socio-economic structure. In this situation, it seems almost impossible to come up with a universal set of norms to regulate human behavior. The objectivistic interpretation of Sartrean ethics is therefore questionable and may be accepted only with substantive rider(s). Moreover, it pays less attention to the inter-subjective relations significantly highlighted in the later writings of Sartre such as CDR. The interpretation that emphasizes the relations based on the mutual recognition is described as inter-subjectivistic one. iii) Inter-subjectivistic interpretation Another defense of Sartrean ethics against the charges of subjectivism or relativism is offered by T. Storm Heter in his Sartre’s Ethics of Engagement: Authenticity and Civic Virtue (2006). He makes significant moves to defend Sartrean ethics through a careful analysis of the notion of authenticity and recognition. Heter (2006) claims that Sartrean ethics is inter-subjective in nature. In order to justify his claim, he begins with an exploration of Sartre‘s notion of human condition involving two dimensions: subjective and objective. The subjective dimension of human condition is understood in terms of the personal projects undertaken by the individual in exercise of free choices. The objective dimension is formed by the look of the others and the facticity of life. One‘s identity or essence is created and recreated by oneself and also by the perceptions of other individuals under existential conditions. Thus, one‘s identity is believed to be the outcome of self-creation vis-à-vis social affirmation. The dialectical formation of one‘s identity due to the look of others has a significant bearing on the moral behavior of the people. The look of others enriches one‘s freedom and also involves the potential to increase social cohesion in which greater freedom of human being can be obtained. One‘s projects, roles and practical freedom assume meaning when they are recognized by other individuals in the society. Such recognition is significant for the actualization of one‘s freedom. Heter (2006) claims that the recognition of other‘s freedom is the foundation of the inter-subjective relations and social ethics in existentialism. He argues that Sartrean ethics is not only concerned with individual freedom but also emphasizes the recognition and embracing of other‘s freedom. If one dominates, suppresses or hinders the freedom of other, then one will not be considered as free. The notion of inter-subjectivity requires that one must authentically promote the freedom of others while promoting one‘s own freedom. The problem associated with the inter-subjective account of ethics is basically epistemological one. It relates to the problem of other minds, how we know that the others are also individuals like us with definite projects, hopes and desires. After all one has no direct knowledge of the mental states of other. Since, one has no direct access to the subjective emotions, beliefs and experiences of others, the possibility of inter-subjective relations and inter-subjective ethics emanating from such relations is epistemically suspect. Sartre however gives an interesting solution to this problem. He claims that an individual immediately encounters the presence of others in his/her experience of being looked at. For instance, one apprehends the other when one is caught in a shameful act. Guilt may be felt even in an imaginary presence of the other. Feelings of shame, guilt and the like affirm the existence of the other. One may argue that even this response cannot save the inter-subjectivistic interpretation from fault. The phenomenological validity of the affirmation of the other may not lead to mutual recognition of freedom in need of the permissibility of equal status such as in the case of master-slave relationship.
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The limitations of the above interpretations of Sartrean ethics warrants further exploration. In the present study, moral objective relativism is proposed as the most defensible alternative. It is argued that Sartre‘s personal accounts of Good indicate that his ethical ideas can be better understood as moral objective relativism. The position of MOR is developed on the basis of notion of Good elaborated by Sartre in NE. Sartre holds that Good is a transcendent or objective reality which is intended by human subjectivity. Human reality transcends towards the Good posited as an objective reality. Sartre says that the ―original relation of man to the Good is the same type as transcendence, that is, the Good presents itself as what has to be posited as an objective reality through the effort of a subjectivity‖ (Sartre, 1992, p.556). The source of Good intended by an individual is human consciousness which defined as freedom. In BN, human freedom is recognized as the fundamental value and source of all values. Values are regarded as lacks which are to be brought to the level of being by human consciousness. However, despite emanating from human consciousness, Good transcends human subjectivity. It goes beyond human subjectivity in its universal essence. Sartre holds that Good is ―Subjective in that it must always emanate from a subjectivity and never impose itself on this subjectivity from the outside, it is objective in that it is, in its universal essence, strictly independent of this subjectivity‖ (Sartre, 1992, p. 556) Sartre says that ―universality of the Good necessarily implies the positing of the Other‖ (Sartre, 1992, p.557). The universal dimension of Good demands that one must act for the common Good of other individuals and urge others to do the same. From this conception of Good, the notion of MOR is developed. MOR can be said to be a moderate version of relativism. It locates the source of human values in human subjectivity and considers the values as relative to particular circumstances. However, at the same time these relative values reflect objectivity since they are meant for the common welfare of all individuals.
Finding MOR in Sartre’s notion of Good in Notebooks The notion of MOR is formulated on the basis of Sartre‘s notion of Good in NE. Sartre argues that Good is understood in terms of an act. He holds that, ―Good has to be done‖ (Sartre, 1992, p. 555). It is the final result of an act, and, at the same time, it does not have an independent existence apart from the act that is performed by an individual. It is thus different from a platonic kind of Good which exists independently of an agent. The individual who does the Good cannot be identical with it. It means that the performer of good actions cannot be called good person as the possessor of Good. Rather, he is a creator or performer of that Good. Sartre maintains that the person who does a good act or renders the justice is usually called good or just person. But he argues that ‗―good‖ does not mean: one who possesses the Good, but: one who does it. Just does not mean: who possesses justice, but: who renders it‘ (Sartre, 1992, p. 556). When someone claims that a particular act or a person is Good or just, it does not mean that the person or act that he or she performs is Good or just. One cannot be the possessor of Good or justice; rather a certain act or a person is called Good or just because that person does a good act or renders the justice. Good is transcendent and objective in character which is projected or intended by human consciousness. Sartre states that ―the original relation of man to the Good is the same type as transcendence, that is, the Good presents itself as what has to be posited as an objective reality through the effort of a subjectivity‖ (Sartre, 1992, p. 556). MOR is modeled on this conception of Good. Since the Good that is posited as an objective reality is not completely independent of human subjectivity, rather it is related to and dependent on the human consciousness which conceives and creates it. This conception of Good cannot be said to be completely relativistic since it is projected as an objective reality. It is therefore the relation of Good to human subjectivity which MOR intends to present. Sartre holds that relation of Good and human subjectivity is as ―tight as the intentional relation that links consciousness to its object, or the one that binds man to the world in being-in-the-world‖ (Sartre, 1992, p. 556). Sartre holds that the Good has both subjective and objective dimensions. Good is subjective because it originates from one‘s subjective act, however it is also objective because in its universality, it transcends the human subjectivity: The Good cannot be conceived apart from an acting subjectivity, and yet it is beyond this subjectivity. Subjective in that it must always emanate from subjectivity and never impose itself on this subjectivity from the outside, it is objective in that it is, in its universal essence, strictly independent of this subjectivity. (Sartre, 1992, p.556) The notion of MOR represents the subjective and objective aspects of Good. The Good has its roots in the human reality implies that it comes through the individual who conceives it and them performs it in terms of concrete act. Sartre says, ―So man has to be considered as thebeing through which the Good comes into the world. Not inasmuch as consciousness can be contemplative but inasmuch as the human reality is a project‖ (Sartre, 1992, p. 556). Creation of Good by human actions however does not mean that goodness is brought about by more efforts. Generally it is believed that since the inculcation of moral values requires conscious effort, the nature of values also
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include this aspect. According to Sartre, it is a misconception ―to confuse the Good with what takes the most effort‖ (1992, p.556). He rues, ―it would cost me more in effort to strangle my son than to live with him on good terms. Is this why I should strangle him? And if between equally certain paths that both lead to virtue I choose the more difficult, have I not confused means and ends? For what is important is to act, not to act with difficulty‖ (Sartre, 1992, p.556). These instances show that it is not appropriate to say that putting more effort or choosing the difficult path always brings Good. Rather, one must act sensibly and put effort in an intelligible manner. Thus, Good is not something which is acquired or achieved through the constant effort as an ascetic exercise. He holds that by constant effort as an ascetic exercise, ―I am yielding first to a naturalistic ethics of exercise, of the gymnastics of the soul. I have the thing like [choisiste] idea of profiting from an acquisition, like the gymnast who does fifteen repetitions today so as to be able to do twenty the day after tomorrow‖(1992, p. 556). Sartre‘s suggestion is that the field of ethics is unlike the field of sports, music, dance or any other profession where there is a particular goal to achieve which may be achieved through regular efforts. In the domain of ethics, it is not the case that one can gain expertise or performs better on the basis of past efforts. Rather, one always encounters new and unique situations and problems. The person who is able to address and solve the moral issues and problems efficiently once, may very well fail to do so in future occasions, if one is not alert. Sartre counts, ―In ethics there is neither trampoline nor acquisition. Everything is always new. Hero today, coward tomorrow if he is not careful‖ (Sartre, 1992, p.556). Sartre argues that one‘s effort reveals the relation of one‘s subjective act to the Good that is posited as an objective reality. When someone puts more efforts, one experiences one‘s act to a greater degree in relation to the Good. If a person puts less effort, the more the Good is experienced as a given and objective thing. However, if one makes more efforts, Good is observed as oscillating and fading as covered with obstacles which one thinks as he or she is responsible for creating a conception of Good: The less I make an effort, the more the Good toward which I strive seems to me given, to exist in the manner of a thing. The more I make an effort, the more this Good that oscillates and fades and bumps along from obstacle to obstacle is something I feel myself to be making. It is in effort that the relation of subjectivity to the Good gets uncovered for me. (Sartre, 1992, p.556) It shows that Good has its origin in human subjective action and it is revealed through ones efforts. When one survives an accident or escape from one‘s destruction, one also experiences Good as also subject to destruction because if there will be no agent who performs good action, then how Good can survive. If one‘s efforts to do Good, results into failures, then it makes one realize that Good has not been done or yet to be done. Thus one‘s efforts disclose that an individual has prior existence than Good which created through human projects. Sartre holds that ―Effort reveals the essential fragility of the Good and the primordial importance of subjectivity‖ (1992, p.556). Thus, Sartre description of efforts reflects the notion of MOR. Since the efforts reveal to an individual his relation with Good, which is posited by him as an objective reality, is not completely independent of the human subjectivity. Rather, it has its origins in concrete human projects. Moreover, the Good is not completely relativistic because it is posited as an objective reality despite having its basis in human subjectivity. Human consciousness projects this Good as an objective reality and transcends towards it. That is why Sartre claims that ―it matters little whether the Good is. What is necessary is that it be through us‖ (1992, p. 556). Sartre gives the reason why the Good is posited an objective reality as independent of the human subjectivity. Human subjectivity must transcend towards the Good that is posited by it to attain a meaning. In choosing oneself, an individual chooses the Good. Similarly in choosing or doing a good act, person creates his or her identity. In choosing the Good, an individual chooses oneself. One creates one‘s identity by transcending towards the Good: Subjectivity finds its meaning outside of itself in this Good that never is and that it perpetually realizes. It chooses itself in choosing the Good and it cannot be that in choosing itself it does not choose the Good that defines it. For it is always through the transcendent that I define myself. (Sartre, 1992, p.556) Thus drawing insights for this relation of human subjectivity and Good, the position of MOR reflects that although the individual is the source of the Good, but its identity is meaningless if it does not posit the Good as an objective reality and transcends towards it. Sartre further claims that Good must be done in such a way that one must be willing to sacrifice one‘s life to bring happiness in the life of the person for whom one has done the Good. But the happiness must not come through chance or by someone else. Rather, its source must be the person who has done the Good. Sartre holds that Good must be done by an individual. But he also maintains that it must not be confined to a particular individual. Rather, the Good must be done by every individual. That is its universal essence: What is certain is that the Good must be done by some human reality. But is it a question of my individual reality, of that of my party, or of that of concrete humanity? In truth, the Good being universal, if I could melt into the human totality as into an indissoluble synthesis, the ideal would be that the Good was the result of the doing of this totality. (Sartre, 1992, p. 557)
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However, it is suggested that the universality of Good does not imply that an individual completely dissolves oneself in the human totality. An individual can participate in this totality to will this universal Good but not at the cost of losing one‘s particular identity in totality. Every individual is historical being with one‘s unique hopes and desires. Sartre says that the synthesis of one individual with the human totality is not possible and considers human totality as a detotalized totality where all individuals are united in the context of willing the universal Good, but at the same time, each individual is different from the other in individual subjectivity, choices and actions. Sartre states ―This concrete humanity is in reality a detotalized totality, that is, it will never exist as a synthesis –it is stopped along the way‖ (Sartre, 1992, p. 557). Due to lack of this synthesis, the goal of the humanity to do the Good for all will not be achieved. But, the universal character of Good implies that it must be done in the face of other. The universality of Good entails that it must posit the other individual. But if one and the other individual are dissolved into a synthesis resulting into a totality, then it will be impossible for them to do the Good: The quality of universality of the Good necessarily implies the positing of the Other. If the Other and I were to melt into a single human reality, humanity conscious of being a unique and individual historical adventure could no longer posit the Good except as the object of its own will. (1992, p.557) The objective and transcendent character of the Good is due to universality of Good. The positing of Good by one‘s individual action necessarily implies the positing of other individuals and urging them to do the Good. It is not possible for one to avoid this reality in the moral and social domain. Human reality, be it a particular individual, group or a society, has to do the Good for the others and also demanding from the others they must also do it. The notion of Good demands the positing of not a single human subjectivity but human totality. It also demands commitment towards not from a single individual but from all individuals: It is concrete subjectivity (the isolated subject or the group, the party) that has to do the Good in the face of others, for others, and in demanding from the diversity of others that they do it too. The notion of Good demands the plurality of consciousnesses and even the plurality of commitments. (Sartre, 1992, p.557) This relation between human subjectivity and the universal Good is represented in terms of the notion of MOR. The Good is posited by human subjectivity, so it is relative, but it is not completely relative because in its universality it attains objective character. Sartre holds that Good is the ideal of human consciousness in the concrete world whose project is to have Good done by every single individual in a limited as well as extended group by large number of human beings. The project is however not that smooth, we may encounter some individuals who may not be willing to pursue it or sometimes oppose this ideal: Good is necessarily the quest of concrete subjectivities existing in the world amidst other hostile or merely diversely oriented subjectivities. Not only is it my ideal, it is also my ideal that it becomes the ideal of others. Its universality is not de facto, it is de jure like its other characteristics. (Sartre, 1992, p. 557) From this relation of human subjectivity and Good, Sartre concludes two points. First is that an individual does not desire the Good for the sake of Good. Since there is no a-priori conception of objective Good independent of human subjectivity, therefore one is not intended to do the Good for the sake of already established conception of Good. Second, an individual does not desire to do the Good to gain personal interests. Since the Good is done by an individual in the face of others and it also demands that other individuals must also do it for the others, personal interests cannot be the motivating factor for doing Good and hence it depicts a de jure or law like character. Sartre also maintains that from both the cases, one need not have a conception of individuals who already developed their identity and some fixed conception of Good. Rather, it is due to the relation of human subjectivity and the Good that both, the performing individuals and the Good, are defined. Sartre also gives the reason why an individual chooses or posits the Good. For him, it is the interest of an individual which becomes the primary motivating factor for the choice of Good. Due to his or her interest in the Good, he or she chooses it. Thus the world of ethics is created by the individuals actively engaged in the conception of values and their implementation. It is in the very moment of creating such world and ethics according to the interest, human beings define their identity: The interested man of the ethics of interest, for example, chooses, due to motivating factors that have to do with existential psychoanalysis, both to be interested and that the Good be his interest. He defines himself by this interest in the very moment that he defines the world and ethics by this interest. (Sartre, 1992, p. 558) Interest is however no longer a burden on the choice because it is the individual who goes for it in the exercise of his/her freedom. In other words, a fixed quality or readymade values cannot be of any help to an individual to actualize his or her freedom. Individuals choose their identity, essence or attributes through their choices. At the
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level of choice, an individual cannot be defined as the individual with this or that interest. Furthermore, Sartre holds the relation of an individual and Good is inseparable. One cannot separate oneself from the Good. For, one defines oneself by positing and doing the Good. If individuals disassociate themselves from the choice of the Good, it is impossible for them to define their identity. Sartre elaborates this relation by comparing it with relation of human consciousness and the world. He holds that consciousness will not be considered as the consciousness of anything, if it is separated from the world. Consciousness is always conscious of something and is understood in relation to the world. If the world will be taken away from it, then it will not remain any more the conscious of anything and it will be impossible to define consciousness. Similarly, if Good will be separated from the individual, then it will be impossible to define one‘s identity, choices and actions. Sartre states, ―Take this Good away from him, he is nothing at all, just as if you were to take the world away from consciousness, it would no longer be consciousness of anything, therefore no longer consciousness at all‖ (Sartre, 1992, p. 558). Sartre also maintains that it does not mean that an individual sticks or holds to his or her Good to create the identity. The act of defining oneself is performed by way of transcending towards the chosen Good. It is this march which is definitive of the identity of the individual. It is therefore up to the individual to conceive the Good as an actual, objective reality in order to ascribe an ontological superiority to the good over him or her. Due to this kind of projection of Good, Sartre holds that the individual ―is in some way raised up by the Good to serve it. We see this clearly in religion for God has raised up man to reflect his glory‖ (Sartre, 1992, p. 558). From this interpretation of relation of human subjectivity with Good, it is concluded that the human totality regards this Good as its ideal which demands that all individual must follow and serve it and define themselves by practicing it in concrete situations. This description of relation of individual with the Good reflects the notion of MOR. The Good is relative because it has been chosen by individual as per the interest. However, it is not completely relative because it is objectively common to all the aspirants. The positing of Good implies the positing of other due to which it represents an objective character. Due to the positing of other, this Good distances itself and transcends beyond human consciousness. In this way, Good which is posited by an individual attains objectivity. The human subjectivity defines itself when it posits Good as a transcendent and objective reality. Human reality defines itself by following and transcending towards this Good. Thus, Sartre‘s description of the relation of human subjectivity and Good reflects both subjective and objective character. It represents the notion of moral objective relativism.
4. Conclusion The analysis of Sartre‘s notion Good in NE reflects the notion of MOR. Sartre‘s notion of Good in NE reflects the notion of MOR because the Good is projected as an objective and universal reality by human subjectivity. The source of the universal and objective aspect of Good is human subjectivity. Good is taken to be an objective reality which is posited by human subjectivity. Since it is posited by human subjectivity, it seems smacking of relativism though in a moderate way. Moreover, it is also objective and universal because it is projected by an individual as a shared goal towards which every individual seeks to transcend with the aspiration that the other individuals also transcend towards it. The Good is objective and universal in character also because it is for the common welfare of the other individuals.
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