University of South Florida Scholar Commons Graduate Theses and Dissertations Graduate School 1-1-2015 Heidegger and the Problem of Modern Moral Philosophy Megan Emily Altman University of South Florida, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd Part of the Philosophy Commons Scholar Commons Citation Altman, Megan Emily, "Heidegger and the Problem of Modern Moral Philosophy" (2015). Graduate Theses and Dissertations. http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/5845 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Heidegger and the Problem of Modern Moral Philosophy by Megan E. Altman A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Department of Philosophy College of Arts and Sciences University of South Florida Co-Major Professor: Charles Guignon, Ph.D. Co-Major Professor: Lee Braver, Ph.D. P. Christopher Smith, Ph.D. Stephen Turner, Ph.D. Date of Approval: February 27, 2015 Keywords: Aristotle, Virtue Ethics, Individualism, Existentialism, Nihilism Copyright © 2015, Megan E. Altman DEDICATION I dedicate this dissertation in loving memory of Naomi Altman and Norman Buben. I must also make a special point of expressing my gratitude to my family for their selfless love, immeasurable generosity, and constant support. My Zayde, James, has instilled in me the meaning of my Jewish heritage and a sense of responsibility in belonging to that heritage. My parents, Heather and Ben, have taught me the importance of commitment and dedication, and my brother, Rudy, has kept me humble with his courage and bravery both in military and civilian life. This dissertation could not have been written without them. In addition, I am indebted to Carol and Craig Trudgen, whose genuine compassion and loving encouragement have contributed greatly to my recent philosophical endeavors. Finally, and most of all, there is an inexpressible debt of gratitude to Adam Buben. He, more than anyone I know, is an exemplar of what matters in life, living with a deep sense of responsibility and earnest commitment, confronting the inescapable limits and vulnerability of human life, accepting ambiguity and remaining open to difference. His steady presence has been the greatest gift in my life. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I remain indebted to my dissertation committee, whose intellectual guidance, illuminating conversations, and tireless efforts are the bedrock of my philosophical achievements. The genesis and fruition of this projection would not have been possible without them. Professor Lee Braver’s timely and thoughtful feedback brought clarity and coherency to my arguments, and he has become a mentor to me in other areas of academic life. Professor Stephen Turner was of great help in keeping me honest in my considerations of the political implications of Heidegger’s ethics, as well as, the accuracy of my account of the historical development of ethics in Western philosophy. Professor P. Christopher Smith’s intellectual rigor, sincere dedication, and steady encouragement have made immeasurable contributions to this project and the development of my philosophical thought. My advisor, Professor Charles Guignon, has taught me how to be a levelheaded, conscientious, and responsible scholar. I am honored and blessed to have been able to learn from him over the past thirteen years. My very first course as an undergrad was his Existentialism course, and I cannot begin to put into words all that his brilliant scholarship, earnest mentorship, and endearing character has meant to me over the years. He has profoundly impacted my life, and I shall remain indebted to his teachings and friendship. Needless to say, any mistakes and shortcomings in the dissertation are mine alone. I would like to acknowledge contributions from the University of South Florida, Florida Gulf Coast University, and Hiram College for their financial and collegial support throughout the various stages of this project. I must also express my sincere gratitude to Colin Anderson and John Koritansky for their thought-provoking conversations and treasured contributions to my recent achievements. I wish to express a special thanks to Adriana Novoa-Levine and Alex Levine for cultivating an intellectual space of meaning and creativity through love and friendship. I have also received support and encouragement from numerous friends, colleagues, and students. In no particular order, these include Kate McLean, Nicole Lamberton, Melissa Simoni, Sally Guignon, Jessica Williams, Brian Dunst, Casey Rentmeester, Steve Burgess, Nate Draluck, Ali Elamin, Dave Cheely, Jared Kinggard, Jeffrey Hinzmann, Hans Pedersen, David Eck, Bill Koch, West Gurley, Kevin Aho, Geoff Pfeifer, Andrea Pitts, Phillip Scuderi, Anthony DeSantis, Joanne Waugh, Michael Gibbons, Raymond Gross, Darlene Corcoran, Eric S. Nelson, Naill Keane, Bob Haak, Laura Carlton, Ross Voit, Abby Staysa, Clara Packard, Heather Brant, Alan Fink, Michael Hall, Sanders Melvin, Sara Coe, Andrew Armstrong, Tyler Thomas, Sara Sabarese-Carter, Robin Shura, Damaris Peters Pike, Glenn Whitehouse, Victoria Chávez-Kruse, Kelly Lewis, Merose Hwang, Luis Brunstein, and Ella Kirk. TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract ........................................................................................................................................... ii Chapter 1: Introduction ...................................................................................................................1 Chapter 2: The Question Concerning Heidegger’s Ethics ............................................................20 Premodern Ethics ..............................................................................................................29 The Fragmentary Ethos of the Enlightenment ...................................................................52 The Question of Heidegger’s Ethics .................................................................................69 Chapter 3: Heidegger’s Destruction of Modern Moral Philosophy ..............................................78 Heidegger’s “Violent” Interpretation of Aristotle’s Ethics ..............................................83 Critiques of Heidegger’s Supposed Radical Individualism ............................................108 Critiques of Heidegger’s Supposed Nihilism ..................................................................129 Concluding Remarks on the Supposed Moral Bankruptcy of Heidegger’s ‘Ethics’ ......144 Chapter 4: How Heidegger’s Vision of Ethics Hears the Callings of an Ethos ..........................147 Heidegger’s Anti-Individualism .....................................................................................156 Authentic Historicity and Ethical Relativism .................................................................179 Authenticity as a Call for an Ethical Transformation .....................................................205 Chapter 5: Heidegger’s Ethics is First Philosophy .....................................................................210 Heidegger’s Rejection of the Is-Ought Distinction ........................................................219 The Virtues of Heidegger’s Post-Humanist Ethics .........................................................228 Critical Assessment of Heidegger’s Ethics .....................................................................242 References ....................................................................................................................................248 i ABSTRACT The guiding question of this project is, “Why does it count as a critique of Heidegger that he does not defend a particular moral position?” A standard criticism levied against Heidegger is that, since he has nothing positive to say about post-Enlightenment moral theory, he has nothing to contribute to moral philosophy, and this marks his greatest shortcoming as a philosopher. Why is there a demand for Heidegger, or any other philosopher, to theorize about morality, when we do not have this expectation for, say, aesthetics, theology, or various other regional domains of human life? Why should we expect Heidegger to theorize about what humans must be like in order to care about and engage in moral thought? Answering these questions involves an extended discussion of ways of understanding ethics in Western philosophical thought, as well as, Heidegger’s own view of ethics. I begin with a detailed exposition of the paradigmatic shift from premodern ethics, as it is based on an understanding of ethos (a form of life with its practical and normative dimensions), to modern conceptions of ethics based on Enlightenment (1750-1850) individualism and the fact- value distinction. This account of the history of ethics in philosophy attempts to demonstrate that the transition to modernity is marked by a schism between Being (ontology) and Ought (ethics) which makes any post-Enlightenment justification of ethics impossible (and helps us see why Heidegger always scoffs at the project of working out an ethics). My primary goal is to prove that Heidegger’s appropriation of Aristotle’s thought not only challenges the underlying metaphysical assumptions of mainstream moral philosophy, but also shows us a way back to the ii unity of ethics and ontology. My claim is