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War Rights and Military Virtues: a Philosophical Re-Appraisal of Just War Theory

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War Rights and Military Virtues: a Philosophical Re-Appraisal of Just War Theory The University of Notre Dame Australia ResearchOnline@ND Theses 2014 War rights and military virtues: A philosophical re-appraisal of Just War Theory Matthew T. Beard University of Notre Dame Australia Follow this and additional works at: https://researchonline.nd.edu.au/theses Part of the Philosophy Commons COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA Copyright Regulations 1969 WARNING The material in this communication may be subject to copyright under the Act. Any further copying or communication of this material by you may be the subject of copyright protection under the Act. Do not remove this notice. Publication Details Beard, M. T. (2014). War rights and military virtues: A philosophical re-appraisal of Just War Theory (Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)). University of Notre Dame Australia. https://researchonline.nd.edu.au/theses/96 This dissertation/thesis is brought to you by ResearchOnline@ND. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses by an authorized administrator of ResearchOnline@ND. For more information, please contact [email protected]. War Rights and Military Virtues A Philosophical Re-appraisal of Just War Theory Doctoral Thesis Prepared by Matthew T. Beard School of Philosophy and Theology University of Notre Dame, Australia Supervised by Christian Enemark and Hayden Ramsay Supported by The Morris Research Scholarship Declaration I, Matthew Thomas Beard, declare that this PhD thesis, entitled War Rights and Military Virtues: A Philosophical Re-appraisal of Just War Theory is no more than 100,000 words exclusive of title pages, table of contents, acknowledgements, list of figures, reference list, and footnotes. The thesis is my own original work, prepared for the specific and unique purposes of this academic degree and has not been submitted in whole or part for the awarding of any other academic degree at any institution. Where work is not my own original contribution, it has been referenced appropriately. Matthew Thomas Beard 30/5/14 i Abstract The overwhelming majority of theorists addressing questions of the morality of war do so from within the moral framework provided by Just War Theory (JWT): a normative account of war that dates back over 1500 years in the Western Tradition. However, today’s iterations of Just War Theory are markedly different from those of its intellectual ancestors. Specifically, today’s accounts tend not to consider matters of moral virtue, personal excellence, moral psychology, or human flourishing – that is, aretaic matters – to be worthy subjects of discussion. Instead, they prefer to focus overtly on questions of law, justice, and human rights – deontological questions – as if they were the entire purview of a comprehensive morality of war. I explore some of the major theorists in the history of Western JWT, showing that the ancestors of today’s just war theories did consider aretaic matters – in particular the moral virtues – to be of central importance to the morality of war. I also show how and why it came to be that deontological and aretaic discussions became fragmented in contemporary JWT. In order to demonstrate how this fragmentation is problematic, I consider deontological ethics’ connection to aretaic ethics. I explain how contemporary JWT tends to conceptualise rights, emphasising the central place of intention in those theories. I show how aretaic ethics can enrich deontological appraisals of ongoing debates in military ethics. ii Finally, I make a positive case for aretaic ethics by identifying new questions that aretaic ethics reveals to JWT, those being: the complexity of the identity of soldiers, how moral character and identity can help prevent moral transgressions, and the moral and psychological trauma suffered by many soldiers and veterans. I argue that aretaic modes of thinking help to explain moral transgressions of soldiers and the psychological difficulties that veterans can experience post-war. Deontological and aretaic ethics also interact in the three professions most relevant to waging war: soldiers, commanders, and political leaders. I show how the virtues are necessary character traits in order to guarantee that warfighters and their political leaders can be relied on to fulfil their professional duties. Aretaic ethical analysis is also able to provide conceptual understanding of supererogatory actions. Contemporary just war theorists would be wise to re-integrate aretaic ethics into their considerations of the morality of war. Aretaic ethics can be combined seamlessly and productively with deontological ethics, yielding more robust and intelligible responses to the most pressing controversies facing military ethics today. Rights and deontology present crucial elements of the ethics war, but they can be ably complemented by insights from aretaic ethics; specifically, matters of character and the moral development of the agent. Furthermore, incorporating aretaic ethics into JWT enables theorists to utilise that framework to consider matters currently outside of its purview, but which are of growing relevance to military practice. iii Acknowledgements This thesis has been three-and-a-half years in the making, and I am not the same man today that I was when it began. I am, however, all the better for having written it. This thesis could not have been completed without the generous support of Mr. Karl Morris. Karl’s generosity led to the creation of the Morris Scholarship for Ethics, of which I was the inaugural recipient. I am extremely grateful for Karl’s financial support, but also for his interest in the progress of my thesis and the development of my ideas. I offer my thanks to my supervisors, Christian Enemark and Hayden Ramsay. Christian accepted the role of supervisor at the beginning of 2013 when my thoughts were at their least coherent. That I completed a thesis at all – irrespective of quality – is testament to Christian’s kindness, wisdom and professionalism. Thanks are also due for Christian’s continual efforts to ground my philosophical hand-wavings in the empirical realities of war and military practice: this thesis is much more grounded for the expertise and advice provided in marathon meetings in Canberra and over Skype! Hayden has been my mentor and friend since my philosophical studies began in 2008. He has been a source of constancy, stability and reason throughout the writing of this thesis. Most of all, his philosophical demeanour and spirit iv have been sources of inspiration and example that I have (perhaps embarrassingly) sought to replicate. To those who proof-read this thesis in part or in full, Elle Glynn, Nick Evans, and Jenn Edgar, thank you. My apologies if I was unable to make all the changes you recommended. My work is much stronger for your help. Academic support is only a small part of what it takes to complete a thesis. Immense thanks are due to my parents, Mark and Jane, and siblings, Bec, Andrew, Nathan, Rachel and Emily, for their love, support, hilarity and distraction for the duration of this. Thanks also to my future in-laws, Garth, Sandra and Michelle for their interest, love and support. To my colleagues at the Centre for Faith, Ethics & Society, Sandra Lynch and Elle Glynn, thank you for tolerating my occasional madness, providing wonderful sounding-boards for my ideas, and allowing me to balance the demands of my employment and scholarship. Without you both, the last shred of my sanity would be long gone. My life writing this thesis has been a paradox. Whilst my mind, readings and writings have been occupied with war, death and sorrow, I have enjoyed the most surreal peace I’ve ever known. To Jennifer Edgar – soon to be Jennifer Beard – who was a stranger when this thesis begun and will be my wife before it is awarded, I offer my deepest and most sincere thanks. You have been my Helen and my Andromache – my comfort and my compass, my motivation and my salvation, my peace and my joy – since the day I met you. Thank you for making this work the second most important project in my life, and v especially for helping me in the final week before submission, when I couldn’t help myself. In particular I acknowledge my late Grandfather, Leading Shipman Robert George McNamara, who served in the Royal Australian Navy from 1947-1970. Pop, like so many others, wore his duty with silent, stoic pride. The pride he took in his service and his country was matched only by the love he held for his family. Finally, I acknowledge those for whom this thesis actually promises to be of some assistance: those for whom war is a practical reality and for whom peace is far rarer than it has been for me. I hope that, in some way, my work may be of service. At my grandfather’s funeral, a member of the local RSL branch recited the following verses. The first speaks of peace, the second of safety. It seems to me that more can be done to provide both to soldiers, veterans, and all those responsible for decision-making in times of war. O valiant hearts who to your Eternal Father, strong to save, glory came Whose arm hath bound the restless Through dust of conflict and wave, through battle flame; Who bidd'st the mighty ocean deep Tranquil you lie, your knightly Its own appointed limits keep; virtue proved, Oh, hear us when we cry to Thee, Your memory hallowed in the For those in peril on the sea! land you loved. - Eternal Father, Strong to Save - Oh Valiant Hearts vi Table of Contents Chapter One – Introduction 1 1 Approaches to Moral Philosophy 3 2 Just War Theory 17 3 Thesis Rationale, Content and Purpose 34 4 Conclusion 40 Chapter Two – Just War
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