Employing Appropriate Political and Military Instruments

AF in the Antiterrorist Operation Presentation for the Swedish Defence University by Oleksiy Melnyk, Co-director, Foreign Relations and International Security Programmes, Razumkov Centre, Ukraine Hybrid nature of the conflict Talking about a hybrid nature of the on-going Russia-Ukraine conflict, many tend to believe that this is an absolutely new type of warfare. In fact, most of the military conflicts could be characterised as “hybrid wars” differentiated in that respect only by the scale and proportions of using different military and non-military techniques and tools for achieving an ultimate victory or specific objectives. The hybrid novelty of the current conflict is just a reflection of the contemporary social development and the information technologies. Therefore, if one is to think about an anti-hybrid war strategy, the key word is “war” and the winning strategy should be based on recognising that fact and therefore employing appropriate political and military instruments. The most important drivers behind the current Russia-Ukraine conflict are the hybrids of an aggressor and a mediator; of fiction and reality; of strong words and weak actions; of efforts aimed to stop or not to provoke an aggressor and in fact provoking and encouraging an aggression. Encouraging aggressor by not calling and handling the war as a war The Ukrainian Government – also adherent to the peaceful solution – evaded to call Russia an aggressor for many months and up until now there is no official declaration of the state of war with Russia. Article 106. Constitution of Ukraine reads “The President of Ukraine shall: 19) submit to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine a declaration of a state of war, and adopt a decision on the use of the Armed Forces and other military formations established in compliance with laws of Ukraine in the event of armed aggression against Ukraine; 20) adopt, in accordance with law, a decision on the general or partial mobilisation and the introduction of martial law in Ukraine or in its particular territories, in the event of a threat of aggression, or danger to the independence of Ukraine; 1 The same is repeated in Article 4 of the Law “On Defence of Ukraine”. Despite the fact that starting from the end of February 2014 the Russian Federation has conducted almost every action that is qualified by both the international law (1974 UN GAR 3314) and the national legislation as the acts of aggression, the martial law was declared neither after the first facts of military invasion in Crimea nor during the few waves of obvious Russian aggression in Eastern Ukraine. The name the “Anti-terror operation” given to the apparent full-scale armed conflict has made this “hybrid war” even more hybrid and further complicated both the deployment of the Ukrainian Forces and the prospects of the conflict resolution. Political constrains for military strategy This conflict has no military solution. Any attempt to challenge such an approach either in Ukraine or abroad risks to be named as a counterproductive and dangerous position of a “party of war” and provoking an escalation of conflict. This is how Ukraine had escaped bloodshed in Crimea and this how Ukraine has lost Crimea and has gotten a bloody war in Donbas. Minsk arrangements are both a product and a cause of the on-going conflict. It has become absolutely obvious that the Minsk accord serves many purposes except the conflict resolution. No wonder, because it was imposed by the Kremlin and was not actually designed for such purpose. Now, parties involved are pursuing their different interest in order to achieve inconsistent objectives by using the same single instrument. Russia’s interest is to achieve its objectives by non-military instruments. Ukraine’s interest is to stop bloodshed after two tragic defeats (Illovaysk, Debaltseve), to internationalise the conflict, to buy time… The Western interest, mostly European or even more precise German is to remove this problem if not completely from the list or at least to drop it from the top. The US seems to use the Minsk as an instrument of deterrence of Russia. This is a reality of the real politic. For Ukraine, in order to help itself and its partners, to preserve the pro-Ukrainian coalition there is no choice but to show it compliance with the Minsk’s commitments. The key point is to avoid accusations 2 for violating truce and heavy weapons withdrawal. That is what the political agenda is. The Ukrainian military is ordered to follow the agenda, i.e. to avoid using weapons at any cost and the Ukrainian soldiers do pay a very high cost. Si vis pacem, para bellum and let your adversary know Every conflict has at least two sides. As long as one side is willing and able to use military force as a primarily argument, the other side has very limited options if tries to avoid fighting. When you are attacked, you have either to fight back, or to hide or to run away. It is terribly risky to waste time available for reaction to appease someone geared up for a fight. Neither Ukraine nor the West want war with Russia, but trying to avoid “unnecessary” confrontation with one who does not respect any red lines has served so far rather in favour of the aggressor. President Putin has different opinion about a value and an appropriateness of military instruments. The level of success he has achieved (at least he believes) in pursuing his objectives in Ukraine and on the international arena has been secured mainly by the use or threat of military force. There still prevails an adherence to non-military instruments among the key European leaders and in the White House, but it is uncertain whether there is enough time and the chance for Sun Tzu’s art “to subdue the enemy without fighting”. To paraphrase another famous Sun Tzu’s quotation “who wishes to fight must first count the cost” one may also suggest to count the cost for those who wishes to avoid a battle at any cost. Ukraine lost Crimea in March 2014 in fact without real fighting, but not without casualties. The official Kyiv was afraid to provoke an armed conflict and the acting Head of State Oleksandr Turchynov later acknowledged the intensive external pressure advising not to provoke Putin. Perhaps, that might be the right decision taking into consideration the existing circumstances. In fact, in February-March 2014 the Ukrainian Government has almost no military means to deter the Russian invasion either in Crimea or anywhere. 3 The decision making process in Kyiv was further complicated by the Kremlin’s official denial and the Western leaders’ reluctance to accept the obvious facts of the ongoing Russian military invasion. The principal objective of the intensive diplomatic activity among Kyiv, Moscow the Western capitals was to avoid military escalation, i.e. to avoid war with Russia. To achieve that objective all the parties mutually agreed not to provoke Putin. The box “Do Not Provoke Putin!” has become one the most important criteria in the checklist for the peace-making initiatives since. Now, we come to the last but not least feature of the hybrid nature of the Russian- Ukrainian war. This is not the Ukrainian internal conflict as the Kremlin presents it. This is not just the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. This is the one of operations in the greater context of the Kremlin’s hybrid war against the West, where Ukraine has been used as the battle ground and an instrument. Trying not to provoke Putin in Crimea did not help Ukraine to avoid the war on its territory. Whether the efforts not to provoke Putin in Ukraine will help the West to escape from Putin’s attack remains to be seen. NATO has provided already some additional measures to assure the Baltic nations, but the question remains. What if not Narva, but a trivial piece of NATO border is violated? Should this issue be managed diplomatically and politically only? For how long the Article 5 of the Washington Treaty remains a deterrent for Putin’s options? Can Europeans really rely on national and NATO’s military forces (even capable and willing to fight) if the politicians would try to avoid confrontation with Putin by any means. 4 .

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