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For Free Distribution ELECTIONS LeGAL ASSESSMENT US AMBASSADOR GeOFFREY PYATT IN UKRAINE OF THE 2014 RuSSO-UKRAINIAN WAR ON CHALLENGES FOR UKRAINE № 14 (80) NOVEMBER 2014 WWW.UKRAINIANWEEK.COM Featuring selected content from The Economist FOR FREE DISTRIBUTION |CONTENTS BRIEFING Lobbymocracy: Ukraine does not have Rapid Response Elections: The victory adequate support in the West, either in of pro-European parties must be put political circles, or among experts. The to work toward rapid and irreversible situation with the mass media and civil reforms. Otherwise it will quickly turn society is slightly better into an equally impressive defeat 28 4 Leonidas Donskis: An imagined dialogue on several clichés and misperceptions POLITICS 30 Starting a New Life, Voting as Before: Elections in the Donbas NEIGHBOURS 8 Russia’s gangster regime – the real story Broken Democracy on the Frontline: “Unhappy, poorly dressed people, 31 mostly elderly, trudged to the polls Karen Dawisha, the author of Putin’s to cast their votes for one of the Kleptocracy, on the loyalty of the Russian richest people in Donetsk Oblast” President’s team, the role of Ukraine in his grip 10 on power, and on Russia’s money in Europe Poroshenko’s Blunders: 32 The President’s bloc is painfully The Bear, Master of itsT aiga Lair: reminiscent of previous political Russians support the Kremlin’s path towards self-isolation projects that failed bitterly and confrontation with the West, ignoring the fact that they don’t have a realistic chance of becoming another 12 pole of influence in the world 2014 Russo-Ukrainian War: A comprehensive 34 legal assessment in the framework of international law ECONOMICS Volodymyr Lavrenchuk, Board Chairman of RaiffeisenB ank 14 Aval, speaks about the future of Ukrainian banks Mykola Tochytskyi, Ukraine’s Permanent Representative to the Council of Europe: 36 “It is possible to legally prove that Russia Many Winners, a Few Bad Losers: is assisting terrorism” A lower oil price will boost the world economy 18 and harm some unpleasant US Ambassador Geoffrey Pyatt: regimes—but there are risks “There will be no Cold War 2.0” 38 Economist EricR einert speaks on his vision 20 of Ukraine’s economic development, ways to overcome poverty, threats of de-industrialization FOCUS Freedom For Others: Why not everyone 40 raised under western democracy SOCIETY considers freedom a universal value Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights Nils Muižnieks: It is important to go to 23 Crimea to draw attention to the situation there Between Interests and Values:The West cannot develop freely with a dominating, backward Russia 42 24 HISTORY All Quiet on the European Front: The Story of Odesa: Through Cossacks, Khans and Russian Emperors In Western Europe there 44 is fairly widespread indifference to the fighting in Ukraine CULTURE & ARTS or the growing tensions Milenko Jergović, one of the most influential in the Baltic States. They contemporary writers from Central-Eastern Europe, do not see it as a threat speaks on the wars in the Balkans and Ukraine, to their own way of life language conflicts and nationalistic preconceptions 26 48 E-mail [email protected] www.ukrainianweek.com Tel. (044) 351-13-87 The Ukrainian Week № 14 (80) November 2014 Editors address 37 Mashynobudivna str., Kyiv, 03067, Ukraine Founder ECEM Media GmbH. Publisher ECEM Media GmbH Print run 15 000. Free distribution Address Austria, Am Gestade,1, 1010 Vienna Our partner State registration certificate КВ № 19823-9623ПР 19.03.2013 Chief Editor Alla Lazareva Editors Anna Korbut, Natalia Romaneс, Shaun Williams № 14 (80) NOVEMBER 2014|THE UKRAINIAN WEEK|3 BRIEFING| Rapid Response Elections The impressive victory of pro-European forces in the party lists must be put to work toward rapid and irreversible reforms, otherwise it will quickly turn into an equally impressive defeat he parliamentary elections Author: tion were held on a proportional these two parties could separately were a dizzying success for Oleksandr basis, the corresponding ratio of attempt to form coalitions with pro-European candidates. Kramar deputies in Parliament would be other “Maidan parties”. TYet a cursory look at the re- 396 to 54. In this example, the However, the strong gains by sults created a misconception Bloc of Petro Poroshenko (BPP) pro-European political forces were among the public that the domina- and Arseniy Yatseniuk’s People’s fed by the temporary demoraliza- tion of Parliament by pro-Euro- Front could form a coalition with- tion of the pro-Russian electorate, pean political forces is permanent, out the involvement of other polit- which resulted in low voter turn- and the threat of revenge by for- ical forces, holding 126 and 128 out in the southern and eastern mer Party of Regions members seats respectively for a stable 254- regions (32-42%) and higher mo- and the pro-Russian project has seat majority. However, each of bilization of the electorate in west- passed. However, deeper analysis reveals the fallacy of such findings and the serious dangers hidden beneath the surface. Indeed, pro-European candi- dates won party lists in every re- gion except the liberated areas of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. This seems to finally put to rest the popular narrative of Ukraine as a nation divided by regional pro-European and pro-Russian leanings. The margin of victory was least pronounced in Odesa and Kharkiv oblasts, but even there, pro-European parties gar- nered more votes than the three pro-Russian parties in most elec- toral districts. The exceptions are five districts in the Kharkiv region (171-173, 176, and 178) and one in the Odesa region (143). This year’s parliamentary elec- tion results show significantly greater gains by pro-European candidates in southern and eastern regions than were made in previ- ous elections. Pro-European candi- dates with party affiliations and in- dependent candidates with similar views gained at least 26 seats. Vic- tories in Mykolayiv and Kherson regions formed a large part of these gains (10 out of 11 seats). Another interesting feature of this election was the success of the nationalists in central and eastern Ukraine, and their devastating defeat in most districts of western Ukraine. Overall, pro-European politi- cal forces won 198 seats on party lists, while the “opposition bloc” ended up with only 27. If the elec- 4|THE UKRAINIAN WEEK|№ 14 (80) NOVEMBER 2014 |BRIEFING The strong gains by ern regions (60-70%). Therefore, changing preferences, but simply pro-European the next elections will not take the longevity of the changes affect- better mobilization of pro-Russian political forces in the place four months from now: last October 26 elections ing the country’s electoral land- voters. At the same time, the dis- were fed by the winter, Yanukovych also believed scape should not be overesti- appointment of pro-European temporary that he still had a year until the demoralization of mated: change is taking place, but voters could significantly reduce the pro-Russian presidential election and nearly it is not as significant as the elec- their participation in the next electorate three years until the parliamen- tions of October 26 would suggest. elections. This dangerous process tary elections. It would be simi- After all, of the 30.4 million regis- is already clearly visible. In the larly short-sighted for the favor- tered voters, less than 10.9 million May 25 presidential election, pro- ites of this election (People’s Front voted for the five pro-European European candidates received or Andriy Sadovyi’s Samopomich parties that joined the Parliament 14.3 million votes, while that (Selfreliance)) to think that they (12.4 million including Svoboda number had shrunk to 12.4 mil- were “on top of the world” to stay. (Freedom) party, Anatoliy Hryt- lion by the October 26 elections. Credit quickly erodes trust. 9.9 senko’s Civil Position party and Thus, 95% of the reduction in million people voted for Porosh- the Right Sector). overall voter turnout between the enko on May 25, and on October The strong gains by The fact that the pro-Russian two elections from 18 to 16 million pro-European 26 only 3.45 million chose his triad (United Opposition, the was due to the decrease in support political forces in the party. Thus, this is no time for the October 26 elections Communist Party, and Serhiy Ti- for pro-European candidates. were fed by the pro-European forces to relax and hipko’s Strong Ukraine) garnered It is a dangerous illusion for temporary rest on their laurels. demoralization of only 2.6 million votes in this elec- the President and Prime Minister the pro-Russian The rapid, even feverish tion does not mean that they will to assume that they have four electorate change of public sentiment that not reap three or four times more years until the next election. Noth- was reflected in the significant de- in the next elections—not due to ing and no one can guarantee that cline in support for the BPP and the growth of the People’s Front and Samopomich is an excellent example of the complete confu- sion in which the Ukrainian public finds itself, ready to jump from the known to the unknown without NO ONE CAN GUARANTee THAT THE NEXT ELECTIONS WILL NOT TAKE PLACE FOUR MONTHS FROM NOW any certainty that it will better ful- fill their expectations. This situa- tion demonstrates the dominance of political infantilism, messianic illusions and simple emotions over common sense among the majority of voters: while avoiding 71 ex-Party of Regions MPs or grassroots organization and refus- members of the pro- ing to accept greater responsibility Yanukovych majority in the previous themselves, they frantically scan parliament got the proposed political menu for through to the new the next victim upon which all re- one through FPTP districts: 50 won in sponsibility for their fate and the south-eastern fate of the state can be shifted.
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