Acting As One? Co-Ordinating Responses to the Landmine Problem

Third World Quarterly, Vol 24, No 5, pp 855Ð871, 2003

Acting as one? Co-ordinating responses to the landmine problem

KJELL ERLING KJELLMAN, KRISTIAN BERG HARPVIKEN, ANANDA S MILLARD & ARNE STRAND

ABSTRACT This article looks at co-ordination within humanitarian mine action (HMA), and co-ordination between HMA and other humanitarian and development initiatives. The discussion focuses specifically on the role of UN-led Mine Action Centres (MACs) and the analysis draws on case studies of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Afghanistan. A contention throughout is that MACs often employ a rigid approach to co-ordination. This constricts the flexibility of mine action organisations, limits the development of creative initiatives and poses a barrier to co-ordination between HMA and other humanitarian initiatives. A second point pursued is that co-ordination arrangements are embedded in a broader institutional context, and this context has in turn the potential to impact on co- ordination. The analysis presented here suggests a number of implications for HMA in general, together with a number of policy considerations. The article concludes by offering some thoughts for the future on the importance of effective co-ordination arrangements both within HMA as a sector and between HMA and other sectors of humanitarian assistance.

How can co-ordination practices facilitate more effective responses to the problem of landmines? How can actors involved in mine action facilitate co- ordination with other sectors of humanitarian assistance? Moreover, what constitute practical guidelines for improving co-ordination efforts in the future? One of the most acute issues facing regions that have experienced armed conflict is that of developing an adequate response to the problem of landmines. Because landmines are such an immediate danger to individuals and communities, an imperative has been to develop an encompassing set of activities designed to minimise their effects, which has become known as humanitarian mine action (HMA).1 Aside from the obvious physical dangers posed by landmine contamina- tion, landmines also represent a barrier both to long-term development efforts and to short-term emergency interventions. In the absence of a carefully designed and integrated overarching programme, the threat from landmines

Kjell Erling Kjellman is in the Department of Sociology and Human Geography at the University of Oslo, PO Box 1096 Blindern, NO-0317 Oslo, Norway. Email: [email protected]. Kristian Berg Harpviken is at the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, Fuglehauggata 11, NO-0260 Oslo, Norway. Email: [email protected]. Ananda S Millard is at the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), 7bis avenue de la Paix, PO Box 1300, CH-1211 Geneva 1, Switzerland. Email: [email protected]. Arne Strand is at the Christian Michelsen Institute (CMI), PO Box 6033 Postterminalen, NO-5892 Bergen, Norway. Email: [email protected].

ISSN 0143-6597 print/ISSN 1360-2241 online/03/050855-17 2003 Third World Quarterly DOI: 10.1080/0143659032000132894 855 KJELL ERLING KJELLMAN ET AL blunts effective humanitarian responses in complex emergencies and thwarts the impact of long-term development initiatives. An ongoing challenge for actors involved in HMA and other humanitarian sectors is for different sectors to work together in a way that recognises the unique character of mine action. Within both HMA and other sectors of humanitarian assistance, the concept of co-ordination has gained increasing favour among policy makers, government officials and donors as a way of organising the delivery of aid. In part, this reflects the complexity associated with humanitarian assistance. Humanitarian mine action and development efforts bring with them a parade of diverse actors, including various UN agencies, governmental and nongovernmental organisations and, more recently, private commercial companies. Responses must be flexible and innovative on the one hand, while efficient and cost-effective on the other. Operations must ensure the safety of both operators and affected populations. In order to be successful, interventions must find ways of meeting the needs of target groups and beneficiaries, while effectively utilising the unique assets different actors are able to bring to a situation. The sometimes conflicting political interests of international and national forces must be balanced and, not least, the preferences of donors must be accommodated. As a response to this myriad of challenges, ‘co-ordination’ has become a favourite buzzword within humanitarian assistance. Yet, there has been a growing realisation that co-ordination efforts have not always been particularly successful by any measurement, no matter how well intentioned they may have been. To even the most casual observer, it has become apparent that many humanitarian initiatives have failed to provide for the basic needs of target groups; it is also no secret that resources have been ineffectively used or that goals and strategies have often been dictated by political pressure. Co-ordination bodies have often been unable to reconcile the disparate goals and strategies actors have, and at times have proven rigid, reluctant or simply unable to adapt to the changing needs of dynamic contexts. For their part, donors have further complicated well-meant efforts through ill-timed increases or decreases in funding, or by pressuring for agendas that may not be suited to the needs of aid recipients. Within both HMA and other sectors of humanitarian assistance, the net outcome has been the ineffective delivery of assistance and wasted resources. Through a review of mine action in Afghanistan and Bosnia and Herzegovina, this article takes a critical look at some of the central issues within co-ordination. How have agencies and other key actors adapted to the unique challenges posed by HMA? To what extent has there been co-ordination between HMA and other forms of humanitarian assistance? What are some of the barriers preventing effective co-ordination, and what practical guidelines can be suggested for improving co-ordination efforts? There is a prevailing view that mine action must be governed by effective co-ordination mechanisms, and that co-ordination between mine action and other humanitarian initiatives is imperative in both short-term interventions and long-term development efforts. Effective co- ordination is viewed as crucial for several reasons. On the one hand, this stems from the very nature of HMA, which demands technical proficiency and the need for quality control by an independent actor. On the other hand, mine action has become politically attractive, and as a result has drawn large numbers of diffuse 856 CO-ORDINATING RESPONSES TO THE LANDMINE PROBLEM actors and involved the mobilisation of significant amounts of resources, increasing the demand for co-ordination in order to ensure an effective and efficient response. This has not only made co-ordination within HMA more important, but has also emphasised the need for creative and flexible co- ordination between HMA and other humanitarian and development efforts. There are, of course, many factors that serve to complicate co-ordination. In this article, we point to two broad sets of factors that are particularly fundamental. First, co-ordination arrangements contain the potential for the exercise of authority by a single actor, often leading to the development of rigid co-ordination bodies unable to adapt to changing circumstances. Second, co- ordination can be said to take place in a broader institutional setting that includes other inter-organisational principles aside from co-ordination, complicating the role of co-ordination bodies. A point emphasised throughout this article is that authority and the broader institutional context constitute particular challenges for co-ordination, and that an understanding of each of these aspects can help inform the planning of co-ordination efforts in the future.

Contrasting experiences: Afghanistan and Bosnia and Herzegovina

The discussion here looks at two of the more high-profile cases within HMA— Afghanistan and Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) drawing on interviews with representatives from HMA and mine-affected populations conducted during field visits to each country. The analysis focuses on what has become the chief co- ordination mechanism within HMA—national Mine Action Centres (MACs) that are established and led by the UN. As part of their mandate, MACs are responsible for the co-ordination and quality control of all mine action within a country or region, are vested with the authority to accredit and delegate tasks to mine action agencies, and are partially responsible for facilitating co-ordination between HMA and other humanitarian and development initiatives. The analysis draws on fieldwork conducted during 2000 and 2001. The material gathered during visits to each country includes a relevant document review, interviews with UN, NGO and government representatives, and interviews with people affected by the presence of landmines in their communities. The timeframe for the analysis focuses primarily on the period before September 2001. While BiH can be said to have been characterised by relative stability since the cessation of armed conflict in 1995, the case of Afghanistan is considerably different, particularly in the wake of the US-led military intervention in the autumn of 2001. As is often typical in the aftermath of armed conflict, the situation in Afghanistan since 2001 has been both dynamic and fluid, making any assessment of the country’s mine action programme a difficult proposition. In the case of Afghanistan, co-ordination arrangements in the period following 2001 deserve to be assessed in their own right. A review of Afghanistan and BiH is useful for several reasons. Taken together, the two cases provide a useful historical and chronological overview of the development of MACs. Afghanistan represents the first effort at establishing a MAC with the responsibility for co-ordinating all mine action within a country. At the time that Afghanistan MAC was established in the late 1980s, the issue of land- 857 KJELL ERLING KJELLMAN ET AL mines had not attained the visibility that would characterise it by the mid- to late 1990s, and there was little political interest in mine action. This differs markedly from the experience of Bosnia and Herzegovina. By the time of the Dayton Agreement at the close of 1995, landmines had been placed squarely on the international political agenda, and there was considerable international interest in mine action. In contrast with developments in Afghanistan, mine action in BiH came as a result of pressure from governments, donors and various international agencies. The MACs in Afghanistan and BiH have also been generally perceived as opposites in terms of success. Although success is a relative concept, there is wide consensus that HMA in Afghanistan has generally been a success story, providing a sharp contrast to the many difficulties that have beset mine action in BiH. At this point we simply note these differences; in later sections of this article, these issues will be discussed more fully. In the next section, however, the focus shifts to an examination of the role of authority and the institutional context, two aspects of co-ordination that form the background for our discussion of HMA in Afghanistan and BiH.

Understanding co-ordination ‘Co-ordination’ is a term that is often used but rarely defined. In its most basic form, the co-ordination of humanitarian assistance is a way of solving a collec- tive problem. That is, how is it possible for a range of widely different organisations to work together within a cohesive and integrated framework? Under even the most favourable circumstances, the sheer numbers of actors typically involved in humanitarian initiatives and the diverse interests these actors represent will raise a spectrum of practical and organisational issues, such as reaching agreement on institutional, administrative and operational dimensions.2 In a general sense co-ordination can be seen both as a process whereby two or more units are brought together to operate in a more harmonious manner and as an organisational commitment to complete tasks.3 Co-ordination describes a systematic utilisation of policy instruments that include strategic planning, data- gathering and information management, mobilising resources and accountability assurance, orchestrating a functional division of labour, maintaining relationships with political authorities and providing leadership.4 In the context of humanitarian assistance co-ordination can be seen as an attempt to bring together disparate agencies in a concerted and cost-effective manner in order to ensure that priorities are clearly defined, resources more efficiently utilised and the duplication of effort minimised. In most cases, co-ordination occurs in a relatively egalitarian manner. That is, there is little or no exercise of formal authority, and relationships between actors tend to be horizontal rather than vertical. Such an approach may include the sharing of information, planning through equal participation by the involved parties, and decisions taken through consensus and agreement. Co-ordination mechanisms will generally emerge as a reflection of the capacities, expertise and legitimacy of the parties involved. In such circumstances, power and authority are latent. Alternatively, actors might develop guidelines and standards to achieve 858 CO-ORDINATING RESPONSES TO THE LANDMINE PROBLEM similar goals, and by consensus decree that a single agency should be granted the authority to lead, or the task of doing so. In such a case, authority and the possibility of sanctions are vested in a single actor, but the granting of such authority is decided by common agreement among all interested parties. However, this is not to say that co-ordination arrangements are always the result of democratic processes; nor does it make any claim about the effectiveness of such arrangements. Rather, it simply points to the fact that, as a general rule, authority is not the dominant trait of most co-ordination arrangements. Nevertheless, implicit in virtually all co-ordination is the potential for an exercise of authority and rules-based sanctions. Should it prove necessary, a dominant agency has the authority to define the agenda, instigate preferences and enforce sanctions. As Jon Bennett has described it: Coordination is also about power—power to determine the allocation of resources, to exert influence over warring parties, governments and, let it be said, recipients. Most NGO coordination bodies comprise several dominant agencies who have a vested interest in using the body as a vehicle for pursuing policies complementary to their own programme.5 Dominant agencies, at least in theory, have a great deal of leeway in the degree to which they use their authority, hence also significant influence on the extent to which co-ordination arrangements become rigid and inflexible solutions. Such authority can come in the form of control of information or resources, as well as the institutionalised legal means to implement preferences. In most instances, however, the actual exercise of authority tends to be the exception rather than the rule. The use of authority can raise the costs of organising and require a great deal of knowledge and resources. Few actors have these assets at their disposal, and even fewer possess the legitimacy to instigate co-ordination based on authority in the first place. This, however, has not prevented authority from manifesting itself within certain sectors of humanitarian assistance. As we will see, the field of humanitarian mine action is one of the sectors in which co- ordination arrangements have been characterised by a reliance on authority. A second issue concerns the institutional context in which co-ordination takes place. Co-ordination arrangements do not occur in a vacuum, but are instead embedded in a broader institutional sector that includes alternative principles of organisation and a vast array of actors. In the course of the 1990s, the sector of humanitarian assistance has become the domain not only of ‘traditional’ UN agencies and NGOs, but also of governmental and quasi-governmental bodies, along with military and commercial enterprises, to name but a few of the various types of actors within the sector. It is no coincidence, then, that the increase in numbers and types of actors has brought with it a multiplicity of operational modes, decision-making processes and institutionalised rules. Co-ordination is only one of the ways in which the relationship between two or more actors may be structured. Aside from co-ordination, organisations and agencies may seek to engage in informal linkages, based on the shared trust between actors and their capacities for self-organisation. This can be thought of as co-operation or—to use another buzzword within the aid industry—‘partnership’.6 In contrast to co- ordination, co-operation captures the idea of two or more actors engaging in a 859 KJELL ERLING KJELLMAN ET AL voluntary, self-initiated endeavour that is not governed by formal institutionalised rules or processes. Rather than authority, trust is the mechanism that ensures that actors are in compliance with mutually held interests and objectives, without the need to resort to formalised organisational arrangements. Given that trust forms the basis for establishing and maintaining co-operation, it is also a more tenuous arrangement than co-ordination, although even the most loosely based co-operative arrangements might contain some form of agreement or provision. Humanitarian agencies are also organised around principles of competition. In recent years, the private sector has increasingly gained acceptance as a means of achieving efficiency in the provision of goods and services, including humanitarian assistance.7 Agencies, whether they like it or not, compete for tangible and intangible resources, including not only the obvious financial rewards they may accrue but also such assets as prestige, knowledge and power. NGOs are dependent on securing a flow of resources from donors; in order to do this, they must often strive to establish their position within a sector and demonstrate their worthiness as funding recipients. Governments and donors can play important roles in organising competition among organisations. By emphasising aspects such as efficiency, donors and governments help to establish the groundwork that provides the impetus for competitive behaviour and help define the institutional framework in which competition takes place. Competition can even form part of an effective co-ordination effort: the introduction of competition as a mechanism to stimulate innovation is perfectly compatible with co-ordination arrangements. Implicit in co-ordination, co-operation and competition are somewhat different notions of management and governance structures. Whereas co-ordination implies a certain amount of formalised governance structures, co-operation implies a higher degree of democratic decision making and voluntarism, with little guidance by formal structures or authority. Competition, meanwhile, implies the pursuit of tangible and intangible resources but, in contrast to co-ordination and co-operation, there are few mechanisms that serve to establish or facilitate joint agendas or strategies. In the case of co-ordination, that mechanism is authority; with co-operation, the mechanism is trust. Competition largely lacks such a mechanism, guided instead by the so-called ‘invisible hand’ posited by economic theory or the belief that actors will not behave opportunistically. The distinction between each approach is more a question of degree than kind, however, and the logic of how each of these operates will become clearer in the review of the two cases under consideration here.

Mine action centres (MACs) In the vast majority of mine-affected countries, the United Nations has assumed a lead role in the co-ordination and, until the late 1990s, implementation of HMA.8 Because mine action falls under the rubric of humanitarian assistance more generally, it operates on the same assumptions as other forms of aid. From the UN’s perspective, there is a longstanding principle of vesting national governments with responsibility for humanitarian assistance of all kinds, including the initiation, organisation, co-ordination and implementation of aid within their own borders.9 Such an approach is designed to ensure that assistance takes place in 860 CO-ORDINATING RESPONSES TO THE LANDMINE PROBLEM accordance with national interests and planning, and that it conforms to recog- nised principles of international relations. The same basic principle holds true with regard to mine action. Under ideal circumstances, national governments should function as co-ordinators of mine action. This has been common practice since the end of World War I, when governments assumed responsibility for addressing the issue of landmines and unexploded ordnance within their borders. Of course, national governments do not always have the capacity or willingness to assume such a responsibility. Weak or ineffective governments, under- developed national institutions and lack of legitimacy are only some of the potential barriers. In theory the UN is mandated to operate only after it is ‘invited’ to do so by a host nation or government. In practice the UN has interpreted its mandate more broadly and has taken a much more active role in defining the circumstances under which it can provide humanitarian aid. Initially, UN involvement in mine action proceeded in fits and starts. Beginning in the late 1980s a number of UN agencies showed an interest in mine action, in part because it became increasingly evident that their mandates required them to take action and that mine action demanded significant levels of financing and visibility.10 Responsibility for the co-ordination and facilitation of mine action fell first to the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA); from 1997 and onwards, this role was assumed by the UN Mine Action Services (UNMAS), located within the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO).11 In most cases the UN’s mandate defines the role of the UN as that of co- ordinator for all mine-related activities in a country or region.12 Applying the same principle as with other forms of humanitarian assistance, UNMAS is supposed to initiate mine action in the event that a state is weak, ineffective or specifically makes such a request. The formal institutional arrangement (or co- ordination mechanism) used to support a mine action programme in a country is that of national Mine Action Centres (MACs). While the specifics vary somewhat from case to case, the basic premise of these MACs is the creation of an organisational structure that can be subsumed under or easily transferred to existing national institutions. The role of various MACs tends to differ somewhat, but their primary areas of responsibility include the development of a national strategy for dealing with the mine threat, the initiation of surveys and assessments, the setting of standards, the accreditation of implementing agencies such as NGOs and commercial companies, and the monitoring and quality assurance of operations. In certain instances, MACs may also assume responsibility for financial control and management, although this is dependent on the specific demands of individual contexts. Nevertheless, there are certain aspects of MACs that can be said to be constants: mine action centres retain the authority to delegate tasks or areas to be cleared to implementing organisations and agencies; and MACs control all quality-assurance aspects, a particularly crucial function given the inherent risks associated with mine action. If MACs are to be effective as co-ordination bodies, a fundamental challenge lies in securing a sufficient basis of information and data upon which to prioritise, make decisions and delegate tasks. The need for information gathering and management is not unique to mine action. Indeed, virtually all sectors of humanitarian aid require a knowledge basis in order to design and implement 861 KJELL ERLING KJELLMAN ET AL interventions. From the perspective of mine action, any operation must begin by establishing the scope and location of mines and areas suspected of containing mines. As Rae McGrath, founder of Mines Advisory Group (MAG), has put it, ‘there can be no response initiative without a plan and there can be no plan without an understanding of the problem’.13 Traditionally, this has meant a reliance on ‘objective’ quantifiable measurements as a means of defining the extent of the mine problem or assessing the progress of an operation. Inspired by other sectors of humanitarian assistance, HMA has undergone a gradual transformation over the past several years, which Ananda Millard and Kristian Berg Harpviken have termed a ‘quiet revolution’.14 At the core of this transformation is a shift towards defining the mine problem in terms of the impact landmines have on human populations as opposed to the total number of mines or square meters cleared. This reorientation has inspired new approaches in an effort to develop more effective tools for impact assessment.15 From the perspective of MACs, initiating surveys and managing data forms the cornerstone to co-ordinating a well planned operation. In spite of the fact that mine action in general, and MACs more specifically, are part of a broader postwar reconstruction effort, a characteristic that has tended to define the sector as a whole is the preponderance of a military organisational culture. Much of this can be traced to the practice of recruiting and relying on personnel with military backgrounds: ‘Almost all senior and middle-level personnel in national mine action centres, relevant UN agencies, mine action NGOs and commercial agencies are serving or ex-military officers’.16 Of course, a reliance on personnel with military backgrounds is to a certain degree warranted, given that mine clearance requires a specific type of technical experience and the armed forces are one of the few places where one can gain that type of specialised knowledge; as a result, there is naturally a high percentage of personnel with a military background at the operational level. However, what is questionable is when personnel with exclusively military backgrounds and no administrative experience are used to fill managerial positions.17 These positions could quite easily be filled by staff with experience from other sectors of humanitarian aid. Since this tends not to happen, the result is that mine action is characterised by an ingrained military culture that tends to promote relatively rigid organisational structures.18 Hence, MACs also tend to be modelled on the vertical organisational structures favoured by the armed forces. Such a professional composition is not necessarily inherently problematic, but it does have the potential to limit the understanding of broader humanitarian objectives within mine action, and brings with it an approach in which authority and the possibility for sanctions may tend to dominate.19

Co-ordination in practice

The discussion now turns to an examination of HMA in Afghanistan and BiH. The first part of the analysis focuses on co-ordination within HMA, what we refer to as sectoral co-ordination, followed by a discussion of co-ordination between HMA and other humanitarian initiatives, which we term cross-sectoral co-ordination.

862 CO-ORDINATING RESPONSES TO THE LANDMINE PROBLEM

Sectoral co-ordination: MACs in Afghanistan and Bosnia and Herzegovina By the late 1980s Afghanistan had become one of the most severely mine- affected countries in the world as a result of the decade-long struggle against the invading forces of the USSR. In spite of this, there was little if any political atten- tion being paid to the issue, and it would not be before the mid-1990s that landmines would become popularised in the media and generate political interest. When the UN established a capacity to deal with the mine problem—at first called the United Nations Mine Clearance Programme (UNMPC) and later the Mine Action Centre for Afghanistan (MACA)—this was done in a relatively low- key fashion. There was a complete absence of international actors upon which to draw, and local Afghan NGOs were used as implementers, with the United Nations maintaining its role as the chief co-ordination mechanism. This was a set-up that was soon to prove successful, and the innovate nature of the programme is noteworthy. Among the steps that served to strengthen the position of MACA’s position as a co-ordinating body was the use of new types of data.20 A specialised agency within the programme—the Mine Clearance Planning Agency (MCPA)—helped pioneer the use of surveys, with a national general survey (Level One) being completed in 1993. The programme as a whole has utilised the regular application of technical surveys (Level Two) before clearance, and it produced the first systematic post-clearance impact assessment in 1998.21 The programme has also proven to be innovative with regard to technology. For instance, the implementation of the protected backhoe has contributed to increasing the pace of clearance—particularly in residential areas —without compromising security. The net effect was a significant reduction in the number of mine accidents: landmine accidents among de-miners were reduced from a total of 100 in 1993 to only a handful by 2001. Furthermore, these developments served to strengthen and solidify MACA’s position as a co- ordinating body and contributed to a sense of legitimacy among implementing partners. One of the keys to the success of MACA was that it was established utilising national Afghan NGOs from the outset.22 In other countries a persistent problem has been that international implementing agencies have effectively carved out their own niches, making the transfer of responsibility for mine action to national capacities difficult. When the national Afghan NGOs were established in 1989, the UN envisioned a stable government and an eventual transfer of the agencies to national institutions. Even when that political scenario failed to materialise, the national NGO solution still proved viable, with several of the Afghan NGOs possessing extensive technical and managerial expertise. A second key to MACA’s success stems from the fact that, when it was established, international political interest in the issue of landmines was comparatively low. In this sense, the mine action programme in Afghanistan was shielded from the drawbacks of having to accommodate the preferences of international actors, in the form of both implementing agencies and donors. National Afghan NGOs were insulated from having to compete for international prestige and resources, while they could still compete among themselves. This not only fostered the development of the programme as a whole, but also served as an effective means of generating

863 KJELL ERLING KJELLMAN ET AL variegated and innovative responses, particularly in the early years of the programme. The burden on MACA as a co-ordinating body was also reduced, since there was little need to exert authority in the interest of balancing the conflicting agendas that often characterise international NGOs and commercial companies. This success story became somewhat tainted by the end of the 1990s as MACA seemed to be exerting greater control over the programme as a whole. For instance, when the Agency for Rehabilitation and Energy Conservation in Afghanistan (AREA) placed its ‘community-based demining programme’ under the auspices of MACA beginning in 1998, it was forced to increase the size of its teams from 10 to 22 de-miners so that the output of these teams would be directly comparable to that of teams from other organisations.23 Problematically, such an increase in team-size greatly undermined the basic philosophy underlying AREA’s alternative approach. Similarly, while MACA was instrumental in building viable national NGOs, it has been somewhat reluctant to recognise their increased capacities and take the necessary steps needed to foster further innovations. MACA has also used its leverage in order to meet its organisational needs within the larger UN apparatus. One prominent example of this has been the use of national NGOs to fulfil MACA’s own personnel requirements in an effort to circumnavigate inflexible UN regulations. One potential reason MACA has sought to retain control over national NGOs is that granting them more independence risks building organisational structures that will not be self-sustainable in the future. While there may be some logic to such a contention, the price is greater control over the programme by MACA and a thwarting of the development of flexible and innovative responses. The UN has also sought to capitalise on the success of the Afghan programme, wishing to retain its strong identification with what is probably its most successful mine action endeavour. It has thus been naturally reluctant to loosen its control over the national NGOs. In essence, the Afghan programme as a whole would have been better served had MACA chosen a less authoritative approach, a strategy warranted given the increased capacities that the national NGOs have demonstrated. At least in part, MACA’s increased exercise of authority can be attributed to the changing nature of mine action internationally. The issue of landmines has, since MACA’s inception, developed into an issue capable of mobilising significant political interest and support. This means not only that there are more actors involved than previously, but also that there is increasing pressure on co- ordination bodies such as MACA to manage often conflicting political agendas and interests. The greater control assumed by MACA over the Afghan programme is significant because of the implications it has for the future. Before the US-led campaign against the Taliban and suspected terrorist networks in 2001, it was thought that most high-priority areas in Afghanistan could be cleared within seven to 10 years—although the country would still have a mine problem for decades after that. While it will take some time fully to assess the impact of the latest round of armed conflict in Afghanistan, it is certain that the country’s landmine problem will be long-term, and there is consensus among observers that a different approach than the one currently practised will be required. Before the US-led actions there had been some discussion within the programme about how 864 CO-ORDINATING RESPONSES TO THE LANDMINE PROBLEM to address this problem.24 There is recognition that HMA in Afghanistan would benefit from an approach that is at once flexible, locally based and low-cost. One suggestion is for smaller and more mobile units, able to offer the types of response needed to deal with smaller-scale tasks. The increasing degree of control by MACA over national NGOs poses a barrier to this process, and is particularly detrimental at a time when the latter’s hard-won expertise would merit just the opposite. The Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Centre (BHMAC) presents a contrast to experiences in Afghanistan. BHMAC has been plagued by a number of problems, ranging from an insufficient overview of the scope of the mine problem to allegations of corruption. Many of these problems manifested themselves from the outset. Rather than being integrated within existing national structures, BHMAC was established outside national capacities. Initially, BHMAC was to both co-ordinate and implement mine action, a dual role that ultimately proved a failure. Since late 1999, BHMAC has limited its role to co-ordination, planning, tasking and quality assurance. A fundamental problem has been that BHMAC failed to initiate a comprehensive assessment of the scope of the mine problem in BiH—particularly in its early phases—and carried out only a limited general (Level One) survey in 1998 and 1999. The resulting lack of survey data has not only constituted a key liability in the effort to establish the extent of BiH’s mine problem, but has also made it difficult for BHMAC to establish itself as a legitimate co-ordinating body, among both implementation agencies and donors. Many of the problems encountered by BHMAC can be attributed to the circumstances in which it was established. Following the Dayton Agreement at the end of 1995, there was considerable international interest and political pressure to instigate humanitarian initiatives in BiH, not least in terms of addressing the issue of landmines. From the perspective of donors and the international community, the actual clearance of mines was seen as more important than devoting resources to surveys and data gathering. The organisational structure of BHMAC was also complex and cumbersome from the beginning. Reflecting BiH’s sociocultural and political divisions, the MAC structure was originally divided into two separate entities, with FEDMAC representing the Federation of BiH and RSMAC representing the Republika Srpska. BHMAC served as a link between these two bodies, functioning as a central overarching co-ordination mechanism. In addition, there was an external Board of Donors, established to provide guidance to the MAC structure and co-chaired by the Office of the High Representative (OHR) and the Deputy Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General. BHMAC, FEDMAC and RSMAC have since merged into one entity, although this transition has been far from unproblematic. A further complicating factor have been attempts to establish HMA activities outside the MAC structure. (This is not particularly surprising given that, by the time BHMAC was established, there was far more international political focus on the provision of humanitarian aid in general and far more interest in the issue of landmines in particular. This is reflected in the enormous presence of international NGOs and commercial de-mining companies in BiH, particularly in comparison with other cases such as Afghanistan.) The first such effort was 865 KJELL ERLING KJELLMAN ET AL attempted by the World Bank, which initially envisaged support to mine action as part of a broader humanitarian initiative and subsequently channelled roughly US$18 million primarily to commercial companies, bypassing the MAC structure in the process. It later abandoned this programme, however, deeming mine clearance as falling outside its area of competence. The most significant attempt at channelling funds outside the MAC structure has been the establishment of the International Trust Fund (ITF) in 1998. The ITF has been heavily supported by the USA, which provides matching funds for all contributions, making it particularly attractive for other nations also to channel funds through the ITF. Along with the World Bank arrangement, the presence of a funding structure such as the ITF has helped encourage an influx of diverse organisations and agencies. For instance, the ITF allocates tasks through a competitive bidding process, awarding contracts to the lowest bidder. Notably, this has drawn a range of commercial de-mining companies to BiH. Although BHMAC retains responsibility for accrediting, tasking and quality control, the bidding process creates new incentives for all involved parties to relax standards in order to accommodate commercial companies that bring with them a flow of resources. This in turn places greater demands upon BHMAC as a co-ordinating body to carry out its functions effectively as it attempts to mediate the competing interests of different agencies. While it would be oversimplifying somewhat to label BHMAC a failure and MACA a success, this brief overview of each does suggest that such a general pattern holds true. From the perspective of co-ordination, several key differences between the two bodies are worth highlighting. The fact that MACA was established without significant international political pressure or donor interest facilitated its task as a co-ordinating body. In contrast, BHMAC was established in a context of great pressure from governments and donors, without much planning. Thus, while MACA was able to forge a climate of co-operation—particularly in its early phases—BHMAC encountered a situation characterised by competition for prestige and resources. The steps taken by MACA to ensure sufficient data upon which to task efficiently increased its effectiveness as a co- ordinating mechanism and ensured its legitimacy among implementing agencies. In the case of BHMAC, few such steps were taken, hampering the organisation’s effectiveness while hindering it from establishing legitimacy as the chief co- ordinating mechanism in BiH.

Cross-sectoral co-ordination: mine action as a humanitarian initiative Although mine action has frequently been viewed as a specialised, highly technical sector, there is growing recognition that it is part and parcel of a broader humanitarian initiative. For instance, landmines can pose barriers to the repatriation of refugees and the reconstruction of homes, schools and infra- structure, as well as to agencies addressing these issues. For its part, the United Nations has elaborated an overarching policy and guidelines for organisational integration for cross-sectoral co-ordination.25 According to the UN, the problem of landmines should be viewed as first and foremost a humanitarian concern. The UN makes no official distinction between various types of mine action—ie humanitarian mine action, mine action in support of operations mandated by the 866 CO-ORDINATING RESPONSES TO THE LANDMINE PROBLEM

UN Security Council or mine action in support of reconstruction and development. Rather, the UN holds that these should be interrelated with other issues of peace building and reconstruction, such as reintegration of refugees and internally displaced persons, revival of communities and development. UNMAS is to be the focal point of all mine action co-ordination within the UN, in conjunction with the Resident Co-ordinators in the field. In cases where the situation makes it necessary for the UN to initiate mine action under its own auspices, UNMAS is to seek the development of a programme in conjunction with relevant local partners, NGOs, donors and UN bodies. Such a plan should spell out objectives and priorities. When programmes are initiated in the field, co- ordination mechanisms are to be established to ensure that countrywide mine action activities are integrated, monitored and reviewed. One of these mechanisms includes a database, consisting initially of a general survey (Level One), ideally followed by a technical survey (Level Two). In terms of cross- sectoral co-ordination, UNMAS is to work closely with other UN agencies. For instance, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) is given responsibility for the sharing of information with UNMAS regarding the humanitarian implications of landmines. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is responsible for addressing the socioeconomic con- sequences of landmines, and the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) is charged with with implementing mine action programmes by contract with UN agencies such as UNMAS and UNDP. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is responsible for refugee return and is to work with United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) to develop appropriate mine-awareness programmes. While there is no shortage in the way of policy formulation, there has been little in the way of concrete co-ordination across sectors in the cases reviewed here. There has been a tendency towards compartmentalisation of tasks. In part, this stems from a general ideological position whereby mine action is primarily viewed as a technical task rather than an integral element of humanitarian assistance in general. One indication of this is that UNHCR in BiH—which was in this case assigned a lead humanitarian role—developed its own de-mining capacity in order to speed up its repatriation programme. There is also little evidence of formalised contact or interaction between HMA and other humanitarian agencies. For example, the International Consortium of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA), representing NGOs in BiH, stated that it had not sought the inclusion of mine action in any concerted co-ordination effort, because it had confidence in the work of the local MAC. In Afghanistan, cross-sectoral co-ordination takes place among the different bodies of the UN-led Principled Common Programming (PCP) process, occurring at either the national or regional level. This also means that co-ordination between UN agencies tends to be stronger than co-ordination with NGOs and other relevant entities, including the government. At the local level, formal co- ordination is relatively weak for several reasons. First, the hierarchical MACA structure, where priority-setting and other functions are high up in the system, does not encourage great initiative at the local level. Furthermore, HMA personnel do not perceive themselves as a part of the larger assistance community. When 867 KJELL ERLING KJELLMAN ET AL asked about co-ordination in general, most HMA staff—even at relatively high levels—speak almost exclusively about co-ordination within their own sector. Individual HMA agencies involved in implementing the Afghan programme do not participate actively in other co-ordinating bodies, which is understandable since their influence on priority-setting is minimal. Nonetheless, this closes off another forum for the potential reconciliation of agendas and reinforces the impression that HMA represents an exclusive sector. Substantial disadvantages arise from the low priority given to local-level co-ordination. One problem is that access to data gathered by other agencies working in the same locality is often lost. Another problem is that the relationship between agencies and local communities becomes skewed, as witnessed in Afghanistan, where one development agency works with one particular village council while an agency involved in community-based mine awareness in the same village works with another.

Conclusions Within mine action and other humanitarian and development sectors, the concept of co-ordination has gained increasing favour among policy makers and government officials. To the detriment of many humanitarian efforts, calls for greater co-ordination have often been made without an understanding of many of the dynamics that underlie the concept. In this article, we have contended that two keys to understanding co-ordination are that co-ordination arrangements harbour the potential for authority and that they are embedded within a broader institutional context. These issues are exemplified by our review of national mine action centres that were established and led by the UN in Afghanistan and BiH. The exercise of authority has worked to hinder the development of variegated approaches, while an increasingly complex organisational sector has created new demands for flexibility on the part of MACs. As HMA is increasingly becoming the domain of private commercial companies and competition, some form of central co-ordination mechanism may be necessary in order to assure that the highest possible operational standards are maintained. Nevertheless, the cases reviewed here point to some of the drawbacks associated with such an approach. Authority can create rigid hierarchical structures that thwart the development of innovative approaches. In the process, the distinct advantages in terms of knowledge, capacities and resources that a broad spectrum of actors possesses is often stifled in the face of co-ordination arrangements that do not allow for a multiplicity of approaches. The suggestion here is that the flexibility inherent in more informal co-operative efforts could be one solution, making it possible to draw on the unique qualities possessed by different actors in order to facilitate a multi- pronged approach. There has been little in the way of cross-sectoral co-ordination in the cases reviewed here. In part, we would suggest that the unusual character of HMA, particularly the predominance of military expertise, personnel and organisational culture within the sector, constitutes a potential barrier to co-ordination with non- HMA actors. In spite of recent efforts to correct this, HMA is still viewed as a highly technical sector, set apart from the broader field of humanitarian and development initiatives. We would further suggest that inflexibility acts as an 868 CO-ORDINATING RESPONSES TO THE LANDMINE PROBLEM inhibitor of co-ordination between actors involved in HMA and those drawn from other humanitarian sectors. Because cross-sectoral co-ordination implies flexibility and the development of approaches that are able to respond to complex situations, the rigidity of HMA co-ordination inhibits integration between HMA and other humanitarian initiatives. This review of co-ordination can provide some useful practical lessons for policy makers. There is clearly a need to develop variegated responses to the issue of co-ordination. Ideally, such an approach would recognise that, while there is a need to maintain a high level of standards within HMA, it is also vital to encourage and facilitate flexibility and innovation. One possible way to accomplish this is through exploring the potential for informal co-operative efforts. Co-operation may provide the roots for an approach that draws on the full capacities possessed by diverse actors. This would benefit not only HMA, but also reconstruction and humanitarian efforts more broadly. Policy makers need to recognise that competition poses a challenge to co-ordination, bringing with it not only a greater number of actors but also a new logic. Competition may have the unintended effect of encouraging an increasingly hierarchical and authoritative model of co-ordination. The challenge for co-ordination bodies is to mediate the negative effects of competition, turning the potential inherent within competition into a means of stimulating greater innovation. There is also a need to ensure that approaches are decided on the basis of adequate information and are not subject to pressures that emanate from donors or politicians. On the one hand, this involves the collection and management of specific data related to HMA, while emphasising the need for policy makers to gain a comprehensive understanding of the country contexts in which HMA takes place. On the other hand, a requirement for sufficient data also entails an understanding of the diverse interests that humanitarian efforts bring. Such an understanding should include an overview of political motives, types of actors, the logic they are guided by and how these affect co-ordination. While acquiring and analysing such information can place great demands on policy makers, the evidence reviewed in this article suggests that the benefits from such an approach far outweigh its costs.

Notes

This article is the result of research conducted by the Assistance to Mine-Affected Communities (AMAC) project at PRIO (http://www.prio.no/amac). AMAC acknowledges the financial support of the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade and the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Comments on an earlier version of this article by Sayed Aqa, Gary Littlejohn and Kjell Björck, along with those by two anonymous reviewers for Third World Quarterly, are greatly appreciated. We also wish to acknowledge the co-operation of mine action agencies and staff, and the generosity and willingness of mine-affected populations in assisting with our inquiries. This article develops and refines ideas first presented in K B Harpviken, A S Millard, K E Kjellman & A Strand, Sida’s Contributions to Humanitarian Mine Action, Final Report, 01/06, Sida, 2001, in which we describe co-ordination arrangements in Afghanistan, BiH and Kosovo. 1 Throughout this article, we use the terms ‘HMA’ and ‘mine action’ interchangeably to refer to the range of activities aimed at mitigating the effects of landmines on human populations. It is worth noting that there is currently some criticism of the term HMA, which some see as misrepresentative for different reasons. One argument is that all mine action is by nature humanitarian, and therefore HMA is 869 KJELL ERLING KJELLMAN ET AL

a tautology. The counterargument is that much mine action is carried out for purposes that are not necessarily humanitarian, as when the military clears mines as part of a larger war effort. A second argument takes as a starting point that the term ‘humanitarian’ connotes short-term life-saving interventions of an emergency character (as it partly does in the limited perspective of aid budgets and policies), as opposed to interventions aiming at fostering development or promoting human rights, for example. However, in everyday usage (as well as in the definitions contained in dictionaries) ‘humanitarian’ is much wider, connoting the promotion of human welfare more generally, which is fully compatible with aims other than short-term life-rescuing operations. We therefore choose to retain the designation HMA throughout this article. 2 See A Donini, The Policies of Mercy: UN Coordination in Afghanistan, Mozambique, and Rwanda, Occasional Paper no 22, Providence, RI: Thomas J Watson Jr Institute for International Studies, 1999, p 13. 3 B Hvinden, Divided Against Itself: A Study of Integration in Welfare Bureaucracy, Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1994, p 5. 4 Donini, The Policies of Mercy, p 12. 5 J Bennett, ‘Inter-agency coordination in emergencies’, in D Robinson, T Hewitt & J Harriss (eds), Managing Development: Understanding Inter-Organizational Relationships, London: Sage, 2000, p 172. 6 J Harriss, ‘The principles and practice of co-operation and partnership’, in Robinson et al, Managing Development, p 226. 7 J Chataway, ‘The private sector and competitive markets in development’, in Robinson et al, Managing Development, pp 67Ð88. 8 Following the findings of the influential 1997 United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) reports, an international policy consensus has emerged contending that these two functions be kept separate. See R Eaton, C Horwood & N Niland, Study Report: The Development of Indigenous Mine Action Capacities, New York: DHA, 1997. 9 United Nations, ‘The Strengthening of the Coordination of the Humanitarian Emergency Assistance of the United Nations’, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 46/182, 1991. 10 C Horwood, Humanitarian Mine Action: The First Decade of a New Sector in Humanitarian Aid, Relief and Rehabilitation Network Papers no 32, London: Overseas Development Institute, 2000. 11 Ibid, pp 10Ð11. 12 In certain cases, such as during UN peacekeeping operations or in emergency situations when a local government is absent, the UN may also implement mine action. However, the respective mandates are unclear, and there is often a great degree of ambiguity regarding the UN’s role. 13 R McGrath, Landmines and Unexploded Ordnance: A Resource Book, London: Pluto Press, 2000, p 85. 14 A S Millard & K B Harpviken, Reassessing the Impact of Humanitarian Mine Action: Illustrations from Mozambique, PRIO Report 1/2000, Oslo: PRIO, 2000. 15 For a critical review of current approaches to impact assessment in mine action, see K B Harpviken, A S Millard & K E Kjellman, ‘Measures for mines: impact assessment in humanitarian mine action’, Third World Quarterly, 24 (5), 2003, pp 889Ð908. 16 Horwood, Humanitarian Mine Action, p 31. 17 Ibid. See also M Ruberry, ‘Behind the scenes of mine action’, Journal of Mine Action, 6 (1), 2002, pp 90Ð93, at http://maic.jmu.edu/journal/6.1/notes/ruberry/ruberry.htm, accessed 22 July 2003. 18 For instance, Hugo Slim has argued that there are considerable cultural differences between civilian and military organisations. H Slim, ‘The stretcher and the drum: civil–military relations in peace support operations’, in J Ginifer (ed), Beyond the Emergency: Development within UN Peace Missions, London: Frank Cass, 1997, pp 123Ð140. 19 As Pamela Aall, Daniel Miltenberger and Thomas G Weiss have argued: ‘Almost as if they were different countries, they speak different languages, saturating their documents and conversations with terms, acronyms, and jargon that mean little or nothing to the others. Each has its own philosophy, methods of operation, and organizational culture—and these may not merely differ but actually clash.’ Aall et al, Guide to IGOs, NGOs, and the Military in Peace and Relief Operations, Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace Press, 2000. 20 See Mine Clearance Planning Agency, ‘Socio-economic impact study of mine action operations Afghanistan: interim report’, Islamabad: Mine Action Centre for Afghanistan (MACA), 1998. 21 General surveys (Level One) seek to provide a basis for planning through updated information on the nature and extent of hazardous areas, and the impact that hazardous areas may have on populations. The general survey should also include an inventory of existing national capacities and the feasibility of implementing mine action. Technical (Level Two) surveys seek to provide topographical and detailed technical information (eg soil composition, depth of mines) on identified areas in order to assist in the planning of operations. See United Nations Mine Action Services (UNMAS), ‘International

870 CO-ORDINATING RESPONSES TO THE LANDMINE PROBLEM

mine action standards (IMAS)’, New York: UNMAS, 2001, at http://www.mineactionstandards.org/imas. htm, accessed 21 July 2003. 22 For a review of the factors that contributed to MACA’s success, see K B Harpviken, ‘Breaking new ground: Afghanistan’s response to landmines and unexploded ordnance’, Third World Quarterly, 23 (4), 2002, pp 931Ð943. 23 K B Harpviken, ‘Towards community-based demining? AREA’s project in Nangrahar Province, Afghanistan’, Landmines Memo no 3, Peshawar: Assistance to Mine-Affected Communities (AMAC), May 1999, at http://www.prio.no/amac. 24 B van Ree, ‘A concept for demining of low priority areas in Afghanistan’, Report to UNOCHA, OCHA, 1995. 25 UNMAS, ‘Mine action and effective coordination: the United Nations policy’, New York: UNMAS, 1998, at http://www.mineaction.org/unmas/_refdocs.cfm?doc_ID=280, accessed 22 July 2003.

871 Postcolonial Studies: culture, politics, economy

EDITORS Dipesh Chakrabarty, University of Chicago, USA Michael Dutton, University of Melbourne, Australia Leela Gandhi, La Trobe University, Australia Sanjay Seth, La Trobe University, Australia

Postcolonial Studies is the journal of the Institute of Postcolonial studies, Melbourne Postcolonial Studies is the first journal specifically aimed at publishing work which explores the various facetstextual, figural, spatial, historical, political and economic of the colonial encounter, and the ways in which this encounter shaped the West and non-West alike A growing academic literature, recognises that the colonial encounter was a seminal event in the history of both the West and the non-Western world, shaping culture and literature, politics and history From being the provenance of the area studies scholar, it has become the site of numerous investigations from many disciplines, as well as a theoretical perspective from which to view a variety of concerns Postcolonialism is the name which such investigations have acquired, and Postcolonial Studies provides a forum for them

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