Acting As One? Co-Ordinating Responses to the Landmine Problem
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Third World Quarterly, Vol 24, No 5, pp 855–871, 2003 Acting as one? Co-ordinating responses to the landmine problem KJELL ERLING KJELLMAN, KRISTIAN BERG HARPVIKEN, ANANDA S MILLARD & ARNE STRAND ABSTRACT This article looks at co-ordination within humanitarian mine action (HMA), and co-ordination between HMA and other humanitarian and development initiatives. The discussion focuses specifically on the role of UN-led Mine Action Centres (MACs) and the analysis draws on case studies of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Afghanistan. A contention throughout is that MACs often employ a rigid approach to co-ordination. This constricts the flexibility of mine action organisations, limits the development of creative initiatives and poses a barrier to co-ordination between HMA and other humanitarian initiatives. A second point pursued is that co-ordination arrangements are embedded in a broader institutional context, and this context has in turn the potential to impact on co- ordination. The analysis presented here suggests a number of implications for HMA in general, together with a number of policy considerations. The article concludes by offering some thoughts for the future on the importance of effective co-ordination arrangements both within HMA as a sector and between HMA and other sectors of humanitarian assistance. How can co-ordination practices facilitate more effective responses to the problem of landmines? How can actors involved in mine action facilitate co- ordination with other sectors of humanitarian assistance? Moreover, what constitute practical guidelines for improving co-ordination efforts in the future? One of the most acute issues facing regions that have experienced armed conflict is that of developing an adequate response to the problem of landmines. Because landmines are such an immediate danger to individuals and communities, an imperative has been to develop an encompassing set of activities designed to minimise their effects, which has become known as humanitarian mine action (HMA).1 Aside from the obvious physical dangers posed by landmine contamina- tion, landmines also represent a barrier both to long-term development efforts and to short-term emergency interventions. In the absence of a carefully designed and integrated overarching programme, the threat from landmines Kjell Erling Kjellman is in the Department of Sociology and Human Geography at the University of Oslo, PO Box 1096 Blindern, NO-0317 Oslo, Norway. Email: [email protected]. Kristian Berg Harpviken is at the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, Fuglehauggata 11, NO-0260 Oslo, Norway. Email: [email protected]. Ananda S Millard is at the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), 7bis avenue de la Paix, PO Box 1300, CH-1211 Geneva 1, Switzerland. Email: [email protected]. Arne Strand is at the Christian Michelsen Institute (CMI), PO Box 6033 Postterminalen, NO-5892 Bergen, Norway. Email: [email protected]. ISSN 0143-6597 print/ISSN 1360-2241 online/03/050855-17 ᭧ 2003 Third World Quarterly DOI: 10.1080/0143659032000132894 855 KJELL ERLING KJELLMAN ET AL blunts effective humanitarian responses in complex emergencies and thwarts the impact of long-term development initiatives. An ongoing challenge for actors involved in HMA and other humanitarian sectors is for different sectors to work together in a way that recognises the unique character of mine action. Within both HMA and other sectors of humanitarian assistance, the concept of co-ordination has gained increasing favour among policy makers, government officials and donors as a way of organising the delivery of aid. In part, this reflects the complexity associated with humanitarian assistance. Humanitarian mine action and development efforts bring with them a parade of diverse actors, including various UN agencies, governmental and nongovernmental organisa- tions and, more recently, private commercial companies. Responses must be flexible and innovative on the one hand, while efficient and cost-effective on the other. Operations must ensure the safety of both operators and affected popula- tions. In order to be successful, interventions must find ways of meeting the needs of target groups and beneficiaries, while effectively utilising the unique assets different actors are able to bring to a situation. The sometimes conflicting political interests of international and national forces must be balanced and, not least, the preferences of donors must be accommodated. As a response to this myriad of challenges, ‘co-ordination’ has become a favourite buzzword within humanitarian assistance. Yet, there has been a growing realisation that co-ordination efforts have not always been particularly successful by any measurement, no matter how well intentioned they may have been. To even the most casual observer, it has become apparent that many humanitarian initiatives have failed to provide for the basic needs of target groups; it is also no secret that resources have been ineffectively used or that goals and strategies have often been dictated by political pressure. Co-ordination bodies have often been unable to reconcile the disparate goals and strategies actors have, and at times have proven rigid, reluctant or simply unable to adapt to the changing needs of dynamic contexts. For their part, donors have further complicated well-meant efforts through ill-timed increases or decreases in funding, or by pressuring for agendas that may not be suited to the needs of aid recipients. Within both HMA and other sectors of humanitarian assistance, the net outcome has been the ineffective delivery of assistance and wasted resources. Through a review of mine action in Afghanistan and Bosnia and Herzegovina, this article takes a critical look at some of the central issues within co-ordination. How have agencies and other key actors adapted to the unique challenges posed by HMA? To what extent has there been co-ordination between HMA and other forms of humanitarian assistance? What are some of the barriers preventing effective co-ordination, and what practical guidelines can be suggested for improving co-ordination efforts? There is a prevailing view that mine action must be governed by effective co-ordination mechanisms, and that co-ordination between mine action and other humanitarian initiatives is imperative in both short-term interventions and long-term development efforts. Effective co- ordination is viewed as crucial for several reasons. On the one hand, this stems from the very nature of HMA, which demands technical proficiency and the need for quality control by an independent actor. On the other hand, mine action has become politically attractive, and as a result has drawn large numbers of diffuse 856 CO-ORDINATING RESPONSES TO THE LANDMINE PROBLEM actors and involved the mobilisation of significant amounts of resources, increasing the demand for co-ordination in order to ensure an effective and efficient response. This has not only made co-ordination within HMA more important, but has also emphasised the need for creative and flexible co- ordination between HMA and other humanitarian and development efforts. There are, of course, many factors that serve to complicate co-ordination. In this article, we point to two broad sets of factors that are particularly fundamental. First, co-ordination arrangements contain the potential for the exercise of authority by a single actor, often leading to the development of rigid co-ordination bodies unable to adapt to changing circumstances. Second, co- ordination can be said to take place in a broader institutional setting that includes other inter-organisational principles aside from co-ordination, complicating the role of co-ordination bodies. A point emphasised throughout this article is that authority and the broader institutional context constitute particular challenges for co-ordination, and that an understanding of each of these aspects can help inform the planning of co-ordination efforts in the future. Contrasting experiences: Afghanistan and Bosnia and Herzegovina The discussion here looks at two of the more high-profile cases within HMA— Afghanistan and Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) drawing on interviews with representatives from HMA and mine-affected populations conducted during field visits to each country. The analysis focuses on what has become the chief co- ordination mechanism within HMA—national Mine Action Centres (MACs) that are established and led by the UN. As part of their mandate, MACs are responsible for the co-ordination and quality control of all mine action within a country or region, are vested with the authority to accredit and delegate tasks to mine action agencies, and are partially responsible for facilitating co-ordination between HMA and other humanitarian and development initiatives. The analysis draws on fieldwork conducted during 2000 and 2001. The material gathered during visits to each country includes a relevant document review, interviews with UN, NGO and government representatives, and interviews with people affected by the presence of landmines in their communities. The timeframe for the analysis focuses primarily on the period before September 2001. While BiH can be said to have been characterised by relative stability since the cessation of armed conflict in 1995, the case of Afghanistan is considerably different, particularly in the wake of the US-led military intervention in the autumn of 2001. As is often typical in the aftermath of armed conflict, the situation in Afghanistan since