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Kargil Vijay Diwas KARGIL VIJAY DIWAS The Kargil War also known as the Kargil conflict, was an armed conflict between India and Pakistan that took place between May and July 1999 in the Kargil district of Kashmir and elsewhere along the Line of Control (LOC). In India, the conflict is also referred to as Operation Vijay, which was the name of the Indian operation to clear the Kargil sector. The town of Kargil is located at two hundred and five km from Srinagar, facing the Northern Areas across the LOC. Kargil was the first war between India and Pakistan after the one in 1971 which led to the formation of Bangladesh as a separate country. The cause of the war was the infiltration of Pakistani soldiers disguised as Kashmiri militants into positions on the Indian side of the LOC, which serves as the de facto border between the two states. The war took place despite the two nations signing the Shimla Agreement which stated that no armed conflict shall take place on the said boundary. The Indian and Pakistani armies fought the Kargil War in May-July 1999. On 3 rd May, Pakistani intrusion in Kargil was reported by local shepherds.Infiltrations was first noticed in Dras, Kaksar, and Mushkoh sectors.In the mid of May, Indian Army moved in more troops from Kashmir Valley to Kargil Sector. Atal Bihari Vajpayee-led NDA government was in power at the time of this war. India launched 'Operation Vijay' to clear the Kargil sector of infiltration by Pakistani soldiers and Kashmiri militants on the Indian side of the Line of Control. The Indian Air Force's role in acting jointly with the Indian Army ground troops during the war was aimed at flushing out regular and irregular troops of the Pakistani Army from Indian Positions in the Kargil sector along the Line of Control. On 26 May IAF launches air strikes against infiltrators .This particular operation the code name Operation Safed Sagar was a major part of the Kargil war. India used its air power at the height of 32,000 feet for the first time. From identifying the Pakistani troops and Mujahideens to interdiction, all the actions were performed well by the pilots and engineers despite just one week of training. On 6th june Indian Army launched its major offensive in Kargil. On 3 June Indian Army secured Tololing in Dras and on 9th ,two key positions in the Batalik sector. On 4 July the Army recaptured the Tiger Hill after an 11-hour battle. On July 7 th, Jubar Heights in Batalik was also recaptured. During the initial stages of the war, Pakistan blamed the fighting entirely on independent Kashmiri insurgents, but documents left behind by casualties and later statements by Pakistan's Prime Minister and Chief of Army Staff showed involvement of Pakistani paramilitary forces, led by General Ashraf Rashid. lndia also released intercepts of conversation between Pakistan Army Chief Gen. Pervez Musharraf, and Chief of General Staff Lt. Gen. Aziz Khan as proof of Pakistan Army's involvement. PM Atal Bihari Vajpayee declared the operation successful on July 14, and the the complete eviction of Pakistani troops and infiltrators was formally announcd on July 26, 1999. India lost more than 500 soldiers on the Kargil territory while reports from Pakistan states that more than 3000 of their soldiers,mujahideens and infiltrates died. The war is one among the recent examples of, high-altitude warfare in mountainous terrain and as such posed significant logistical problems for the combating sides. It is also the sole instance of direct, conventional warfare between nuclear states. There were three major phases to the Kargil War.First, Pakistani forces infiltrated into the Indian-controlled section of Kashmir and occupied strategic locations enabling it to bring NH1 within range of its artillery fire. The next stage consisted of India discovering the infiltration and mobilising forces to respond to it.The final stage involved major battles by Indian and Pakistani forces resulting in India recapturing most of the Territories held by Pakistani forces and the subsequent withdrawal of Pakistani forces back across the LOC after international pressure. It was the Indian army who stood as the real piller of power, that finally lead us to this victory. They placed their lives on the line for the nation and this readiness of them to risk their lives and limps that deserves the respect of every citizen. Though soldiers are representatives of our country and guardians of peace during the time of war, many of us do not realise their sacrifice. In spite of their selfless action they are often paid a pittence. Remembering them just in any occasion is not enough. We should pay them back for their sacrifice by moulding ourselves into better citizens who have the potential to uplift the nation with our selfless attitude. Pay your tribute to the martyrs who died in the war zone and slept forever in the lap of mother earth sacrifing their lives for the sake of our country. May their death never go in vein. Let these soldiers live eternally in our hearts. KL 19 SWA 151734 CPL JYOTHI ROY ALPHONSA COLLEGE PALA NCC 5 KERALA GIRLS BN NCC CHANGANACHERRY .
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