Socio -Economic Rehabilitation of Refugees in

Toba Tek Singh During 1947 -1961

NAYYER ABBAS

Registration No.

17-GCU-PHD-HIS-11

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

GC UNIVERSITY LAHORE

ii

Socio - Economic Rehabilitation of Refugees in Toba Tek Singh During 1947-1961

Submitted to GC University Lahore in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

IN HISTORY

By

NAYYER ABBAS

Registration No.

17-GCU-PHD-HIS-11

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

GC UNIVERSITY LAHORE iii iv

v vi

vii

CONTENTS

Acknowledgement ...... ix

Abstract ...... xii

List of Abbreviations ...... xiv

List of Maps ...... xvi

List of Tables ...... xvii

List of Illustrations ...... xviii

INTRODUCTION ...... 1

0.1 Significance of the Research ...... 3 0.2 Research Questions ...... 4 0.3 Chapterization ...... 5 0.4 Literature Review...... 7 0.5 Sources and Methodology...... 14

CHAPTER 1 TOBA TEK SINGH DURING COLONIAL PERIOD: CONSTRUCTING ‘HYDRAULIC’ SOCIETY IN CHENAB COLONY (1900-1947)...... 16

1.1 Conceptualizing the Development of Canal System and Establishment of Canal Colonies in Punjab: Their Underlying Motives ...... 18 1.2 Establishment of Lower Chenab (Lyallpur) Colony ...... 25 1.2.1 Major objectives...... 27 1.2.2 Selection of Grantees ...... 29 1.3 Lower Chenab Colony as Pattern Setter ...... 36 1.4 Toba Tek Singh: Pre-Colonial Development ...... 40 1.5 Agricultural Colonization in Toba Tek Singh ...... 42

Conclusion ...... 47

CHAPTER 2 PARTITION AND MIGRATION: PATTERNS AND TRAJECTORIES 1947-1948...... 49

2.1 Decolonization of India and Great Migration 1947 ...... 50 2.1.1 Muslim separatism in India and demand of Pakistan ...... 53 2.1.2 Partition of Punjab and Bengal ...... 63 2.1.3 Partition and Ensuing Communal Tensions ...... 69 2.2 Conceptualizing Factors Leading to Migration in 1947 ...... 74 viii

2.3 The Phenomenon of Forced Migration ...... 76 2.4 Patterns of Migration of Non-Muslims Communities from Toba Tek Singh ...... 78 2.4.1 Migration Process from Rural and Urban areas of Toba Tek Singh to India ...... 80

Conclusion ...... 86

CHAPTER 3 THE STATE POLICY OF REFUGEES REHABILITATION 1947- 1961...... 88

3.1 The Government Response to the violence and Refugee Crisis ...... 89 3.2 Migration to East and West Pakistan and Demographic Shift ...... 93 3.3 The Growing Tensions between the Muslim Migrants and Local Sikh and Hindu Communities ...... 99 3.4 Rehabilitation of Refugees in Pakistan After 1947...... 102 3.4.1 The Government Policy of Rehabilitation ...... 104 3.4.2 Policy of Nationalization of Land in West Punjab ...... 107 3.4.3 The Rehabilitation Policy: Its Execution ...... 109 3.5 Rehabilitation of Refugees in Toba Tek Singh: Process, Policies and Execution ...... 114 3.5.1 Muslim Refugees of Chak 331/JB and Town Toba Tek Singh and the Government Response to Their Rehabilitation ...... 117 3.5.2 The Ordeal of Refugees in the Refugee Camps ...... 118 3.5.3 The Refugees Perspective of Migration ...... 119 3.5.4 The Refugees Nostalgic Feelings with ancestral localities ...... 120 3.5.5 Choice of Toba Tek Singh as Permanent Abode ...... 121 3.5.6 The Phenomenon of Corruption in Process of Rehabilitation and Responses of the Refugees...... 122

Conclusion ...... 129

CHAPTER 4: SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACT OF REHABILITATION OF REFUGEES IN TOBA TEK SINGH 1947-1961 ...... 131

4.1 Refugees Rehabilitation and Its Impacts on Local Politics ...... 132 4.2 Refugees Rehabilitation in Toba Tek Singh: A Historical Appraisal ...... 136 4.3 Assessing the Impacts of Refugees Rehabilitation in Rural and Urban Areas in Toba Tek Singh ...... 140 4.3.1 Refugees Rehabilitation and peasantry ...... 143 4.3.2 The Reaction of Local Landowners towards Muslim Refugees ...... 152 4.4 Role of the Government in Refugee’s Rehabilitation and the Expectations of the Refugees ...... 168 Conclusion ...... 172 Illustrations ...... 177 Appendix ...... 190 ix

Glossary of Vernacular Terms ...... 205 Bibliography ...... 210 Acknowledgement

It is a matter of pleasure to acknowledge the generous support of my professors, colleagues, friends, family and staff of different libraries and archives for completion of this dissertation, though it is quite difficult to mention them all here.

I am grateful to my supervisor Dr. Tahir Mahmood whose continuous help throughout the project made it possible. From discussions around the different ideas to the meticulous reading of several draft of the thesis, he supported me with lot of patience. He enhanced my understanding to town and village level research techniques. Whenever I was stuck to a complex situation during dissertation writing he came and rescued me with his knowledge. His open arm and friendly behaviour helped and enhanced my learning capabilities.

It is indeed important to mention six months fellowship awarded me through the International Research Support Initiative Programme (IRSIP) by Higher Education Commission (HEC) of Pakistan. Under this programme I spent six months at Royal Holloway University of London under co-supervision of Prof. Dr. Sara Ansari. She red first draft of my thesis and gave valuable feedback. Whenever I sent her manuscript of any chapter she replied without any delay even though she was very busy with her academic endeavors. Her important suggestions proved very helpful to improve my thesis. I am really thankful to her gracious support.

I owe intellectual debts to Dr. Hussain Ahmad Khan who shared his valuable thoughts at the crucial synopsis writing stage and guided me with his scholarly insights regarding my work. I am equally indebted to Professor Dr. Ian Talbot and Dr. Pippa Virdee for their much appreciated comments and suggestion on my synopsis. Their encouraging remarks were the real motivational force behind the successful start and completion of this project. Their suggestions helped me a lot during different stages of my research and thesis writing process.

I am highly indebted to my teachers, senior colleagues and friends at GC University, Lahore, Prof. Dr. Tahir Kamran, Prof. Dr. Farhat Mahmud, Dr. Muhammad Ibrahim, Dr. Irfan Waheed Usmani, Dr. Tahir Jamil, Frzana Arshad, Saeed Ahmad, Naila Pervaiz, Noor Rehman Mahsud, Huma Pervaiz and Ayaz Gull, x

Shifa Saher, Mohsin Ahmad Khan, Ayesha Naeem. My teachers at GC University Lahore, especially Professor Tahir Kamran, shaped my critical historical understanding. Dr. Tahir Mahmood and Huma accompanied me my several visits to Punjab Archives Lahore, Commissioner Record Office Lahore, Punjab Public Library, Faridkot House Central Record Office/Library and many other places in Lahore for collection of data.

I am thankful to Asad Ali Abbas, Ahmad Hassan Tawari, Zaheer Ahmad and Muratab Ali for helping me during interviews from Toba Tek Singh, Kamalia and Gojra. I cannot forget their unconditional support during my visits to these areas. Without their generous support, from selection of the sample of interviewees from different Chaks and urban areas to the final conduction of interviews, I could not develop the oral accounts for my projects.

I am grateful to my host Mohsin Ahmad and his family in Edgware, London for their generous hospitality. Throughout my six months stay in Edgware, Mohsin helped me in one way or the other. Especially he enlightened my understanding about Mohajir dilemma in Pakistan because of his Karachi urban background. He also gave me useful information and suggestions in planning of my several visits to British Library, SOAS, Royal Holloway, the National Archives, Cambridge, and Southampton. Meetings with him and his two kids, Rabi and Sabi, especially on weekends, were a source of relaxation and amusement after whole week of reading and writing.

The staff of the following libraries, archives and institutions is the unsung heroes of this research project. The Colony Record Office Toba Tek Singh, Central Record Room Faridkot House Lahore, Commissioner Record Office Faisalabad, Commissioner Record Office Lahore, Farid Kot House Library, Punjab Public Library Lahore, The Diyal Singh Trust Library Lahore, The Central and Postgraduate Libraries GC University Lahore, Library of Agriculture University Faisalabad, The Punjab Archive Lahore, The British Library London, The Cambridge Library Cambridge, The SOAS Library, The Library Royal Holloway, The National Archives London.

I never forget the open arm welcome of Fakhar Bilal at the British Library. He gave the first hand information about the sources in the library about my project. He xi also introduced me with other research fellows from Pakistan or abroad conducting research in History at the British library. I am grateful to his support. I am also thankful to Rana Muhammad Abrar Ahmad from Punjab University who helped me in collocation of primary sources from Faisalabad. He also gave me useful feedback on my research during my meetings with him.

Khuram Chohan from Department of Geography GC University Lahore helped me in digitization of the old maps. These maps could not read and obviously not used as-it-is in the thesis. I am grateful to him for his support and time. I am indebted to Dr. Haider Ali for his valuable feedback on my thesis. He also helped me in translating the Punjabi poems into English.

In the last but not least the support of my family remained with me throughout my project. Without prayers of my parents and support of brothers, sisters it would have been difficult to complete this project. I am also thankful to my wife for her support and suggestions.

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Abstract

The partition of 1947 affected the socio-economic position of the Punjab at large scale. It has differential impacts on the different areas of the Punjab. These varied impacts are historically rooted and desired a careful grass-root level academic research. To challenge general standard narrative of uniform migration process and homogenous rehabilitation of the refugees, this research is focused on canal colony areas in the West Punjab by taking Toba Tek Singh as a case study. The existing literature is confined to provincial and districts level accounts and desired extension to tehsil and town level understanding of this very complex process of migration and rehabilitation of the refugees.

The partitions of Punjab and Bengal, in the wake of the partition of 1947, was the major [though not the only] factor of violence, communal massacre and forced migration across the border between India and Pakistan. Apart from Bengal, where

Pakistan-India border went through less catastrophic change and real migration started in 1950s, in Punjab the migration process was spontaneous and started even before

August 1947. Because of migration of the Hindu and Sikh population and resettlement of millions of Muslims refugees from India, West Punjab had gone through massive socio-economic change after the partition. Rehabilitation of the refugees, after the partition, was shown as the top priority by the government of

Pakistan, considering it ‘lurking dangers’ to the very existence of Pakistan. Most of these phenomena [the partition, refugee crisis, failure of democracy etc.] were interpreted with the help of ‘high politics’ approach, based on national or provincial level understanding. District and tehsil level micro socio-economic and political xiii changes are generally overlooked because of variety of reasons, especially, comparatively a difficult research terrain. During last fifteen years or so West Punjab has witnessed considerable attention by the historians in terms of the partition and its aftermath. But most of the research is still confined to border or industrial cities, like,

Lahore, Gujranwala, Sialkot, Faisalabad. Especially the canal colony areas are generally overlooked.

This thesis is influenced by the project ‘The Subcontinent Divided: A New

Beginning’ which intends to write ‘a New History’ of the partition through the lens of

‘human dimension approach’. Through empirical based historical study and oral history techniques we counter-checked the established narrative of partition-related refugee’s rehabilitation projects and analyzed socio-economic transformation in

Punjab after the partition. Every day state approach also has been used to understand the changes in day to day affairs after the partition in Toba Tek Singh.

The case studies of three villages and town of Toba Tek Singh in tehsil Toba

Tek Singh [district Lyallpur] proved very helpful to understand socio-economic changes in Lower Chenab Colony before and after the partition. The Lower Chenab

Colony was the richest canal colony in west Punjab in which non-Muslim [Sikhs and

Hindus] had dominant share in agrarian economy. They were replaced with Muslim refugees after the partition. This thesis helps us to understand the grass root level socio-economic changes to further comprehend provincial and national level issues. It also provides in-depth information about; factors of migration of Hindu and Sikh communities, role of the government in the refugee’s rehabilitation, local-refugee relationships and refugee identity in Toba Tek Singh. This locality based information not only enhanced existing understanding about the partition and its aftermath but also xiv question the official narrative of smooth and efficient refugees’ rehabilitation process in post partition period.

List of Abbreviations

AF Akali Fauj [Akali Army]

BC Boundary Commission

CB Colony Branch

CLO Chief Liaison Officers [for evacuation of refugees]

CO Colonization Officer

CSO Civil Supply Officer

CLO Chief Liaison Officer [for evacuation of refugees]

DC Deputy Commissioner

DCRO Deputy Commissioner’s Record Office

DLO District Liaison Officer [for evacuation of refugees]

FR Final Report [the Chenab Colony Settlement]

GoP Government of Punjab

GRRF Governors’ Refugees Relief Fund

GMFC Grow More Food Campaign

JDC Joint Defence Council

LCCC Lower Chenab Canal Colony xv

LCCP Lower Chenab Canal Project

MLNG Muslim League National Guard

MEO Military Evacuation Organization

MLA Member Legislative Assembly

MPA Moveable Property Agreement

PBF Punjab Boundary Force

PBC Punjab Boundary Commission

PERO Pakistan Economic Rehabilitation Ordinance

PPEPO Pakistan Protection of Evacuee Property Ordinance

PRRC Pakistan Refugees Rehabilitation Corporation

RD Rechna Doab

RSS Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangh

SR Settlement Report

SDO Sub Division Officer

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LIST OF MAPS

1. India 1945-1947 ...... xx 2. The Punjab: At the transfer of power, 1947 ...... xxi 3. Punjab 1947 and Communal breakdown ...... xxii 4. The Punjab Canal Colonies ...... xxiii 5. Districts of Punjab Province ...... xxiv 6. District Toba Tek Singh [present Tehsil-Wise] ...... xxv 1.1 Sandal Bar ...... 18 1.2 Process of Colonization in the Punjab ...... 29 1.3 Lyallpur District ...... 33 1.4 Plan of Assessment Circle, Jhang Branch...... 44 2.1 Illustrating Hindustan, Pakistan, Sikhistan and the Indian States [1943] ...... 60 2.2 Indian Partition 1947 and principal flows of refugees across the Pakistan-India borders...... 63 2.3 Partition of Bengal 1947 ...... 69 2.4 Strength of different volunteer organizations in India (1943) ...... 71 3.1 Main Streams of Refugees (figures in thousands) ...... 96 3.2 Town Toba Tek Singh ...... 115 3.3 Villages/Chaks in Toba Tek Singh ...... 116 3.4 Chak No. 331 JB [ShairGardh/Athwal] ...... 116 4.1 Toba Tek Singh Town and Neighbouring Chaks (1952) ...... 170 4.2 Land Required for Installation of Industry in Toba Tek Singh 1952 ...... 171

xvii

LIST OF TABLES 1.1 Percentage of Canal irrigation in different districts of Punjab ...... 20 1.2 Canal Systems in Punjab ...... 21 1.3 Canal Colonies in Punjab ...... 24 1.4 Assessment circles in Lower Chenab Colony, showing total and allotted and cultivated area ...... 26 1.5 Punjab Canal Colony Districts, Density of Population, 1881 and 1941 (p.s.m) ...... 30 1.6 Chenab Colony: Allotment of Land ...... 32 1.7 Population variation in Lower Chenab Colony and Lyallpur District 1891- 1941 and Statistics of Immigration for Lower Chenab Colony from Different Districts of The Punjab ...... 34 1.8 Distribution of Land among different caste of immigrants in the Lower Chenab Colony...... 35 1.9 Gross Receipts, Net Revenues (Excluding Interest) and Net Profit or Losses (Including Interests) by different canal systems in Punjab ...... 38 1.10 Annual Net Revenues (excluding interest) and Net Profits (including interest) as a percentage of Total Capital Outlay by different canal systems in Punjab ...... 39 1.11 Gross Receipts and Net Profits on area irrigated by different canal systems in Punjab ...... 39 1.12 Toba Tek Singh: Surveyed and Assessed Area (in acres) 1906-07 ...... 44 1.13 Toba Tek Singh: Religions (1911) ...... 45 1.14 Town’s Population in Toba Tek Singh: Religions (1941) ...... 46 1.15 Population of Tehsil Toba Tek Singh (1941) ...... 47 3.1 Zones of India important for migration of Muslim community to Pakistan .. 94 3.2 Refugees in Pakistan with respect to their Origins ...... 95 3.3 Evacuee Figures up to 22 nd November 1947 ...... 99 3.4 Distribution of Landowner’s holdings (1939) ...... 109 3.5 Categorization of West Punjab MLA’s regarding their reputation in allotments and refugees rehabilitation ...... 123 4.1 Claimants of Chak 331JB with range of initial verification to final confirmation ...... 146 4.2 Extract of Jamabindi Town Toba Tek Singh, Chak No 326JB showed ownership of property ...... 163 4.3 Proportion of the Mohajirs : Punjab & Bahawalpur State ...... 164 4.4 Comparison of Selected Tehsils in terms of increase in Population 1931-1951 ...... 165

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LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

1. The Bar before colonization Punjab Canal Gazetteers, Vol. 1, Lower Jhelum Canal, 1920 (Lahore, Government printing, 1921) 2. The Bar after colonization Punjab Canal Gazetteers, Vol. 1, Lower Jhelum Canal, 1920 (Lahore, Government printing, 1921) 3. Tek Singh Park adjoining to the railway station Toba Tek Singh, with ‘historical’ pond (Toba) of Tek Singh (Source: District Census Report of Toba Tek Singh 1998) 4. District Headquarters Hospital, Toba Tek Singh Source: District Census Report of Toba Tek Singh 1998 5. Prem Satti (Samadhi), Kamalia, Toba Tek Singh Source: District Census Report of Toba Tek Singh 1998 6. Tehsil Council Hall (Jinnah Hall) established in 1910 (Photo credit: Mine) 7. Railway Station Toba Tek Singh Source: Asad Ali Abbas and Zaheer Ahmad 8. Railway Station Toba Tek Singh (Photo credit: Asad Ali Abbas) 9. Gau-Shalla (A religious place for protection of cows) Toba Tek Singh (Photo credit: Asad Ali Abbas) 10. Gau-Shalla Toba Tek Singh (Photo credit: Asad Ali Abbas) 11. Janj Gaher (Marrage House) Toba Tek Singh (Photo credit: Asad Ali Abbas) 12. Annaj Ki Mandi, Daana Mandi (Grain Market) (Photo credit: Asad Ali Abbas 13. Gurdwara declared rundown and owned by the Evacuee Trust Property Board (ETPB); A disputed properity between ETPB, education department and Anjuman Madniyia Hanfia (Deoband) seminary Source: https://www.dawn.com/news/1274803 14. Gurdwara (Inside view) Source: https://www.dawn.com/news/1274803 15. Gobindpura Toba Tek Singh (Photo credit: Asad Ali Abbas) 16. Main Bazar Toba Tek Singh (Photo credit: Asad Ali Abbas) 17. Chenab Fabrics (Pvt) Toba Tek Singh (Photo credit: Asad Ali Abbas) 18. A worker working on Electric Loom (Photo credit: Asad Ali Abbas) 19. A worker working on Electric Loom (Photo credit: Asad Ali Abbas) xix

20. Municipal Committee/ Committee Bagh, Toba Tek Singh (Photo credit: Asad Ali Abbas) 21. Gojra Railway Station (Photo credit: Asad Ali Abbas) 22. Kacha gojra chowk (Photo credit: Asad Ali Abbas) 23. Chak No. 331 JB/Shair Gardh (Athwal) Wheat fields (Photo credit: Mine) 24. Chak No. 331 JB/Shair Gardh (Athwal) Wheat fields (Photo credit: Mine) 25. Chak No 331JB/Shair Gardh (Athwal), Play ground (Photo credit: Asad Ali Abbas) 26. Chak No 331JB/Shair Gardh (Athwal), Animal drinking pond (Photo credit: Asad Ali Abbas) 27. Clock Tower Toba Tek Singh Source: http://mctobateksingh.lgpunjab.org.pk/Pic-Gallery.html 28. Chak No 331JB/Shair Gardh (Athwal), A street dividing the locals and the refugee areas (Photo credit: Mine)

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Maps

Map 1. India 1945-1947 xxi

Source: Daniel Marston, The Indian Army and the End of the Raj (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 116

Map 2. The Punjab: At the transfer of power, 1947 xxii

Source: Imran Ali, The Punjab Under Imperialism, 1885-1947 (Princeton University Press)

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Map 3. Punjab 1947 and Communal breakdown

Source: Source: Daniel Marston, The Indian Army and the End of the Raj (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 281

xxiv

Map 4. The Punjab Canal Colonies

Source: Source: Imran Ali, The Punjab Under Imperialism, 1885-1947 (Princeton University Press)

xxv

Map 5. Districts of Punjab Province

Source: https://www.google.com.pk/search?q=districts+of+punjab+pakistan&rlz (Accessed on 12 Jan 2017)

xxvi

Map 6. District Toba Tek Singh [Tehsil-Wise]

Source: Deputy Commissioner office Toba Tek Singh

1

Introduction

This study traces the history of mass migration in Toba Tek Singh 1 during the partition of British India in 1947 by investigating the projects to rehabilitate the refugees between 1947 and 1961. This period is significant in context of the rehabilitation process from temporary grants of evacuee properties to the complete ownership to the refugees. 2 Division of Punjab on the basis of religion directly affected the local population and almost twelve million people migrated across the borderline. Radcliffe Award, which could not be published until August 17, 1947, further aggravated the situation. No doubt, the higher authorities from both sides assured the minorities of their protection in the new states but adequate measures in this regard could not be taken. Mass migration led to a series of communal riots and then forced migration from both sides in the Punjab after the partition in some particular regions specifically in industrial and border areas. The migration patterns in Toba Tek Singh were somewhat different because of its ethnography, and geographical location and economy. It is estimated that two hundred and fifty thousand acres of land had been granted to the Sikh agriculturist community from the Amritsar District in Lower Chenab Canal Colony of Rechna Doab 3 during the development of the Canal Colony Projects in late nineteenth and early twentieth century.4 This indicates that the non-Muslim community of Toba Tek Singh was more influential socio-economically because of its majority and control over the economic sources. This factor coupled with the family ties in Indian Punjab shaped the partition related migration patterns and contributed in socio-economic transformation of the region after the partition.

There were different economic, religious and political factors involved in mass migration after the partition. People who migrated to India were much less in numbers than the refugees who came to Pakistan. Demographic statistics reveal that one fourth

1 Toba Tek Singh is an important district of central Punjab of Pakistan. It carved out from Faisalabad (Lyallpur) in 1982 and became independent district. Its etymological foundation derived from a kind hearted Sikh religious personality Tek Singh. During Canal Colonies project in late nineteenth century this area got attention by the colonial settlers. It is also famous for Partition classic Toba Tek Singh by Saadat Hasan Manto (1912-1955), the greatest Urdu short story writer of twentieth century. 2 West Pakistan Year Book, 1961, E1 (12) 1961, PSA, p.99 3 The land between the river Ravi and Chenab is known as Rechna Doab 4 Imran Ali , The Punjab Under Imperialism, 1885-1947 (New Delhi: OUP, 1989), pp. 18-23 and Ian Talbot & Shinder Thandi, People on The Move: Punjabi Colonial and Post-Colonial Migration (ed.) (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. Xi 2 of the total population of the Punjab consisted of refugees in the early years of Pakistan and among them 97.5 percent migrants alone were from north-west areas of India 5. Most of these refugees were rehabilitated by the government in central and southern Punjab. According to the census of 1951, 69 percent of the population of districts Lyallpur [now Faisalabad] and Sargodha consisted of migrants 6. Therefore, Toba Tek Singh [then tehsil of Lyallpur] had received considerable portion of this migrated population because of the commonality of their language, culture and huge agriculture land and urban property 7 left by Sikh and Hindu migrants. It is pertinent to mention here that the non-Muslims who migrated from Toba Tek Singh had substantial control over business activities and had major share in the agriculture sector as well. While Muslim refugees settled in this particular region came from different economic background 8. This had enormous bearing on the socio-economic conditions in the region.

The rehabilitation of the huge migrant class was really a gigantic challenge faced by the nascent state of Pakistan. As the ethnic and communal riots erupted in some specific areas of Punjab, both states of India and Pakistan were compelled to agree on refugee transfer policy. This policy comprised the transfer of statistical information regarding refugees and evacuee properties. This process led to a number of state organized refugees rehabilitation and resettlement organizations and departments 9. Ministry of Refugees and Rehabilitation, Punjab Refugees Council, Military Evacuation Organization, and the office of Commissioner for refugees and rehabilitation were set up.

In this research, I argue that the partition based migration affected the socio- economic position of the agrarian society of Toba Tek Singh in post-independence period. This was the outcome of migration of the Sikh and Hindu communities from this region in 1947 which contributed to the huge influx of Muslims migrants. Due to

5 The Census of Pakistan, 1951, Vol.1, Table 19-A; Vol.6, P. 65 6 Ibid., Vol. 5, p. 75 7 Muhammad Waseem, Muslim Migration from East Punjab: Patterns of Settlement and Assimilation in Ian Talbot & Shinder Thandi, People on The Move, p. 65 8 Ian Talbot, “Violence, Migration and Resettlement: The Case of Amritsar”, in Ian Talbot & Shinder Thandi, People on The Move, p. 86 9 The Government of Pakistan, The Journey to Pakistan: A Documentation on Refugees of 1947 (Islamabad: National Documentation Centre, 1993), p.16 3 the flawed refugee’s rehabilitation policies migrant -local-divide still exists in the area. It desires a careful research of refugee rehabilitation process in this locality.

0.1 Significance of the Research

Post partition Punjab has witnessed one of the largest human migrations in the twentieth century. Migration of non-Muslim communities [Hindu and Sikh] in the partition of 1947 from the canal colonies to Indian Punjab was their second migration. During their first migration, they were migrated and settled to the canal colonies from eastern and central districts of the Punjab by the British government during late nineteenth and early twentieth century. From this very reason one can easily judge the profound impact of this migration on canal colonies areas. Toba Tek Singh is selected as a case study for analyzing the patterns of the migration and its impacts. It was one of the most affected areas at the time of partition because of the numerical strength and dominant economic position of non-Muslim community which migrated to East Punjab after partition in 1947. The huge demographic shift, rehabilitation of refugees and economic transformation because of partition based migration, makes this region an important case study for the history of partition. The economic significance of this area can be discovered from the quote of M.L. Darling ‘The Lyallpur Colony 10 is the richest tract in India and perhaps even in Asia’. 11 Despite the fact it was this richest economy, Toba Tek Singh remained under-researched and could not attract due attention of the historians. However, the focus of this study will be post partition rehabilitation process of the refugees and socio-economic transformation in Toba Tek Singh. This Study will also investigate the partition-led dislocation patterns, and trends in resettlement of migrants in this region. It will contribute in the existing partition related research by introducing some unexplored sources such as, revenue record, census data, and refugee rehabilitation reports. Comparatively, more research has been conducted on east Punjab than on Pakistani Punjab.12 The significance of

10 Lyallpur, now Faisalabad, was a new district consisting of four tehsils, Toba Tek Singh, Lyallpur, Samundri and Jaranwala established in 1904 11 S M. Darling, The Punjab Peasant: In Prosperity and Debt (4th Edi) (Lahore, 1947),p.132; see also Imran Ali, The Punjab under Imperialism, 1885-1947 (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 18- 23 12 Ravinder Kaur, Since 1947: Partition Narratives among Punjabi Migrants of Delhi (Oxford, 2007); S. Mehta, Migration: A Special Perspective (Jaipur, 1990); A. S. Oberoi, H.K. Manmohan Singh, Causes and Consequences of Internal Migration: A Study of Indian Punjab (New Delhi, 1983); R.R. Paul, Rural Urban-Migration in Punjab: An Economic Analysis (Bombay, 1989); Kamaljit Singh, Internal 4 this research is also signified by the fact that this period had had an impact on the latter social, cultural, economic, and political history of the Punjab.

According to the Census of 1951, 7.25 million people migrated to Pakistan from 1947 to 1951, which almost constituted the ten percent of the entire population of united Pakistan. Majority of the migrant population, which settled in west Punjab, belonged to the areas of east Punjab, Ajmer, Delhi, Rajputana, Jammu and Kashmir.13 This ratio was considerably high as compared to the other provinces of Pakistan.14 The research will show how this factor affected the refugee’s rehabilitation process in Toba Tek Singh.

I would try to set the research in the context of what has already been done by scholars such as Talbot, Gilmartin, Virdee and Chattha. There has been a move towards understanding the partition first from a national level, then at provincial level, moving towards districts and now tehsil level as this study does. This localized study will help us to understand the partition in a better way by combining the approaches used in the existing literature on the partition, migration and rehabilitation of refugees.

0.2 Research Questions

This work will provide a detailed account of the partition related rehabilitation process in Toba Tek Singh from 1947 to1961, by focusing on socio-economic conditions shaped by the rehabilitation process. This work provides an in-depth insight into the refugee dilemma in Pakistan after 1947 at locality level. The research focuses on the following questions:

i. How did the mass migration affect the socio-economic position of the native society of Toba Tek Singh?

ii. What was the contribution of non-Muslims in the economy of Toba Tek Singh in pre-partition Punjab?

iii. What was the communal composition of Toba Tek Singh at the time of the partition?

Migration in a developing Country (New Delhi, 1991); D.P. Chaudhri, A.K. Dasgupta, Agriculture and the Development Process: A study of Punjab (London, 1985) etc. 13 The Census of Pakistan 1951, Vol. 1, Karachi, n.d, p. 31 14 Ibid 5

iv. Why did the Sikh and Hindu communities of Toba Tek Singh migrate to the east Punjab?

v. What was the socio-economic background of the Muslim migrants which were rehabilitated in Toba Tek Singh after migration?

vi. What kinds of strategies were adopted by the state to carry out the rehabilitation process in Toba Tek Singh?

0.3 Chapterization

The thesis consists of four chapters besides the introduction and conclusion.

Chapter 1 Toba Tek Singh during Colonial Period: Constructing ‘ hydraulic ’ Society in Chenab Colony

The opening chapter starts with the historical background of the tehsil 15 Toba Tek Singh [became district in 1982] underscoring the establishment of lower Chenab colony during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century in the Punjab. Toba Tek Singh was among the four tehsils of newly established district of Lyallpur in 1904. This is significant in terms of development before which it was a vast waste land [Rechna Doab] inhabited by the pastoral tribes. It was the largest Canal Colony project having three types of grants, peasants [ abadkar ], yeoman [ sufedposh ] and capitalist [rais ]. As per the government policy, to appease the ‘dominant peasant castes of rural Punjab’ eighty percent of the land was granted to the small peasants, whereas 4.2 percent [70,000 Acres] of the land was allotted to military personnel. The grantees for this project were taken from seven districts, Ambala, Ludhiana, Jullundur, Hoshiarpur, Amritsar, Gurdaspur and Sialkot. Most of these areas were inhabited by Sikh population. The community organization with respect to the relations between grantees and the janglis [the cattle grazers, seminomadic pastoral tribes of the area] and within the grantees will be discovered in this chapter.

Chapter 2 Partition and Migration: Patterns and Trajectories

The second chapter focusses on different patterns of migration after partition of India in Punjab in 1947. The different factors were involved in the dislocation of

15 Sub-division of District Lyallpur [Now Faisalabad] 6 huge population across the border. These factors includes communal riots, general conception of Hindu and Muslim states, family links of the canal colony non-Muslim [Hindu and Sikh] refugees with the east Punjab districts, and official refugees transfer policies between India and Pakistan. This chapter investigates these factors which contributed to the migration of Hindus and Sikhs from Toba Tek Singh. They had numerical strength and established family linkage with eastern Indian Punjab which makes Toba Tek Singh different from other regions.

Chapter 3 The Sate Policy of Muslim refugees Rehabilitation 1947-1961

The third chapter sheds light on major contours of the rehabilitation process undertaken by the state during 1947-1961. Rehabilitation of the refugees after partition was one of the biggest challenges in front of the nascent state of Pakistan. However, the evacuee properties were allotted mainly to the migrants in this area. The plans and policies for the settlement of the migrants for this region are covered in this chapter. Finally, it will link with the literature on the concept of the ‘everyday state’. This raises the issues of citizenship and refugee status, the issue of ‘corruption’ and highly differentiated experiences of partition-related refugees in west Punjab in general and in Toba Tek Singh in specific.

Chapter 4 Socio-Economic Impact of Rehabilitation of Refugees in Toba Tek Singh 1947-1961

The fourth and the last chapter identify the socio-economic implications of the refugee rehabilitation projects in Toba Tek Singh. It also highlights changing behaviour of the local society in context of their economic position after partition. Moreover it also analyses the new relations of production and division of sources between the host and the migrant classes in this area. It reveals some of the tensions between locals and migrants and the demands migrants placed on the state. Another area also comes in the purview of this chapter: whether there were local conflicts, not only between migrants and locals, but within these broad categories. This chapter will also address the questions: how did locals tenants of outgoing Hindu and Sikh former’s fare? How did the refugee influx impact on landless laborers who had previously worked for evacuees and had taken over the land they had abandoned? Finally, how long did uncertainties persist over permanent right to former evacuee lands? Did winners and losers’ in this process change over time? 7

0.4 Literature Review

History of the Canal Colonies Punjab

History of the canal colonies in the Punjab during colonial period has been researched by the number of historians. David Gilmartin analysed the Punjabi migration to the Canal Colonies during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and provided a critical link ‘between village organization and sate power that lay at the heart of colonial rule’.16 D. S. Tatla found the roots of rural Punjabi migration to the annexation of Punjab which further contributed by two factors of ‘concept of martial races’ and ‘canal irrigation project in bars’.17 Imran Ali argued that agricultural colonization in the canal colonies in Punjab by the British government distorted the development and explained ‘how one isolated sub-economy, that of the Punjab, could have experienced significant growth and yet have remained backward’.18 Malcolm Darling also highlighted this aspect of canal economy and concluded as ‘the bulk of the cultivators of the Punjab are born in debt, live in debt, and die in debt’.19 The material prosperity of the canal colonies, he remarked, ‘owes more to good fortune than to effort, more to high price than to skill, and more to the labors of the canal engineer and the colonization staff than to his own industry and thrift’.20 Tahir Mahmood has given a new approach to the politics of collaboration and military recruitment during colonial period by taking District Shahpur as case study. He has proved that collaboration was ‘a dynamic two-way process, rather than, as it is often portrayed, a top down, one way relationship’.21 In response to the earlier emergence of communalism in urban areas of the canal colonies as compared to the rural areas he maintained ‘in the market towns of the (Jhelum canal) colony, Hindu benefited the most from the new economic opportunities and given their wealth and education they better equipped to establish their majority in the urban representative

16 David Gilmartin, ‘Migration and Modernity: The State, the Punjabi Village, and the Settling of the Canal Colonies’ Ian Talbot & Shinder Thandi, Peoples on the Move: Punjabi Colonial and Post- Colonial Migration (Karachi, OUP, 2004), p.3 17 D S Tatla, “Rural Roots of the Sikh Diaspora”, Ian Talbot & Shinder Thandi, Peoples on the Move: Punjabi Colonial and Post-Colonial Migration (Karachi, OUP, 2004), p.47 18 Imran Ali, The Punjab Under Imperialism 1885-1947 (New Delhi: OUP, 1989) p. vii 19 Malcolm Darling, The Punjab Peasants: In prosperity and Debt (Lahore: Nafees Printers, 1947) p. 246 20 Ibid 21 Tahir Mahmood, “Collaboration and British Military Recruitment: Fresh Perspective from colonial Punjab, 1914-1918”, Modern Asian Studies 50, 5 (2016), pp. 1474-1500. 8 institutions’.22 Mridula Mukherjee also criticized the policies of agricultural colonization of British government during colonial period through examining ‘the impact of colonialism on the agrarian economy as whole and, on the agrarian class structure in particular’.23 She maintained that the investment in agriculture development in Punjab was hampered because ‘the vast majority of cultivators were unable – because of their insufficient holdings, the pressures of state taxes, rents and debt, the nature of commercialization, lack of credit, low productivity levels and the like—to generate a surplus for investment’.24 P. Virdee’s research on the partition of Punjab and its aftermath is also quite relevant to discuss. She argued in her research that ‘localised patterns of political authority and culture impacted on the differential experience of partition related migration’.25 She further emphasized that ‘the experience of partition and dislocation was a process rather than an event confined to August 1947’.26 All these historians researched canal colony areas of Punjab through different aspects but locality based case studies approach from establishment of canal water dependent society to emergence of specific communal composition, and further its links with migration patterns in 1947 is generally avoided.

‘New History’ of Partition: An ‘Human Dimension’ Approach

The first major work in this regard is People on the Move: Punjabi Colonial and Post-Colonial Migration, edited by Ian Talbot and Shinder Thandi. This book covers the contemporary trends and themes of the partition of the Punjab and its aftermath. It is a part of the series ‘The Subcontinent Divided: A New Beginning’ intends to provide new insight into the partition of Punjab in 1947. This ‘new history’ is characterized by new theme of ‘human dimension’ of the partition related history. The study of ‘Punjabi migration’ has been approached at three levels, i.e during colonial period, at the time of partition and in post-independence period. David Gilmartin in Migration and Modernity beautifully analyzed the Punjabi migration to the Canal Colonies during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and found

22 Tahir Mahmood, ‘Communal Life in the Market Towns of Jhelum Canal Colony’, Pakistan Journal of History and Culture, Vol. XXXV, No. 2 (2014), pp. 1-24 23 Mridula Mukherjee, Colonizing Agriculture: The Myth of Punjab Exceptionalism (New Delhi: Sage Publication, 2005), P. xiii 24 Ibid. p. 169 25 P. Virdee, Partition and Locality: Case Studies of the Impact of Partition and Its Aftermath in the Punjab Region 1947-1961 , Unpublished PhD Thesis, Coventry University, December 2004 26 Ibid 9 a link ‘between village organization and sate power’. Same theme has been discussed by D. S. Tatla in the same book and found the roots of rural Punjabi migration to the annexation of Punjab which further contributed by two factors of ‘concept of martial races’ and ‘canal irrigation project in bars’ . Hence, these researches proved that the ‘culture of migration’ in Punjab was the outcome of the British policies. Muhammad Waseem assesses the ‘Pattern of Settlement’ of the refugees after partition in Pakistani west Punjab and concluded that most of the migrants settled in west Punjab because of the ‘multiple incentives were pushing them in this direction’. 27 By taking Lahore and Amritsar as case studies, Ian Talbot, examined the impact of partition and its aftermath and further linked it with wider theories related to the ‘forced migration’. He investigated the roots of violence in Punjab’s leading cities from April 1947 and considered the violence in Amritsar, a reaction to exaggerated reports of the Rawalpindi massacres. Ishtiaq Ahmed has also examined the same theme in his work, Forced Migration and Ethnic Cleansing in Lahore in 1947, and testifies the official partition literature with refugees’ accounts. As a whole, this book is an important source for understanding the new themes of the partition of subcontinent in general and Punjab in particular. The Deadly Embraced: Religion, Politics and Violence in India and Pakistan 1947-2000 is the continuity of the series, The Subcontinent Divided: A new beginning. The leading experts and research scholars contributed on post partition communal violence. The Great Partition: The Making of India and Pakistan written by Yasmin Khan is well researched work, gave importance to the ‘human dimension’ of the partition. She addressed the partition at three levels i.e context, execution and aftermath by combing the local politics with ordinary lives. She tried to redirect the partition history based on ‘high politics’ i.e state sponsored approach by introducing the new sources at locality level. Refugees and the End of Empire: Imperial Collapse and Forced Migration in the Twentieth Century an edited work by Panikos Panayi &Pippa Virdee. This volume combined a wide range of articles highlighting the refugees experience in context of the collapse of British Empire. Well-articulated essays contributed by established authorities like Ian Talbot and emerging scholars like Pippa Virdee addressed the refugee experience in highly novel and comparative way. The case-studies had been taken from Austro-Hungarian

27 Muhammad Waseem, “Muslim Migration from East Punjab: Patterns of Settlement and Assimilation”, Ian Talbot & Shinder Thandi, Peoples on the Move: Punjabi Colonial and Post- Colonial Migration (Karachi, OUP, 2004), p.63 10

and Ottoman Empires to the collapse of British Empire in India. The other important contributions on the ‘new history’ of the partition, having locality based human dimension approach, include R. Menon & K Bhasin, Borders & Boundaries: women in India’s partition ; U. Butalia, The Other Side of Silence: Voices from India’s Partition ; M Hasan (ed.), Inventing Boundaries: Gender Politics and the Partition of India ; G Pandey, Remembering partition ; S. Setter & Indira B. Gupta (eds.), Pangs of Partition: The Human Dimension . The two other important works, I. Talbot, Freedom’s Cry: the Popular Dimension in the Pakistan Movement and Partition Experience in North-West India; and M. Hasan (ed.), India’s Partition, process, Strategy and Mobilization, adopted the ‘history from bellow methodology’ may also include in this category.

Locality-Based Comparative Approach

This approach is basically extension of the themes raised by ‘new history’ of partition with combination of ‘localized case-studies’. This approach has broadened the canvas of the historiography of the Partition by incorporating new methodologies of oral history, anthropology and sociology.28 The most recent work, having much relevance to my study, is Partition and locality: Violence, Migration, and Development in Gujranwala and Sialkot, 1947-1961 written by Ilyas Chattha. The author has applied a ‘locality-based approach’ in understanding the impacts of partition and its aftermath specifically in Gujranwala and Sialkot. He has introduced some new empirical sources in existing partition related literature and used them in questioning the official accounts. Oral history techniques employed by him for filling the gaps in partition history at local level where the official accounts found silent. Similarly, another important research work of this category is unpublished PhD thesis by Pippa Virdee (Coventry University, 2004) which locality-based study of Ludhiana and Lyallpur, is also quite relevant to my research.

‘High Politics’ Approach

It is a traditional approach in which partition related history has dominated by reasons, justifications and ‘high-level’ decision making in 1940’s regarding partition plan of India. From ‘natural end’ of the British Empire to ‘regrettable necessity’ and

28 Ian Talbot & Shinder Thandi, People on The Move , p. xix 11

outcome of the policy of ‘divide and rule’ to culmination of ‘two-nation theory’, partition of 1947 has seen as mere event and not beyond that. One of the most important work of ‘high politics’ approach is The Great Divide: Britain-India- Pakistan written by H.V. Hodson. Being Constitutional Advisor to the Viceroy of India, Lord Linlithgow, he had direct access to the official correspondence and documents. Because of this reason, he put forth a very authentic analysis of the historical events which led to the ‘great divide’ and contributed to the tragic massive killings, migration and conflicting relations of the independent states of the region. It highlighted only British opinion of the partition. The other remarkable works of this category include is V. P. Menon’s The Transfer of Power in India ; The Emergence of Pakistan , Chaudhry Muhammad Ali; S. Mahajin’s Independence and Partition; Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, The Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan.

The ‘material on migration in Pakistan is more scattered’ as aptly mentioned by Ian Talbot and proposed ‘localized case-studies’ approach to overcome this shortcoming. I have selected this approach for ‘hydraulic’ 29 society of Toba Tek Singh to analyze the partition related migration and refugees rehabilitation policies and projects. Canal colonies areas [especially four major projects of Chenab, Jhelum, Lower Bari Doab, and Nili Bar Colonies] need such type of approach to investigate the refugee’s rehabilitation projects in these areas.

The Concept of ‘Everyday State’ and Life after Partition

For study of the nature and ‘functioning of the state on everyday life’ after the partition the concept of ‘everyday state’ 30 has been used by different renowned scholars. The scholarly research work of Ian Talbot, Sara Ansari, Taylor Sherman, William Gould, C. J. Fuller is worth mentioning here.31 Similarly Elisabetta Iob’s doctoral research ‘A betrayed Promise? The Politics of the Everyday State and The

29 Imran Ali, The Punjab under Imperialism, 1885-1947, p.9 30 Taylor C. Sherman, William Gould, Sarah Ansari, From Subjects to Citizens: Society and the Everyday State in India and Pakistan, 1947-1970, Modern Asian Studies 45, 1 (2011) pp. 1-6 31 For general views on the concept of the everyday sate and on the pressures generated by partition migration in comparative context, please see, Sara Ansari, Taylor Sherman, William Gould, The Flux of the Matter: Loyalty, Corruption and the ‘Everyday State’ in Post-Partition Government Services of India and Pakistan, Past and Present, no. 219 (May 2013); Sara Ansari, Everyday expectations of the State during Pakistan’s Early years: Letters to the Editor, Dawn (Karachi), 1950-1953, Modern Asian Studies 45, 1 (2011) pp. 159-158; Ian Talbot, Divided Cities: Partition and Its Aftermath in Lahore and Amritsar 1947-1957 (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2006) 12

Resettling of Refugees in Pakistani Punjab 1947-1962’ is also worth mentioning. This research is focused on ‘the everyday experience of the state among those middle-class Partition refugees who resettled in Pakistani Punjab’. 32 This approach is quite helpful for historical study of the ‘development of day-to-day popular, public cultures’ in Pakistan and India. Different sort of themes and issues, like, performative aspect of state power, partition’s effect on the state in the form of corruption, nepotism, and in the end shaping of citizenship and religious identities incorporated in this approach.

Understanding Forced Removal and Migration in the 19th and 20th Centuries

Forced removal and migration 33 was one of the most atrocious features of the in nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 34 The term ‘forced migration’ was first time incorporated in the Encyclopaedia Britannica in 1970s. 35 Sometimes in history it was also used in parallel with ‘expulsion’ such as was common in West Germany during the 1950s. Here the factor of ‘sheer brute violence’ is included by the term ‘forced migration’ being a part of all such phenomenon of ‘expulsion’ or ‘removals’. Though this term is missing with ‘emotional charge of both sides: the rage and revenge [if not pleasure] among those who did the expelling; the mixture of anger, desperation, and hatred among those who were expelled’. 36

It can denote ‘very physical violence’ which in modern time has been used for ‘ethnic cleansing’. 37 The term ethnic cleansing ‘has been the common denominator of massacres’ which resulted many ‘expulsions and refugees movements’ in nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 38 ‘The terms genocide and ethnic cleansing’, according to Ian

32 Elisabetta Iob, ‘A betrayed Promise? The Politics of the Everyday State and The Resettling of Refugees in Pakistani Punjab 1947-1962’ (Unpublished PhD Thesis, Royal Holloway, University of London, 2013) 33 Forced Migration is ‘a general term that refers to the movements of refugees and internally displaced people [those displaced by conflicts within their country of origin] as well as people displaced by natural or environmental disasters, chemical or nuclear disasters, famine, or development projects.’ Please see http://www.columbia.edu/itc/hs/pubhealth/modules/forcedMigration/definitions.html while According to Encyclopedia Britannica, ‘Forced migrations usually involve people who have been expelled by governments during war or other political upheavals or who have been forcibly transported as slaves or prisoners.’ 34 Richard Bessel and caludia B. Hakke, eds, Removing People: Forced Removal in The Modern World (Oxford, 2009), p.3 35 Alf Ludtke, ‘Explaining Forced Migration’ in Richard Bessel and Caludia B. Hakke, eds, Removing People: Forced Removal in The Modern World (Oxford, 2009), p. 13-32 36 Ibid, p.18 37 Ibid 38 Ibid 13

Talbot, ‘are rooted in Europe’s troubled twentieth century history’. 39 Furthermore ‘genocide is indelibly linked with the Nazis ‘final solution’ of what they termed the Jewish problem’. 40 Alexander Hinton, an anthropologist, considered ethnic cleansing a ‘vague term’ as compared to genocide, which ‘directly addresses the killing of a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, in whole or in part’. 41

But in both cases—genocide or ethnic cleansing—the motive is ‘to destroy the people’, while in forced migration, the displacement of the people is the real motivation. Here ‘displacement’ has many shapes and forms among which ‘physical destruction’ is one of them: in ‘removing or transplanting a group of people…though, death often has been considered as an unavoidable side-effect of the policy, an acceptable price to pay in order to achieve the underlying aims of removal’. 42 Mostly, the factors which shaped the causes of forced removal were ‘economic and strategic consideration’ with issues of ‘inclusion and exclusion’. These factors according to Bessel and Hakke ‘have often been shaped by cultural, religious and ethnic/racial consideration, relationship of the people with land’. 43

Despite this difference, forced migration, genocide and ethnic cleansing are interconnected and interrelated phenomena. Millions of people were removed forcefully from their settlements in all parts of the world in the last two centuries. There were social, political, religious, racial and cultural factors behind all such expulsions and migrating movements. The severe intensity of these factors and reasons made ‘forced removal a global phenomenon on a massive scale’. 44 Advancement in technologies, two world wars, the rise of nationalist ideas, capitalist economy, racist ideas and processes of decolonization, all such factors have ‘given

39 Ian Talbot, Divided Cities , p. xxvi 40 Ibid 41 Alexander L. Hinton, ‘Introduction: the Dark Side of Modernity: Toward an Anthropology of Genocide’, in id. (ed.) Annihilating Difference: The Anthropology of genocide (London, 2002), p.1-40, see also, Frank Chalk, ‘Redefining Genocide’, in G.J. Andreopoulos (ed.) Genocide: Conceptual and Historical Dimensions (Philadelphia, 1994); Robert Gellately (ed.) The Specter of Genocide: Mass Murder in Historical Perspective (Cambridge, 2003); Eric Weitz, A Century of Genocide: Utopias of Race and Nation (Princeton, 2003); ‘Until the Second World War, genocide was a “crime without a name,” in the words of British Prime Minister Winston Churchill. The man who named the crime, placed it in a global-historical context, and demanded intervention and remedial action was a Polish- Jewish jurist, a refugee from Nazi-occupied Europe, named Raphael Lemkin (1900–59)’, for detail see, Adam Jones, Genocide: A Comparative Introduction 2 nd Edi (2011) 42 Richard Bessel and Caludia B. Hakke, Int, (eds), Removing People: Forced Removal in The Modern World (Oxford, 2009), p.1-11 43 Ibid 44 Ibid 14

this dreadful phenomenon (forced migration) a quantitatively and qualitatively new character’. 45

The precedents of ‘the slaughter of almost one million peoples within a few months in the spring of 1994 in Rwanda and killings of tens of thousands of people in former Yugoslavia from 1992’ 46 provided genocide with a special drive. Though the term ‘ethnic cleansing’ had established link with ‘Serbian attempts to drive Muslims and Croats from their ancestral homes in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the early 1990s’, both ‘terms of genocide and ethnic cleansing’, according to Ian Talbot ‘have in popular writings been used almost synonymously’. 47 Analogies are also sometimes provided between forced migration and the holocaust in terms of ethnic violence. Accordingly, the violence associated with the complex events of the Punjab during the time of partition might be cautiously describes as a ‘communal holocaust’. 48

0.5 Sources and Methodology

This study will heavily rely on documentary sources complementing with the information gathered from oral history techniques. I have selected this approach because of following reasons. Firstly, biased history of the partition at official level complicated the events of the partition related violence and mass migration in Punjab. These documentary accounts had produced by both official and non-official writers from each side of the border adopted the ‘high politics’ and state sponsored blame game approach. British, Pakistani and Indian authors highlighted the partition in a way which suited and served their own national interests. Official primary sources could not portrait the actual and unbiased picture of the communal violence because most of the officials had their own communal affiliations. Same is the case with refugee’s rehabilitation projects where state has looked very efficient instead of unusual delay and irregularities in allotments of the evacuee grants. But meanings of the partition and Independence are different for the refugees on both sides of the border. They saw it in terms of miseries, sufferings, killings of their loved ones, up- rootedness from their areas and forced migration. Secondly, this technique is more appropriate for those areas specifically in Pakistani west Punjab, which are under

45 Richard Bessel and Caludia B. Hakke, Int, (eds), Removing People: Forced Removal in The Modern World , p.1-11 46 Ian Talbot, Divided Cities , p.xxvi 47 Ibid 48 Ibid 15

researched and official primary accounts [census data, refugee rehabilitation reports, budget reports] are still unutilized. I have personally visited Punjab Secretariat Archives, Lahore, Settlement record office in the Faridkot House, Lahore and district record office in Toba Tek Singh. There are lots of difficulties in consulting that record because the record is not well preserved and catalogued. The record in Punjab Secretariat is well kept but missing of reports of ‘resettlement of refugees on Land’ will create problems. Because of this very reason, these accounts having these shortcomings cannot as-it-is use for historical investigation regarding patterns of migration, refugee rehabilitation and development in partition stricken areas. An authentic narrative can be constructed with the participation of the real actors of the partition i.e refugees. Through oral history techniques we can engage the real culprits and victims of violence and forced migration. Through this methodology documentary accounts will counter-check by the literary accounts and first-hand information from the migrants and host community. Interviews will conduct from refugees as well as the locals from rural and urban areas of Toba Tek Singh to assess their role in the migration and resettlement. The authenticity of the oral history in depicting the true picture of past is now widely acknowledged by the historian. 49 But at the same time these oral sources demand careful and critical analysis.50 The libraries and resources centers which will consult during this research include: The British Library London, The National Archives London, National Documentation Centre [NDC], Islamabad ; National Archives of Pakistan, Islamabad; Punjab Secretariat Archives, Lahore; Settlement Record Office and Library, Faridkot House, Lahore; District Record Office [Colony Record], Toba Tek Singh; District Council Library, Toba Tek Singh; Post Graduate Library, GC University, Lahore; Central Library, GC University, Lahore; Quaid-i-Azam University Library, Islamabad; Punjab Public Library, Lahore; Quaid-i-Azam Library, Bagh-i-Jinnah, Lahore; Diyal Singh Library, Lahore; Main Library of University of the Punjab, Lahore and Library of Lahore University of Management Sciences [LUMS], Lahore.

49 A. Thomson, “Fifty Years On: An International Perspective on Oral History”, Journal of American History, 85, 2 (September 1998), pp. 581-95; P. Thompson, Voices of the Past: Oral History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988). 50 R.J. Grele, “On Using Oral History Collection: An Introduction” , Journal of American History, 74, 2, (September 1987), pp. 570-78 16

Chapter 1 Toba Tek Singh during Colonial Period: Constructing ‘ hydraulic ’ Society 1 in Chenab Colony

First I will praise the true Lord I will tell a new tale today How of old the Ba’r was the prey of thieves The shelter of deer, jackals and rats Now no barren jungle is left Young ⃰ sahib has peopled the land

Most mighty heroes are the English Who have now turned aside the river They digged a canal straight as an arrow And planted groves on its banks Brush and brushwood has been swept away

A very mighty officer he is Whom he beholds with favour He exalts in a moment Sikhs have been made headmen The Guru has increased their credit twofold 2

⃰ Captain F. Popham Young was the Colonization officer of the Chenab Colony

Toba Tek Singh is an important town of the Chenab Colony in west Punjab. The Colony covered most of the part of government wastelands known as Sandal Bar in Rechna Doab between the rivers Ravi and Chenab. 3 The Colony was reckoned as a

1 The term Hydraulic Society can be parallel with Hydraulic Civilization maintains control over its population by means of controlling the supply of water. Karl August Wittfogel (1896–1988) a German American historian, coined this term in his book Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power (1957) 2 An extract from the Punjabi ballad, reflecting native mind towards settlement work in the Lower Chenab colony during late nineteenth and early twentieth century by the British government. This ballad was sung at the farewell ceremony of Captain F. Popham Young was the Colonization officer of the Chenab Colony in 1899. For detail please see Gazetteer of the Chenab Colony (Lyallpur) sang-i- Meel Publication, 1904, reprinted in 1996 Lahore, PP. 34, 35; This colonization process and prosperity also brought some adverse socio-economic changes. As Malcolm Darling said in his renowned book The Punjab Peasants that ‘the bulk of the cultivators of the Punjab are born in debt, live in debt, and die in debt’. Issues of salinity and rise of level of under earth water were also eclipsed the growing notion of prosperity. 3 On north-east side some portion of Khangah Dogran, Tehsil of District Gujranwala, was covered by the Chenab Colony. Hafizabad, Chiniot, Jhang and Shorkot Tehsils on north-west, Kabirwala tehsil of Multan on south-west, sharakpur, Gugera, Montgomery tehsils of Lahore and Montgomery on south- east side was covered by this Colony. Its total area was 3855 square miles and stood 13 th (excluding 17

district by the British government for census purpose in 1901 and comprised whole or parts of the tehsils of three districts, Jhang, Lahore and Gujranwala. 4 Toba Tek Singh was among the other major towns [Lyallpur, Gojra, Chiniot, Sangla] of this Colony, which acquired importance for agricultural export markets. Its importance was further enhanced because of its link with North-Western Railways’ Wazirabad-Khanewal Branch. Toba Tek Singh [The pond of Tek Singh , a Sikh saint] was a small locality on the road between Jhang and Chichwatni constructed during the nineteenth century. It was constituted as a tehsil in 1900. According to the Imperial Gazetteer of India it was a ‘Tahsil of the new Lyallpur District, Punjab, lying between 30°50' and 31°23' N. and 72° 20' and 72°54' E. with an area of 865 square miles (2,240 km2)’. 5 In 1906 its population was 148,984, having ‘342 villages, including Toba Tek Singh (population, 1874), the head-quarters, and Gojra (2589), an important grain market on the Wazirabad -Khanewal branch of the North-Western Railway’. 6 It is pertinent to mention here that though Gojra was a bigger market than Toba as shown above in population it never surpassed Toba Tek Singh because of its central geographical position in the area. Being as a central place in the establishment of Lower Chenab Colony the Punjab Government approved the establishment of dak bungalows in towns of Toba Tek Singh and Lyallpur in 1902. 7 Toba Tek Singh contributed to the Indian economy with land revenue and cesses amounting to 4.7 lakhs in 1905-6. In the context of its agricultural fertility and irrigation ‘the tehsil consists of a level plain, wholly irrigated by the Chenab Canal. The soil, which is very fertile in the east of the

area of Jhang) among 32 Districts of Punjab at that time. For detail see Gazetteer of the Chenab Colony: Lyallpur (Lahore, Sang-i-Meel Publications, 1996), p.1 See also Imperial Gazetteer of India, The Clarendon Press, Oxford 1908, v. 10, p. 187. Chenab Colony originally formed part of the Sandal Bar, which is the lower half of the Rechna Doab, aname compounded of the words Ravi and Chenab, the two rivers bounded it. The road from Lahore to Pindi Bhattian, via a Sheikhupura and Khangah Dogran, roughly defines its north-eastern limit, if nearly all the Sharakpur tehsil be exluded. South- west it extends as for as the railway station at Shorkot Road, where canal irrigation stops. South-east and North-west the ravi and the Chenab Riverains, which enter only partially into the scheme of colonization, oppose it further progress. Final Report on the Chenab Colony Settlement by B.H. Dobson, 1915 4 The Chenab Colony comprised of eight Tehsils, Lyallpur, Toba Tek Singh, Samundari, Chiniot, Jhang [Jhang District], Khangah Dogran, Hafizabad [Gujranwala District], Sharakpur [Lahore District]; In Census of India 1901 Jhang was excluded from the Colony area. 5 http://dsal.uchicago.edu/reference/gazetteer/text.html?objectid=DS405.1.I34_V23_412.gif . Accessed on November 5, 2014 6 Ibid 7 Letter from Revenue and Financial Secretary to Government, Punjab to the Commissioner Multan Division No.1955, dated Lahore, 23 rd September 1902 18

tehsil , becomes sandy towards the west. The boundaries of the tehsil were somewhat modified at the time of the formation of the new District of Lyallpur’. 8

Map 1.1: Sandal Bar

Source: Revenue and Agriculture Department, August 1897, Nos. 36-42, Forecast of the Reassessment of the Jhang District. File No. 28

1.1 Conceptualizing the Development of Canal System and Establishment of Canal Colonies in Punjab: Their Underlying Motives

In 1885, a well-organized system of canals was started by the British, which eventually supported the agricultural colonization and economic prosperity in Punjab. Under this canals project, 695 government and 33 private canals were dug, through which ‘728 out of every 1000 acres were irrigated’.9 From 1887-88 to 1931 there was tremendous increase in canal-irrigated area in the Punjab. It increase from 2.3 million

8 Imperial Gazetteer of India , the Clarendon Press, Oxford 1908, v. XXIII, p. 406. 9 Census of India, 1931, Volume XVII, Punjab Part I, printed at Civil and Military Gazette press, Lahore, 1933, p. 37 19

acres [1886-87] to 6 million acres in 1900-01, and one major factor for this big increase was opening of the lower Chenab Canal for irrigation [1887-92]. In the second decade of the twentieth century it enhanced up to 10 million acres because of the completion of famous Triple Canals Project [the Upper Chenab, the Upper Jhelum and the lower Bari Doab ], which was ‘near to the total ploughed area of England and Wales [10.5 million acres]’.10 After inauguration of the Sutluj Valley Project, the last four canals of Table 1.2, irrigated land increased to 12.4 million acres in 1929-30.

Agricultural colonization in west Punjab during colonial period was one of the top priority projects for the British government. Among other causes, economic gain was a major factor for shifting full concentration for the development of this project. As it is quite evident from this, the major part of the revenue administration in this region had remained in the hands of Colonization officer [a post which abolished in April 1907] instead of the Deputy Commissioner. 11 It was a post which combined with Assistant Colonization Officer sanctioned to exist for two years from 1 April 1898 for Chenab Canal Colonization scheme. At the end of this term, again a letter written by Governor General of India in council to Her Majesty’s Secretary of State for India recommended the extension of this term for further two years. The government wanted to complete this project in all its domains before handing ‘over to the ordinary administration’. 12 The Governor General remarked that ‘the assessment [including water rates, land revenue, cesses and malikana ] on the colonized amounted in 1897-98, the latest year for which figures are available to Rs. 21,32,000 showing an increase over the figures of the previous year of Rs. 3,68,000’. 13 The government gained over 20 lakhs from one of the three branches of the Chenab Canal Colonization scheme. It was estimated that at the completion of this project the annual direct revenue would be enhanced by 70 lakhs. For looking into the ‘magnitude of the interests involved’ Secretary of State for India sanctioned the proposal of the Punjab

10 Ibid. p. 38, Before 1913-14 Delhi was the part of the Punjab therefore separate statistics, excluding Delhi, are not available. 11 Imperial Gazetteer of India , The Clarendon Press, Oxford 1908, v. xvi, p. 223 12 Revenue and Irrigation Department, Irrigation, May 1900, Nos. 1-5, File No.7, Continuation of the posts of Colonization and Assistant Colonization officers in connection with the Chenab Canal Colonization Scheme for a further period of two years. 13 Ibid 20

government with remarks that ‘I am of opinion that sufficient cause is shown for the further retention of theses posts’. 14

Development of the Canal Colonies and its economic prosperity was essentially a two-way process out of which the government and cultivator mutually benefitted. This area would have remained wasteland without the policies of the British Government and ‘on the other hand without the resolution, industry, and skill of the first settlers, 2.5 million acres that from the colony could never had been turned into one of the granaries of the world’. 15 Malcolm Darling aptly mentioned in his book that the Chenab Colony was ‘a remarkable example of the beneficence of a wise government turned to admirable account by the labour of a hard-working peasantry’. 16

Agricultural prosperity in this region was the outcome of this well-planned canal system, controlled by the state. In the words of Imran Ali, ‘great dependence of cultivation on canal water supplied by a centralized authority established in this region a truly hydraulic society’. 17

The following table shows that the level in each district of the Punjab that was irrigated by these canals especially Lyallpur which was 99 percent dependent on canal water for irrigation.

Table 1.1: Percentage of Canal irrigation in districts of Punjab

Districts Districts Districts

Percentage of canal irrigation of canal Percentage irrigation of well Percentage of ofsources other Percentage irrigation irrigation of canal Percentage irrigation of well Percentage of ofsources other Percentage irrigation irrigation of canal Percentage irrigation of well Percentage of ofsources other Percentage irrigation

14 Revenue and Irrigation Department, Irrigation, May 1900, Nos. 1-5, File No.7. 15 Malcolm Darling, The Punjab Peasants: In prosperity and Debt 4th Edi (Lahore, Nafees Printers, 1947) p.132 16 Ibid 17 Imran Ali, The Punjab Under Imperialism 1885-1947 (New Delhi: OUP, 1989), p. 9 The term Hydraulic Society can be parallel with Hydraulic Civilization maintains control over its population by means of controlling the supply of water. Karl August Wittfogel (1896–1988) a German American historian, coined this term in his book Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power (1957) 21

Lyallpur 99 1 .. Gujrat 71 29 .. Ludhiana 24 76 .. Hissar 99 1 .. Muzaffargardh 68 29 3 Rawalpindi 23 48 29 Multan 90 8 2 Karnal 66 33 1 Attock 12 83 5 Shahpur 88 12 .. Jhang 66 34 .. Ambala 4 64 32 Montgomery 84 16 .. Amritsar 56 44 .. Sialkot 2 91 7 Sheikhupura 84 15 1 Gujranwala 53 46 1 Simla .. .. 100 Ferozepore 82 18 .. Gurdaspur 42 57 1 Kangra .. .. 100 Lahore 80 20 .. Gurgoan 38 58 4 Jullundur .. 100 .. D G Khan 79 15 6 Hoshiarpur 36 61 3 Jhelum .. 92 8 Rohtak 77 23 .. Mianwali 33 66 1 British 73 26 1 Territory

Source: Census of India, 1931, Volume XVII, Punjab Part I, Civil and Military Gazette, Lahore, 1933

Under this government policy different canal projects were launched by the British Government. The following table shows the various details about different canal projects established by the colonial authorities in the Punjab during second and first half of nineteenth and twentieth centuries respectively.

Table 1.2: Canal System in Punjab

Serial Name of the Lengt Length of Culture- Average Date of Date of Date of Numbe Canal System h of the able area area commencemen first completion r the distributarie commande irrigated t of irrigation of main s in miles d in annually construction construction line in thousands in miles of acres thousand s of acres 1 Western 335 1892 2305 877 Before 1820 1886 Jumna annexation 1891-92 1895 1888Sirsa Branch 2 Sirhind 537 3446 2093 1774 1867-68 1883-84 1886-87 3 Upper Bari 341 1535 1452 1304 1849-50 1860-61 1878-79 Doab 4 Lower Bari 132 1244 1532 1181 1906 1913-14 31-3-1917 Doab 5 Upper 173 1250 1453 596 1905 1912-13 31-3-1917 Chenab 6 Lower 471 2522 2724 2530 1884 a 1887 a 1889-1900 Chenab 1890 1892 7 Upper Jhelum 128 608 545 332 1905 31-3-1917 8 Lower 181 1011 1240 876 1897 31-3-1917 Jhelum 9 Upper Sutlej ------337 Some existed 1855 1858-59 22

(Inundation before 1884 1885-86 canal) annexation and some added later 1855-70 10 Sidhnai 67 253 396 299 1883-84 1886 1886 11 Indus 441 269 649 236 Existed before Prior to 1849-50 (Inundation) annexation 1849 12 Shahpur 116 117 116 67 1862-64 1870 1870-71 13 Ghaggar 97 33 108 16 1896-97 1897 1898-99 14 Lower Sutlej 333 Before Were in Some 15 Chenab 227 130 386 193 annexation operation improvement 16 Muzarffargar 446 543 647 337 prior to s finished in h the 1895 annexatio ----do---- n of the Some Punjab by improvement the British s finished in 1896 17 Pakpattan 200 975 1103 276 1923-24 1926-27 31-3-1932 Canal 18 Dipalpur 157 866 888 391 1924-25 1927-28 31-3-1932 Canal 19 Eastern Canal 70 377 423 137 1924-25 1927-28 31-3-1932 20 Mailsi Canal 107 643 730 239 1925-26 1927-28 31-3-1932 Source: Census of India, 1931, Volume XVII, Punjab Part I, Civil and Military Gazette, Lahore, 1933

Construction of the Lower Chenab Canal for colonization and cultivation in Sandal Bar was considered as a cornerstone in the history of agricultural colonization in the Punjab. It was so successful that it transformed the whole Bar from an arid region inhabited by nomadic pastoral tribes to what came to be viewed as a progressive, modern ‘the richest and most flourishing district of the Punjab’. 18 As far as local standards of living were concerned, Darling during his visit to a village of this track remarked that ‘relative to their needs, these villagers are probably better off than most peasants in southern Europe’. 19

Up to the construction of Lower Chenab Canal (1887-92) ‘there was nothing new in the idea of irrigation by canal’. 20 This project was considered so important by the state that in a letter to the Commissioner and Superintendent Lahore Division in 1897, Captain Douglas, the Deputy Commissioner of Jhang, suggested stopping settlements process in Jhang District for ten years. The Commissioner readily

18 Remarks of H. D. Craik, Revenue Secretary to Government, Punjab and Its Dependencies, on Final Report on the Chenab Colony Settlement by B.H. Dobson, 1915 19 Malcolm Darling, The Punjab Peasants: In prosperity and Debt 4th Edi, p.35 20 Ibid. p.112 23

accepted this proposal for the following reasons. (a) By the construction of Chenab Canal the whole of the Sandal Bar is being brought under cultivation. (b) The Kirana Bar will in a few years be brought under cultivation by the Jehlum Canal. (3) The Railway from Wazirabad has as yet only been constructed to the new tehsil of Lyallpur: It is to be extended to Multan. 21

After the annexation of the Punjab, the Upper Bari Doab Canal was constructed by the British government and open for irrigation in 1860-61. The waters for this canal had been taken by the Ravi for irrigation of the areas of Lahore and Amritsar. But the first major experiment in colonization through the canal was introduced in 1886, with opening of the Sidhnai Canal ‘with the aid of the weir on the river Ravi to push large scale irrigation into the high Bar of western Punjab’. Due to low flow and irregular supply of water, this project could not show the desired results. But it set the precedent for the latter canals projects. 22 After this the construction of and irrigation through the Lower Chenab Canal had so brilliant success that it proved as ‘the turning point in the economic history of the Punjab’. 23

These canal systems further linked with the establishment of nine canal colonies between Beas-Sutlej and Jhelum rivers, from 1885 to the end of British rule in India. Under these process three doabs, Bari, Rechna and Jech, lying between Beas- Sutlej and Ravi rivers, Ravi and Chenab Rivers and Chenab and Jhelum rivers, respectively, came under the development. 24 This process of colonization shaped by two forces, at first the state and secondly social structure. The state was empowered by granting the rights of distribution of vast wastelands of the bars , after declaring crown lands, and the canal-waters. Secondly, a specific society was manufactured, through social engineering, in the canal colonies, which protected the economic and political interests of the government. Due to this social engineering, in rural areas there was huge class divisions, from big landlords to small cultivators and landless labour and from divisions within the peasantry class to urban mediators sprung after

21 Letter to Senior Secretary to Financial Commissioners from Commissioner and Superintendent Lahore Division, 27 th January 1897. Punjab Archives Lahore, Revenue file of Jhang District 22 David Gilmartin, “Migration and Modernity: The State, the Punjabi Village and the Settling of the Canal Colonies” in Ian Talbot & Shinder Thandi, People on the Move: Punjabi Colonial and Post- Colonial Migration Edt (Karachi, OUP, 2004), p. 4 See also, Malcolm Darling, The Punjab Peasants: In prosperity and Debt 4 th Edi, p.112 23 Malcolm Darling, The Punjab Peasants: In prosperity and Debt 4th Edi, p. 113 24 Imran Ali, The Punjab Under Imperialism 1885-1947 (New Delhi: OUP, 1989), p. 8 24 establishment of town markets. Division of sources on the basis of caste widened the gap of social inequalities. It further led to some social changes, most specifically change of caste, among the Punjabi population for securing land grants. 25

In this process of colonization, four major and five small colonies were established. Chenab, Jhelum, Lower Bari Doab and Nili Bar were among the major colonies. All canal colonies irrigation systems directly or indirectly were interdependent except the Chenab and the Jhelum which ‘had its own perennial canal system’, though two link canals under Triple Canal Project were constructed to supplement water supply in the Ravi to irrigate Bari Doab Colony. 26 The one of the key salient feature of these canal colonies, which differentiates this region with the other districts of the Punjab, was ‘perennial irrigation’ which provides it a guaranteed supply of water for a whole year. 27 The following table shows the particulars facts about these canal colonies which shaped one of the most extensive irrigation systems in the world.

Table 1.3: Canal Colonies in Punjab

Name of the Period of Where Situated Name of the Estimated Colony Colonisation Canal Work cost of Doab Districts construction (Rs 000) Sidhnai 1886-1888 Bari Multan Sidhnai 1301 Sohag Para 1886-1888 Bari Montgomery Lower Sohag 1803 Para Chunian 1896-1898 Bari Lahore Upper Bari …… 1904-1906 Doab

25 I came to know about this through my personal visit of different villages in Toba Tek Singh and conversation with the locals. 26 Imran Ali, The Punjab Under Imperialism 1885-1947 (New Delhi: OUP, 1989), p. 10,11 27 Ibid. many variation in this canal system had sum-up Imran Ali in his book as, ‘Sidhnai Colony was irrigated by a potentially perennial canal that was, in fact, used only for the kharif (autumn) harvest. The colony did not obtained a rabi (spring), as all available water was taken away on upstream on the Ravi River by the upper Bari Doab Canal, which irrigated proprietary lands in Lahore and Amritsar districts. Thus Sidhnai Canal was a seasonal one, and rabi crop, if sown, had to be matured through well irrigation. Sohag Para colony was atypical because it was irrigated not by a perennial canal but by a seasonal inundation canal. This also provided canal irrigation for the kharif crop only; as in Sidhnai Colony, well irrigation was necessary for the rabi crop. In 1925, forty years after its construction, Sohag Para Canal was converted to a perennial channel when it was incorporated into the Sutlej Valley Project. Chunian Colony was different again. No separate perennial canal was constructed for it; colony was constructed by an extension of the Upper Bari Doab Canal into crown waste lands.’ 25

Chenab 1892-1905 Rechna Lyallpur (complete) Lower Chenab 53072 1926-1930 Gujranwala Jhang Lahore Sheikhupura Jhelum 1902-1906 Jech Shahpur, Jhang Lower Jhelum 43613 Lower Bari 1914-1924 Bari Montgomery, Multan Lower Bari 25086 Doab Doab Upper Chenab 1915-1919 Rechna Gujranwala, Sialkot, Upper Chenab 43596 Sheikhupura Upper Jhelum 1916-1921 Jech Gujrat Upper Jhelum 49770

Nili Bar 1926 Not Bari Montgomery, Multan, Sutlej Valley 83787 completed by Project 1940’s

Source: Imran Ali, The Punjab Under Imperialism 1885-1947 (New Delhi: OUP, 1989), p. 9

1.2 Establishment of Lower Chenab (Lyallpur) Colony

The origin and development of Lyallpur, as a capital of the Lower Chenab colony, was considered as a ‘miracle’ during the start of twentieth century because of its profound success in such a short span of time. 28 Lands grants in the Chenab colony had been granted from 1892-1902 and 1926-1930. It was the most expensive and the largest canal colony project, considered as ‘ Prototype’ 29 , and constructed at two stages. It was a lucrative project, not only for the British colonizers but also among the grantees because of its economic prosperity which was outcome of vast agriculture production.

The main Chenab canal with its three great subdivisions, the Rakh, Jhang and Gugera branches, transformed the vast track in Lyallpur and Toba Tek Singh from a Bar to a settled cultivatable region during British rule. Formation of assessment

28 Kapur Singh Bajwa, “A Study of the Economic Effects of the Punjab Canal Colonies” [unpublished PhD thesis] University of Leeds, 1925 29 Sir M W Fenton, K.C.S.I., Financial Commissioner, had given this title to Lyallpur colony. In his note to the Final Report of the Chenab Colony , he said, ‘In the administration and economic development of the modern the Punjab, the Canal Colonies are the most notable achievement, and of the Punjab canal colonies the Lyallpur colony is the prototype. In any income-yielding capacity of a tract some credit should be given to the part which it takes in contributing the railway traffic receipts. From this point of view the position of the Lyallpur Colony must be regarded as one of high importance. That such pride of place should have been attained by a tract, which thirty years ago was an arid wilderness, is a phenomenon which can never be sufficiently dwelt upon by those who seek to appraise the result and achievements of British rule in India. (This report) is nonetheless a valuable record of solid facts to which resort can be had by all whose task it is to find justification for British rule in India.’ 26

circles, in Lower Chenab Colony, was a clear departure from ‘conventional policy’ in which, the ‘number of these circles is in proportion to the extent and variety of the physical changes observable throughout the tehsil, which changes are reflected in style and quality of the cultivation in several tracts’. 30 If this method was adopted then whole of the colony would come under a single circle, because of general similarity in soil, climate, cultivation and rainfall. ‘Priority of foundation was the basis’ according to the new principle, ‘upon which the colony chaks were organized into circles’ for assessment work. 31 Hence the colony comprised of seven circles, including extensions. 32 Fifty eight propriety villages were apart from these circles, though their irrigation system depended on Lower Chenab Canal.

Allotment in the Lower Chenab Colony was started in 1892, 33 when 230,761 acres on all three branches of Chenab Canal (Rakh, Jhang, Gugera) were granted. In 1903, this total grant raised to 1,813,501 acres, which shows the rapid progress of this project. Old traditional living settlements, rahna or jhok of the Bar were replaced with more systematic chack system with numbers, for getting better results and easier calculation, from 1874 to 1884. 34 The details of these allotments are as follows.

Table1.4: Assessment circles in Lower Chenab Colony, showing total and allotted and cultivated area

Sr. Circle. Total Allotted Cultivated Assessing officer Area. area Area 1 Jhang Branch, Circle I 258429 205526 194800 Mr. G.F.de 2 Jhang Branch, Circle II 353658 253146 241249 Montmorency 3 Jhang Branch, Circle III 142750 82426 76136 Captain M.L. 4 Gugera Branch, Circle I 464638 370773 364657 Ferrar 5 Gugera Branch, Circle II 440456 327824 318851 Captain M.L. 6 Rakh Branch 597940 457024 436748 Ferrar 7 Extention-Bahlak, Bhangu, 200443 128026 115612 Captain M.L.

30 Final Report on the Chenab Colony Settlement by B.H. Dobson, 1915, p. 2 31 Ibid 32 These extensions were opened up during 1920-1930. For detail see Imran Ali, The Punjab Under Imperialism 1885-1947 (New Delhi: OUP, 1989), p.20 33 Real work of colonization started in February 1892. Mr. M E D Maclagan was appointed as Colonization Officer. In 1890 some allotments had made, near Khangah Dogran, irrigated by Inundation canal. See Gazetteer of the Chenab Colony (Lyallpur) sang-i-Meel Publication, Lahore, P. 29 34 Ibid, p.4-5 & 18-19 27

Nahra, Nupewala, Dangali, Ferrar 8 Killianwala 81464 81464 38203 Mr. B.H. Dobson Proprietary Villages Mr. B.H. Dobson Mr. B.H. Dobson

Mr. B.H. Dobson

Whole Colony 2,539,778 1,906,209 1,786,256 Source: Final Report on the Chenab Colony Settlement by B.H. Dobson, 1915, p.2

1.2.1 Major Objectives

Philanthropic spirit, though initially for the relief of congested districts of central Punjab, the introduction of practical agricultural society having best agriculturist health communities, the need of mares and camels for breeding for military purposes, and the ‘growth of selected seeds’ 35 were some major motives behind establishment of the lower Chenab colony. 36 The British government provided the following reasons for this massive migration of the settlers: (a) to relieve the pressure of population upon the land in those districts of the province where the agricultural population had already reached, or is fast approaching the limit which the land available for agriculture can support; and (b) to colonize the area in question with well-to-do yeomen of the best class of agriculturalist, who will cultivate their own holdings with the aid of their families and of the usual menials, but as much as possible without the aid of tenants, and will constitute healthy agricultural communities of the best Punjab type. 37 These ideas formed part of the evolutionary process of the policy adopted by the British Government towards western Punjab.

After Punjab’s annexation, doabs areas and the resident nomadic tribes were considered as potential threat to the government. Hence, ‘these doabs visualized as the

35 Edmund Candler, The Work at Lyallpur (Lahore, The Superintendent Govt. Printing, Punjab, 1920) 36 Malcolm Darling, The Punjab Peasants: In prosperity and Debt 4th Edi(Lahore, Nafees Printers, 1947) p.116 37 Chenab Colony Gazetteer (1904) , p.29, In a letter from Revenue Secretary, Punjab Government to Secretary, Revenue and Agriculture Department, Government of India, Punjab Government explained her intention for the colonization scheme as ‘It seems essential to preserve the tradition of the Punjab as a country of the peasant farmers. No other general frame of the society is at present either possible or desirable in the province….Similarly, as to the yeomen grants which differ from the peasants grants rather in size than in character….Capitalist farming in general is not a system suitable to the Punjab. But a moderate infusion of the capitalist element is not without advantage. It supplies natural leaders for the new society…to reward (governments) well-deserving servants….encouraging the more enterprising of the provincial gentry….enable government to obtain a better price’ 28 haunts of thieves and plunderers’ by the British government ‘posed for them an element of political instability and potential danger’. Similarly, ‘the nomadic and pastoral tribes inhabiting the doabs were looked on with suspicion and disfavor’. 38 Another important factor was ‘settlement of the disbanded Sikh army’ which was considered as major reason for construction of the Upper Bari Doab Canal. 39

The government had articulated the ‘essentials of the successful colonization’ before starting its colonization scheme in the bar . These prerequisites can be summarized as: ‘colonists were obliged to build houses and reside in selected village site, join in the construction of a well and submit to certain elementary rules of sanitation; the control of all common land, roads, watercourses, grazing grounds was maintained in the hands of government; as the country-side would be denuded of its fuel and timber reserves in the process of colonization, grantees were required to plant a certain number of trees’. 40 This scheme transformed the Bar into ‘rural and urban/commercial sections’ because of great flux of migrants and increase in population. 41

38 Fareeha Zafar, “The Impact of Canal Construction on the Rural Structures Of the Punjab: The Canal Colony Districts, 1880 to 1940” Unpublished PhD Thesis, School of Oriental arid African Studies, University of London, May 1981, p. 20 39 Ibid. ‘Therefore, till 1854, the construction of public works which included canals, was entrusted to a military Department, and it was in 1854 that the Public Works Department was formed. It was also at this time that the Government decided to borrow money for irrigation works under the head of 'Extraordinary' expenditure. Prior to this in India, irrigation had been under the purview of the East India Irrigation Company and the madras Irrigation Company.’ See also, Rajit K. Mazumder, “The Making of Punjab: Colonial Power, The Indian Army and Recruited Peasants 1849-1939”, PhD Thesis, SOAS, University of London, 2001, p. 96 ‘The decision to acknowledge Punjab as a land of small zamindars living in village communities and to award ownership rights to the peasant proprietor was derived from the compulsions surrounding annexation in 1849. The Sikhs had been acknowledged by Dalhousie to be 'the most formidable enemy we have yet encountered in India' and the British were keen to ensure that they did not have reason for further discontent. To keep the demobilized Sikh army from causing trouble it suited the colonial government to award zamindars the right of ownership and, by reducing revenue demands, to enable them to take part in profitable agriculture. The first Punjab Administration Report was self-congratulatory: That large bodies of brave men, once so turbulent and formidable...should lay down their arms, receive their arrears and retire from an exciting profession to till the ground, without in any place creating a disturbance is indicative of the effect which has been produced by British power, of the manly forbearance which characterizes the Seikhs and the satisfaction felt at the justice of the Government.’ 40 Final Report on the Chenab Colony Settlement by B.H. Dobson, 1915, p.4 41 Fareeha Zafar, “The Impact of Canal Construction on the Rural Structures Of the Punjab: The Canal Colony Districts, 1880 to 1940” PhD Thesis, School of Oriental arid African Studies, University of London, May 1981, p. 72

29

Map1.2: Process of Colonization in the Punjab

Source: Fareeha Zafar, The Impact of Canal Construction on the Rural Structures Of the Punjab: The Canal Colony Districts, 1880 to 1940. PhD Thesis

1.2.2 Selection of Grantees

The grantees for the project of Lower Chenab Colony were taken from seven districts: Ambala, Ludhiana, Jullundur, Hoshiarpur, Amritsar, Gurdaspur and Sialkot. 30

Most of these areas were Sikh populated and ‘two hundred and fifty thousand acres of land in the Rechna Doab of the Lower Chenab Canal Colony alone was allotted to Sikh agriculturalists form the Amritsar District’. 42 Huge land grants were allotted to these settlers across newly constructed watercourses linked the Rakh, Jhang and Gugera branches which placed Lyallpur district in less than fifty years among the top populated districts of the Punjab.

Table 1.5: Punjab Canal Colony Districts, Density of Population, 1881 and 1941 (p.s.m)

Sr. Canal Colony District 1881 1941 Gujrat 336 485 Lahore 251 261 Gujranwala 204 396 Multan 91 265 Shahpur 87 208 Montgomery 74 313 Jhang 67 244 Lyallpur ---- 397 Sheikhupura ---- 208 Source: Census of India 1881 and 1941

Lower Chenab Colony was the largest Canal Colony project, having three types of grants, peasants ( abadkar ), yeoman ( sufedposh ) and capitalist ( rais ). Peasants were promised twenty years of occupancy rights subject to their residence and cultivation the land grants. Yeomen were allowed to purchase proprietary rights at the expiry of the granting period with precondition of their residence on the tract and allotted 2 to 5 squares each with Rs. 6 per acre as nazarana . Capitalists could also enjoy privilege to purchase proprietary rights but on large scale than yeomen. They were granted 6 to 20 Squares with advance nazrana of Rs. 10 to Rs. 20 per acre. It was an attempt to provide a class of ‘natural leaders’. 43 They had no liability to settle in the granted land like yeomen but this privilege to the capitalist became problematic for the British government’s policy of colonization. This phenomenon was explained

42 Ian Talbot & Shinder Thandi, Peoples on the Moves: Punjab Colonial and Post-Colonial Migration (Karachi: OUP, 2004), p.xv 43 Final Report on the Chenab Colony Settlement by B.H. Dobson, 1915, p.4 31

by Malcolm Darling at length under the ‘Absenteeism’. These were the people granted lands for providing leadership to the ordinary peasants, but, in his view, ‘this hope has not been fulfilled, partly because it was found impossible to insist upon residence, partly because even the resident yeomen rarely attained to any leading position’. Landlord showed least interest in their grants and found ‘nearly always an absentee’. In 1908 colonies meeting, colonization officials showed mistrust of the capitalist grantees. 44

Beside this there were also some other type of grants, like military and camel service. Military grants were the peasants or yeomen type grants, subject to rank, services rendered to the empire, and zamindari linkage. ‘Grants of the yeomen type were as a rule’ as mentioned in the report, ‘only made to the commissioned officers’. To qualify for these grants ‘length of service-not less than twenty years- and zamindari connections’ were the preconditions. 45 As camel and horse were the only means of transportation in the bar , local nomadic Baloch tribes were engaged by the government through the camel and mule-breeding grants. Hence, the supply and transport officer of the Camel Corps, Lyallpur, had the ‘duty to register camel, enlist sarwans and hold regular inspections of men, gear and animals. Similarly, mule- breeding grants were controlled by ‘an officer of Army Remount department, stationed at Lyallpur’. 46

As per the government policy for portraying Punjab as a country of peasants and to appease the ‘dominant peasant castes of rural Punjab’, 78.3 percent of land (1,428,680 acres) in Chenab colony had been granted to the small peasants, 47 These peasants were of three kinds: ‘Immigrants’ (taken from central Punjab Districts Ambala, Ludhiana, Jullundur, Amritsar, Gujrat, Lahore, Hoshiarpur, Gurdaspur and Sialkot, which had the best agricultural traditions); ‘Nomads’ ( janglis ), the cattle grazers of the Bar, selected by Colonization officers after checking their record from local oral sources; and ‘Hithari’, the old landlords of the region. 48 As depicted in following table, this class of the peasants, considered as ‘backbone’ of the colony,

44 Malcolm Darling, The Punjab Peasants: In prosperity and Debt 4th Edi, p.118,119 45 Final Report on the Chenab Colony Settlement by B.H. Dobson, 1915, p.6 46 Ibid. 47 For details Rajit K. Mazumder, “The Making of Punjab: Colonial Power, The Indian Army and Recruited Peasants, 1849-1939” PhD Thesis, SOAS, University of London, 2001, P.95; Malcolm Darling, The Punjab Peasants: In prosperity and Debt , p.117 48 Final Report on the Chenab Colony Settlement by B.H. Dobson, 1915, p.5 32 was selected ‘almost entirely from the central Punjab’. This tract, especially Ludhiana, Jullundur and Amritsar, represented ‘the flower of the Indian agriculture’. 49

Table 1.6: Chenab Colony: Allotment of Land

Type of Grant Rakh Branch Jhang Branch Gugera Branch Extentions Total Acres % Acres % Acres % Acres % Acres % Colonization Scheme

Peasants 280000 70 500000 91 544000 77.7 ------1324000 80.2 Yeomen 60000 15 25000 4.5 35000 5.0 ------120000 7.3 Capitalists 60000 15 25000 4.5 45000 6.4 ------130000 7.9 Police ------6000 0.9 ------6000 0.4 Military ------70000 10 ------70000 4.2 Total 400000 100 550000 100 700000 100 ------1650000 100

Final Distribution

Peasants 342768 75 439431 81..2 542652 77.7 103829 81.1 1428680 78.3 Yeomen 44331 9.7 38461 7.1 58250 8.3 8834 6.9 149876 8.2 Capitalists 38390 8.4 30580 5.7 50921 7.3 8450 6.6 128341 7.0 Miscellaneous 31535 6.9 32626 6.0 46774 6.7 6913 5.4 117848 6.5 Total 457024 100 541098 100 698597 100 128026 100 1824745 100

Source: Imran Ali, The Punjab Under Imperialism 1885-1947 (New Delhi: OUP, 1989), p. 22

According to the 1891 Census, the total population of the Lower Chenab Colony was 112,286. Dobson expressed reservations with this census statistics 50 on the grounds that ‘the census on that year was taken in the cold weather, when the regular nomad population was largely augmented grazers from the riverine villagers’. In 1911, the population increased to 1,105,997 including 548,207 immigrants, born outside the colony. In 1941, Lyallpur was the developed centre of the Colony, stretched on 3522 sq miles with seven market 51 towns and a population of 1,396,305.

49 Malcolm Darling, The Punjab Peasants: In prosperity and Debt , p.117 50 Exact figure is not possible as the Sandal bar was comprised of the area from four districts and separate census record of the Bar was not existed. In 1901 Jhang areas were excluded from the Lower Chenab Colony. 51 Lyallpur, Chak Jhumra, Tandlianwala, Jaranwala, Toba Tek Singh, Gojra, Kamalia 33

It was essentially a modern agriculture based economy with 1,269,978 rural populations in 1941. It had 2215.37 percent variation in population from 1891 to 1941, which was the highest in all districts of the Punjab. The total population of Lyallpur town was 69,930, which comprised majorities of Hindus or Sikhs (Hindu 47%, Sikh 16%, Muslim 33%, and Christian 4%). 52

Map 1.3: Lyallpur District

Source: Census of Pakistan 1951: Punjab, Lyallpur District

Credit for the success of the colony went to ‘the sturdy peasants of Amritsar, Jullundur, Gurdaspur and Ludhiana, who have settled down in increasing numbers as permanents residents of the Colony: and palm for successful and efficient colonization must rest with them’. The role of the ‘aboriginal communities’, the jangli nomadic tribes were also very important in the Bar colonization. Initially, they were against the colonization process 53 and tried to create hurdles for the migrated grantees.

52 Census of India 1941, Volume VI, Punjab, 53 They were reluctant for the land grants, as beautifully depicted in a Punjabi ballad. All the Janglis requested with folded hands, ‘Hang Us but never give us lands, We are ready to leave the country and become beggars, We will never wait for tomorrow and are ready to leave our huts today, Not even grains sufficient for our food can be produces in this jungle, From where shall we pay the land revenue do not destroy us, But Young Sahib made them put their thumb marks, They went on repeating ‘Do not deceive us sir’ 34

But with the passage of time, they settled down in the Bar along the other migrant grantees. 54

Table 1.7: Population variation in Lower Chenab Colony and Lyallpur District 1891- 1941 and Statistics of Immigration for Lower Chenab Colony from Different Districts of The Punjab

Census Statistics Statistics of immigration Year of Population Districts of 1901 1911 Enumeration Lower District Origin Chenab Lyallpur: Colony: Census Census 1941 1911 1891 112,286 60,306 Sialkot 103,390 96,984 1901 780,674 586,009 Amritsar 67,963 81,144 1906 863,244 ---- Jullundur 56,983 70,847 1911 1,105,997 836,372 Gurdaspur 43,593 52,701 1921 ---- 968,063 Hoshiarpur 35,099 44,234 1931 ---- 1,167,702 Lahore 28,620 28,176 1941 ---- 1,396,305 Gujrat 25,352 25,174 Ludhiana 17,807 28,306

Source: Final Report on the Chenab Colony Settlement by B.H. Dobson, 1915, p.34 and Census of India, Vol VI, Punjab, 1941, p. 11

Immigrants were 64.6 percent of whole of the Lower Chenab Colony population. Hindu Jats were 79,657, among whom the majority was Sikh (60,518). They were allotted 448,565 acres, 23.67 percent of the total land granted in different capacities of peasants, capitalists, yeomen, special rewards and auction purchasers. In intelligence and energy they surpassed the Arains and the Kambohs classes of cultivators and considered as ‘the most useful class of the peasants which have come

Kapur Singh Bajwa, “A Study of the Economic Effects of the Punjab Canal Colonies” (unpublished thesis) University of Leeds, 1925, p.35 54 Final Report on the Chenab Colony Settlement by B.H. Dobson, 1915, pp.34,35 see also Kapur Singh Bajwa, “A Study of the Economic Effects of the Punjab Canal Colonies” (unpublished thesis) University of Leeds, 1925 35

to the colony’. 55 Muhammadan Jats came second as land grantees 234,432 acres (12.31 percent), though they were majority in number 150,602 but marked as ‘fair cultivators but inferior to the Arains, Sainis or Kambohs’. Arains numbered 70,246 in the census and had been allotted 191,794 acres. They too were regarded as excellent cultivators and welcomed in the colony for land grants but they supposedly lacked in their physical capacity. Similarly, kambohs had no parallel as cultivators either in skill or energy but ‘in general capacity they are not the equal of the Hindu Jats, who looks down on them’. 56

Table 1.8: Distribution of Land among different caste of immigrants in the Lower Chenab Colony

Distribution of Land: Immigrant-64.6 percent of the whole Colony Religion Caste Percentage Hindu Jat 23.67 Kamboh 2.45 Saini 0.87 Rajput 0.52 Miscellaneous 4.3 Christian Miscellaneous 0.61 Government Departments, Municipalities, District Boards, 0.7 Army Remount Department, Cavalry Stud Forms Musalman Jat 12.31 Arain 10.7 Rajput 2.75 Pathan 1.43 Gujar 1.22 Kamboh 0.56 Miscellaneous 2.51 Source: Final Report on the Chenab Colony Settlement by B.H. Dobson, 1915, p.34 and Census of India, Vol VI, Punjab, 1941

55 Chenab Colony Gazetteer (1904), p. 51; Final Report on the Chenab Colony Settlement by B.H. Dobson, 1915, pp.37 56 Chenab Colony Gazetteer (1904), p.52 36

1.3 Lower Chenab Colony as Pattern Setter

The Lower Chenab Colony was thus transformed from a wasteland to a prosperous agriculturist society due its canal projects and thanks to the efforts of its cultivators. It was not an easy task to bring under cultivation so many million acres of arid land. The first impression of the bar was not good and ‘no wonder that many returned in disgust to their home, seeing only the wilderness and blind to the Eldorado that it was to become’. 57 Many difficulties had to be overcome as the area ‘was wide, empty, and desolate, the population hostile (native nomads were against the migrants influx in the Bar ), and the climate in summer of the fiercest’. Moreover, there was no system of transportation and communication. Because of absence of roads, ‘the tract could only be reached by bullock cart, camel, or horse, and even when the first harvest was won, there was no railway to take it to the market’. 58

Canal colony-based agriculture growth boosted the state income and it benefited all the classes associated with it. Commenting on the general prosperity, Malcolm Darling narrated his personal experience as: ‘In 1923 I visited the prosperity of one of them near Lyallpur. The owner, a Sikh, had received grant of 150 acres, and a result of many years of sustained hard work, even to the point of occasionally weeding the field himself, and of close personal supervision of his Christian tenants, he had been able to build a large two-storey country house at a cost of Rs. 15,000, and had surrounded it with a sixteen acre garden. (He) was the first agriculturist to have a telephone in his house’. Though it was not so with all the grantees it was quite difficult to imagine such progress in a locality where thirty years previously there had been nothing except for nomads roaming in the Bar. Darling further described his visit to the grantees from the janglies: the village consisted of ‘forty houses, divided into blocks by two broad lanes forming a cross and meeting at the well in the Centre of the village. Close to the well is a half-finished mosque, on which Rs. 2000 has been spent…A marriage costs Rs. 1250 against Rs. 50 or Rs. 60 a generation ago’. 59 With the increase in their income their standard of living also improved. When questioned about the rise in the standard of living among migrant grantees, Darling had presented the example of Chak 208 in Lyallpur, a colony village of Ludhiana Sikh:

57 Malcolm Darling, The Punjab Peasants: In prosperity and Debt , pp 114-115 58 Ibid 59 Malcolm Darling, The Punjab Peasants: In prosperity and Debt, p.p 121-123 37

It is early spring and we approach it through fields of young wheat stretching away to the horizon in the sea of green, splashed with the brilliant yellow of mustard flower and broken by islets of sugar-cane. A track just broad for a bullock cart takes us through a young orchard, and a moment later we walking down one of the two main streets of the village, with high, clean mud-plastered walls on either side; and as we pass, we catch glimpses, through noble gateways, of roomy courtyards full of children and cattle…Another good instance of the spontaneous co-operative effort, which is characteristic of Indian Village life, is the building of a fine red brick gurdwara at a cost of Rs. 3000. The head of the village is Zaildar, who with his 200 acres, which he farms himself, is something of a landlord….instead of the usual mud- plaster, his house is made entirely of brick and has an imposing gateway, vestibule, and porch….When he was in Ludhiana, he never kept accounts, but now that he has to farm 200 acres he cannot get on without them. 60

These are some glimpses of socio-economic life of the grantees from Lower Chenab Colony during first half of the twentieth century. There was general prosperity in the Colony. This progress also had great impact on the surrounding districts especially from where grantees were selected for the colony. Over 100,000 grantees had been selected from Amritsar for the Lower Chenab. Therefore, if any person looked prosperous in surrounding districts ‘it is ten to one that he has colony ties or has money abroad’. As Lyallpur Colony was the richest and prosperous among all the colonies, it ‘used to remit over twenty lakhs a year’ even before 1914. With 3,000 miles of metaled road, 5,000 miles of railways, bridges, headworks, and link of the native economy with international markets, all were important factors that boosted the local economy. 61 In 1904-05, assessed Land revenue of Lyallpur District was Rs 1,395,147,na sum that had reached Rs 4,247,795 in 1911-12. 62

The Public Works Department, Irrigation Branch, is a one source to estimate the profitability of a Canal Colony. From its records we can discover the annual revenue and profit derived by the state. The following tables illustrate the economic prosperity of the lower Chenab colony. With the help of gross receipts, it has been possible to calculate net revenue and net profit that made the Lower Chenab Canal Project the most consistently lucrative for the government up to 1946. Being the

60 Ibid. p.133-134 61 Malcolm Darling, The Punjab Peasants: In prosperity and Debt , p. 137 62 Punjab District Gazetteers , Lyallpur , Volume xxxi, Statistical Tables, 1912 38

largest project of its kind, ‘this work in the 1910s, 1920s, and 1930s continued to provide net annual profits of between Rs 10 and Rs 20 million, whereas, in 1945-1946 it returned Rs. 23.6 million’. 63 The following table also compares this project in profitability with other projects.

Table 1.9: Gross Receipts, Net Revenues (Excluding Interest) and Net Profit or Losses (Including Interests) (Rs. 000) 64

Name of 1915-16 1925-26 1935-36 1945-1946 Work Sidhnai Canal Gross Receipts 833 971 837 ---- Net Revenue 686 868 688 ---- Net Profit/Loss 641 825 645 ---- Lower Gross Receipts 15922 22133 19590 30295 Chenab Net Revenue 12650 18999 15934 25420 Canal Net Profit/Loss 11574 17805 14355 23603

Lower Jhelum Gross Receipts 4122 6041 5149 6445 Canal Net Revenue 3304 4610 3767 4934 Net Profit/Loss 2763 3927 3059 4018 Lower Bari Gross Receipts 553 9117 9314 14000 Doab Canal Net Revenue -97 7506 7716 12084 Net Profit/Loss -800 6793 6927 11211 Upper Gross Receipts 1017 4352 2987 5066 Chenab Canal Net Revenue 184 2669 1594 2768 Net Profit/Loss -963 1431 374 1163 Upper Jhelum Gross Receipts 6 2347 1680 2033 Canal Net Revenue -336 1317 500 704 Net Profit/Loss -1747 -129 -982 -1044 Sutlej Canals/ Gross Receipts 746 915 9307 16951 Project Net Revenue 336 252 6700 11744

63 Imran Ali, The Punjab Under Imperialism 1885-1947 (New Delhi: OUP, 1989), p. 163-164 64 The main canal of each canal system has been taken as unit. Chunian Canal system was the part of Upper Bari Doab Canal System, therefore not mentioned separately. Sohag Para Canal was part of Upper Sutlej Canals up-to 1925-1926, after that it is accommodated in Sutlej Valley Project. Under the combined heading of Sutlej Canals/ Project, Upper Sutlej Canals (including Nili Bar Colony) figures provided from 1915-1926 and Sutlej Valley Project information given from 1935-1946. See for information Imran Ali, The Punjab Under Imperialism 1885-1947 (New Delhi: OUP, 1989), p. 161 39

Net Profit/Loss 277 194 2932 8293

Source: Imran Ali, The Punjab Under Imperialism 1885-1947 (New Delhi: OUP, 1989), p. 164

These tables compare the major canal projects in Punjab in respect of annual net revenue/profit and gross receipts/net profit per acre respectively, which further strengthen the argument that the Lower Chenab Canal Colony was the most successful and profitable project up to the end of the British empire in the subcontinent.

Table 1.10: Annual Net Revenues (excluding interest) and Net Profits (including interest) as a percentage of Total Capital Outlay

Name of Work 1915-16 1925-26 1935-36 1945-1946 Sidhnai Canal Net Revenue 51.55 65.35 51.45 ---- Net Profit 48.18 62.13 48.24 ---- Lower Chenab Net Revenue 39.78 54.04 53.95 50.67 Canal Net Profit 36.40 50.64 32.38 46.74 Lower Jhelum Net Revenue 20.07 24.36 18.60 18.46 Canal Net Profit 17.37 20.75 15.10 15.03 Lower Bari Doab Net Revenue 0.46 34.10 33.09 50.43 Canal Net Profit - 3.79 30.86 29.70 46.80 Upper Chenab Net Revenue 0.53 7.15 4.22 6.39 Canal Net Profit - 2.79 3.83 0.99 1.69 Upper Jhelum Net Revenue 0.79 2.97 1.11 1.49 Canal Net Profit - 4.12 - 2.90 - 2.18 - 2.21 Sutlej Canals Net Revenue 18.50 13.83 7.27 13.23 Project Net Profit 15.23 10.69 3.18 9.34 Source: Imran Ali, The Punjab Under Imperialism 1885-1947 (New Delhi: OUP, 1989), p. 164

Table 1.11: Gross Receipts and Net Profits on area irrigated (Rs. per acre)

Name of Work 1915-16 1925-26 1935-36 1945-1946 Sidhnai Canal Gross receipts 3.08 3.10 2.66 ------Net Profit 2.37 2.64 2.05 ------Lower Chenab Gross receipts 6.97 8.81 8.29 10.37 Canal Net Profit 5.07 7.09 6.07 8.08 Lower Jhelum Gross receipts 4.94 6.72 5.95 6.42 Canal Net Profit 3.31 4.37 3.53 4.00 Lower Bari Doab Gross receipts 1.95 7.47 7.54 9.09 Canal Net Profit - 2.82 5.56 5.61 7.28 Upper Chenab Gross receipts 3.13 7.39 5.55 6.10 40

Canal Net Profit - 2.96 2.43 0.69 1.40 Upper Jhelum Gross receipts ----- 6.73 5.84 5.36 Canal Net Profit ------0.37 - 3.41 - 2.75 Sutlej Canals Gross receipts 2.74 3.31 6.90 7.58 Project Net Profit 1.02 0.70 2.17 3.71 Source: Imran Ali, The Punjab Under Imperialism 1885-1947 (New Delhi: OUP, 1989), p. 166

1.4 Toba Tek Singh: Pre-Colonial Development

The locality now called Toba Tek Singh was part of the vast wastelands, the Sandal Bar and lower half of Rechna Doab (Rechna is a blend of the words Ravi and Chenab) inhabited by semi-nomadic pastoral tribes such as the Baloch, Kharrals and Sials. 65 Some historical accounts of this region can be extracted from Sakala of Brahmans, the Sagal of Buddhism and the Sangla of Alexander’s historians . Lassen had collected the Brahminical accounts related to this region from the Mahabharata. Buddhists linked this region with the legend of seven kings 66 . As this region was inhabited by different semi-nomadic pastoral tribes, the Kathaena tribe of this region was attacked by Alexander. The historical accounts of this fight were mentioned by Greek historians, Arrian and Diodorus and the Roman historian Curtius. Hwen Thsang, renowned Chinese historian, also visited the Bar in 630-633 A.D. and provided an account of this region in his travelogue. 67

During the middle Ages the Bar remained under the control of different confronting tribes. Their history we can find in the Jhang, Gujranwala and Montgomery Gazetteers but the information contained there is more about their conflicts rather than the Bar itself. Bhattis, the Muslim tribe, practically controlled eighty two villages in Hafizabad and Khangah Dogran tesils, which formed the north eastern portion of the Bar. They clashed with the Viraks of the northern end, a Jat and chiefly Hindu tribe. In the Bar’s central region the Kharrals had control and some minor tribes of the Bar the Waghas and the Wasirs grazed cattle under their protection. During Sikh rule the Kharrals used to give a proportion of grazing rent, collected from the minor nomadic tribes, to the Sikh government. Towards Jhang, the

65 Imperial Gazetteer of India , The Clarendon Press, Oxford 1908, v. x, p. 187. 66 Alexander Cunningham, The Ancient Geography of India: The Buddhist Period, Including the Campaigns of Alexander, and the Travels of Hwen-Thsang 1st pubd 1871(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013) p.186 67 Chenab Colony Gazetteer (1904) , p.11-13; see Also Alexander Cunningham, The Ancient Geography of India 41

Sials, Harrals and Syeds had the suzerain tribes. During the rule of Walidad Khan 68 , the great chief of the Sials, this tribe’s influence expanded up to Kamalia, a town of Toba Tek Singh, by defeating the Kharals. This great chief of the Sials tribe also gave defeat to the Rind Baloches, another important stakeholder in the socio-economic structure of the Bar . Three masonry dome-roofed buildings were established to mark this victory of the Sials over the Rind Balooches, halfway between Jhang and Toba Tek Singh. Kot Kamalia (named after the great chief of Lakhera clan of the Kharrals) was captured again by the Kharrals after the death of Walidad Khan. From Chiniot to Pacca Mari (renamed as Lyallpur after establishment of Chenab Colony, travelers used to stay here when travel between Lahore and Jhang) was under the jurisdiction of Rajoa Syeds. With the passage of time, most of these tribes established their permanent settlements ‘rahanas’ or ‘jhoks’, and nomadic characteristics diminished gradually. During Sikh rule, the Sikh government did not directly interfere in the Bar and indirectly collected grazing tax called ‘tirni’ through local tribal chiefs. This system of grazing tax was adopted by the British government after the annexation of Punjab: as E. Abbott, Settlement officer of Jhang stated, ‘The earliest system employed by the British Government was taken from the Sikh regime’. But from 1860 to 1874, village boundaries were demarcated for Regular Settlement. It was further improved from 1874 to 1884 with Chak System. 69

According to some archeological reports, this region at some time in history had remained a very prosperous agricultural society. According to E.H. Pargiter, Superintendent Engineer, Chenab Circle, a number of old drainages, well-marked nullahs with sites of old towns on their banks were found, which probably used to flow in the past. With the passage of time these drainages changed their direction which meant that the spring level gradually subsided and rendered the well useless, thus compelling the population to abandon their lands and residence and to migrate to other tracts. 70 That this apparently desolate tract, should have once supported a

68 The collection of revenue from population inhabiting the Bar and Desert of the Thall and influence of the sials was limited to the sub- urban areas of Jhang which was included in the Government of Chiniot, Shorkot and the throne of Delhi was occupied by the Lodhis. There was, however, no resident governor and the Sials paid their revenue to the Nouls who were then dominant in this part of the country. Mal Khan once visited Chiniot obtained the Farman (order) of the Jhang revenue from the governor and established contacts with the Mughal empire directly for the first time. No important event occurred till Walidad Khan, 12th in decent from Mal Khan, gained power and ruled this area. For Detail see http://jhang.dc.lhc.gov.pk/PublicPages/HistoryOfDistrict.aspx 69 Gazetteer of the Chenab Colony (Lyallpur) sang-i-Meel Publication, Lahore, PP. 13-19 70 Chenab Colony Gazetteer (1904) , p.4 42

teeming population was viewed by B.H. Dobson, settlement officer Chenab Colony, as incredible but there was evidence of the fact in numerous mounds ( thehs ), strewn with debris of bricks and pottery which mark the presence of human habitation in a by-gone age. 71 These types of reports by geologists contributed to the establishment of very organized system of canal colonies in west Punjab during British rule.

1.5 Agricultural Colonization in Toba Tek Singh

Toba Tek Singh was established as a town in Jhang Branch Circle II (An revenue assessment circle of Lower Chenab Colony) in 1900, one year after its link with the railway in 1899. It had also been allotted Chak number 326 JB (Jhang Branch) during the colonization process. Toba Tek Singh and Gojra (then town and now Tehsil of Toba Tek Singh) emerged as an important market town in this region. Colonization and migration led to the socio-economic transformation of the whole tract, from Lyallpur to Shorkot and from Jhang to Kamalia. 72

Toba Tek Singh was irrigated by the Lower Chenab Canal System, which was the second largest canal system with a length of 471 miles (main line) and an average area irrigated annually of 2,530,000 acres. It was started in 1884-1890 and completed in 1899-90. Its water was controlled through the Khanki Headworks, the oldest headworks of its kind, constructed in 1889 on the River Chenab. Toba Tek Singh as a tehsil of Lyallpur had scanty rainfall (average rainfall in Toba Tek Singh from 1901 to 1909 was 9.14 inches), hence 99 percent was dependent on this canal irrigation. 73 This indicates the importance and meanings of the canals water for Toba Tek Singh. Its migrant peasant society, together with its agriculture-based economy dependent on the water of the Lower Chenab Canal, controlled by the state, made it truly a hydraulic society. Located at the tail end of the Canal also enhanced the importance of canal water for the locality.

The colonization process in this area started in 1896 and within two years the majority of the land had been allotted to the grantees. 375 Colony Villages, wholly on Jhang and Gugera Branches of Lower Chenab Colony, were allotted between 1896 and 1915. The majority area comprised land from Jhang Branch Circle II and Gugera

71 Final Report on the Chenab Colony Settlement by B.H. Dobson, 1915, p.3 72 Final Report on the Chenab Colony Settlement by B.H. Dobson, 1915, p.8 73 Punjab District Gazetteers , Lyallpur , Volume xxxi, Statistical Tables 1912, p.13 43

Brach Circle II with 98 and 96 villages respectively. 74 In 1906-07, the total area of tehsil Toba Tek Singh including forests was 556,754 acres, while 443,441 acres was granted for cultivation, slightly less to the tehsil of Lyallpur. At the end of 1911, the areas from where majority of the grantees had been selected were Hoshiapur (13,923), Jullandher (18,066), Ludhana (8,720), Amritsar (18,326), Gurdaspur (9,734), Sialkot (18,829), and Jhang (13,699). Other than these, grantees from Ferozpur, Lahore, Montgomery, Jhelum, Gujrat, and Gujranwala were also successful in consolidating considerable land allotments in Toba Tek Singh.

The average land allotted in different villages in Toba Tek Singh was 1 to 1.5 square. Grantees were mentioned as abadkaar. In two years i.e from 1899-1900 seventy-seven grantees had been allotted lands in Chak 331 GB. This showed the growing increase in the grantees. Though the early difficulties, to make land cultivatable were enormous. Mare breeding land was also granted to the numberdars (village headmen). This was more for to enhace social status apart from economic benefits involved. In a statement, Suchait Singh [one of the Numberdar of Chak 331JB] complaints that the Mare breeding land [one sequare], which had been allotted to him, is not good for cultivation. Therefore, he had to rely on his purchased land for fodder of the mare. (See appendix)

74 Final Report on the Chenab Colony Settlement by B.H. Dobson, 1915, p.8 44

Map 1.4: Plan of assessment circle Jhang Branch

In most cases, the colonization officer accommodated grantees from the same locality in the same village. Though all villages were allotted a number they were also known by the grantees’ previous identities. In Toba Tek Singh most of grantees were accompanied by their families for their permanent settlement but their association with their previous hometown was reflected in their living style and day-to-day affairs.

Table 1.12: Toba Tek Singh: Surveyed and Assessed Area (in acres) 1906-07

Cultivated

s

Total Area Available for Cultivation Not

in Use -Sailab -Sailab

District or Tehsil Year Total includingForest Area GovernmentWaste Others WellsNumber Pacca of Number ofjhalars Use in dhenklis, Wells,Kacha Chahi including Chahi Chahi including jhalari Nahri Chahi Totalof Chahi All Kinds Canal Mileage Nahri Sailab Barani Abi Total Area Cultivated Total including Assessment Muafis of that and Jagir 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 45

19 121 104 947 8136 1332 1321 3473 4794

369831 103246 1906-07 1373892 1120755 1359611 1975942 District Lyallpur 46 ------585 391

1775 1775 96171 17142 420508 422868 461317 576891 1906-07 Tehsil Lyallpur 34 20 36 22 ---- 472 129 601 268 30981 356368 357027 254393 556754 134694 1906-07

Tehsil Toba Tek Singh 19 87 38 725 849 288

8100 1569 2418 55123 593997 405045 582735 842297 138966 1906-07 Tehsil Samundri Source: Punjab District Gazetteers, Lyallpur, Volume xxxi, Statistical Tables, 1912

By 1911, the total population of Toba Tek Singh was 194,911, with 3,009 urban populations. Hindus and Sikh formed a majority in urban areas, controlling markets and trade. Toba Tek Singh Town had four factories, all were owned by non- Muslims. In 1911 Gojra Town had 5,417 inhabitants, out of which 2,385 were Hindus, 715 were Sikhs, 2,052 were Muslims and 265 were Christians. A considerable portion of the Muslim population had consisted of jangli nomadic tribes. They were largely ignored during the allotment process. They did not fit into their policy of colonization adopted by the British Government towards this colony. Most of the time, they worked as tenants for the migrant grantees. The economy of Toba Tek Singh at the time of the partition, therefore, was controlled by migrant grantees, who had settled in this locality only fifty years earlier.

Table 1.13: Toba Tek Singh: Religions (1911)

District Lyallpur 1911 Tehsils 1911 Distribution of every 10000 of papulation by religion and sex 1911 Persons Males Females Lyallpur Samund- Toba Total Urban Rural ari Tek Singh 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Persons 8557711 398244 264556 194911 ------

Males 486927 228064 147260 111603 5677 6863 5641 46

Females 370784 170180 117296 83308 4323 3137 4359

Hindus 154603 91526 63077 82761 38276 33566 1802 4165 1732 Sikhs 146670 85623 61047 78024 41943 26703 1710 929 1733 Jains 125 78 47 101 11 13 1 9 1

Muhamma- 524288 291986 232302 222894 176917 124477 6113 4488 6162 dans Native 31877 17641 14236 372 Christians European 146 72 74 14464 7407 10152 2 409 372 & Eurasian Christians Others and 2 1 1 1 2 ------Unspecified Source: Punjab District Gazetteers, Lyallpur, Volume xxxi, Statistical Tables, 1912

According to the census of 1941, the urban population of Toba Tek Singh was 33,925 as compared to 3,009 in 1911. This rapid increase in population was due to tremendous agricultural growth and emerging commerce activities in the locality. As in rural areas where Sikhs and Hindus controlled the agriculture sector, so too in urban areas did non-Muslims especially Hindus enjoy a more or less complete hold on commerce and trade. In Toba Tek Singh town, Hindus comprised almost 55 percent of the total population. In Toba Tek Singh’s Grain Market, not a single shop was owned by Muslims. Even in Main Bazar there was only one Muslim-run shop, Muhammad Yousaf, though Muslim formed almost 28 percent of the total population in the town.

Table 1.14: Towns Population in Toba Tek Singh: Religions (1941)

Toba Tek Gojra Kamalia Total Singh Total 6666 12964 14295 33925 Percentage (Grand of the Total) Grand Total Hindu 3717 6824 6903 17444 51.41% (55.76%) (52.63%) (48.28%) Muslim 1902 3253 6011 11166 32.91% (28.53%) (25.09%) (42.04%) 47

Indian 345 1167 75 1587 4.67% Christian (5.17%) (9.00%) (0.52%) Sikh 643 1559 1302 3504 10.32% (9.64%) (12.02%) (9.10%) Source: Census of India, 1941: Volume VI (Punjab) PP.36-37

Similarly in Toba Tek Singh tehsil, non-Muslims were in clear majority. According to the 1941Census of India statistics, Hindus, Muslims, and Sikhs were 57.27%, 34% and 6.67% of the total population respectively.

Table 1.15: Population of Tehsil Toba Tek Singh (1941)

Toba Tek Singh Percentage Hindu 456683 57.27 Muslim 271144 34.00 Indian Christian 16353 2.05 Sikh 53233 6.67 Total 797413 Source: Census of India, 1941: Volume VI (Punjab) PP.62

Conclusion

The Lower Chenab Colony was the project through which millions of acres of the sandal bar were transformed from arid land to one of the most prosperous agriculture tracts in the world. There were number of factors behind the colonization of this tract by the British government but the project ultimately benefitted all classes that were associated with it. Grantees belonging to this project were carefully selected from among agriculturist communities belonging to the districts of central Punjab. Land was granted to them at different stages by colonization officers and their teams under well planned colonization scheme. Under this scheme this tract witnessed the arrival of hundreds of thousands of migrant settlers from different districts of Central Punjab. It was their first migration, and so, while they settled themselves completely in the new region they still retained family ties with their previous hometowns.

After a very brief period of initial difficulties, land grants in the Lower Chenab Colony became very productive for the grantees. Whole year supply of water, a planned system of chak on three subdivisions of the Lower Chenab Canal, the linking of these colony villages through roads with towns and then these towns through 48 railway with domestic and international markets, were major factors that boosted local economic activities. Though this economic prosperity benefitted the settlers of the colony its effects were also seen in neighbouring districts of the Punjab. But this prosperity was totally dependent on canal waters, as the bar had very scanty rainfall. Canal waters were completely controlled by the state, which projected Lower Chenab Colony as a hydraulic society. Increase in agriculture production led to the emergence of different grain markets in the tract.

Hence the development of Toba Tek Singh - from a small unknown locality of the sandal bar to the status of tehsil and important grain market on North-Western Railway’s Wazirabad -Khanewal Branch – represents an important example of the kind of hydraulic society established by British government in late nineteenth-century Punjab. There were different forces that shaped the process of agricultural colonization in this region. At first the bar land was declared as government wasteland and local pastoral tribes were removed by rejecting their ownership rights. This step enhanced the discretionary role of the state in the distribution of this vast wasteland among new migrant agricultural classes. Hence, the dependence of agriculture on canal water, and the control of land and water, ultimately made Toba Tek Singh totally dependent on the will of the state. These factors shaped Toba Tek Singh into a true hydraulic society.

After the colonization process in Toba Tek Singh, agriculture growth in rural areas and commerce and trade in urban areas went in the hands of non-Muslims migrant settlers. They were not only in majority especially in urban areas but also held the strings of economic activities in the wider locality. Within fifty years or so in the wake of the Partition, settlers were forced to migrate back to their previous hometowns. Not surprisingly it proved very difficult and painful for them to leave the place which they had themselves developed from arid bar to a flourishing locality. Again there were a number of factors involved in their reverse migration, and these will be explored later on in this thesis.

49

Chapter 2 Partition and Migration: Patterns and Trajectories

There behind barbed wire, on one side, lay India and behind more barbed wire, on the other side, lay Pakistan. In between, on a bit of earth which had no name, lay Toba Tek Singh. 1

Toba Tek Singh has become a metaphor for partition historiography, especially in context of the psychological impacts of the partition on the peoples affected by the forced migration. Above lines [which have been taken from renowned short story ‘Toba Tek Singh’ written by Saadat Hasan Manto] does not only question the rationale of the partition of the Punjab but also highlights the real meaning of the partition for the common man of Sikh community in Toba Tek Singh, who becomes the ‘other’ 2 overnight on their own soil. They had to forsake the land of their birth, which they cultivated with their blood and sweat. It was very difficult and very painful as well for them to comprehend the fact that they were now refugees in their own land. They migrated, halfheartedly, with a hope that one day they would come back, but this they never did. This chapter highlights different patterns of the partition-related migration from West Punjab to India in 1947. These patterns were directed by different factors like, communal riots; general conception of Hindu and Muslim states; family bonding of Hindus and Sikhs of canal colonies in East Punjab and official refugees transfer policies. These all factors contributed for large scale

1 Saadat Hasan Manto, Mottled Dawn: Fifty Sketches and Stories of Partition (New Delhi, Penguin Books, 1997), p.10 Saadat Hasan Manto, “Toba Tek Singh,” in Manto Nama (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel, 1990),p.11-18; Kingdom’s End and Other Stories, trans, Khalid Hasan (London: Verso, 1987); Saadat Hasan’s short story is about the partition of India and its impacts in 1947. The main character of this short story is a Sikh lunatic of Toba Tek Singh in a mental asylum in Lahore. His name was Bishan Singh, belonged to a landlord family and who gone mad. He declared his place, in mental asylum, Toba Tek Singh where he stood from last fifteen years, as he did not want to go India or Pakistan. One morning he found dead at the same place. Through the discussion of lunatics of different religious communities of Punjab in this short story, Saadat Hassan Manto meticulously questioned the rationale of the partition of Punjab and highlighted its psychological impacts on the different communities. See Ayesha Jalal, The Pity of Partition: Manto’s Life, Times, and Work across India-Pakistan Divide (Karachi: OUP, 2013),P.3 2 Otherness is the condition or quality of being different or “other,” particularly if the differences in question are strange, bizarre, or exotic. Otherness has emerged as a widely discussed mental construct of pragmatic significance in the humanities and social sciences over the last 3 decades. Dialogues on rethinking sociality, for example, have seriously considered otherness and related concepts such as intersubjectivity and recognition in the contexts of social relations, social problems, and social organizations. For detail, http://www.sage-ereference.com/view/research/n304.xml The self/other concept is originally attributed to Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel in Phenomenology of Spirit (1977). Additional scholars who use the concept include Williams (1997), Butler (2004), Butler (2006), Lorber (1994) and many others. Sami Schalk, ‘Self, other and other-self: going beyond the self/other binary in contemporary consciousness’ Journal of Comparative Research in Anthropology and Sociology, Volume 2, Number 1, Spring 2011 50

migration of Hindus and Sikhs from West Punjab. This chapter examines the role of these factors in the migration of Hindus and Sikhs from Toba Tek Singh to India.

In the first chapter we discussed in detail the establishment of Toba Tek Singh and its communal composition within the Chenab Colony during colonial period. It is a fact that majority of the non-Muslim migrants from Toba Tek Singh were not the original inhabitants of the tract. 3 They settled in the locality half a century earlier, during the colonization process in the Lower Chenab Colony, before the partition. But they certainly developed an association with the locality as they played a pivotal role in its development and the transformation of this locality from an arid Bar to one of the most prosperous agricultural tracts of the region. Moreover, they still retained their social and economic links with their relatives in the east Punjab. So their level of association with the locality was different from that of non-Muslims who lived for centuries in other non-canal colony parts of the west Punjab. On the whole— numerically, socially and economically—they were well-off especially in towns of Toba Tek Singh, Gojra and Kamalia, which are main focus of our research. The fact that Pakistan was going to become a Muslim state was a very important factor in accounting for the patterns of migration of non-Muslims from Toba Tek Singh, though other factors—violence and family links of the refugees with East Punjab— cannot completely be ignored. Before we turn to patterns of migration, it is important to first look at the decolonization process.

2.1 Decolonization in India and the Migration 1947

Before addressing the terms ‘transfer of power’ or ‘end of empire’, it is essential to comprehend the phenomenon of decolonization. The term ‘decolonization’ has been defined in different ways, such as ‘the process of colonial collapse, the progress of imperial withdrawal, [and] the end of empire’. 4 But these have different underlying assumptions associated with them. These assumptions can be illustrated as ‘that the end of European colonial empires amounted to a clear process of socio-economic change; or that imperial powers recognized the need to end their colonial control and deliberately set about withdrawal; or more fundamentally;

3 As we have seen in previous chapter that almost all the local Jangali tribes were Muslims ; and non- Muslims, Sikhs and Hindus migrated to the Bar from most of the overpopulated central districts of the Punjab. 4 Martin Thomas, Bob Moore, L J. Butler, Crises of Empire: Decolonization and Europe’s Imperial States 1918-1975 (London, 2008), p.2 51

that colonialism and formal empire can be chronologically compartmentalized’. 5 Such approaches, which stretch from a denial of local agency in process of independence to the concept of ‘flag independence’ [i.e. ‘story of electoral reform granted, government changes enacted, and treaties signed’] to trying to establish links ‘between formal imperial rule and the more informal, but no less iniquitous ties of neocolonial control’, have made the term decolonization very problematic. 6

According to the ‘high politics’ analysis, the decolonization process was the combination of ‘privileging government policies devised in response to the actions of westernized elites that demanded, contested or negotiated final independence agreements’. 7 Some analysts use this approach to understand the dependency of newly-independent colonies on west, whereas others have interpreted this dependency in the context of colonial modernization projects such as introduction of ‘western languages, educational structures, industrial infrastructure and economic organization’ 8 which actually became the cause of emergence of ‘modern’ westernized elites in those societies. This continuity of colonial domination after decolonization within the framework of modernity also is explained in Partha Chatterjee’s phrase ‘derivative discourse’. 9 These explanations can be helpful in understanding the terms of ‘transfer of power’ or ‘end of empire’ in context of decolonization, though here our main focus is on the impact of decolonization on migration patterns.

Where the decolonization of India is claimed as ‘role model’ in the history of decolonization, it is also associated with ‘the greatest episode of migration’ in the twentieth century. In the wake of the partition of India, which considered as the final solution to resolve ethno-communal problem by the British colonial government, around 18 million people migrated across the new borders.10

5 Ibid 6 Ibid 7 Ibid 8 Ibid p.4 9 Partha Chatterjee, Nationalist thought and The Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse (Minneapolis, 1993), p. 12 10 Ian Talbot, ‘The End of the European Colonial Empires and Forced Migration: Some Comparative Case Studies ’ in Panikos Paniayi and Pippa Virdee, Refugees and the End of Empire: Imperial Collapse and Forced Migration in the Twentieth Century edt.(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011) p.38 52

The growth of nationalism played a very vital role in the process of decolonization of British rule in the sub-continent. Nation formation here passed through a process of making of symbols and ideas around which anti-colonial movements would gather. Paul Brass, as Francis Robinson mentions in his book, has highlighted two important symbols, those of language and religion. In identifying these two symbols, Brass’s prime motive was to ‘reveal the dynamic process by which people come to identify their interests with language or with their religion, to build association to pursue those interests’. 11 Paul Brass further elaborates his argument as the ‘the process of nationality-formation is one in objective difference between peoples acquire subjective and symbolic significance, are translated into group consciousness and become the basis for political demands’. 12 The ‘Hindu renaissance’ under Raja Ram Mohan Roy and ‘Muslim Renaissance’ under Sir Syed Ahmad Khan together with the ‘Hindi-Urdu controversy’ provided the essential foundation for Hindu and Muslim nation building process, during the twentieth century. In context of ‘political action’ as a second factor in nation formation, the establishment of All India National Congress and All India Muslim League represented very calculated steps.

After the First World War, the British Empire not only remained intact but was ‘extended to almost a quarter of the worlds’ land area’. Yet the internal strength of the British Empire in relation to imperial defence was exposed in 1919 when the armed services were informed by the Cabinet that ‘we should assume that the British Empire will not be engaged in any great war during the next ten years’ 13 and it [the idea ‘not be engaged in any great war’] further extended for another ten years in 1928. This critical position of the British government in interwar period can further be judged by Chamberlain’s appeasement policy towards Nazi Germany and fascist Italy. Therefore in India which was ‘considered the most valuable British possession and technically constituted empire in itself’ 14 , the British government tried to pacify nationalist demands through the system of ‘dyarchy’.

11 Francis Robinson, Islam and Muslim Society in South Asia (New Delhi, 2000), p.156 12 Ibid 13 Martin Thomas, Bob Moore, L J. Butler, Crises of Empire: Decolonization and Europe’s Imperial States 1918-1975 (London, 2008), P.17-29 14 Ibid 53

This was one step towards meeting the nationalist elite’s demand for self- government, introduced in the Government of India Act 1919. It granted to Indians a ‘reasonable role in provincial government’ which later in Government of India Act 1935 extended to ‘full provincial self-government’.15 Where the development of the political system enhanced the power of nationalist forces in India, the start of the Second World War further weakened the British Raj. In the conflicting Congress- British atmosphere, the Muslim League successfully established its political position by the end of the Second World War. 16

2.1.1 Muslim separatism in India and the Demand for Pakistan

The state of Pakistan was carved out from the north western and north eastern Muslim majority areas of India though the Muslim population was scattered throughout the sub-content. The history of Muslim separatism in British India can be understood on following lines: orientation of the Muslim society in South Asia; constitutional and political reforms introduced by the British government during the colonial period; and major developments during the last decades particularly the impact of Congress Ministries, the Second World War, the Cabinet Mission Plan and Mountbatten Talks with Indian leadership on the transfer of power. 17

Muslims 18 lived side by side with other communities of India for centuries in the same villages, towns and cities in length and breadth of India. During the British raj, the emergence of separatism among the Muslims of UP was the event of great importance due to its long term effects on the Indian politics. As Francis Robinson argued in response to Brass, ‘the Muslims in UP who organized around the symbol of Islam were the heart of one of the most striking example of nation formation the world has seen’. 19 Pre-existing differences between Hindus and Muslims were ‘emphasized, communicated and translated into the political movement… [when] they saw themselves in danger of losing their privileges as a dominant community’. 20 Robinson maintained that ‘during the 1920s and early 1930s Muslim separatism as a

15 Ibid 16 Ibid 17 Ian Talbot and Gurharpal Singh, The Partition of India (Cambridge, 2011), p. 26-27 18 Muslims were at key place in power sharing equation in India before the British raj. Their influence started with the annexation of Punjab by Mahmud of Ghazni in 1018 and then defeat of Prithviraj by Mahammad Ghoris in 1192 by defeating the Prithviraj laid the foundation of the Muslim rule in India. 19 Francis Robinson, Islam and Muslim Society in South Asia (New Delhi, 2000), P.158-159 20 Ibid 54

political force reached a low ebb [and] western-educated UP Muslims were scattered through several organizations: the Khilafat Committee, the Congress, the landlord political organizations, a shrunken Muslim League. Some even dropped out of politics altogether. It was not till they understood the consequences of Congress power in the province of its victory in the 1937 elections that they came together in large number to support Muslim separatist politics again. From this moment till the emergence of Pakistan they were at the heart of the league’s activities, dominating many of its committees and holding many of its top offices….Without the leadership and devotion of these western educated Muslims there would have been no Pakistan’. 21

Though Muslims had a majority in the north eastern and north western areas of India, which later became Pakistan, the idea of Pakistan was first popularized among Muslims in those areas where they were in minority. As Talbot mentioned, ‘paradoxically, [the call] for separate political representation and ultimately a separate homeland did not come from the Muslims in these areas [Muslim majority areas] but from the minority area of the United Province (UP) where they numbered around 8 million or 15 percent of the total population at the time of the 1941 census. A further 5 million Muslims resided in neighboring Bihar, where they formed 10 percent of the population’. 22

The Pakistan movement, as Hamza Alvi, eminent Pakistani economist cum sociologist, argued ‘was neither a millenarian ideological movement devoted to the realization of an Islamic state nor was it a movement of feudal landlords yet again a movement of an emergent Muslim national bourgeoisie’. 23 He maintains that though the landed elite of the Muslim majority areas eventually joined the Muslim League to consolidate their position, the ‘central driving force behind the Muslim movement was a class that has a distinct position in colonised societies whose role need to be recognised more fully and explicitly’. 24 Alvi labelled this class as the ‘salariat’ i.e urban educated people doing jobs in colonial government at different capacities. This

21 Nawabzada Liaqat Ali Khan of Muzaffarnagar, League Secretary and in effect Jinnah’s Deputy; Nawab Ismail Khan of Meerut, Chairman of the Committee of Action; Choudhry Khaliq-u-zzaman, a very influential member of the Working Committee; Raja of Mahmudabad, who gave the League the weight of his family and much financial support. Please see Francis Robinson, Islam and Muslim Society in South Asia (New Delhi, 2000), p.199-200 22 Francis Robinson, Islam and Muslim Society in South Asia (New Delhi, 2000),p.199-200 23 Hamza Alvi, ‘Pakistan and Islam: Ethnicity and Ideology’ in Fred Halliday Hamza Alavi (edt), State and Ideology in the Middle East and Pakistan (London, 1988), PP. 64-111 24 Ibid 55

class performed a pivotal role for the establishment of Pakistan, with the collaboration of ‘new professionals’ like journalists, lawyers, and urban intellectuals. 25 Jinnah’s ‘Two Nation’ theory was the ideological comparison of ‘weaker Muslim salariat vis- à-vis the dominant high cast Hindu salariat group’. After the establishment of Pakistan this ‘Muslim salariat’ group fractured across other new ethnic identities of Punjabi, Sindhi, Baluch, Pathan and Bengali for a new equation of privileges which is beyond the scope of our research. Hence, the same stance was also taken by Alavi, as mentioned above, that ‘it was in the Muslim minority provinces, especially in the UP, rather than those in which Muslims were in majority, that Muslim political and ideological movements were generated’. 26 The Muslim League, though initially founded by ‘Muslim Notables, so called feudal’, but it is a general misconception that it was always dominated by that group. The fact is that soon after its establishment this political party had gone in the hands of the Muslim salariat class. They demanded the right of separate electorates, to counter local Hindu majorities in UP and Behar, which was not a problem facing Muslims who were living in Muslim majority areas. But the weak performance of the Muslim League in provincial elections of 1937 pushed Jinnah to gather support of the landed elite of the Muslim- majority areas, which actually benefitted landlords instead of the League. At this time, Jinnah’s aim was to establish a ‘grouping of Muslim-majority provinces enjoying a degree of regional autonomy, possibly within an overall Indian Federal Union rather than the partition of India…particularly important for the sake of the Muslims of the UP and the Muslims minority provinces’. 27 For this purpose Jinnah accepted the Cabinet Mission Plan but the August 1946 Calcutta riots totally changed the political scenario.

The gradual development of the political system and the introduction of constitutional reforms in response to the nationalist forces by the colonial government gradually increased local representation in the government institutions at different levels. This started the race among the local communities to grab these opportunities. The introduction of representative institutions, which started with the Indian Council

25 Ibid 26 Ibid, Furthermore, the role Sir Syed Ahmad Khan in construction of UP bases salarait class was prominent. He played central role in transformation of old UP Muslim aristocracy to the new Muslim salariat. He himself was example of this as he joined the services of East India Company against the wishes of his family and rose to be a Munsif or Sub judge. 27 Hamza Alvi, ‘Pakistan and Islam: Ethnicity and Ideology’ in Fred Halliday and Hamza Alavi edt, State and Ideology in the Middle East and Pakistan (London, 1988), PP. 64-111 56

Act 1861, more importantly influenced by three factors of the colonial census [introduced in India in 1881], scientific mapping of religious communities and Britain’s personal understanding of Indian society.28 The Government of India Act 1909 was a very important event in the history of Muslim separatism in India. It was introduced by the British government in response to the fear of rule of Hindu majority by Muslim minorities in the wake of ‘gradual democratization’ and emergence of aggressive Hindu nationalism against partition of Bengal (1905). The Simla Deputation (1906), a delegation of Muslim notables, met Lord Minto, the Viceroy of India, to discuss the safeguarding of Muslims interests. The establishment of All India Muslim League (1906) can also be comprehended in this perspective. The right of separate electorates which was granted to Muslims by the Indian Act 1909 remained intact in the Government of India Acts of 1919 and 1935. The right of separate electorate was accepted by the Congress in Lucknow Pact 1916, the point considered as climax of Hindu-Muslim unity, but later rejected by the Nehru Report of 1928. Jinnah’s fourteen points represented a serious effort towards Indian unity within a weak federation through maximum provincial autonomy but it was also rejected by the Congress. The Roundtable Conference was called in London by the British government to try to reach a consensus-based constitutional draft for India, but the communal question could not resolve. The British government tried to resolve this through the 1932 Communal Award by extending the right of separate electorate to other minorities in India.

The results of the provincial elections of 1936-37 and role of the congress ministries [1937-1939] is pivotal in directing the Muslims of subcontinent for demand of Pakistan. Both the Congress and the Muslim League took part in the provincial elections of 1936-37 held under the Government of India Act 1935 in which Congress ‘won great electoral victory’. Out of eleven provinces, the Congress secured a majority in five and with the collaboration of the other parties was able to form government in seven provinces. The Muslim League performed badly in these elections due to its weak organization at provincial level in the absence of Jinnah (1931-1936). ‘Dyarchy’ had been abolished and full responsibility granted at provincial level which made the Congress ministries very strong. The informal approval of the Viceroy that the governors of the provinces would not ‘ordinarily’ use

28 Ian Talbot and Gurharpal Singh, The Partition of India (Cambridge, 2011), p.29 57

their ‘special powers’ further strengthened the Congress position. 29 In response to the Muslim League’s proposal to form coalition ministry in UP, Congress replied that Muslim League members would be included in the cabinet if they set-aside their Muslim League identity and stopped functioning as separate group. The Muslim League rejected this offer and preferred to sit in opposition. Congress was misled by its victory regarding its roots in the Muslim community. According to Ian Talbot, ‘Congress’s appeal to Muslim voters was relatively limited, for it had contested only 58 out of the total 482 Muslim seats and succeeded in only 26. Despite these disappointing results, the party continued to claim that it represented all communities. [Rejection of the Muslim League’s offer for coalition government] was a grave blunder, which increased the psychological distance between the Congress government and the Muslim masses’. 30 Muslims interests in all domains of life were suppressed, especially in Muslim minority areas by the Hindu majority under the Congress government. Though the investigations of Muslim League regarding these Muslim miseries and problems were exaggerated, they did contain much reality. 31 This was the time when Jinnah took responsibility for reorganizing the Muslim League for the maximum safeguard of Muslim interests in India. He was aware of the weakness of Muslim leadership as he said in 1938, ‘…of the intelligentsia of the Muslims who were [in 1935] in the forefront of what is called political life, most, I do not say all-were careerists. They chose their place according to their convenience, either in the bureaucratic camp or in the other camp, which is the Congress camp’. 32

The Lahore Resolution, passed at the historic session of Muslim League on 23 March 1940, later dubbed as Pakistan Resolution, occupies a landmark place in the history of the Pakistan movement. Jinnah in this session stressed that the Muslims of the subcontinent were not minority but a separate nation belonging to a different civilization. The resolution stated that ‘no constitutional plan would be workable in this country or acceptable to the Muslims unless it is designed on the following basic principle, namely, that geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted….that the areas in which Muslims are numerically in a majority as in north-western and eastern zones of India should be grouped to

29 Chaudhari Muhammad Ali, The Emergence of Pakistan (Lahore, 2012), p.27 30 Ian Talbot and Gurharpal Singh, The Partition of India (Cambridge, 2011), p.32-33 31 Ibid 32 Quoted in Chaudhari Muhammad Ali, The Emergence of Pakistan (Lahore, 2012), p.41 58

constitute independent states in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign’. 33 The word ‘states’ creates vagueness in this resolution leading Ian Talbot to remark that it ‘may well have been designed to give Jinnah room for maneuvering, but it also encouraged ideas of a Pakistan confederation which were not fully exhausted even when in 1946 the plural ‘states’ excised from the separatist demand’. 34

Where the unilateral decision of the British government regarding India’s participation in the Second World War alongside the British on 3 September 1939 was a ‘tactical blunder’ 35 , this war gave opportunity to Muslim League to strengthen her position in changing political situation. Due to which British government had to face resistance in the form of non-cooperation 1939-1942 and later Quit India movement which Barbra Metcalf has described as ‘the gravest threat to the British rule in India since the revolt of 1857’. 36 Similarly the Congress response to the British decision [India’s participation in the Second World War alongside the British] with resignations was a miscalculated step which opened space to the Muslim League for political maneuvering. The Muslim League celebrated the resignation of the Congress ministries as a day of ‘deliverance’. During the war the Muslim League was the close ally of the British government and provided timely assistance not only in the war but also to counter Congress resistance. Hence during war time politics, ‘Congress was the main loser for the policy of disengagement and open hostility, while the Muslim League enjoyed a new credibility and respectability’. 37

Initial war time difficulties forced the British government to secure support of India through negotiations but again The Congress missed this opportunity and miscalculated the British position while the Muslim played well. The Congress was not ready to cooperate with the British government in wartime efforts and insisted on ‘substantial immediate transfer of power’. But the Viceroy Linlithgow made it clear in his ‘August Offer’ that the British government was not ready for the transfer of power to any government whose authority was challenged by any other powerful so-called national group. But soon British government had to change her stance. The fall of

33 Ibid p.38 34 Ian Talbot and Gurharpal Singh, The Partition of India , p.33 35 Barbara D Metcalf, A Concise History of Modern India (New York, 2012), P.203 36 Ibid, P.206 37 Ian Talbot and Gurharpal Singh, The Partition of India , p.34 59

France in 1940 and Singapore and Burma in early 1942 pushed the British government them to negotiate with the Congress for cooperation. Sir Stafford Cripps’s flying visit to India in 1942 was the outcome of this desperate situation. This offer accepted independence of India ‘by the convening of a constituent assembly, at the end of the war…with the important proviso that no unwilling portion of the country should be forced to join the new state’. 38 It also offered increase of Indians in the Viceroy’s executive council but failed to get recognition from the major local political parties. The Congress was demanding the transformation of the ‘viceroy council into a cabinet responsible to an Indian legislature or even transfer the defense ministry in Indian hands’. 39 The Cripps offer was rejected by the Congress on the instruction of Gandhi who viewed it as ‘a post-dated check on a failing bank’. 40 While the Muslim League rejected it, it ‘did not concede Pakistan unequivocally’. 41 Jinnah- Gandhi talks, which took place in September 1944, were apparently an effort to ‘accommodate Muslim League’s demands’, and gave further authenticity to the idea of Pakistan, confirming Jinnah’s status as ‘sole spoke man’ of the Muslims of the subcontinent. 42

This was the time when the British government thinking in terms of possible geographical division of India along communal lines. This factor shows the gradual increasing importance and influence of All India Muslim League in front of the British government. The expected divisions were Pakistan, Sikhistan and Hindustan. In a secret intelligence report with the War Office, a map had been shared in 1943 regarding this division. 43 This report clearly highlighted ‘East Pakistan’ and ‘West Pakistan’ through map [2.1]. The report also clearly highlighted the ‘disputed areas’ i.e the areas in which Hindus had been in majority but that present within the Muslim majority provinces. This report required attention during explanation of different ideas about the Pakistan scheme, like ‘the bargaining counter’ 44 , British role, division of Punjab and Bengal.

38 Barbara D Metcalf, A Concise History of Modern India , P. 204-205 39 Ibid 40 Chaudhari Muhammad Ali, The Emergence of Pakistan , p.44 41 Ibid 42 Ian Talbot and Gurharpal Singh, The Partition of India, p.35 43 Intelligence Correspondence With War Office, WS 13127, IOR: L/WS/1/745 B.L 44 According to Ayesha Jalal, ‘demand for full sovereign Pakistan gave’ Mr. Jinnah a ‘bargaining counter’ and he ‘hoped to persuade Congress to accept the [Cabinet] Mission’s proposed All-India 60

Map 2.1: Illustrating Hindustan, Pakistan, Sikhistan and the Indian States [1943]

Source: Source: Intelligence Correspondence With War Office, WS 13127, IOR: L/WS/1/745 B.L

Now, the Muslim League claimed the only representative of all the Muslims of India by rejecting the Congress stance of representation of all the Indians across the religious lines. A conference of Indian leaders was called by Viceroy Lord Wavell in June 1945 at Shimla to resolve the constitutional and political issues through making an ‘executive council wholly Indian [apart from himself and the commander-in-chief] to run an interim government’. 45 Jinnah adopted the position in the conference that as the Muslim League was the representative of all Muslims in India, therefore the Muslim League alone had the right to nominate all the Muslim members of the executive council. The conference, however, failed and ‘Jinnah’s firm stance won him the day’. 46 But the real task that faced Jinnah was to prove his stance in the coming elections.

federal scheme as a lesser evil’. Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan (Lahore, Sang-e-Meel Publications, 1999), p. 187 45 Barbara D Metcalf, A Concise History of Modern India , P.211-12 46 Ian Talbot and Gurharpal Singh, The Partition of India , p.35 61

General elections for the provincial and central legislature, held in the winter of 1945- 46, had crucial significance for the Pakistan Scheme. Both the Muslim League and the Congress participated with the slogans of Pakistan and united India respectively. The Muslim League won all the seats reserved for Muslims in the central legislature. Similarly in provincial elections it won 439 out of 494 seats reserved for Muslims, capturing 75 percent of the total Muslim vote in comparison to the 4 percent it had obtained in 1937. In Punjab, which was considered as ‘cornerstone of Pakistan’, the Muslim League delivered a crushing defeat to the Unionist Party by capturing 75 out of 86 Muslim reserved seats. Similarly, the Muslim League won 113 out of 119 reserved seats for Muslims in Bengal, 34 out of 40 in Bihar and 54 out of 64 in UP. It also formed a ministry in Sindh. The League was unable to secure a majority in NWFP and won 17 of 36 Muslim reserved seats but later rectified its position through a referendum held in June 1947 when people overwhelmingly voted for Pakistan. The election results were the clear verdict of the Muslim masses in favour of Pakistan.

The Cabinet Mission Plan was the last hope, where the consensus between All India Muslim League and the Congress could be built but it failed. Before the Viceroy’s meeting with the provincial assemblies for constitution-making, British government in London announced on 19 February 1946 that they are sending a team of three cabinet members to India, for close consultation with the Indian political leadership. For the completion of its object—i.e ‘to set up quickly acceptable machinery whereby Indians could determine the form of government under which India could realize full independence status and to make the necessary interim arrangements’ 47 —the Mission conducted a series of talk with the Indian political leaders association from 24 March 1946 to 29 June 1946. After failing to reach any consensus, the Mission announced a historical document on 16 May 1946, which it considered ‘the best immediate arrangements’ for the future constitution and Interim government of India. Though the Pakistan demand was not accepted by the Mission, but the essence of its hope was there in the classification of the provinces into A, B, C, where B and C were Muslim majority areas. The Council of Muslim League accepted this plan on 6 June 1946 but only halfheartedly due to ‘the grave issues involved and the League’s earnest desire for a peaceful solution [and showed its willingness to join the constitution body by] reiterating that sovereign Pakistan

47 H V Hodson, The Great Divide: Britain India and Pakistan (Karachi, 1985), p.133-160 62

remained the unalterable objectives of the Muslims’. 48 The Congress had not accepted the Plan due to its concerns with the grouping of the provinces and communal representation in the interim government. The Commission issued the new ‘award’ on 16 June 1946 by breaking the ‘Hindu-Muslim parity’ and replaced 5:5:2 with 6:5:3, where six belonged to the Congress including one scheduled caste, five for the Muslim League and three for Sikhs, Indian Christians and Parsis.

The conflicting situation arisen due to the statement of the Cabinet Mission. According to this statement ‘if the two major parties [the Congress and the Muslim League] or either of them proved unwilling to join the proposed team, the Viceroy would proceed to form an interim Government which would be as representative as possible of those willing to accept the statement of 16 May’. 49 On 23 June Stafford said in a letter that ‘the Muslim League has accepted the constituent assembly scheme of May16 and Congress has not. There is no logical reasoning for preferring the latter to the former’. 50 But the government was not ready for opposition from the Congress and the Viceroy reinterpreted his previous statement as ‘the scheme of 16th June having failed to accept the necessary acceptance, he was free to from such a government as he chose, representing, as far as he could make it so, the parties who had accepted the statement of 16 May, whether or not they accepted the statement of 16 June’. 51 Jinnah replied on this changed stance as follows: ‘the Mission had gone back on their words’. The failure of the Cabinet Mission proved disastrous and led to ‘Direct Action day’, the communal violence involved in the ‘great Calcutta Killing’ and the partition-related communal massacres and then forced migration in 1947. 52 Following map illustrates the principal flows of refugees across the Pakistan- India borders in 1947.

Map 2.2: Indian Partition 1947 and principal flows of refugees across the Pakistan- India borders

48 Ibid 49 Ibid 50 Ibid 51 Ibid 52 Ibid 63

Source: Martin Thomas, Fight or Flight: Britain France and Their Roads From Empire (London, 2014), p.99

2.1.2 Partition of Punjab and Bengal

The British government wanted the peaceful transfer of power in order to secure its maximum interests in post-independence scenario in the subcontinent but the circumstances that led to the last days of the Raj were entwined and very complex to be resolved. On one hand, there was the British belief that the subcontinent’s strategic and economic stability lay in its unity and, on the other hand, they were committed to the safeguard minority rights. Muhammad Ali Jinnah also pleaded the demand of Pakistan in a very strong way. Jinnah’s much needed support for the British government during the Second World War, as we have discussed earlier, was also a timely decision which shaped the British transfer of power policy in India. As Ian Talbot remarks, ‘the closing period of British rule laid bare the contradiction 64

between the short-term tactic of boosting the Muslim League and the long-term imperial commitment to a united India’. 53

The results of the 1946 elections and failure of the Cabinet Mission, which was considered as the last hope for united India, due to the Congress inflexible approach 54 and ambiguous statement of the Mission of 16 June 1946, led the events to the point of no return. In a letter to Mountbatten on 15 June 1946, Wavell highlighted this situation: ‘it looks as if, after many weeks of bargaining, the Congress were going to run true to form and turn down yet another offer [of the Cabinet Mission]. What will happen next is uncertain, but it will certainly be difficult and unpleasant’. 55

In the presence of all anti-government policies of the Congress, started from resignations from the provincial ministries to non-cooperation movement and from the ‘Quit India’ movement to the failure of the Cabinet Mission, the British government looked aligned with the Congress desires, not just because of the Congress’s status as representative of the majority of Indian masses but because of the fear of another expected call of ‘quit India’ by the Congress. As Ian Talbot points out, ‘the outgoing Raj did not have the stomach for repressing another majority nationalist struggle after ‘quit India’’. 56 Besides there was another threat, that of the ‘Azad Hind’ 57 movement which haunted the exhausted British government. The leadership of ‘Azad Hind’ movement was criticizing British intention and sincerity in the Cabinet Mission and on the other hand was idealizing the Congress and its leadership especially Nehru. It was communicated to the British government through secret

53 Ian Talbot and Gurharpal Singh, The Partition of India , p.39 54 The Congress accepted the Cabinet Mission plan but at its own ‘destructive interpretation’. But latter in a press conference after the Working Committee’s meeting held on July 6, 1946, Mr. Nehru declared that ‘the Congress had accepted no plan, short or long’; it had committed to participation in the proposed Constitutional Assembly, but to no more. The Assembly would be sovereign authority, and the grouping scheme would probably never function…..the Centre would have to include (as the corollary of foreign affairs, defense and communication) defense industries, foreign trade currency and credit, and adequate taxing powers. The Mission proviso about proper arrangements for minorities was a domestic Indian problem. ”we accept no outsider’s interference with it, certainly not the British Government’s.”…Congress regarded itself as free to change or modify the plan (The Cabinet Mission Plan) in the Constituent Assembly as it thought best. See detail H V Hodson, The Great Divide , p.162- 63 55 H V Hodson, The Great Divide , p. 156 56 Ian Talbot and Gurharpal Singh, The Partition of India , p.37 57 Azad Hind was a secret Indian Workers Association worked for the independence of India from British raj. According to the M.I.5 report ‘Azad Hind came to the notice of the Home Office in May, 1945, when the India Office drew attention to the inflammatory nature of the first number…(its) views…are in many respects similar to those which have recently been aired in journals issued by, e.g. The Communist Party, the Revolutionary Communist party and the Independent Labour Party’. File No. H.O.45/25460 The National Archives London 65

agencies reports which further highlighted the intensity of the expected resistance to the government from the nationalists. 58

After failure of the Cabinet Mission Plan and ‘the Direct Action day’ of 16 August 1946, political situation reached to point of no return. In this critical situation the Viceroy announced on 24 August 1946 the formation of the new interim government. The Muslim League was not taken into confidence on the Congress’s stance on the Cabinet Mission Plan and the British response to that. Hence the All- India National Council of the Muslim League passed a resolution which declared that ‘the Congress intended to use its majority to upset the clear intentions of the Cabinet Mission plan in the Constituent Assembly’. 59 Hence, it revoked the Muslim acceptance the Mission’s statement of 16 May 1946 and authorized the Working Committee to plan a ‘direct action day’. On 16 August 1946 the ‘direct action day’ was observed throughout India and Calcutta was converted into massive communal riots. 60

Lord Wavell was replaced with Lord Mountbatten as the Viceroy of India for final stage of transfer of Power. He arrived in India on 22 March 1947. His views regarding the transfer of power, which he shared with Sirdar Patel in a meeting on 12 April 1946, were that he was ‘in favour of a firm Union with a strong central government. He would like to see the Interim Government-with a possible addition of Mr. Jinnah-operating independently, and becoming the successor authority when power was finally transferred in June 1948. The next best solution was the Cabinet Mission Plan. The one course into which he did not want to be forced was unrestricted Pakistan, but if he were it would have to be a truncated Pakistan’. 61 He tried his best to generate consensus among the Indian political leadership on the Cabinet Mission Plan, but failed.

Partitioning of Punjab and Bengal was adopted as a tool to avoid partition of India or weaken Jinnah’s position on the question of a separate sovereign state for the Muslims of the subcontinent. 62 This move proved disastrous and became one of the

58 File No. H.O.45/25460 The National Archives London 59 H V Hodson, The Great Divide , p.163-168 60 Ibid 61 Ibid 62 Sardar Patel said to the Viceroy that as soon as the Viceroy announced the prospective partition of Bengal, the Bengali Muslims would break from the League in order to preserve the province as a 66

major causes of violence and large scale migration in India. 63 The Punjab province had remained under the control of the Unionist Party from 1923, the year of its establishment, through to the provincial elections of 1946 with cross communal and ‘unequivocal support from the British’. In 1946 provincial elections however, the Muslim League won a majority of seats, but the Unionist Party formed a coalition government with the support of Congress and the Akali Dal. From the very first day Khizr’s premiership had to face very serious resistance from Muslim League. The law and order situation further became problematic with the activities of belligerent organizations such as the Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangh (RSS), the Sikh Akali Fauj and the Muslim League National Guard. Against the backdrop of the British announcement showing their intention to transfer of power in India by June 1948 and ‘direct action’ from the Muslim League, Khizr had to resign on 2 March 1947. The fall of the Unionist government was not only sealed the fate of a united Punjab but also removed the barrier from communal violence, as revealed in such developments as the act of ‘Master Tara Singh … brandishing a sword on the steps of Punjab Assembly building on 3 rd March 1947’ 64 , agitation of Hindu and Sikh students against Pakistan demand in Anarkali Bazar Lahore, and anti-Muslims riots in Amritsar where ‘four thousand Muslim shops were burned down in the walled city’. 65 A sharp response was seen in Rawalpindi and Multan divisions where Sikhs and Hindus became victims of brutal violence from Muslims. The Rawalpindi massacre led to the demand of a divided Punjab by Sikhs and Hindus and the Congress passed a resolution in favour of this on 8 March 1947. Up to 15 June Jenkins, the Governor of Punjab, tried to establish mutual understanding between Muslims and Sikhs for coalition government but failed. He wrote to the Viceroy that ‘unity means ruin of one kind, and partition ruin of another; if there is to be ruin anyway, partition seems the simpler and perhaps the less bloody from of it’. 66 On 17 June 1947 the Partition Committee was constituted. Other than dividing assets between East and West Punjab, an important step taken by the Partition Committee was the establishment of

whole, and same might possible follow in the Punjab…..real chance that Mr. Jinnah would either be forced to come to terms or be overthrown by the League. See detail, H V Hodson, The Great Divide , p.235 63 Tahir Kamran, ‘The Unfolding Crisis in Punjab, March-August 1947: Key Turning Points and British Responses’ Journal of Punjab Studies Vol.14 No.2, 2007 p.187-207 64 Ibid 65 Ibid 66 Ibid 67 the ‘Punjab Boundary Force’ to avoid violence on expected border areas. Under the ‘3 June Plan’, the Punjab and Bengal Boundary Commissions were constituted on 30 June and Sir Cyril Radcliffe arrived in India as its Chairman on 8 July 1947. 67 He handed over the Muslim-majority areas of ‘tehsils of Ferozepur and Zira [with respective] Muslim majorities of 55.2 and 65.2 percent to India’ due to ‘other factors’. Delay in the publication of the Award until 17 August 1947 was a key ‘contributory factor in partition-related massacres’. 68 Pakistan government had serious reservations on the Award 69 and British government also looked worried if Pakistan had raised allegation on the matter. 70

Bengal was the second province which was divided between Pakistan and India during the partition of subcontinent in 1947 on the basis of Muslim and Hindu- majority areas. The role played by Sikhs and Hindus combined in the division of the Punjab, while here ‘ bhadralok 71 Hindus preferred to carve up Bengal rather than to

67 Ibid; see also Ian Talbot, Divided Cities: Partition and Its Aftermath in Lahore and Amritsar 1947- 1957 (Karachi, 2007), p.37-41; Richard D. Lambert, Hindu-Muslim Riots (Karachi,2013), p.207-288 68 Ian Talbot and Gurharpal Singh, The Partition of India , p. 46 69 Pakistan had serious reservations about the division of Punjab and Bengal. ‘Other factors’ gave much space to the Sir Cyril Radcliffe in demarcation of boundaries. Mr. Yousuf Khattak, General Secretary of the Pakistan Muslim League, blamed the Sir Cyril Radcliffe for change in the Award in favour of India against Pakistan. He Said ‘I accuse Sir Cyril Radcliffe of having first made an award which was communicated to sir Even Jenkins and then having changed it to the disadvantage of Pakistan. I accuse him of having done so with a political motive and extra-judicial influence…. [and] betrayed the trust reposed by Muslims in his integrity and impartiality. I assert that he dare not now give straight answers to my straight questions [1. Is it a fact that he changed his award to the disadvantage of Pakistan even after it had been communicated to the then Governor of Punjab, Sir Even Jenkins? 2. Is it a fact, as stated by Sardar Patel in a speech in Calcutta, that it had been agreed beforehand that India would not lose Calcutta?], because he had a guilty conscience’. File, ‘Sikh and Boundary Commission Award’ 1947/48 No. DO 133/100, The National Archives London. 70 A top secret letter had been written by Sir Terence Shone, High Commissioner for the U.K in India to the Commonwealth Relations office on 28 April 1948, which showed the planning and advance preparation to answer the allegation regarding change in the award in favour of India with consultation with Lord Mountbatten. In the letter he wrote ‘your telegram 1058 of 22 nd April giving Lord Mountbatten’s comments on the draft parliamentary answer prepared in advance in case Pakistan release Abell’s letter of 8 th August 1947. As regard the suggested modifications (A), the draft we first put to Radcliffe described it as “a provisional boundary” but he did not like this and doubt if he can be got to accept the redraft suggested by Lord Mountbatten. I see no difficulty about (B). As regards (C) I think we must wait and see what in fact the Pakistan’s allegation is… It is of course true, no improper attempts were made to influence Radcliffe’s decision, but he tells me that he did quite deliberately seek the views of all sorts of people including British officials and some of these conversations took place at a late stage. There is, therefore, certain awkwardness in any wording that suggest that Radcliffe was absolutely aloof… I suspect that at an early stage there was a distinct impression in Pakistan that the variation affected the Gurdaspur area which in turn affected communication with Kashmir’. File, ‘Sikh and Boundary Commission Award’ 1947/48 No. DO 133/100, The National Archives London. 71 With the socio-economic activities of the British in Bengal, ‘created a new social group famed Bengali Bhadralok (the gentlefolk), which spread its influence over other parts of India and in due course played important role in partition of Bengal. 68

accept the indignity of being ruled by Muslims’. 72 By dividing Bengal with the help of ‘Hindu separatism’, ‘the Congress High command was [not only]ready to pay the price of partition in order to strengthen its hold over a unitary India, but … the Congress campaigned successfully for the vivisection of its province on communal lines’. 73 Calcutta and Noakhali riots gave real momentum to ‘the campaigns to the partition of Bengal…. [which was] led by the rump of the old Bengal Congress [and] it was stridently backed by the right-wing nationalist Hindu Mahasabha’. 74 Contrary to this, according to Ian Talbot, ‘unlike Punjab, where local demands for partition followed the Rawalpindi riots, Hindu leaders did not demand a separate West Bengal province in the wake of Calcutta and Noakhali riots [1946], but only after the Attlee’s February 1947 declaration which signaled an imminent British departure’. 75 He further maintained that ‘instead of riots, far more important was the Muslim League’s success in mobilizing the peasant support against landlord and moneylender along communal lines’. 76 The slogan of the abolishment of the Zamindari system ‘struck at the heart of the interests of the bhadralok rentier class’. 77 Some Muslims and Hindus like Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy, Surat Bose and Kiran Shankar favoured united Bengal but all efforts failed. Hence, Bengal was partitioned according to the Radcliffe Award between East and West Bengal, with a huge population of Hindu and Muslim remaining on both sides of the boarder. This not only affected the socio-economic position of the province but generated a long-term process of violence and migration.

Map 2.3: Partition of Bengal 1947

72 Joya Chattergee, Bengal Divided: Hindu Communalism and Partition 1932-1947 (Cambridge, 1994), p.266 73 Ibid 74 Joya Chattergeeji, The Spoils of Partition: Bengal and India 1947-1967 (Cambridge, 2007), p.14 75 Ian Talbot and Gurharpal Singh, The Partition of India , p.51 76 Ibid 77 Ibid 69

Source: Joya Chatterji, The Spoils of Partition: Bengal and India 1947-1967 (Cambridge, 2007)

2.1.3 Partition and Ensuing Communal Tensions

To understand partition led violence and migration, we have seen the process of partition of India in which crucial factor was division of the two Muslim-majority provinces of Punjab and Bengal in August 1947 under the 3 June Plan. The plan was so ambiguous ‘to all its superficial complexities and fine details’ 78 that created confusion and frustration among the people of sub-continent at start. It was, as Yasmin Khan has depicted, ‘wafer thin and left numerous critical aspects unexamined and unclear’. 79 Khan proceeds to raise different questions, such as ‘where India was and where Pakistan was? Who was now an Indian or a Pakistani? Was citizenship underpinned by a shared religious faith, or was it a universal right, guaranteed by the state that promised equality and freedom to all? Where people expected to move into

78 Yasmin Khan, The Great Partition: The Making of India And Pakistan (New Delhi, 2007), p.4 79 Ibid 70

the state where their co-religious resided in a majority’. 80 People were unaware about their areas, where they would fall, as the boundaries were ‘hurriedly marked’ through the Radcliffe Award announced on 17 August 1947. If Nehru accepted ‘this plan with no joy in his heart’, then Jinnah also showed disappointment to this plan by commenting that ‘it is clear that the plan does not meet in some important respects our point of view; and we cannot say or feel that we are satisfied or that we agree with some of the matters dealt with by the plan’ and by leaving the final acceptance or rejection of it to the Muslim League’s working committee. 81 Even Mountbatten could not provide a satisfactory answer to a question related to the expected ‘mass transfer of population’ in wake of the plan: the Viceroy replied ‘personally I don’t see it; there are many physical and practical difficulties involved. Some measure of transfer will come about in a natural way….perhaps governments will transfer populations. Once more, this is a matter not so much for the main parties as for the local authorities living in the border areas to decide’. 82 These were fatal flaws and shortcomings which led to large scale massacre and massive migration movement in months following the Plan.

The growing number of volunteer-cum-private political and communal armies also created an alarming situation for the government during the early months of 1947. There number increased especially after the Defence of India Rules 1946. Agencies warned serious danger of open clash of these organizations 83 with deteriorating government control. The report forwarded with the compliment of M.I.2, War Office, on 24 January 1947 mentioned ‘India so-called volunteer organizations are, in fact, private political and communal armies…the removal of restrictions by expiry of the Defence of India Rules in 1947, and current communal tensions, have combined to accelerate their growth. While the stage of open clashes between organized bodies of volunteers has not yet been reached, it remain a dangerous, and

80 Ibid 81 Ibid, p.3-4 82 Published in Times of India, 5 June 1947, cited in Yasmin Khan, The Great Partition, p.100 83 These organizations were included National Volunteer Corps or Rashtriya Swayan Sevak Sangh (Militant Hindus, Strength 100,500), Muslim League National Guards (Muslim League, Strength 92000), ShaIromni Akali Dal or Akalis (Sikhs, Strength 90000), Khaksars (Pan Islamic, Strength 12500), Ahars or Majlis-i-Ahrar-i-Islam-i-Hind (Militant Muslim, Strength 3000), Congress Volunteer Corps and RashtraSeva Dal and Azad Hind Volunteer Corps or Hindustani Seva Dal (Congress, Strength 58000), Red Shirts or KhudaiKhidmatgars (Congress Muslim, Strength 12500), Azad Hind Dal (Left Wing Congress, Strength 8500), Ram Sen and Hindustan National Guards (Hindu Mahasaba, Strength 13000), Hindustan Red Army (Revolutionary Terrorists, Strength 10000), Independent Labour Party Volunteer Corps or Samata Dal (Scheduled Classes, Strength 55000) 71 likely possibility whenever the internal situation seriously deteriorates’. 84 According to this report total strength of these organizations was 500,000 in which volunteers had been well organized. 85

Map 2.4: Showing strength of different volunteer organizations in India (1943)

Source: Intelligence Correspondence With War Office, WS 13127, IOR: L/WS/1/745 B.L The partition-linked brutal communal violence became the major cause of the massive migration across the border between India and Pakistan in 1947. The scale of this massacre and forced migration 86 could have been reduced had adequate measures had been taken by the state authorities before, during and after the partition of British Indian Empire. Both the British government and local national leadership were

84 Intelligence Correspondence With War Office, WS 13127, IOR: L/WS/1/745 B.L 85 Ibid, The degree of organization varies in these organizations. ‘As an indication, volunteers of the (probably) best organized body: (a) Wear Uniform similar to that of Indian troops. (b) usually carries lathis (iron bound staffs) and are trained to use them effectively. (c) are taught to use swords, spears and daggers and received some musketry instructions. (d) Attend training campus for courses in drill, weapon training, tactics, and psychological education’. 86 Ian Talbot has identified the difference of ‘migrants’ and ‘refugees’ and remarks that ‘the movement across borders was rarely voluntary’. See Ian Talbot, Gurharpal Singh, The Partition of India , p. 90 72 equally responsible for this tragic episode of history. From the decision to partition the provinces of Punjab and Bengal 87 to the division of the law and order related forces along communal lines, 88 and the hasty transfer of power [under Gandhi’s proposal] 89 to postponement of the announcement of the Radcliffe Award [due to the fear of resistance by Nehru and Patel] 90 all were major factors responsible for large scale communal killings, plundering, looting, uprooting and two-way migration movements.

The whole subcontinent was in the grip of violence and riots at the arrival of Lord Mountbatten as the last Viceroy. After one week of discussions with the political personalities and administrative officials of India government, ‘the only conclusion’, Mountbatten remarked, ‘that I have been able to come to is that unless I act quickly I may well find the real beginnings of a civil war on my hands’. 91 He further stated that ‘the whole country is in a most unsettled state. There are communal riots and troubles in the Punjab, N.W.F.P., Bihar, Calcutta, Bombay, U.P., and even here in Delhi’. 92

87 Mountbatten mentioned in his personal report No.2 dated 9 th April 1947 that ‘the only alternative to the Union Government is partition of the Punjab; this is recommended by Congress but could in Jenkin’s view probably only be imposed by force, which would require a lot of troops, and spell economic ruin for the province. (Because of) the Sikhs’ preparations for serious civil war…I am anxious to avoid any chance of hot headed action on their part’. See IOR: L/PO/6/123, p. 23, In response to Jinnah’s stand on Creation of Pakistan and division of the Defense Forces, Mountbatten replied that ‘his remarks applied also to the partition of the Punjab and Bengal’. P.25 88 During his first week Cabinet meetings Mountbatten asked ‘whether they thought that the army could be divided along communal lines by June 1948, the Congress members unhesitatingly said it was out of the question, but the Muslim League members appeared to think it was possible. All however agreed that this question could only be answered by experts’. IOR: L/PO/6/123, p. 17-18; Similarly Chaudhari Muhammad Ali, The Emergence of Pakistan , p.255 89 During his early meetings ‘Gandhi was hoping for a Mountbatten-Gandhi Pact!’ regarding the ‘transfer of power’ which was refused by Mountbatten by saying that ‘at the present stage I have no intention of making up my mind on the solution’. IOR: L/PO/6/123, P.24 According to Mountbatten Gandhi was against the ‘Partition Plan’. By forwarding idea of ‘whole of India’ he proposed Mountbatten that he ‘could stay until June 1948 as Constitutional Governor General, or quit India immediately and leave them to run it’. IOR: L/PO/6/123, p.90 In response to unhappiness of Gandhi with 3 rd June Plan, Mountbatten remarks that this plan should have christened as ‘The Gandhi Plan’ as ‘all the salient ingredients were suggested to me by him’. He further said ‘Mr. Gandhi told me that British should quit India and transfer power as soon as possible and not later than the end of this year (1947)’. IOR: L/PO/6/123 P. 123-124 (File 2) 90 Mountbatten mentioned in his personal report that ‘the Bengal award had by then (12 th August 1947) been sent in but I had deliberately refrained from reading it. I was told however that it allotted the Chittagong Hill Tracts to Pakistan. My Reform Commissioner, V.P. Menon, was present at the meeting and was able to warn me of the disastrous effects that this was likely to have on the Congress leaders. He went so far as to say that Nehru and Patel were both certain to blow…if the details of the Award were given to them before the 15 th he (V.P. Menon) thought they might well refuse to attend the meeting of the Constituent Assembly which I was to address’. IOR: L/PO/6/123, p.247 File 3 Viceroy ‘s Personal Report No. 17 Dated 16 th August 1947 91 IOR: L/PO/6/123, p.16 92 Ibid 73

Punjab was the most disturbed and unstable province where the situation was speedily going out of the government’s control. In a meeting with Mountbatten on 18 April 1947, three Sikh leaders—Master Tara Singh, Gyani Kartar Singh and Sirdar Baldev Singh—rejected any hope ‘to avoid the partition’ of Punjab. They were trying to consolidate their position in Punjab, especially in eastern districts, through violent means. 93 It was the major cause of the migration of millions of people on communal lines in this area. In this grave situation of ‘communal war’, Mountbatten ‘told Jenkins and his acting General Officer Commanding, Major General Bruce, and Lieutenant General Sir Arthur Smith, the acting Commander in Chief, to prepare plans for moving in additional forces into the Punjab, in good time before the announcement of the voting on Partition’. 94 He further ‘warned them to stand by on the North West Frontier; and have given Burrows the same warning for Bengal’. 95

Punjabis, after the 1946 elections, had been divided on communal lines, Muslims, Sikhs, Hindus. Communal disturbances in other parts of India, Calcutta, Bombay, Noakhali, Western UP, Bihar, and NWFP severely affected the socio- political life of Punjab. By promulgating the Punjab Public Safety Act [November 1946] and banning ‘private armies’ in January 1947, the Government tried to control communal strife. After resignation of the Unionist Ministry on 2 March 1947, and violent speeches by Congress Panthic Sikhs on 3 March, riots erupted in Lahore the very next day. 96 On 5 March 1947 the Governor of the Punjab proclaimed Governor Rule under Section 93 of Government of India Act 1935. An anti-Pakistan day was celebrated on 11 March, though the Government tried to stop it as it was ‘likely to be

93 Raja of Faridkot showed a letter to Mountbatten on 23 rd April 1947, which had been written by Tara Singh and Kartar Singh, ‘in which they invited him to take over the entire policy, organization and safety of life and property regarding the districts of Ludhiana, Ferozepore and portion of Lahore and its administration’. Mountbatten also ‘has seen an appeal issued by the Sikhs leaders, calling for “War Fund” of Rs 50 lakhs’. They were actually preparing for ‘Civil War’. IOR: L/PO/6/123, p. 64-64 94 IOR: L/PO/6/123, p. 95 95 Ibid 96 In secret report by Home Secretary to Government of Punjab it is mentioned that ‘the trend of recent political developments in the Punjab has been deeply resented by Sikhs and Hindus. Both communities had have interpreted these developments as being unduly favorable to the Muslim League and are apprehensive that they will now be subjected to Muslim domination. Recent speeches by Sikh and Hindu leaders have been marked militant and today [March 4 th ] crowd, which have sometimes resorted to violence, have openly defied the existing control orders. (After attacking police) during the afternoon trouble developed on purely communal lines and Lahore city has been the scene of some communal fighting…. [and] there is an ever-present possibility that disorder may spread rapidly to other places’. No. Sec-2515-2553-SB Lahore Dated the 4 th March, 1947 74

fraught with considerable danger’ in the existing communal tension. 97 Surprisingly enough that situation was going out of control in the Punjab but in a confidential letter the Secretary of State for India and the Viceroy [Lord Wavell] had expressed gladness on the ‘improved’ situation in the Punjab. 98 Other major cities, Amritsar, Rawalpindi, Multan, Sialkot and Jullundur and rural areas of Attock, Rawalpindi and Jhelum also descended into communal violence and lawlessness. Especially organized attacks and raiding on villages of Amritsar, Lahore, Firozpur, Hoshiarpur, and Jullundur districts, started after 10 May, caused large scale massacre and expulsion of Muslim population towards western districts of the Punjab. 99 Soon after this alarming situation, especially after warning to the Jenkins, the Governor of the Punjab, of ‘violent action’ by Giani Kartar Singh if the Boundary Commission’s Award could not satisfy their (Sikhs) demands, a ‘unified military command’ under the control of ‘Joint Defence Council’ had been decided in the Partition Council’s meeting. 100

Meanwhile in Bengal, this scheme of ‘Joint Command Organization’ was refused by the Army and the Area Commander in Bengal as ‘they did not anticipate the same difficulties as in the Punjab’. 101

2.2 Conceptualizing Factors Leading to Migration in 1947

Partition-related violence and the migration movements during and after the partition of subcontinent were closely interconnected. Partition-related violence was one of the major factors which became the cause of uprooting and exodus in 1947 from both sides of the border. 102 It was different from traditional communal violence

97 Secret Letter by Home Secretary to Government, Punjab No Sec-2741-74—SB, Dated 10 th March 1947 98 Copy of a telegram No. 3891 dated 22 March 1947 from the Secretary of State for India, London to H. E. Governor of the Punjab & Copy of a Telegram No. 597/S dated 23 March from H. E. The Viceroy H. E. Governor of the Punjab 99 IOR: L/PO/6/123, p.282 File 3 Report from Jenkins to the Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten dated 4 th August 1947 100 IOR: L/PO/6/123, p.183 File 3 Viceroy ‘s Personal Report No. 13 Dated 18 th July 1947; Governments of India and Pakistan agreed for such joint special military command from ‘1 st August 1947 covering civil districts of Sialkot, Gujranwala, Sheikupura, Lyallpur, Montgomery, Lahore, Amritsar, Gurdaspur, Hoshiarpur, Jalandhar, Firozpur and Ludhiana’. It was led by Major-General T.W. Rees with assistance of Brigadier Digambar Singh (India) and colonel Ayub khan (Pakistan) in advisory capacity. After 15 th August he was responsible to the both government through Joint Defense Council and Supreme Commander. IOR: L/PO/6/123, p.204 Statement by the Partition Council. 101 IOR: L/PO/6/123, p.209 File 3 Viceroy ‘s Personal Report No. 15 Dated 1 st August 1947 102 Ian Talbot and Gurharpal Singh, The Partition of India ; Ian Talbot, Divided Cities ; Sara Ansari, Life After Partition: Migration, Community and Strife in Sindh 1947-1962 (Karachi, 2005); Vazira Fazila- Yacoobali Zamindar, The Long Partition and Making of Modern South Asia: Refugees, Boundaries, Histories (Karachi, 2008); Ilyas Chattha, Partition and Locality ; Pippa Virdee, “Partition and Locality: 75

due to its ‘more extensive and brutal’ nature and link with the ‘transfer of power’ at the end of British raj. In August 1947, the Governor of the Punjab Sir Evan Jenkins reported to Lord Wavell that the social structure of Punjab had been fractured ‘along communal lines’. The Governor ‘pressured Khizr Tiwana against the large private armies’, involved in communal violence and trained by the ‘former INA and demobilized Indian Army soldiers’. 103 At the end of the World War Two ‘the flood of weapons and demobilized soldiers’ also enhanced the factor of violence through trained ‘volunteer movements’ among Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims especially in Punjab. 104 The violent activities of these ‘volunteer movements’ created ‘large numbers of casualties and refuges’. In the Rawalpindi riots of March 1947 ‘there was a considerable exodus towards the central and East Punjab and indeed Delhi and UP: by the end of April 1947, the official estimates of refugees in Punjab put the figure at 80,000’. 105 Some prominent Sikhs leaders from Lahore like Baba Kharak Singh, Sardar Sardul Singh Caveeshar and Sardar Amar Singh made an appeal to the Sikh community of Rawalpindi, Attock and Jhelum not to migrate as, in their view, this would be ‘suicidal and would eventually prejudice the cause of the minorities’. 106 They further said that it was ‘against the glorious traditions of the Panth to evacuate their homes’ but failed to stop the migration. 107

The second important factor for the migration movements was ideas around the establishment of a Muslim state, Pakistan, for obvious reasons. ‘Muslim separatism’ was based on the Two Nation theory, i.e. the Muslims of the subcontinent belonged to a different nation to Hindus; therefore they must have a separate homeland after the departure of British from India. While Jinnah, time and again, clarified that the rights of minorities in the new state of Pakistan would be protected and Pakistan would not be a ‘theocratic state’ 108 , but this did not remove the fear of Muslim-majority rule and sense of inferiority among the non-Muslim communities of East and West Pakistan. Sardar Swarn Singh, a prominent Sikh Leader and member of

Case Studies of the Impact of Partition and Its Aftermath in Punjab Region 1947-1961”, Coventry University, Unpublished PhD thesis, 2004 103 Daniel Marston, The Indian Army and the End of the Raj (Cambridge, 2014), p.296-97 104 Ian Talbot and Gurharpal Singh, The Partition of India , p.61 105 Gyanendra Pandey, Remembering Partition: Violence, Nationalism and History in India (Cambridge, 2003), p.24 106 Pakistan Times (Lahore) April 16, 1947 107 Ibid 108 Muhammad Ali Jinnah’s address to First Constituent Assembly of Pakistan on 11 August 1947 76

the Panthic party in the Punjab Assembly, declared that ‘Sikhs are determined not to live under League’s subjugation’. 109 Large numbers of Hindus migrated from East Bengal to West Bengal and Hindus and Sikhs left West Punjab, Sindh and NWFP for India during and after the partition due to this factor.

Migration also took place under refugees transfer policies between India and Pakistan. In Punjab, the ‘Boundary Force’ was established under the partition committee to stop violence and smooth evacuation of the refugees especially in border areas. Jinnah condemned the idea of dividing Punjab and Bengal by declaring it ‘a sinister move’ and hoped that ‘neither the viceroy nor His Majesty’s Government will fall into this trap and commit a grave error’. The ‘transfer of power’ to the India and Pakistan, he maintained, ‘must mean a division of Defense forces and there must also be an exchange of populations where necessary’. 110

2.3 The Phenomenon of Forced Migration

Migration patterns were very much affected and shaped by the characteristics of decolonization and the particular circumstances that led to decolonization. Prolonged liberation wars by nationalists against the colonizers and communal and ethnic clashes [during and after decolonization process] within the same colonies generated different patterns of migration between colonies and the metropolitan and within the same colonies as well. Different European empires, especially the British [the largest colonial empire] French and Dutch, went through different decolonization experiences. Their reaction to their colonial problems, as mentioned by Ian Talbot, depended on or was shaped by number of factors such as ‘impact of domestic and international opinion on policy; the strategic and economic value of colonial possession; the presence or absence of important settlers communities and their relationship with the colonial authorities; the type of nationalist struggle with which they were confronted’. 111

Negotiation between the colonizers and the colonized was the best option for a smooth decolonization process that avoided violence, bloodshed and mass migration. Colonial powers secured their imperial interests [material, strategic, and cultural] by

109 Pakistan Times (Lahore) May 11, 1947 110 Pakistan Times (Lahore) May 1, 1947 111 Ian Talbot, ‘The End of the European Colonial Empires and Forced Migration: Some Comparative Case Studies ’ in Panikos Panayi and Pippa Virdee, ed., Refugees and The End of Empire , pp.29-30 77

negotiating with carefully selected ‘collaborators’112 when they were certain that now they could not ‘maintain colonial rule in the long term’. 113 These colonial powers, Thomas asserts, ‘had to identify elite groups willing to collaborate with them’. 114 He further maintains that ‘if such collaboration formed the basis of colonialism, then decolonization could be interpreted as the attempt to renegotiate collaborative arrangements when the original framework had proved unable to meet the challenge of modernization, war and rapid social change in the colonies’. 115 Similarly, the nationalist elite of the colonies, which were also against any ‘social revolution accompanies political freedom’, felt comfortable with negotiating with the leaving colonial rulers instead of armed resistance ‘unless they were given no choice’. 116

One of the major patterns of migration in the wake of imperial collapse was when colonizers and their local collaborators in police services had to face the violent resistance from the local people when they did not respond to nationalist demands in a timely fashion. This generated the migration of the white population and their local collaborators to metropoles such as in the case of the ‘Ambonese military in the Dutch East Indies, or the herkis in Algeria’. 117 In the case of Algeria, it is estimated that 50,000 Algerians were killed by its French colonial rulers during the last weeks which ultimately hampered any possibility of negotiation for withdrawal. Similarly, a hasty and ill-planned transfer of power by the colonial empires also generated forced migrations, for instance, the Belgian withdrawal from Congo and Portuguese withdrawal from Angola and Mozambique. 118

As compared to the French, Dutch or Portuguese empires, the British decolonization experience is generally perceived as a ‘role model’ in terms of negotiation and transfer of power. It has been seen as comparatively better in

112 The concept of ‘collaboration’ was popularized by a Cambridge historian Ronald Robinson. Dr. Tahir Mahmood used this concept in context of recruitment process for British Army from Punjab during World War one. Tahir Mahmood, ‘Collaboration and British Military Recruitment: Fresh perspectives from colonial Punjab, 1914–1918’ Modern Asian Studies: Published online: 19 January 2015,pp1-27 113 Martin Thomas, Bob Moore, L J. Butler, Crises of Empire: Decolonization and Europe’s Imperial States 1918-1975 (London, 2008), P.9 114 Ibid 115 Ibid 116 Ian Talbot, ‘The End of the European Colonial Empires and Forced Migration: Some Comparative Case Studies ’ p. 30 117 Ibid 118 Ian Talbot, ‘The End of the European Colonial Empires and Forced Migration: Some Comparative Case Studies ’ p. 30 78

‘historiography of decolonization’ in terms of the way in which it disengaged itself from empire. 119 Having flexible to nationalist demands, they safeguarded not only the immediate migration of foreign settlers but also avoided direct confrontation with the local population. The two examples of India and Palestine are generally given in this context. In the first case the British opted for the partition of India, between Muslims and non-Muslims majority areas, after peaceful negotiation for transfer of power. But in the second case they refrained from the partition solution. In both cases, however, massive internal population displacement took place on ethno-religious grounds and millions of people were massacred. Which question the general perception of British experience in the history of decolonization as a ‘role model’. Ethno-religious based internal migration is more likely to take place in plural societies where minority groups ‘thrive under the protection of colonial rule’ and where independence threatened the reversal of their protected or privileged position in the local societies. Other than the Muslims and Sikhs of India, the Ibo of Nigeria and Ashanti of Ghana represent another example. 120

The migration of Hindus and Sikhs from Toba Tek Singh was a planned migration. It includes Hindus and Sikhs decision to migrate after the partition due to evacuation of policies of the respective governments. Though the fear of violence was also present but it was mere threat influenced by news of violence from other part of Punjab especially non-Canal Colonies areas. Within the same villages and towns, Muslims helped Hindus and Sikhs in their migration process from their localities to the town’s refugee campus. From there they were transported to India through rail and Lorries.

2.4 Patterns of Migration of Non-Muslims Communities from Toba Tek Singh

During and after the partition of the Punjab, refugees who migrated to India fell into two major categories: the colonist [settlers] and the non-colonist [non- settlers]. The Sikhs and Hindus, who had been allotted waste-lands in West Punjab during the canal colonization process, were known as colonists. In this chapter our focus is on the migration of the colonists of Toba Tek Singh. Migrating Hindus and Sikhs from West Punjab to East Punjab were associated with number of different

119 Martin Thomas, Bob Moore, L J. Butler, Crises of Empire , P.11 120 Ian Talbot, ‘The End of the European Colonial Empires and Forced Migration: Some Comparative Case Studies ’ p.33-34 79

professions which enables them to be characterized according to their occupations: Hindus associated with non-agriculturist professions such as moneylending and shop keeping; non-agriculturist Hindu and Sikh landlords, with land in rural areas subsidiary to village money lending and trading, cultivated by Muslims tenants; a large number of Sikh landlords from the colony districts of Multan Division and Sheikupura and Gujranwala; agriculture labour, tenant-farmer, Bazigars and a large section of peasant farmers from canal colonies. As mentioned by Randhawa,

‘certain districts of West Punjab, such as Lahore, Lyallpur, Montgomery, Sheikupura, Gujranwala, and parts of Multan, Shahpur and Gujrat districts large numbers of peasant farmers migrated to East Punjab. Many of these who migrated from canal colonies had their original homes in the districts of East Punjab, more importantly in Jalandhar Division. These were the colonists who had gone a generation or so ago into the canal colonies and there, with labour and skill, raised one of the most flourishing system of agriculture in the world’. 121

With the passage of the time, the settlers adjusted themselves in the colonies. The early difficulties of the waste lands ‘had faded and the colonies appeared to them their old homes (and) they returned only occasionally to their ancestral homes for the marriage of a son or a daughter’. 122 Within half a century Lyallpur district had been converted in to the most prosperous society among other canal colonies, and ‘at the time of the partition [it] was swimming in plenty, and had population over a one million inhabitants and the land owners paid land revenue and water-rate amounting to about Rs.2 crores to the Government’. 123 In Lyallpur district, most of the colonists were Jat Sikhs, as mentioned in Chapter 1.

As other districts of West Punjab were in the grip of violence, district Lyallpur [now Faisalabad] ‘fared better’ in context of the migration, ‘possibly on account of the fact that Sikh population was well armed’. 124 This district had one of the largest non-Muslims populations which ultimately migrated to India. Initially they were

121 M.S. Randhawa, Out of the Ashes: An Account of the Rehabilitation of Refugees from West Pakistan in Rural Areas of East Punjab (Punjab, 1954), p.11 122 Ibid, p.37 123 Ibid, p.37 124 Ibid, p.17 80

reluctant to migrate but later under the instructions of their leadership they had to migrate. In the words of Pippa Virdee,

‘Conditions in Lyallpur district were relatively peaceful until the end of September [1947]. The Sikh Jat farmers were in particular reluctant to abandon their fertile fields….level of violence was relatively mild compared to what was witnessed elsewhere in the Punjab….Their decision to leave was based on the advice of both the Sikh leader Master Tara Singh and the West Punjab Governor, Sir Francis Mudie’. 125

2.4.1 Migration Process from Rural and Urban areas of Toba Tek Singh to India

There were three types of villages in Toba Tek Singh. First type of villages was those where the Sikhs had absolute majority. Similarly, second type was where the Muslims had absolute majority. While the third type of villages had mixed population across the communal lines. Hindus in all these three types of villages had small population held shops and moneylending business. But, they had majority in urban centers [Toba Tek Singh, Kamalia, and Gojra].

Chak 331JB was the colony village where both Muslims and Sikhs had almost equal population including few Hindu families. They had peaceful relations with each other before the partition of Punjab though economic jealousy was present among the Muslims especially against Hindus. They had respect for each other’s religions. Yasin Shah, a local from this village, told:

‘We had good relations [with Hindus and Sikhs] just like living in one brotherhood and had respect for each other. They had great respect for saadat [the Family of Prophet Muhammad PBUH]….they attended Moharam jaloos [processions] with great respect…..we used to participate each other’s religious festivals. We had participated in Besakhi Maila which had been held at grain market in Toba Tek Singh. Sachait Singh numberdar , along with his friends from Sikh and Muslim communities used to participate with colorful turbans on his head’. 126 He further narrated, ‘though they [Muslim and Sikh]

125 Pippa Virdee, Partition and Locality: Case Studies of the Impact of Partition and Its Aftermath in Punjab Region 1947-1961, Coventry University, Unpublished PhD thesis, 2004 126 Interview with Yasin Shah, Chak No. 331 JB, Tehsil and District Toba Tek Singh, 13 March 2015; Interview with Nazar Hussain, Chak No. 331 JB, Tehsil and District Toba Tek Singh, 13 march 2015; 81

had separate spaces within the same village and had combine dine restrictions but there was general communal harmony.127

Here [in the Chak 331 JB] also had, as we have discussed earlier, small population of Hindus, involved in business of moneylending and held all the shops. Sikhs and Muslims were also very prosperous community because of overall growing agricultural production. But Muslims looked frightened to non-Muslim especially Hindu’s economic dominance. Because of gradual depleting economic space, due to less fertile lands [as compared to the Sikh landowners] and borrowing of money from Hindu moneylenders, there was general tendency among the Muslim landowners of this Chak to sell or pledge their agriculture lands before the partition. Few Muslim families tried to challenge the monopoly of Hindus. ‘We started a Kiryana shop [General Store] in the village’ said by Yasin Shah ‘parallel to the Hindus and requested to the Muslims to do not pledge your lands [to the Hindus] and sell your agriculture commodities on our shop...you can borrow money from us [for your necessary family affairs like marriage etc.]’. 128

Due to common ancestral localities, the settlers of this locality had general brotherly relations across the communal lines, as reflected in most of the oral accounts. But near the partition of Punjab, communal tensions had started emerging. It was obvious outcome of the All India level complex politics, in which All India Muslim League and Indian National Congress were contested. Their conflicting policies and objectives were continuously shaping the national and local level social behaviors. Though this factor was generally beyond comprehension of general public but national level politics and communal tensions had gradually been penetrating into the remote towns and rural societies in Punjab. Through one event we can understand the nature of conflicts and communal tensions in Chak 331 JB in Toba Tek Singh. ‘…the Hindus and Sikhs’ said by Yasin Shah ‘were against the slaughter of Cow. One day, few Muslims [Lal Din and his friends] slaughtered cow and moved it to the whole village by putting it on their shoulders. It accelerated the communal tensions in the village but later the matter was resolved by the elders of the all three communities

Interview with Sadiq Ali, Chak No. 331JB, 14 March 2015; Interview with Sadiq Ali, Chak No. 331JB, 14 March 2015 127 Ibid 128 Interview with Yasin Shah, Chak No. 331 JB, Tehsil and District Toba Tek Singh, 13 March 2015 82

[Muslims, Sikhs and Hindus]…and helped to maintain a peaceful atmosphere near the partition’. 129

Violence [other than the partition related violence] had been a very prominent feature of the rural society. The clashes erupted not only among different communities but also within members of same community as well. One of the major sources of clash was on canal water. The canal water was very precious thing for this rural society because the agriculture, the backbone of the local economy, was totally dependent on the canal waters. Other than religion and water there was another type of friendly fight called ‘ Chinjh’ [friendly fight]. At the end of Dewali [Hindu religious festival] said by Nazar Hussain ‘there had been friendly fight between the groups of two villages. These groups had been fully equipped with Lathies [sticks], spears, axes and other such tools. The fight had already been planned by sending and accepting sweet by villagers from one village to the other. The fight started by stretching simple line on the ground. Many people had been injured and few sometime even died in that fight. It was automatically ended after accepting the defeat by one party and sometime with affirming the same fight next year. Our village [ Chak 331JB] normally had such fight with neighbouring Chak 298JB [wholly Sikh population]. In one such fight two brothers Noor Din and Hameed Din had severely injured and we took them back to our village on bull cart’. 130 Such type of ‘friendly fights’ were also present in rural areas of east Punjab as well.131

Majority of the rural non-Muslim population in Toba Tek Singh was comprised of the Sikh community. They were agriculturist and owing to growing agricultural economy, the most prosperous community. They had fertile lands which produced huge agricultural production the whole year. They also had beautiful and vast pacca houses and havailees in the villages. They did never think about any migration from Toba Tek Singh because of their well established life. Even close to the partition most of them had believe that it’s a temporary situation and things would soon be settled down. Same was the case with Muslim community in rural areas about any expected migration of non-Muslims from their localities. ‘We were not expecting’ said Yasin Shah ‘that they [Sikhs and Hindus] would have to migrate. There was no

129 Ibid 130 Interview with Nazar Hussain, Chak No. 331 JB, Tehsil and District Toba Tek Singh, 13 march 2015 131 Interview with Faqeer Muhammad , Chak Kanthan, 11 December 2015 83

atmosphere of hatred among us. We were also not expecting coming of Muslims refugees from India. Things were happened at upper level [all India] about the partition…and then their [Sikhs and Hindus] camp was established by the government at grain market’. 132 Though they [Sikhs and Hindus] had some information beforehand about the partition, said another local of Chak 331JB ‘but they had confirmed about their expected migration after the arrival of Muslim refugees from India in our locality’. 133 Another local person, Safdir, rejected this perception that the Hindus and the Sikhs were came to know about their migration all of sudden. He said:

‘…they [Hindus and Sikhs] were more aware than us because of their relations in Amritsar, Hoshiarpur, and Jalandhar. They had been kept them informed [about the violence and migration of Muslims from their localities]’. 134

The actual cause of the migration of Sikhs and Hindus form rural areas in Toba Tek Singh was not violence but the fear of violence, although the factor of violence cannot altogether be ignored. The oral accounts suggest that the local Muslims were involved in looting of evacuee properties instead of killings, but in most of cases after the migration of the non-Muslims. The establishment of a Muslim state Pakistan and decision of their [Hindus and Sikhs] leadership for transfer of population, accompanying with family links in the East Punjab were the major factors of migration of the Hindus and the Sikhs from Toba Tek Singh. These factors had worked as push and pull factors. As we have seen earlier that they were not the old inhabitant of this land from centuries but mere half a century back they settled here, unlike the Sikh and Hindu communities of other areas [non-canal colonies] of West Punjab. Call of the Sikh leadership for migration from Pakistani Punjab was just strengthened the previous factors. The real cause of the migration of non-Muslim communities was, remarked by Yasin Shah ‘creation of Hindustan and Pakistan. Due to this Muslims had to migrate to Pakistan while Hindus and Sikhs to India…Sikhs and Hindus had not face any violence [in our locality]. They had migrated very peacefully…but they might have face violence during their migration’. 135 Nazar Hussain told ‘there was no violence or economic reason involved [in migration of Sikhs and Hindus]. When Punjab was divided and Muslims of East Punjab were

132 Interview with Yasin Shah, Chak No. 331 JB, Toba Tek Singh, 13 March 2015 133 Interview with Nazar Hussain, Chak No. 331 JB, Toba Tek Singh, 13 march 2015 134 Interview with Safdir, Chak No. 331 JB, Toba Tek Singh, 14 march 2015 135 Interview with Yasin Shah, Chak No. 331 JB, Toba Tek Singh, 13 March 2015 84

forcefully expelled from their ancestral localities then [in reaction to that] they [Sikhs and Hindus] had to migrate to India. But in our village they faced no violence. There was a fear of attacks by the jathas [militant band] from outside the village to the all three communities, Sikh, Hindu and Muslim of our village.’ 136 As our village was surrounded by the Sikh majority villages, said Yasin Shah ‘one day we came to know that Sikhs of Chak 299 JB are going to attack on us. We made our defence but later we found that it was a rumor’. 137

Help by the local Muslims to the migrating Hindus and Sikhs was another theme of the migration process from this locality. The local Muslims provided protection, from any expected violence from the outside of the village, to the Sikhs and Hindus of their localities in Toba Tek Singh. It shows that at first stage because of rumors and deteriorating law and order situation all communities were felt threatened for any expected violence. Secondly, at least within the same village peoples of all communities were supporting each other at the time of the partition. Hindus and Sikhs were accompanied by the local Muslims to the refugee camps, which were established by the government in towns of Toba Tek Singh. All three grain markets of Kamalia, Gojra and Toba Tek Singh were used as refugee camps for non-Muslims by the government. ‘No Muslim was involved’ said Safdir ‘in violence against Sikhs and Hindus in our locality’. 138 Rather they were supported in peaceful migration to the refugee camp in grain market in Toba Tek Singh. They [non-Muslim refugees of Chak 331 JB] even looked after by the Muslims of our village during their stay in the refugee camp. 139

In urban areas in Toba Tek Singh, Hindu community was in majority [as discussed in Chapter 1]. They also had cordial relation with Muslims in town Toba Tek Singh. Ahsan Burki, whose family migrated to Town Toba Tek Singh from East Punjab before the partition, told ‘the migrated Hindus and Sikhs of town Toba Tek Singh had good relations with the local Muslims’. 140 Manzoor Naz, another prominent

136 Interview with Nazar Hussain, Chak No. 331 JB, Tehsil and District Toba Tek Singh, 13 march 2015 137 Interview with Yasin Shah, Chak No. 331 JB, Tehsil and District Toba Tek Singh, 13 March 2015 138 Interview with Safdir, Chak No. 331 JB, Tehsil and District Toba Tek Singh, 14 march 2015 139 Interview with Yasin Shah, Chak No. 331 JB, Tehsil and District Toba Tek Singh, 13 March 2015 140 Interview with Muhammad Ahsan-ul-Haq Barki, Toba Tek Singh City, 11 January 2016 85

local Muslim, informed that ‘they [Hindus and Sikhs] were aware of their migration and were very sad [because of their migration]’. 141

They [Hindus and Sikhs] were well informed about the political changes at all India level and its impacts on locality Toba Tek Singh. They were economically sound and politically strong and influential. They had made plan of their expected migration well before the partition. They had started shifting their wealth gradually well in-time. The establishment of refugee camp in the grain market was also an advantage for the non-Muslims of town Toba Tek Singh. They also had the support of local Muslim community in their peaceful migration. There numerical strength might also be one factor for their comparatively peaceful migration. Though some Muslims were involved in looting of the evacuee properties but it was after transfer of non- Muslim to the refugee camps. Oral accounts also supported absence of any violence against the non-Muslims in town Toba Tek Singh.

Migration of Hindu community was more organized and systemic as compared to Sikhs in Toba Tek Singh. They were transferred by the government through trains or sometimes by trucks. But Sikhs had to migrate mostly through foot convoys, loaded their luggage on bullock carts, other than specific wealthy Sikh families, who migrated through trucks and trains. Majority of Hindus were living in the towns. Due to which they were well informed and politically more influential as compared to the Sikhs. A migrant from Toba Tek Singh, Jai Gopal Sethi, narrated his old memories about Toba Tek Singh as:

‘This city [Toba Tek Singh] was a very good city, here Sikhs and Hindus and Muslims’ population was almost equally divided. Our nanaji [paternal grandfather, Late Amir Chand Kohali ji] had a big house here. There were so many ponds and canals for irrigation. Our Nannaji had five daughters namely, Shanti [My respected mother], Sumitra [Now expired], Ram Rakhi [expired], Ram Pyari [expired], Murgai [expired]. Whenever there were summer holidays all our masijis [aunts] along with their kids used to assemble at Toba Tek Singh at our Nana's place’.142 This shows that the Hindus of this locality were very prosperous and living peacefully among other [manly Sikhs and Muslims] communities. He further told why and how they migrated from Toba Tek Singh at the time of the partition:

141 Interview with Manzoor Naz, Toba Tek Singh City, 11 January 2016 142 http://jgsethix1.blogspot.com/2007/08/before-partition-7-at-toba-tek-singh.html (accessed on 12 January2016) 86

‘Nanaji used to sit at entering First floor room called the Bathak [drawing room]. All of a sudden we heard a thundering sound all the families started running here and there I was told that there was invasion by Muslims in the back lane and they were looting and burning the houses of Hindus. My Nanaji ordered all the ladies and children to save their lives and immediately take shelter in the next lane. All the family members were running leaving behind all the households…Now they Muslims surrounded us. They were carrying all the weapons like Swords knives long chhuras and lathis [long cane] and spears…police was there supposedly for safety but every brutalities were being committed in the presence of the police and military. While running my mother could not carry anything but she threw the Potli [A bag of cloth] of Gahenes [ornaments] in the Bhusa room [Husk Room]. All of us along with hundreds and thousands population were ordered to march towards the Anaaj ki Mandi [Grain Market] and all along the route the police and Muslims were following us…our servant [Maaghi Ram] accepted the Islam and helped the Muslims to loot our houses’.143 This narration reflects, as we have earlier mentioned in this chapter, that Hindu and Sikh villages and areas were attacked by the Muslims for the sake of looting evacuee property. He [Jai Gopal Sethi] had not mentioned any casualty faced by his family or community in his locality. Most of the Sikhs and Hindus evacuated from their areas by themselves or with support of the official evacuation organizations under the refugee transfer policies. There was growing fear of attack among the non- Muslims by the Muslims. Another important fact which he described was the conversion among the lower caste Hindus. The socially and economically depressed classes were not only prone to conversion but also involved in violence and looting the evacuee properties. They even in many cases changed their religion for this purpose. Then he [Jai Gopal Sethi] shared his experience during their stay in a temporary established refugee camp at the Anaaj ki Mandi [Grain Market] Toba Tek Singh:

We were told that this portion of country had become the part of Pakistan. We were being kept as hostages in the grain market till the military from India came there for carting us to free India. This Anaaj Ki Mandi was a small place and the whole Hindu population of the city was huddled like animals like sheep and goats. There were tents in the market we used to sleep in the open. The drainage and sanitation conditions were worst and there was outbreak of cholera fever. All the four gates of the Anaaj Ki Mandi were locked and there was police to guard us as prisoners. All the population were daily used to pray to god to save themselves from the atrocities of Muslims and they used to look for the train of military from India to transport them to India. Some news was there that they [Muslims] might butcher the whole population as the rumors’

143 Ibid 87

were floating that the trains from India were coming full of dead bodies and such that they would retaliate and kill ourselves in return. 144 These memories of a migrant Hindu from Toba Tek Singh have much common with the local oral accounts about the migration of Hindus and Sikhs after the Partition 1947 to India. It sheds light on the plural composition of the society. Apart from the numerical majority Hindus and Sikhs were very well-off communities before the partition. It also mentioned the threat of violence and establishment of Pakistan and India as key factor behind their migration from Toba Tek Singh.

Conclusion

The patterns of the partition-related migration were influenced by different factors after the partition of 1947. These factors include communal violence; ideas around Hindu and Muslim states; family linkages of Hindus and Sikhs of canal colonies in East Punjab and finally refugees transfer policies adopted by the nascent states of India and Pakistan. These factors contributed at different levels for large scale migration of Hindus and Sikhs from West Punjab. The rise of the forces of nationalism in India shaped the decolonization processes. From First World War to Second World War, these forces gradually strengthened their position. After introduction of religion into politics, especially during the Khalafit Movement, these forces bifurcated into Hindu and Muslim nationalism led by Indian National Congress and All India Muslim League respectively. The election of 1937 and establishment of the Congress Ministries further strengthened the Muslim separatism in India. The Muslim League’s support to the British government during the World War Second and its remarkable success in the elections of 1945-46, had great importance for Pakistan scheme. After the failure of Cabinet Mission plan and the ‘Direct Action’ political situation became out of control and reached at the point of no return. Hence decolonization process in India heightened the communal conflicts, violence and then mass migration across the border between India and Pakistan. Refugees transfer policies, especially in the wake of partition of Bengal and Punjab, also shape the migration patterns in 1947. The partition of Bengal and Punjab not only influence the patterns of the migration but also enhanced its scale manifold. As these were the Muslim majority provinces with considerable non-Muslim population.

144 http://jgsethix1.blogspot.com/2007/08/before-partition-7-at-toba-tek-singh.html (accessed on 12 January2016) 88

In the towns of Kamalia, Gojra and Toba Tek Singh, Hindus had complete control over business and trade activities. In rural areas Sikh colonists [settlers] had very strong position based on their agriculture economy. Even few Hindu families in all the villages had strong grip over the rural economy because of their business of money lending and shops. In presence of this strong socio-economic position and friendly relations with Muslims, the migration of non-Muslims [Hindus and Sikhs] was outcome of threat of violence and the establishment of Pakistan, a future Muslim state, where they feared would permanently live under the Muslim dominance. In many cases, Sikh and Hindu majority villages were attacked by the Muslims but mostly for looting of evacuee property and not for killings. Second and more important factor was their [Hindus and Sikhs] family relation in East Punjab, from where they had originally migrated half a century back and settled in Toba Tek Singh. Hindus and Sikhs both from rural and urban areas generally migrated peacefully with the support of local Muslim community. The government initially kept them in refugee camps from where they migrated to India through trains, trucks and foot convoys.

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CHAPTER 3 THE STATE POLICY OF MUSLIM REFUGEES REHABILITATION 1947-1961

‘The birth of Pakistan in August, 1947, synchronized with an unprecedented ordeal of fire and blood through which her people had to pass. As a result of large-scale disturbances over the sub-continent, Muslims started in their tens of thousands for safety and shelter into Pakistan. This sudden and unprecedented rush of millions of restitutes created extremely difficult problems both for the Central as well as Provincial Governments about evacuation and transport, shelter, food, means of livelihood, public health, sanitation etc. Rehabilitation of the displaced persons was taken up almost immediately. Land was allotted in the Punjab and other parts of Pakistan on yearly basis to those persons who were prepared to cultivate it personally. Shops and houses vacated by the non-Muslims were also made available to them. Taccavi loans were granted to enable the new settlers to start work. In the camps, works and training centers were started for the displaced persons to enable them to learn crafts and vocations’. 1

The above-mentioned statement, extracted from official report of Government of Pakistan at the end of post-Partition decade, provided a very simple picture of the very complex and varied history of displacement and resettlement of millions of Muslim refugees 2 in Pakistan after migration from India. Migration patterns varied from East Bengal to different provinces of West Pakistan, and were further complicated by class and gender issues; the ‘everyday state’ 3 accounts of refugee

1 Government of Pakistan, Ten Years of Pakistan 1947-1957 (Karachi, Pakistan Publication, 1957), p, 239 2 Word ‘MUHAJIR’ is frequently used parallel to ‘refugee’, which was defined in Census of Pakistan 1951 as ‘a person who had entered Pakistan as a result of Partition or for fear of disturbances connected therewith, no matter from where, when or for how long a stay’. 3 The concept is increasingly deployed by anthropologists, sociologists, historians, geographers and political scientists to understand day to day affairs of the state and its effects on ordinary citizens. In Pakistan context, important work include: Sarah Ansari, ‘Everyday Expectations of the state during Pakistan’s early years: Letters to the Editors, Dawn (Karachi), 1950-1953’, Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 45, No. 1 (January 2011), pp. 159-178; Taylor C. Sherman, William Gould, Sarah Ansari, ‘From Subjects to Citizens: Society and the Everyday State in India and Pakistan, 1947–1970’, Vol. 45, No. 1 (January 2011), pp. 1-6; Taylor C. Sherman, William Gould, Sarah Ansari, ‘The flux of the matter: loyalty, corruption and the everyday state in the post-partition government services of India and Pakistan’, Past and Present , No. 219 (1), pp. 237-279; Elisabetta Iob, ‘A Betrayed Promise? The Politics of the Everyday State and the Resettling of Refugees in Pakistani Punjab, 1947-1962’, Unpublished PhD Thesis (2013), In Indian context, research around ‘everyday state’: C. J. Fuller and Véronique Bénéï (eds), The Everyday State and Society in Modern India (London: C. Hurst and Co., 2001); Gupta, ‘Blurred Boundaries: the Discourse of Corruption, the Culture of Politics, and the Imagined State’, American Ethnologist, Vol. 22, No. 2 (May 1995), pp. 375–402; Craig Jeffrey, ‘Caste, Class and Clientelism: A Political Economy of Everyday Corruption in Rural North India’, Economic Geography, Vol. 78, No. 1 (January 2002), pp. 21–41; and René Véron, Stuart Corbridge, Glyn Williams and Manoj Srivastava, ‘The Everyday State and Political Society in Eastern India: Structuring Access to the Employment Assurance Scheme’, The Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 39, No, 5 (June 2003), pp. 1–28. 89

resettlement and rehabilitation contradicted, at different scale, to the official narrative. The process of settlement was, as Ian Talbot aptly remarks, ‘far from uniform as was suggested in official literature; rather, migrants suffered numerous vicissitudes and their experiences were heavily mediated by social class, ethnicity, language, caste and unspoken assumptions about gender’. 4

This chapter assesses the process of rehabilitation of refugees in post-partition period [1947-1961] in Toba Tek Singh providing background [in terms of government response to violence and migration of the Muslim refugees to Pakistan] to this process at West Punjab level in general and Toba Tek Singh in specific. The role of the state in formation of policies regarding rehabilitation of the refugees after the partition is covered in this chapter. By applying the concept of ‘everyday state’ this chapter highlights the issues around citizenship, refugee status, corruption in allotment of evacuee prosperity in Toba Tek Singh. This also includes condition of the refugee camps and settlement of the refugees from camps to Toba Tek Singh.

3.1 The Government Response to the violence and Refugee Crisis

Due to huge pressure of the work and complexities regarding the partition and ‘transfer of power’, the government could not give much attention to the refugee crisis. In the Partition Council meeting on 4 August 1947, Lord Mountbatten aptly said that, ‘the problems of refugees is very serious one which has perhaps so for not received the attention which it deserves’. 5 To stop any ‘further exodus of the refugees’ and to encourage ‘the return of those who have already left’, the members of the Partition Council for future dominions of Pakistan and India decided the following action.

a. Retaining the refugee camps both sides of the borders with complete responsibility of ‘administration and finance’ by respective dominion governments after the partition. b. Make arrangements for the smooth access of the officers from both sides to solve-out problems of ‘relief and rehabilitation’ of the refugees.

4 Ian Talbot, Gurharpal Singh, The Partition of India , p. 90 See also Ravinder Kaur, ‘The Last Journey: Exploring Social Class in the 1947 Partition Migration’, Economic and Political Weekly, vol. 41, No, 22 (Jun. 3-9, 2006), pp. 2221-2228 5 IOR: L/PO/6/123, p.229 File 3 Viceroy ‘s Personal Report No. 16 Dated 8 th August 1947 90

c. Managers would be appointed to look after the evacuee property up-to the safe return of the migrated owners. d. Under the provincial governments, after the assessment of the damage done to the refugee’s property both moveable and immoveable, ‘grants of relief or compensation should be given to those who have suffered’. e. The confidence of the minorities in both sides of the border would be restored through speedy trials of the offenders; make responsible respective village and locality officials such as Zaildars , Lambardars , SafaidPoshis , Tehsildars , Sub- inspectors, for the protection of the minorities and to provide shelter to the businessmen and professionals from minorities. f. Speedy rehabilitation measurers for the refugees, by the both dominion governments, ‘to their respective homes’. 6 But these safety measures failed to stop the large scale violence, organized attacks on the minority localities, the refugee trains and columns, the murders, the abduction, the rape and huge population displacement, especially in East and Central Punjab areas. 7Auchinleck, the Supreme Commander of the Joint Defense Force [JDC], described ‘horrifying account’ of his visit on 14August 1947 to the Punjab at the Joint Defense Council meeting presided over by Mountbatten. The rumours about ‘the Award’ in the Punjab, as Auchinleck stated:

‘…had been sufficient to start large scale rioting which would undoubtedly have been a real communal war on a big scale if it had not been for the Joint Boundary Force. In Amritsar and vicinity, the Sikhs have formed armed bands of considerable strength which are carrying out raids on Muslim majority villages at the rate of three or four each night. These bands are well

6 Ibid 7 There are no authentic accounts related to this violence and loss of human lives. Figures varied from two to five millions as Ian Copland mentioned ‘One of the earliest attempts, but a fairly careful one, was made by the West Pakistan government in 1948, using figures from the 1941 Indian census and data from a special West Punjab census commissioned in 1948. First, the authors of this study tried to work out what the Muslim population of East Punjab would have been if partition had not supervened. Allowing for a conservative natural increase of 1.6%, they came up with a figure of 5,935,000 Muslims. They then subtracted the totals for Muslim refugees in West Punjab- 5,103,000-and Muslims still living in East Punjab--270,000. By this reckoning 472,000 were 'unaccounted for', presumably killed. Similar calculations, with similar results (in the order of 350,000 deaths) have been done for the Hindu and Sikh populations of West Pakistan. But all these studies suffer from basic statistical flaws: the wartime 1941 census is generally considered to have undercounted by a significant amount; and boundary changes have made district-by-district comparisons difficult. Note by Fazal-i-Ilahi, Supt. Refugee Census Operations, W. Punjab, n.d. [1948], BL, Mudie Coll., 27’, cited in Ian Copland, ‘The Master and the Maharajas: The Sikh Princes and the East Punjab Massacres of 11947’, Modern Asian Studies, 36, 3, (2002), pp. 657-704 91

organized, and often included mounted men who are used as scouts to reconnoiter for a favorable opportunity’. 8

He further mentioned that ‘there are also Muslims bands organized for the same purpose in the Lahore district, but these are fewer in numbers, smaller in size, and apparently less well organized’. 9 In reference to the inability of Police to control massacre in Amritsar, he said:

‘…the casualties to Muslims have been alarmingly high due to the emasculation of the City Police Force caused by the new Hindu Superintendent of Police disarming the Muslim Policemen. Jenkins quickly rectified it, and removed the official but the harm had been done. In Lahore, the trouble is due chiefly to the Muslims retaliating for the massacre in Amritsar’. 10

In response to the Supreme Commander’s open remarks about the situation in East Punjab, Mountbatten remarked that ‘Auchinleck gave this account so lucidly, so firmly and such transparent integrity that it make a profound impression on everyone round the table and I hope will have gone far to re-establish his position with the government of India’. 11

The government was completely aware about the involvement of the political leadership in hyping the communal tensions and even in criminal activities. It was reported to the Mountbatten on 5 August that prominent Sikh leader, Master Tara Singh ‘was closely involved in terrorist plans for wrecking Pakistan special trains from Delhi to Karachi, for throwing a bomb at Jinnah in the State Drive in Karachi and for attacking certain canal headworks’. 12 But the arrest was postponed unanimously by Mountbatten and the two future Governors of East and West Punjab who were present, until the announcement of the Boundary Commission’s Award. 13

The violence erupted in Punjab especially in East Punjab and Sikh Princely States was not an accidental rather a planned action. The Joint Boundary Force, which

8 IOR: L/PO/6/123, p.250-51 File 3 Viceroy ‘s Personal Report No. 17 Dated 16 th August 1947 9 Ibid 10 Ibid 11 Ibid ; Chaudhari Muhammad Ali, who was the Secretary to the Joint Defense Council Meeting, presented the same facts in his book The Emergence of Pakistan , p.257. 12 IOR: L/PO/6/123, p.252-53 File 3 Viceroy ‘s Personal Report No. 17 Dated 16 th August 1947 13 Ibid 92 was working the command of Major General Rees, was abolished on 1 September 1947. This was decided in the meeting of Joint Defence Council, held in Lahore on 29 August, attended by Mountbatten and Jinnah. It is worth mentioning here the farewell remarks of Auchinleck for Major General Rees:

‘…the massacres, arson and disorder which started in Amritsar before the Boundary Commission had made its award had nothing to do with the boundary or anything connected with it. The whole movement was undoubtedly planned long beforehand and soon gave rise to inevitable repercussions in the West Punjab. So, that you and your troops were faced with a problem quite different from that which you had been asked to solve and far beyond your capacity’. 14

The Sikh princely states of East Punjab and the Akali Dal nexus performed an important role for accomplishment of the plan of establishing a Sikh homeland through Muslim massacre and expulsion. The Akal Fauj [army] was established by Master Tara Singh in February 1947 to resist the Pakistan scheme. 15 The role of Hindu Mahasaba -controlled press, 16 in exploiting Sikh emotions and directing them against Muslims to achieve their vested political interests in partition of Punjab, can also not be ignored. As Ian Copland has maintained that ‘approaches were made to Hindu groups who shared the Akalis’ desire to save Punjab from Muslim domination, such as the Mahasabha and the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh [RSS]’. 17 Sikh rulers

14 Chaudhari Muhammad Ali, The Emergence of Pakistan 14 th Ed (Lahore, RSP University of the Punjab, 2012), p.258 15 Sikh Jathas (militant bands) were assembled and organized for attacks on Muslim Localities. ‘initially much of the organizing in this respect was done by Gyani Harbans Singh, an escaped criminal under the overall direction of a Council of Action in Amritsar whose members included ex-Indian National Army officer Colonel NarinJin Singh, SardarBeldev Singh, GianiKartar Singh, Master Tara Singh and Raghbir Singh, the former Patiala minister. The Committee also took over the job of raising money to buy arms and equipment for the Jathas, eventually amazing a war-chest of between 10 and 12 lakhs ’. cited in Ian Copland, ‘The Master and the Maharajas: The Sikh Princes and the East Punjab Massacres of 11947’, Modern Asian Studies, 36, 3, (2002), pp. 657-704; Daniel Marston, The Indian Army and the End of the Raj (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,2014),p.283 16 Lahore was the home of a number of Hindu Newspapers before the Partition; some of the leading newspapers were Pratap, Milap, BandeMatram, Paras and Bharat Mata. See Lahore Lahore Aye: Lahore’s pre-1947 Hindu newspapers by A Hamid, Daily Times: Sunday, February 04, 2007, http://apnaorg.com/columns/ahameed/column-44.html [accessed 1-2-2016] 17 Ian Copland, ‘The Master and the Maharajas: The Sikh Princes and the East Punjab Massacres of 11947’, Modern Asian Studies, 36, 3, (2002), pp. 657-704; Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangh (RSSS) was a Hindu secret army, established in 1925 by Rao Bali Ram Hedgewar , a Nagpur doctor. The ‘ideology was drawn from the belief that the whole of the Indian sub-continent was the land of the Hindus who have lived in it for thousands of years and the Muslims in this part of the world were foreigners and intruders’ and as ultimate objective to re-establish true Hindu state in India by forcefully 93

of princely states had divided the Eastern and Central districts of the Punjab to control and ultimately forcefully annexation after the British withdrawal through cleansing of Muslim population. Sikh and Hindu immigrants from Rawalpindi and Multan, after disturbances in those localities, provided a spark for these Sikh plans. 18 After the announcement of the Radcliffe Award, within short span of two weeks ‘perhaps 6000 Muslims were killed in the Patiala capital alone, half of Narnaul Town [essentially the Muslim parts] destroyed, and scores of Muslim villages burnt and looted in Jat- dominated rural areas of Patiala, Nabha and Faridkot’. 19 Without doubt, as Ian Copland has remarked, ‘violence in East Punjab in 1947 was state-sanctioned’ 20 , with exception of the princely states of Loharu and Malerkotla. The Indian Government declared Patiala a ‘dangerously disturbed area’ in late September 1947, when accidently ‘one night attack on a village by Sikhs from Kalsia left two Hindus dead, three seriously injured and several cows incinerated’. 21 Now, further violence was not considered essential as, ‘the majority of the east Punjab Muslims were already dead, or on their way to Pakistan’. 22

3.2 Migration to East and West Pakistan and Demographic Shift

The planned violence in Indian Territory and adjacent areas caused large- migration of Muslims towards East and West Pakistan. The majority of Muslims from Northern, North Western, and Central Zones of India migrated to West Pakistan [Map. 3.1]. In contrast to West Pakistan, East Pakistan’s border with India went ‘through less cataclysmic change’ and there the real migration started in the 1950s instead of 1947. 23 In Census of Pakistan 1951, different areas of subcontinent had been divided into following groups, from where migration to Pakistan took place during and after the partition of 1947.

conversion to Hinduism or expulsion. RSSS had close links with the Akalis in planned swift and widespread massacre in the Punjab, especially in central and eastern districts during the Partition. Government of Pakistan, RSSS (RashtriyaSwayamsevakSangh) In The Punjab (Lahore, Government Printing Press West Punjab,1047), p.11 18 Tahir Kamran, ‘The Unfolding Crisis in Punjab’, 14:2, p. 192 19 Ian Copland, ‘The Master and the Maharajas: The Sikh Princes and the East Punjab Massacres of 11947’, Modern Asian Studies, 36, 3, (2002), pp. 657-704 20 Ibid; Daniel Marston, The Indian Army and the End of the Raj ,p.283 21 Copland, ‘The Master and the Maharajas: The Sikh Princes and the East Punjab Massacres of 11947’, Modern Asian Studies, 36, 3, (2002), pp. 657-704; Daniel Marston, The Indian Army and the End of the Raj (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,2014),p.283 22 Ibid 23 Ian Talbot and Gurharpal Singh, The Partition of India , p. 96 94

Table 3.1: Zones of India important for migration of Muslim community to Pakistan

Sr. Zones Provinces/States and Agencies No 1 North Uttar Pradesh (UP and States) 2 East Assam and States, Bihar and States, Orissa and States, West Bengal and States, Nepal and Sikkim 3 South Coorg, Madras and States, Mysore and Andeman and Nicobar 4 West Bombay and States, Baroda States, West Indian States and agencies and Portuguese India, Junagadh and Manavadar 5 Central Madhya Pradesh (C.P), Madhya Bharat (Central Indian States and Agencies), Bhopal State and Hyderabad State. 6 North West East Punjab and States, Ajmer, Delhi and Rajputana States and Agencies, Jammu and Kashmir State 7 Other Parts French India, Bhutan and other Indian States Source: Census of Pakistan 1951

According to the Census of Pakistan 1951, the total population of the Muslim refugees was 7.23 million. Out of this East Pakistan held 699,079, which can be compared with the share of Karachi’s [Federal Capital of Pakistan] refugee population of 616,906 in 1951. Out of 7.2 million refugees, 5.2 million were resettled in West Punjab, among which 5.1 million were from Northwestern Zone only. Muhammad Waseem has dubbed this as ‘internal migration’ where ‘shared linguistic, historical and geographical identities of locals and the migrants encouraged the refugees’ integration’, 24 but refugee identity is still there exist, especially in rural areas of West Punjab, though not as vibrant as in Sindh among the Urdu-speaking refugees. Punjab, Sindh [including Karachi] and East Bengal accounted for 76%, 16.2% and 9.6% of the total refugee population. In 1951, in Pakistan every tenth and in the Punjab every fourth person was refugee.

24 Muhammad Waseem, ‘Muslim Migration from East Punjab: Pattern of Settlement and Assimilation’ in Ian Talbot and ShinderThandi, People on the Move , p. 63 95

Table 3.2: Refugees in Pakistan with respect to their Origins [ Census of Pakistan 1951 ]

Places of Zone of Origin

Enumeratio Total North East South West Centra North n l West

of Total

Other Places Percentage of Total Refugees Percentage Population Pakistan 722658 46421 70131 1801 160374 95181 578509 238 100 9.8 4 8 7 0 6 8 Baluchistan 27988 6331 276 297 1538 3011 16501 34 0.4 2.4 East Bengal 699079 20773 67073 982 185535 2697 2009 28 9.6 1.7 5 5 Karachi 616906 19756 19874 1110 119158 49579 217649 197 8.6 55 0 7 9 NWFP 51126 17114 546 57 355 1673 31375 6 0.7 1.6 Punjab 528119 10554 5566 822 5404 17175 514668 - 73 25. 4 1 6 6 Sindh 550291 11689 4320 4745 32064 21046 370876 341 7.6 11. 9 2

Source: Census of Pakistan 1951

96

Map 3.1: Main Streams of Refugees (figures in thousands)

Source: Census of Pakistan 1951

After the partition of Bengal in 1947 the Muslim minority of West Bengal, Bihar and Assam started to migrate to East Bengal. In 1951 there were 699,079 refugees in the total 41,932,329 population of East Bengal. A special report on ‘Refugees Problem in East Pakistan’ by the Government of Pakistan mentioned that ‘East Pakistan, fortunately, was spared the worst that the Punjab and the West Pakistan provinces suffered during the disturbances in 1947’.25 The report further stated:

‘…after partition the population of East Pakistan was estimated to about 44000,000 of which over 13000,000 were Hindus. In West Bengal, there were 5000,000 Muslims. There were no large-scale migration between the two Bengals immediately following partition, but, later, migration on both sides

25 MSS EUR F158/641B E. No. 2146, Refugees Problem in East Pakistan, p.33 B.L 97

began to take place on an individual basis until it assumed serious proportions early 1950 as a communal disturbances in India’. 26

During first three months of year 1948 only about 120,000 Muslims migrated to East Pakistan from Calcutta and its industrial areas. But after the disturbances of February 1950 within two month about 1,000,000 Muslims migrated to East Pakistan. A ‘system of joint check’ was introduced, to monitor and ‘record the cross traffic’ at the Darsana and Benapole border stations, in August 1950, following the Liaqat- Nehru Agreement [April 1950]. This agreement enhanced the influx of refugees on East Pakistan as out of the 685,231 Hindus who entered East Pakistan, almost 230,000 were those who migrated before and now came back. On other side, this agreement could not attain the same ‘encouraging proportion’ for Muslim migration to East Pakistan. Statistics showed the huge influx of Muslims into East Pakistan, where many were those who had taken ‘second refuge in East Pakistan’. 27

The migration process in East Bengal can be compared with the migration to the Punjab in a number of ways. Both in the Punjab and East Bengal, as Talbot has maintained, ‘despite anticipatory flights of Hindu capital, there was no expectation of permanent uprooting’. 28 Where the migration of the minority from one side contributed the flight of the minority from other dominion, same factor in the long run minimize the chances of any reverse process due to their settlement on the evacuee properties. As far as the ‘level of violence’ is concerned, in Bengal it was quite low as compared to Punjab, where it became out of control in August-September 1947 and both Pakistan and India were forced to take measures regarding the ‘exchange of population’. Even Bengal official authorities refused any such offer of establishment of joint boundary force, as was established in the Punjab, before partition.

The real starting point of the migration in Bengal was 1950 in contrast to the Punjab where migration was at climax in August 1947, gradually decreased up-to December of the same year. After the communal riots in Bengal, Bihar and Assam, the two-way movement of migration of Muslims and Hindus started and ‘in mid-April 1950 there were over 800,000 Muslim refugees in East Bengal’.29 After the Liaqat-

26 MSS EUR F158/641B E. No. 2146, Refugees Problem in East Pakistan, p.33 B.L 27 Ibid 28 Ian Talbot and Gurharpal Singh, The Partition of India , p. 102 29 Ian Talbot and Gurharpal Singh, The Partition of India , p. 103 98

Nehru Pact in April 1950, large numbers of Hindu refugees came back East Pakistan along with the Muslim refugees from West Bengal which raised the population of refugees in East Pakistan to 950,000. 30

Before the introduction of the passport system there was increase in the two- way migration movement of Muslim refugees in 1952 on East Pakistan border. Replying to a question in press conference, Mr. A C. Guha, the Prime Minister of India stated in November 1952 that:

‘…there is marked increase in the number of Muslim migrants from India to East Pakistan. Even previously there was an excess of the Muslims travelling to Pakistan from India over those travelling from Pakistan to India’. 31

He further maintained that ‘from April 1, to October 15, 1952, that is in six and half months, 513,340 Muslims travelled from West Bengal to East Pakistan by rail. During the same period 422,220 Muslims travelled in the reverse direction’. 32 Between Assam and East Pakistan, in above mentioned period, ‘138,960 Muslims travelled by rail and road from Assam to East Pakistan and 140,532 Muslims came from East Pakistan to Assam’. 33

Military Evacuation Organization [MEO] played important role in transfer of Hindus and Sikhs from Toba Tek Singh to India and Muslim refugees in reverse direction. The Punjab Boundary Force [PBF] was abolished on 1 September 1947 and Maj. Gen. Peter Rees was ‘offered a senior position in the newly formed Military Evacuation Organization [MEO]’, for a Joint Evacuation Movement [JEM] plan in October 1947. The purpose of this organization was ‘to facilitate evacuation of refugees [through] employ military personnel from both sides to provide transport and escort’. 34 Two Chief Liaison Officers [CLO] were based in Lahore and Amritsar 35 and supported by District Liaison Officers [DLO] appointed by India and Pakistan. After

30 Ibid; Census of Pakistan 1951, the total number of refugees in East Bengal were 699079. Table 19-A Muhajir Origin, Further in East Bengal Table Vol 8 of Census of Pakistan 1951, there is a note that this total of Refugees ‘excludes persons who reported Nationality other than Pakistani’. Table 1-A 31 India News November 19, 1952, Mss Eur F158/641B, p.4 B.L 32 Ibid 33 Ibid 34 Daniel Marston, The Indian Army and the End of the Raj ,p.339; Ravinder Kaur, ‘The Last Journey: Exploring Social Class in the 1947 Partition Migration’, Economic and Political Weekly, vol. 41, No, 22 (Jun. 3-9, 2006), pp. 2221-2228 35 The office of Chief Liaison Officer for East Punjab was also shifted to Lahore from Amritsar after it establishment. 99

getting information from the DLOs, Chief Liaison Officers coordinated with the Military Evacuation Organization [MEO] for the implementation of the plan for evacuation of refugees. All modes of transportation—trains, motor trucks, aircraft and foot convoys—were used but most of the evacuation operation conducted through foot convoys, as the following table shows.

Table 3.3: Evacuee Figures up to 22 nd November 1947 36

Muslims Non-Muslims Total By Motor Transport 215,690 349,834 565,524 By Rail 943,720 849,500 1,793,220 By Foot 2,385,165 1,014,000 3,399,165 Total 3,544,575 2,213,334 5,757,909

Jammu and Kashmir was another area where the influx of Muslims refugees started in September 1947 ‘because of the atrocities committed by the Maharaja’s troops, I.N.A and Sikh gangs’. 37 The migration movement from Jammu and Kashmir to Pakistan was increased when the Indian army entered Kashmir, and:

‘…by January 1949 the number of these displaced persons had swelled to 6,00,000 of whom 2,00,00 were in Azad Kashmir, approximately 3,00,000 in the border districts of the Punjab and 1,00,000 in the various camps’. 38

3.3 The Growing Tensions between the Muslim Migrants and Local Sikh and Hindu Communities

Despite Pakistan Government efforts to stop the migration movement of minority communities from both sides of the border, the minority leadership in Pakistan stressed on the transfer of population at all cost. 39 Violence against Hindus and Sikhs in West Punjab especially in Rawalpindi, Sialkot, Sheikupura and Gujranwala and fear of permanent suppression under Muslim majority after the partition, were the major factors of this distrust. Mr. Bhim Sen Shcher, Deputy Leader

36 Cited in Virdee, P. (2004) ‘Partition and locality: case studies of the impact of partition and its aftermath in the Punjab region 1947-61.’ Coventry University, PhD Thesis 37 MSS EUR F158/641B No35/51, Relief and Temporary Rehabilitation of Kashmir Refugees, p.24 B.L 38 Ibid 39 With the arrival of millions of Muslim refugees, the society in West Punjab became less tolerant towards the Hindu and Sikh communities. Therefore these communities considered them misfit in existing troubled situation and decided for migration. 100 of the Congress Party in Pakistan Constituent Assembly, stated on 26 October 1947 that:

‘…it was futile to expect the minority community to have any faith in the assurance made by Mr. Mr. Ghazanfar Ali Khan, Minister of Food in the Pakistan Government, in his campaign for the restoration of settled conditions in the Western Punjab’. 40 He further maintained that ‘the completion of the exchange of population was a matter of days and he felt that no more time or energy should be wasted in trying to stop it’. 41

The loyalty of the Hindus and Sikhs with the state of Pakistan also remained suspicious. There activities were closely monitored by the Government of Pakistan during early days in post partition period. A case was reported in the weekly confidential diary of the police department in Gujranwala district, which reflected this trend right after the partition. With the title of ‘Hindus and Sikhs’ it was reported that:

‘Nand Lal Nadhok of city Gujranwala has sold land under cultivation on two wells for Rs: 64000/- and has deposited the sale proceeds in the Imperial Bank of India, Lahore. It is believed that his stay in Pakistan is merely meant for the disposal of his property’. 42

It is further mentioned that ‘he can never be a loyal subject of Pakistan’. It was investigated that ‘whether Nand Lal has been declared as Pakistani. If so, did he obtain the Custodian’s permission to sell his land? ’. Later on the investigation proved that the report had been made by Superintendent of Police ‘without verifying its correctness’ and was wrong. 43

The Government of Pakistan was very cooperative as far as the evacuation of the non-Muslims [Hindus and Sikhs] from Pakistan areas after the partition was

40 U.K. High Commissioner in Pakistan Dispatch No. 57 of 31 st October 1947, Pakistan IOR: L/WS/1/747 P.4 B.L; though there was a parallel Sikh leadership consisted of Baba Kharak Singh, SardarSardul Singh Caveeshar and Sardar Amar Singh from Lahore who made appeal to the Sikh community to stop migration and maintained ‘migration is suicidal and would eventually prejudice the cause of the minorities. The Khalsa has always withstood aggression and injustice, but it is against the glorious traditions of the Panth to evacuate their home (from) the districts of Rawalpindi, Attock and Jhelum’. The Pakistan Times, April 16, 1947 41 U.K. High Commissioner in Pakistan Dispatch No. 57 of 31 st October 1947, Pakistan IOR: L/WS/1/747 P.4 B.L. The Pakistan Times, April 16, 1947 42 Weekly Diary No.11 for the Week Ending the 9 th July 1949, Confidential, Police Department, Gujranwala, Lahore Division 43 Ibid 101 concerned. In a letter to Mr. Gandhi, Mr. J. R. Symonds, a worker of The Society of Friends, 44 wrote evacuation of the Hindus and Sikhs from West Punjab:

‘I have been working almost entirely in West Punjab on behalf of non- Muslims….perhaps the most vivid collection is of the evacuation of Lillah, in the Jhelum District in November 1947. As we came into the town with our Sikh drivers all the Muslims assembled and glared at us suspiciously. Suddenly, an old gentleman with a long red beard came out and hugged me like a bear….there was sigh through the crowd. Some went home, but many stayed to help the Hindus load their heavy tin boxes, and there were tears in their eyes as we left’. 45

He further narrated how ‘in Sargodha the Deputy Commissioner was always accessible and friendly to the non-Muslim deputations and did everything he could to improve their conditions’. 46 About his rehabilitation activities in Faisalabad he maintained that:

‘…another very fine Deputy Commissioner was in Lyallpur [now Faisalabad]. So consistently did he protect the non-Muslims that to heard several disgruntled local Muslims want to the Prime Minister of West Punjab to have him removed as pro-Hindus . But the P.M backed him as an officer who was doing his duty’. 47

The government of Pakistan was ready to cooperate with the Indian government to provide safe evacuation to the Hindus and Sikhs who were willing to migrate. Regarding the experience and interaction of Indian officials with their Muslim counterpart he [J. R. Symonds] said,

‘Brigadier Mohite [Head of Indian Evacuation Organization] boldly moved his headquarter from Amritsar to Lahore as soon as he appointed. He setup his

44 It was International society to undertake relief and rehabilitation measures in war strike areas of different parts of the world during 1940’s. Mr. J. R Symonds and Mr. H. G Alexander were appointed by this organization in West and East Punjab respectively ‘to observe reports on and endeavor to maintain the standard of food, shelter, and medical aid of Muslim refugees in India and non-Muslim refugees in Pakistan ’. Both workers were officially appointed as gazetted officers by East and West Punjab Governments. IOR MSS EUR Photo EUR 347/18 45 Published in Harijan Feb 1948, IOR MSS EUR Photo EUR 347/18 46 Ibid 47 Ibid 102

office in the same building with the Pakistan M.E.O and established such excellent liaison that every train and truck which crossed the border always come back with a full return load. Eventually unofficially, quite outside the inter-governmental arrangements, he arranged for Indian troops to go out into the villages along with Pakistan troops and thus we rescued many desperate non-Muslims…I never heard a bad word from any Pakistani against Brigadier Mohite and yet he completed his evacuation program well ahead of schedule…Mr. Nituram [Chief Liaison Officer to East Punjab Government] approached the Muslim Deputy Commissioners as friend and former colleagues and frankly asked their help’. 48

He concluded his letter by expressing his opinion as, ‘I believe that if more Indians could approach the Pakistanis in a spirit of confidence, expecting their friendship and help, the Punjab could become safe for minorities within a year’. 49

3.4 Rehabilitation of Refugees in Pakistan After 1947

Different initiatives had been taken by the government of Pakistan for rehabilitation of the millions of refugees from India after the partition. The task of transfer of population was beyond the expectations of the new government. International help sought by the government of Pakistan to cope with this challenge. An appeal made by Mr. Ghazanfar Ali Khan, Minister of Food, ‘to the Red Crescent Societies of Turkey and Egypt and to the Red Lion Society of Iran, for warm clothing and general assistance to meet the requirement of refugees’. 50 Similarly, ‘appeals have been made to charitable organizations in the U.S.A by Mr. M.A. Ispahani, Pakistan’s Ambassador, and Begum Tassaduq Hussain, a member of Pakistan’s delegation to U.N.O, and Pakistan Government to H.M. Representatives in Muslim countries’. 51

The Quaid-i-Azam Mohamed Ali Jinnah Refugee Relief Fund was established by the Government of Pakistan for the rehabilitation of refugees. This fund was established for the betterment and welfare of the refugees after the partition by the government of Pakistan. According to the third list of the fund ‘the grand total by cash received is Rs 3,675-13-6 [and] the grand total by cheques received and promised is

48 Ibid 49 Ibid 50 U.K. H.C. in Pakistan Review 17/23 October 1947, Pakistan IOR: L/WS/1/747 P.18 B.L 51 Ibid 103

Rs 10,14,684-8-3’. 52 Appeals were also made to national and international level organizations for economic contribution for this fund. A charity show for the collection of funds for refugees in Pakistan was organized by the High Commission for Pakistan in London on 27 May 1948. Habib I. Rehamatoola, High Commissioner for Pakistan in UK, requested for the royal patronage for this charity show. 53

The Government also tried to use religious emotions to solve the refugee crisis. A scheme for ‘Adoption of Mahhajireen [refugees] Families in Brotherhood by Ansar Families’ was introduced by the Government in this regard.54 Under this scheme, Commissioners and Deputy Commissioners visited districts, tehsils, towns and even villages to establish a brotherhood bond between the locals and refugees on the pattern of Islamic concept of ‘ Ansar and Mahhajireen’ .55

Ministry for Refugees and Rehabilitation West Punjab decided to publish a new Urdu weekly paper, The Muhajir , for supporting the refugees of the West Punjab in their day to day life. According to the press note it will ‘confine itself to giving information in the simplest possible Urdu on all matters pertaining to camp arrangement, movements of refugees, and their settlements and rehabilitation’. 56 It was further decided that ‘the paper will be distributed free in all campus and in every single village throughout West Punjab where refugees are sent for final settlement’. 57

For keeping the record of the Muslim refugees from India during the early days of Pakistan, registration of the refugees had been decided by the government of Pakistan. It was crucial for the effective rehabilitation of the refugees. For this purpose the Ministry for refugees and Rehabilitation West Punjab announced that ‘when refugees reached the first rest camp, they will be registered and entries made on the cards showing the name of the head of the family, the number of members in

52 The Pakistan Times, , October 10 1947 53 IOR: L/PJ/7/13816 54 This concept had been taken from Islamic History. During the Migration of Prophet Muhammad [PBUH] with his followers from Macca to Madinah, the Muslims of Madinah welcomed the refugees from Macca. 55 This scheme was proposed by Commissioner Lahore Division in a conference of Commissioners and Deputy Commissioners held in Governor House in November 1947 and adopted. Cited in letter from Commissioner Lahore Division to all Tehsildars in Lahore Division Cr. No. 2761 Dated 1 st /4 th December 1947 56 The Pakistan Times, October 10, 1947 57 Ibid 104 the family, occupation and last address’. 58 The deputy commissioners of Sialkot, Lahore and Montgomery [Sahiwal] had given authority for the registration of the refugees. The Ministry further announced that ‘arrangements are being made for the distribution of cards at Wagah and Hadiara and for the registration and making the necessary entries at Walton and Bawoli camps’. 59 The major reason was to ‘check the undesirable practice noticed in a good few cases of refugees settling in one place, using fodder and food and then passing on to another village or of shifting from one district to another district needlessly’. 60

Another feature to keep refugees well informed and to solve their issues, Refugees’ Corner started into different daily newspapers. It was specifically for the refugees from East Punjab and ‘includes inquiries from refugees regarding the safety and welfare of their families and any replies thereto, government announcements regarding relief, rehabilitation and any other matter which concern and may be of interest to refugees’. 61 Similarly, refugee camps were established and help of the volunteers was sought to coup with this refugee crisis during the early days by the government of Pakistan. 3.4.1 The Government Policy of Rehabilitation

Refugee rehabilitation policies varied over the time after the partition because of different factors like, the understanding with Indian government regarding the refugee properties, the status of minorities, variations in the migration movements, concerns about revival of economic and business activities and shortage of food. The first major concern was the rehabilitation of economic process and protection of the evacuee property. Most of business and trade activities in West Punjab had controlled by Hindus and Sikhs which migrated to India during 1947. Hence, in October 1947, two ordinances were issued by the Governor for economic rehabilitation of the refugees, namely, Pakistan Economic Rehabilitation Ordinance [PERO] and Pakistan Protection of Evacuee Property Ordinance [PPEPO], to meet these immediate concerns. 62

58 Ibid 59 The Pakistan Times, October 14, 1947 60 Ibid 61 The Pakistan Times, October 9, 1947 62 The Pakistan Times, October 19, 1948 105

The first major step towards formation of a comprehensive and cohesive rehabilitation policy was the understanding of refugees’ numerical strength. Most of evacuation work of the refugees from both sides of the border in the Punjab had almost completed up-to the last week of December 1947. The two way evacuation in the Punjab, as stated by the Mr. Ghazanfar Ali Khan [Minister for Refugees & Rehabilitation, Government of Pakistan], was ‘practically complete’. He further maintained that ‘there are now only a few thousands in pockets in the two Punjabs and they are mainly abducted women and those that have been forcibly converted’. 63 This fact [to know about real numerical strength of the refugees] had provided advantage to the government to adopt a well-planned strategy of refugees’ rehabilitation in West Pakistan, especially in West Punjab, contrary to East Pakistan [now Bangladesh] where the migration remained continue even in 1950’s. Introducing the first Budget of West Punjab, Finance Minister [West Punjab] Mian Mumtaz Muhammad Khan Daultana remarked that the government had issued registration cards to the Muslim refugees in the refugee camps before directing them to different places for their resettlement. He said:

‘…your government evolved vast schemes for dealing with refugees on their arrival in this province. They were initially housed in transit camps and were issued registration cards…they were then directed to the districts’. 64

Most of the policies regarding resettlement and rehabilitation of the refugees were temporary in nature and influenced by process of trial and error. Among the 5000,000 refugees, which evacuated from the East to the West Punjab in just less than five months 65 after the partition, 4000,000 had been resettled, claimed by Mr. Ghazanfar Ali Khan. The settlement of the remaining, as Mr. Ghazanfar Ali Khan told, depended on four major factors as

‘(a) To what extent the Sind Government will co-operate (b) What the attitude of the Punjab Government will be towards their future land policy (c) The checking up on the allotment of land, houses, shops and the like and the

63 The Pakistan Times, December 31, 1947 64 The Pakistan Times, January 7, 1948 65 This included the persons evacuated from the Punjab States and Bharatpur and Alwar. They were evacuated by railway, foot, and motor transport convoys and by air. 106

ensuring of an equitable distribution of these (d) The refugees themselves [i.e. how they would cooperate or react to the government policies?]’. 66

To address these factors, a ‘high-powered’ 67 meeting had been planned in Karachi on January 1, 1948. They planned to settle two lakhs refugees from the West Punjab [Lyallpur, Lahore, Montgomery, and Muzaffargarh] through train and foot convoys in Sindh. A census was proposed of all the settled refugees to conduct at the end of March for equitable distribution of the evacuee property. 68

The mutual cooperation between Pakistan and India was also very much needed for the smooth rehabilitation of the refugees. The Indo-Pakistan Moveable Property Agreement [June 1950] was signed ‘for restoration of movable property of displaced persons’. Under this agreement the two governments had to exchange the lists of such properties along ‘with the bank-drafts representing the sale proceeds’ through a Joint Implementation Committee [JIC]. There was ban on the transfer of immoveable evacuee property by sale or exchange ‘imposed by Ministry of Rehabilitation’. 69 It had to end on 10 April 1956 but was extended for one further year. On 28 November 1956 the Government promulgated:

‘the Evacuee Property [Multiple and Irregular Allotments] Ordinance. But later on, while converting the Ordinance in to an Act of Parliament, the National Assembly in its Budget Session [February 1957] excluded irregular allotment and allotment of industrial concerns and agriculture land from its scope as it was held that there was nothing irregular in the allotments made under the law [and under the policies of Industries Rehabilitation Boards and Rehabilitation Settlement scheme]’.70

This very step of removing the ‘irregular allotment and allotment of industrial concerns and agriculture land’ from the Evacuee property Act 1957 raised doubts about the whole allotment process. This also justified the narrative based on the oral

66 The Pakistan Times, December 31, 1947 67 Meeting was attended by M. A Jinnah, Liaqat Ali Khan, M.A Khuhro (the Sindh Premier) and officials of the Ministry for Refugees & Rehabilitation including Mr. Moss, the Secretary. 68 The Pakistan Times, December 31, 1947 69 Government of Pakistan, Ten Years of Pakistan 1947-1957 (Karachi, Pakistan Publication, 1957),p. 244 70 Ibid. P.244-45 107 and ‘everyday state’ accounts that much of corruption was involved in allotments of evacuee properties after the partition in West Punjab.

The shortage of food also haunted the government to take steps in this domain after the partition. But it took six years to start ‘Grow More Food Campaign’ in Punjab. In this regard two types of lands were selected by the government for allotment to the refugees purely on temporary grounds; lands along the rivers sides and Evacuee Banjar lands. According to a circular by the Punjab Government:

‘in view of the food crisis, lands available along the rivers should be leased out for one year for cultivation of food crops without charging any rent or water rate and preference should be given to refugees provided they are capable of cultivating it’. 71

This report further maintained that ‘A scheme to give the entire evacuee banjar lands in the province on lease on tube-well and ordinary well-sinking conditions in connection with the ‘Grow More Food Campaign’ was [also] framed by Government’. 72

The Registration of Claims (Displaced Persons) Ordinance 1956, later Act, introduced and claims invited from the refugees for immoveable properties left in India. These claims dealt at four stages: registration, verification, evaluation of evacuee property, and compensation. The claims received from May 1955 to 31March 1956. Under this Act, Claims Commissioner had given special powers to accept such claims which could not filed due to some sufficient acceptable reasons. 73 In 1958, the government passed the Displaced Persons [Land Settlement] Act for the allotment of evacuee property against the claims. But, in 1973 the Federal Government imposed ban on the allotment of evacuee property and all settlements laws were repealed with effect from 1 July 1974 with direction to the unsatisfied claimants to file C.C.L-I form for cash compensation. The available/residual evacuee properties were transferred to the provincial governments for disposal, under the Evacuee properties and Displaced Persons Laws [Repeal] Act No XIV of 1975. Two separate schemes, Disposal of Rural Land and R.P Scheme [disposal of urban and rural available evacuee properties]

71 Summary of Work Done in Connection With Resettlement of Refugees on Lands in the Punjab (Lahore, Government Press, 1954) P. 1 72 Ibid 73 Government of Pakistan, TenYears of Pakistan 1947-1957 ,p. 244-45 108 introduced by the provincial government with the support of Board of Revenue which is beyond the scope of this research. 74

3.4.2 Policy of Nationalization of Land in West Punjab

The government of the West Punjab showed her intention regarding the nationalization of land right after the creation of Pakistan. The Revenue Minister, West Punjab, Sardar Shaukat Hyat Khan declared that ‘the preliminaries in this connection have been worked out and experiment would shortly be initiated in Thal area’. 75 In this regard he said that ‘the government will expropriate half of the land owned by those who have more than 1,000 acres of land and one-third of those who possess land from 50 to 1,000 acres’. 76 He further maintained that ‘the government had abolished the Jagir system and no Jagirs would be granted to anybody’. The Jagir System according to him ‘was a weapon to create stooges and tighten the imperialistic grip on the masses’. 77

Land reforms were much desired during the initial days of Pakistan especially because of the heavy influx of the Muslim refugees from India. Sardar Shaukat Hyat Khan’s scheme for proposed partial appropriation of Thal lands has caused flutter among the masses and it ‘certainly claim the merit of diverting public attention to the most fundamental aspect of agrarian economy’. 78 It was considered ‘first acknowledgement by the state that public welfare precedes private privileges and national interests can and should overrule the interests of class and clan’. 79 It was generally believed and ‘hardly anyone will contest that big landlordism as practiced in this country is wasteful and uneconomic’ and the wealth produced by the tenants, whom they surrendered to the landlords, has lost by the state. 80

Nationalization of land has become the question of life and death for Pakistan. It was generally believed that landlordism in West Punjab is real factor behind the economic crisis in agriculture sector. With solution of this problem it was estimated

74 CSC Case No 792/2011 Akram Javaid VS The State etc. 75 The Pakistan Times, October 8, 1947; this will mean that nationalization of 50,00,000 acres of land in that area which is yet mostly desert. This area has no canals to irrigate it and this plan will only have some meaning after the Thal Scheme is completed. 76 The Pakistan Times, October 8, 1947 77 Ibid 78 The Pakistan Times, October 16, 1947 79 The Pakistan Times, October 16, 1947 80 Ibid 109 that hundred and thousands of more refugees could be allotted lands. Mr. Ghazanfar Ali Khan, Minister for Refugees and Rehabilitation, Government of Pakistan, also showed such concerns while discussing the land policy in the Punjab and said that I personally feel that it should have three tenants per square instead of two and ‘if this takes place then it will mean that several hundred thousand agriculturist can be absorbed on the land in the West Punjab’. 81 But it reduced the present share of the landlord. This landlordism introduced by British, suited their own economic, military and political objectives. The influence of the landlords on the economic life of West Punjab can be gathered from following table.

Table 3.4: Distribution of Landowner’s holdings [1939]

Land holdings No. of Landlords Total acreage Up to 5 acres 10,79,000 22,93,300 5 to 15 acres 4,18,000 14,74,300 15 to 50 acres 2,08,000 47,50,500 50 to 100 acres 20,600 20,31,200 Over 100 acres 14,400 58,31,600 Over 500 acres 1,760 41,93,500 Source: These figures are based on Calvert’s the Size and Distribution of Landowner’s holdings (1939) cited in The Pakistan Times October 19, 1947

This shows that almost 1.5 million (86%) peasant families had less than 15 acres each during the early days in Pakistan.

3.4.3 Rehabilitation Policy and its Execution

In East Bengal the rehabilitation process was started by the Government of Pakistan for Muslim refugees from West Bengal, Bihar and Assam. This process became more difficult and complex when migrated Hindus started coming back after the Prime Ministers’ agreement in 1950. According to the official special report, ‘the problem of relief and rehabilitation was complicated by the simultaneous arrival of both Hindu migrants and Muslim refugees from Bharat’. 82 Relief camps were opened by the provincial government for the refugees to provide them with shelter and medical aid and initially more than one lakh refugees were accommodated. After

81 The Pakistan Times, December 31, 1947 82 MSS EUR F158/641B E. No. 2146, Refugees Problem in East Pakistan, p.33 B.L 110 being rehabilitated in different vocations, ‘an appreciable numbers [had] returned to their native places’. Other than this there were 51,171 Muslim refugees in 45 camps maintained by the government with Rs. 10500 daily expenses. These relief camps were declared as ‘self-sufficient units’ by the Government of East Pakistan as: on the one hand, maintenance allowances were given to the disabled, women and children and, on the other hand, jobs were also provided by establishing different societies and industrial units in Aminabad Colony [Dacca], such as Weaver’s Co-operative Society, Tailors’ Society, Jute Spinning Society, Rope-making Industry, Block-Making, Printing of cloth and Carpentry Section, Embroidery Training Canter and Motor Transport Society. Similarly, in Mirpur Colony [Dacca] 250 houses at the cost of Rs. 1,200 each were also distributed free of cost, among the same number of refugee families. In addition to this jobs were also provided by the government through establishing new cottage industries. The profit of all these schemes was distributed among the workers. 83

The establishment of a branch of Pakistan Refugees Rehabilitation Corporation [PRRC] in East Pakistan was also an important step by the government of Pakistan. According to a report covering the period up to mid-June 1951, this corporation had ‘sanctioned Rs 90846 in loans and has recommended a loan of Rs. 45500 to the Central Board. It has invested Rs 37900 in various cottage industries and has plans ready for several small industries in which Rs. 120000 will be invested’. 84 The total amount to be spent ‘by the corporation on the establishment of cottage industries for refugees is Rs. 295246’. 85 The report further mentioned that up to May 1951, Rs. 140,000 had been ‘advanced [as] a free grant and interest free business loans to deserving refugees’ from the total of Rs. 600,000 sanctioned through the Governors’ Refugees Relief Fund [GRRF].

In the context of the rehabilitation of agriculturist refugees in East Bengal, 5449 families [five persons per family] were rehabilitated ‘in the districts of Rajshahi, Pubna, Khustia, Jessore, Dinajpur, Bogra, Dacca, Mamemsing, Chittagong Hill Tracts, Sylhet and Rangpur’ with free grants and advanced loans of Rs. 1,102,650 and Rs. 2,648,260 respectively. Similarly, Rs. 939,266 distributed among 823 non-

83 Ibid 84 Ibid 85 Ibid 111 agriculturist refugee families, which included Rs. 49,100 as a free grant and Rs. 890,166 ‘as loans for construction of stall-cum-houses and business capital’. 86

The returning of huge numbers of Hindu evacuees after the Liaqat-Nehru agreement made the situation worse in East Bengal. Up to the middle of 1951, out of 166,010 houses and 9,766 shops, almost 100,611 houses and 9,038 shops were restored to returning Hindus. An organization called the ‘Displaced Persons’ Search Services Bureau’ was also established by the provincial government of East Pakistan to locate missing or abducted persons. The allocation of Rs 7 lakhs by the East Pakistan government could not cope with this reverse migration of the Hindus. The Central authorities had to sanctioned additional amount of Rs. 15 lakhs for this purpose. As a whole the Central Government ‘sanctioned Rs. 44 Lakh as grant in aid’. A grant of Rs 2,000,000 was also released for the establishment of a Satellite Town at Tongi. Under the title of Provincial Governments Schemes of Rehabilitation of Refugees, Rs. 2,855,150 sanctioned prior to these grants by the Central Government. 87 Though the Government of Pakistan claimed close collaboration with the provincial Government of East Bengal in relief and rehabilitation of refugees in the above mentioned report, especially in case of Hindu evacuees, the resignation of J. N Mandal from Central Cabinet showed that things were not going smoothly. 88

The government of Pakistan claimed the completion of verification of the claims of lands in March 1951 but it was not reflected in micro level accounts such as RL II registers. In a recorded talk on Radio Pakistan on 20 March 1951, Dr. I. H Qureshi, Minister of State for Refugees and Rehabilitation, claimed that the Government fully understood the refugees’ problems and, despite many administrative and economic constraints ‘today the vast majority of the refugees have been rehabilitated’. 89 He maintained that most of the refugees at the beginning who entered in West Punjab were agriculturists and that the majority of them had been allotted evacuee land by the Punjab Government. He said:

‘the Punjab Government have almost completed the verification of the claims for land in accordance with the Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme and it hoped

86 Ibid 87 MSS EUR F158/641B E. No. 2146, Refugees Problem in East Pakistan, p.33 B.L 88 The Times, October 21, 1950; MSS EUR F158/641B, Hindu Return To Pakistan, p.53 B.L 89 Recorded Talk on Radio Pakistan, 20th March 1951, ‘The Refugee Problems’. MSS EUR F158/641B, E.No.1000, p.42 112

that majority of the claimants will be semi-permanently settled within the course of the next financial year and actual allotment of the land will start in April’. 90

Similarly in Sindh, he reported that ‘claims of the refugees from agreed areas for semi-permanent settlement have been invited and very soon the work of the verification will start in right earnest’. 91

According to the official sources, at the end of 1956 ‘in West Pakistan, 1343704 claims 92 for agricultural land registered by the displaced persons from ‘agreed areas’ of India , out of which 1004856 claims have been finally settled on a provisional-permanent basis, covering an area of about 3465556 acres of evacuee agricultural land’. 93 The districts where the resettlement process had been reportedly completed included Attock, Gujrat, Rawalpindi, Thal and Mianwali of the Punjab. The rehabilitation process had also been completed in Baluchistan but progress in N.W.F.P, Sindh, Khairpur, and Bahawalpur was only considered by the Government as ‘satisfactory’. In Sindh evacuee land had been taken from the local haris, to whom it had been granted under the ‘temporary rehabilitation settlement scheme’ and was now granted to displaced persons. 94

In urban areas, there was also shortage of industrial and commercial units, as mentioned by Dr. Qureshi. Up to 1951, as most of these properties had been allotted to refugees as per claim of the central government. It was the same situation with housing accommodation in the cities. Almost all the big cities had reached their saturation point regarding the accommodation of the refugees. The Central Government accordingly directed provincial governments to established satellite towns for the creation of new space for unsettled refugees. 1,300 new quarters were constructed by the authorities in Karachi for federal government employees.

90 Ibid 91 Recorded Talk on Radio Pakistan, 20th March 1951, ‘The Refugee Problems’. MSS EUR F158/641B, E.No.1000, p.42 92 Whereas about 300000 claims of immovable property left in India [worth of 1450 million pounds] were filed by the Muslims refugees in Pakistan. These also included the claims of the ruling families of Princely States of Manawadar, Junagardh, Mangroletc which alone of several millions of pounds. The Government of Pakistan appointed almost 20 officials for the verification of these claims. Times, may 5, 1956,MSS EUR F158/641B 93 Government of Pakistan, TenYears of Pakistan 1947-1957 (Karachi, Pakistan Publication, 1957),p. 240 94 Ibid 113

Cooperative housing societies were established and the government allotted land to them for the establishment of new housing societies. 95 West Punjab up-to February 1957 allocated Rs. 76.82 million from the Rehabilitation Tax Fund and granted a loan of Rs. 20 million by the Rehabilitation Tax Committee. The West Punjab Government spent ‘Rs. 47.1 million out of the Rehabilitation Tax grant on 27 schemes of satellite towns and colonies’. Three satellite towns in Lyallpur [Faisalabad], two in Multan and one each in Sargodha, Montgomery [Sahiwal], Gujranwala, Rawalpindi, and Jhang were established. 96 With a capital of Rs 10,000,000 Pakistan Refugees Rehabilitation Finance Corporation [RRFC] was incorporated to provide support for skilled refugees. Under this cottage industries were established in Gujranwala, Multan, Shikarpur, Hyderabad, Bholari and Karachi. Highlighting the ‘progress of rehabilitation’ process, Dr. Qureshi remarked:

‘…it is estimated that [up-to March 1951] about 53 lakhs of refugees have been rehabilitated in the Punjab out of whom more than 40 lakhs been resettled in rural areas. In Sind nearly 480000 have been settled on land and 371000 in urban areas. The N.W.F.P, Baluchistan and Bahawalpur have rehabilitated about 84000, 14000, and 351500 refugees respectively’. 97

In addition to this the Government of Pakistan had to spend between Rs. 2 and Rs 3 crore per annum for the relief and rehabilitation of about ‘5 lakhs refugees driven from Kashmir’. The Government had not adopted a permanent resettlement policy for such refugees as it was considered that eventually they would return home once the Kashmir issue had been settled with India. Hence they were resettled on initially temporary basis in Azad Kashmir and some border districts of Pakistan. 98

In spite of all these claims, however, refugees had not looked satisfied and even criticized the government policies regarding rehabilitation. In a letter to the editor of the Pakistan Times, a refugee said that his letter had not been replied or even acknowledged by the rehabilitation department. He maintained that the refugees

95 Recorded Talk on Radio Pakistan, 20th March 1951, ‘The Refugee Problems’. See also MSS EUR F158/641B, E.No.1000, p.42 96 Government of Pakistan, Ten Years of Pakistan 1947-1957 , p. 241 97 Recorded Talk on Radio Pakistan, 20th March 1951, ‘The Refugee Problems’. MSS EUR F158/641B, E.No.1000, p.42 98 MSS EUR F158/641B No35/51 Relief and Temporary Rehabilitation of Kashmir Refugees, p.24 B.L 114 especially from Delhi and East Punjab ‘find themselves penniless and stranded’. 99 He broadly divided the refugees into; old persons, pensioners, businessmen, legal practitioners, and technical men and stressed that ‘these refugees have the first claim on the properties left by the non-Muslim evacuees in Pakistan, without any cash payments, which they unable to make’. 100 But here [in Pakistan] he said ‘houses are being allotted on payment of rents, and goods in shops etc., are being sold to the highest bidders, thus depriving the indigent refugees who have rightful claim on them in lieu of what they have left behind’. 101 One can find many such disgruntled letters to the editors of different Urdu and English newspapers after the creation of Pakistan.

By 1956 the Pakistan Government lagged far behind its neighbour India in the process of rehabilitation and so hoped ‘to finish the gigantic task by the end of 1958, and then to wind up the Ministry of Refugees and Rehabilitation’. 102

3.5 Rehabilitation of Refugees in Toba Tek Singh: Process, Policies and Execution

There was remarkable increase in the population of the four colony districts of Punjab i.e. Lyallpur [Faisalabad], Montgomery [Sahiwal], Multan and Shahpur before the partition [as discussed in chapter 1] and this trend continued after August 1947. The factor of economic prosperity due to their fertile agricultural land and partition- led violence and massive killings ‘influenced the movement of the refugees from India, who migrated to these districts in a higher proportion’. 103 Lyallpur was the top district with highest increase in population among all other districts of West Punjab in 1951. Due to the vast evacuee [rural and urban] property left by Sikhs and Hindus in Toba Tek Singh, Samundri, Jaranwala, and Lyallpur, the government resettled a huge proportion of refugees arriving from different districts of East Punjab. According to the census of 1951, Lyallpur counted 986,236 refugees [of which 978,156 were from North West India] which was highest figure for all districts in West Punjab in 1951. 104

99 The Pakistan Times, January 1, 1948; we can found a number of such letters to the editors of different daily newspapers during early days of Pakistan after the partition by the refugees, showed complaints or criticism on the rehabilitation process, schemes and their implementation. 100 The Pakistan Times, January 1, 1948 101 Ibid 102 Times, May 5, 1956, MSS EUR F158/641B 103 Census of Pakistan 1951, Vol.5, Punjab and Bahawalpur State, Karachi, P.42-43 104 Ibid, Table 19-A 115

In Toba Tek Singh, we have selected Town Toba Tek Singh [326 JB] and colony Chak No. 331 JB [village Shair Gardh/Athwal; have almost 50 percent refugee population] for understanding refugees’ rehabilitation in urban and rural areas after the creation of Pakistan. I have also selected two other villages Chak 13 [the refugees are in majority with few houses of the locals] from Kamalia and Chak 434 [the locals are in majority with few houses of the refugees] near Gojra just to strengthen argument of the research.

116

Map 3.2: Town Toba Tek Singh

Source: http://www.pbs.gov.pk/content/district-glance-t-t-singh , accessed on 23 December 2015

Chak 331 JB is carefully selected, because of its location in the tehsil Toba Tek Singh and demographic composition. Whole of the population of this village including Sikhs, Muslims and Hindus migrated to this locality from Sialkot, before the partition, during the process of establishment of the canal colonies by the British government. The non-Muslims [Hindus and Sikhs] were almost fifty percent of the village population, which latter replaced with the Muslim refugees from India. I have not found the Janglis in this Chak [the original inhabitant of this land, the Sandal bar ] except few houses outside the village. These were mostly cattle grazers though few individuals were also working on lands of the local landholders.

Sikh and Hindus of Chak 331/JB had economically and numerically strong communities before the partition. Hindus were mostly shopkeepers and also involved in moneylending, whereas, Sikhs were major landholders parallel to the Muslims. Both Sikhs and Hindus had been migrated to India after the partition in 1947, and left behind huge evacuee property and agricultural land. This Chak is located towards 117 west of the town Toba Tek Singh, at distance of 2-3 KM. It is irrigated by Jhang Branch of lower Chenab Canal and major crops like wheat and cotton were supplied to the market of Toba Tek Singh. From where by train these commodities transported to the other parts of the region.

Map 3.3: Villages/Chaks in Toba Tek Singh

Source: Deputy Commissioner Office Toba Tek Singh

Map 3.4: Chak No. 331 JB [ShairGardh/Athwal]

118

Source: Deputy Commissioner Office Toba Tek Singh

3.5.1 Muslim Refugees of Chak 331/JB and, Town Toba Tek Singh and the Government Response to Their Rehabilitation

In Chak 331 JB all evacuee lands had been granted to the Muslim migrants from India. They [refugees] comprised almost half of the total population of the village. The majority of them had migrated from Firozpur, Hoshiarpur, and Ludhiana. In town Toba Tek Singh, the Muslim refugees replaced the numerically and economically strong Hindus and Sikhs communities that reflected in their better socio-economic position in the post partition period. Majority refugees of town Toba Tek Singh are migrated to this locality from Sirhand, Hoshiarpur, Jalandhar and Ludhiana after the partition. After uprooting from their ancestral localities in India, their entrance in Pakistan was not proved as end of their pains and miseries rather start of another long painful journey. They had to go through a number of phases to the final settlement in Toba Tek Singh or in other words from a refugee to ‘full- fledged citizen’ of Pakistan.

Resourceful and influential refugees went through a process of speedy rehabilitation. Apart from all state policies regarding rehabilitation of the refugees in Toba Tek Singh, resettlement process depended on the refugees’ own ability and capacity to rehabilitate them. In this struggle, economically and socio-politically influential refugees benefitted by the state policies and even some time more than their just share. While the poor and state-dependent refugees, which were in majority in case of Toba Tek Singh, had emerged as losers in this race of rehabilitation and resettlement. A refugees success, in words of Rivinder Kaur ‘in setting up homes, businesses, and gaining employment, then, became the success of state policies, whereas failure to be self-reliant was an individual failure that the state was not responsible’. 105 Though she stated this in context of Indian refugees but it is quite relevant to the Muslim refugees of Toba Tek Singh who used their own sources and social links to get benefit by the policies of refugee’s rehabilitation department.

105 Ravinder Kaur, ‘Distinctive Citizenship: Refugees, Subjects and Post-Colonial State in India’s Partition’, Cultural and Social History, vol 6, Issue 4, PP. 429-446 119

3.5.2 The Ordeal of Refugees in the Refugee Camps

Though to enter in Pakistan was a matter of relief for the millions of refugees but the challenges of hunger and diseases were not came to an end. Abdul [a refugee from Chak 331JB] narrated his story as:

‘…after many days of journey at last we crossed the border and entered Pakistan. Army was escorting our foot convoy. First we stayed in a small Pakistani village. They gave us food and shelter. Next morning we went to Lahore Cantonment. We stayed there [in a refugee camp] for 2-3 days. During that stay there spread cholera epidemic. My father died in the camp with that disease. Daily 100 to 200 people died in the camp and the government put dead bodies on the cart and dumped them outside the camp. But the proper burial of our father was helped by one of our family friend Buraq, who was serving in Pakistan Army and posted at Lahore’.106

After uprooting form their ancestral places in India, refugees of Toba Tek Singh had to face lot of hardships in form of violence, hunger and diseases. When they crossed the border some of them took shelter in border villages before going to refugee camps. Few of the refugees went to their relatives in Lahore. From Lahore they moved to Lyallpur or Sahiwal before their final settlement in Toba Tek Singh. Some of the refugees of Toba Tek Singh from Hoshiarpur, Ludhiana and Kashmir, entered in Pakistan through Sialkot, Shakar Gardh and Narowal border areas. From where, they moved to Toba Tek Singh via Sheikupura and Lyallpur.

The horrifying accounts of refugee’s death due to cholera epidemic in Lahore cantonment refugee camp, as narrated by Abdul, are sufficient to understand the situation of refugee campus in other areas in West Punjab after the partition. Due to the starvation, exhaustion and cholera, it is reported, ‘the death rate in refugee camps in Lahore has been steadily mounting [and] more than 1,300 dead were counted on Tuesday [30 September 1947] at the Walton camp’. 107 These accounts were much less than those narrated by Abdul in above account.

106 Interview with Abdul Ali, Chak No. 331JB, 8 June 2015 107 The Pakistan Times, October 2, 1947 120

Lyallpur refugee camp, established at the cattle fair grounds, was one of the largest refugee camps in the West Punjab, where refugees were temporary accommodated before their final settlements in Toba Tek Singh and other surrounding areas. The refugees were, in very miserable conditions, waiting for materialization of their claims and rehabilitation by the government. After receiving lot of complaints from the refugees of Lyallpur refugee camp through the press, Sirdar Shaukat Hyat Khan [Revenue Minister] visited the camp after getting full powers by the Premier to deal with the situation. He was shocked by seeing the ‘the utter mismanagement and chaos prevailing in the camp where a huge mass of humanity was living in the open, receiving no help from the official or any non-official agency, except that of daily rations’. 108 The situation was even worse as the:

‘young [refugee] girls had to trudge long distances in search of fuel, most of them in tattered clothes [and] there had been instances of molestations of young girls by the volunteers and of the parents having been beaten up when they protested’. 109

After removing the Deputy Commissioner and dismissing the commandant of the refugee camp and depot holders, he ordered to shift the refugees to the newly found commodious buildings which included school and college hostels. 110 It was not only in Lyallpur and Toba Tek Singh [Gojra], the refugee camps across the West Punjab had been facing such conditions up to their closure. 111

3.5.3 The Refugees’ Perception of the Migration

Initially, most of the refugees who migrated and settled in Toba Tek Singh had been considered their migration a temporary event. They had to leave their homes all of sudden as they were not prepared for this migration. Their relations with the other non-Muslim communities were friendly and brotherly, though occasionally

108 The Pakistan Times, December 31, 1947 109 Ibid 110 The Pakistan Times, December 31, 1947. The West Punjab Agricultural College Relief Camp, Lyallpur was part of the ‘Do now’ policy of Sirdar Shaukat Hyat which he started in December 30, 1947. See details of the camp in The Pakistan Times, February 29, 1948 111 The refugee camps in West Punjab closed by the government in October 1948. It informed by Mr. A. M Khan Leghari [Refugee and Rehabilitation Commissioner, West Punjab] to the Central Refugee Ministry at Karachi that ‘all refugee camps in West Punjab have been closed – the latest to be liquidated were the camps at Montgomery and Okara, except for 2500 refugee there who were to be re- settled in Muzaffargarh district’. For detail see The Pakistan Times, October 19, 1948 121 conflicting as sometimes conflicting within the same community. Qurban Hussain, who was 18 years old at the time of the partition, told:

‘[He] was quite young when the partition took place. Our village was Shadiwal, in tehsil Zera of district Firozpur. At that time, our relations [with the other religious communities] were very good and brotherly but when Pakistan and Hindustan came into being, everything changed. Life was going very smooth [before the partition] and we had no idea that we had to migrate’. 112

Muhammad Hafeez, a refugee from village Tallania, tehsil Sarhand told that ‘during early days of the partition our elders thought that we will go back Hindustan as the situation will be normal. They never thought about the permanent resettlement in Toba Tek Singh’. 113 It was also confirmed by a local Safdar from Chak 331JB:

‘…when the partition [of 1947] took place they [Sikhs and Hindus of Chak 331JB] thought that we would come back as the situation would be normal. Just as we [Muslims] go Sialkot and then come back after some time. Similarly, Muslim refugees of our locality were thinking they would go back to their ancestral localities [in India] and it’s a temporary situation’. 114

3.5.4 The Refugees Nostalgic Feelings with ancestral localities

With the partition of Punjab, border line divided it into East and West, Indian and Pakistani Punjab. Both territories had controlled by the respective governments after the partition. Movement across the border had also been controlled and monitored by introducing the cards and the permit system. During early days of the partition this practice [cards and the permit system] was difficult to understand for common refugees. They still felt their roots in their old localities, left in India in 1947. In some cases they even left their one or two family members in India to look after their properties. Abdul Ali [a refugee of Chak 331 JB] who had migrated from Dasua tehsil of district Hoshiarpur, narrated his story of migration as:

112 Interview with Qurban Hussain, Chak No. 331JB, 4 February 2015 113 Interview with Muhammad Hafeez, Toba Tek Singh, 15 January 2016 114 Interview with Safdar, Chak No. 331JB, 14 March 2015 122

‘…when Sikhs were removing us from our ancestral localities, my grandfather left there. He stayed there for three years after the creation of Pakistan. The Sikhs of our locality said to us that we will send you money after selling your property. We gave them our address [in Pakistan] and also visited Lahore many times [after the migration] to contact them [our Sikh friends] but they never came to give us our money. After three years our grandfather had come to Pakistan. He allowed by the military to cross the border after enquiring one of our family members Ghulam Nabi, who was living in Lahore. The army even enquired police in Toba Tek Singh about our grandfather and they were told by Choudhry Barkat Ali numberdar [Chak 331 JB], that this person had allotted land in our village’. 115

The government also devised an emotional strategy for the rehabilitation process. There were some emotional announcements from the government officials to commemorate the Muslim sacrifices in East Punjab, for just to counter the resistance and anger of the refugees in Toba Tek Singh. Pir Ahsan-ud-Din, Deputy Commissioner Lyallpur said ‘we should celebrate the Day of the martyrs of East Punjab’. 116 Highlighting the miseries and sacrifices of Muslim refugees and relating it with the Islamic cause, the government not only tried to hide their failure and mismanagement in rehabilitation process but also hoped for support by the locals.

3.5.5 Choice of Toba Tek Singh as Permanent Abode

It was also quite common during the early days after the Partition that most of the refugees from India had chosen different localities before final resettlement for in Toba Tek Singh. They were not given any special instructions [or at least had no access to such instructions if there were any] from the rehabilitation department in this regard. They used their personal linkages or in some cases guided by passerby for their destination for settlement. Most of them continued wondering in different areas before coming in Toba Tek Singh for final settlement. Qurban Hussain narrated his journey to Toba Tek Singh as:

‘….after crossing the Pakistan-India border, we stayed one month and ten days in Lahore. From there we moved to Pattoki by train and stayed there about 20

115 Interview with Abdul Ali, Chak No. 331JB, 8 June 2015 116 The Daily Saadat, January 31, 1948 123

to 25 days. After that we settled in Arifwala, District Montgomery [Sahiwal] and we allotted land there by the government. We stayed there for six month when our parental uncle took us to Chak 331JB, Toba Tek Singh…..We came here because some of our family members had already settled here’. 117

The oral accounts provided by the other refugees who resettled in Toba Tek Singh also somehow same. A refugee from India [Hussain Ali] came to know about Chak 331JB by a Sikh migrant:

‘We first came in Lyallpur [Faisalabad] from Lahore, where a Sikh told us about Athwal [ Chak 331JB] and said “you should go Athwal, a village near Gojra in Toba Tek Singh. There you might allot land by the government”. Then we allotted land by the government in Chak 331JB [Toba Tek Singh]’. 118

3.5.6 The Phenomenon of Corruption in Process of Rehabilitation and Responses of the Refugees

During the early years of Pakistan, the state worried about the general practice of corruption among the government officials, especially regarding allotments of evacuee properties. Different sort of step had been taken by the state to stop this practice. Though, these steps by the bureaucracy also have been seen as interference in the nascent political setup but most of the political personalities were found involved in corruption regarding allotment of evacuee properties. In June 18, 1949, a circular letter, mentioned top-secret, marked by the Governor of Punjab to the deputy commissioners to send reports regarding ‘misconduct’ 119 of Members Legislative Assembly [M.L.A’s] or the Ministers found guilty. On the basis of these reports, all M.L.A’s and the Ministers of West Punjab came under close monitoring by the police and were categorized into three classes A, B and C, ‘the A being those about whom everyone agrees that they had a good reputation, the B those who are universally

117 Interview with Qurban Hussain, Chak No. 331JB, 4 February 2015 118 Interview with Hussain Ali, Chak No. 331JB, 12 November 2015 119 ‘Misconduct’ according to the Public and Representatives Offices (Disqualification) Act, 1949 is defined as ‘Misconduct includes bribery, corruption, jobbery, favoritism, nepotism, willful maladministration, willful misappropriation, or diversion of public moneys, or moneys collected, whether by public subscription or otherwise, by or at the instance of persons holding honorary or stipendiary office under the Central Government, and any other abuse of official powers or position or any abetment thereof’.

124 accused of malpractices and the C the others’. 120 The letter further maintained that ‘the classification should be based on public repute and not on your own opinion on the probability or otherwise of guilt’. 121 An overview of the information provided by different deputy commissioners can be seen in the following table.

Tab 3.5: Categorization of West Punjab MLA’s regarding their reputation in allotments and refugees rehabilitation

District A B C Sialkot Mian Mumtaz Daulatana (M.L.A) Ch. Sarfraraz Khan (M.L.A) Ch. Nasirud Din (M.L.A) 122 Sheikupura Muhammad Hussain Rai Shahadat Khan (M.L.A), Chaudhry Roshan Din ( Chatha (M.L.A) [Rana Nasar Ullah& Ali M.L.A), Rai Shahadat Akbar (Ex-M.L.A’s from Khan (M.L.A), Sheikh Hoshiarpur) Ch. Nasar Karamat Ali [Ex-Minister; Ullah& Ch. Akram Khan his Son-in-law, Sheikh (Ex-M.L.A’s from Amritsar) Muhammad Tufail was were allegedly involved in Tahsildar in Shahdara allotment of factories to facing many allegations of themselves in Sheikupura criminal commissions and and other districts] omissions and Deputy Commissioner remarks were ‘I am unable to

120 Under Secretary to Government West Punjab, Home Department Lahore to The Commissioner and Deputy Commissioners Lahore Division D.O. No. 173-HS/49 File No. G 1549 [The Commissioner Office Lahore] 121 Ibid 122 Ibid, K.S. Sardar Abdus Samad Khan, Deputy Commissioner Sialkot remarked ‘it seems that both these M.L.As have been too clever in indulging in mal-practices through their relations and not direct. As regards Ch. Sarfraz Khan, there is documentary evidence to the effect that his cousin Pir Muhammad has been auctioning abandoned cattle without authority and issuing receipts without crediting the sale process into government treasury. Similarly, his real brother Muhammad Nawaz and his cousin Gul Nawaz have been disposing of abandoned cattle and crops including good horses and tangas , of the non-Muslim evacuees without crediting the sale process in the government treasury. Some of the documents throwing light on the matter and actual receipts issued by them have been collected by Sardar Zaka Ullah, Tahsildar Pasrur, and these are in his custody. So far as Ch. Nasir Din is concerned I have not been able to secure any documentary evidence against his mal-practices through his relations of misappropriating abandoned property in the dumps of various villages, but there are allegations against him to that effect…I have not been able to find anything about him [Mian Mumtaz Daulatana] by way of reputation or otherwise’. 125

make up my mind as regards the classification of this Ex-Minister. I am ‘however’ extremely doubtful of his fitness for the (A) list’] Gujranwala Ch. Salah-ud-Din [allegation Ch. Raj Muhammad Tarar have been made that he has MLA Parliamentary misappropriated a lot of Secretary [though some of silver and gold recovered by his relations are people and made Farzi reasonably suspected of auction of evacuee property having participated in and cattle; Deputy looting after the partition]; Commissioner remarked, ‘no Ch. Zafarullah Khan doubt he is unscrupulous but [Deputy Commissioner owing to his close remarked ‘I have not had relationship with the Hon’ble much adverse reports Minister of Finance, against them hence it Muhammad cannot definitely be said MumtazDaultana, it is that they were corrupt or necessary to deal with him have misused or abused tactfully…I was advised by their position or the Commissioner that it influence’.] would be best to warn him verbally which I did’. 123 ]; Sheikh Karemat Ali Ex-MLA Ex-Minister 124

123 Ibid, Muhammad Afzal Khan, Deputy Commissioner Gujranwala [took over charge on 13 April 1948] maintained that ‘I have heard quite a lot against Ch. Salah-ud-Din I must say that he has got a very bad reputation and is alleged to have taken part in looting and misappropriation on a large scale. He sold sixty-five Persian wheels of non-Muslims evacuees in the Wazirabad Tahsil at ridiculously low price (Rs.50/- each) to his friends, favourites and members of his party. While the average annual rent for the use of a Persian wheel was in neighborhood of Rs. 100/-. It is thus clear that he sold evacuee property worth Rs.65000/- for about Rs.3000/- or Rs.4000/-. On enquiry he informed me that he did so under the authority of the then Deputy Commissioner Mr. Jafri. The latter had entirely denied having given him any such permission. I have an enquiry held in this matter and the persons to whom these Persian wheels were sold by Ch. Salah-ud-Din had stated that they are prepared to return these wheels to the government provided they are refund the money which they had paid to Ch. Salah-ud-Din. This case is now pending with the Deputy Rehabilitation Commissioner, Gujranwala’. 124 Ibid, With regard to Sheikh Karemat Ali, Muhammad Afzal Khan, Deputy Commissioner Gujranwala said ‘though he was not actually resided in this district, was elected from the Urban Constituency which includes the towns of this district. His reputation, as far as I have been able to ascertain, has been very bad. One of his relations or friends, M. A. Sheikh got a metal factory at Kamoke allotted in his name apparently through the influence of Sheikh Karemat Ali. I am informed that at the time of allotment of this factory to M.A. Sheikh it was full of manufactured or partly 126

Lahore Mian Muhammad Rafiq Malik Wazir Mohammad Sirdar Mohammad Husain MianIftikhar-ud-Din Nawab Sir Muzzafar Ali Khan Qizilbash Mr. S.P.Singha Mr. C.E. Gibbon Begum J.A Shah Nawaz Begum SalamaTasadduq Husain 125 Source: File No. G 1549 [The Commissioner Office Lahore]

These sorts of charges of corruption against the officials and non-officials were also raised by the politicians as well. Mian Mumtaz Dultana, Finance Minister, West Punjab Government, admitted that ‘with the weak administration at the centre, officials and non-officials behaved in most irresponsible manner and acquired looted property to satisfy their greed’. 126 Though he assured that his government ‘is determined to see that such officials who are charged with corruption are immediately brought to the book’ 127 but where this statement showed the ‘weak government’ at the centre it also exposed the mismanagement and flaws in refugees’ rehabilitation projects as well.

Issues around ‘corruption’ in rehabilitation of Muslim refugees from India in Toba Tek Singh are common in oral accounts of the refugees and the locals. In many cases, the property claims of the refugees were rejected because the poor refugee had manufactured utensils worth over a lac [100,000] of rupees. I am further informed that Sheikh Karemat Ali’s son actually remained in possession of this factory and is alleged to have misappropriated metal worth lacs of rupees. This factory is not actually worked and the allottee left it after disposing of the stock-in-trade which was lying in it…I was told that this M.A. Sheikh secured some more allotments in other towns i.e The Pandit Bros. in Lahore and some chemists shops in Sialkot through the influence of Sheikh Karemat Ali. Should there be no objection this might be got verified through the Deputy Commissioners of those districts’. 125 Ibid, S. S. Jafri, Deputy Commissioner mentioned about Ex-M.L.A’s of District Lahore that ‘none of the above has really come into prominence for any misconduct. Malik Wazir Mohammad is not highly spoken of. The opinion about Sirdar Mohammad Husain is somewhat conflicting, but he is generally well spoken of. One case of usurpation of evacuee land near his house by MianIftikhar-ud- Din came to notice but otherwise he enjoys a good reputation. Immediately after partition allegations were made in the press against Begum Salam Tasadduq Husain with regard to unauthorized possession of articles of furniture etc., belonging to evacuees, but I do not aware of any enquiries having been made’. 126 The Pakistan Times, December 31, 1947 127 Ibid 127 no money to bribe or had no approach to the officials in rehabilitation department. The refugees were also seemed unaware about the allotment of their lands because of allotment of the lands on more than one place under the ‘unit system’. Issues of illegal allotments and capturing of evacuee lands and properties by the locals were also quite common during the early days after the partition. Yasin Shah, a local of Chak No.331JB and worked as Patwari in lands and rehabilitation department remembering the rehabilitation of the refugees in his locality as ‘…we considered them [refugees] our Muslim brothers. The government established campus for them and provided them food…when they came to the villages, lands allotted to them by the government’. 128

Talking about the malpractice in the allotment of the evacuee lands and general conduct of the officials of rehabilitation department to the refugees, Yasin Shah remarked:

‘…there are still many refugees who does not know that where they had been allotted lands according to their claims [forms]. The [rehabilitation] officials were not ready to tell them that where they had been allotted lands according to their claims, although refugees had claims forms in their hands…, nobody ready to guide them [to their allotted lands]. If the refugee agreed to surrender half of the allotted land [as bribe] to the official then he told them that where their land has been allotted’. 129

Highlighting the problems with the ‘unit system’ and corruption in Central Record Office Lahore, Yasin Shah said:

‘…there are some cases according to which refugees had allotted only few units of the accepted claims…where the remaining units had been allotted? Whether in Bhaker, in Jhang, in Laya, in Sumandary or in Toba Tek Singh, nobody knows. It could only be possible if they visited the Central Record Room Lahore and checked that the refugee of such name came from India and where he had been allotted lands according to his/her claim form. Then where his allotment letter had been sent? Only in this way they could know about the dispatch number, district, tehsil and village of allotment. But

128 Interview with Yasin Shah, Chak No. 331 JB, Tehsil and District Toba Tek Singh, 13 March 2015 129 Interview with Yasin Shah, Chak No. 331 JB, Tehsil and District Toba Tek Singh, 13 March 2015 128

to know about all this information there [in Central Record Room Lahore] only bribe and personal links worked’. 130

Most of the Patwari s, in Toba Tek Singh, were involved in corruption regarding allotment of evacuee lands to the refugees. Some high official were also involved in grabbing the evacuee property. 131 The above accounts of corruption of the Patwaris and their conduct with the Muslim refugees in Toba Tek Singh are also proved by following lines [Patwari : In words of a migrant] written by Mr. Ahsan Ismail Siddiquee, a refugee from Gojra, Toba Tek Singh. 132

Qiamat pe qiamat aaj kal dhate hain patwari

Gariboun bay-kisoun per Zulm farmatey hain patwari

[The patwaris caused havoc to the poor and helpless refugees…Who are oppressed by the patwaris ]

Ye adam zaad hain laken deranduon sey sewa vahshi

Hamara hoon petay hain hamain khatey hain patwari

[patwari have appearance of human beings but theses savages are worse than the beasts…they drink our blood and eat us up]

Samejhtey thay ham apney mulk ko daaral-amman laken

Hadees-i-Mashraqi Punjab dohratey hain patwari

[We thought our country house of peace…but these patwari repeat the stories of torture of East Punjab]

‘Hamari jaib mey kuch daalney sey kaam hota hai’

Asharoon he asharoon mey ye samjhatey hain patwari

[These patwari tries to convey to us through hints ‘our work will be done if we fill their pockets with money’]

Ameeron ko to kuch ley dey k Achey see jagha dey dee

Gariboun ko jahnum main punhchatey hain patwari

[They allotted good land to the rich after taking money from them...but they consign the poor to the hell]

130 Ibid 131 A case against Naib-Tahsildar [Kamalia] registered under section 409/411 who captured redhandedly in looting the evacuee property from Bait-ul-Maal. See The Daily Saadat, January 4, 1948 132 The Daily Saadat, January 7, 1948 129

Hamari bey sarosamanian ham ko rolatee hain

Mager ashrat ke nagmay aaj-kal gaatey hain patwari

[Our penury and privation cause us to weep…But the patwaris sing the song of delight and happiness]

Bardey afsar be to abb koi shaqayat nahi suntay

Na janey un ko a’her kia pila atey hain patwari

[The high officials do not listen to our complaints…but we don’t know what type of drink these patwari offers to them]

Khuda ka khoof hey rakha ho jab k taaq-i-nisian par

Haqoomat ko bahla khater main kab latey hain patwari

[When they have put aside the fear of God…how can these patwari take heed of their government?]

Kal ik mahfil main koi dil-jala kehta tha youn Ahsan

‘Inhain insaan na khayae jo ban jatey hain patwar’

[Last day a distressed person spoke despairingly of the patwaris in a gathering…Don’t call patwaris human being]

The change in the policy of rebate in house rent to the refugees provided by the Rehabilitation department also affected the refugees in Toba Tek Singh. There were huge numbers of refugees who lived in rented evacuee houses. They protested against this policy of the government and said ‘the rents of the evacuee houses are already very high and removal of rebate on house rents would be great burden on the poor and stranded refugees’. 133 The justification, given by the government, for this policy was that they wanted to maintain the expenses of the Rehabilitation department. This policy was severely criticized by the refugees in Toba Tek Singh. They maintained that ‘if the Rehabilitation department could not complete the resettlement process of the refugees in five years because of their ill planning then refugees should not be charged for that’. 134

There were also open clashes between the government officials and the refugees over the allotments of lands in Toba Tek Singh. The State force was used to remove the refugees from their allotted lands after cancellation of their allotments by

133 HaqPasand (Urdu Weekly), August 25, 1952 134 Ibid 130 the government. It was because of the misconceptions over the allotments between the refugees and the government. In one of these cases, as reported in the press,

‘…four refugees were killed on the spot and seven wounded as the result of a clash with police in a village near Kurarianwala police station on December 12, 1947. An Assistant sub-Inspector of police, a Head Constable and a Constable were also injured’. 135

Giving the explanation of the event the news correspondent said ‘the clash occurred when some refugees resisted the police who were trying to evict them from land which had previously been allotted to them. The allotment, however, was later cancelled as it was found that the refugees were non-agriculturists’. 136 Whatever the reason was, that shows that the rehabilitation policies in Toba Tek Singh were not going smooth and it continuously creating confusions and problems for the refugees. In next chapter we will see, the socio-economic impact of these refugees’ rehabilitation policies in Toba Tek Singh.

Conclusion

Partition of Punjab and Bengal became one of the major causes of the migration of millions of refugees to both sides of the border. After outbreak of violence and start of mass migration, both governments of Pakistan and India tried to restore the confidence of the minorities on both sides but these efforts could not be succeeded. The support of the west Punjab government to India in evacuation of Hindus and Sikhs was exemplary. Every possible help provided by the government of Pakistan for the safe and sound migration of Hindus and Sikhs from west Punjab to India.

Large scale migration of millions of Muslim refugees started after the creation of Pakistan due to organised violence in Indian Territory and adjacent areas. The majority of them were from Northern, North Western, and Central Zones of India. One of the major contrasts between migration process in East and West Pakistan was that in East Pakistan migration process started in 1950’s instead of 1947, as in case of West Pakistan. Because of severe violence in East Punjab especially in the princely

135 The Pakistan Time December 20, 1947. 136 Ibid 131 states, influx of refugees in West Punjab was beyond the expectation of the government of Pakistan.

Among other immediate measures, national and international help sought by the government of Pakistan to address the refugee crises. The scheme of Ansar and Mohajreen, weekly Urdu paper Mohajir , Quaid-i-Azam Relief Fund, Refugee Corner in daily newspapers, registration cards of the refugees, all were the early efforts of the government of Pakistan in this regard. Multiple factors like, coordination and agreement with Indian government over the evacuee properties, the status of minorities, variations in the migration movements, concerns about revival of economic and business activities and shortage of food, directed the refugees rehabilitation policies in Pakistan after the partition. The policies of the government regarding refugees rehabilitation severely affected and proved short lived due to problem with the assessment of the real numerical strength of the Muslim refugees.

The camps were established to provide shelter, food and medical facilities to the refugees. After verification of the claims, the refugees allotted evacuee properties on temporary grounds. Different department and organizations established and funds allocated to rehabilitate the refugees. New satellite towns made to create space for the refugees in different cities. Official accounts about the rehabilitation of the refugee portrayed smooth and efficient picture where the government sharply responded to the miseries and plight of millions of Muslim refugees. But the ‘everyday state’ and oral accounts of the refugees have reflected different and varied situation about the settlement of the refugees and the government response to this critical matter. Most of the refugees denied any instruction or assistance regarding the selection of their final settlement. Refugees moved to those areas where they finally settled with the help of their personal contacts or through information of the other refugees. Most of the refugees totally negated any economic assistance from the government officials, for their rehabilitation. Even for the allotment of lands, shops and houses in rural and urban in Toba Tek Singh, they had to go through long and painful process. Most of the refugees had not even allotted property according to their claims. Many MLA’s and siting ministers, officials of the rehabilitation department found involved in corruption regarding allotment of evacuee property. The Muslim refugees who came after the partition were greater than the non-Muslim refugees who had migrated to India. Therefore the land and evacuee property left by them was not sufficient. To 132 coup this problem the government had showed her intention for the ‘nationalization’. There was much corruption involved in allotments of evacuee lands and property to the Muslim refugees from India in Toba Tek Singh.

131

CHAPTER 4

SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACT OF REHABILITATION OF REFUGEES IN TOBA TEK SINGH 1947-1961

(There would be) lurking dangers to the very existence of Pakistan if quick, drastic and effective steps are not taken to re-absorb 6,000,000 refugees in our economic and social life.

Mian Iftikhar-ud-Din, President Punjab Muslim League Minister for Refugees & Rehabilitation West Punjab [December 1947]

Rehabilitation of the refugees from India was one of the major tasks for Government of Pakistan during early years of Pakistan. The situation was so grave that this issue was considered direct threat to the national security and existence by the official authorities as depicted in above statement. The very foundations of the nascent state of Pakistan had been shaken by huge influx of millions of Muslim refugees from India. The conventional historiography of the partition ignored the grass-roots level socio-economic and political changes, which are essential to understand for the macro-level dynamics in Pakistan. The main theme of this chapter is socio-economic impact of refugees’ rehabilitation in Toba Tek Singh. Apart from the socio-economic implication it will also provide some clues about the local politics of the refugee’s rehabilitation. In socio-economic domain this chapter examines the new relations of production, division of sources and tensions around this, between the hosts and the migrants in this area. This chapter will also briefly discuss another theme like, whether there was local conflict not only between migrants and locals, but within these broad categories. It will further link with the question of refugee identity in this area and transition from temporary to permanent allotment of evacuee properties.

The growing hopelessness and miseries in the wake of partition and migration among the refugees became a serious challenge to the Government. All national level changes during post partition period in Pakistan, whether they were social, economic or political, had some links with latent changes at cross root level. Existing literature on partition focusses on prominent urban areas like Lahore, Karachi, Gujranwala, 132

Sialkot and Faisalabad [Lyallpur] 1 but small towns and rural areas in Punjab which assimilated the huge influx of refugees from India are generally overlooked. Here the refugee crises were at the core in socio-economic changes after the partition.

4.1 Refugees Rehabilitation and Its Impacts on Local Politics in Toba Tek Singh

The role of the Muslim League was disappointing in addressing the refugees’ problems and their rehabilitation projects. There was general discontent among the refugees towards the leagues’ performance. In a letter to the editor of the Pakistan Times a refugee said ‘the Muslim League which has done miraculous work in making the people Pakistan-minded and winning the election campaign, is almost without existence in the West Punjab field of work’. 2 He further suggested that ‘the Provincial League, Committee of Action, the City Leagues and the Rural Leagues should come forward without delay [as] their absence means loss of life for thousands every day’. 3 Instead of turning its attention to the refugee issues, Muslim League had been preparing the society for military training against any future threat to Pakistan from India. The Salar of district Lyallpur had organized military training centres at various places including Toba Tek Singh. Lack of public willingness to join such training centres showed that there was clear difference between the priorities of the peoples and the Muslim League. Millions of refugees were looking for their immediate rehabilitation. Food, clothing and shelter were their immediate concerns. But, there was a lot of resentment from the officials of Muslim League National Guards towards people’s indifferent behaviour regarding military training. This is very ‘awful’, said Salar Muslim League National Guards, ‘Muslims are not taking interests [in military training in the military training centres which they established]. They should turn their complete attention to this work and sell their property to buy gun [for defence of Pakistan against any expected attack from India]’. 4 In the absence of any support from political leadership and for the protection of their rights, different sort of organizations were established by the refugees in

1 Some of the major works includes; Ian Talbot, Divided Cities ; Vazira Fazila-Yacoobali Zamindar The Long Partition ; Ilyas Chattha, Partition and locality: Violence, Migration, and Development in Gujranwala and Sialkot, 1947-1961 ; Pipa Virdee, Partition and Locality: Case Studies of the Impact of Partition and its aftermath in the Punjab Region 1947-1961 2 The Pakistan Times, October 16, 1947 3 Ibid 4 The Daily Saadat , January 22, 1948 133 different parts of West Punjab. Such refugees organizations also established in Toba Tek Singh. They made organization under common objective i.e. to safeguard the interests of the refugees but they differed in their composition. This variation was, like, on the basis of their locality in India or commonality of their profession or ethnic group etc. This factor showed the lack of confidence by the refugees on the Muslim League to resolve their issues. Anjuman Mohajreen [Refugee Association] of city Gujranwala was among many others. It showed reservation over the ‘enhanced water rates and house rents’ in a meeting held on July 2, 1949 presided over by Hakim Gulam Qadri. A Committee under the name of ‘ Islah [correction in] Allotment Committee’ was organized ‘to look after the interests of Mohajirs in the re- allotments’. 5

These refugee organizations also had political dimension. Refugees were organizing them around the identity of ‘ Mohajir’ in different parts of the West Punjab especially when the different political parties started ‘propaganda in the rural areas in connection with the coming assembly elections’. 6 In a private meeting, members of District Muslim Councilors Gujranwala desired ‘that the monopoly of big people over the Muslim League should now end and representatives from non-agriculturists, labour classes and industrial classes should be elected for the assembly’. 7 They further demanded that ‘the Muslim leaguers who indulged in looting and grabbing should not be considered at all during the coming elections’. 8 Similarly, a refugee organization ‘Panchayet Kabeer Mohajreen’ was established on January 1948 in Toba Tek Singh with its branches in Kamalia, Gojra and Chak-Johmra. The major objective was to solve the issues of the refugees, which included allotments, food, shelter and employment, through organizing them at a single platform. 9

In 1950’s different resolutions were passed by Pakistan Muslim League from its platform regarding refugee rehabilitation. These were not more than showoff or to gain popularity among the masses. A resolution was passed by the Council of the Pakistan Muslim League on January 1956 showing ‘grave concern and anxiety

5 Police Report, Confidential, Weekly Diary No. II for the week ending the 9 th July 1949, Gujranwala District 6 Ibid 7 Ibid 8 Ibid 9 The Daily Saadat , Lyallpur, January 14, 1948; Similarly, In Jhang a refugee organization Anjaman-i- Rafique-ul-Mohajreen was established on January 3, 1948 for the protection of refugees rights. 134

[regarding] the unsolved problems of refugee rehabilitation’ and maintained ‘it is regrettable that while the Central Government have announced from time to time that refugee rehabilitation stands in their programme only second to Defence in priority, they have not taken effective steps to mobilise all their resources and complete the task’. 10 It demanded rehabilitation of the refugees from the Government within one year. A Sub-Committee was also constituted in April 1956 by the Working Committee of the Pakistan Muslim League consisting of ‘Sheikh Saddiq Hassan Sahib, Mr. Abdul Qasim and Mr. Ahmad E. H. Jafar to advise the committee on matters related to refugees’. 11 After almost one year, from the constitution of the Committee, the Working Committee of the Pakistan Muslim League took up the issue and showed disappointment regarding the work of refugee rehabilitation by the Government. It remarked that ‘[the Committee] regret that unfortunately the problem of proper resettlement of refugees have not been solved so for and the disposal of their claims and award of compensation to those who left their properties in Bharat is still awaiting solution’. 12 After realizing the responsibility regarding refugee problems, the Working Committee showed full organizational support to cope with this grave issue. The resolution mentioned that ‘the Muslim League as the organization which strived for and won Pakistan owes a special responsibility in this behalf. The Working Committee therefore, directs all the branches of the League organization and the League Parliamentary parties in the various legislatures of Pakistan to actively work for the early and effective solution of the Mohajir problem. The Committee authorized the President to set up a special Committee which should from time to time devise means for the achievements of the abovementioned objectives and adopt measure in consultation with the various Mohajir Organizations which may facilitate this task’. 13

In some cases, the Muslim refugees themselves had complaints of corruption about Muslim members of Punjab Assembly from East Punjab. A Muslim refugee from Toba Tek Singh wrote to the editor of Daily Saadat about the corruption of MLA from East Punjab [his name was censored by the newspaper]:

10 Resolutions of the Pakistan Muslim League, No 12 (from January 1956 up to October 1957) 11 Meeting of the Working Committee of Pakistan Muslim League, held on 23-26 April 1956 12 Meeting of the Working Committee of Pakistan Muslim League, held on 18-20 May 1957 13 Ibid 135

‘…this person told us before the partition that our areas would be included into Pakistan; therefore we have no need to worry. But when the riots started he secretly shifted his belongings with trucks and migrated to Lahore, leaving us there helpless….Muslims of East Punjab had to face huge loss of life and property because of this coward Muslim MLA….He embezzlements in Quaid-i-Azam Relief Fund….I can prove that he did not hold even 20% of the property in East Punjab to that he was allotted in Pakistan…the Government should investigate about him through C.I.D’.14

These were very serious allegations by the refugees about their MLA’s from East Punjab which gave clues about the general conduct of politicians and their perception among masses. In third chapter we have seen the reputation of the politicians among the masses right after the partition. With some exceptions, they looked busy to serve themselves or their relatives in allotments of the evacuee property.

The Muslim League, Toba Tek Singh, was going through a critical situation because of its reorganization, membership and refugee crisis, right after the partition with some exceptions. 15 The Secretary of the Gojra Branch of the Muslim League resigned from the post because of his reservations about performance of the party to safeguard the interests of the peoples especially the refugees. In an emergency meeting which held for selection of new secretary, the president of the Muslim League, Toba Tek Singh, Sufi Ghulam Rasool Ziayee, stressed for new membership for the party. He said that the ‘inertia’ of the party could only be broken by making it popular among the masses again by solving their problems and especially the refugee issues. We have also seen absence of coordination between the town’s government administration and the party officials to solve refugee crises. 16 This issue of ‘lack of

14 The Daily Saadat (Urdu), January 31, 1948; Instead of giving attention to corruption of fellow MLA’s, Mr. Sheikh Sadiq Hassan Amritsari [Leader of MLA’s of Muslim League from East Punjab] requested Quai-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah to give membership of West Punjab Assembly to all the Muslim League members of East Punjab Assembly. 15 In few villages in Toba Tek Singh, we have found primary structure of The Muslim League intact which worked for the refugees. Primary wing of the Muslim League Village Jaja [Chak 394 JB, next village to Chak 331 JB] formed Imdad-i-Muhajreen Majilis-i-Amal [Refugees’ Help Action Committee] for refugees’ to help refugees in their village in terms of their permanent residence and basic necessities. Ch. Faiz Muhammad was its president. While Ch. Nabi Bukish, Mr. Faiz Rusool and Hakim Abdul Haq were Vice President, Joint & Financial Secretary and Secretary respectively. The Daily Saadat (Urdu), January 21, 1948 16 The Daily Saadat, January 28, 1948 136 coordination’ or disunity between the government officials and the leagues’ workers also raised in front of Pir Ahsan-ud-Din, Deputy Commissioner Lyallpur [now Faisalabad] in presence of Mian Ghulam Shabir, Sub Division Officer (SDO) Toba Tek Singh, during a press conference on January 19, 1948. They stressed the need of close coordination and unity between the political and the government officials for smooth and speedy rehabilitation of the refugees in Toba Tek Singh. 17 Ziayee himself criticized the policies of government officers in Toba Tek Singh regarding rehabilitation of refugees. He shifted complete responsibility on Mian Ghulam Shabir and his close advisers for all miseries of the refugees and mismanagement in rehabilitation process. He said:

‘…the local [Toba Tek Singh] government officials are portraying themselves as dutiful and pious, which is not true. They are supporting the capitalists and ex-unionist members. They are not ready to help the refugees even in this extremely cold weather’. 18

4.2 Refugees Rehabilitation in Toba Tek Singh: A Historical Appraisal

Contrary to the West Punjab government claims for the smooth and speedy rehabilitation of the refugees, the situation was serious and alarming at grassroots level in Toba Tek Singh. Rehabilitation plans were not implemented though they looked very comprehensive and effective on the papers. A sitting MLA, Wali Mohammad Goher visited the different villages in Toba Tek Singh in February 1948 and reported:

‘I recently toured a number of villages and met numerous refugees of all type (and) surveyed (a) Refugees settled on land and business (b) Refugees still without any fixed and abode and occupation (c) The general disposal of the property left by Hindus and Sikhs (d) Networks of officials recently appointed, throughout the country, for the rehabilitation of the refugees. I found the existing state of affairs far from satisfactory’. 19

He also highlighted another important fact about the refugees’ complaints that was about the absence of the Muslim league from the scene and said:

17 The Daily Saadat, January 21, 1948 18 The Daily Saadat, January 5, 1948 19 The Pakistan Times, February 27, 1948 137

‘…all those men who in their days of settled life wholeheartedly worked for the Muslims and the League, are now everywhere being neglected while those who fully exploited the Unionists, the Congress, and the Muslim League, are even now successfully exploiting the present regime. They are flourishing’. 20

He also reported the shortage of food which generally believed by the people was due to the corrupt government officials and their confederates. This factor also shattered the moral of the people as ‘groups of refugee women and children, with their haggard faces, are seen going door to door in search of food and their necessities of life’. 21 Exploiting the miseries of these refugees ‘many officials and other indulge in pleasantries (and) sense of humanity and of fellow-feeling appear to have deadened in many persons’. 22 He further maintained that ‘wheat is selling at exorbitant prices (and) even then it is available only to the privileged few’. 23 Hence the establishment of urgent Relief Wheat Depots with efficient administrative setup and increase in present scale of ration of 4 chhatanks of atta [per refugee per day, 4 Chhatank = ¼ KG] to 8 chhataks of atta was suggested by him. 24 The shortage of food was so severe in Toba Tek Singh that the refugees started coming back to the refugee camps [where situation was comparatively better], even after their temporary settlements. Warning issued by District Publicity officer in different local newspapers to stop this trend. 25

To overcome shortage of food and other basic necessities of life, the department of civil supplies of Punjab government, established depots for continuous supply of food and other essential commodities in Toba Tek Singh. 26 There were lot of complaints about the distribution and functioning of these depots as well. According to a report published in local newspaper, rules were not followed in distribution of depots in Toba Tek Singh. The depots, including those which were left by the non-Muslims, had been given to their favourites by the government officials.

20 Ibid 21 Ibid 22 Ibid 23 Ibid 24 Ibid 25 The Daily Saadat , January 22, 1948 26 West Punjab Government also had devised a scheme ‘Grow More Food Campaign’ in 1953 to overcome food crises. See, Summary of Work Done in Connection With Resettlement of Refugees on Lands in the Punjab (Lahore, Government Press, 1954) P. 1 138

The old Muslim depot holders were neglected without any justification in allotment of the depots.

The procedure of establishment of the depots also lacked uniformity. In some areas the government established four depots in a single village and in other parts four villages linked with a single depot. 27 Such type of mismanagement created frustration among the masses especially the refugees. To control the shortage of supply the depots of sugar, oil and cloths were established by the CSO [Civil Supply Officer] in Toba Tek Singh. ‘The poor refugees had to stay in the city [Toba Tek Singh] for days for food and basic commodities like sugar and oil…the quality of ration is also very poor’ 28 said by a news reporter.

In context of ‘rehabilitation of refugees’ Mr. Goher said ‘some undeserving persons and officials are rolling in plenty, while the majority of refugees are flouting about in dire want and misery’. 29 He continued ‘the establishment appointed for rehabilitation work is full of misfits’. 30 It lacks effective control and supervision. Most of the officials are actuated more by mercenary motives than by ideas of actual work. Great irregularities prevail among most of the officials connected with the administration of rehabilitation work on the spot. The most important work of the allotment of land or its cancellation is practically left in the hands of Patwaris .31

Moveable property, left by the non-Muslims who migrated from this locality after the partition, also grabbed by local village headmen or the officials involves in the rehabilitation process. Mr. Goher said:

‘…most of the moveable property left by non-Muslims in the villages was allowed to fall into the hands of some local headmen. Most of the articles have been fraudulently auctioned for nominal prices to a favoured few. Most of the officials and their confederates have amassed great fortunes out of the property left by Hindus and Sikhs. Such big misappropriations are quite well-

27 Daily Saadat , January 9, 1948 28 The Daily Saadat , January 22, 1948 29 The Pakistan Times, February 27, 1947 30 Ibid 31 Ibid 139

known to the people at large. It is strange that such things should have escaped the notice of the government so far’. 32

Corruption, he [Wali Mohammad Goher, MLA] said ‘has permeated most of the rehabilitation work’. To check this practice the high officials ‘should select one tahsil at a time and spend ten to fifteen days there in close study and scrutiny of work in a helpful manner’. 33 In a letter to the editor of the Daily Saadat, a refugee of Toba Tek Singh [Gojra Refugee Camp] complained against the Rehabilitation Department of the Government and said:

‘The refugees of Korali Camp [Ambala], who have taken shelter in Gojra refugee camp, were passing through a very miserable life. The government has been showing no concern about their depressed condition. The evacuee houses and lands has forbidden to them. There is a severe shortage of food and cloths’. 34

The problems of the refugees in context of housing, verification of claims and allotments, harsh response of the government official and rejection of claims, shortage of food and unemployment, lack of unity among the refugees in Toba Tek Singh is beautifully depicted in following lines, Panah-guzinoon Ki Mushkaalat [Difficulties of shelter-seekers (Refugees)] by a refugee poet, Fazal Ahmad Fiaz Haryanvi. 35

Lakhta houn kuch panah-gazeenon Ki Mushqalat

Jin ko gam o alam say moyser nahi najat

I’m writing about some difficulties of the refugees…Who don’t have any escape from griefs and miseries

(Awal to bood-o-bash ko milta nahi makan)

(Pihrtay hain rooz thokrain khatey khan khan)

First, they have not found a home to live in …It’s their daily routine to move from one place to another

(Derkhwast lay key jatey hain hakim kay roo-broo)

(Hakim kay itifaq say kadray tund-hoo)

32 Ibid 33 Ibid 34 The Daily Saadat , January 16, 1948 35 Ibid 140

They present themselves before the administrators with their applications…But the administrator looks a bit harsh

(Derkhwast un kee akher ko hoti hay mustard)

(Dushman ko b kudha na dakhay ya rooz-i-bad)

At the end their pleas are rejected…May God not show such bad time even to the enemy

(Pher pher k baar-i-khater ahbaab hotay hain)

(Baytaab misl i mahee i bay’aab hotay hain)

The friends keep on moving with heavy heart…They feel restless like fish without water

(Pher is k baad pait k dozah ka hay sewal)

(Din raat in ke jaan ko khata hay yay khayal)

Then there is a big question of hunger…This worry is continuously haunting them

(Waa ho giaa ya uqdaa to fiqar-i-moash hay)

(Bacharron ko moash ke her soo tlash hay)

If this problem is solved then there is a problem of livelihood to be worried about…These wretched are continuously searching job

(A’thoon paher moash ke tangi say tang hain)

(Tang a k ahlay khana say musroof-i-jang hain)

All the time they are worried about the means of living …With these worries in their mind they quarrel with their family members

(Miltay hain taanay aaqbat indaish yay naihy)

(Tootay faliq ab in pay ya negal jaye ya zamee)

They are taunted for not being far sighted…They are cursed to death

(Aaree abaa’ i daanish-o-hoosh-o-kurd say hain)

(Tahreek-i-jado-jahd say b na bald hain)

They are lacking intelligence and awareness…They are also ignorant about the motivation of struggle

(Is per wo garaani-i-ashiya k al-am’an)

(Qasir qalim bayyan say hay goung hay zab’an) 141

They pray for shelter from price hike of basic necessities…Pen and tong are at a loss to describe this situation

4.3 Assessing the Impact of Refugees Rehabilitation in Rural and Urban Areas in Toba Tek Singh

Official and unofficial historiography of the partition of the Punjab is lacking in the understanding of the problems of the refugees’ rehabilitation at grassroots level. Miseries and plight of the Muslim refugees, if ever highlighted, mentioned in the context of the ‘price’ for the independence. Apart from the honest and dedicated staff, most of the officials in the rehabilitation department were involved in corruption after the partition. This corruption of the officials had remained hidden, in most of the cases, behind lack of sources and evidences.

Growing indifference, among the local community in Toba Tek Singh, towards refugees’ problems and issues was one of the prominent themes of social behaviour. The locals felt threaten by gradual increasing population of the refugees. Apart from their numerical strength, the refugees had been seen as strong competitors for resources by the locals. The society showed indifferent behaviour towards the refugees from India, just after a few months of the partition in Toba Tek Singh [district Lyallpur]. Though it was beyond the capacity of the locals to accommodate such a huge population of Muslim refugees but initially there was welcoming behaviour of the locals. After few months they turned indifferent to refugees’ miserable conditions. Apart from the refugee camps in Lyallpur and Toba Tek Singh, refugees took shelter along the roadsides and in open spaces after the partition. Yaqub Khan, might be a refugee, wrote a letter to the editor of the Daily Saadat [Lyallpur], in which he mentioned a horrifying and woeful account about the plight of refugees and social response in district Lyallpur. Today on 10 January 1948, he narrated:

‘I have seen a Panahgir [refugee] dying along the road in Mohala Douglas Pura. Hundreds of People were gathered around him, waiting for his death. [After some time] when the poor [refugee] died, the people threw his dead body on garbage in an open space along Government College [Lyallpur]. Soon after, crows and dogs gathered around the dead body. Among crowd, I had 142

seen many people who took part in looting the evacuee properties of non- Muslims’. 36

Another feature of the society in Toba Tek Singh was hatred against Hindus and Sikhs communities after the partition. Most probable reason was that the refugees were now the major component of the society. These people were not ready to accept the presence of these communities among them. Though, there were announcements and some practical initiatives have been taken by the government to provide every help and protection to them. 37 Hindus and Sikhs, if had not migrated, ultimately converted to Islam. 38 There was different news of accepting Islam by local Hindus published in the local newspapers of Lyallpur during the early days.

There were different reasons involved in intolerant behaviour against the non- Muslims [Hindus and Sikhs] and their conversion to Islam [in some cases] in Toba Tek Singh. Among other reasons, one reason was majority of the Muslims especially after the influx of Muslim refugees in Toba Tek Singh from India. This factor was continuously enhanced insecurity among the Hindus and Sikhs. Secondly, the Muslims in general and Muslim refugees in particular were less tolerant towards the Hindus and Sikhs because of their painful migration experience and atrocities committed against them by the non-Muslims in India. Thirdly, we cannot completely ignore the economic aspect of the religious conversion. As in some cases Hindu and Sikh individuals gave preference to their jobs or businesses instead of migration to India.39

The local government called for Claims from the refugees for the allotment of evacuee property [houses, shops, lands] in Toba Tek Singh. The oral accounts confirmed ‘corruption’ involved in resettlement process through bogus claims. The verification of this confirmation is very difficult as the access to the original claims forms had been stopped by the government of Pakistan. This step by the government

36 The Daily Saadat , January 24, 1948 37 We have discussed this theme in Chapter second of this thesis. 38 In District Lyallpur many people among non-Muslim communities advertised their conversion of religion in different local newspapers. Soshail Kumar, Agriculture Assistant [Sands Section] Agriculture College Lyallpur accepted Islam and his new name was Niaz Ahmad. Similarly, even a Christian whose name was Ameen Chand also changes his name to A C. Yaqoob as his old name was resembled to Hindu names. For detail please see, The Daily Saadat, January 24, 1948; Another Hindu Lala Sanat Ram [Agriculture Assistant Zaraiytee College Lyallpur] accepted Islam with new name Abdullah Alif Saani, The Daily Saadat , January 9, 1948 39 Ibid 143 created doubts about the allotments and rehabilitation process. To avoid the complexities associated with the age old allotment process is also another reason for this step by the government.

Refugee’s claims were initially settled through temporary allotments as these claims could not be verified within short span of time. This step was taken by the government of West Punjab for just to reduce pressure on refugee camps. Later on, record of lands was exchanged between the East and West Punjab Governments, and on the basis of Jamabinidi and Shajra-nasab [Genealogical tree] lands were allotted to the claimants. Three copies of Farid Haqeeqat/Malkeat [List showing ownership of Lands] were made by the government for concerned claimant, tehsil and district revenue offices respectively.

The Claims were converted into units through evaluation of property left in India. As the land in Toba Tek Singh [district Lyallpur] was considered good for cultivation, therefore, maximum five acre of agricultural land was granted to each individual claimant. But usually, one acre of land was allotted to each member of the family on temporary grounds. In many cases land was allotted at more than one place in other tehsil, district or some time even in other province. 40 This also reflected in the field research in Toba Tek Singh, where the refugees were allotted lands in other areas in Punjab like, Khanewal, Khanpur, Sahiwal [Montgomery], Bahawalpur, Jhang, apart from Toba Tek Singh. In most of the cases this factor led to the division of the families, as some members of a family moved there to look after the remaining allotted land. In some cases the refugees in Toba Tek Singh could not find out where the remaining units of land had been allotted to them. And when they ultimately came to know after many years of struggle, there land had fragmented into number of small units because of series of sale and resale of that property from one person to another. This practice could not be possible without the support of the corrupt officials in the Rehabilitation Department.

Later on government had compiled registers [RL-II] from the original refugee’s claims/forms. These registers show the details of the allotments of lands to the refugees, like name of the refugee, previous residence [village, Tehsil, District] in India, date of initial verification, date of confirmation, allotted land etc. Government

40 Personal conversation with Muhammad Sadique Patwari, Farid Court House, Lahore, April 2015 144 also prepared the copies of these RL-II registers, verified by the Circle Patwaris and Tahsildars . This very step again opened the way of corruption for the corrupt officials in the rehabilitation department. Patwaris and Tahsildars had the authority to compile these registers according to the original claims but nobody knows at what level the accuracy was kept intact. The chances of willful changes in the duplicate lists just to reward the corrupt individuals, whether they were among the refugees/locals or the officials in the rehabilitation department, cannot be ignored. There were many complaints about the allotments and compilation of these registers. 41 Though ‘Mukhbari’ petitions were filed against such allotments and wrongful changes in RL- II registers and in some cases land was resumed in favor of the Provincial government. 42 But the real degree of malpractice and corruption could not be judged without access to the original claims form of the refugees.

4.3.1 Refugees Rehabilitation and Peasantry

In Chak 331 JB [Toba Tek Singh] houses and lands was granted to the refugees migrated in majority from Ferozepur, Jalandhar, Gurdaspur. One of the major reasons of the rehabilitation of the refugees from these areas to Toba Tek Singh was the pre-partition community links. This factor we have discussed in detail in first chapter. These family relations proved very helpful for the refugees to migrate and settle in Toba Tek Singh after the partition. In most of the cases we have seen that a member of a family had already been visited the locality Toba Tek Singh before the final arrival of the whole family.

Another prominent feature of the settlement process was commonalities [apart from common Punjabi Culture] such as, common Berardi , sect or common ancestral locality in East Punjab, which influenced the resettlement process in Toba Tek Singh. These common bonds emerged not only between the locals and the refugees but also within the refugees. We can find different villages in Toba Tek Singh where the refugees resettled under this scheme. Bhatti Chak is just one example where all the refugees are belonging to Rajput Bhatti Berardi . Even in Town Toba Tek Singh, in

41 Different cases we can see in the court of Chief Settlement Commissioner e.g. Qazi Mushtaq Ahmad through his legal heirs Versus The State/Abdul Qayyum etc. CSC Case No. 369/2012; Muhammad Aslam Shahi Vs State CSC Case No. 316/2008; Mushtaq Ahmad Vs The State CSC Case No. 744/2011; Ghulam Nabi Vs The Sate CSC Case No. 899/2011; Ali Sher Lakhu Vs The State CSC Case No. 635/2010 etc. 42 Ibid 145

Sirhand colony, all the refugees migrated from Sirhand [a locality in India]. The refugees settled in Chak 331/JB belonged to Shia sect of Islam. They had compatibility with the local Shia Muslim community. The locals were also in search of same sect of the Muslim refugees for rehabilitation in their village on evacuee lands after the partition. Hence almost all the refugees [mostly Syed, Rajput and Kamboh communities], who were settled in Chak 331JB were Shia Muslims. When I asked Abdul Ali, a refugee from Chak 331JB, why they came in this particular village, he replied:

‘…at start we moved to Montgomery [Sahiwal] from Lahore. In the train we met a Syed from this Chak [331 JB]. He used to come to Montgomery for Majalis [Shia religious gatherings]. He told us about this village and also gave a letter for Ahmad Hussain Shah, a school teacher at Primary School Toba Tek Singh. We came to Toba and met him. He took us to Chak 331JB. During this period for a short time we also moved to Syed-Nagar, a locality of Syed community in Gujranwala, but came back to Toba where lands were allotted to us’. 43

This factor was also endorsed by a local Nazar Hussain; he maintained that:

‘These Muhajreen [refugees] first came to Toba Tek Singh. From where, they were invited by one of our village’s Syed to settle in this village because they belonged to our muslak [sect]. The Syed was a school teacher at Toba Tek Singh. He did so to avoid any problem in future’.44

The better socio-economic position of the Sikhs and Hindus in pre-partition Toba Tek Singh also reflected in post-partition prosperity of the Muslim refugees in this locality. In Chak 331JB, non-Muslim communities, Sikhs and Hindus lived in separate spaces in the village. On one side of the main street, which divided the village into two equal halves, there were houses of Sikhs and on the other half there was Muslim community. Both Muslims and non-Muslims communities had migrated from Siraylee [a locality in Sialkot] during the establishment of Lower Chenab colony by the British government. The lands had allotted to them for cultivation in this village [ Chak 331JB]. Due to this factor, all Communities [Muslims, Sikhs and

43 Interview with Abdul Ali, Chak No. 331JB, 8 June 2015 44 Interview with Nazar Hussain, Chak No. 331JB, 13 March 2015 146

Hindus] had brotherly and peaceful relations before the partition of the Punjab. They participated into each other’s religious and cultural ceremonies and festivals. They even had very strong Punjabi cultural bond. There were three numberdars in Chak 331JB. Baba Umer Din had represented the Muslims while Sachait Singh and Baba Lahnoo represented the Sikh and Hindu communities respectively. 45

The Sikhs were a bit more prosperous than Muslims. They had allotted more fertile agricultural lands as compared to the Muslims. Nazar Hussain, a local of the Chak 331JB told that ‘the fertile squares of lands near the Village were allotted to the Sikhs, as they were economically strong. The Muslim grantees were allotted comparatively inferior agricultural tracts. After the partition these fertile lands were allotted to the Muslim refugees from India. Now our lands are barren and salinity effected’. 46 This factor further contributed for the strong socio-economic position of the refugee community in Toba Tek Singh which we will discuss in details later in this chapter.

There was lack of planning, coordination and irregularities in the refugee’s rehabilitation process in rural areas of Punjab. For the allotment of lands in Chak 331JB to the refugees we have only available record of RL-II registers. According to these records Muslim refugees of Chak 331JB were from Jalandhar, Firozpur, Amritsar, Hoshiarpur, Gurdaspur, Ludhiana districts. About 168 refugees filed their claims for allotment of lands in which only 126 had been allotted lands in this Chak . Their claims for lands were accepted and initially verified from the record, mutually exchanged between East and West Punjab governments. The claims of 42 refugees were rejected by the rehabilitation department without mentioning any reason in the register. Nobody knows whether their claims rejected for lack of documentary evidences provided by the refugees with their claims or absence of information in the government record which was provided by the government East Punjab. The most of the claims initially verified from 1950 to 1956. The rehabilitation department finally verified them from 1952 to1956 after receiving land record from India. The confirmation period was stretched from 1950 to 1960. There are also such entries in RL-II records of this village, where, initial verification and final confirmation both are

45 Ibid 46 Interview with Nazar Hussain, Chak No. 331JB, 13 March 2015 147 missing. 47 Such type of irregularities further strengthened the doubts about the transparency of rehabilitation process.

In many cases claims dismissed after final confirmation without mentioning any reason against in the RL-II register. Some claims were rejected after initial confirmation as they were not found in the record which the West Punjab government received from India. Some claimants also filed cases against the rejection of their claims. Some claims rejected having mentioned ‘uncomplete’. 48 In some cases initial verification were as late as in 1966 and confirmation in 1967. 49 The information regarding the claims filed by the Muslim refugees in Toba Tek Singh and allotted lands in Chak No. 331JB is shown in following table.

Table 4.1: Claimants of Chak 331JB with range of initial verification to final confirmation

Claim Initial Claim Initial Claim Initial Claim Initial Claim Initial verification verification verification verification verification No No No No No and and and and and Confermation Confermation Confermation Confermation Confermation 85 - 3 5-2-1952 1177 - 200 5-2-1952 70 13-3-1953 19-2-1952 19-2-1952 - 19-2-1952 71 12-5-1953 2859 - 73 5-2-1952 1181 5-2-1952 2003 5-2-1952 36 - 19-2-1952 74 19-2-1952 19-2-1952 1261 19-2-1952 74 - 1828 5-2-1952 81 5-2-1952 1176 - 683 - 12394 - 19-2-1952 79 19-2-1952 - - 10390 - 3965 - 3068 5-2-1952 1193 5-2-1952 1833 5-2-1952 2003 13-3-1954 19-2-1952 19-2-1952 19-2-1952 19-2-1952 2361 12-5-1954 1845 - 1283 5-2-1952 3842 - 4454 - 1246 25-4-1954 1846 19-2-1952 19-2-1952 7-1-1954 - 10-6-1954 4282 5-2-1952 600 5-2-1952 377 - 1804 5-2-1952 1349 25-4-1954 4281 19-2-1952 19-2-1952 7-1-1954 19-2-1952 10-6-1954 4285 - 740 - 1996 - 105 - 71 13-3-1953 7-10-1954 12-5-1953 1997 - - 12-5-1953 1998 4275 - 1293 5-2-1952 1995 - 1804 5-2-1952 2859 14-3-1954 7-10-1954 19-2-1952 2000 - 19-2-1952 5-4-1954 2001 1186 - 1254 5-2-1952 2866 - 1865 13-3-1953 1126 - 1187 7-10-1954 19-2-1952 2867 - 1863 12-5-1953 - 2868 1126 5-2-1952 154 5-2-1952 680 13-2-1950 1863 13-3-1953 1169 13-3-1953 19-2-1952 2589 19-2-1952 12-5-1950 12-5-1953 1168 12-5-1953

47 Register RL II, Chak No 331 Jhang Branch, Tehsil Toba Tek Singh, District Faisalabad. 48 Register RL II, Chak No 284 Jhang Branch, Tehsil Toba Tek Singh, District Faisalabad 49 Register RL II, Chak No 383 Jhang Branch, Tehsil Toba Tek Singh, District Faisalabad 148

1169 5-2-1952 1129 5-2-1952 7793 - 1861 13-3-1953 1179 13-3-1953 1168 19-2-1952 19-2-1952 - 12-5-1953 12-5-1953 1179 5-2-1952 2853 5-2-1952 107 - 1698 - 1147 13-3-1953 19-2-1952 2854 19-2-1952 108 - 7-1-1954 12-5-1953 2855 1147 5-2-1952 1112 5-2-1952 6385 - 8394 - 1144 - 19-2-1952 1113 19-2-1952 8381 - 7-1-1954 1145 - 1114 8383 8392 1145 5-2-1952 1181 5-2-1952 1831 - 8382 - 1148 - 1144 19-2-1952 19-2-1952 1829 7-1-1954 8388 20-2-1960 1149 7-1-1954 1140 - 1189 5-2-1952 2356 - 1136 13-3-1953 1150 26-11- - 1188 19-2-1952 - 1135 12-5-1953 1151 1953 1130 7-1-1954 1132 1148 5-2-1952 1116 5-2-1952 2358 - 1155 - 1129 - 1149 19-2-1952 1115 19-2-1952 - - 1130 - 1128 1150 5-2-1952 1183 5-2-1952 1137 - 1153 13-3-1953 2853 - 1151 19-2-1952 1184 19-2-1952 - 1150 12-5-1953 2854 7-1-1954 2855 1175 5-2-1952 1161 5-2-1952 3396 - 1182 14-3-1954 1180 - 19-2-1952 1156 19-2-1952 - 5-3-1954 7-1-1954 1163 1160 2265 5-2-1952 1136 5-2-1952 2000 - 1181 14-3-1954 1189 13-3-1953 2261 19-2-1952 1135 19-2-1952 13-5-53 5-3-1954 1188 12-5-1954 1133 1132 63 5-2-1952 1155 5-2-1952 2001 - 1193 - 1116 13-3-1953 67 19-2-1952 1153 19-2-1952 - - 1115 12-5-1954 76 5-2-1952 1152 5-2-1952 8377 - 1175 13-3-1953 1165 13-3-1953 75 19-2-1952 19-2-1952 - 12-5-1953 12-5-1954 70 5-2-1952 1899 - 7968 - 108 13-3-1953 1163 13-3-1953 71 19-2-1952 1900 7-1-54 17-5-1953 67 12-5-1953 1160 12-5-1954 1158 1162 82 5-2-1952 1182 - 1253 5-2-1952 76 13-3-1953 480 26-11- 83 19-2-1952 15-2-52 19-2-1952 77 12-5-1953 2852 1953 1058 7-1-1954 Source: Colony Record Room, Deputy Commissioner Office, Toba Tek Singh

Uneconomic holding was also very important feature of the rehabilitation process in the rural areas in Punjab. In many cases agricultural land was allotted in more than one place, not only within the same village but some time outside the tehsil or district even. 50 This became one of the major factors for low agriculture output by

50 Register RL II, Chak No 284 Jhang Branch, Tehsil Toba Tek Singh, District Faisalabad 149 dividing the cultivator’s attention and wastage of sources. A compact agriculture unit was required for more effective and economic usage of labour and sources though it was difficult to provide exact tract of land, claimed by a refugee, at one place. In majority of cases refugees in Chak 331JB had allotted lands at 2 to 3 different places in the village. 51

Refugees in rural areas of Toba Tek Singh are economically more prosperous than the locals because [as we have mentioned earlier] they replaced the economically prosperous Sikh and Hindu communities. Sikhs agriculturists, as compared to the Muslim agriculturists, held superior agricultural lands. Hindus in the villages were involved in moneylending and also owned shops. Hence there houses, shops and agriculture lands were allotted to the Muslim refugees from India across the rural areas in Toba Tek Singh. They started cultivation with empty hand with the support of the local cultivators and tenants of the outgoing Sikhs landowners. The strong economic position of the outgoing non-Muslim communities provided them strong bases to flourish in Toba Tek Singh. Yasin Shah, a local of Chak 331 JB, told that:

‘…the properties, lands, houses, shops, left by the Hindus and Sikhs were allotted to the refugees. Locals were very few. Most of the property held by non-Muslims and that had been allotted to these refugees [after the partition]…..they worked very hard and provided education to their children, [which proved] a real source of change and progress [for them]...…and [they] had equal share in socio-economic development of Toba Tek Singh’.52

Sadiq Ali, another local person, told:

‘Refugees had made great contribution to the economic development of our locality. They started business, made shops. Some of them went abroad. I personally knew a refugee, Majeed, he started business with a small shop and now he is a very rich businessman…similarly Rahmat Ali of our village was begging when he came in our village as a pinahgir but now he is a big landowner’.53

51 Ibid 52 Interview with Yasin Shah, Chak No. 331JB, 13 March 2015 53 Interview with Sadiq Ali, Chak No. 331JB, 14 March 2015 150

Refugees were reluctant to admit the role of the contributory factors in their progress, e.g. strong economic bases left by the migrated Sikhs and Hindus, help from the local community etc. They mostly highlighted their continuous struggle and divine assistance in their development and prosperity. ‘..at our arrival here [ Chak 331JB] we rebuilt allotted houses as those were not livable…we started cultivation and purchased cattle, in one way or the other we started our life again. With God’s help, agricultural production started increasing. There was abundant supply of [canal] water. God had removed our poverty’ 54 told by Adul Ali a refugee from Chak 331JB.

Refugees in other rural areas in Toba Tek Singh also have a same story of life after the partition. Self-reliance and divine help are the prominent features of their resettlement and economic progress. They started their life, as their oral accounts reflect, with a very humble position. They worked hard and ultimately God helped them to resettle their lives on strong footing. They seldom acknowledge the assistance of the local community in their rehabilitation. With their growing economic position they had changed their mud houses with brick houses and replaced bulls with tractors in cultivation. With growing economic prosperity they gave serious attention to the education of their children. This strategy enhanced their economic position many fold and also provided them strong social status. A refugee from Chak 13 narrated as:

‘We worked hard and earned our livelihood. Continuous divine help has also been with us. Now our village had pakki [metalled] roads. It is because of our taxes which we paid to the government. The mills [sugar, cotton] in our locality also received bulk of raw agriculture production, produced in our lands…during Ayub era the government distributed tractors to the cultivators [which had very positive effects on agriculture in our locality]’. 55

Most of the tenants of outgoing Hindus and Sikh farmers were jangalis and the few Muslim colony settlers. Their economic position was dependent on the Sikh and Hindu agriculturists. They cultivated their lands at different share in kind of the production ranging from ½ to 1/8 and sometime on meal of two times. After the partition, they cultivated the lands in the absence of their previous non-Muslim landowners but had to hand over the lands to the new landowners i.e. Muslim

54 Interview with Abdul Ali, Chak No. 331JB, 8 June 2015 55 Interview with Faqir Muhammad, Chak No. 13, Tehsil Kamalia, 6 February 2015 151 refugees in Toba Tek Singh. These local tenants were also temporary allotted lands by the government but after some time they ejected from their lands just to accommodate Muslim Refugees from India. The government also tried to accommodate these ejected tenants by introducing Ejected Tenants Scheme (ETS). The cases are still pending in the courts about this scheme.56 Initially they [tenants] provided their much needed services to the refugee landowners but after some time, approximately in one to two years, had to hand over these lands to the refugees. There were two major reasons for that transition. First, during early period the refugees had no tools and bulls for cultivation of their allotted lands therefore they had to depend on the local tenants for short period. Secondly, the services of the tenants were uneconomical for long time for the refugee landowners because of the division of lands into uneconomic holdings. Therefore, in most of the cases, refugees started cultivation of their lands by themselves.

In Chak 331JB land of the outgoing Sikhs and Hindus was allotted to the Muslim refugees. The refugees, Yasin Shah said ‘had good relations with the tenants. The tenants worked for different shares in kind like ½, ¼, and 1/8 of crops [because of general unemployment]’.57 Safdar told that ‘tenants of the outgoing Sikhs and Hindus had continued work for the refugees…. [and some of them] grabbed their [refugees] lands’. 58 Especially, when the refugees had involved in business, added another local from Chak 331JB, their dependency on the local tenants enhanced for the cultivation

56 One of such cases was writ petition No. 12834/03 Kameer Vs. Province of Punjab in which ‘Kameer and Sadiq sons of Gullah and Gullah son of Hasta residents of Chak No. 215RB Tehsil & District Lyallpur [Faisalabad], being local tenants, were temporarily allotted Chiragah Land of Sq. No.21 situated in the same Chak on usual terms on the year 1949. Killa Nos. 1-19 of Sq. 21were confirmed to Babu Khan etc. refugees on 15-01-1954 in lieu of their rights abandoned by them in India under the Rehabilitation Laws. Petition filed by Kameer etc. before the then Collector of the District for review of his orders dated 1-10-1955 cancelling the temporary allotment was also declined on 30-1- 1956…The petitioner filed an appeal against the order dated 30-1-1956 of District Collector Lyallpur in the Court of Commissioner Multan which came up with hearing before Addl: Commissioner Revenue, Multan, who rejected vide order dated 2-6-1956 with the direction that the District authorities should take necessary steps to provide the appellants with alternative land in the same estate or one of the neighbouring estates if they are ejected…Case of the petitioner for alternative allotment was determined by the scrutiny committee in its meeting held on 6-3-2002…The Board of Revenue Punjab, Colones Wing, considered the issue in the light of instructions/policy on the subject and found the petitioner ineligible for alternative allotment of state land as the policy for allotment of land under the Ejected Tenants Scheme, at first time introduced by the Provincial Government, Colonies Department in the year 1956’. For further detail please see, Register Allotment Year 1956, Ejected Tenants , Commissioner Office, Faisalabad 57 Interview with Yasin Shah, Chak No. 331 JB, Tehsil and District Toba Tek Singh, 13 March 2015 58 Interview with Safdar, Chak No. 331JB, 14 March 2015 152 of their allotted lands. 59 But most of the refugees in Chak 331JB and other villages of Toba Tek Singh had started cultivating their lands by themselves. 60 Abdul Rahman shared that:

‘[When we arrived here] jangali tenants had cultivated the agricultural lands of the outgoing Sikhs and Hindus. They continued to cultivate the lands and next year they handed over our lands to us and left this place as most of the lands had been allotted to the Muslim refugees from India. Then we started cultivation’. 61

Apart from the jangalis , as we have discussed earlier, some local Muslim settlers were also cultivating the lands of the outgoing Hindus and Sikhs. They also worked for their new landowners i.e. Muslim refugees in Toba Tek Singh. Similarly, the landless laborers continued provide services to the new landowners. They provided assistance to them in watering the fields, harvesting the crops and its transportation to the market and storage at homes. When we allotted lands, said by Faqeer Muhammad:

‘Some of the local Muslim families were working as tenants for our allotted lands… [They] cultivated our lands because we could not buy bulls and tools for cultivation. They gave us our share from crops. They had very good relations with us. They still lived in our village like the aryain family did’. 62

From temporary allotments to the permanent rights of the lands, the refugees had to go through different phases to qualify for the grants. As we had discussed earlier, there was no planned process of allotments of lands to the refugees by the government. In urban areas, most of the evacuee houses were captured by the refugees and the locals without allotments. During verification of three localities, Douglas Pura, Santt Pura and Guru Nanak Pura, Ch. Ali Shair [District Rehabilitation Officer, Lyallpur] found that most of the houses were occupied illegally by the locals or the refugees. In some cases different houses were captured by the members of the

59 Interview with Sadiq Ali, Chak No. 331JB, 14 March 2015 60 Interviews with Qurban Hussain and Hussain Ali, Chak No. 331JB, 12 November 2015; Interview with Faqeer Muhammad , Chak Kanthan, 11 December 2015 61 Interview with Abdu-Rahman, Chak No. 13, 4 February 2015 62 Interview with Faqeer Muhammad , Chak Kanthan, 11 December 2015 153 same refugee family without allotment from the concerned department. 63 Similarly, most of the refugees occupied agriculture lands without any legal authority or official approval. Due to this factor they lived under continuous fear of removal from the lands they occupied. In early 1948, the government issued a notice of expulsion for the refugees from such lands, which occupied illegally. According to the announcement of Public Relation Department [PRD] of the Government, all those refugees, who had no agriculture background and illicitly captured the lands, would be ejected from the lands immediately after verification. 64

4.3.2 The Reaction of the Local Landowners towards Muslim Refugees and Refugee Identity

Division of sources at the arrival of the refugees determined the relations of production between the host and the migrant classes. Similarly, it also shaped the relationship between cultivator/tenant and landowner. As we have discussed in chapter two that there was no forced migration of Sikh and Hindus, sparked by any sort of direct violence in this locality, though there is evidence of looting and capturing of evacuee property by the locals, left behind by the outgoing Sikh and Hindu communities. According to the locals of Chak 331JB, evacuee property was handed over to the Muslim refugees in their locality at their arrival, justly and systematically. Nazar Hussain, a local, narrated:

‘Here, in our Chak [Chak 331JB] there was no incident of violence or looting. All property and lands [of Sikhs and Hindus] handed over to the Muslim refugees…..the numberdar [village Headman] of our locality looked after the houses of the migrated Hindus and Sikhs. These property and lands were handed over to the Muslim refugees at their arrival. Among other things which had been stolen from the non-Muslims houses were tools of cultivation and utensils’. 65

Similarly, Yasin Shah told about the evacuee property in Chak 331JB as:

63 The Daily Saadat, January 21, 1948 64 The Daily Saadat, January 28, 1948 65 Interview with Nazar Hussain, Chak No. 331 JB, Tehsil and District Toba Tek Singh, 13 march 2015 154

‘…Nobody looted or captured that property. That was evacuee property and handed over to the Muslim refugees only. Some of the refugees were not allotted lands [because the refugees were very large in numbers as compare to the evacuee lands] and during Ayub era they were allotted lands out of those lands that came under jurisdiction of the provincial government. For example, the lands had been allotted in 394JB [to the Muslim refugees]’. 66

The analyses of rehabilitation process through RL-II registers and oral accounts shows that the settlement process in Toba Tek Singh was not smooth as shows in the state level accounts. The Muslim refugees from India had to face lot of hardships during their rehabilitation process.

On the other side, there were also some allegations by the locals on abusing the evacuee property by the Muslim refugees. Initially at their arrival, refugees had general sympathies with the locals and the government officials because of their hardships which they had faced during migration process. But their growing numerical strength threatened the locals. Their free movement, from one place to another, was beyond the control of the officials of the rehabilitation department and even by the local communities. Yasin Shah said:

‘Refugees had occupied many houses [beyond their legal right] in our locality. In many cases, a single family acquired the possession of many houses [through illegal means]. There was 2 to 1 ratio between refugees and the locals. Some refugees sold their allotted houses or gave them on rent. Some of them even constructed houses on government’s lands which were illegally occupied by them. This is still going on’.67

In response to this local narrative, the refugees had their own point of view regarding the sources and property left by the Sikhs and Hindus. They rejected all these allegations, brought against them, by the locals regarding illegally occupying property at their arrival. According to them, the local community had already looted and captured such evacuee sources. They [refugees] had been allotted only lands, very small to that which they owned in India. The houses, which allotted to them by the rehabilitation department, were not suitable to live. These houses were already looted

66 Interview with Yasin Shah, Chak No. 331JB, 13 March 2015 67 Interview with Yasin Shah, Chak No. 331 JB, Tehsil and District Toba Tek Singh, 13 March 2015 155 by the locals and they did not find any household things of routine use. The tools of cultivations, livestock, ornaments or other such properties of the migrated non- Muslims had already been looted from evacuee houses before their allotment to them. Even the agriculture commodities, wheat, cotton etc. were looted by the locals. When we came, a refugee told ‘the houses of the Sikhs and Hindus, allotted to us, had already been looted by the locals. We had received only some cattle and tools for cultivation, which provided by the Tahsiladar to us’.68

In other villages in Toba Tek Singh, conditions were somehow the same. The villages, which left by the Non-Muslims having their absolute population, also met the same fate. Muhammad Nazir, a local from a village near Gojra remarked that after the migration of Hindus and Sikhs:

‘…local landlords occupied the lands and houses. Everything, i.e. tools of cultivation, cattle, clothes, and blankets were taken by the numberdars in their custody. Only a small share of these articles was handed over to the Muslim refugees of their locality and they kept the remaining with themselves’.69

In a letter to the editor of the daily Saadat , a refugee of Chak 278 JB [Pacca Anna] complained that:

‘After the migration of Sikhs of surrounding villages to the refugee camps, in their villages generally and in our village especially, law and order situation is very poor …the locals had looted the property of the surrounding Sikh villages as they destroyed their crops….the numberdar of our village seized the evacuee property of our village and also controlled the evacuee lands. This evacuee property should be given to the Muslim refugees of our village’. 70

This shows that the evacuee properties in rural areas controlled and distributed by the government through village numberdars . They made responsible by the government to kept safe evacuee properties form looting, capturing in their areas. They were also in close contact with the government officials for peaceful evacuation

68 Interview with Yasin Shah, Chak No. 331 JB, Tehsil and District Toba Tek Singh, 13 March 2015 69 Interview with Muhammad Nazir, Chak No. 433 JB, near Tahsil Gojra, District Toba Tek Singh, 10 December 2015 70 The Daily Saadat (Urdu), January 31, 1948 156 of Sikh and Hindu communities from their localities. The huge burden of the Muslim refugees and scarcity of evacuee sources created lot of problems for the refugee rehabilitation department in the locality. The lack of capacity and authority of the government not only enhanced the problems of the rehabilitation department but also provided considerable autonomous position to the lower officials. Among these officials, tahsildars , patwaries and numberdars were mostly involved in corruption.

Division of sources in rural areas in Toba Tek Singh was in favor of the refugees as compared to the locals. The refugee had been allotted the major source of production i.e. land which was very fertile and left by the migrated non-Muslim communities. Hence the refugees in rural areas of Toba Tek Singh had enjoyed better socio-economic position in the society after the partition.

In Toba Tek Singh there was general welcoming behaviour from the host community to the Muslim refugees. Host community was mainly comprised of the Janglies , the original inhabitant [of the Sandal Bar ], and the Muslim Settlers [of the Lower Chenab Colony]. The major proportion of the society was consisted of Muslim Settlers, as the Janglies were very few. ‘We welcomed them [the refugees] and settled them in the houses left by the Sikhs and Hindus and provided them food and clothes. They were in very poor condition. We helped them because they came after leaving their ancestral places’ 71 remarked by Yasin Shah. ‘Locals had provided all possible help to the refugess. Food, clothes, blankets were provided to the refugees at their doorsteps by the numberdars ’ said another local from Chak 433JB. 72 This point of view was also endorsed by refugees from Chak 331JB. When we came in this village [Chak 331JB], said a refugee:

‘Barkat Ali [numberdar ] was alive at that time when we were arrived in this Chak [331 JB]. After few days there was Eid-ul-Azha [Muslim religious festival]. He provided us with meat, flour, wheat, rice, cocking oil, etc. at our doorstep. He cared us very much and provided us basic necessities of life during our early days in this Chak’.73

71 Interview with Yasin Shah, Chak No. 331 JB, Tehsil and District Toba Tek Singh, 13 March 2015 72 Interview with Muhammad Nazir, Chak No. 433 JB, near Tahsil Gojra, District Toba Tek Singh, 10 December 2015 73 Interview with Abdul Ali, Chak No. 331JB, 8 June 2015 157

The above situation was also quite common in the villages where there were only few houses of the locals. Abd-ul-Satar, a refugee, maintained that ‘there were only few houses of the locals [in our village] and they were very good to us’. 74

With the passage of time gradually tensions emerged between the migrants and the host communities. It was mostly because of emergence of the refugees as major contestant for the sources in the locality. Sadiq Ali maintained that ‘[in terms of progress and prosperity] Mohajirs are far ahead of us. We [locals] sold lands and they [refugees] now became sahookar [wealthy class, moneylender]. The rich became poor and poor became rich.’ 75 ‘We gave them [refugees] shelter when they came in our locality after the partition. When they had allotted lands by the government, they started cultivation [and became rich]. The ordinary working classes [among the refugees] controlled shops and became rich while the rich class [locals] of this village became poor’ 76 stated by Safdar.

The initial resistance to the refugees was from the Janglies instead of the local Muslim settlers. We have already discussed the host community divided in to Janglies and Muslim settlers. The Janglies as a whole, while the local Muslim settlers partially, had worked as tenants of the migrated Sikhs and Hindus landowners before the partition. These Janglies were less tolerant towards the Muslim refugees as compared to the other locals, i.e. Muslim settlers. Talking to the behaviour of the locals to them, a refugee told:

‘Locals were of two types. One was those who settled here before the partition along the Sikh and Hindu settlers. They had allotted lands by the British colonial rulers and remained here after the partition. They had very good behaviour with us. But other [Janglies ] did not behave well. They ran to hurt us and say “ panahee kidoon a’a gay nain?” [Where these refugees have come from?]’. 77

Such rural areas in Toba Tek Singh, where the refugees had to face a numerically strong local community, they consciously have kept their migrant identity. The locals had various understandings regarding this mindset e.g. from

74 Interview with Abdul Satar, Chak No. 13, 5 February 2015 75 Interview with Sadiq Ali, Chak No. 331JB, 14 March 2015 76 Interview with Safdar, Chak No. 331JB, 14 March 2015 77 Interview with Khuda Baksh, Chak No. 13, 6 February 2015 158 symbolic identification of refugees to the illiteracy and from sense of unity to gradual conversion to the local status are common. Chak 331JB is very ideal for analysis of Mohajir [refugee] identity. Almost half of the population consists of the Muslim refugees from India, physically separated from the locals. On one side of the street, which is dividing the village in to two equal parts, there are locals houses, while on the other side there are refugees. There Mosques, Imam-bargha [Shia-Muslim’s religious place], ponds of drinking water and even there political affiliation are different from each other. They also usually have marriages within their own communities, with some exceptions. All the local population had consensus that this divide exists but they also agreed that after almost seventy years from the partition it should not be continued. It is very sad that after so many years, said Yasin Shah ‘if still anyone considered him/her Mohajir . Less educated segment of the Mohajir community identified themselves as Mohajir ’.78 ‘We remained very cooperative and peaceful with them [refugees] but the separate construction of Mosques and Imam- barghas showed disunity. It shows lack of trust and cooperation’ 79 , added by Nazar Hussain. Another local Sadiq Ali highlighted the symbolic identity of the refugees and said ‘ mohajirs considered them mohajirs because they came in this locality after migration from India. But in actual they are far ahead to the locals in prosperity’. 80 Safdar highlighted the upward mobility of refugees with some sort of sense of superiority as compared to the locals and lesser status of the refugees in the society. He said ‘ Mohajir now considered them as locals but they are easily identifiable due to their specific habits and personality characteristics’.81

Hence overall locals in rural areas in Toba Tek Singh recognized the refugees as ‘ Mohajirs’ but they are bit against this divide and believed refugees should now leave this identification. They also highlighted the progress of the refugees with appreciating their struggle and unity and lamenting the backwardness of the locals and

78 Interview with Yasin Shah, Chak No. 331 JB, Tehsil and District Toba Tek Singh, 13 March 2015 79 Interview with Nazar Hussain, Chak No. 331 JB, Tehsil and District Toba Tek Singh, 13 march 2015 80 Interview with Sadiq Ali, Chak No. 331JB, 14 March 2015; Muhammad Nazir also highlighted the same point and said ‘Mohajir word is for identification’ and it had become popular for refugees. This identity has become their caste. He also mentioned refugee’s consciousness towards their identity by saying ‘Mohajreen only supported their own peoples.’ Interview with Muhammad Nazir, Chak No. 433 JB, near Tahsil Gojra, District Toba Tek Singh, 10 December 2015 81 Interview with Safdar, Chak No. 331JB, 14 March 2015 159 their disunity. There is also a sense of superiority among the locals over the refugees even after acknowledging their [refugees] progress and prosperity.

Refugees also had some reservations with the locals over the matter of their refugee identity in the rural areas in Toba Tek Singh. Both positive and negative connotations are attached with this term of ‘ Mohajir’ in views of the refugees. First group of the refugees is who linked their refugee identity with the migration process after the partition i.e. they considered their Mohajir identity as outcome of that process. They used term ‘ Mojajir’ for just identification and unity of their community. Second group considered that this status is attached with them by the locals. In other words this term of ‘ Mojajir’ had given to the refugees by the locals. They [locals] considered themselves superior and real inhabitant of the locality, therefore, used this term [ Mohajir ] for the refugees. Through this, they did not only try to maintain the difference but also to establish so called hold over socio-political structure. In reply to the question, that, do they or the locals still considered them refugees and, what are the factors behind this mindset, a refugee Hussain Ali answered, as ‘the locals still considered us ‘ Mohajir’ because we had migrated from India’.82 Qurban Hussain, another refugee gave the same answer that ‘yes, they [local population] considers us ‘Mohajirs’ because it has [now] become our identity. They are locals and we are Mohajirs’ .83 Sometime this divide between the locals and the refugees has become harsh. A refugee from Chak 331JB said:

‘They [locals] considered us as Mohajirs from the inception. They did not treat us as human being. The death of one local was considered equal to the death of four refugees…but now we are equal to the locals [socially and economically] and also have friendships [social links]. After the allotments when we had started cultivation, only then they [locals] were taking us seriously. No one likes to be a friend of a poor man. The society did not give importance to the poor man. During early days they [locals] were choudhries [elite class] and we were poor but now we have also economically sound.

82 Interview with Hussain Ali, Chak No. 331JB, 12 November 2015 83 Interview with Qurban Hussain, Chak No. 331JB, 12 November 2015 160

Now, if anyone considered us Mohajir then what we can do. It is a problem of their understanding and we [ mohajirs ] have no concern with that’.84

Why they treated us as mohajirs we do not know, said Faqeer Muhammad, a hundred years old refugee. He further maintained:

‘…it is true that the locals still maintained this difference and have believed on factionalism. They treated us as ‘ mohajir party’ and considered them as locals [with sense of superiority]….till now….though we are economically better than ’. 85

Even in those rural areas where refugees are in majority or absolute population in Toba Tek Singh they kept ‘refugees identity’, though symbolically. The local population, a refugee said, ‘called us mohajirs . Yes, we are mohajirs and have friendly relations with the locals.’ 86 Another refugee remarked ‘they called us mohajirs occasionally but not in routine. Only for to point out someone, like, that person who is mohajir …..our identity is still of ‘ mohajirs’ i.e the mohajirs who came from India’. 87

In case of severe tension between the locals and the refugees, both call each other with different titles. They call each other with the titles of Panahgir /Panahi [for refugee] and Jangli [for local]. The meanings of the both terms are not bad but these up till now are used for just to show other community inferior, poor and uncivilized. Panahgir /Panahi means ‘shelter seeker’ while the Jangli were the original inhabitants of the Sandal bar , where the Lower Chenab Colony was established during the British Period. In place of mohajir , a refugee from Chak 331JB said sarcastically, ‘they [locals] called us Panahgir’ .88 Another refugee further explain this situation and maintained that ‘educated class among the locals call us ‘mohajirs’ while the uneducated locals called us Panahi . We also called them Jangli in the same manner’. 89 Similarly Faqeer Muhammad mentioned the same as ‘the locals [during early days] called us panahgir but now we have good relations with each other. We

84 Interview with Syed Mohabat Hussain, Chak No. 331JB, 10 June 2015 85 Interview with Faqeer Muhammad , Chak Kanthan, 11 December 2015 86 Interview with Khudah Bhksh, Chak No. 13, 6 February 2015 87 Interview with Abdu-Rahman, Chak No. 13, 4 February 2015 88 Interview with Abdul Ali, Chak No. 331JB, 8 June 2015 89 Interview with Abdul Satar, Chak No. 13, 5 February 2015 161 considered ourselves mohajirs till now because we had settled here after migration from India and it is [ mohajir ] our identity’. 90

I have selected the grain market [Galla Mandi] for economic assessment and transformation in town Toba Tek Singh. After the migration of Hindus and Sikhs from town Toba Tek Singh, Muslim refugees from India rehabilitated here and shops and houses were allotted to them by the government.91 They [refugees] were from different areas but majority was from Sirhand, Hoshiarpur, Jalandhar and Ludhiana. 92

This migration provided the chance to the Muslims to introduce themselves in commerce and trade activities in town Toba Tek Singh. Before the partition economic activities in all three towns, Toba Tek Singh, Gojra and Kamalia were largely controlled by the Hindus. Their migration to India after the partition in 1947 was considered as an opportunity by the Muslim Refugees in this locality. Manzoor Naz, a well-known journalist from Toba Tek Singh, told that the refugees [in town Toba Tek Singh] influx continued for almost two years after the partition. They were rehabilitated by the government on the space left by the non-Muslims. 93 Muhammad Ahsan-ul-Haq Barki, another famous local Journalist said:

‘[The refugees in Toba Tek Singh] mostly migrated from Sirhand [India]. They migrated from rural areas and settled in city Toba Tek Singh. Initially, two trains of refugees had arrived and they were accommodated by the government in the government buildings or Gurdwaras [Sikh religious place] and Janj-Gahers [banquet halls] etc.’94

The refugees of town Toba Tek Singh had rural background but they preferred urban locality for final settlement. These refugees had three major types. First, those whose claims had not materialized and they captured evacuee houses and shops and

90 Interview with Faqeer Muhammad , Chak Kanthan, 11 December 2015 91 The Government had adopted a specific policy of allotment of evacuee shops and houses to the refugees in Toba Tek Singh. Deputy Commissioner Lyallpur, Pir Ahsan ud Din maintained that officers would allot evacuee property according to its economic value. Additional District Magistrate would allot property worth up to Rs 5000, Additional Deputy Commissioner up to Rs. 15000, Deputy Commissioner more than Rs. 5000. There was also constituted an advisory committee consisted of three ECS and three professors of government college assisted to the rehabilitation officers. Even the Tahsildar had to take advice from the advisory committee prior to the allotment. See The Daily Saadat, January 19, 1948 92 Interview with Manzoor Naz, Toba Tek Singh City, 11 January 2016 93 Interview with Manzoor Naz, Toba Tek Singh City, 11 January 2016 94 Interview with Muhammad Ahsan-ul-Haq Barki, Toba Tek Singh City, 11 January 2016 162 started living in the city. Second, who had allotted agriculture lands but they sold that lands and permanently settled in city Toba Tek Singh. Third type comprised of those refugees who hold rural and urban both type of properties and settled on both places. In response to the question that, did they [refugees] join the same profession as they had before migration? Barki replied:

‘No. They did not join the same profession. The majority had the agricultural background but they preferred to settle in the town. This factor had led them to enter in business and trade activities. Lands against their claims were allotted to them very late when they already had started business or trade…therefore they were least interested in cultivation. They had focused their attention on business and to progress instead of to continue their old profession’. 95

Monzoor Naz also confirmed this trend and remarked that the refugees in town Toba Tek Singh were from different professional background before the partition. But when they came here after migration they involved in business and trade activities and ‘they [refugees] continued this profession’. 96 Most of the refugees had to start with different menial works. From acceptance of claims to permanent allotment of the lands after final verification, there was very long and tedious process. Therefore the refugees could not wait for that. Hunger emerged as most dreadful enemy for them. Muhammad Hafeez, a refugee from Toba Tek Singh said:

‘We had not received the claims of our lands overnight. At start we worked as an ordinary labourer and then started shop keeping in talaab bazar [Toba Tek Singh]. My father had also been worked as labourer in the grain market. He had never done such type of work before. Now we have a successful business’. 97

In urban areas, as we have seen in rural areas, self-selection of the locality for resettlement under the influence of family links is also an important aspect of resettlement process. Most of the refugees decided themselves to resettle in Toba Tek Singh after the partition. And their family links in the locality played important role in this decision. In some cases refugees finally had resettled in Town Toba Tek Singh

95 Interview with Manzoor Naz, Toba Tek Singh City, 11 January 2016 96 Ibid 97 Interview with Muhammad Hafeez, Toba Tek Singh City, 15 January 2016 163 after changing one or two different areas. This situation was not only showing the complexities of the rehabilitation process but also the challenges which had faced by the rehabilitation department. Taj Muhammad told:

‘Before final settlement in town Toba Tek Singh, we had moved to Chounian from Lahore. My brother, who was in Police department, was posted in Lahore at that time. After temporary allotment of land we had started cultivation there. In 1951, after confirmation of our claims, land had been allotted to us in Chak 518 GB/Gojra….after some time, because of a family conflict, I had sold lands and settled in Faiz Colony, town Toba Tek Singh’. 98

Virtually all the shops and houses in Gala Mandi (grain market), Lukar Mandi [Timber Market] and main Bazar in Toba Tek Singh, was owned by the Hindu Khatris, Aroras and Banias families before the partition. 99 Few Muslims also had involved in business activities but they held mostly rented shops owned by the Hindus. 100 After the partition all Hindus and Sikhs had migrated to India and evacuee property shifted to the Muslim refugees from India. They had temporary allotted the shops and houses. Abdul Ali told that ‘most of the shops in city Toba Tek Singh were owned by the refuges from villages like Chak 95 [Barianwala ] and especially Khanpur and Jaja . Most of these people had migrated from Ludhiana. The families of Ch. Muhammad Ishfaq [Ex-MNA] and Mr. Dastgeer are prominent in this regards’. 101 Even until 1955 the permanent ownership of the property was not transferred to the refugees. 102

Table 4.2: Extract of Jamabindi Town Toba Tek Singh [Chak No 326JB] showed ownership of property

Khawit No Khtoni No Owner Renter House/Shop Killa No 1 1 Hindu Hindu House 55 2 2 H M House 3 H H House

98 Interview with Rana Taj Muhammad, Toba Tek Singh City, 11 January 2016 99 Complete Jamabindi of the Locality Town Toba Tek Singh, Chak No 326JB, Tehsil & District Lyallpur 1943-1944 100 In main Bazar Deydar Buksh and Abdullah; and in grain market Rahyeem Buksh and Noor Din had rented shops Jamabindi of the Locality Town Toba Tek Singh, Chak No 326JB, Tehsil & District Lyallpur 1943-1944 101 Interview with Abdul Ali, Chak No. 331JB, 8 June 2015 102 Jamabindi of the Locality Town Toba Tek Singh, Chak No 326JB, Tehsil & District Lyallpur 1955- 1956 164

4 H 5 H Houses 5 H H House 6 H 2 H-1M Houses 7 H 19H-2M Shops Bazar 8 H H House 9 H H Shop Grain market 10 H H Shop Grain market 11 H 2H Shops Grain market 12 H 5H-1M Shops Grain market 13 H 2H Shops Grain market 14 H 6H-1M Shops Grain market 15 H 4H-1M Shops Grain market Source: Complete Jamabindi Locality Town Toba Tek Singh, Chak No 326JB, Tehsil & District Lyallpur 1943-1944

The Muslim refugees had been successful in the business and trade activities in Toba Tek Singh. The refugees had comprised the major proportion of the population especially in town Toba Tek Singh. After the partition, Toba Tek Singh’s population had sharply increased. As compared to 1941, tehsil Toba Tek Singh’s population in 1951 increased to 208000 persons, third highest increase after Tehsils of Lahore and Lyallpur with increase in population 296000 persons and 245000 persons respectively (Table 4.3). In 1961 the tehsil’s population increased up to 693541 persons, whilst Town Toba Tek Singh had 17847. 103

The refugees had main contribution in the socio-economic life of town Toba Tek Singh because of their numerical strength and hold over the local economy. Toba Tek Singh was very small town and now it is a growing district with population 1621593 persons [1998] and area 3252 Sq. Km.104 In the domain of industrial development Toba Tek Singh also made progress. At the start their were very few industrial units comprised of oil expellers, cotton factories but now there are ‘2 sugar mills, 4 textile spinning, 11 flour mills, 11 yarn sizing units, 46 cotton ginning/pressing factories and 45 oil expellers’. 105

103 Census of Pakistan, 1961, Population Census Commission, Ministry of Home Affairs 104 http://www.pbs.gov.pk/content/district-glance-t-t-singh [accessed November 2016 ] 105 https://www.punjab.gov.pk/toba_tek_singh_industry [accessed November 2016] 165

Table4.3: Proportion of the Mohajirs : Punjab & Bahawalpur State

District Population Thousands Percentage Total Mohajirs Punjab 18828 4908 26 Gujranwala 1047 299 29 Lahore 1895 745 39 Sheikupura 923 310 34 Sialkot 1474 369 25 Dera Ghazi Khan 631 36 6 Jhang 877 139 16 Lyallpur 2153 986 46 Montgomery 1816 713 39 Multan 2108 646 31 Muzaffargarh 751 79 11 Campbellpur 723 38 5 Gujrat 1159 136 12 Jhelum 682 52 8 Mianwali 551 47 9 Rawalpindi 876 106 12 Shahpur 1163 207 18 Bahawalpur State 1823 373 20 Source: Census Punjab 1951

Table 4.4: Comparison of Selected Tehsils in terms of increase in Population 1931- 1951

Tehsils Population Thousands Increase or 1931 1941 1951 Decrees (-) over 1941 Increase Lyallpur 334 406 702 296 Lahore 694 890 1135 245 Toba Tek Singh 305 396 604 208 Montgomery 322 428 604 176 Pakpattan 237 333 482 149 Multan 304 360 507 147 Jaranwala 260 293 438 145 Khanewal 198 252 384 132 166

Okara 220 293 424 131 Sargodha 226 278 405 127 Decrease Shakargardh 247 292 261 -31 Narowal 231 268 252 -16 Minchinabad 110 130 119 -11 Shahpur 156 184 175 -9 Pindigheb 143 167 164 -3 Isakhel 69 78 76 -2

Source: Census Punjab 1951

The locals had many reservations regarding the huge influx of the refugees from East Punjab in the locality. A report published in a local newspaper explained different aspects of these reservations by the locals. Though this report was about general west Punjab situation but it also shed light on the things which were going on in Toba Tek Singh. According to this report the locals of West Punjab had been passing through an alarming and critical phase. Before independence they were deprived by the economically, socially and politically powerful Hindu and Sikh communities and now their position was threatened by the influx of millions of Muslim refugees. The government also had focused her complete attention for the betterment of the refugees. Initially, the locals had helped the refugees but now their own position had become very critical. 106

This report had further mentioned that though the refugees had blamed the locals for seize of evacuee houses and properties but the same kind of allegations had also been raised against the refugees. There were many refugees who had allotted houses, shops, factories or to their brothers and sisters at-a-time in four different cities. Similarly, most of the Muslim refugees had allotted lands against their single claims at more than one place. They [refugees] should have taken basic and necessary help from the government and the local community but actually they had established their monopoly through illegal means. The report had also calculated that Muslim refugees from East Punjab held only 103 registered factories in East Punjab as compared to 236 factories left by the non-Muslims in West Punjab. Therefore, if the Muslim refugees had taken the right share, there would have been much left for the

106 The Daily Saadat, Lyalpur, January 31, 1948 167 locals and some other refugees who were still in the refugee campus. The report marked that due to the vague policies of the government the conflicts between the locals and the refuges had increased. It is the duty of the government, the report suggested, working for the refugees and the locals alike. 107 This report does not only clearly highlight the tensions between the local communities and the refugees but also the irregularities in distribution of evacuee properties among the refugees.

This report also had reflected the locals and refugee’s conflicting relationship during the early days in town Toba Tek Singh but its intensity was not as high as was in rural areas. 108 One possible reason was the Muslim refugees had majority in the Toba Tek Singh. The locals in the town were those who previously had worked under the Hindu and Sikh communities or in some migrated to the town after the partition. Ahsan-ul-Haq remarked:

‘The locals were few in numbers at the time of the partition [in town Toba Tek Singh]. Their economic conditions were also not good. Even having poor economic conditions they helped the Muslim refugees from India, according to their economic position, keeping in mind the Hijrat-i-Madinah [migration of Madinah]’. 109

Talking about the conflicts between the locals and the Muslim refugees he further said that:

‘Initially, the refugees who had migrated from India created this division of local and refugee. They did so to maintain their unity against the locals. This step of the refugees has no space in Islam. But with the passage of time theses difference and hatred had been came to an end. Their standard of living also

107 Ibid 108 There were few cases of conflict between the locals and the migrants over the allotment of some major evacuee industrial units and buildings. One of the cases was over the possession of Imperial Talkies Gojra. This cinema allotted to Mr. Ghulam Mohi-ud-Din [a refugee held a cinema in India]. But a local Mr. Muhammad Din, who got the possession of the cinema by Mr. Lala Nand Lal [owner] on 14 October 1947, was not ready to give it to Mr. Ghulam Mohi-ud-Din. It was also reported that Mr. Lala Nand Lal had no right to hand it over to Mr. Muhammad Din as this cinema was held on contract by Mr. Roshan Lal Verender Nath of Bahawalpur for period of six years [started from 1947]. The Daily Saadat, Lyalpur, January 15, 1948 109 Interview with Muhammad Ahsan-ul-Haq Barki, Toba Tek Singh City, 11 January 2016 168

improved; therefore, they had left their Mohajir identity and mixed up with locals’. 110

Taj Muhammad [a refugee] ratified that in town Toba Tek Singh, the ‘refugee identity’ was much less than the rural areas. He said:

‘…they [locals] had welcomed us warmly…The locals were few, and majority of population in town Toba Tek Singh was consisted of the refugees. Most of them were belonged to the neighbouring villages which had migrated to the town before and after the partition. Now, there is no issue of local and refugee’. 111

Some refugees had complaints against the local Muslim community of Toba Tek Singh and they had recalled their miseries and tensions of early period after the partition as:

‘The locals had given us only small proportion of the evacuee property. In other cities houses were allotted systematically but nobody asked us [about our problems]. We did menial work as refugee in town Toba Tek Singh at our arrival. Flour was distributed by the government at grain market ( gala mandi ) and scale was 5 KG for 10 persons [refugees]…some time we had been returned empty handed after waiting the whole day. There was severe scarcity of food. Once we had not found flour for eight days…now we had good relations with the locals as we are economically well-off ’. 112

Mohajir identity was relative with respect to economic position and numerical strength of the refugees as compared to the locals. With gradual decrease in tension, the question of ‘ mohajir’ identity was also faded away with the passage of time in the town Toba Tek Singh. Those refugees who were not compensated by the government, kept their Mohajir identity. ‘No, now we are not Mohajir and locals also not called us

110 Ibid. During the early days after the partition in Toba Tek Singh, some refugees used to write ‘Mohajir’ as suffix with their name. A meeting of Cloth Depot Holders Selection Board Toba Tek Singh held January 28, 1948 presided over by Sufi Ghulam Rasool Ziayee (President Muslim League Toba Tek Singh) in the Muslim League House Toba Tek Singh. Among other office bearers (Choudhry Abdul Sittar, President; Sheikh Muhammad Anwar ul Haq, Vice President; Mufti Khadam Hussain and Muhammad Ashraf; Finance Secretary) secretary of the Selection Board was Muhammad Adrees Mohajir. 111 Interview with Rana Taj Muhammad, Toba Tek Singh City, 15 January 2016 112 Interview with Muhammad Hafeez, Toba Tek Singh City, 15 January 2016 169 with this title’ 113 said by Hafeez. We have good relations with the locals, remarked by Taj Muhammad ‘they may consider us mohajir but we don’t think so’. 114 Manzoor Naz pointed out that:

‘…there are some refugees who still considered them mohajirs especially those whose claims were not materialized by the government. We do not consider them refugees. We are all equal….but this element of mohajir is still present with varied intensity in our locality’. 115

4.4 Role of the Government in Refugee’s Rehabilitation and the Expectations of the Refugees

Most of the refugees did not get any response from the government in their rehabilitation. They only acknowledged government’s contribution in allotment of lands in rural areas and temporary houses and shops in the towns in Toba Tek Singh. Their response, said Faqeer Muhammad:

‘…was not good to us. They had demanded fare for the vehicle by which we were transported to Toba Tek Singh. It was unfair to ask fare from the poor refugees at the time of great difficulty…we were not allotted land as we had claimed. Half of the land has not yet been allotted to us. I had visited many times Lahore for this purpose but could not succeed’. 116

This shows that there were some officials involved in exploiting the miseries of the poor refugees. Due to long procedure of allotment process many refugees had left their claims unattended after number of futile visits to the main record office Lahore. After lot of complaints against patwaries by the refugees, Pir Ahsan-ud-Din, Deputy Commissioner Lyallpur had personally visited Gojra refugee camp and took notice of Patwari’s malpractices. He also announced the establishment of two industrial units [timber and carpet] for the refugees but just these announcements could not address the refugees’ problems. 117

113 Ibid 114 Interview with Rana Taj Muhammad, Toba Tek Singh City, 15 January 2016 115 Interview with Manzoor Naz, Toba Tek Singh City, 11 January 2016 116 Interview with Faqeer Muhammad , Chak Kanthan, 11 December 2015 117 The Daily Sadat , Lyalpur, January 24, 1948 170

Other than Patwaries some even senior officers, like Tahsildar and the Colony Assistant, were also involved in the allotment of agriculture lands at very low price from market rate for industrial purpose in town Toba Tek Singh. The case of Shah Nawaz and his brothers can be taken as an example to understand the allotments process in town Toba Tek Singh after the partition. They applied for the allotment of 13 kanals and 14 marlas for Belna factory and dairy farm on 3rd September 1953 [Map 2]. Their application was recommended and forwarded by the patwari [Wali Muhammad], the Tahsildar and the Colony Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner Lyallpur for final approval with an average estimation of the land. In estimation of the price of the said land they had ignored the two sales of land on different places in Town Toba Tek Singh. In first case area 1 kanals and 11 marlas was sold in 1947-48 at the rate of Rs 25807/- per acre for Godown , while, in another case land was sold for Imam Bargah [religious place of Shia Muslims] at the rate of Rs 4662/- per acre in 1952-53. The average price of the land in last five years in the neighbouring chaks also had not been considered [other than chak 327 JB, where the average price was Rs 1267/- per acre]. The average price of the agriculture land in the neighbouring chaks , as the Colony Assistant mentioned ‘comes to Rs 8409 for chak No. 331 JB, Rs 2496 for chak No. 330 JB, Rs. 1267/- for chak No. 327 JB’. 118 The average rental value of a square in the neighbouring chaks was Rs 1500/-. In fixing the price of the said land, the Colony Assistant remarked ‘Tahsildar also recommends at Rs 1261/- per acre, the rate on which the land in chak No 327 has been sold for factory purposes’. 119 He further said, ‘taking all these in view I recommend that the value may be fixed Rs. 3000/- per acre for this land’. 120

118 Application by Shah Nawaz and others for allotment of the government land, File No. D 312-413, 326 JB, CB, TTS 119 Ibid 120 Ibid 171

Map 4.1: Toba Tek Singh Town and Neighbouring Chaks (1952)

Source: Colony Record Office, Deputy Commissioner Office Toba Tek Singh

The Deputy Commissioner Lyallpur had rejected the assessment of the land provided by the Tahsildar and the Colony Assistant Toba Tek Singh and remarked ‘I am not at all satisfied with the proposal of the Tahsildar and the Colony Assistant’. 121 He confirmed that ‘the intending purchaser is being favoured by suggesting that price which is the least’. 122 In his detail remarks he exposed the involvement of officials of the Rehabilitation Department in sale of government land at low price for their own interests. He said:

‘I can’t understand as to why the Tahsildar ignored the average price of 10 years of 331JB, which comes to about Rs 8409/- per acre. The land intended to be purchased has better location. Moreover in Chak No 331JB, during the course of last 10 years 91 acres has been sold, the average price of which

121 Ibid 122 Ibid 172

comes to Rs. 8409/-. That price can be much more dependable than the price of 3 acre sold in Chak No 327 JB. I also can’t understand as to why the Tahsildar ignored the price of 83 acres of land sold in 330JB during the last 10 years, average price of which comes to Rs. 2496/-. [Quite adjacent to this land has sold] at the rate of Rs 4662/- for Imam-Bara in 1952-53…I think the price should be assessed at the rate of Rs 10000/- per acre’. 123

Map 4.2: Land Required for Installation of Industry in Toba Tek Singh (1952)

Source: Colony Record Office, Deputy Commissioner Office Toba Tek Singh

The Deputy Commissioner warned the Tahsildar and said ‘[you] should know that such reports creates unfavourable impression in the minds of [your] superior officers and make him undependable’. 124 Without informing the applicants about Deputy Commissioner’s remarks against their application, the Tahisldar replied after 5 months that the applicants were not ready to purchase land at this price by the Deputy Commissioner. The Colony Assistant also refused by saying ‘the land applied by the applicants is situated quite close to the existing residential area and has since been declared ‘unbuilt’ area [and] the town planning scheme has also been prepared and sanctioned by the Government’. 125 At later stage, on 17 May 1955, the applicant accepted to purchase land at the rate of Rs 8000/- per acre and blamed that I have not

123 Ibid 124 Ibid 125 Ibid 173 been informed by the decision of the Deputy Commissioner against my application. Both the Tahsildar and the Colony Assistant were least interested in the sale of the land to the applicants, because, there was no chance of corruption due to real assessment of the price of the land. Through this case we can understand the day to day affairs regarding allotments and general behaviour of the officials of the Rehabilitation Department i.e. favouring the influential and neglecting the poor refugees during the early years after the partition in Toba Tek Singh.

The threat of re-allotment of the evacuee property to other refugees in the absence of the refugees on their allotted lands also had created much disturbance among the refugees. As we have already discussed, in many cases property was allotted to the refugees at more than one place to a single family against their claims. Therefore it was quite difficult for a refugee to be present and cultivate lands on all places at-a-time. They were not even familiar about all the allotments which the government had allotted to them. In some cases their allotments had been re-allotted to the other refugees. According to a notice given by a Senior Sub Judge in Toba Tek Singh ‘all those persons who were allotted shops with possession, immediately open their shops otherwise government would have no responsibility in case of re-allotment to the other refugees’. 126 This shows the level of uncertainty in allotments process during the early days in Toba Tek Singh.

Conclusion

Grassroots level socio-economic changes are very much needed to understand macro level changes at provincial and national level in Punjab after the partition. This understanding provides us a clue to the dysfunctional political system and failure of the Muslim League to perform its effective role to strengthen political system in Pakistan. In Toba Tek Singh failure of the Muslim League to deliver was based on its weak administrative structure and clash with the local government administration over different issues, especially, rehabilitation of the refugees and distribution of evacuee prosperity. The administrative structure of the Muslim League was disturbed because of the migration of Non-Muslim communities and huge influx of the Muslim refugees in Toba Tek Singh.

126 The Daily Saadat , Lyalpur, January 19, 1 948 174

Oral and every day accounts exposed the claim of the government of smooth and speedy rehabilitation of the refugees in Toba Tek Singh after the partition. There was severe shortage of food, clothing and basic necessities of life not only in refugee camps but also in across the rural and urban areas in Toba Tek Singh. The government tried to control this situation through introduction of ‘depot system’ and rationing of the basic commodities but a lot of allegations and complaints exposed the transparency [in distribution and running of depots] and effectiveness of this system to resolve the miseries of the refugees.

The refugees in Toba Tek Singh in both rural and urban areas had much reservation with the government regarding their rehabilitation. Most of the refugee’s claims were rejected, misplaced or partially accepted. The vast majority of the refugees looked unsatisfied with the government rehabilitation schemes. Many of them were even furious against the corrupt officials of the rehabilitation department. They denied any help from the government in their resettlement. In many cases they had to bribe to the patwaries for their allotments. According to majority oral accounts, in the proper resettlement and progress of the refugees, factor of self-reliance and divine help is very much prominent.

The Muslim refugee’s interaction with locals also varied in rural and urban areas in Toba Tek Singh with reference to their numerical and economic strength. In rural areas there was and is clear divide of refugees and locals while in urban areas this element of refugee identity is less visible. Apart from the weak economic and social position, the presence of numerically strong local community also played important role to keep their refugee identity alive by the Muslim refugees in Toba Tek Singh.

175

Conclusion This dissertation suggests through the study of nature and factors behind violence, migration movements and rehabilitation strategies and their implications that the official accounts are not justified in immediate rehabilitation of the Muslim refugees after the partition in Toba Tek Singh. This rehabilitation process could not remove the ‘ mohajir [migrant] identity’ in Toba Tek Singh especially in rural areas. The perception that ‘migrants from East Punjab quickly dropped the mohajir label [in west Punjab]’ is not correct for canal colony areas. Here I will briefly summarize the main points of the thesis. Lower Chenab Colony was the largest and most successful project of the British government in west Punjab during the colonial period. The development of Lyallpur [the capital of Lower Chenab Colony], in a short span of time, was considered as ‘miracle’. Land grants were allotted to the grantees carefully selected from central and eastern districts of Punjab, from well reputed agricultural communities. Sikhs and Hindus of Toba Tek Singh [Sub division of Lyallpur] had been settled in this locality about half a century ago by the British government before the partition. This factor was contributed at length in tracing the patterns of migration from this locality during the partition. The factor of violence had played pivotal role in the migration of the non- Muslims [Hindus and Sikhs] from different areas of West Punjab during and after the partition of Punjab. The roots of violence can be located in decolonization process and rise of nationalistic forces in India generally and in Punjab specifically. Failure of Congress Ministries and Muslim League’s support to the British government during Second World War ultimately supported the Pakistan scheme. Division of Punjab and Bengal in the wake of Partition of India became major factor for violence, looting, plundering, abduction of women and children and large scale population displacement. Though violence was major factor in Industrial and border areas in West Punjab but in canal colony areas violence was not the prime factor. Hindus and Sikhs of Toba Tek Singh had strong socio-economic position in the society. Their relationship in East Punjab during pre-Partition era was the prime factor in their migration. The fear of Muslim dominance in future state of Pakistan and huge influx of Muslim refugees from India had strengthened this factor and they migrated to India 176 from Toba Tek Singh. Sikhs and Hindus of Toba Tek Singh were replaced with Muslim refugees from East Punjab. The massacres, arson and disorder which had started in East Punjab districts and princely states were undoubtedly planned long beforehand and it gave rise to inevitable repercussions in the West Punjab. Sikh and Hindu Migrants of Rawalpindi and Multan, after disturbances in those areas, further sparked the planed violence in East Punjab. Government of Pakistan had tried to revive the confidence of Sikhs and Hindus but failed. The government had provided every possible support to the Indian government for smooth and peaceful evacuation of Sikhs and Hindus after the partition. The rehabilitation of the millions of refugees after the partition was big challenge for the nascent state of Pakistan. Immediately, national and international help required with other measures like the Quaid-i-Azam Relief Fund, Scheme of Ansar and Muhhajreen , Urdu weekly the Muhajir , the refugees’ Corner in different newspapers etc. The policies which had devised by the government to resolve refugee crises, influenced by different factors like Pakistan-India agreements on evacuee property, minorities status, commerce and business activities, shortage of food, shortage of lands, problems of space for refugees, assessment of number of refugees etc. Camps were established to provide shelter, medical facilities and food to the refugees before final settlement in different areas. Nationalization of land was proposed to remove shortage of agriculture land. Similarly, Grow More Scheme was introduced to control shortage of food. New towns made to rehabilitate the excess number of refugees. Oral accounts of the refugees and ‘everyday state’ sources had showed a vast difference between the official narrative and field realities regarding rehabilitation and settlements policies. Refugees from India had moved to different areas in Toba Tek Singh because of their personal links or by chance. Even they had made selection between rural and urban settlement at their own will. Some of the refugees had been accommodated by the locals initially. They provided them [refugees] with food and shelter up to their capacity but the official support was totally absent. The land which allotted to the refugees also had many problems. Many claims were rejected or partially accepted by the government officials. Many refugees had allotted themselves lands on more than one place and most of them were ignorant about their allotments. Most of the officials took advantage of this situation and allotted property to 177 themselves or their favourites. Government’s decision to arrest the corrupt officials and to curbed the corruption, newspaper reports against these corrupt officials and their corruption, all these reflected the oral accounts of the refugees and the locals against large scale corruption in rehabilitation process. It also highlighted flaws in rehabilitation policies by the government after the partition. Better socio-economic position of the refugees in Toba Tek Singh [in both rural urban areas] after the partition is actually because the refugees replaced the migrated Hindu and Sikh communities. They [Hindus and Sikhs] had strong socio- economic status in pre-partition Toba Tek Singh. In rural areas Muslim refugees replaced strong Sikh agriculturists who held more fertile lands than the local Muslim settlers. Whereas in Towns of Kamalia, Gojra, and Toba Tek Singh Muslim refugees replaced Hindus who had complete hold over the economic activities. Rural refugees have great contribution in growing agriculture production though there were some issues of shortage of canal water, uneconomic holdings, and expansion of the towns and encroachment of village lands. Urban refugees held the business and trade activities which were left by the Hindus. Now Toba Tek Singh has converted from a small town to a district with growing agricultural and industrial economy. Because of lack of planning in rehabilitation and resettlement of the Muslim refugees in Toba Tek Singh population is still divided along local and mohajir lines. This mohajir identity is weak in those areas where the mohajir community is economically better and is in majority. In urban areas, the refugees considered themselves ‘ mohajirs’ because of their migration from India to Toba Tek Singh but in rural areas refugees have strong ‘ Mohajir’ identity because of their week economic position or competition with the strong locals [numerically or economically]. Micro level research is very much needed to revisit the macro level understanding of the partition, refugees’ rehabilitation, and their impacts in Punjab. For example the clue to failure of the Muslim League in strengthening the political system in Pakistan can be found at locality level. In Toba Tek Singh the Muslim League confronted with the local administration over different issues like rehabilitation of the refugees, allotment of evacuee property, share of authority etc. The Muslim League also faced many administrative and organizational problems. These were the reasons which contributed for failure of the Muslim League and the political system at national level. This is just one example. Hence more localities 178 based academic research required for comprehensive understanding of complex and varied impacts of the partition and refugees rehabilitation in Punjab. Illustrations

Illustration 1: The Bar before colonization

Punjab Canal Gazetteers, Vol. 1, Lower Jhelum Canal , 1920 (Lahore, Government printing, 1921)

Illustration 2: The Bar after colonization

Punjab Canal Gazetteers, Vol. 1, Lower Jhelum Canal , 1920 (Lahore, Government printing, 1921)

179

Illustration 3: Tek Singh Park adjoining to the railway station Toba Tek Singh, with ‘historical’ pond [Toba] of Tek Singh Source: District Census Report of Toba Tek Singh 1998

Illustration 4: District Headquarters Hospital, Illustration 5: Prem Satti (Samadhi), Toba Tek Singh Kamalia, Toba Tek Singh

Source: District Census Report of Toba Tek Source: District Census Report of Toba Tek Singh 1998 Singh 1998 180

Illustration 6: Tehsil Council Hall (Jinnah Hall) established in 1910

(Photo credit: Mine)

Illustration 7: Railway Station Toba Tek Singh

Source: Asad Ali Abbas and Zaheer Ahmad

181

Illustration 8: Railway Station Toba Tek Singh

(Photo credit: Asad Ali Abbas)

Illustration 9: GauShalla (A Hindu religious Illustration 10: Gau Shalla Toba Tek Singh place for protection of cows) Toba Tek Singh (Photo credit: Asad Ali Abbas)

(Photo credit: Asad Ali Abbas) 182

Illustration 11: Janj Gaher (Marrage House) Toba Tek Singh

(Photo credit: Asad Ali Abbas)

Illustration 12: Annaj Ki Mandi, Daana Mandi (Grain Market)

(Photo credit: Asad Ali Abbas)

183

Illustration 13: Gurdwara declared rundown and owned by the Evacuee Trust Property Board (ETPB); A disputed properity between ETPB, education department and Anjuman Madniyia Hanfia (Deoband) seminary

Source: https://www.dawn.com/news/1274803

Illustration 14: Gurdwara (Inside view)

Source: https://www.dawn.com/news/1274803

184

Illustration 15: Gobindpura Toba Tek Singh

(Photo credit: Asad Ali Abbas)

Illustration 16: Main Bazar Toba Tek Singh

(Photo credit: Asad Ali Abbas)

185

Illustration 17: Chenab Fabrics (Pvt) Toba Tek Singh

(Photo credit: Asad Ali Abbas)

Illustration 18: A worker working on Electric Loom

(Photo credit: Asad Ali Abbas)

186

Illustration 19: A worker working on Electric Loom

(Photo credit: Asad Ali Abbas)

Illustration 20: Municipal Committee/ Committee Bagh, Toba Tek Singh

(Photo credit: Asad Ali Abbas)

187

Illustration 21: Gojra Railway Station Illustration 22: Kacha gojra chowk

(Photo credit: Asad Ali Abbas) (Photo credit: Asad Ali Abbas)

Illustration 23: Chak No. 331 JB/Shair Gardh (Athwal) Wheat fields

(Photo credit: Mine)

188

Illustration 24: Chak No. 331 JB/Shair Gardh (Athwal) Wheat fields

(Photo credit: Mine)

Illustration 25: Chak No 331JB/Shair Gardh (Athwal), Play ground

(Photo credit: Asad Ali Abbas)

189

Illustration 26: Chak No 331JB/Shair Gardh (Athwal), Animal drinking pond

(Photo credit: Asad Ali Abbas)

Illustration 27: Clock Tower Toba Tek Singh

Source: http://mctobateksingh.lgpunjab.org.pk/Pic-Gallery.html

190

Illustration 28: Chak No 331JB/Shair Gardh (Athwal), A street dividing the locals and the refugee areas

(Photo credit: Mine)

191

Appendix 1

192

Appendix 2 The Genealogy of a abadkar of Chak 331 JB

193

Appendix 3 The Genealogy of a abadkar of Chak 331 JB

194

Appendix 4

Statement by Suchait Singh ( Numberdar Chak 331 JB) showed inferiority of soil of

Mare Breeding land grant

195

Appendix 5

Early allotments of land grants to the settlers ( abadkaars) in Toba Tek Singh

196

Appendix 6

Page from the Register of land allotments to the Ejected Tenants in Lyallpur

[Faisalabad]

197

Appendix 7

Sample Questionnaire: (Locals)

1. What is your name and age?

2. Where were you born?

3. Your biradri /zat /caste?

4. What is your mother tongue?

5. What was your ancestral locality before 1947?

6. Some information about your family (parent’s brothers, sisters, and father’s

occupation etc.)

7. What was your occupation at the time of Partition?

8. The nature of your life and relations with other religious communities before

partition 1947? (Inter-communal participation in cultural and religious

festivals and ceremonies etc.) In detail.

9. Did you expect Hindus/Sikhs would have to migrate in 1947? If yes then when

they realized it?

10. What was the reason of migration on Hindus/Sikhs? (Muslim Pakistan,

Communal violence, economic, non-Muslims’ links in east Punjab, other). In

detail.

11. When the communal riots started and what was the reason?

12. Did Muslims of your locality or from other areas were involved in communal

riots (any abduction, killing of Non-Muslims do you know)? Did anyone from

Muslims help non-Muslims during that riots or migration?

13. How did Hindus/Sikhs migrate from Pakistan? Please state circumstances.

14. What happened with the evacuee property? Looting, capturing by the locals?

15. When did refugees from India settle in Toba Tek Singh/in your locality? 198

16. From where they (refugees) came?

17. Did they join the same profession as they had before migration?

18. What was the response of local population towards the Muslim migrants at

their arrival?

19. What was the response of the government regarding refugee’s temporary or

final settlement in Toba Tek Singh?

20. Did refugees justified in their claims of property?

21. Did you find any change in the locals’ response with the passage of time?

Please state your relations with the migrated community since their arrival.

22. Did you or migrants still consider/treated them as a migrant (identity)? If ‘yes’

then what were/are factors behind this mindset?

23. Have migrants cultivated their land after allotment? How was their relation

with the tenants of outgoing Sikh or Hindu farmers? (Rural Grantees)

24. How you grade/assess the rehabilitation plan (government help from

temporary camps to allotments and to start of routine life again) of the

Pakistani government? Not good, average, good, any other remarks? Any

personal understanding?

25. How you feel Toba Tek Singh has changed (in terms of social, economic,

religious, development, political factors) since 1947?

26. What is the role of refugees in the socio-economic development of Toba Tek

Singh since 1947?

199

Appendix 8

Sample Questionnaire: (Migrants)

1. What is your name and age?

2. Where were you born?

3. Your biradri /zat /caste?

4. What is your mother tongue?

5. What was your ancestral locality before 1947?

6. Have you any link with that locality since migration to Pakistan?

7. Some information about your family (parent’s brothers, sisters, and father’s

occupation etc.)

8. What was your occupation at the time of Partition?

9. The nature of your life and relations with other religious communities before

partition 1947? (inter-communal participation in cultural and religious

festivals and ceremonies)

10. Did you expect you would have to migrate in 1947? If yes then when you

realized it and migrated?

11. What was the reason of migration? (Pakistan, Communal violence, economic,

other)

12. When the communal riots started and what was the reason?

13. Did your family affected by communal riots (any abduction, killing or injury

to your family member or friend)? Did anyone from other religious

communities help you during that riots or migration?

14. How did you migrate to Pakistan? Please state circumstances

15. Where did you come in Pakistan before the final settlement in Toba Tek

Singh? How long you stayed there? 200

16. Why and where did you settle in Toba Tek Singh?

17. Did you join the same profession as you had before migration?

18. What was the response of local population at your arrival?

19. What was the response of the government regarding your temporary or final

settlement in Toba Tek Singh?

20. Did you allot the property as you claimed? If no then how can compare it with

your property in India?

21. Had you allotted property at one place/in a same tehsil?

22. Did you find any change in the locals’ response with the passage of time?

Please state your relations with the local community since your arrival.

23. Did you or local population still consider/treated you as a migrant (identity)?

If ‘yes’ then what were/are factors behind this mindset?

24. Please describe your life as refugee in Toba Tek Singh. When you and your

family felt settled?

25. Have you got any economic assistance from official or non-official

organization for your business after allotment? (Urban Grantees)

26. Have you cultivated your land by yourself after allotment? How was your

relation with the tenants of outgoing Sikh or Hindu farmers? (Rural Grantees)

27. How you grade/assess the rehabilitation plan (government help from

temporary camps to allotments and to start of routine life again) of the

Pakistani government? Not good, average, good, any other remarks?

28. How you feel Toba Tek Singh has changed since 1947?

29. What is the role of refugees in the socio-economic development of Toba Tek

Singh since 1947?

201

Appendix 9

Table: RL II Register

No Name Previous residence Date Initial Date Allotted Remarks

claimant Verification Confirmation land Claim Village/ Tehsil District with No Town cast

202

Appendix 10

Distribution of Depots in Toba Tek Singh

203

Appendix 11 Poem: Panah-guzinoon Ki Mushkaalat [Difficulties of shelter-seekers

(Refugees)] by a Refugee Poet, Fazal Ahmad Fiaz Haryanvi published in The Daily

Saadat on 16 January 1948)

204

Appendix 11: Patwari (In words of a migrant) written by Mr. Ahsan Ismail

Siddiquee, a refugee from Gojra, Toba Tek Singh. The Daily Saadat, January 7, 1948

205

Appendix 12 (Selected Interviews)

Date of Interview Name of Interviewee Place of Interview

8 June 2015 Abdul Ali Chak No. 331JB

5 February 2015 Abdul Satar Chak No. 13 Kamalia

4 February 2015 Abdu-Rahman Chak No. 13 Kamalia

11 December 2015 Faqeer Muhammad Chak Kanthan

6 February 2015 Faqir Muhammad Chak No. 13, Kamalia

12 November 2015 Hussain Ali Chak No. 331JB

15 January 2016 Muhammad Hafeez Toba Tek Singh City

10 December 2015 Muhammad Nazir Chak No. 433 JB

11 January 2016 Muhammad Ahsan-ul-Haq Toba Tek Singh City Barki 14 March 2015 Sadiq Ali Chak No. 331JB

14 March 2015 Safdar Chak No. 331JB

13 March 2015 Nazar Hussain Chak No. 331 JB

13 March 2015 Yasin Shah Chak No. 331 JB

6 February 2015 Khudah Baksh Chak No. 13

4 February 2015 Qurban Hussain Chak No. 331JB

10 June 2015 Syed Mohabat Hussain Chak No. 331JB

11 January 2016 Manzoor Naz Toba Tek Singh City

15 January 2016 Rana Taj Muhammad Toba Tek Singh City

206

Glossary of Vernacular Terms

Abadi Village Site

Abadkar Settler

Abi Irrigated

Abiana Water-rate, Occupier’s rate --- as levied by the irrigation department

Ahata Compound in village site

Anaaj /Daana Mandi Grain Market

Anjuman Association

Bannia Village shopkeeper or money-lender

Banjar Waste

Bar Highland/Table land between two rivers

Barani Irrigated by rainfall

Batai Rent taken by division of crops

Bhusa Straw

Chahi Well-irrigated

Chak A block of land, a colony village

Charagah Unallotted portion of a village reserved for Grazing

Bathak Drawing room 207

Fard bachh List showing distribution of land revenue

Gahenaes Ornaments

Girdawari Crop inspection register

Hithar Riverain/lowland tract

Jamabindi Register showing the ownership of property

Jangli Aboriginal nomad grazer

Jathas Group of Ghundas

Jhallari Irrigated from a canal by lift

Jhok village occupied by camel-men

Jaloos Procession

Kallar Alkaline soil, saltpeter

Kamin A village menial

Kiryana General Store

Khasra shudkar Record of irrigation

Khasra girdawari Crop inspections register

Khata Holding

Khatauni List of holdings with name of owners or tenants

Killa Area equal to 1 acre 0 canal 18 marlas : one twenty-fifth of a square 208

Lumbardar Village Headman

Mandi Market Town

Maila Festival

Malba Fund for common village expenses

Malikana Fee paid in recognition of proprietary title

Marla Area equal to 1/160 th of an acre

Mauza A colony estate or village

Misl taqsim Allotment file

Muhajir Migrant, Refugee

Muslak Sect

Nahri Irrigated from a canal by flow

Naib Tahsildar The Deputy or Assistant of a tahsildar

Nazarana Payment made to Government on acquisition of a colony grant

Pakki road Metalled road

Panahgir Shelter seeker, refugee

Patwari A village revenue accountant or registrar

Rahna A settlement of nomad graziers

Rais A capitalist grantee

Rauni Watering before sowing 209

Rechna Doab Country between Ravi and Chenab rivers

Register muzariat Tenancy register

Saadat The Family of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH)

Salar The District in-charge of Muslim League National Guards

Sarwan A camel attendant

Shajra Map, Plan

Shajra abadi Village site plan

Shajra Kishtwar Village field map

Shajra nasb Genealogical tree

Sufedposh A yeoman grantee

Tahsil, Tahsildar Revenue sub-division of a district, official in-charge of the same

Takavi Loan by Government, also acreage rate

Tirni Grazing fee or tax

Wajib-ul-arz Village administration paperstatement of village rights and customs

Waribandi System by which the supply of water to canal branches,

distributaries and watercourses is regulated in rotation

Zail A group of villages amalgamated for administrative purposes 210

Zaildar A local notable appointed to the charge of a zail

Zamindar A cultivator, owner or occupier of land

211

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