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Afghanistan Review 1 13 January 2010 AFGHANISTAN REVIEW Inside This Issue Economic Stabilization Governance & Participation This document is intended to provide an overview of relevant sector events in Afghanistan from 07 January - 12 January 2010. More Humanitarian Assistance comprehensive information is available on the Civil-Military Overview Infrastructure (CMO) at www.cimicweb.org. Hyperlinks to original source material are Justice & Reconciliation highlighted in blue and underlined in the embedded text. Security Social Well-Being ECONOMIC STABILIZATION Matthew Hall, [email protected] / +1 757-683-5273 Back to top President Karzai continues working towards filling his Pajhwok News from Helmand‟s provincial capital new cabinet. According to local Pajhwok News re- Lashkar Gah reported that US Secretary of Agricul- ports, Mohammad Zaher Wahid has been nominated ture Tom Vilsack met with President Karzai and Ag- for the post of Minister of Commerce and Industries riculture Minister Asif Rahimi on a recent visit to one day after Mohammad Hadi Hakimi turned down Afghanistan. Vilsack stressed the need for coopera- the position. Wahid attended graduate school tion with Afghanistan‟s neighbours to improve ex- abroad in Tokyo and London, and his locally re- ports and demand for Afghan goods and products. leased biography reveals extensive experience in He also focused his comments on the need for con- international finance and development. Karzai also tinued agricultural alternatives to poppy. Addition- nominated Abdul Hadi Arghandiwal to head the Min- ally, Vilsack signed a Memorandum of Understand- istry of Economy. According to Radio Free Europe, ing (MoU) with his Afghan counterpart and expects Arghandiwal is the leader of the Islamic Party of Af- 64 officials from the US Department of Agriculture ghanistan and has been linked to Gulbuddin Hek- in Afghanistan by February. According to McClatchy matyar‟s Hezb-e Islami, one of the main insurgent Newspapers, the United States has budgeted more groups connected to the Taliban. The Washington than USD 400 million for the Afghan agricultural Post reported that seven of Karzai‟s 24 initial ap- sector this fiscal year. (Comments? Click here) pointments have been accepted by parliament, in- cluding Muhammad Asif Rahimi (Agriculture), Omar Zakhilwal (Finance) and Wahidullah Shahrani (Mines). GOVERNANCE & PARTICIPATION Ann-Kristin Otto, [email protected] / +1 757-683-4368 Back to top Foreign Policy-The Cable reported that according to contract. Holbrooke said he had talked to di Mistura an interview with US Special Representative for Af- about the offer and that the candidate was cur- ghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke, Swedish rently considering his options. UN Secretariat diplomat Staffan di Mistura has been offered the Spokesman Farhan Haq stated that no official ap- post of UN Special Representative of the Secretary pointment had yet been made. Di Mistura (click General (SRSG) in Afghanistan once it becomes va- here for biography) served as SRSG in Iraq from cant in March. Current SRSG Kai Eide announced 2007 to 2009. late last year that he would not seek renewal of his 2 According to the New York Times, after the Wolesi The Independent Election Commission (IEC) has Jirga (Lower House of National Assembly) rejected published details on the schedule for the 22 May 17 of the 24 nominees for ministerial posts intro- National Assembly elections. Chief Electoral Officer duced by Hamid Karzai on 02 January, the President Daud Ali Najafi stressed that the poll will take place re-submitted a list of 16 new names, including the despite the international concerns reported by the previously missing candidate for Foreign Affairs, Zal- Associated Press over the August 2009 presidential may Rasoul, the long time National Security Advisor. balloting fraud, a significant lack of security and One day later, Pajhwok News reported that Karzai inadequate time for suggested electoral reforms. At introduced Abdul Qadus Hamidi as his nominee for a news conference covered by local Noor TV in Ka- Minister of Telecommunications and Information bul, Najafi claimed that the IEC was in favour of Technology, a post previously been left vacant. The reforms, but that major changes had to be initiated remaining 15 names were new candidates, including by the President first. Najafi also responded to calls three female nominees for the ministries of Women‟s for a delay by saying that the international commu- Affairs, Public Health and, Labour and Social Affairs. nity had no authority to interfere in the elections. Karzai has not yet announced a replacement for Is- He did, however, admit that without the financial mail Khan, the Minister for Water and Energy, who backing of international donors the IEC would face was rejected on the initial vote. The Associated significant challenges organizing the poll. According Press quotes Second Vice President Karim Khalili to Najafi, the elections will cost USD 120 million, urging parliament to “think about the national inter- USD 70 million of which could be covered with left- est of the country [and] make a good decision” over funds from the 2009 presidential elections; a when choosing which ministers to reject. According remaining USD 50 million is required from the inter- to the Wall Street Journal, the nominees are still national community. generating resistance among many Members of Par- liament who claim that the new list includes many The Afghan Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC) political unknowns. Presidential Spokesman Waheed has announced that it has completed investigations Omar told a journalist that the President had a third on all electoral complaints addressed to the IEC list of candidates prepared and is ready to introduce before, during and after the 20 August 2009 presi- the new names in the event that candidates are re- dential and provincial council elections. The ECC jected in the second vote of confidence expected submitted all final decisions to the IEC on 16 De- later this week. cember 2009, making the findings public on their website. (Comments? Click here) HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE Valeria Davanzo, [email protected] / +1 757-683-4271 Back to top According to the Pakistani publication The News, it is stan) have been sheltered in the Bagram district of estimated that one million Afghans living as refugees Parwan province. The construction of shelters, com- in Pakistan do not possess identity cards, creating prised of two rooms for each family, began in April problems as authorities deal with trying to identify- 2009 and was completed in early January 2010. ing those caught in the violence and fighting be- Other assistance reportedly includes the provision tween the government and insurgents. This problem of machinery and farming equipment to the Head of is compounded in Peshawar, as the lack of valid the Provincial Agricultural Department by the Ameri- documents of many Afghan refugees does not allow can Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT). The ma- for easy travel in this insecure area. For those Af- chinery will be provided to farmers at no cost dur- ghans permitted to reside in Pakistan and assisted ing the first year, after which recipients will be by UNHCR under a voluntary repatriation pro- asked to pay 100 AFN (approx. USD 2.00) for every gramme, the situation is better. The programme was hour of use. to have ended in December 2009, but in March 2009, UNHCR and the Pakistani government agreed IRIN News reports that since November 2009, hun- to extend the stay of Afghan refugees until the end dreds of families have been forced to leave their of 2012. The agreement includes the issuance of homes in Kapisa province due to ongoing conflict identity cards to all Afghan refugees, allowing them and/or ethnic and tribal hostilities. In December to legally reside in Pakistan until their return to Af- 2009, the Ministry of Refugees and Returnees ghanistan. (MoRR) estimated the number of displaced families to be 180. The internally displaced persons (IDPs) Further related to Afghan refugees, local Afghan themselves, however, contradict the figure claiming media reports that more than 400 families returning there are now over 1,200 families. According to from neighbouring countries (namely Iran and Paki- IRIN, the eastern outskirts of Kabul City are home 3 to the majority of the displaced, who have sought resentative from the non-government organization shelter in a private market and live in unoccupied Action Contre la Faim (ACF) has recommended nutri- shops without window panes or adequate access to tion monitoring as well as supplementary feeding water. The situation has lead to serious health assistance for vulnerable groups. (Comments? threats including malnutrition and disease. Due to Click here) the severity of malnutrition in the settlement, a rep- INFRASTRUCTURE Matthew Hall, [email protected] / +1 757-683-5273 Back to top According to the Kabul-based Hewad, the Iranian The Scotsman reports that on 08 January, British government will provide USD 30 million to Mazar-e soldiers claimed the upper hand in a battle to se- Sharif, Kandahar City and Jalalabad for the construc- cure the Kajaki dam in northern Helmand province. tion of schools. In a meeting with Iranian Deputy In December, efforts to complete upgrades on the Minister of Foreign Affairs on Financial and Admini- dam, including the installation of a large hydroelec- stration Affairs Hossein Farhi, Rangin Dadfar Spanta, tric turbine, were put on hold as a result
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