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DOWNLOAD PDF File Unity is strength... when “ www.outlookafghanistan.net there is teamwork and collaboration, @The.Daily.Outlook.Afghanistan “ wonderful things can be achieved. [email protected] 0093 799-005019/ 777-005019 In front of Habibia High School, Quote of the Day Mattie Stepanek District 6, Kabul, Afghanistan Volume Num. 4528 Sunday January, 24, 2021 Dalw, 05, 1399 www.Outlookafghanistan.net Price: 20/afs US Can’t Prove Pact Binding Govt Taliban-Moscow Ghani Fires Finance Minister, Organs to Use Links: Kabulov Appoints Caretaker to Domestic Products The Position Signed KABUL - The Biden administration’s at- KABUL - An agreement was signed on Sat- tempts to find links between Moscow and urday between the National Procurement the Taliban would not succeed, says Rus- Authority (NPA) and the Afghanistan sia. Chamber of Commerce and Industries, In June, a major US newspaper reported binding all government departments to use that the American intelligence commu- domestic products. nity had informed then President Don- Ilham Omar Hotak, NPA chief, told the ald Trump about Russian efforts to place agreement-signing gathering that the gov- bounties on US soldiers in Afghanistan. ernment must procure domestic products If a fair investigation was conducted, despite being 25 percent expensive. Washington would reach the conclusion Hotak said after signing this agreement, all that such allegations were just nonsense, government administrations were bound Russia’s special presidential representa- to use domestic products. tive for Afghanistan said. “Earlier when I would ask government de- Sputnik quoted Zamir Kabulov as saying partments that why they do not use domes- on Friday: “They can only invent things, tic products? They would talk about the as such facts just don’t exist. If the new low quality of these products, but it would no longer be an issue,” Hotak said. administration has a desire to conduct KABUL - President Ashraf Ghani agement, lack of commitment to da as acting finance minister. an in-depth study, we can only welcome on Saturday dismissed finance good governance, not obeying Arti- Arghandiwal was a close ally of Hotak claimed that according to the agree- that…” minister Abdul Hadi Arghandiwal cle 77 of the Constitution, violating Ghani during his election cam- ment, the Afghanistan chamber of indus- He insisted that if the investigation was from his post and approved a new Presidential decrees and directions, paigns and was appointed as act- tries would guarantee the quality of prod- carried out in a transparent way, the US acting minister, said the Adminis- the lack of cooperation in an assess- ing minister of finance in March last ucts in order to use them with surety. would understand they are just doing trative Office of the President (AOP) ment of illegal appointments at the year. ShirbazKaminzada, chief of Afghanistan stupid things.” in a statement. ministry and for trying to prevent He received a vote of confidence chamber of industries, urged industrialists Kabulov reiterated attempts to find con- The AOP cited a number of reasons the assessments, the statement read. from the Wolesi Jirga (Lower House to deliver their products to the market nections between Moscow and the Tali- for this move including the delay in The AOP added that Ghani ap- of Parliament) in November last keeping in mind their quantity, qual- ban could not be successful. (Pajhwok) the collection of taxes, weak man- proved Mohammad Khalid Payen- year. (ATN) ity and competitiveness. .... More on Num(Page (1) 4) ACAA Spurns Andarabi Claims Taliban Journalists, Activists Hekmatyar’s ‘Playing for Time’ ‘Barred’ from Ghani’s Claim on Unknown KABUL - Masoud Andarabi, firmed that they will review the Minister of Interior Affairs, said US-Taliban agreement signed in Meeting in Herat Aircrafts Landing Saturday the Taliban is playing February last year and that they for time in the ongoing peace will assess whether the Taliban negotiations in Doha and wait- has met the conditions as per the ing to see what the new US ad- deal, which includes ensuring a ministration decides following reduction in violence and the the inauguration of Joe Biden cutting of all ties with Al- last week. Qaeda and other terror- Biden’s administration has con- ist groups. ... More on Num(Page (3) 4) HERAT - Some journalists and civil society activ- ists claim that they were barred from attending KABUL - Hezb-i-Islami Afghanistan (HIA) 4 Planes Being Added to President Ghani’s meeting with Herat officials on leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar has claimed that Thursday, calling it an act to prevent them from unknown aircraft transfer unknown goods from State-Run Airlines Fleet criticizing the president. Kabul International Airport to foreign countries, KABUL - The Afghan Civil three of the government’s ac- They said President Ghani renamed the Herat a claim the Afghanistan Civil Aviation Authority Aviation Authority said on countability program in Kabul. airport and met with local officials during his trip (ACAA) rejected. Saturday it was making efforts He said preparations were un- to the province. In his Friday’s sermon, Hekmatyar said: “Ac- to purchase four passenger air- derway to added two planes to Ghani visited Herat on Wednesday and left there cording to some reports, aircraft sans logos and planes for the state-run Ariana Ariana and two to Bakhtar air- on Thursday. from unknown place land at Kabul Airport and and Bakhtar airlines this fiscal lines fleets. However, he did not “The treatment by the president and the Presi- transfer unknown goods to foreign countries. year. provide details in this regard. dential Palace towards media and journalists This is happening at a time when the security of Mohammad QasemWafaizada, Mohammad Naeem Salehi, give a feeling to all journalists that the Afghan the airport is at the hands of strange personnel head of the Civil Aviation Au- a spokesman for the Af- government does not give any importance to not regular airport security forces.” thority, told this on the day ghan Civil Aviation... freedom of the press,” said Farhad Joya, a jour- “Bags full of unknown materials, possibly dollars More on Num(Page (4) 4) nalist in Herat. and gold, are transported abroad without inspec- “We planned to meet the president, but some tion; these goods belong to close relatives of indi- women tried to prevent us. They told us that if viduals in the regime.” we raised any demand or criticism, we will be Hekmatyar claimed the process of transferring handled by the presidential guards,” said Soraya these items had intensified since the Doha talks Displaced Families: Aid Distribution Karimi, a civil society activist in Herat. reached a critical stage. “It is necessary for the Other civil society activists raised the same is- parliament to address this important national Begins in Samangan sue and said they wanted to share with the presi- issue as well, to appoint a commission to inves- AIBAK - The International Or- the aid distribution ceremony, dent their findings of the security situation in the tigate the case, to identify the perpetrators and ganization of Migration (IOM) said the United States Agency western province, but they were not allowed to violators and to introduce them to the prosecu- on Saturday started distribut- for International Development attend. tor’s office, and to prevent the recurrence of this ing over 15,000 afghanis each (USAID) had provided the cash “We conducted an investigation about govern- looting,” he said. and winter clothing among 602 aid amounting to 9.241 million ment institutions… and wanted to share it with But ACAA in a statement rejected Hekmatyar’s internally displaced families in afghanis and winter clothing for the president, but we were not allowed to meet claims, saying all civilian flights took off with northern Samangan province. the displaced families. The In- the president,” said Halima Pajhwok, a civil so- ACAA permission and were allowed to fly Syed Kamal Husseini, Refugee ternational Organization of ciety activist in Herat. after all requirements were met and the Director of Samangan prov- Migration (IOM) would “We wanted to raise the demands of the peo- purpose of the flight was ascertained... ince, at the inauguration of implement the... ple in Herat in the area of economy, ... More on Num(Page (2) 4) More on Num(Page (5) 4) More on Num(Page (6) 4) Page 2 January 24, 2021 Main Page Investors Seek End to Land Problem in Kabul Wins U-16 Kabul Industrial Park Football Championship KABUL - A group of investors on “We are faced with many prob- Friday called on the government lems… There are problems in the to address the land problem in import of raw materials as well as the Pul-e-Charkhi industrial park the property rent is high,” Mujtaba in Kabul, raising their concerns said. about the allotment of land to “The government promised us those who are not associated with to provide land for factories’ con- any business. struction, but it has not happened Some of the investors said they so far. We are faced with many pay $3,000 per month for prop- problems,” said Arifullah, an in- erty rent at the industrial park. vestor. The investors said less has been Meanwhile, the Ministry of Indus- done by the government for the try and Commerce pledged to find KABUL - Team Kabul won Shabir Ahmad from Kabul was business community and factory those responsible for leasing the the Afghanistan U-16 Football named as the best goalkeeper owners in terms of land allotment property in the industrial park and Championship of the central of the competitions, Bilal from over the last two decades. address the needs of goods for in- zone by defeating Parwan 1-0 in Parwan was named as the best “At least 60 percent of factory vestors, retailers, and distributors the final match on Saturday.
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