Alexander Cooley is associate professor of political science at Barnard College and Columbia University’s Harriman Insti - tute. Lincoln Mitchell is an associate at the Harriman Institute and the author of Uncertain Democracy: U.S. Foreign Policy and Georgia’s Rose Revolution (University of Pennsylvania, 2008). They are the authors of After the August War: A New Strategy for U.S. Engagement with Georgia (Harriman Institute, May 2010).

Abkhazia on Three Wheels Alexander Cooley and Lincoln Mitchell

SUKHUMI—The land between Georgia offered Abkhazia “limitless autonomy” and this breakaway region represents a tense within the framework of a national federa - coda to a short war and a tenuous peace, a tion, but Abkhaz leaders refused to accept tribute to the fragile nature of such territo - control from politicians in Tbilisi, Georgia’s ries. Here, the frontier post is considered an capital. Abkhazia and South Ossetia had international border by the Abkhaz and is been part of Georgia for most of the Soviet patrolled by Abkhaz troops. Russian forces era, and many Georgians consider both ter - are camped nearby. After Russia and Geor - ritories their own. Still, Abkhazia and South gia’s brief war in 2008, Moscow recognized Ossetia fought for their independence in the Abkhazia and South Ossetia’s declarations of early 1990s, and again in August 2008. independence. Since then, Abkhazia and Since then, leadership in Sukhumi — Abk - South Ossetia have, with the Kremlin’s sup - hazia’s capital —find any arrangement that port, lobbied for others’ recognition but might cede sovereignty to Georgia unac - have, for the most part, failed. The territo - ceptable. Few governments acknowledge ries are internationally isolated and increas - that the war has changed the political reali - ingly dependent on Russia for security, ties in Abkhazia and Georgia. The United hence the Russian troops. A steady stream States and Europe continue to support Geor - of tired residents from Gali, an ethnic re - gia’s territorial integrity, but after spending gion on the Abkhaz side of the checkpoint, time in Abkhazia it is clear that this ap - cross this frontier with shopping bags filled proach is a non-starter. By continuing to with goods for trade. By an unfortunate isolate Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Georgia confluence of geography and politics, they and the rest of the world is implicitly allow - are caught in between. ing Russia to get away with a de facto an - This new, postwar reality has been par - nexation of these territories, all but guaran - ticularly damaging to Georgia. For years it teeing ongoing tension and potential mili - claimed it was on the brink of solving inter - tary conflict along these political fault lines. nal conflicts that have fragmented its terri - While Georgia and Abkhazia both cling tories since the early 1990s, when South Os - to a vision of classical sovereignty and state - setia and Abkhazia were first brought under hood, each lacks an essential element of the Georgian leadership. In the years before the necessary combination of de facto control and August 2008 war, the Georgian government de jure international recognition. For Geor -

© 2010 World Policy Institute 73 gia, despite international support for its the place—in the last two decades Abkhazia cause, any real influence over Abkhazia re - has seen a succession of wars, ethnic cleans - mains little more than a distant vision — it’s ing, international neglect and isolation. been almost 18 years since it had effective Most estimates put the population at about control of the breakaway territory. For Abk - 180,000; during the 1989 census, when hazia, broader international recognition of ethnic Abkhaz constituted a plurality (but its independence appears unlikely. New ties not a majority) of the population, it was with Russia threaten to curtail whatever au - 525,000. The Abkhaz share their tiny terri - tonomy the region enjoyed before the war, tory with a potpourri of ethnic Armenians, when it did not claim to be an independent Russians and Georgians living primarily in state but was, ironically, less under the Gali district. More than 200,000 other Moscow’s sway than it is today. Now the ethnic Georgians were forced from their territory has been turned into a Russian homes and driven across the frontier at the province in every way but its name. Georgia end of 1993, during the wars between Geor - needs to engage with Abkhazia without re - gia and Abkhazia. sorting to the language of exclusive sover - From Tbilisi, the Abkhaz capital of eignty —that will only deepen Abkhazia’s Sukhumi is a seven-hour drive. After four isolation and possible Russian annexation. hours it is interrupted by a checkpoint Georgian and Abkhaz leadership face do - along a ceasefire line, established after the mestic difficulties of their own, further com - 2008 war. This is now Abkhazia’s adminis - plicating matters. In Tbilisi, discussing any - trative boundary. Compared to the rest of thing but total sovereignty over Abkhazia is the South Caucasus, the first part of the trip unacceptable. And the same is true in Sukhu - is smooth sailing. President Saakashvili has mi, Abkhazia’s capital. Throughout his time substantially improved Georgia’s infrastruc - in office, Georgian President Mikheil ture during his six years in office, so traffic Saakashvili has regularly promised his con - moves quickly along the newly renovated stituents that an Abkhaz return was immi - highways. nent; but for many in Abkhazia, Georgian Things change at the checkpoint. rule is a distant memory. These domestic Gocha, our dependable and easygoing driv - constraints render any creative compromise er, heads back to Zugdidi, the nearest city over Abkhazia’s legal status politically impos - on the Georgian side. We walk 200 yards sible. Meanwhile, both Tbilisi and Sukhumi towards the guards, carrying our passports continue to press for their peculiar and im - and a printout of a permit to visit Abkhazia, probable sovereign aspirations. Tbilisi seeks secured through a visa agency in Toronto. international support for Georgia’s non-exis - The Georgian soldiers take a cursory glance tent territorial integrity, while Sukhumi at our passports before waving us through. builds a new state that has little chance of They’re chatting in Mingrelian, a west- being recognized by the countries it needs to Georgian dialect. We set off up the road to - make Abkhazia’s statehood feasible. wards the Abkhaz checkpoint and after about half-a-mile we find two more Geor - gian soldiers glancing at us with some cu - Checkpoints and Boundaries riosity —we’re in business suits, not the Abkhazia lies in the northwest corner of most common attire for these checkpoint Georgia, sandwiched between the Black Sea crossings. The soldiers are more interested and the foothills of the Caucasus. The beau - in talking to us than examining our docu - tiful setting fails to conceal the ugliness of ments. After exchanging a few sentences in

74 WORLD POLICY JOURNAL • SUMMER 2010 ©Dan Uneken The Inguri River: Displaced Georgians on a bridge to nowhere.

Russian, we continue. lies a few hundred yards away, a Russian A bedraggled donkey stands hitched to a flag flying over the entrance, just a few feet jerry-rigged cart. The cart is built from dis - from a large election campaign billboard carded farm equipment and the wheels of an promoting the presidential candidacy of old Soviet Lada sedan. A few feet away sits Sergei Bagapsh, Abhkazia’s recently reelect - the driver, anxiously waiting to make a few ed leader. rubles ferrying travelers across this no man’s A minor clerical error by the visa agency land between the checkpoints. We turn down in Toronto threatens to destroy our plans the donkey cart and walk over a concrete and force us to turn back, but the Abkhaz bridge designed for truck traffic. Spanning soldiers make a few calls to our contacts in the scenic Inguri River, it marks the bound - Sukhumi and tell us to wait. We can’t call ary of the breakaway territory. The bridge is because Georgian cell phones don’t reach pock-marked and full of deep puddles. It has Abkhaz territory, presumably because they had few repairs since the USSR collapsed. are being jammed by Russia, or Georgia, or On the Abkhaz side, the checkpoint both. We settle in, eating energy bars and consists of a series of rundown shacks sur - sipping water. From our previous trip to rounded by a few kiosks selling cigarettes, Abkhazia we learned to bring our own water and liquor. There’s an empty restau - food —there are few stores and restaurants, rant that smells of barbecued meat. Though even in the capital. the checkpoint is manned by Abkhaz At least 100 people pass in both direc - troops, there is no question who is in charge tions. All are locals, ethnic Georgians who here. A substantial Russian military camp live in southern Abkhazia. In the decades

Abkhazia on Three Wheels 75 since conflicts began, Abkhaz leadership has Georgia, you travel through a checkpoint. allowed about 30,000 Georgian residents In Sukhumi, this is a border. In Georgia, from border villages around Gali to return to ethnic Georgians expelled from Abkhazia their homes. The Georgians refer to them as during the wars of the 1990s are Internally “spontaneous returns.” Most have roots in Displaced Persons; in Abkhazia they are Gali, but friends in Georgia. We watch them refugees. In this case, the word choice is es - carry large bags of goods, presumably taking pecially important —refugee implies an es - advantage of the trade opportunities on ei - cape from persecution across international ther side. Taxis and Abkhaz martshutkas , the borders, while Internally Displaced Persons local mini-buses, wait at the checkpoint and move within a country. gradually fill up before departing for points The most striking aspect of traveling further into Abkhazia. One smiling taxi through Abkhazia is its emptiness. Aban - driver approaches every 10 minutes, remind - doned houses, summer homes, villas, ad - ing us that if our ride doesn’t come he would ministrative offices and shacks all litter the gladly take us to Sukhumi. landscape. The region lost about 250,000 While we wait, we are approached by a people, mostly ethnic Georgians, during the chatty Russian soldier, educated, well-armed tail end of wars in the early 1990s. The and clearly with the Federal Security Service, emptiness here is a stark reminder of why the successor to the Soviet-era KGB. We an - Abkhaz statehood is rejected by most of the swer his questions cheerily, explaining that world —the absence of Georgians is evidence the error in our paperwork was not our own, of ethnic cleansing. and agree with him that all people in the In Sukhumi, a few hundred meters from world should live in peace and friendship. A the decrepit boardwalk, an enormous concrete few minutes later we are allowed across the structure looms over the landscape. It was checkpoint, as a large Russian helicopter once home to cafes and restaurants, but today flies above us at low altitude, patrolling the resembles nothing so much as a giant, decay - northern bank of the Inguri. ing cruise ship. A handful of pensioners drink coffee on plastic sun chairs, reminders of a time when Abkhazia was known as the best Into the Void spot for a beach vacation in the USSR, where Though barely 50 miles, the drive to the Soviet elite spent a few weeks a year on Sukhumi takes at least two hours. The roads the Black Sea enjoying the sun and the sea. are atrocious —potholes filled with mud and With so few people, Abkhazia lacks the water slow our aging car to a crawl. These human capital to build a viable government, roads have suffered from years of neglect, create schools and universities, or defend it - not to mention all the tanks that rolled self. Of course, Russia is here to help with across them during the August 2008 war. the staffing and training of a nascent, pro- Russia funded road repair from Sukhumi Kremlin Abkhaz state. But this solution north to its border, but this largesse has not won’t end with a functioning Abkhaz nation. extended south towards Zugdidi, the nearest major city on the Georgian side of the checkpoint. The message is clear — Measuring Up Abkhazia’s future lies with Russia, not Politics in Abkhazia lack the frenetic tone Georgia. common in Georgia. The case for statehood Even language is used differently here. is made in detailed and considered terms, In Tbilisi, crossing between Abkhazia and not the angry rhetoric so common in Tbil -

76 WORLD POLICY JOURNAL • SUMMER 2010 isi. Perhaps because of the far smaller popu - A Meeting With The President lation or the Russian presence, Abkhazia Abkhazia is dominated by Russia. Its citi - feels calm; while Georgia feels like the calm zens wrestle with this fact. Is absorption in - before the storm. In 2010, Georgia is em - to the Russian Federation too high a price phatically absent from the minds of the to pay for self-declared independence, and Abkhaz, a stark constrast to the period be - an end to the fear of Georgian aggression? fore the August 2008 war. When we visited Government officials are less than forthcom - Sukhumi two years ago—just months before ing, and claim that relations with Russia are the war—everyone we spoke to spent a great fine, that they actually have a reasonable de - deal of time portraying Georgia as armed gree of autonomy from Moscow. But this and dangerous. Today the political, civic and business leaders we meet seem uninterested in Georgia, be - cause of what happened after the Abkhazia is dominated by war. Russia. Its citizens wrestle After Georgia attacked “ Tskhinvali, the capital of South with this fact. Ossetia, on August 6, 2008, Rus - sia opened up a military front ” through Abkhazia, mounting an offensive does not jibe with Russia’s economic and into Georgia. In the process, Russian troops political activity throughout Abkhazia. reclaimed the Upper Khodori Valley region, Since the war, local phone exchanges have a heavily militarized mountain gorge that been replaced by Russian ones, so that a call had been triumphantly seized by Georgian to Abkhazia requires the Russian country President Saakashvili in 2006 following its code. The ruble remains the common cur - demilitarization in 2002. Soon after the rency. Russian media, security, and political 2008 war, Russia recognized Abkhazia’s in - presence is ubiquitous. And Abkhaz citizens dependence and sought to legalize its mili - currently travel on Russian passports — tary presence on Abkhaz territory, reaching although this is slated to change within the bilateral defense and border protection next year, when Abkhaz documents will be agreements with Sukhumi. Russian troops distributed. In less than two years, Abkhazia in Abkhazia now formally guarantee Abk - and Russia have signed more than 30 agree - haz security. ments on cooperation in various spheres, Though they may not be taken seriously and the vast majority give Russia the license in Tbilisi or the West, the Abkhaz are focused to impose its standards, transfer its human on state building. In Moscow, it is common capital or, in some form, absorb some sliver to hear leaders say that they will work with of the Abkhaz state or an entire agency or Georgia once the leadership changes, but in enterprise under the cover of an internation - Abkhazia there are no such claims. Indeed, al accord. Abkhaz officials have agreed to the country seems totally disinterested in transfer the bulk of their railroads, maritime Georgia’s tumultuous domestic politics. The transport, electricity transmission and air one glib aside, trumpeted by the Abkhaz traffic control directly to their Russian leadership, political analysts and virtually counterparts. everybody else, is that they are thankful to Much of Abkhazia’s economy comes President Saakashvili for initiating the 2008 from the 2 million Russian tourists who war that ultimately spawned their nation. flock to the Black Sea each year. Due to its

Abkhazia on Three Wheels 77 proximity to the Russian city of Sochi, site deal with the exhiled Georgians, it is likely of the 2014 Winter Olympics, Abkhazia has that their aspirations for independence will become even more closely tied to Russia’s continue to be marginalized. economy. Resources for Olympic-related At midnight, the day before our construction in Sochi —such as a massive planned meetings with Abkhaz leaders, our new cement mixing factory in Tkuarchal — schedule threatens to be derailed. We re - increasingly come from Abkhazia. It’s been ceive a call from an adviser to the Abkhaz suggested that Abkhazian law will soon al - president. A Nicaraguan delegation is in low Russians to buy property here, and it is town and will be visiting Abkhaz official in - almost certain that the land along the Black stitutions the following day, he informs us. Sea will be rapidly bought up. It will be very difficult for us to get time Politically, Russia is the only major with the president, prime minister or any country that maintains diplomatic relations other senior Abkhaz official, he continues, as with Abkhazia. Earlier this year, Moscow they will be embroiled in the extravagant provided a generous foreign assistance pack - ceremonies. We push back against this un - age of $50 million to Nauru, a tiny island expected threat to our schedule, and tell in the South Pacific and the smallest recog - him that most independent countries, at the nized independent country in the world. It very least, should be able to host a minor soon became the fourth country to officially delegation from Central America and recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia, join - squeeze in time for two American academ - ing Nicaragua, Venezuela and, of course, ics. Luckily, the message is received and we Russia. But these recognitions from distant are able to meet with Abkhaz President nations are far more important as external Sergei Bagapsh. validation; they aren’t really genuine sources He graciously receives us in his presi - of partnership. No other state in the region dential office, a large room in one of Sukhu - has indicated that it’s likely to recognize mi’s main government office buildings a Abkhaz sovereignty any time soon, nor will hundred yards from the Black Sea. There are the European Union or the United States. ceremonial swords, prepared for the Beyond the Russian question, the Abk - Nicaraguan delegation, there to remind us haz leadership has no idea how to deal with how seriously Bagapsh takes recognition. local Georgians who were forced out of Abk - He reiterates his government’s commitment hazia more than 15 years ago. If all returned, to economic development and statehood, Abkhazia would again have a Georgian ma - but seems reluctant to confront just how jority, and that would be the end of any difficult such tasks would be. He seems at Abkhaz statehood. But refusing the Geor - peace with the enormous role Russia would gians’ return would mean building a state play in keeping the Abkhaz project afloat. based on ethnic cleansing. The former solu - tion is untenable within Abkhazia; the sec - ond doesn’t sit well with the rest of the No Laughing Matter world. Any popular referendum on statehood In this post-Kosovo world, the Abkhaz aspira - Abkhazia submits to the UN Security Coun - tion for statehood should not be dismissed. cil that does not include a significant portion Officials in Sukhumi argue that, contrary to of these former residents cannot be accepted the American position, Kosovo did in fact es - as legitimate—regardless of whether or not tablish a significant precedent for breakaway these former residents even want to return. territories. The independence of Kosovo, ac - Until its leadership comes up with a way to cording to the Abkhaz argument, is similar to

78 WORLD POLICY JOURNAL • SUMMER 2010 the situation here. In both cases, the estab - released the captain, and Georgian leaders lished country lost its right to govern a break - began to think of more constructive ways to away region through aggressive and unpro - press their sovereign and legal claims. voked attacks. While the analogy is not per - The Georgian government recently pub - fect, it is powerful enough for the Abkhaz and lished a new paper called “State Strategy on the Russians, if no one else. Still, most coun - Occupied Territories: Engagement through tries in the world want nothing to do with Cooperation.” The report centers on the ef - the self-styled independence of either Kosovo forts to win back Abkhazia. This strategy, (which is still only recognized by about 60 “engagement through cooperation,” ad - nations) or Abkhazia, for fear that such recognition will lead to further disintegration and The opening of a Benetton fragmentation within existing store in Sukhumi was hailed states. For its part, Russia op - “ posed Kosovo’s independence as a major achievement. while making it clear that, for them, Kosovo sets a precedent for an independent Abkhazia. mirably puts status questions on t”he back So far, Abkhazia’s plans for economic de - burner and tones down some of the aggres - velopment, diversified economic activity and sive rhetoric that Georgia has used in the trading partners —all of which are essential past. It proposes a set of joint Georgian- for creating a viable state —have met with Abkhaz initiatives in trade, transport, health little success. The opening of a Benetton and education. The Georgian strategy also clothing store in Sukhumi was hailed a major offers Abkhazia the prospect of establishing achievement, but the Finnish cellular giant links to the outside world via non-govern - Nokia stopped selling new hardware here af - mental organizations, on the important con - ter Finland’s foreign ministry objected. In dition that the Abkhaz agree to participate this international legal limbo, it is difficult in joint delegations and international pro - to believe that strong commercial links be - grams with Georgians displaced from Abk - tween Abkhazia and anywhere beyond Rus - hazia. Georgian officials make a point of sia’s influence will begin soon. highlighting just how difficult it was to achieve an interagency agreement on many of the strategy’s provisions, and what a The View from Georgia break this is from previously inflexible posi - Immediately following the 2008 war, the tions. They may be right, but this strategy Georgian government passed the “Law on seems like too little, too late. For years, the Occupied Territories.” It was a highly criti - Georgian public has been led to believe that cized piece of legislation, and it placed the unification of Georgia under the heavy penalties on any individual, organiza - Saakashvili administration was right around tion or corporation with contacts in occu - the corner. So accepting any sort of conces - pied Abkhazia. The law was cited in August sions on status issues, or even a more concil - 2009, when the Georgian Coast Guard in - iatory stance, is difficult. tercepted a Turkish ship transporting fuel to In Abkhazia, the new Georgian strategy Abkhazia, sentencing its captain to 24 years seems like a non-starter too. Some Abkhaz in prison. The Turkish Foreign Minister officials oppose it simply because its ulti - rushed to Tbilisi on a crisis visit, Georgia mate goal remains restoring Abkhazia to

Abkhazia on Three Wheels 79 Georgian rule. Others view it as a strategy likely, that Abkhazia will stumble along in meant not for Abkhaz consumption, but for its current situation, asserting its independ - Georgia’s European and American donors, ence and perhaps even winning recognition who want to see Georgia adopt a more con - from a few more countries in Latin America ciliatory tone towards its breakaway territo - and the Pacific —12 to 16 nations in the ries. Regardless, the Abkhaz are adamant next five years, perhaps. All the while, it that any links they establish with the inter - will remain heavily dependent on Russia. national community will not ultimately be This, clearly, is the path of least resist - decided or mediated by Tbilisi. ance for Abkhazia. But it’s one that, if fol - Ironically, Abkhazia believes that a lowed, will make any hope of separating warming of relations between Georgia and from Russia more difficult with each pass - Russia is a more significant threat than in - ing month. By seeking new and different vading Georgian troops. Although this arrangements of sovereignty, Abkhazia is seems unlikely in the immediate future, drifting into the waiting arms of Russia. there are forces in both Russia and Georgia The absence of international leverage or who believe the two countries must find a even creative thinking about an Abkhaz way to deescalate tensions and militant rhet - state (reinforced by near universal support oric. If this happens, it is not at all unimag - for Tbilisi’s position) makes the considera - inable that Russia could cede all or part of tion of more novel sovereign arrange - Abkhazia back to Georgia. This would also, ments—such as the transfer to an interna - of course, be a valuable bargaining chip for tional administration—quite unlikely. Russia in the West. Now is the time for the West to break Still, in the current political climate, all with Tbilisi and establish some modest Georgian strategies will prove difficult. communications and contacts with Sukhu - There is little interest within Abkhazia to mi, while insisting that it will not recognize engage with Georgia. Moreover, only Russia Abkhaz independence. The West must en - has any ability to move Abkhazia toward gage with the breakaway territory, if only to engagement, and Russia is strongly disin - try to halt Abkhazia’s absorption into Russia clined to push Abkhazia toward talks. Hav - and buy some time for an internationally ing isolated Abkhazia for nearly two decades backed status to be formulated. If this is not in support of Georgia’s territorial integrity, a result which the United States and the EU the EU and the United States have no lever - can accept, then it’s essential that Western age over the leadership in Sukhumi. So diplomats adopt a new strategy of engage - while it is too early to give up on the Geor - ment, while continuing to refuse to recog - gian strategy, it faces potentially insur - nize Abkhazia’s independence. mountable challenges. Reflections on the Road Sovereign Dreams The drive from Sukhumi back to the check - Russia will not let Georgia reassert sover - point follows a slightly different route. eignty over Abkhazia. The rest of the world There are unexpected road closings, and we is not likely to recognize Abkhaz independ - travel on empty pavement through the de - ence. The short- and medium-range future serted town of Gali. The roads here are lit - for Abkhazia will likely end up somewhere tered with garbage and filled with enormous between these poles, but it is not at all clear holes and cracks. In some cases they simply where. It is certainly possible, and perhaps end with no warning. Our driver taking us

80 WORLD POLICY JOURNAL • SUMMER 2010 through this desolate and war-torn moon - the checkpoint our driver bids us goodbye scape happens to be a member of Abkhazia’s and enlists the help of a Russian soldier to substantial Armenian population. At one help him replace the wheel. It’s a good point he sarcastically asks us if the roads we metaphor for Abkhazia, bumping along on have in the United States are this bad. just three good wheels, asking Russia for A few miles north of the checkpoint, help with its fourth. On some level, just as one of the cracks in the road gets the better we figured three wheels were better than of our aging Russian-made Zhiguli and we walking, the Abkhaz seem aware—even if get a flat. Our driver chooses to forge ahead the West is not yet persuaded— that they and we drive the final few miles, jostling have to do the best with what they’ve got. back and forth on the rim. When we reach That it could be worse. •

Abkhazia on Three Wheels 81