THE POST-SOVIET SPACE AND IN THE INTERNATIONAL DIVISION OF LABOUR FROM TRANSITION TO CAPITAL ACCUMULATION

A thesis submitted to The University of Manchester for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Faculty of Humanities

2021 Franco Galdini School of Social Sciences Department of Politics

Contents

List of Figures 6 List of Acronyms 7 Abstract 10 Declaration and Copyright Statement 11 Acknowledgements 12

INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER 13 From Transition to Capital Accumulation in the Post-Soviet Space 13 0. INTRODUCTION 13 1. FROM TRANSITION TO CAPITAL ACCUMULATION: POSITIONING THE THESIS, RESEARCH QUESTIONS, AND CONTRIBUTION 14 2. METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH METHODS 21 2.1. Form analysis: Global content, national forms 21 2.2. Class and Internal relations 22 2.3. Levels of generality 24 2.4. Research methods 25 3. CHAPTER STRUCTURE AND KEY ARGUMENTS 26 4. THE LIMITS OF THE DISSERTATION 31 5. CONCLUSION 32

CHAPTER 1 34 A Monopoly on ‘Normality’: A Review of the Literature on Transition as Development 34 0. INTRODUCTION 34 1. DEVELOPMENT IN TRANSITION 35 1.1. Neoliberal theory 35 1.2. Developmental state theory 37 1.3. Dependency theory 41 1.4. Methodological nationalism common to the literature 43 2. ON ‘NORMALITY’ AND EXCEPTIONALISM (1): TRANSITOLOGY IN THE FSU 44 2.1. The roaring 1990s: (revolutionary) shock therapy and (evolutionary) gradualism 46 2.2. Permanent exceptionalism: From the 2000s to today 51 3. ON ‘NORMALITY’ AND EXCEPTIONALISM (2): TRANSITOLOGY IN UZBEKISTAN 54 3.1. Neoliberal transitology: Uzbekistan as negatively exceptional 55 3.1.a. The 1990s: Non/slow/late reform and the ‘Uzbek growth puzzle’ 55 3.1.b. From the 2000s until today: Permanent exceptionalism and the enduring ‘paradox’ of no transition and transformation 60 3.2. Developmental transitology: Uzbekistan as positively exceptional 62 3.2.a. The rise of the Uzbek model in the 1990s 62 3.2.b. The 2000s to today: State-led upgrading as alternative to neoliberalism 65

2 4. STUCK IN TRANSITION: METHODOLOGICAL NATIONALISM, EXTERNAL RELATIONS, AND IDEAL-TYPE DEMOCRATIC CAPITALISM 68 5. CONCLUSION 70

CHAPTER 2 72 Beyond Exceptionalism: The Political Economy of ‘Resource Rich’ Countries in the International Division of Labour 72 0. INTRODUCTION 72 1. FROM CIDL TO NIDL: EXPLAINING UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT IN THE GPE 74 1.1. The rise of the NIDL: Large-scale industry, labour, and uneven development 76 1.2. National differentiation in the IDL 79 2. THE SPECIFICITY OF ACCUMULATION IN ‘RESOURCE RICH’ COUNTRIES: GROUND-RENT, LAND USE, SURPLUS POPULATION 86 2.1. Forms of ground-rent in capitalism 87 2.1.a. Absolute rent & Simple absolute monopoly rent 88 2.1.b. Differential rents (DRI & DRII) 89 2.2. Ground-rent and ‘backward’ industrialisation: Labour, gender, and surplus population (1) 91 2.3. Primitive accumulation, gender, and surplus population (2) 94 2.4. Land use, gender, and everyday resistance in the age of climate crisis 97 3. BEYOND EXCEPTIONALISM: THE FSU AND UZBEKISTAN AS ‘RESOURCE RICH’ COUNTRIES IN THE IDL 101 4. CONCLUSION 104

CHAPTER 3 106 ‘ of the Diverse’: The Post-Soviet Space in the International Division of Labour 106 0. INTRODUCTION 106 1. THE POST-SOVIET STATES AS RAW MATERIAL EXPORTERS IN THE IDL 107 1.1. Before ‘transition’: Decentralisation, fragmentation, dissolution 108 1.2. ‘Unity of the diverse’: Different ‘paths’ of transition, same form of integration 111 2. GROUND-RENT AND ‘BACKWARD’ INDUSTRIALISATION IN THE FSU 114 2.1. The 1990s: Decentralisation, manufacturing collapse, and economic reprimarisation 116 2.2. From the 2000s until today: Different forms, same content 122 3. DIFFERENTIATING THE COST OF REPRODUCTION OF THE WORKING CLASS: CLASS AND STRUGGLE IN THE FSU 128 4. CONCLUSION 133

CHAPTER 4 135 Ground-rent, Labour, and Uzbekistan’s ‘Backward’ Industrialisation in the International Division of Labour 135 0. INTRODUCTION 135 1. ‘UNITY OF THE DIVERSE’: FROM THE ‘UZBEK MODEL’... 136

3 1.1. The why behind the ‘Uzbek model’ 137 1.2. State policies and institutions: ground-rent for ‘backward’ industrialisation 143 2. ...TO ‘LIBERALISATION’ 148 2.1. Different forms, same content 150 3. A CASE STUDY IN ‘BACKWARD’ INDUSTRIALISATION: UZBEKISTAN’S CAR INDUSTRY SINCE 1992 157 3.1. Uzbekistan’s ‘backward’ car manufacturing 158 3.2. Ground-rent, labour, and solvent demand 165 3.3. The car industry since 2016: new players, same game 167 4. CONCLUSION 169

CHAPTER 5 171 Decollectivisation, Social Stratification, Class and Struggle in ‘Resource Rich’ Uzbekistan 171 0. INTRODUCTION 171 1. DECOLLECTIVISATION AND CLASS STRATIFICATION: THE RISE OF A VAST RELATIVE SURPLUS POPULATION 172 1.1. From collective agriculture to private farmers and landless peasants 174 1.2. A vast relative surplus population: peasants, daily workers, labour migrants 179 2. BETWEEN LABOUR AND SURPLUS: DIFFERENTIATING THE COSTS OF REPRODUCTION OF THE WORKING CLASS 183 2.1. Informal: geography, gender, skills 184 2.2. Formal: geography, gender, skills 190 3. CLASS AND STRUGGLE 195 4. CONCLUSION 198

CHAPTER 6 200 Class, Food In/Security, and Everyday Resistance in ‘Resource Rich’ Uzbekistan in the Age of Climate Crisis 200 0. INTRODUCTION 200 1. LAND AND RESOURCE USE AND DEPLETION IN ‘RESOURCE RICH’ UZBEKISTAN 201 1.1. From Aral Sea desiccation... 201 1.2. Agribusiness and industry 206 1.3. … to glacial retreat 208 2. TECHNO-MANAGERIAL ‘SOLUTIONS’, CLASS STRATIFICATION, AND FOOD IN/SECURITY 210 3. WOMEN AND EVERYDAY RESISTANCE BETWEEN CAPITAL ACCUMULATION AND SOCIAL REPRODUCTION 216 4. CONCLUSION 220

CONCLUDING CHAPTER 222 Capital Accumulation in the Post-Soviet Space: Towards a New Research Agenda 222 0. INTRODUCTION 222 1. MAIN ARGUMENTS AND ANSWERS TO THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 222

4 1.1. Research Question 1 222 1.2. Research Question 2 226 1.3. Research Question 3 227 2. CONTRIBUTION TO THE LITERATURE 231 3. BEYOND EXCEPTIONALISM: TOWARDS A NEW RESEARCH AGENDA 232

APPENDIX 1 236 Map of Uzbekistan 236

APPENDIX 2 237 Fieldwork: List of interviewees and conferences 237

APPENDIX 3 241 GDP growth (annual %) in selected CIS countries (1991-2018) 241

APPENDIX 4 242 Selected International Commodity Prices in USD (1989-2019) 242

APPENDIX 5 243 Uzbekistan’s production (tons) (1989-2019) & cotton exports (mln USD) (1995-2018) 243 Uzbekistan’s & ’s FDIs in mln USD vis-à-vis natural gas price (1992- 2018) 244 ’s FDIs in mln USD vis-à-vis oil price (1992-2018) 245 Uzbekistan’s cotton, gold, and natural gas exports as % of total (selected years) 246

APPENDIX 6 247 ’s car industry since 1992 247 Uzbekistan’s car production/exports vis-à-vis total exports in mln USD (1996-2018) 249

APPENDIX 7 250 Uzbekistan’s land use changes, migration, and remittances in mln USD (2000-2010) 250

APPENDIX 8 251 Uzbekistan’s land use change for key crops/1,000 ha (selected years) 251

BIBLIOGRAPHY 252

Word Count: 88,311 words

5 List of Figures

Figure 1.1. GDP growth (annual %) in selected CIS countries (1991- 46 2018)

Figure 3.1. Selected International Commodity Prices in USD (1989-2019) 116

Figure 4.1. Uzbekistan’s cotton production (tons) (1989-2019) & cotton 149 exports (mln USD) (1995-2018)

Figure 4.2.a. Uzbekistan’s & Turkmenistan’s FDIs in mln USD vis-à-vis 151 natural gas price (1992-2018)

Figure 4.2.b. Kazakhstan’s FDIs in mln USD vis-à-vis oil price (1992-2018) 152

Figure 4.3. Uzbekistan’s cotton, gold, and natural gas exports as % of 154 total (selected years)

Figure 4.4. Uzbekistan’s car production/export vis-à-vis total exports in 162 mln USD (1996-2018)

Figure 5.1. Uzbekistan’s land use changes, migration, and remittances in 182 mln USD (2000-2010)

Figure 6.1. Uzbekistan’s land use change for key crops/1,000 ha 205 (selected years)

6 List of Acronyms

ACRU Antimonopoly Committee of the Republic of Uzbekistan ADB Asian Development Bank ADBI Asian Development Bank Institute AGMK Almalyk Mining and Metallurgical Company AR Absolute rent BBC British Broadcasting Corporation BNS Bureau of National Statistics of the Republic of Kazakhstan CAAN Central Asia Analytical Network CBU Central Bank of Uzbekistan CEE Central and Eastern Europe CER Center for Economic Research (GoU-affiliated) CIA Central Intelligence Agency CIDL Classical International Division of Labour CICP Centre for Research as Practical Criticism CIS Commonwealth of Independent States DMC Motor Company DRI/DRII Differential rent I/II EBRD European Bank for Reconstruction and Development EDB Eurasian Development Bank EIU Economist Intelligence Unit EJF Environmental Justice Foundation EOI Export-Oriented Industrialisation E&Y Ernst & Young FAO Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations FDIs Foreign Direct Investments FEZs Free Economic Zones FH Freedom House FSU Former FTA Free Trade Agreement FTUU Federation of Trade Unions of Uzbekistan FW Fieldwork GCF Green Climate Fund GDP Gross Domestic Product GEF Global Environment Facility GM GosKomGMR Uzbekistan State Committee for Geology and Mineral Resources GosKomStat State Committee of the Republic of Uzbekistan on Statistics GoU GPE Global political economy HRW IACHR Inter-American Commission on Human Rights IAMO Leibniz Institute of Agricultural Development in Transition Economies ICG International Crisis Group IDL International Division of Labour IEA International Energy Agency IFC International Finance Corporation

7 IFIs International Financial Institutions IFMR Institute of Forecasting and Macroeconomic Research (GoU-affiliated) ILO International Labour Organisation IMF International Monetary Fund INT Interviewee IOM International Organisation for Migration IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change IRP International Resource Panel (UNEP) ISI Import-Substitution Industrialisation ITUC International Trade Union Confederation IWPR Institute for War and Peace Reporting JICA Japan International Cooperation Agency JV Joint Venture KNOMAD Global Knowledge Partnership on Migration and Development LRMM Central Asia Labour Rights Monitoring Mission MFT Ministry of Trade of the Republic of Uzbekistan MNCs/TNCs Multinational/Transnational Corporations MOE Ministry of Economy of the Republic of Uzbekistan MOF Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Uzbekistan NBU National Bank for Foreign Economic Activity of Uzbekistan NGMK Navoi Mining and Metallurgical Company NIDL New International Division of Labour OCC Organic Composition of Capital ODA Official Development Assistance OEC Observatory of Economic Complexity (at MIT Media Lab) OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development OICA International Organization of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers PKM Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan PP Resolution of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan PPP Purchasing Power Parity R&D Research & Development RFE/RL Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (US government funded) Rosstat Federal State Statistics Service of the Russian Federation RPRF Executive Order of the Government of the Russian Federation RQ Research Question SAMR Simple absolute monopoly rent SAPs Structural Adjustment Programmes SCNP State Committee for Nature Protection of the Republic of Uzbekistan SMEs Small and Medium Enterprises SOEs State-Owned Enterprises SWFs Sovereign Wealth Funds UFRD Uzbekistan Fund for Reconstruction and Development UN United Nations UNCCD Secretariat of the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development UNDESA United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNECE United Nations Economic Commission for Europe

8 UNEP United Nations Environment Programme UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change UNG Uzbekneftegaz (Uzbekistan’s oil and gas company) UzKhimProm Uzbekistan’s chemical company UzHydroMet Centre of Hydrometeorological Service of the Republic of Uzbekistan UP Decree of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan USD Dollar USDA United States Department of Agriculture Foreign Agricultural Service USDS United States Department of State US-SEC United States Securities and Exchange Commission USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics UzSSR Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic WCAs Water Consumers’ Associations WFP World Food Programme WHO World Health Organisation WTO WWAP UNESCO World Water Assessment Programme WWII World War II

9 Abstract This dissertation analyses the transformation in the political-economy of the post-Soviet space and Uzbekistan since 1991 as diverse national forms of the essential unity of global capital accumulation. Due to their integration into the International Division of Labour (IDL) as primary commodity producers, in line with other ‘resource rich’ countries of the Global South, the states of the former Soviet Union (FSU) exhibited the same qualitative forms of raw material export orientation and ‘backward’ capital accumulation, whereby small manufacturing capitals by international standards produce relatively expensive and substandard goods largely for the domestic market. Within this qualitative unity, the quantitative diversity between and within these states in the past three decades has resulted from the varying magnitude of ground-rent available on their territories, as encapsulated in the fluctuating international prices of their resource endowments. Ground-rent is the value incorporated in the price of primary commodities due to the need to pay a rent to the landlord for the use of land in their production. As such, land use changes following independence led to the expulsion of the mass of the people from said land in order to put it to use for capitalist production, turning this population into relative surplus for the requirements of accumulation, as extractive and ‘backward’ industries could only absorb a fraction thereof.

All these dynamics have been evident in Uzbekistan, too, as it integrated into the IDL as a raw material exporter in line with the FSU and other ‘resource rich’ states of the Global South. Given the centrality and specificity of cotton production, the ‘Uzbek model’ mediated this form of incorporation with the state maintaining a relative ‘centralisation’ of economic activity to secure the input production, irrigation coordination, and labour mobilisation necessary to produce cotton for export. Changing material conditions in the country and the global market in the following decades, particularly cotton ceding pride of place to gold and natural gas as the key primary commodities for export, set the stage for the current series of ‘liberalising’ reforms. Throughout its independent history, however, Uzbekistan has exhibited the same qualitative forms of raw material export orientation and ‘backward’ capital accumulation as the FSU, as its balance of trade and developments in the country’s car industry clearly demonstrate.

In parallel, the majority of the population has been expelled from the land to shift its use from social reproduction to production for capital accumulation, turning this vast mass of people into relative surplus for the requirements of capital and giving rise to informality, poverty, and rural outmigration in the country. The ensuing splintering of the working class along in/formal, geographic, skill, and gender lines explain the largely localised and spontaneous forms of labour mobilisation to resist precarisation, with the authoritarian state using a host of repressive tools to diffuse protests and, at times of a perceived threat to the process of accumulation, crush them. In this context, while women have borne the brunt of informalisation and pauperisation, their work has become even more central to the reproduction of this relative surplus population; in turn, the escalating climate crisis on the back of growing raw material extraction/production has placed women at the centre of everyday resistance to capital, as land and resource use for accumulation risks precipitating a full-blown reproduction crisis specifically for the relative surplus population. Thus, as the foundational divide in capitalist society, class defines women’s worsening material conditions as well as their, and the surplus population’s, heightened vulnerability to climate change.

The dissertation contributes to the scholarly literature in two ways. First, it explains the post-1991 transformation in the FSU and Uzbekistan beyond the transition literature’s exceptionalisation of the region, accounting for these states’ qualitative unity and quantitative diversity as national forms mediating the essential unity of global capital accumulation. Second, it builds on the rich empirical evidence from the FSU to contribute to a theorisation of ‘uneven development’ in the Global South, particularly in terms of the gender- and climate-related effects of capitalist transformation in relation to class. As such, the dissertation hopes to promote a new research agenda that studies the FSU region within the broader dynamics of uneven development in the global political economy.

10 Declaration and Copyright Statement

No portion of the work referred to in the thesis has been submitted in support of an application for another degree or qualification of this or any other university or other institute of learning.

Copyright Statement i. The author of this thesis (including any appendices and/or schedules to this thesis) owns certain copyright or related rights in it (the “Copyright”) and s/he has given The University of Manchester certain rights to use such Copyright, including for administrative purposes. ii. Copies of this thesis, either in full or in extracts and whether in hard or electronic copy, may be made only in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (as amended) and regulations issued under it or, where appropriate, in accordance with licensing agreements which the University has from time to time. This page must form part of any such copies made. iii. The ownership of certain Copyright, patents, designs, trademarks and other intellectual property (the “Intellectual Property”) and any reproductions of copyright works in the thesis, for example graphs and tables (“Reproductions”), which may be described in this thesis, may not be owned by the author and may be owned by third parties. Such Intellectual Property and Reproductions cannot and must not be made available for use without the prior written permission of the owner(s) of the relevant Intellectual Property and/or Reproductions. iv. Further information on the conditions under which disclosure, publication and commercialisation of this thesis, the Copyright and any Intellectual Property and/or Reproductions described in it may take place is available in the University IP Policy (see http://documents.manchester.ac.uk/DocuInfo.aspx?DocID=24420), in any relevant Thesis restriction declarations deposited in the University Library, The University Library’s regulations (see http://www.library.manchester.ac.uk/about/regulations/) and in The University’s policy on Presentation of Theses.

11 Acknowledgements

A PhD is a very lonely enterprise, especially during a pandemic. I was fortunate to find many old and new friends in Manchester and elsewhere who helped me through it.

First, I would like to thank my supervisors for the insane amount of work they put into the manuscript. Stuart, for his open door policy whenever (and it was often) I’d storm into his office complaining about the bloody thing, as well as for two decades of friendship, and counting. Yoram, for putting up with my ‘personality’, while painstakingly reviewing all my drafts (including the footnotes!) and never letting me get away with the jargon. For all that and more, I am immensely grateful to both.

I would like to thank the many people in Uzbekistan and Central Asia who let me into their lives and answered my too many questions. A sincere THANK YOU for your time, warmth, and hospitality. I cannot mention you but you know who you are. This thesis would not exist without you.

I also want to thank all the friends who supported me during these past years: Luke and Rosie for a decades-long friendship and a roof over my head when I first returned to Manchester; Claudio for the metal \w/ and the coffee; Ana for the lunches; Jon for constantly asking questions; Giulia for the Italian food and the tutorial notes; Giacomo for his pit-stops at ‘il Bestia’ during his ‘walks’; Jen for the coffees and for lending me her amazing brains; Aliki for the ….. about the PhD; Joanna for the challenge; Konstantinos for the junk food; Abdul for the sweets, food, and the Frankfurt School; Ilias for his generosity and encyclopedic knowledge; Davide for the breaks; Leila for making fun of Marx; Terry for the living room table; Aisha for keeping it real; Robert and Tim for the trust and a job; Tom for another job that keeps me in touch with Central Asia; Greig for ground-rent; Japhy for setting the example; Philipp for the proofreading; Kom and Sim for so much I don’t have enough space here; Paolo for his sense of humour and for answering all my (again, too many) questions about Kazakhstan; Maurizio for his English; Davide for coming to see me anywhere and being my man with ‘ground focus’.

To all those I missed, my sincere apologies. The last few months have been trying.

Last but not least, I would like to thank my families who, through the years, have cherished and supported me, no questions asked. I cannot think of a more selfless form of love. It is to them that this thesis is dedicated.

12 INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER From Transition to Capital Accumulation in the Post-Soviet Space

0. INTRODUCTION

Writing in 2019, one of the world’s top experts on transition in the post-Soviet space wondered about what he defined as Central Asia’s ‘many paradoxes’ (Pomfret 2019: 265). Particularly, he referred to the fact that, while ‘[w]ith continued dependence on primary product exports and most of the population in agriculture’ the Central Asian republics’ ‘economic structure is little changed’, still ‘any visitor to the region after a twenty-year absence could not help but be struck by the huge economic transformation, especially in the main cities but also in many small towns and some rural areas’ (ibid.). This short passage is symptomatic of the failure of the literature on transition (‘transitology’), which has dominated the debate on the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) since its collapse in 1991, to account for the political-economy of transformation in the fifteen independent republics born out of the ashes of the USSR.1 As it argues that the states of the former Soviet Union (FSU) have as yet failed to transition to capitalism (‘little changed’), transitology is left with the paradox of no transition and ‘huge economic transformation’ during the past three decades.

This dissertation explains precisely this transformation. As such, not only does it fill an important gap in the literature on transition in the FSU and the case study of Uzbekistan, but it also moves the scholarly debate beyond transition and the exceptionalisation of the post-Soviet space as permanently stuck between two ideal-type systems, namely the Soviet command economy and Western free-market capitalism. Instead, studying the diverse national developments in the FSU region as forms of the unity of global capital accumulation offers a cogent alternative to the transition framework, which enables the dissertation to untangle the rich diversity of the FSU states’ transformation within their essential qualitative unity as ‘resource rich’ countries in the global political economy (GPE). In this way, the dissertation contributes to the scholarly debate on the FSU and Uzbekistan within the broader literature on ‘uneven development’ in the Global South.

1 Henceforth, with post-Soviet space and former Soviet Union (FSU) (countries, states, republics), I refer to twelve out of the fifteen successor states to the former USSR, namely: 1. Armenia, 2. , 3. , 4. Georgia, 5. Kazakhstan, 6. , 7. Moldova, 8. , 9. , 10. Turkmenistan, 11. Ukraine, and 12. Uzbekistan. Of those, the five Central Asian republics are Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. In 2004, the three Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania joined the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), so they are excluded from the analysis.

13

Section 1 positions the dissertation within a specific Marxist theoretical tradition that allows it to overcome the limitations of the transition framework and contribute to the scholarly debate on uneven development in the Global South in general, as well as to the literature on the FSU and Uzbekistan in particular. Section 2 expounds the methodology and methods underpinning the research, which contribute to the dissertation’s move beyond the transition paradigm to explain the radical transformation of the FSU and Uzbekistan in the past three decades. Section 3 outlines the structure of the dissertation, along with the main arguments advanced in the six substantive chapters comprising it. Section 4 draws attention to the dissertation’s limitations, while the Conclusion summarises the chapter’s main points.

1. FROM TRANSITION TO CAPITAL ACCUMULATION: POSITIONING THE THESIS, RESEARCH QUESTIONS, AND CONTRIBUTION

Since the 1990s, a vast literature has come to dominate the debate on the transformation in the countries that became independent as a consequence of the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991. Given the timing of the dissolution, this literature on transition in the former USSR emerged within, and fully incorporated, what by then had become the dominant neoliberal consensus on the theory and practice of development, which advocated for ‘a healthy private sector’, as well as ‘a much reduced role for government, openness to (and so competitiveness with) the rest of the world, and macroeconomic stability’ (World Bank 1993a: 85) as the only path out of poverty for developing countries in the Global South. In this perspective, neoliberal transitology posited that the orthodox policy package - macroeconomic stabilisation, liberalisation, privatisation - was the only ‘normal’ way for the FSU countries to transition between what it framed as two mutually exclusive ideal-type systems, namely from the authoritarian communist command economy to Western democratic free-market capitalism.

First, in line with the neoliberal literature, transitology methodologically construed the global as external to the national state and, at best, as the ‘context’ of development; thus, as ‘all countries face the same external environment’ (Gore 1996: 81), differences in performance between the various post-Soviet states inevitably become the consequence of internal factors, in particular these states’ policies, institutions, and bureaucratic elites (methodological nationalism). Second, within its ideal-type dichotomy, transitology idealised democratic capitalism as a classless, gender-liberating, and eco-friendly system in direct opposition to the authoritarian command economy of the Soviet Union. Put differently, since this was democratic capitalist development for all, labour exploitation by capital, hence

14 class, was erased from the analysis; the gendered dimension of labour exploitation was externalised from the process of capital accumulation, as women’s liberation would be realised through the market; and, finally, environmental degradation and the ensuing climate crisis were also presented as externally related to the process of capital accumulation, as technological innovation would decouple GDP growth from the increase in material throughput, hence ecological impact, in the economy (external relations).

Therefore, for the past thirty years, the research agenda has focussed on why the FSU states and Uzbekistan largely failed to conform with this ideal-type normative framework. As it consistently framed the region as suffering from an underdevelopment and authoritarianism problem (Gevorkyan 2018: 130; Nisnevich & Ryabov 2020) as a direct result of a lack of, or a partial and incomplete, transition to democratic capitalism, transitology was left with the ‘paradox’ of no transition and radical transformation three decades after the collapse of the USSR. In this context, the case study of Uzbekistan is particularly intriguing as it became the battleground between two sets of transition literature. On the one hand, the dominant neoliberal transitology negatively exceptionalised the country for refusing to apply the orthodox reform package, only to resort to another ‘paradox’ (the ‘Uzbek growth puzzle’) once Uzbekistan returned to GDP growth faster than most other FSU states in the 1990s. On the other hand, following in the tradition of developmental state theory, the government of Uzbekistan (GoU) under President and a small minority of scholars positively exceptionalised the country’s performance in the FSU region as the result of a successful strategy of industrial upgrading. While the former clearly remained trapped in the ‘paradox’ of no transition and transformation, the latter avoided the paradox but still could not explain why, to date, Uzbekistan largely remains an exporter of raw materials to the world market rather than finished industrial goods, hardly an example of successful industrialisation. In short, developmental transitologists could only postulate Uzbekistan’s success by omitting key empirical evidence contradicting their account. For this reason, to this day the specific case study of Uzbekistan has remained ‘one of the most enigmatic’ within transition economies for transitology (Pomfret 2000: 734).

As a result, all transitology has been unable to explain capitalist transformation in the FSU states and Uzbekistan since 1991. Specifically, the literature has failed to answer the following research questions (RQs) about the FSU republics and the case study of Uzbekistan, which this dissertation is going to address in detail:

RQ1. Why, despite their different transition ‘paths’, have all the post-Soviet states including Uzbekistan become primary commodity exporters, in line with ‘resource

15 rich’ countries in the Global South? Why are international commodity prices crucial to explaining these states’ political-economic transformation since independence?; RQ2. Why did Uzbekistan follow a ‘gradualist’ path of reform? Why has the country recently embarked on a series of ‘liberalising’ reforms?; RQ3. Why are land use changes key to accounting for class stratification and struggle in Uzbekistan since independence? Why are land use changes also crucial to explaining the acceleration of, and differential vulnerability to, the climate crisis in the country?

I contend that, due to the shortcomings in its methodology (methodological nationalism, external relations) and theoretical framework (ideal-type classless, gender-liberating, eco- friendly democratic capitalism) - which are reviewed at length in Chapter 1 - the literature on transition is ill-equipped to provide a cogent answer to these RQs. Instead, I argue, the Marxist framework pioneered by independent scholar Iñigo Carrera and applied by affiliated researchers under the auspices of the Centre for Research as Practical Criticism (CICP) in Buenos Aires, Argentina (henceforth, CICP approach), provides a more insightful approach to address the RQs. Moreover, I maintain that the CICP approach can incorporate, and expand upon, other crucial theoretical contributions found in the feminist and ‘green’ Marxist traditions, thus adding further layers of detail to the answers to these RQs.

While the CICP approach along with key insights from feminist and ‘green’ Marxists is expounded in Chapter 2, I now briefly touch upon their main theoretical planks in order to position the dissertation within the broader debate on uneven development and highlight its original contribution to the scholarly literature.

First, within the essential unity of global accumulation, whose most potent form of mediation is found in large-scale industry, national diversity (‘uneven development’) between countries in the Global South has emerged since the 1960s in line with their form of integration into the International Division of Labour (IDL). On the one hand, a number of countries in East Asia - such as and, more recently, - have experienced meteoric industrialisation given the suitability of their relatively cheap and highly disciplined working class to serve as operators of, or work as appendages to, the computerised machinery on the robotised assembly line of large-scale industry. On the other hand, the majority of the countries of the Global South have remained, or, upon gaining independence, have integrated into this (post-1960s) New International Division of Labour (NIDL) on the basis of the (pre-1960s) Classical International Division of Labour (CIDL), that is, as primary

16 commodity exporters due to the relatively favourable natural conditions for the extraction/production of raw materials on the land within their borders.

Since ground-rent is the crucial form in which private landed property - no matter its legal form - is valorised within capitalist relations of production (Marx 1894/1991), the international prices of primary commodities must encapsulate a ground(i.e. land)-rent to be payable to the landlord for the use of this irreproducible means (land) in the production of raw materials.2 As in ‘resource rich’ countries the land is often privately leased but legally state-owned, the landlord-state has mediated the flow of this significant wealth (ground- rent) from the export of primary commodities on the world market to guarantee the process of capital accumulation on its national territory. In parallel, however, ‘resource rich’ countries have tended to concentrate within their borders populations that have become (relative) surplus to the requirements of global capital accumulation, since, inter alia, their capital- intensive extractive industries have only managed to absorb a small fraction of said population. Put differently, from the indiscriminate reproduction of the working class under Fordist conditions of industrial production prevalent in the decades immediately following the end of World War II (WWII), the changing material conditions of production in large- scale industry (computerisation, robotisation) since the 1960s led to the differentiation in the costs of reproduction of the various national fractions of the working class (class stratification). In ‘resource rich’ countries, this process has been particularly evident in the emergence of a vast (relative) surplus population struggling to survive amid informality, precarity, and mass rural-urban, including international, migration.

As did other ‘resource rich’ countries in the Global South, the FSU states including Uzbekistan unequivocally integrated into the IDL as primary commodity exporters due to the relatively favourable natural conditions for the extraction/production of raw materials within their borders. As a result, on the one hand, they have mediated the ground-rent form to secure the process of capital accumulation on their national territories while, on the other hand, they have tended to concentrate within their borders populations that have become relative surplus for the requirements of capital accumulation, as observable in the process of mass informalisation, precarity, and rural-urban, including international, migration therein. In this way, the CICP approach can explain the qualitative unity (raw material export orientation, relative surplus population) characterising the FSU states including Uzbekistan as ‘resource rich’ countries in the IDL (Kandiyoti 2002b: 253-254; Gevorkyan 2011: 54, 56,

2 Chapter 2 expounds the theory of ground-rent pioneered by Iñigo Carrera and found in the CICP approach, presenting the various forms of ground-rent and their specific social origins.

17 2018: 190-198; UNCTAD 2019); in turn, this form of integration into the IDL is equally crucial to understanding the quantitative diversity (resource endowments and their fluctuating international prices) between and within these states’ ongoing transformation since 1991 (RQ1, RQ2).

Second, in order to meet global solvent demand for raw materials, ‘resource rich’ countries since the 1960s have expelled peasants en masse from the land to divert it to the extraction/production of primary commodities, in what in Marxian terminology is known as primitive accumulation (Marx 1867/1976).3 This process helps to explain the origin of the relative surplus population, along with the escalating processes of informalisation, precarisation, and rural-urban, including international, migration discussed above. Marxist feminists (e.g. Mies 1986/2014, 1993; Federici 2004, 2011, 2012; Bhattacharya 2017b) have demonstrated the importance of foregrounding gender in any analysis of class, as women have simultaneously borne the brunt of these developments, while, amid growing precarity, their work as subsistence farmers has become even more central to the reproduction of this relative surplus population. Equally, ‘green’ Marxists (e.g. Shiva 1993; Burkett 1999; Foster 1999; Araghi 2000; Clark & Foster 2010; Foster & Clark 2020) have exposed the crucial contradiction between production for use and production for capital accumulation, as, technological innovations notwithstanding, the boundless accumulation process drives the constant rise in material throughput resulting in ‘capitalism’s historically unprecedented tendencies toward biospheric crisis’ (Burkett 1999: 11), evident in the current, and escalating, climate crisis. As a result, the latter has been impinging on subsistence food production especially for the relative surplus population, placing women at the forefront of everyday resistance to capital, which, in turn, has been encroaching on women’s survival strategies to incorporate them into the boundless process of accumulation, with the real possibility to precipitate a social reproduction crisis for the already precarious relative surplus population.

The dynamics of capitalist transformation in the FSU and Uzbekistan since 1991 have been in line with other ‘resource rich’ countries. During Soviet times, given the centrality of workers’ manual skills to the Fordist process of large-scale industrial production, hence their relatively strong control over the production process including via high levels of unionisation, the Soviet state guaranteed the indiscriminate reproduction of the working class, as evident

3 The debate as to whether Marx considered primitive accumulation as a ‘one-off’ act belonging to the pre-history of capital or as an ongoing process in capitalism is beyond the scope of the dissertation, but see e.g. Bonefeld (2001, 2014); Brass (2011: Chapter 5); and City Special Issue 2017.

18 in full employment, job security, and widespread welfare provisions. Following independence, the reprimarisation of the economy (deindustrialisation) and the decollectivisation of agriculture mediated the FSU region’s integration into the IDL as raw material exporters, shifting land from use for social reproduction to use for capital accumulation via the production/extraction of primary commodities, while ‘freeing’ the mass of the population from said land. This gave rise to a vast relative surplus population across the FSU that struggles to survive amid growing informality, precarity, and mass migration. In Uzbekistan, these processes yielded distinct gender-differentiated outcomes, as evident in the feminisation of agriculture, manual agricultural labour, and poverty in the country. Likewise, as the main subsistence farmers, women have become even more central to the reproduction of this relative surplus population. As the extraction/production of primary commodities depletes the fertility of the soil, destroys biodiversity, and feeds into the escalating climate crisis, it directly impinges on land (and resource) use for social reproduction, to which women have resisted with specific survival strategies on which, in turn, capital has encroached in order to incorporate them into the boundless process of accumulation. As such, capital accumulation in the ‘resource rich’ country of Uzbekistan risks precipitating a possible crisis of social reproduction for the relative surplus population. All these are the crucial dynamics of transformation in the FSU region and Uzbekistan that the transition literature fails to explain.

Therefore, the dissertation makes the following original contributions to the scholarly literature:

1. The dissertation applies a novel approach grounded in the discipline of political economy to explain the transformation of the FSU region and Uzbekistan since 1991, whose study has been dominated by the literature on transition. Also, to date, the CICP framework has mostly been deployed to analyse uneven development in ‘resource rich’ states in Latin America and newly-industrialised East Asian countries, along with some case studies in Europe, such as Spain, Ireland, and the United Kingdom (e.g. Purcell 2010, 2014; Grinberg 2011, 2013; Charnock et al. 2016; Charnock & Starosta 2016; Harvey 2019). By adopting the CICP framework, the dissertation moves the debate from transition to capital accumulation in the FSU and Uzbekistan to investigate the rich empirical evidence of their transformation as ‘resource rich’ countries within the IDL, while simultaneously using this empirical contribution to substantiate the accuracy of the CICP theoretical approach in dissecting uneven development in the GPE.

19 2. The dissertation incorporates the insights of the feminist and ‘green’ Marxist literature into the CICP approach in order to provide a unified understanding of the dynamics that the former theorise, grounded in the changing material conditions of large-scale industrial production. By starting with the global accumulation of capital, whose most potent form of mediation is found in large-scale industry, the CICP approach can frame the contributions of the feminist and ‘green’ Marxist tradition within a unified theorisation of the diverse phenomena occurring in ‘resource rich’ countries - from informalisation to precarisation, migration and climate breakdown - and their multiple overlapping relations.4 In turn, the feminist and ‘green’ Marxist literature enables the CICP framework to highlight (a) the multiple and distinct gendered outcomes of class stratification with the rise of a vast relative surplus population, as mediated by the recrudescence of patriarchal norms, and (b) the origins of the escalating climate crisis within the changing material conditions of large-scale industrial production, along with the gendered resistance, and class- determined vulnerability, to it. In this way, the dissertation expands on the feminist and ‘green’ Marxist contribution via the CICP approach, while moving some way towards contributing to the latter’s ultimate aim of developing a ‘“unified field theory” of uneven development’ (Charnock & Starosta 2018).

Due to all of the above, the dissertation can explain the diverse (national) forms of the ongoing transformation in the FSU countries and Uzbekistan since 1991 as the direct and unequivocal result of the full development of (global) capital accumulation, in all its class, gendered, and environmental consequences, rather than the negation of an ideal-type democratic capitalism construed as development for all, as transitology would have it (or its industrial ‘upgrading’ success, as developmental transitology posits specifically for Uzbekistan). This theorisation contributes to explaining both the qualitative unity, as well as the quantitative diversity in the FSU states and Uzbekistan since 1991, thus answering the RQs in a cogent and comprehensive way, as the empirical chapters (3-6) show.

As mentioned, however, the dissertation takes issue not only with the transition literature’s theoretical framework, but also with the methodology underpinning it - methodological nationalism and external relations - which contributes to its inability to address the RQs. Instead, the dissertation relies on a different methodology, to which I now turn.

4 In this regard, I acknowledge Purcell & Martinez’s (2018) contribution to a Marxist political ecology grounded in the CICP approach.

20 2. METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH METHODS

Section 2 presents the combination of form analysis and internal relations underpinning the dissertation’s methodology, which informs the theorisation and empirical analysis of uneven development in the Global South in general, and the FSU countries including Uzbekistan in particular. Likewise, the section introduces the four levels of generality along which the research material has been organised in Chapters 2-6. The last subsection provides an overview of the research methods deployed to gather the empirical data, along with the primary and secondary sources collected and used in the analysis.

2.1. Form analysis: Global content, national forms

Capital accumulation is global in content and national in form. While the (global) accumulation of relative surplus value ‘determines the constitution and dynamics of the international division of labour’ (IDL), in turn, the state is the (national) form mediating its evolution (Charnock & Starosta 2016: 4; Caligaris 2016: 58). Within the essential unity of global accumulation, different national states in the Global South have integrated into the IDL either as sources of relatively cheap and highly disciplined labour, such as Korea and China, or as producers of raw materials, such as the FSU and Uzbekistan, resulting in the former’s meteoric industrialisation and the latter’s economic reprimarisation. As such, the ensuing uneven development in the countries of the Global South, including the FSU and Uzbekistan since 1991, is ‘the product of the full development of the global essence of accumulation’ (Iñigo Carrera 2013: 63), or ‘unity of the diverse’ (Marx 1857/1993: 101; Ilyenkov 1960), rather than the consequence of the underdevelopment of capitalism in these countries.

Therefore, the integration of the FSU and Uzbekistan into the IDL as ‘resource rich’ countries explains the qualitative unity behind the diversity in their political economies since 1991, or ‘unity of the diverse’. On the one hand, economic reprimarisation and land decollectivisation mediated the FSU’s and Uzbekistan’s incorporation into the IDL as primary commodity producers, shifting land use from social reproduction to capital accumulation via the extraction/production of raw materials for export and resulting in the rise of a vast relative surplus population ‘freed’ from said land. Raw material export orientation and the presence of a vast relative surplus population have characterised the FSU’s and Uzbekistan’s political economy since 1991 (‘unity’). On the other hand, the different resource endowments and their fluctuating international prices account for the quantitative diversity between and within the FSU states, including Uzbekistan, in the past

21 three decades (‘of the diverse’). Contra the transition literature’s methodological nationalism, however, all these are forms of the full development of global capital accumulation in the national spaces of the FSU and Uzbekistan, rather than the result of a lack of, or a partial and incomplete, transition to an ideal-type democratic capitalism.

2.2. Class and Internal relations

Since the state mediates the global process of capital accumulation (‘unity’), despite ‘its fetishised appearance as an independent political form’ (Alami 2018: 62), its policies, institutions, and bureaucracies - in a word, its politics - are social forms of mediation of the antagonism between capital and labour, i.e. the class struggle (Clarke 1991; Burnham 1994; Iñigo Carrera 2013; Grinberg 2013: 180; Bonefeld 2014: 159; Purcell 2014: 167). In this perspective, the ‘essential feature of the state is its class character; its autonomy is the surface form of appearance of its role in the class struggle’ (Clarke 1991: 186, emphasis added), which is to guarantee the accumulation of the national total social capital, namely ‘the sum total of the individual capitals’ (Marx 1867/1976: 726) operating on a national territory regardless of their ‘nationality’ and legal form (e.g. state-owned, private, JV). Since the 1960s, in ‘resource rich’ countries this has largely entailed the shift from the Fordist conditions of industrial production and the ensuing indiscriminate reproduction of the working class, to their integration into the IDL as producers of raw materials for export, resulting in land use changes and the attendant differentiation in the costs of reproduction of the working class, or, in simple terms, class stratification. This is most evident, on the one hand, in the rise of a vast relative surplus population struggling to survive amid informality, precarity, and migration, and, on the other hand, the state’s mediation of the ground-rent form to guarantee capital accumulation on its national territory. Again, it bears repeating that the state secures the reproduction of the national total social capital, meaning the combination of all capitals operating on its territory, regardless of origin, legal form, and even of the accumulation requirements of specific individual capitals. In other words, while some individual capitals may fail to accumulate and go bankrupt as a result, the point for the state is the reproduction of the total social capital, hence the continuation of the general process of accumulation.

In the FSU and Uzbekistan, the authoritarian state mediated the integration of these ‘resource rich’ countries into the IDL via top-down decrees and resolutions, leading to the reprimarisation of the economy and the shift in land use via decollectivisation from the indiscriminate reproduction of the working class to the steep differentiation in its costs of reproduction via informalisation, precarisation, and migration. As a result, while a minority

22 of workers have been employed in extractive industries and related sectors, earning the lion’s share of the total wage, the majority of the population has been turned into a relative surplus for the requirements of accumulation. In parallel, since land is largely privately leased but state-owned in the FSU states, the landlord-state has accrued enormous wealth (ground-rent) via the export of primary commodities which, contrary to Soviet times, has been overwhelmingly allocated to guarantee the valorisation of the national total social capital, rather than to welfare provisions for the indiscriminate reproduction of the working class, in turn weakening class solidarity (Chapters 3-4). The authoritarian state has been functional to secure this transformation by deterring labour organising and, in case of the emergence of a perceived threat to the process of valorisation from labour, nip it in the bud (Chapters 3-5). These phenomena are all part of the region’s radical transformation that the transition literature is unable to explain.

While class is the foundational social divide in the capitalist mode of production and social reproduction (Burnham 1994; Harvey 2006: 24-35), labour does necessarily exist in and through ‘all the concrete particularities and determinations that constitute [diverse] living social groups’ (McNally 2015: 133) in different national states, such as e.g. gender, race, and ethnicity. In other words, these ‘distinct parts of a social whole’ are internally related (McNally 2017: 104), so ‘social relations’ of gender, race, and ethnicity must be understood as co-constitutive of class (McNally 2015: 131). In ‘resource rich’ countries, including the FSU and Uzbekistan, processes of informalisation, precarisation, and migration have yielded clear gender-differentiated effects, particularly in women subsistence farmers’ increasing centrality to the reproduction of the relative surplus population, as well as their everyday resistance to capital’s encroachment on land (and resource) use that risks undermining their survival strategies (Mies 1986/2014: 117ff.; Federici 2012; Bhattacharya 2017b: 88-90). Finally, technological innovations notwithstanding, land use changes from social reproduction to capital accumulation are internally related to the overall rise in material throughput in the GPE, hence to the climate crisis and class, given the specific vulnerability of the relative surplus population to climate change.

In Chapter 2, I incorporate the insights of Marxist feminists into the CICP theoretical approach, framing gender as internally related to, hence co-constitutive of, class, as ideologically mediated by recrudescing patriarchal norms. In Chapters 5-6, I show the potency of this approach in the empirical analysis of the outcomes of decollectivisation in Uzbekistan, namely gendered class stratification, as evident in the feminisation of agriculture, unskilled agricultural labour, and poverty, as well as the class-mediated differential vulnerability to climate change. Equally, in Chapter 2, I integrate the theorisation

23 of ‘green’ Marxists on the relation between capitalism and the climate crisis into the CICP theoretical approach, construing climate change as internally related to class in contrast to the techno-managerial optimism of ‘green growth’, which posits a decoupling of production from material throughput despite the capitalist growth imperative, thus turning capitalism from the cause into the solution to the problem. In Chapter 6, I demonstrate the analytical power of this approach in the empirical study of how the escalating climate crisis in Uzbekistan, linked to the growing extraction/production of primary industrial and agricultural commodities, is further heightening the vulnerability of the relative surplus population, especially women. In short, the combination of form analysis and internal relations enables the dissertation to present a historical-materialist analysis of capitalism that transcends the transition literature’s idealisation of democratic capitalism as a classless, gender-liberating, and eco-friendly system.

For clarity, the substantive theoretical and empirical chapters (2-6) have been organised at four different levels of generality, to which I now turn.

2.3. Levels of generality

In order to analyse the diverse developments in the FSU and Uzbekistan since 1991 within their underlying qualitative unity as ‘resource rich’ countries in the IDL, the dissertation moves between four levels of generality (Ollman 1990: 50-60), ‘rising from the abstract to the concrete’ conceived as ‘a rich totality of many determinations’ (Marx 1857/1993: 101, 100). Namely, the dissertation ascends from the more general to the more concrete in order to present the complex research material clearly and effectively.

Starting at a higher level of generality (Level 1), Chapter 2 explains national differentiation (‘uneven development’) between states in the Global South since the 1960s as a result of their diverse forms of integration into the IDL, in line with either the productive characteristics of a country’s working class (relatively cheap, highly disciplined) or the relatively favourable conditions of production/extraction of raw materials within its territory. For this latter group of ‘resource rich’ countries, ground-rent has been the key form of mediation of their participation in the IDL. Thus, ascending to the next level of generality (Level 2), the chapter engages with the state’s mediation of the ground-rent form via land use changes in ‘resource rich’ countries since the 1960s. This simultaneously guaranteed the reproduction of the total social capital in these states, while turning the majority of their populations into (relative) surplus for the requirements of capital accumulation.

24 Chapter 3 rises to a more concrete level of generality (Level 3) in order to assess how the ‘resource rich’ FSU states have mediated the ground-rent form since attaining independence in 1991. This resulted in the radical shift from the Fordist conditions of industrial production and indiscriminate reproduction of the working class during Soviet times, to the ground-rent subsidisation of capital accumulation and the simultaneous differentiation in the costs of reproduction of their different fractions of the working class (class stratification), most evident in the rise of a vast relative surplus population within their territories. Finally, at the last and more concrete level of generality (Level 4), the dissertation reveals the ‘rich totality of many determinations’ in the Uzbek state’s mediation of the ground-rent form via decollectivisation, which fundamentally changed the country’s political economy since 1991. On the one hand, state policies and institutions secured the accumulation of the total social capital via ground-rent subsidisation (Chapter 4); on the other hand, the state mediated the differentiation in the costs of reproduction of the working class along in/formal, geographic (urban-rural, regional), gender, and skill lines, including the rise of a vast relative surplus population struggling amid un(der)employment, poverty, and migration, and particularly vulnerable to the precipitating climate crisis (Chapters 5-6).

2.4. Research methods

The dissertation relies on a vast array of primary sources including in Russian (Bibliography) collected online and during fieldwork, from President Karimov’s numerous books, essays, and speeches, to official decrees and regulations issued by the (Karimov, 1991-2016, and Mirziyoyev, 2016-today) and the Cabinet of Ministers, reports of GoU-affiliated think tanks such as the Center for Economic Research (CER), and data from the State Committee of the Republic of Uzbekistan on Statistics (GosKomStat). Likewise, the research draws on semi-structured qualitative interviews with 111 stakeholders (grouped from INT-1 to INT-75), including 106 face-to-face interviews, four via a combination of conversations over the WhatsApp application and follow-ups via emails, and one anonymously via several email exchanges (Appendix 2). Face-to-face interviews were conducted during two periods of fieldwork (September 10-December 15, 2018, and May 16- June 17, 2019) in and several other cities, towns, and villages across the country (ibid.); during the first period of fieldwork I also attended four international conferences in Tashkent covering different aspects related to the research (ibid.). Fieldwork was carried out on a multiple-entry research visa obtained as a visiting fellow at the University of World Economy and Diplomacy (UWED) in Tashkent; affiliation provided the necessary administrative support to authorise interviews within GoU ministries, affiliated think-tanks, and any other official organisation. Full anonymisation was decided prior to travelling to

25 Uzbekistan for fieldwork to guarantee the safety of interviewees, and proved crucial to gaining the trust of potential stakeholders. Finally, throughout my fieldwork, I meticulously recorded my informal conversations with people from all walks of life, as well as my own observations, which I entered into two annotated Word documents with a combined word count of 8,177 words, and to which I refer in the dissertation as FW-2018 and FW-2019.

Moreover, the dissertation incorporates a large body of secondary literature, from policy reports to macroeconomic and sectoral studies by international organisations such as the World Bank, the IMF, the EBRD, and various UN agencies, as well as by regional and international policy centres and think-tanks. Data and information found in three decades of transition literature, particularly the many seminal anthropological works on Central Asia and Uzbekistan (Chapter 1), are also extensively integrated into the empirical chapters (3- 6).

In the next section, I provide an overview of the dissertation’s chapters, as well as the key arguments that they advance in order to address the three specific RQs.

3. CHAPTER STRUCTURE AND KEY ARGUMENTS

The dissertation consists of an Introductory Chapter, six substantive chapters (1-6), and a Concluding Chapter.

The Introductory Chapter positions the dissertation in the broader literature on transition and uneven development in order to highlight its contribution in answering the RQs. The chapter explains the thesis’ methodology and research methods, exposes its chapter structure and key arguments and, finally, its starting point and limits.

Chapter 1 reviews the literature on transition within the broader literature on development, namely neoliberal, developmental state, and dependency theory, arguing that transitology replicates, and reinforces, the dominant neoliberal consensus on the theory and practice of development that has emerged since the 1960s. Framing Western democratic free-market capitalism and the Soviet authoritarian command economy as two mutually exclusive ideal types, transitology investigates the reasons behind the FSU countries’, and Uzbekistan’s, failure to transition to its normative framework of democratic capitalism. As all states face the same external context in the global market, national differentiation must be the outcome of internal factors (methodological nationalism). In the case of the FSU and Uzbekistan, neoliberal transitology argues, these factors are the continuation of Soviet-style

26 distortionary policies cum authoritarian government that allowed rent-seeking elites to amass vast wealth to the detriment of the country’s development and the population’s welfare. Since the orthodox policy package of liberalisation, privatisation, and macroeconomic stabilisation is never questioned, the rising informality and poverty, especially among women, as well as the acceleration of ecological destruction in the region after 1991 have all been consequences of a lack of, or a partial and incomplete, transition. In other words, the gendered exploitation of labour and the rise in material throughput in the economy are externally related to the process of capital accumulation, which is instead idealised as classless, gender-liberating, and eco-friendly (external relations). As a result, three decades after the collapse of the USSR, transitology is stuck with the ‘paradox’ of no transition and radical transformation in the FSU countries. Next to the dominant neoliberal transitology, the GoU and a small minority of scholars construed the Uzbek model as a successful case of developmental state; while developmentalists avoid this ‘paradox’, they still fail to account for the crucial fact that, three decades after attaining independence, Uzbekistan remains a raw material exporter in the IDL, hardly an example of industrial ‘upgrading’.

Therefore, transitology can neither explain why, despite different transition ‘paths’ in terms of policies, institutions, and bureaucratic capacity, today the FSU countries including Uzbekistan are all primary commodity exporters in the IDL, nor how this has defined their political-economic transformation since 1991 (RQ1, RQ2, RQ3).

In order to answer the RQs, Chapter 2 expounds a different theoretical framework from transition, as pioneered by independent scholar Iñigo Carrera and applied by other CICP scholars, while incorporating insights from feminist and ‘green’ Marxists into the CICP approach. At the first level of generality (Level 1), the chapter argues that national differentiation (‘uneven development’) in the Global South since the 1960s occurred due to either the productive characteristics of a country’s working class or its relatively favourable conditions for the production/extraction of primary commodities in its territory. As a consequence, some states such as South Korea and, more recently, China - whose working class was relatively cheap and highly disciplined, hence specifically suited to working as appendages to the increasingly computerised machinery and robotised assembly line in large-scale industry - experienced a meteoric process of industrialisation, giving rise to the NIDL. Instead, most other countries in the Global South remained or, upon gaining independence, were integrated into the IDL on the basis of the CIDL, that is, as raw material exporters.

27 Ascending to Level 2 of generality, the chapter theorises the specificity of capital accumulation in these ‘resource rich’ countries. In view of the social institution of landed property, the international prices of primary commodities must include a ground(i.e. land)- rent to be paid to the landlord for the use of the irreproducible means of production: land. As a result, within the essential unity of global capital accumulation, these countries have become sources of appropriation of this extraordinary wealth (ground-rent), defining the qualitatively ‘backward’ form in which manufacturing capitals accumulate within their borders. Regardless of ‘nationality’ and legal status, all such capitals have been ‘small’ by international standards, producing substandard and relatively expensive goods mostly for the domestic market. In order to satisfy global solvent demand for raw materials, particularly from large-scale industry, the mass of the population has been expelled from the land for it to be put to capitalist production, turning it into a (relative) surplus for the requirements of capital accumulation, since the limited scale of capital-intensive extractive industries and ‘backward’ industries could only absorb a small fraction thereof. Informalisation, precarisation, and rural outmigration ensued, with women’s ‘double burden’ escalating as a consequence, while their role as subsistence farmers became ever more crucial for the reproduction of this surplus population. Moreover, as the growing capacity of large-scale industrial production drives the overall growth in material throughput in the economy, women have been catapulted to the centre of everyday resistance to capital in the context of the escalating climate crisis. In turn, capital strives to incorporate their survival strategies into the boundless process of accumulation, with the potential to precipitate a reproduction crisis for the relative surplus population in these ‘resource rich’ states.

The dissertation’s theoretical-methodological framework enables it to account for the radical transformation in the FSU and Uzbekistan during the past three decades in all its rich class, gender, and environmental determinations, as detailed in the empirical Chapters 3-6.

Chapter 3 ascends to a more concrete level of generality (Level 3) to answer RQ1. The chapter argues that, following the collapse of the USSR in 1991, the FSU countries were integrated into the IDL as primary commodity exporters much like the Soviet Union before them, due to the relatively favourable conditions for the extraction/production of raw materials within their newly-established international borders. Only for these commodities did global demand remain solvent, as the highly unionised, hence relatively expensive and undisciplined fractions of their now-former-Soviet working class were wholly unsuited for world market production. As such, despite their different transition ‘paths’, the FSU countries including Uzbekistan were incorporated into the IDL as primary commodity exporters, defining their political economies since 1991 as sources of appropriation of ground-rent in

28 line with other ‘resource rich’ countries in the Global South. In this context, manufacturing capitals in their territories could only accumulate at the average rate of profit via ground- rent subsidisation, being ‘small’ and technologically ‘backward’ in relation to international standards, thus producing substandard and relatively expensive goods mostly for domestic market consumption.

Within this qualitative unity (economic reprimarisation, ‘backward’ industrialisation), national diversity between the FSU countries has depended on the changing magnitude of ground- rent available on their territories in line with the fluctuating international prices of their resource endowments (quantitative diversity), as was the case both during the ‘liberalisation’ of the low-oil-price decade of the 1990s and the ‘recentralisation’ of capital in the energy industry from the 2000s onward in the wake of the Chinese-demand-led commodity supercycle. It was labour, however, who bore the brunt of the transition. While the state mediated the ground-rent subsidisation of the total social capital, the mass of the population was expelled from the land in order to put it to capitalist production, leading to the rise of a vast relative surplus population for the requirements of accumulation, which could only be partially absorbed by capital-intensive extractive industries or ‘backward’ manufacturing capitals due to their small scale of production. This explains the spread of informality, precarity, poverty, and mass rural outmigration in the FSU states. As this brutal process of class stratification along in/formal, rural-urban, and skill lines weakened class solidarity, labour mobilisation has been largely spontaneous and localised, while the authoritarian state has mediated the class struggle to guarantee the process of capital accumulation via various tactics, including by brutally repressing labour in case of a perceived threat to the process of accumulation.

Rising to the final level of generality (Level 4), Chapter 4 answers RQ2 and starts addressing RQ3. The chapter asserts that, as an agrarian landlord-state, Uzbekistan had to rely on the natural cycle of seasonal alternation central to agriculture for cotton production; put differently, it either grew the crop or lost (cotton) rents for an entire year. The centrality and specificity of cotton to the Uzbek economy explains the choice of the Uzbek model as the country’s own ‘gradual’ transition ‘path’, whereby the state maintained a central role in the production of inputs, the coordination of irrigation, and the mobilisation of labour necessary to secure cotton production for exports. Still, Uzbekistan integrated into the IDL as a primary commodity exporter in line with the other FSU states, due to the relative favourable conditions for the production/extraction of raw materials in its territory and the unsuitability of its working class to produce for the world market.

29 As such, the country has also become a source of appropriation of ground-rent, whose manufacturing capitals exhibit the same qualitatively ‘backward’ form as in the rest of the FSU. This has been the case during the period of ‘centralisation’ of the cotton sector and overall economic activity under President Karimov (1991-2016), as well as with the current Mirziyoyev administration’s ‘liberalisation’ of the currency regime and the cotton sector, since the latter has been replaced by gold and natural gas as the main export commodities accruing ground-rent in the form of hard currency. Simply put, Uzbekistan has been transformed from an agrarian into a mining landlord-state. The chapter illustrates ‘backward’ industrialisation via ground-rent subsidisation with the case study of the Uzbek car industry’s development since 1992, whose ‘small’ manufacturing capitals have produced substandard and relatively expensive vehicles mostly for the domestic market. Along with other ‘backward’ industries and related sectors such as finance and insurance, the car industry has employed a largely male, city-dwelling, and higher-skilled formal workforce that has earned the lion’s share of the total wage in the country. This introduces the crucial issue of class stratification in independent Uzbekistan (RQ3), which is analysed in detail in the next chapter.

Chapter 5 continues operating at Level 4 of generality to provide further answers to RQ3. It contends that decollectivisation signalled the radical post-independence shift from land use for the indiscriminate reproduction of the working class, including in agricultural collectives, to land use for capital accumulation in Uzbekistan. In this regard, the country’s inclusion into the IDL as a raw material exporter was mediated by the expulsion of the mass of the population from the land, giving rise to a vast relative surplus population left to fend for themselves amid growing informality, precarity, and mass rural outmigration, since ‘backward’ industries could only absorb a small fraction thereof into the process of accumulation. Women bore the brunt of all these processes, as evident in the feminisation of agriculture, manual agricultural labour, and poverty, while simultaneously seeing their ‘double burden’ increase exponentially particularly as concerns food production for the reproduction of this relative surplus population. As this process of class stratification along in/formal, geographic (urban-rural, regional), gender, and skill lines shattered class solidarity, labour’s mobilisation to resist precarisation has been largely spontaneous and localised. For its part, the authoritarian state has exploited labour’s weaknesses to deescalate conflict in order to prevent protests from spreading, while deploying its apparatus of repression to intimidate, harass, and deter organising, or, at times of a perceived threat to the process of accumulation, ruthlessly crush it.

30 Finally, while continuing the analysis at Level 4 of generality, Chapter 6 finishes addressing RQ3. The chapter argues that, as a primary commodity producer in the IDL, Uzbekistan has contributed to, and suffered from, the ongoing changes to the Earth’s ecosystem in line with the extraction, production, and transportation of raw materials, including cash crops, on its territory. This has resulted in the acceleration of the ravages of climate change in the country, from the increasing salinisation/decreasing fertility of the soil to the retreat of the glaciers feeding into Central Asia’s main river systems. The ‘green’ technologies that the state and the donor community have introduced to mitigate the climate crisis are actually contributing to its exacerbation, as they enable the continuation, and even the expansion, of the process of capital accumulation. The contradiction between land and resource use for capital accumulation and their use for social reproduction places women at the centre of everyday resistance to capital, given their crucial role in guaranteeing the reproduction of the relative surplus population via food production. However, as capital encroaches on women’s survival strategies to incorporate them into the boundless accumulation process, it risks precipitating a social reproduction crisis specifically for the relative surplus population.

The Concluding Chapter reviews the key arguments deployed in the dissertation to answer RQ1, RQ2, and RQ3, while reiterating its main contributions to the scholarly literature. Finally, it presents the contours of a new research agenda on the transformation of the post- Soviet space and Uzbekistan that benefits from, and feeds into, the theorisation of uneven development in the Global South deployed in the dissertation.

I now turn to the limits of the dissertation.

4. THE LIMITS OF THE DISSERTATION

While there clearly seems to be broad scholarly agreement on the fact that ‘state socialism was a distinctive social formation with its own institutional logic and dynamics of development’ (Kandiyoti 2002b: 238), particularly since the collapse of the Soviet Union some scholars have subjected the claim that Soviet communism represented a radically different system from Western capitalism to scrutiny (e.g. Resnick & Wolff 1993, 2002; Howard & King 2001; Iñigo Carrera 2013: 73-74, 108-109, 125-130). A detailed analysis of the nature of state socialism, and whether the latter definition correctly captures the political- economy of the USSR, is beyond the scope of this study. Instead, the dissertation uses as a starting point the similarities between the West and the USSR during the first decades of the Cold War - Fordist conditions of industrial production; indiscriminate reproduction of the

31 working class - which, within its ideal-type dichotomy between Western democratic capitalism and Soviet authoritarian communism, the transition literature downplays, or ignores altogether. The dissertation then proceeds to explain capitalist transformation in the past three decades in the FSU successor states in general, and the specific case study of Uzbekistan in particular, in order to provide cogent answers to RQ1, RQ2, and RQ3.

Although the triangulation of various bodies of primary and secondary data and sources has been deployed to improve accuracy and reduce bias, any study of Uzbekistan is constrained by the general lack of availability and the low reliability of the country’s official data. This includes the GoU’s use of statistical methodologies that, during the Karimov presidency (1991-2016), differed from those applied internationally (Romanova et al. 2017: 10, fn. 41; UNDP 2018a: 96; INT-5; INT-14; INT-32; INT-36; INT-41), in order to reflect the country’s specific characteristics (GoU’s supporters) or to paint a more favourable picture of the Uzbek model’s achievements (GoU’s critics). Moreover, a precise calculation of ground-rent flows into the FSU and Uzbekistan via the CICP quantitative methodology (Iñigo Carrera 2007; Grinberg 2011) will require further research, including data collection, in the future. Instead, I use the available figures on total export revenue in USD as overall (and, admittedly approximate) indicators of ground-rent circulation in the FSU and Uzbekistan. This, however, does not change the overall conclusions of the dissertation, given that primary commodities make up the largest share of the FSU republics’ total exports.

Finally, my own limitations have translated into the exclusion of the important ethno-national (Uzbek-Tajik) dimension of labour fragmentation in Uzbekistan given my lack of knowledge of the Tajik language, which prevented me from conducting interviews with Tajik speakers independently, i.e. without interpreter, in order to address this sensitive subject with no repercussions for the interviewees. As a result, the ethno-national issue for the USSR/FSU in general, and Uzbekistan in particular, is addressed only anecdotally (Chapters 3, 5).

5. CONCLUSION

This Introductory Chapter highlighted the need for a different approach to analyse the transformation of the FSU and Uzbekistan since 1991, in view of transitology’s methodological and theoretical limitations. The chapter presented the dissertation’s methodology and research methods, as well as the main traits of the theoretical framework deployed in the next chapters, foregrounding the thesis contribution to the scholarly literature on uneven development in the Global South, and specifically to the literature on transition in the post-Soviet space and the case study of Uzbekistan. Finally, it introduced

32 the chapter breakdown with reference to the specific arguments developed in each to address the RQs, concluding with a short overview of the dissertation’s limits.

Before expounding the theoretical framework underpinning the thesis, I turn to a review of the literature on transition in the FSU and Uzbekistan in the context of the literature on development.

33 CHAPTER 1 A Monopoly on ‘Normality’: A Review of the Literature on Transition as Development

0. INTRODUCTION

The literature on capital accumulation (‘development’) in the GPE is extensive. Section 1 briefly reviews some key aspects of the debate on development in the neoliberal, developmental state, and dependency theory literature, as crucial background to the rise of a dominant neoliberal consensus on the theory and practice of development since the 1960s, while highlighting the common methodological nationalism underpinning these otherwise diverse bodies of literature. In this context, Section 2 investigates how (neoliberal) transitology fit, and fed, into this neoliberal consensus, establishing a monopoly on the conventional wisdom about development in the scholarly debate on the post-Soviet space, which has been framed as a transition from the Soviet authoritarian command economy to Western democratic free-market capitalism - idealised as a classless, gender-liberating, and eco-friendly system. As the FSU kept failing to live up to this ideal-type democratic capitalism, transitology has continued exceptionalising the FSU as underdeveloped and authoritarian as a result of a lack of, or a partial and incomplete, transition. As such, the literature has been stuck with the ‘paradox’ of no transition and radical transformation in the FSU countries during the past three decades, unable to explain the latter in view of its ideal- type theorisation of the former.

Likewise, as Section 3 argues, Uzbekistan has also been exceptionalised vis-à-vis the dominant paradigm, whether negatively as a non/slow/late reformer (neoliberal transitologists) or positively as a successful developmental state (developmental transitologists); either way, transitology’s monopoly on the conventional wisdom of development has been reinforced. Moreover, while the neoliberals are equally stuck in the ‘paradox’ of no transition and transformation, the developmentalists can only posit a Uzbek success by the omission of crucial facts. Succinctly put, the latter avoid the ‘paradox’ but still cannot explain transformation. Section 4 exposes how all the literature on transition in the FSU in general, and Uzbekistan in particular, suffers from the same methodological nationalism and idealisation of capitalist development as classless, gender-liberating, and eco-friendly development for all. This conceals class as the foundational divide in capitalist society; externalises gender from labour exploitation, hence class; and frames the overall rise in material throughput in the economy along with the ensuing climate crisis as external

34 to the process of capital accumulation. The conclusion summarises the chapter’s main findings.

1. DEVELOPMENT IN TRANSITION

In the euphoria of the West’s ‘victory’ over the USSR in the Cold War, there seemed to be little doubt that, in Fukuyama’s era-defining phrase, the world had reached the ‘end of history’, namely ‘the end point of mankind’s [sic] ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government’ (Fukuyama 1989: 4; Jones Luong 2002: 1; Åslund 2007: 37). The idea that Soviet Communism and Western Capitalism - both with a capital ‘C’ - had been two irreconcilable ideal-type systems appeared to be vindicated, with the former’s defeat not only sealing the latter’s superiority, but also cementing the domination of the neoliberal consensus as the conventional wisdom in development theory and practice (EBRD 1994: 3; Hoffmann 2000: 245; Shields 2012: Chapter 2). Thus, this section reviews three of the main bodies of literature - neoliberal, developmental, and dependency theory - in the scholarly debate on development, illustrating the rise of this neoliberal consensus as the crucial context in which the literature on transition in the FSU emerged.

1.1. Neoliberal theory

In The East Asian Miracle, a policy research report investigating the reasons behind the success of the so-called Asian tigers, the World Bank (1993a) argued that, since the 1970s, ‘a consensus has emerged among economists on the best approach to economic development’, namely ‘a healthy private sector, … a much reduced role for government, openness to (and so competitiveness with) the rest of the world, and macroeconomic stability’ (World Bank 1993a: 85). Whereas from ‘the time of the founding of the Bretton Woods institutions [and during] the first two or three decades after the Second World War’ (EBRD 1994: 3) the central role of the state in development was rarely contested in the literature (Chang 2003: 13; Radice 2008: 1164), this new consensus hailed ‘the changing role of the state, mainly in response to past failures by governments to improve welfare through state action’ (World Bank 1995: 9). The various iterations of this consensus, which has been reigning ‘supreme’ (Wylde 2016: 125) as the theory and practice of development up to the present day, have become known as neoliberalism (Chang 1999: 183), especially but not exclusively in the writings of its critics (e.g. Spechler et al. 2004; Boas & Gans-Morse 2009; Biebricher 2015; Venugopal 2015). In the first half of the 1990s, the new orthodoxy was encapsulated in the Washington Consensus, a set of ‘10 policy instruments’

35 (Williamson 1990: 7) representing ‘the common core of wisdom embraced by all serious economists’ (Williamson 1993: 1334), including privatisation, financial deregulation, and ‘trade policy, which should be export oriented and open to imports (import liberalisation)’ (Williamson 1990: 14-16).

As Pirie (2007: 4) argues, it was ‘the comprehensive reorganisation of economic activity on a regional/global level’ since the 1960s that drove ‘the transformation of the concept of development’. Central to this global reorganisation of production - commonly dubbed globalisation - was the relocation of increasingly more complex industrial processes from developed countries in the Global North, namely Western Europe and the United States, to some specific countries and territories in the Global South, such as South Korea and Taiwan. In this light, successful industrialisation specifically in high value-added goods for export became the litmus test of successful development, in contrast to raw material exports due to the low value-added and volatile prices of primary commodities. As a result, neoliberal orthodoxy - based in ‘the appropriate roles of markets and governments’ found in neoclassical economics (Wade 1990: 10) - promotes policies such as export orientation and trade liberalisation as development becomes synonymous ‘with participation in the global market’ in an increasingly globalised world (Pirie 2007: 4).

In this perspective, export-led industrialisation has been the main engine behind East Asia’s success since the 1960s (e.g. Kim 1991). The role of government is conspicuous by its absence, as ‘East Asia does better than other newly industrializing countries because the East Asian state interferes hardly at all in the working of the market’ (Wade 1990: 22; Stiglitz 1998b: 10). As The East Asian Miracle concludes, ‘rapid growth is associated with effective but carefully delimited government activism’ (World Bank 1993a: 84). East Asian governments simply ‘made good use of international markets’ (World Bank 1995: 3) or, in other words, state intervention ‘was essentially market-friendly, market-conforming, or even otherwise negative in its impact[, so] to the extent that it promoted development, the state merely did what the market would have done had it been working perfectly’ (Fine 2001: 137). Either way, the neoliberal consensus is reinforced, as ‘industrial policy cannot win: if it fulfills neoclassical expectations, it is “ineffective”; if it violates them, it is inefficient!’ (Amsden 1994: 629).

Given the consensus around the set of policies for a country to develop, the implication for the Global South has been that ‘the application of policies based on early post-war development thinking’ (Stiglitz 2001: 47), such as industrial policy, have necessarily translated into no or underdevelopment, especially for fostering corruption and rent-seeking.

36 Thus, when the 1997 Asian financial crisis struck, in International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and academic circles alike ‘there was a widespread feeling that rent-seeking and corruption underpinned the crisis, and that without uprooting the institutional structure of “crony capitalism”’, of which industrial policy was a fundamental part, ‘the prospects for the region were dim’ (Khan & Kwame Sundaram 2000: 1; Kwame Sundaram 2002: 8; Burkett & Hart- Landsberg 2003: 159-160; Jeong 2004: 12, 134). Not only did the literature fail to explain how crony capitalism had suddenly risen ‘in what had been just a short time before model capitalist economies’ (Burkett & Hart-Landsberg 2003: 160), but it also failed to address why this system could account for ‘a remarkable recovery from crisis’ thereafter (Shleifer & Treisman 2005: 160).

As the decade of the 1990s drew to a close and the orthodox package in the form of structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) was failing to generate growth and alleviate poverty (Standing 2000: 757; Fine 2001), a post-Washington Consensus crystallised in the late 1990s, emphasising the central role of institutions in correcting market failures (World Bank 1997). As Williamson (2003: 329) concedes, the Washington Consensus ‘focused on policies, not institutions. Recognition of the key role of institutions in nurturing development was the big change in development economics in the 1990s’ (also Fine 2001: 138ff.). Good governance became the name of the development game (World Bank 1997; Phillips 2006: 22), requiring ‘an effective state, one that plays a catalytic, facilitating role, encouraging and complementing the activities of private businesses and individuals’ (World Bank 1997: iii). In other words, the issue was framed as ‘one of balance’ that depended ‘on the country, the capacity of its Government, and the institutional development of its markets’ (Stiglitz 1998a: 8). In this context, Stiglitz (1998c, 2001: 60-63) acknowledged the role of the state in the East Asian miracle, inasmuch as it promoted market-friendly policies such as outward (export) orientation and the liberalisation of trade within a strong institutional framework. In this view, along with corruption and rent-seeking, ‘financial sector liberalisation without the necessary regulations and supporting institutions was identified as the fundamental cause’ of the 1997 Asian crisis (Stiglitz 2001: 63).

Sections 2 and 3 show that corruption and rent-seeking figure high in transitology’s analysis of underdevelopment in the FSU and Uzbekistan.

1.2. Developmental state theory

In reaction to the dominant neoliberal consensus, the meteoric rise of the Asian tigers from the 1960s onward spawned a vast new literature on the role of an activist ‘developmental’

37 state in achieving late industrialisation. Clearly, developmental state theorists set out to mount a challenge to the ‘long-held assumptions of generations of economic thinkers’ (Amsden 1989/1992: 3) within the dominant neoliberal orthodoxy (Wade 1990: 12-13, 29, 84-85), according to whom the state was not to lead in development, but rather to enable the market and simply correct its failures. As late industrialisation is theorised as a process of learning via technological catch up with the West, scholars empirically analyse the policies, institutions, and bureaucracies of the developmental state (Fine 2013: 4; Pirie 2018: 135-136), starting in its locus classicus of East Asia with Amsden’s (1989/1992) and Wade’s (1990) seminal works on South Korea and Taiwan, respectively, that build on Johnson’s (1982) previous research on Japan.

The ‘institutional locus’ of a developmental state can be found in ‘one or more central agencies vested with the powers to plan and coordinate within parts of the economy and with some responsibility for industrial success’ (Wade 1990: 33). In the case of Japan, such a ‘pilot organization’ was the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, or MITI, which ‘create[d] and execute[d] industrial policy’ (Johnson 1982: 26) via an ‘elite bureaucracy staffed by the best managerial talent available’ within ‘a political system in which the bureaucracy is given sufficient scope to take initiative and operate effectively’ (ibid.: 315). Put differently, ‘a determined developmental elite’ (Leftwich 1995: 405) needs to refrain from interfering in the works of the technocratic bureaucracy, while simultaneously shielding it from the meddling of special interest groups such as ‘politicians or outside interests, particularly business interests’ (Johnson 1982: 53). In turn, these ‘strong political and bureaucratic institutions … simultaneously maintain[] dense ties with [society and] the private sector’ (Haggard 2004: 61), in what Evans (1995) labels ‘embedded autonomy’. While these apparatuses possess a certain degree of ‘corporate coherence’ (autonomy), they are not ‘insulated from society… . To the contrary, they are embedded in a concrete set of social ties that binds the state to society and provides institutionalized channels for the continual negotiation and renegotiation of goals and policies’ (ibid.: 12).

Within a robust industrial policy, the developmental state ‘picks winners’ (Wade 1990: 320) in the form of specific national firms (‘national champions’) that benefit from a range of protections and incentives to bridge the technological gap with international players, until such a time when they can eventually compete in the world market. At the heart of this has been the state’s policy of setting ‘relative prices deliberately “wrong” in order to create profitable investment opportunities’ instead of ‘“right”, as dictated by supply and demand’ (Amsden 1989/1992: 14, 13) and ‘in line with international prices’ (Wade 1990: 29). As a result, ‘instead of the market mechanism allocating resources and guiding private

38 entrepreneurship, the government made most of the pivotal investment decisions. Instead of firms operating in a competitive market structure, they each operated with an extraordinary degree of market control, protected from foreign competition’ (Amsden 1989/1992: 139). In this context, in contrast to ‘blanket neoclassical criticism of import substitution’ industrialisation (ISI) (Wade 1990: 85), the state coordinated ISI and export oriented industrialisation (EOI) policies, with the former contributing to overall growth and preparing the ground for the latter (Wade 1990: 84-110; Amsden 1994: 628) in a ‘complementary and interactive’ fashion (Gereffi 1990: 18).

When the 1997 Asian crisis erupted, to neoliberals’ explanations rooted in corruption and rent-seeking, developmentalists retorted that such phenomena were rife in the East Asian economies throughout the decades of sustained economic growth (Amsden 1989/1992: 146, 2007: 88; Tiberghien 2007: 166-167); in other words, ‘[n]ot only was there no simple correlation between the extent of rent-seeking and long-run economic performance, there was also little correlation between the intensity of rent-seeking and the country’s vulnerability to the financial crisis of 1997’ (Khan & Kwame Sundaram 2000: 4). Instead, they argued, it was the enforcement of neoliberal policies such as deregulation and financial liberalisation both nationally and internationally that precipitated the crisis (Burkett & Hart- Landsberg 2003: 165; Kok Fay & Kwame Sundaram 2001). As Chang et al. (2001: 145) succinctly put it, ‘it was the demise of industrial policy, rather than its perpetuation, which drove the Korean economy into crisis’.

Therefore, one central preoccupation of the developmentalists has been to identify the key characteristics of a generalisable model of late-industrialisation that could be replicated by other countries in the Global South (Amsden 1989/1992: 3-4, 1994: 631; Gore 1996: 117; Stark 2012: 3). This leads to the ‘uncomfortable disjuncture’ between the political regimes to which these scholars aspire ‘(democratic and liberal) and those they assert are required for late industrialisation (authoritarian)’ (Selwyn 2015: 43), as has been the case at least initially in all the ‘tigers’ and continues to be the case in China (Radice 2008: 1154; Hayashi 2010: 56-58; Wylde 2016: 128; Bolesta 2019). Be it as it may, developmental state theorists maintain that, with the right set of policies and institutions, other states could emulate the success of the East Asian tigers and progress to the production of increasingly complex industrial goods for export. However, while other East Asian economies at least partially followed in the path of South Korea and Taiwan, earning the title of second-tier Asian tigers

39 (Kwame Sundaram 2001; Booth 2001: 31, 38; Ikpe 2013: 196-197),5 repeating the success of the ‘classic’ trailblazers has proven so elusive that even Wade (2014: 3) has recently conceded that, since World War II (WWII), ‘the number of non-western countries which have become developed is less than ten - even stretching the categories of “non-western”, “countries” and “developed”’ (also Haynes & Husan 2002: 393).

In spite of this, a variety of scholars have continued to deploy the concept of the developmental state in the most disparate contexts as a valid counter to the dominant neoliberal orthodoxy, arguing for the continuing validity of the model in the current era of globalisation (Hayashi 2010: 50, 65, 2017).6 Weiss (2012) highlights states’ ongoing and widespread intervention in investment and finance, as well as in the technological field, while Mazzucato (2014) and Block (2008) speak of the ‘entrepreneurial state’ and the ‘hidden developmental state’, respectively, referring to huge state support to R&D especially in high-tech industries in the USA. But it is with the rise of China in recent decades that developmental state theory found renewed impetus (Radice 2008: 1155; Fine 2013: 3, 15- 20; Selwyn 2015: 39; Wylde 2016: 135),7 including in the theorisation of the (neo)developmental state in the era of the Chinese-demand-led commodity supercycle since the 2000s. With the so-called Pink-Tide governments in Latin America from the mid- 2000s to the mid-2010s (Burchardt & Dietz 2014: 470-471; Webber 2015: 162-164), as well as across the Global South (Third World Quarterly Special Issue 2018; for a critique, Marois & Pradella 2015: 7-9), states could leverage high international commodity prices in order to implement developmental and redistributive policies, giving rise to neo-extractivism as a form of new developmentalism.

In this perspective, the (re)nationalisation of natural resource extraction within State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) in the Global South, particularly in the energy industry, represents a developmental boon for ‘resource rich’ countries (Singh & Chen 2018: 1081); so does ‘the growth of sovereign wealth funds [SWFs] and the rise of the investor state’, particularly in oil-rich states in the wake of Chinese-demand-driven high commodity prices (Weiss 2012: 32; Alami & Dixon 2020b: 71). By contrast, some scholars in the neoliberal tradition have framed these developments within the rise of a new form of authoritarian state capitalism,

5 The original World Bank’s study (1993a) included the second-tier tigers of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand. 6 By contrast, other scholars consider the developmental state ‘a historical relic’ (Pirie 2013: 155) that has been superseded by the neoliberal (Pirie 2007: 39-52), regulatory (Jayasuriya 2001a, 2001b, 2005), or competition (Cerny 2000) state. 7 Some scholars (e.g. Chu & So 2010; Lim 2017) emphasise instead the neoliberal aspects of China’s development model.

40 as natural resources risk becoming a curse for development in the context of weak institutions and elite corruption (Bremmer 2010: 122, 149-160; 2012; Gel’man 2010; Kurlantzick 2016: 41-44; Spechler et al. 2017).8 Put differently, state capitalism is framed as a ‘deviant, corrupt, politically-driven, undemocratic, and irrational’ system, against which ‘Western capitalism’ is constructed as ‘a fundamentally democratic, rational, efficient, meritocratic, virtuous, and pure version of capitalism. Hence, this Western capitalism is constituted not only as morally superior, but also as the ideal[-type] norm’ (Alami & Dixon 2020a: 6). In a way, state capitalism is a further iteration of crony capitalism; it is as corrupt, rent-seeking, and crony as its predecessor, only (and perhaps, because) the state appears to play a more active role, particularly in extractive industries, due to the large rents that can be accrued from high commodity prices.

Sections 2 and 3 reveal how, in the transition literature, the FSU’s and Uzbekistan’s failure to transition to ‘normal’ capitalism gave rise to an authoritarian state capitalist system marred by rent-seeking and corruption; for their part, the GoU and a minority of scholars positively exceptionalise Uzbekistan under the ‘Uzbel model’ as a case of successful developmentalism.

1.3. Dependency theory

While predating both bodies of literature reviewed so far, dependency theory engages with, and offers a radically different perspective on, the same fundamental questions about the international division of labour (IDL) between industrialised and primary commodity producing countries in the GPE. Hailing from post-WWII Latin America, dependency scholars have attempted to explain the wealth gap between what they define as the developed states in the core (or, alternatively, the centre or metropolis) and the underdeveloped countries in the periphery, which includes the Latin American region and other parts of the Global South (Amin 2011: 7-8, 42). Their central argument revolves around how the unequal terms of exchange in the division of labour in the international economy structurally consigns peripheral countries to underdevelopment, since, historically, they ‘concentrated on and became specialised in the monoproduction of un- or hardly processed raw materials for export to the metropolis’ (Gunder Frank 1978: 11-12). As in the long run the prices of raw materials have tended to decline relative to the prices

8 A review of the vast literature on the ‘resource curse’ and on the ‘new’ state capitalism is beyond the scope of this chapter, but see e.g. The Economist (2012: 3); Badeeb et al. (2017); Spechler et al. (2017: 5-6); and Alami & Dixon (2020a, 2020b).

41 of manufactured goods, the terms of trade of primary commodity exporters in the periphery have equally tended to worsen in favour of industrial manufacturers in the centre.

This unequal exchange translates into the outflow of value from the former to the latter, thus determining the periphery’s underdevelopment (Iñigo Carrera 2013: 168-169). While world- system theory added a semi-periphery that guarantees international political stability as an intermediary between the core and the periphery (Wallerstein 1974: 404-405), it remained anchored to the principle of unequal exchange/value outflow due to asymmetrical power relations between countries. In Wallerstein’s (1974: 401) formulation, ‘the operation of “unequal exchange” … is enforced by strong states on weak ones, by core states on peripheral areas. Thus capitalism involves not only appropriation of the surplus-value by an owner from a laborer, but an appropriation of surplus of the whole world-economy by core areas’.

As surpassing the periphery’s underdevelopment became the central concern of dependency theorists, two schools of thought can be loosely identified in this regard. On the one hand, economists close to the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) advocated for protectionism and ISI as crucial components of any programme that wanted to achieve national development, given that only a switch from primary to industrial commodity production could reverse the outflow of value from the periphery to the core (Connell & Dados 2014: 123; Ahrens et al. 2016: 50; McMichael 2016: 51-52). On the other hand, more radical scholars averred the impossibility of catching up with the West for underdeveloped countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America within the capitalist world-system (Gunder Frank 1978: 171; Amin 2011: 171-175).

In recent years, some scholars have framed their critique of neo-extractivism within the tradition of dependency theory, in clear contrast to the above-mentioned new developmentalism literature. Pointing to the enduring prevalence of raw material exports in the balance of trade of countries in the Global South, they posit that ‘[d]ependency on the metropolitan centres via the extraction and export of raw materials has remained practically unaltered to this day’ (Acosta 2013: 63). As a result, neo-extractivism is but the continuation of neo-colonial relations of dependence between the un(der)developed Global South and the developed Global North (Acosta 2013, 2017; Cope 2019: 72, 134), as evident in the continuing outflow of value from the former to the latter. As Cope (2019: 30) puts it, ‘[e]ven after decolonisation, the continued outward flow of surplus and the consequent failure to reinvest in the production of capital goods remains a major economic handicap, and helps

42 keep the so-called developing countries perennially underdeveloped relative to the advanced capitalist countries’ (emphasis added).

Chapter 2 introduces a different theorisation of value flows in the GPE from dependency theory, arguing that a mass of extraordinary wealth actually inflows into ‘resource rich’ countries in virtue of their raw material exports. This, I contend, contributes to our understanding of developments in the FSU region and Uzbekistan since 1991.

1.4. Methodological nationalism common to the literature

While (even radically) disagreeing on specifics, the bodies of literatures reviewed in this section frame capital accumulation (‘development’) as a national process, whether ‘market- enhancing’, ‘embedded yet autonomous’, or ‘dependent’. As a consequence, at best, ‘the global economy appears as the context or environment to which national strategies adapt, react [and] integrate’ (Grinberg 2013: 178), or by which they are constrained hence fail to spur development and result in underdevelopment. Despite conceiving of the capitalist system as a world system, dependency theory also operates within this methodological nationalism (Gore 1996; Pradella 2014), as it ‘ultimately explain[s] the developmental course of each particular country in terms of the interaction between “internal factors” and “external constraints”’ (Fitzsimons & Starosta 2018: 116), thus reproducing the nation state as the ‘basic unit of analysis’ (Wimmer & Glick Schiller 2002: 305). It is in the unequal interaction/exchange between core and periphery states that the former (have) develop(ed) and the latter (have) remain(ed) underdeveloped, due to the outflow of value from the latter to the former.

Therefore, the development literature fetishises the national state form (Chang 2009: 44- 45)

as the affirmation of a national process of capital accumulation on its ‘path to development’. If this process does not fully travel down the path to ‘full development’ as an autonomous national process of accumulation, the matter is solved by claiming that such a circumstance can only be due to the application of ‘incorrect’ economic policies or the presence of some internal ‘deformity’ or ‘perverse behaviour’; for example, the lack of ‘capitalist’ behaviour (Iñigo Carrera 2016: 44-45) or corruption (e.g. neoliberal theory, transitology), or unequal exchange between developed and developing countries (dependency theory). In this way, the literature’s methodological

43 nationalism leads it to mistake the form that ‘the product of the full development of the global essence of accumulation’ takes in the different states of the Global South for its polar opposite, namely ‘the result of the “underdevelopment” of capitalism’ in these countries (Iñigo Carrera 2013: 63).

Sections 2 and 3 review the literature on the FSU region and Uzbekistan, which shares the same methodological nationalism with the literature on development, while largely fitting, and feeding, into the dominant neoliberal consensus.

2. ON ‘NORMALITY’ AND EXCEPTIONALISM (1): TRANSITOLOGY IN THE FSU

By the time the USSR collapsed in 1991, the neoliberal consensus had largely become the conventional wisdom on development theory and practice (EBRD 1994: 3). It is in this context that (neoliberal) transitology emerged as the specialised literature dealing with the exceptional case of the USSR’s transition from the authoritarian communist command economy to Western democratic free-market capitalism (Olson 1995: 445). Since the former ‘was an historical anomaly, an aberration, an experiment that ha[d] been tried, found wanting and rejected’ (Shields 2012: 12; World Bank 1995: 98), it followed that ‘democratic capitalism … was now unchallenged by any possible alternative’ (Davidson 2015: 106). In this way, the transition literature established a monopoly on the conventional wisdom on development (‘normality’), defined as transition to an ideal-type democratic capitalism, fitting, and feeding, into the dominant neoliberal consensus. In order to develop, the FSU states had to transition from the aberrant communist system to its opposite ideal-type of Western ‘capitalist normality’ (Rutland 1999: 184; Sachs 1994: 268; Åslund 1999: 8, 2007: 36; Bohle 2000: 235; Gleason 2003: 19, 141, 148; Pusca 2007: 355; Shleifer & Treisman 2005, 2014), all as theoretically framed and empirically assessed by transitology. What was meant ‘[b]y “normal”’ clearly was ‘an ordinary Western society - a democracy with a market economy, predominant private property, and the rule of law’ (Åslund 2007: 36).

While critical voices joined the debate on transition, including by advocating for the developmental state approach ‘as a model for the rest of the global South, and indeed for post-communist Eastern Europe and the ex-USSR’ (Radice 2008: 1153-1154), the fact that one such contribution (Chang & Nolan 1995) chose Against the Mainstream as its subtitle neatly captures just how dominant the literature on transition was then, and has been since. Likewise, some scholars (e.g. Levitsky & Way 2010) did contest the shaky empirical foundations of transitology’s claim about capitalism and democracy being ‘mutually dependent and enabling’ sides of the same development equation (Pares Hoare 2019: 173;

44 Sachs 1995, in Marangos 2004: 225; Gleason 2003: 148; Kornetis 2015: 7; Spechler et al. 2017: 1). As it becomes apparent in the following pages, however, the transition literature has continued exceptionalising the FSU states and Uzbekistan against its ideal-type democratic capitalism, specifically construing the region as suffering from underdevelopment and authoritarianism as a direct result of a lack of, or a partial and incomplete, transition.

All this has important ramifications for the literature’s research agenda. First, with the opposition between the USSR and the West as ideal-type systems reinforced, key points of commonality between the two Blocs were obscured. These included the centrality of industrialisation to both modernisation projects as well as their similar conditions of Fordist industrial production during the first post-WWII decades (Hoffmann 2000: 256-258; McMichael 2016: 49-50), whose restructuring starting in the 1960s has been transforming relations of production and social reproduction across the globe since, including in the so- called West.9 Second, within this ideal-type dichotomy, transitology idealises democratic capitalism as a classless, gender-liberating, and eco-friendly system, against which it exceptionalises the FSU republics as marred by underdevelopment and authoritarianism to this day. Yet, having framed the region’s ills as the outcome of a lack of, or partial and incomplete, reforms, the literature is left with the ‘paradox’ of no transition and radical transformation in the FSU and Uzbekistan.

In this section, I review the literature on transition in the FSU in general, while Section 3 specifically discusses transitology in Uzbekistan. In both sections, the review is organised along two broad historical periods, namely (a) the first decade of transition in the FSU and Uzbekistan, with the collapse in production and living standards in the 1990s, and (b) the decade of the 2000s until today, when the region started exhibiting sustained growth rates in the wake of the Chinese-demand-led commodity supercycle, with growth slowing to lower yet still relatively high levels in the second half of the 2010s (Figure 1.1). Clearly, the term transitology covers very diverse scholarly traditions dealing with the FSU and Uzbekistan, from (neo-institutionalist) economics to international relations, political economy, area studies, and anthropology. However, as Section 4 argues, all the literature on transition shares the same methodological nationalism found in the literature on development, as well as the idealisation of (a classless, gender-liberating, and eco-friendly) democratic capitalism as the normality of development theory and practice. In this sense, the transitology label

9 I return to these similarities in the next chapters. As mentioned in the Introductory Chapter, the dissertation does not concern itself with the question as to whether state socialism correctly defines the political-economic system of the USSR.

45 highlights the commonalities at the core of the literature’s research agenda, which continues to dominate the study of the FSU region and Uzbekistan to this day.

Figure 1.1. GDP growth (annual %) in selected CIS countries (1991-2018) Source: own elaboration based on World Bank data (data set in Appendix 3).

2.1. The roaring 1990s: (revolutionary) shock therapy and (evolutionary) gradualism

In the early years of transition, the issue of speed was considered to be crucial for reform, in order to avoid sending ‘confused signals to economic agents from a hybrid system - neither the old command system nor a viable alternative’ (World Bank 1993b: 11). As a result, from the inception the reform strategy earned the moniker of ‘shock therapy’ for being radical, comprehensive, and swift in implementation, with proponents justifying the revolutionary shock in virtue of the therapy that would follow (Pusca 2007: 342), as ‘far- reaching reforms’ were expected to ‘establish the necessary basis for sustainable and significant economic growth over the medium and long terms’ (World Bank 1993b: 11, emphasis added).

In line with the neoliberal consensus and in direct opposition to the distortions of the now- discredited Soviet system, the transition policy set included (trade and price) liberalisation, privatisation, and macroeconomic stabilisation (Sachs 1990; World Bank 1993b: Chapters 3, 6; Pomfret 1995: 51-58; Marangos 2005: 70). A crucial aspect of achieving a systemic

46 overhaul would be to bring prices in line with international prices (‘getting prices right’), in order to end the inter-sectoral subsidies typical of the Soviet economy and promote the efficient reallocation of resources, including a shift in production away from uncompetitive state-owned heavy industries and towards private enterprises and services (World Bank 1993b: 65, 88, 1996: 2-4; Pomfret 1995: 45; Connolly 1997: 410; Krueger & Ciolko 1998: 722; Broome 2010: 117; Shleifer & Treisman 2014: 4). The IFIs introduced transition indicators that became reference standards in the debate, so former communist and socialist countries could be ranked, compared, and contrasted according to their adherence to the orthodox policy set; in Central Asia, for example, while Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan emerged as reform leaders, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan were consistently classified as laggards or outright non-reformers (EBRD 1999, 2002: 20, Table 2.1; Åslund 2003; Gleason 2003: 42; Lord 2005: 19; Blackmon 2009: 141; Broome 2010: 112, 145, 168; Jones Luong & Weinthal 2010: 87-88; Batsaikhan & Dabrowski 2017: 307, Fig. 8; Pomfret 2019: 14-15).

The FSU countries needed ‘to reform their state sectors and accept the destruction of state employment’, since ‘[t]he key to renewed growth is a successful reorganization of labor out of the public sector and into higher productivity activities. This involves mass privatizations, falling trade protection, and a more workable financial system’ (World Bank 1995: 101, 123, 109), with the ‘privatization of agricultural land and state farms [being] just as important as privatization in the industrial and service sectors’ (Dervis et al. 1994: 23) in order to achieve ‘the greatest gains’ for workers via a reliance ‘on market forces rather than the state in allocating resources’ such as labour (World Bank 1995: 10, 98). Although women were shifting ‘out of the labour force at a higher rate than men’ and showing ‘slower transition rates out of unemployment’ (ibid.: 108), equality would be advanced with the implementation of policies supporting women’s choices via the market (World Bank 1996: 72). Finally, as Soviet communism’s ‘underpricing of energy’ incentivised ‘energy-intensive, environmentally harmful industries and technologies’ that resulted in ecological devastation, the price mechanism would instead encourage the adoption of ‘more environment-friendly technologies’ (Dervis et al. 1994: 15). In short, the huge social dislocations of transformation would be functional to the transition to a normal capitalist economy, whose classless, gender-liberating, and eco-friendly development would ultimately be beneficial to the general population.

As the 1990s progressed, a rich literature engaged with the effect of so-called initial conditions such as country size, income level, initial industry share of GDP, and resource endowments on policy choices and transition outcomes in the various FSU countries (World Bank 1996: 19-21; de Melo et al. 1997: 1-9; Ofer & Pomfret 2004: 1-4, Table 1.1; Blackmon

47 2005, 2009, 2011; Ruziev et al. 2007: 9, Table 1; Spechler 2008: 32; Pomfret 2019: 11, Table 2.1). Eventually, in line with the rise to prominence of a post-Washington consensus rooted in neo-institutionalist economics (Section 1), the literature concluded that ‘initial conditions make an important difference, but the importance wanes over time and, after ten years of transition, can no longer be considered the main explanatory factor’ (Falcetti et al. 2000: 15). Instead, good policies and institutions are. The institutionalist turn generated an extensive debate between so-called shock therapists and gradualists on the role of institutions in transition, including in relation to reform design, sequencing, and speed of implementation (e.g. World Bank 1993b: xx, 1, 11, 35-36, 61, 78, 1996: Chapter 1, 2002: Chapter 2; Sachs 1994: 275-278; Desai 1997: 2, 38; Åslund 1999, 2007: Chapter 2; Popov 2000; Stiglitz 2002; Dehejia 2003; Marangos 2004, 2005; Pusca 2007; Hoen & Irnazarov 2012; Roháč 2013: 66-68). On the one hand, proponents of shock therapy maintained that a fast and comprehensive transition delivered more growth and less pain (Sachs 1994; Shleifer & Treisman 2014: 10-11, 14), as ‘radical reformers have outgrown the gradual reformers, which in turn have outgrown the lagging reformers’ (Wolf 1999: 15). On the other hand, supporters of gradualism advocated the ‘slow building of the institutions that are necessary for free market capitalism’ (Roháč 2013: 66; Stiglitz 2001: 59), since the shock led to a ‘near institutional vacuum’ (Chang & Nolan 1995: 23) that resulted in ‘low growth, inflation, unemployment, corruption and crime’, rather than in therapy (Marangos 2005: 77).

Although revolutionary shock therapy and evolutionary gradualism differed in terms of the speed of reforms, at the most fundamental level they prescribed different timelines toward the same goal of transition (Lo 1995: 79; Dehejia 1996: 425; Gleason 2003: 25). Since neither questioned the validity and objective of the policy set, when ‘unexpected … surprises continued to surface through the reforms period’ (Gevorkyan 2018: 136), transitology resorted to a series of exceptions, ‘puzzles’, and ‘paradoxes’ in order to account for the fact that reality repeatedly failed to live up to the literature’s expectations (e.g. Blanchard 1997 in Repkine 2004: 156; Zettelmeyer 1998; Taube & Zettelmeyer 1998; Zavadskaya 2000: 9; Eke & Kuzio 2000; Bakanova et al. 2004; Yudaeva et al. 2004; Pomfret 2006: 90, 2019; Åslund & Jenish 2007; Ahrens & Hoen 2012: 12-13; Gel’man 2016: 459). Either way, transitology’s monopoly on normality was reinforced.

This was again the case once the first decade of transition failed to produce the ‘sustainable and significant economic growth’ that transitology had predicted would ensue as a result of ‘far-reaching reforms’ (World Bank 1993b: 11); having established the validity of the reform set, blame had to be assigned elsewhere. Thus, the literature ascribed the huge slump in production, mass deindustrialisation, raw material export concentration, low FDI flows, and

48 the ‘drastic drop in overall living standards’ during the 1990s (Pusca 2007: 343; Kalotay 2004: 120; Marangos 2004: 229; Roháč 2013: 71; Gevorkyan 2018: 124; Figure 1.1; Chapters 2-4) to either a lack of reform or to the ‘inadequate application of an otherwise sound set of principles’ (Rodrik 2002: 1). Vested interests had derailed otherwise sound reforms, resulting in a failed, or partial and incomplete, transition, amid the rise of crony capitalism (e.g. Åslund 1999; Kołodko 2000, in Hoen & Irnazarov 2012: 35; Lane 2000: 190; Cooley & Heathershaw 2017: 52-57). In the FSU, ‘comprehensive reforms … were rarely adopted in full, and the ones adopted were poorly implemented’ due to ‘partial liberalization and privatization. The soft budgets and remaining barriers to entry generated tremendous opportunities for rent seeking and theft, especially in economies rich in natural resources’, with ‘[l]imited economic reform [going] hand in hand with limited political reform’ (World Bank 2002: 108-109; Åslund 2007: 3-4).

Elites kept in place ‘key elements of the previous command system’ such as subsidies, so they and their cronies could acquire the significant rents accruing especially from the extraction and export of raw materials (Åslund 1999, 2007: Introduction; Roland 2002: 30; World Bank 2002: 105-107, 109). While the literature defined rents as ‘money made on government transfers or any kind of market distortions’, including any form of subsidised credit, import or other government subsidy (Åslund 1999: 3-4, 36; Boadway & Flatters 1993: 7-8), it left the crucial question of the social origin of these rents unexplored (Chapter 2). Equally, in the same way as the neoliberal literature blamed crony capitalists for the 1997 Asian financial crisis, transitology ascribed the failure of transition to crony capitalism; what neither literature explained, though, is how those same bureaucracies that had supervised rapid industrialisation (Asian ‘tigers’) or rapid reform (‘shock therapy’) could turn overnight from successful bureaucrats or top reformers into cronies. Instead, the literature turned ‘objective economic outcomes’ (raw materials export concentration, rents) into ‘subjective political behaviour’ (rent-seeking) (Purcell 2010: 60), explaining neither.

Rather, the results of capitalist transformation in the FSU - labour exploitation, including in gender-differentiated ways; environmental degradation - were framed as their opposite, namely as the underdevelopment of an ideal-type classless, gender-liberating, and eco- friendly capitalism in the region. Put differently, the literature ignored class as the foundational divide in the capitalist system, while it externalised gender from the exploitation of labour, hence class, and the process of capital accumulation from the overall rise in material throughput in the economy. All empirical evidence that failed to fit the literature’s normative framework was turned into the consequence of a lack of, or a partial and incomplete, transition. First, no or partial reforms were responsible for the mass

49 un(der)employment that followed the privatisation of enterprises and the decollectivisation of agriculture, with the rise of a huge informal economy where workers struggled to survive amid wage arrears and non-payment, a collapsing welfare state, and mass rural outmigration (Depoy 1996: 1149; Gilpenson 2001; Clarke 2002; Durand 2003; Laruelle 2007; Mitra & Yemtsov 2006: 37; Rodgers & Williams 2009; Rasanayagam 2011; Aliyev 2015; Trevisani 2018; UNDP 2018a; World Bank 2018b, 2019).

Second, due to the failure to transition, women were being squeezed in much greater numbers than men out of the formal economy and into lower-paying sectors such as health and education, as well as into informal (under)employment, particularly in commercial and subsistence agriculture (Ashwin 2006: 46, Table 2.1; Kozina & Zhidkova 2006; Wooden et al. 2009: 41; Khitarishvili 2016; Romanova et al. 2017; Wegren et al. 2018: 45, fn. 123; World Bank 2018b). As their ‘double burden’ increased in direct proportion to the collapse of the welfare state, the general trend became one of feminisation of agriculture, unskilled agricultural labour, and poverty (Kandiyoti 1999: 517; Prokofieva 2000; Kandiyoti in Spoor 2004: 5, 34; Moghadam 2005: 23-25; Veldwisch & Bock 2011: 588; Rocca et al. 2015: 8-9; FIDH 2016: 4, 20; Mukhamedova & Wegerich 2018), within a process of retraditionalisation mixed with resurgent nationalism promoting ‘traditional’ gender roles, such as the ‘male breadwinner’ in Russia (Ashwin 2006; Walker 2015 in Morris 2016: 146). While feminist scholars acknowledged the gap between the stated objective of promoting equality through the market and the actual gender-differentiated effects of the transition (e.g. Moghadam 1996: 330, 341, 343; Kandiyoti 2007a), the state was expected to ‘challenge patriarchal stereotypes concerning the appropriate role of women’ in order to fulfil the promise of ‘genuine equality’ (Lapidus 2000: 106, 102), which it largely failed to accomplish as a consequence of a lack of, or a partial and incomplete, transition.

Third, as Soviet state-led resource mismanagement (World Bank 1996: iii) led to ‘ecocide’ and the fall of the USSR (Coumel & Elie 2013: 160; Foster 2015), the price mechanism would lead to a shift from the misallocation of resources typical of the command economy to the efficient use of inputs under capitalism, including with the introduction of energy- saving technologies. The main issue for the FSU republics would be to ‘overcome the local environmental problems … inherited from the Soviet Union’ and ‘embrace sustainable development’ (Sievers 2001: 1; EBRD 1999: 54; Novikov & Kelly 2017: 86). Since transitology put ‘faith’ in the fact that ‘the transition would bring a more sustainable practice of resource extraction’ (Coumel & Elie 2013: 161), it interpreted the continuation of environmental devastation in the FSU states as the consequence of a lack of, or a partial

50 and incomplete, transition to an ideal-type eco-friendly capitalist system (Josephson 2016: 381-382).

In sum, transitology established a monopoly on normality understood as transition to democratic capitalism via liberalisation, privatisation, and macroeconomic stabilisation within a strong institutional setting able to withstand rent-seeking behaviour. It then ‘assessed [success or failure] according to three precepts: the extent to which (1) formal [policies and] institutions … conformed to the (2) standard of [neo]liberal democracy, at (3) the national scale’ (Moldalieva & Heathershaw 2020: 172, emphasis added). Since good policies and institutions would make for good results, the opposite must necessarily be true, so when the outcome of transition at the close of the first decade significantly differed from expectations, the literature identified corrupt elites and crony capitalists as the spoilers of an otherwise sound theory and policy set for development. Equally, whenever reality deviated from the theory, the literature framed it as exceptions, ‘puzzles’, and ‘paradoxes’. Either way, transitology’s monopoly on normality was reinforced, as evident in the continuing dominance of transition as the framework of analysis for the FSU in the following two decades, to which I now turn.

2.2. Permanent exceptionalism: From the 2000s to today

At the turn of the millennium, reality dashed transitology’s expectations once again, as, despite a lack of, or a still incomplete, transition, FSU states started registering significant growth levels in the wake of soaring commodity prices, particularly as a consequence of rising Chinese demand (Figure 1.1; Chapters 2-4). In Pomfret’s (2010: 15) words,

many foreign observers expected the longer-term relative economic performance to reward those countries which had bit [sic] the bullet of seriously reforming their systems in the 1990s to create effective market economies while punishing those countries which had held back on reform. In practice, outcomes in the second decade were primarily determined by whether countries had energy resources or not.

The same applies to the decade of the 2010s until today, though commodity prices plateaued to lower but still historically relatively high levels, translating into slower yet sustained rates of growth (Figure 3.1).10 Since reformers were expected to perform better than laggards and non-reformers, transitology frames the empirical evidence of no/partial

10 The dissertation stops at the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic.

51 transition and growth as ‘The Eurasian Growth Paradox’ (Åslund & Jenish 2007; Ahrens & Hoen 2012: 12-13); equally, corruption seemed to have little to no effect on FDI flows to the region (Tondel 2001: 39; Åslund & Jenish 2007: 25) which, while remaining comparatively low in relation to global flows, experienced a remarkable increase in line with the rising prices of raw materials, particularly oil and gas (Chapter 3).

However, the literature argued, due to the ‘still-incomplete transition from a centrally planned economy to an efficient market system’ (Ahrens et al. 2016: 52; Stark 2012: 2), the ensuing weakness of state institutions continued to make them vulnerable to capture by powerful vested interests, especially in relation to the growing rents accrued from natural resource extraction (Collins 2009: 275-276). Rent-seeking and corruption were thus turning the bonanza of high commodity prices into a curse, as elites and their cronies misappropriated resources instead of allocating them to foster development via ‘the kind of cooperation between business and government which allowed the “tigers” of southeast Asia to manage their export-led growth efficiently’ (Spechler 2008: 34). Neo-institutionalist economists posited that, since the FSU states had failed to build ‘a distinct set of core institutions’ able to spur ‘sustained development’, including ‘undistorted markets characterized by low rents’ (Ahrens & Hoen 2012: 10, 9), the region was being trapped in a ‘resource curse’ (Kandiyoti 2002b: 253-254; Auty 2006b: 33-34; Esanov et al. 2006; Gel’man 2010: 93).

Thus, the literature focused on the multiple interlinks between, on the one hand, the formal political-economic and legal systems and, on the other, the informal rules and networks of patron-client relations underpinning what it defined as post-Soviet (neo)patrimonial regimes (Robinson 2011; Gel’man 2016).11 ‘[R]ather than offering a parallel structure’, however, ‘informal patterns’ have been bound ‘into the formal system’ (Heathershaw & Schatz 2017: 21), resulting in a complex web of overlapping and ‘co-existing informal and formal rules, elite power, personalized relations, and patronage networks’ (Moldalieva & Heathershaw 2020: 173), extending to all levels of society. While the ‘logic of rent-seeking behaviour pervading the economy’ had serious ‘consequences for economic development’ (Grävingholt 2012: 158), the ‘ability to extract and distribute rent’ actually guaranteed the stability and resilience of these regimes, enabling a process of authoritarian consolidation (Ambrosio 2014: 487-488; Ilkhamov 2007; Robinson 2011: 444; Gel’man 2016: 461). Put differently, the lack of economic reform went hand in hand with the lack of democratisation.

11 The fact that regime has been the literature’s preferred term to refer to the FSU governments reveals, and reinforces, the established consensus on the normality of democracy and the abnormality of authoritarian rule.

52 However, while the literature framed most of the region as still unreformed or stuck in a partial and incomplete transition, it could only interpret the momentous changes to its political-economy and society since 1991 as a ‘paradox’ of no transition and transformation (Pomfret 2019: 265).

Beginning in the decade of the 2000s and continuing in the 2010s, energy-rich FSU states in particular were becoming increasingly involved in extractive industries on the back of rising commodity prices, either through a process of ‘creeping renationalisation’ of the oil and gas industry largely privatised during the 1990s, as in Russia (Hill & Fee 2001: 464; Moser 2017), or with the creation of national SOEs controlling a significant share of the energy market including in JV with foreign MNCs, as in Kazakhstan (Kaiser & Pulsipher 2007). For the literature, these developments were proof of the continuing lack of/partial transition in the FSU, as new and old authoritarian figures - such as Putin in Russia and Nazarbayev in Kazakhstan - recentralised resource rents to amass fabulous personal wealth and continue benefitting their circles of cronies, while guaranteeing the regime’s stability and their political longevity (Hill & Fee 2001; Åslund 2004; Olcott 2004: esp. 17-19; Bowyer 2008: 13, 31; Rutland 2013: 350ff.). Given the state’s centrality to the process of rent recentralisation, a number of scholars maintained that these dynamics signalled the rise of ‘authoritarian state capitalism’ (Shleifer & Treisman 2014: 1; Bremmer 2010; Ahrens & Hoen 2012, 2019; The Economist 2012; Djankov 2015), which has been as crony as its crony capitalist predecessor (Åslund 2007: 262; Spechler et al. 2017), yet could use this newly acquired influence in the economy as an instrument of foreign policy via e.g. national oil companies, as well as SWFs created as investment vehicles to channel the energy bonanza at home and abroad (Bremmer 2008: 56-59, 2010: 80-111).

Clearly, the ‘obvious contrast to state-capitalism is free market capitalism’, with the former being the latter’s abnormal doppelganger which, even in the best case scenario, fosters ‘state-driven growth’ but ‘usually fails in nurturing innovation’ (Spechler et al. 2017: 2, 8). As in the literature on development, in transitology ‘state capitalism is imagined as deviant, and its apparent abnormality and alterity is constructed in references to a presumed universal template of capitalist organization which dominates in the West’ (Alami & Dixon 2020: 7). Again, failed economic transition has resulted in a failed political transition from an authoritarian system to its ideal-type opposite of Western democracy. Actually, thirty years after the collapse of the USSR, FSU states have consolidated illiberal ‘counternorms’ to the ‘Western-led liberal order’ (Cooley 2019: 589-590) to such an extent that authoritarianism has increasingly become institutionalised in opposition to ‘democratic … and people-based

53 alternatives’, namely the ‘liberal international order, based on the promotion of human rights and democracy’ (Costa Buranelli 2020: 1010, 1005).

Therefore, three decades after the collapse of the Soviet Union, transition remains the dominant framework of analysis in a region that keeps being exceptionalised as stuck in permanent abnormality, hence still in need of a specialised literature to help it to overcome the many obstacles on the way to the normal development of democratic capitalism (e.g. Stark 2012; Ahrens et al. 2016: 52; Monaghan 2016: 14; Aldayarov et al. 2017; Bohr et al. 2019; EBRD 2019). As Murtazashvili recently put it, ‘what I’ve learnt from my fellow scholars who’ve examined transitions over the post-Soviet space over the past 30 years [is that,] if we know anything, it’s that moving out of Soviet-era political and economic institutions is very hard’ (in CAP 2020: min. 5:11ff.). Clearly, the only way to ‘spur [the region’s] development’ remains ‘political reform and liberalisation of its state-dominated and corruption-prone economy’ (Cooley & Heathershaw 2017: 2-3).12 Having theorised the region as stuck in a permanent transition, however, transitology is unable to explain why, despite no, or partial and incomplete, reforms, the FSU states have undergone such radical changes to their political-economies and societies in the past thirty years, resorting instead to the ‘paradox’ of no transition and transformation, as in Central Asia (Pomfret 2019: 265).

Having reviewed transitology in the FSU in general, I now turn to an assessment of transitology in the specific case study of Uzbekistan.

3. ON ‘NORMALITY’ AND EXCEPTIONALISM (2): TRANSITOLOGY IN UZBEKISTAN

Neoliberal transitology has dominated the debate on Uzbekistan for the past three decades, too. Neoliberal transitologists negatively exceptionalised the country as a non/slow/late reformer, whose failed transition favoured the enrichment of the elites to the detriment of the general population and overall economic development. For their part, the GoU and a small minority of scholars countered the neoliberal discourse with an account rooted in developmental state theory, positively exceptionalising the Uzbek model for its success at industrial upgrading. Despite their differences, however, ultimately both sets of literature can only frame Uzbekistan as exceptional in (positive or negative) relation to (neoliberal) transitology’s established monopoly on normality as democratic capitalism, which, as a

12 While the authors are specifically discussing Turkmenistan in this passage, their argument neatly encapsulates transitology’s enduring vision for the FSU states.

54 result, is once again reinforced as the conventional wisdom of what is normal in the theory and practice of transition as development.

3.1. Neoliberal transitology: Uzbekistan as negatively exceptional

3.1.a. The 1990s: Non/slow/late reform and the ‘Uzbek growth puzzle’

While most former communist countries in and between Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and Central Asia embraced one form or another of the original Polish shock therapy package under the supervision of the IFIs and Western advisors (Sachs 1994: 267), the government of Uzbekistan (GoU) openly resisted the orthodox reform set in favour of what it defined as its own gradual model of a ‘socially oriented market economy’, or Uzbek model for short (Karimov 1993a: 216, 1995: 163-164, 170, 2007). As a result, neoliberal transitology - which dominates the literature on Uzbekistan as much as it does the debate on transition in the FSU in general - construed the country as a non/slow/late reformer maintaining a closed and autarchic (in a word, Soviet) economy cum authoritarian regime (e.g. Desai 1997: 8; EIU 1997a: 97-98; EBRD 1999: 106; Melvin 2000: 110, 2004: 136; ICG 2001: 21-22, 2004; Åslund 2003: 77, 2007: 3-4, 245-246; Jones Luong 2004a: 21-22; Trushin & Trushin 2005: 339-340, 368; Gavrilis 2006: 17-20; Collins 2009: 262; Stefes & Wooden 2009: 19; Broome 2010: 112; Jones Luong & Weinthal 2010: 86, 92, 95-97; Blackmon 2011: Chapter 2; Cooley & Heathershaw 2016, 2017; Batsaikhan & Dabrowski 2017: 306; IMF 2018b: 6; Teles Fazendeiro 2018: 34). Equally, in the transition indicators on (trade and price) liberalisation and privatisation, Uzbekistan most often figured at or near the bottom; the same applied to other reform benchmarks such as business environment and FDI attractiveness (e.g. EIU 1997a: 97, 1997c: 30, 2000a: 34; EBRD 2002: 20, Table 2.1; Batsaikhan & Dabrowski 2017: 307, Fig. 8; Section 2).

As Uzbekistan was negatively exceptionalised for refusing to apply what was the conventional wisdom of development theory and practice, the research agenda focussed on the reasons of the country’s abnormality, which the literature identified in the interplay of initial conditions (resource endowments), the policies of the Uzbek elites, and the institutions in which they operated (Melvin 2000: 72-73; Collins 2006: 192-193; Broome 2010: 114-115). As the archetypal homo sovieticus, President Karimov - a former First Secretary of the Communist Party of the UzSSR and a Soviet-trained economist who filled the post of president of Uzbekistan from independence in 1991 until his death in 2016 - could only ‘look to the past for the future development’ of the country (Blackmon 2005: 398, 2009: 150, 2011; Frye 2010: 231). So, he surrounded himself with loyal Soviet bureaucrats

55 and technocratic elites (Collins 2006: 195-196; McGlinchey 2011: 116), who guaranteed the continuation of Soviet policies and institutions following independence (Rumer 2005: 25-27; Blackmon 2005: 398, 2011: 31; FH 2008).

Crucially, in contrast to Kazakhstan’s oil, which depended on Russian pipelines for export and Western technology for extraction and whose international price was low in the 1990s (Blackmon 2005, 2009, 2011; Pomfret 2010: 2, 8-9), the export of Uzbekistan’s ‘mobile’ raw materials cotton and gold - whose price was relatively high at the time of independence - could be readily shifted from the USSR to international markets in exchange for hard currency. As a consequence, the GoU could rely on a significant revenue stream immediately after the country became independent, allowing it to avoid or delay reform, while introducing its own unorthodox path instead (World Bank 1993b; De Melo et al. 1997: 27; IMF 2000: 5; Trushin & Trushin 2000: 201-202; Blackmon 2005, 2009, 2011; EIU 2008: 21; Broome 2010: 123-125). At the heart of it lay the country’s cotton sector, which both epitomised, and whose export earnings guaranteed, Soviet continuity after independence. ‘In theory, Uzbekistan has been gradually liberalising the Soviet-era cotton industry structure, breaking up state and collective farms and demonopolising the buying process. In practice, almost nothing has changed for the average farmer since the Soviet period’ (ICG 2005: 3, emphasis added).

Contra the privatisation standard, the GoU maintained public ownership of the land, as well as state orders and quotas for cotton, buying it at lower than international market prices in order to extract rents ‘from agriculture … to finance industrialization’ (Trushin & Trushin 2005: 353). As in the rest of the literature on transition in the FSU, the social origins of such rents are left unaddressed; instead, cotton rents are said to originate from a squeeze on agriculture as a sector (World Bank 1993b: 36, 2002: 36; IMF 2000: 13; Rosenberg & de Zeeuw 2000: 13; Kandiyoti 2002a: 4, 2003: 227; Spoor 2004: 25; Guadagni et al. 2005; Pomfret 2005: 225; Zhukov 2005: 304; Lombardozzi 2020b: 655). In practice, state institutions such as the Central Bank of Uzbekistan (CBU) and the National Bank of Uzbekistan (NBU) redistributed cotton and other rents accruing from the export of raw materials such as gold, natural gas, and copper, via a complex system of Soviet-style policies at the core of the Uzbek model’s industrial policy, including multiple exchange rates for the national currency, in order to subsidise the development of specific industrial sectors (e.g. car manufacturing), particularly via ISI, within a protected domestic market (World Bank 1993b: 29, 85, 1994: 35, 2013a: 16, 25; IMF 1998: 99, 107, 2000: 9, 15, 78; EIU 2000b: 33; Rosenberg & de Zeeuw 2000: 4, 13; Pomfret 2005a: 225-226; Trushin 2018: 16; Chapter 4). The continuation of these distortionary policies, however, created fertile ground

56 for corruption and rent-seeking that benefitted the elites to the detriment of the population and the country’s overall development (World Bank 1993b; Connolly 1997: 410; Melvin 2000: 69; Jones Luong & Weinthal 2001: 385-386, 2006; Auty 2003: 259-260; ICG 2004: 14; Pomfret 2006; Hoen & Irnazarov 2012: 31).

Ultimately, the ‘elite in Uzbekistan believed that it was best served by accruing rents from distorted economic policies’ (Blackmon 2011: 97), so Soviet-style policies and institutions allowed for rent-seeking and corruption which, in turn, yielded the opposite of development. This has been evident in the country’s lack of international competitiveness, especially of its manufacturing industries, and the low levels of FDI flows into the economy (EIU 1997a: 97, 1997d: 38, 2002: 10, 34, 2003: 4, 2004: 5-6, 2005: 5-6, 2013: 7; Trushin & Trushin 2000: 202, 2005: 368; Lord 2005: 18-19; Zhukov 2005: 319), as well as in the spread of informality, poverty, and mass rural outmigration - the ‘most striking symptom[s]’ of policy and institutional ‘failure’ (Pomfret 2019: 115) - with specific gender-differentiated effects (more on this below). Equally wasteful was the policy to divert land from cotton to wheat cultivation in order to achieve grain self-sufficiency (Zhukov 2005: 321; Spoor 2005: 72; Pomfret 2019: 98-99), while state orders and quotas for cotton production continued the Soviet practice of state-led water mismanagement that exacerbated the desiccation of the Aral Sea, instead of allowing the price mechanism to facilitate the introduction of efficient resource management and water-saving technologies to mitigate the ravages of this environmental disaster (e.g. Melvin 2000: 76-77; EIU 2002: 29; Gleason 2003: 118; World Bank 2009: 43; Wooden et al. 2009: 52; Tursunova 2012: 32). Failure to reform the economy translated into the failure of political reforms, as evident in the ‘emergence of a powerful authoritarian system [relying] to a significant degree upon the elite’s ability to manipulate the economy to its own advantage through corruption, advantageous government contracts and privileged access to financial and other resources’ (Melvin 2000: xii). In this context, predictions for the future of Uzbekistan were dire, with some positing the distinct possibility of its ‘economic collapse’ and imminent ‘self-destruction’ (ICG 2001: 15, 2006: 1; Melvin 2000; Spechler 2008: 56; Murtazashvili 2012: 81-82).

Therefore, against its normative framework of transition to an ideal-type classless, gender- liberating, and eco-friendly democratic capitalism, the literature construes the results of capitalist transformation in Uzbekistan as their opposite, that is, as the lack of, or partial and incomplete, reforms. No and/or unorthodox reforms misallocated the country’s key factor endowments, namely a rich resource base and a cheap and qualified labour force (Cavanaugh 1992: 38; Trushin & Trushin 2000: 207), failing to achieve development for all, including women, and save the environment. Class disappears as the foundational division

57 in capitalist society; gender is externally related to labour exploitation, hence class; and the overall rise of material throughput is externalised from the process of capital accumulation and the ensuing climate crisis, which instead becomes the hallmark of the Soviet system (‘ecocide’). No transition negated development for all, since it continued aberrant Soviet policies such as state orders for cotton, the misuse of scarce resources particularly water, and the mass mobilisation of forced (including child) labour for the cotton harvest in autumn (EBRD 2005: 38; McGuire & Laaser 2018).

Since the literature negatively exceptionalised the country as a non-reforming ‘renegade’ (Broome 2010: 190) and ‘an outlier’ (INT-12), the consensual view became that the Uzbek model had ‘no chance of success in bringing about sustained economic growth’ (IMF staff quoted in Broome 2010: 144-145, emphasis added; World Bank 1993b: 39-40; Taube & Zettelmeyer 1998; EIU 2002: 32; Gleason 2003: 143; Pomfret 2005: 233; Ruziev et al. 2007: 8, 26-27; Blackmon 2011: 99). Thus, when by the mid-1990s Uzbekistan showed a ‘far milder’ decline in GDP than in most CEE and FSU countries (Zettelmeyer 1998: 5-6; Gleason 2003: 119; Pomfret 2019: 95), being ‘amongst the first [post-Soviet states] to report positive output growth’ (Ruziev et al. 2007: 15-16), the literature could only frame this unexpected development as the ‘Uzbek growth puzzle’, or ‘paradox’ (Klugman 1998; Zettelmeyer 1998; Spechler et al. 2004). In a paper reminiscent of the neoliberal argument about East Asian industrialisation (Section 1), the IMF (1998: 30) asserted that the country’s ‘favorable output performance did not occur because, but in spite of, gradualist macroeconomic and structural policies’.

Again, within transitology’s monopoly on normality, ‘to the extent that it promoted development, the state merely did what the market would have done had it been working perfectly’ (Fine 2001: 137). If successful, industrial policy was ineffective; if unsuccessful, it was inefficient; either way, the neoliberal consensus was reinforced (Amsden 1994: 629). While the IMF (1998: 30) acknowledged that ‘policies and initial conditions cannot be easily unbundled’, the focus tilted decidedly in favour of the latter given the negative exceptionalisation of the former. So, in Uzbekistan, initial conditions such as low level industrialisation, cotton production, and energy self-sufficiency had guaranteed lower initial output decline (Zettelmeyer 1998: 31), though the Fund never explained how the GoU’s deliberate policies to sustain cotton and industrial production (World Bank 1993b: 12, 16, 63, 74), as well as to invest in the energy sector for the stated purpose of achieving self- sufficiency (EIU 1997b: 29, 2008: 25; IMF 1998: 11; Kotz 2003b: 34; Pomfret 2005: 234, fn. 9; Jones Luong & Weinthal 2010: 86) could be considered as ‘initial conditions’.

58 Finally, a series of seminal anthropological works (e.g. Ilkhamov 1998, 2000, 2013; Kandiyoti 1999, 2002a, 2003, 2007a, 2007b, 2009a, 2009b; Kandiyoti & Mandel 1998: 533; Spoor 2004, 2005; Trevisani 2009, 2010, 2019) studied ‘the societal transformations that impinge upon daily struggles for survival’, including ‘changing forms of livelihood [and] informal networks’ (Kandiyoti 2002b: 252). These scholars focussed on how the breakup of collective farms (decollectivisation), along with the infrastructures, social services, and formal employment that these institutions provided, demolished the Soviet social contract in Uzbekistan (Trevisani 2010: 216; Ilkhamov 2013: 260). This triggered huge social dislocations with gender-differentiated outcomes such as the feminisation of agriculture, unskilled agricultural labour, and poverty so prevalent in the Uzbek countryside (Kandiyoti 1999: 517; Kandiyoti in Spoor 2004: 5, 34; Veldwisch & Bock 2011: 588; Adaptation Fund 2014: 3; Mukhamedova & Wegerich 2018; Chapter 5), as well as mass rural outmigration to cities, particularly the capital Tashkent, and third countries, especially Russia and Kazakhstan (UNDP 2005; Laruelle 2007; Maksakova 2008; Abdullaev 2008: 16; CER 2009a; Marat 2009: 16; Veldwisch & Bock 2011; World Bank 2013a; Ajwad et al. 2014: 9- 10; FAO 2018). In this context, patriarchal norms recrudesced in Uzbekistan and the region, as evident in the increasingly ‘subordinate role of women at home, and in the social, economic, and political spheres’, often framed in the language of conservative religious and social values (Stefes & Wooden 2009: 23; Constantine 2007: 115, 120-124; Commercio 2015).

However, since these studies posited that ‘the Soviet command economy and governance structures’ in Uzbekistan ‘were kept in place with only perfunctory nods in the direction of market and democratic reforms’ (Kandiyoti 2007a: 612, 2007b: 31; Ilkhamov 1998; Constantine 2007: 123), the result was a ‘unique phenomenon’ of ‘some sort of hybrid between market and command system’ (Ilkhamov 2000, 1998: 543, 553). Again, Uzbekistan presented ‘the paradox of a reform that avoided introducing any substantial features of a market economy and liberalization, but nevertheless caused important changes in agricultural production relations and the agrarian structure’ (Trevisani 2009: 123). In line with transitology in the FSU, the literature was left with the paradox of no transition and radical transformation. This feature has continued to be central to neoliberal transitology in Uzbekistan to this day, which is reviewed in the next subsection.

59 3.1.b. From the 2000s until today: Permanent exceptionalism and the enduring ‘paradox’ of no transition and transformation

As in the 2000s Uzbekistan entered a period of sustained growth along with the FSU region in the wake of the Chinese-demand-led commodity supercycle (EIU 2006: 2-3, 5, 2007a: 5, 2013: 7; Spechler 2010: 44; Pomfret 2019: 116), preoccupations about the country’s possible collapse gave way to studies about the origins of authoritarian stability and resilience, which scholars identified in a mixture of economic growth, repression, and co- optation via redistributive policies, particularly through the revival of an old institution like the mahalla (‘neighbourhood’) (Murtazashvili 2012: 85ff.; Chapter 5). Formal and informal rules, as well as patronage networks formed the backbone of the Uzbek neopatrimonial regime (Collins 2009; Grävingholt 2012: 162), at least partly explaining its durability.

Concerning the longevity of Uzbekistan’s authoritarian regime … what makes it resilient to internal and external challenges is a complex of circumstances, foremost among them, its ability to benefit from formal and informal, modern and traditional institutions and practices, the mixture of which constitutes what can be characterised as neopatrimonial authoritarianism (Ilkhamov 2007: 80).

Informal patron-client networks remained ‘paramount’ in the country, including ‘both clan relations, as well as regional bases of power’ (Kangas 2001: 137; Collins 2006). Still, within the competition for resource rents between the centre and the periphery, specifically the capital Tashkent and the regions (Ilkhamov 2004), Uzbekistan’s neopatrimonial regime succeeded in ‘the co-optation of local elites to the regime, encouraging them to use local law enforcement and security bodies as tools of extraction to exploit lucrative rent-seeking avenues’ (Markowitz 2013: 6). This formed the basis of ‘a coercive rent-seeking state’ (ibid.: 15) commanding a pervasive apparatus of repression that could be deployed in case of a real or perceived threat to the regime, as was the case with the massacre of protesters in Andijan, Fergana Valley, in May 2005 (McGlinchey 2011: 116-117; Ambrosio 2014: 477- 478; Chapter 5).

Clearly, despite growth, the continuation of distortionary policies under the Uzbek model not only failed to achieve development, as it prevented the price mechanism from allocating resources efficiently to foster economic diversification (Pomfret 2006: 89-90), but also turned the primary commodity bonanza into a ‘curse’ (Esanov et al. 2006; Spoor 2005: 72; Markowitz 2013: 4). In other words, ‘the centralized and nontransparent accrual of export rents facilitated the consolidation of [the] authoritarian regime’, which still exhibited

60 ‘notoriously high levels of corruption’ (Jones Luong & Weinthal 2010: 117-118). The difference now was that, increasingly, the rent-seeking elites at the heart of Uzbekistan’s ‘closed oligarchic regime and closed economic system’ were operating ‘within global spaces’ connected ‘to the hidden global financial system of tax havens and shell companies’ (Cooley & Heathershaw 2017: 113, 19). Thus, against the expectation of transition to democratic capitalism, along with the Central Asian region, the country suffered from ‘the coincidence of authoritarianism and capitalism’, itself the result of a ‘partial and selective’ liberalisation (ibid.: 10, 52). Again, when unorthodox policies resulted in better growth than the literature expected, the latter credited initial conditions rather than the GoU’s policies for this ‘growth puzzle’; likewise, as reality kept failing to fulfil the literature’s expectations of a transition to democratic capitalism, it ascribed this failure to the partial or incomplete application of an otherwise sound set of policies. Either way, neoliberal transitology’s monopoly on normality was reinforced.

Equally, scholars in the neo-institutional tradition interpreted the enduring presence of the state in extractive industries, mostly organised as SOEs responsible for virtually all primary commodity extraction and export, as an example of the consolidation in Uzbekistan of an authoritarian form of state capitalism, with a ‘dual economy’ consisting of a state-dominated core and a liberalised periphery (Ahrens et al. 2016; Spechler et al. 2017: Chapter 1; Ahrens & Hoen 2019: 89, 92). In the former, ‘all economic actors and activities’ are ‘strongly influenced directly or indirectly by state action’ (Ahrens et al. 2016: 58), including state-order crops such as cotton and wheat; SOEs mining gold, oil, natural gas, and copper; and foreign corporations operating in the textile, electronics, and automotive sectors inside and outside the country’s Free Economic Zones (FEZs) (ibid. 61-64, 67). Instead, the periphery is ‘made up by the parts of the economy that are not - or are to a considerably lower degree - influenced by state action’, especially Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs), which experienced a remarkable growth since the 2000s (ibid.: 2016: 58, 64-67; Spechler et al. 2017: Chapter 5). However, as authoritarian state capitalism is the negative doppelganger of Western free market capitalism, the key research question becomes whether this duality is ‘merely transitional’, or represents the ‘inherent, long-lasting failure in the modernization’ of Uzbekistan (Spechler et al. 2017: 11).

Therefore, to this day, neoliberal transitology keeps exceptionalising Uzbekistan as a non/slow/late reformer against its normative framework of transition to democratic capitalism. When long-serving Prime Minister Shavkat Mirziyoyev assumed the presidency in 2016 after President Karimov died, transition continued to be the dominant framework in the debate. On the one hand, the new president was quick to jettison the Uzbek model and

61 present his administration in the language of reform, opening and liberalisation, along with some scholars and the media (Burunciuc et al. 2018; Buckley 2018; Higgins 2018; Starr & Cornell 2018; Chakrabarti 2020: min. 41:36ff.); on the other hand, a number of experts framed the new presidency as embracing a form of authoritarian upgrading (Lemon 2019; Anceschi 2019), with ‘economic reform as the leadership’s preferred measure to carry out an extensive process of authoritarian modernisation’ (Anceschi 2019: 117).

Noone doubted that the only way to normal development would be for Uzbekistan to finally transition to ‘a fully functioning democracy and market economy’ (Hug 2020: 152). Three decades after the collapse of the USSR, transitology in Uzbekistan was back in 1991. ‘Karimov really froze in place many of the old institutions that existed and so reforms are really beginning now from the Soviet era’ (Murtazashvili in CAP 2020: min. 5:11ff.). As the IMF (2018b: 6) put it, as ‘a late reformer, Uzbekistan can benefit from the experiences of other transition economies. Like other countries at the start of reforms, Uzbekistan faces challenges and risks due to the magnitude of needed reforms and the need to build experience and institutional capacity’ (emphasis added). As a result, having (negatively) exceptionalised Uzbekistan as a non/slow/late reformer for thirty years, neoliberal transitology is left with the ‘paradox’ of no transition and transformation, being unable to explain why the political-economy and society of a recidivist non-reformer such as Uzbekistan could undergo such radical changes during the past three decades (Pomfret 2019: 265). These include, for example, the development of new economic sectors in the country, such as the automotive and electronics industries, as well as the overall informalisation of economic activity and mass labour migration amid the general collapse in living standards for the working class.

In opposition to neoliberal transitology, the GoU under President Karimov and a small minority of scholars upheld Uzbekistan as a success story within the developmental state tradition. It is to this body of literature that I now turn.

3.2. Developmental transitology: Uzbekistan as positively exceptional

3.2.a. The rise of the Uzbek model in the 1990s

President Karimov (1993a, 1995, 1998a, 1998b, 2000, 2007) engaged extensively with the debate on transition from communism to capitalism. While agreeing with the general premise of the need to transition from a failed system (the former) to its ideal-type opposite (the latter), he unequivocally identified the orthodox reform package - macroeconomic

62 stabilisation, trade and price liberalisation, and privatisation - as catastrophic for production and living standards in the FSU and CEE countries (Karimov 1993a: 188, 1995: 173, 311- 312; Spechler 2008: 33). Specifically, the anti-inflationary monetarism of ‘shock without therapy’ (Karimov 1993a: 216) was resulting in enterprise bankruptcy, deindustrialisation, mass layoffs and social instability, while failing to control runaway inflation in the short run (Karimov 1993a: 215-216, 1995: 191, 226, 271-272, 286-287, 299-300). In contrast to shock therapy, Karimov and the GoU, along with GoU-affiliated think tank experts involved in the transition, devised an evolutionary alternative for Uzbekistan (Karimov 1993a: 216, 1995: 165, 172-173; Pomfret 2019: 97), namely an ‘Uzbek model’ that was ‘consciously influenced by Korea and [the] southeast Asian tigers’ (Spechler 2000: 102, 2004: 73;13 Abazov 1998b: 16, 20; Wikileaks 2009; INT-1), where a ‘strong state played a leading role in the social sphere and export promotion’ (Karimov 1993a: 188-189, 209).

Transition to what Karimov and the GoU defined as a socially oriented market economy would proceed through dirigiste means, allowing ‘enterprises and the population to adapt to market conditions and free price formation without shocks’ (Karimov 1995: 226). The role of the state was crucial in leading gradual reforms, including via a robust industrial policy entailing inter-sectoral transfers to subsidise industrialisation and engineer economic diversification and modernisation (Cornia 2003; Kotz 2003a: 15, 2003b: 33; INT-1; INT-2; INT-9; INT-26; INT-42). The Uzbek model relied on the country’s abundant natural resource endowment and availability of a cheap and qualified labour force (Karimov 1993a: 194-195, 265, 1995: 285, 323, 2000: 331; Kotz 2003a: 8, 2003b: 47; INT-40b), which the state needed to mobilise in order to shift away from the ‘one-sided primary commodity orientation of the economy’ as a ‘raw material appendage’ to the USSR (Karimov 1993a: 253, 1995: 163) and towards industrialisation and trade ‘in finished products’ (Karimov 1993a: 236; INT-3; INT- 40b).

The state would allocate revenues from the sale of cotton and other primary commodities on international markets in order to diversify the economy, starting from priority industrial branches with backward and forward linkages to other economic sectors, such as energy and mining, while in parallel moving into higher value-added manufacturing in line with available raw materials (e.g. petrochemical sector) and a sector’s multiplier effect (e.g. automotive and electronics industry) (Karimov 1993a: 235-237, 253-255, 1995: 175-176, 1998a; World Bank 1993a: 74; INT-10; INT-15). In this perspective, industrial and other

13 This is the same author whose analysis of Uzbekistan from the 2010s onward gravitates towards an authoritarian state capitalism framework (previous subsection).

63 policies formed part of the same deliberate strategy, in which energy and grain self- sufficiency, ISI, export promotion, JVs with foreign corporations and FDI-attraction would all combine to achieve the structural transformation of the economy, improving the country’s position in the IDL (Karimov 1993a: 189, 233-234, 254, 1995: 173-176, 180, 208; INT-15), since ‘the future of our economy lies in its integration with the world economy’ (Karimov 1995: 233, 1993a: 232-239). There could be little doubt that Uzbekistan’s mid-1990s return to positive GDP growth before most other FSU states was no puzzle, but rather was due to the success of the Uzbek model, which had avoided the pitfalls of shock therapy and achieved better results than other transition economies in terms of growth and industrialisation, as well as social policies and poverty reduction (Karimov 1993a, 1995).

Clearly, given the centrality of cotton rents to the overall strategy, agriculture was used ‘as a source of funding for ambitious industrialisation plans’ and ‘a means to facilitate structural change in the economy’ (INT-26; Karimov 1993a: 240), with ‘administrative means’ enforcing the transformation from collective to private farms ‘via land leases rather than private ownership of land’ (INT-26). Thus, as in neoliberal transitology, developmentalists identified hard currency earnings from cotton (i.e. rents) as part of a squeeze on, or inter- sectoral transfers from, agriculture as a sector (Kotz 2003a: 15; CER 2004: 17, 36), leaving the social origins of such rents unaddressed. Moreover, ‘Karimov always understood this [inter-sectoral] transfer not only in terms of resources, but also in the fact that industries needed cheap labour, which is why the former president had such a bad attitude towards labour migration’ abroad (INT-26).14 In other words, while for neoliberals the Uzbek model was a failure due to state interference in the economy, for the GoU that was precisely the reason for its success, so the latter focussed on industrialisation and diversification into e.g. car manufacturing as clear proof that the strategy was working (World Bank 2002: 36; INT- 19; INT-20; INT-21; INT-24; INT-29), while ignoring, or even denying, ‘the very existence of [international] labor migration among its citizens’ (Marat 2009: 16; Laruelle 2007: 113; FH 2016: 4), as well as the practice of forced, including child, labour (e.g. Dell 2011; Fitzpatrick 2011a).

As a neutral agent, the Uzbek state was fostering classless development for all amid ‘the absence of division into various opposing political groups on class, social, and religious grounds’ (Karimov 1995: 278, 284, 1993a: 256) and within ‘our own notion of democracy’ (Karimov quoted in Abazov 1998a; Stark 2012: 6) or a form of ‘guided democracy’ (Abazov

14 Towards the end of his life, President Karimov called migrant workers ‘lazy’, accusing them of ‘disgracing all of us’ (Trilling 2013; FH 2016: 4).

64 1998b: 20), which prioritised the economy over politics (Karimov 2007). Instead, ‘the interests of the state, the society, the family and the individual’ were all bound together in one common goal: development (Perlman & Gleason 2007: 1333). Within this vision, there was no contradiction between promoting the ‘formation’ of a ‘class of real owners’ and entrepreneurs (Karimov 2000: 329; UzLiDep15 2019; INT-39), as the engine of the country’s economic growth, and the mass ‘freeing’ of the labour force from the land in order to reallocate it according to the needs of the changing economy (Karimov 1993a: 230). Instead, as the agent of development for all, the state would promote ‘the implementation of a strong social policy, as it is the state’s responsibility to support the socially vulnerable segments of the population’ within a socially oriented market economy (Karimov 2007), including via allotting private land plots to the ‘freed’ labour force, especially women and young people in rural areas, in order to allow them to support themselves and their families during the transformation (Karimov 1995: 204-205). In this view, the state-led reorganisation of Soviet collective farms into private farms would ensure the ‘harmonious combination of [the] interests of each peasant, each worker with the interest of the entire group’ (Karimov 1997, quoted in Ilkhamov 1998: 546). As for women, their responsibility as carers for their families’ food and nutrition would become even more crucial in the household plots, along with their role as wives and mothers in the reproduction of the (classless) nation, since ‘to take care of women, mothers, means to protect children, and in the end - take care of the nation’ (Karimov 1999, quoted in Cornia et al. 2003: 85; Chapter 5).

3.2.b. The 2000s to today: State-led upgrading as alternative to neoliberalism

By the 2000s, amid high raw material prices on the back of the Chinese-demand-led commodity supercycle, developmentalists regarded Uzbekistan as a successful, albeit authoritarian, state whose ‘staple globalism’ (Spechler 2010: 44) continued diverting earnings from exports in primary commodities such as cotton and, increasingly, gold, natural gas, and non-ferrous metals into industrialisation and the modernisation of the economy, making it ‘more diversified’ than any of the other post-Soviet Central Asian republics (ibid.: 45). While acknowledging the authoritarian nature of the GoU, these scholars focussed on the country’s ‘developmental policies … often neglected’ in neoliberal transitology (Lombardozzi 2020a), which represented a possible alternative to neoliberalism and its

15 The Liberal Democratic Party of Uzbekistan (UzLiDep) defines itself as the country’s movement of entrepreneurs and business people, including small business and farmers (fermery). Founded in 2003, it supported Karimov’s candidacy to the presidency in various elections. After Karimov’s death in 2016, the party backed Mirziyoyev’s successful presidential bid in 2016.

65 standard policy package (Lombardozzi 2020b: 638) by simultaneously offering ‘decent levels of welfare’ and ‘economic progress’ (Lombardozzi 2019: 55, 63-64).

With time, one crucial issue became how to calibrate industrial policy in order to build on this success to ensure long-term growth via further diversification away from raw materials and into the export of manufactured goods (Karimov 2000: 331; McKinley & Weeks 2007: 17; ADB 2011: 3). This approach required an ‘integrated’ industrial policy jointly formulated ‘by consultation among the executive branch, the Ministry of Economy and the Central Bank’, combining an expansionary fiscal policy and a competitive exchange rate to channel resources towards further diversification and industrialisation (McKinley & Weeks 2007: 14- 16). At the heart of this strategy would be a mixture of ISI and export promotion, as well as support to SME development and small-holder agricultural production as engines of economic growth (Cornia 2003: 106-108, 114). Likewise, in line with ‘the experience of the East Asian countries’, the GoU should focus on infant industry promotion in ‘sectors that are resource-, skilled labour- and semiskilled labour-intensive’ (ibid. 107) in order to utilise fully one of the country’s comparative advantages, namely a cheap, and growing, labour force; this should go hand in hand with specific policies addressing the increasing concentration of wealth in the capital Tashkent and the ensuing higher incidence of poverty in rural areas (Cornia 2003, 2006; Cornia et al. 2003: 60-61).

With sustained growth rates and continuous investments in industrialisation, by the 2010s some neo-institutionalist scholars began speaking of the Uzbek ‘miracle’, arguing that the country’s performance was ‘truly exceptional for the post-Soviet space’ thanks to ‘the ability to preserve the institutional capacity of the state’ (Popov 2013: 5, 3). Industrial policy lay at the core of this ‘economic success story’ (ibid.: 5), which managed to increase ‘the share of industry in GDP and the share of machinery and equipment in the total industrial output, and export’, especially with the creation of ‘a competitive export-oriented auto industry from the ground up’ and the diversification of the domestic economy (Popov & Chowdhury 2016: 5; World Bank 2002: 36; ADB 2011: 2-3; Ajwad et al. 2014: 10; Lombardozzi 2019: 63). Thus, ‘as far as industrial policy is concerned, Uzbekistan has been a clear case of post- socialist developmental state’ (Bolesta 2019: 15).

Equally, in agriculture, the GoU pursued ‘multiple strategic developmental objectives’ via ‘selected protectionist trade and industrial policies’ for ‘developmental upgrading’, including in the horticulture sector (Lombardozzi 2020a). This created income for farmers and work for peasants, guaranteed food security, and saved precious water resources by diverting land from cotton to fruit and vegetables production, including for export (ibid.). In other

66 words, with the breakup of the cotton monopoly on agriculture inherited from the Soviet system, which had devastated the country’s environment especially with the shrinking of the Aral Sea (Karimov 1993b: 45, 1999: 22, 2007: 18), as well as the introduction of water- saving technologies (Karimov 1998b: 112-113, 2002: 351), state-led resource management and economic diversification were mitigating the effects of production on the ecosystem, especially in the Aral Sea basin. Between ‘ecological constraints [and] technological innovation’ (Lombardozzi 2019: 68), the state allocated scarce resources to more profitable activities, reducing environmental degradation and creating more added-value, a win-win scenario. Finally, while it is acknowledged that women have been more negatively affected by the transition (McKinley et al. 2003: 136-137), they have represented a crucial ‘factor endowment’ for capitalist transformation; for instance, young women in rural areas have been key low-wage unskilled agricultural labour for the agro-industrial upgrading strategy (Lombardozzi 2020a).

In short, developmentalists aver that Uzbekistan has been a success vis-à-vis the dominant paradigm of transition to capitalism, whose monopoly on normality is reinforced as a consequence. In this context, class disappears as the analysis focusses instead on the positive effects of distortionary policies for development for all, with authoritarianism either denied under the guise of ‘guided democracy’ or regretted as a necessary evil to achieve state-led economic upgrading. Equally, gender is externally related to labour exploitation, hence class, as women are another example of the Uzbek model’s good allocation of factor endowments on the path to development for all, including women. Finally, the rise in material throughput and the accelerating ravages of climate change in the country are also externally related to the process of capital accumulation, which is turned from the source of the crisis into its solution via e.g. water-saving technologies.

Ultimately, however, developmental transitologists can label the Uzbek model a success only by omission, leaving unexplained crucial aspects of the country’s political-economy (e.g. raw material export orientation), as well as the reasons behind the Mirziyoyev administration’s jettisoning of the model in favour of the current ‘liberalising’ reform agenda (Bolesta 2019; Lombardozzi 2020b: 655-656). Succinctly put, this literature avoids the neoliberals’ ‘paradox’, but still cannot explain the country’s radical transformation.

Having reviewed transitology in Uzbekistan, I now turn to the theoretical-methodological limits common to all the literature on transition, which lie at the root of its failure to explain the radical transformation of the FSU region and Uzbekistan since 1991.

67

4. STUCK IN TRANSITION: METHODOLOGICAL NATIONALISM, EXTERNAL RELATIONS, AND IDEAL-TYPE DEMOCRATIC CAPITALISM

Despite the wide variety of scholarly traditions found within transitology, all transition literature suffers from the same shortcomings that severely limit any insight into the transformation of the FSU and Uzbekistan during the past three decades. In line with the literature on development, the same methodological nationalism informs transitology’s framing of capital accumulation (‘development’) as a national process. As such, the literature focusses on the policies, institutions, and elites in the FSU and Uzbekistan, and their in/capacity to muster the developmental potential of the global market, which, at best, is relegated to the context of national development.

First, the global system provides an invaluable road map for reforms. Second, the global system provides an opportunity to borrow technology, capital, and management techniques, to help catch up economically after decades of falling behind. Third, with many other countries and regions also trying to rejoin the world economy, the post-Communist countries are in international competition for capital, foreign direct investment, and export markets (Sachs 1994: 268).

Since in the global market all states face the same external environment, or ‘context’ of development, success or failure must be ascribed to internal factors (Pomfret 1995: 134; Blackmon 2009: 146). In this perspective, ‘national policies [and institutions] which conflict with the norms of a [neo]liberal international economic order’ must be ‘harmful to national economic interests’ (Gore 1996: 79), thus necessarily result in ‘underdevelopment’ (Pradella 2014: 189, 2015).

Therefore, the FSU’s failure to transition to the normality of democratic capitalism has condemned the countries of the region, including Uzbekistan, to suffer from an ‘underdevelopment problem’ (Gevorkyan 2018: 130), along with an authoritarianism problem (Nisnevich & Ryabov 2020). Put differently, in transitology the effects of capitalist transformation have been inverted into their opposite, namely as the underdevelopment of an ideal-type (classless, gender-liberating, eco-friendly) democratic capitalism in the FSU region (Iñigo Carrera 2013: 63). Since the transition should have facilitated the progression from the wasteful command economy to the efficient capitalist market - with the price mechanism regulating the optimal allocation hence sustainable use of human and natural resources to guarantee development for all - widespread informality, precarisation, and

68 poverty, as well as women’s deteriorating situation and the environment’s accelerating degradation in the FSU countries could only be explained as the outcome of a lack of, or a partial and incomplete, transition.

In Uzbekistan, their differences notwithstanding, neoliberal and developmental transitology (negatively or positively) exceptionalised the country’s political-economy in the past thirty years in relation to the established normality of democratic capitalism, which, as a consequence, has only been reinforced. Because of their insistence on the failure of transition, neoliberal transitologists had to resort to ‘puzzles’ and ‘paradoxes’ of their own creation in order to account for Uzbekistan’s huge social and political-economic transformation since 1991. For example, while considering industrial policy a fiasco due to Soviet-style distortionary policies favouring rent-seeking, they could not explain the emergence of new industrial sectors (e.g. automotive, electronics) in the country and international MNCs’ participation therein (Zhukov 2005: 320). Succinctly put, the literature is left with the ‘paradox’ of no transition and transformation. Equally, developmentalists emphasised the success of industrial policy by omitting the crucial fact that, during the past three decades, Uzbekistan has largely remained a raw material exporter in the IDL, with industries manufacturing for the domestic market, as well as failing to explain change under current President Mirziyoyev. Ultimately, developmentalists avoid the neoliberal ‘paradox’, but cannot explain the reason behind the country’s radical transformation either.

Neither literature problematises class as the foundational divide in capitalist society, instead simply disagreeing on the best way to allocate labour, with neoliberals supporting the price mechanism and developmentalists the state’s ‘distortionary’ policies. As a consequence, the former negatively exceptionalise Uzbekistan as a non/slow/late reformer maintaining a Soviet-type economy, as evident for example in the continuous use of forced, including child, labour and the high incidence of labour informality. For their part, the latter positively exceptionalise the Uzbek model in terms of growth, industrialisation, and poverty reduction, either denying forced labour and labour exploitation, or explaining it as a necessary evil on the path to developmental upgrading. However, both agree that a cheap and qualified labour force represents a crucial factor endowment for the country’s development. With labour a simple factor of production, the issue continues to be one of optimal allocation (Karimov 1995; The Economist 2019).

Equally, the gender-differentiated effects of transition have been either inverted as the consequence of a lack of, or a partial and incomplete, transition (neoliberals), or explained as necessary on the path to development (developmentalists). Either way, rather than co-

69 constitutive of class, methodologically, gender has been externally related to the process of capital accumulation under capitalism. In neoliberal transitology, bad policies and institutions (no transition) yielded underdevelopment, leading to ‘the core of women’s former claims to citizenship’ being ‘thoroughly eroded’ (Kandiyoti 2007a: 603), as evident in the feminisation of agriculture, unskilled agricultural labour, and poverty in Uzbekistan. For developmentalists, instead, (especially young) women have been a crucial factor of production behind state-led upgrading, as well as the main carers of the nation during the transition to development for all, including for women.

Finally, neoliberals invert the continuation, and acceleration, of environmental devastation in independent Uzbekistan into the country’s failure to transition to normal capitalism, idealised as an eco-friendly system in which the price mechanism guarantees the efficient management and allocation of scarce resources. Instead, the preservation of Soviet-style distortionary policies in cotton production, which favours the elites’ rent-seeking over the country’s development, led to the misallocation of resources and the ongoing desiccation of the Aral Sea. While developmentalists agree with the diagnosis of the Aral Sea disaster being the result of Soviet state-led mismanagement of cotton monoculture, they retort that the Uzbek model has been addressing the problem via water-saving technologies and economic diversification away from cotton and towards industrial upgrading. In other words, both sets of literature turn capitalism from the cause of climate change into its solution, as, methodologically, the overall rise in material throughput in the economy and the ensuing climate crisis are construed as external to the process of capital accumulation, rather than intrinsically resulting from it.

5. CONCLUSION

This chapter reviewed three decades of literature on transition in the FSU and Uzbekistan in the context of the broader literature on development. Section 1 appraised neoliberal, developmental state, and dependency theory, arguing that a neoliberal consensus on the central role of the market has come to dominate the theory and practice of development in the Global South since the 1960s, while underscoring the common methodological nationalism underpinning these otherwise very different bodies of literature. Section 2 assessed how, fitting and feeding into this consensus, neoliberal transitology established a monopoly on normality in the debate on the transition from the Soviet authoritarian command economy, which it evaluated against its ideal-type system of democratic capitalism, construed as classless, gender-liberating, and eco-friendly. As reality failed to conform to the literature’s blueprint, the latter framed developments in the FSU as due to a

70 lack of, or a partial and incomplete, transition, so, to this day, transitology has been left with the ‘paradox’ of no transition and transformation. Section 3 contended that transitology in Uzbekistan exceptionalised the country either negatively, as a non/slow/late reformer (neoliberals), or positively, as a successful developmental state (developmentalists), against the dominant paradigm which, as a result, has been reinforced. Thus, the former have been equally stuck in the ‘paradox’ of no transition and transformation; the latter have avoided the paradox, but have nonetheless failed to explain the transformation. As Section 4 maintained, all transitology on the FSU and Uzbekistan suffers from the same methodological nationalism and idealisation of capitalism as a classless, gender-liberating, and eco-friendly system, which hides class as the foundational divide in capitalist society, while externalising gender from labour exploitation, hence class, as well as ecological degradation from capital accumulation (external relations).

Since these theoretical-methodological shortcomings are at the heart of transitology’s failure to account for capitalist transformation in the FSU and Uzbekistan in the past three decades, Chapter 2 integrates the methodology introduced in the Introductory Chapter with a different theoretical framework that, I argue, explains developments in the region since 1991 as diverse national forms mediating the essential unity of global capital accumulation. As such, not only does this framework surpass the literature’s methodological nationalism, external relations, and ideal-type democratic capitalism, but it also provides a different account of value flows in the GPE from dependency theory, arguing that ‘resource rich’ countries in the IDL become sources of appropriation of extraordinary wealth (ground-rent) largely inflowing into their national territories in virtue of their raw material exports. It is to this task that I now turn.

71 CHAPTER 2 Beyond Exceptionalism: The Political Economy of ‘Resource Rich’ Countries in the International Division of Labour

0. INTRODUCTION

Building on the pioneering work of Iñigo Carrera and the CICP scholars, along with insights from feminist and ‘green’ Marxists, this dissertation espouses a novel theoretical- methodological approach that provides an alternative framework to engage with the transformation in the FSU and Uzbekistan since 1991 within the global process of capital accumulation. This approach frames national differentiation between countries of the Global South since the 1960s (‘uneven development’) as their diverse forms of participation in the IDL in line either with the productive characteristics of their specific segment of the working class, as has been the case with the Asian ‘tigers’ and more recently China, or with the relatively favourable conditions for the production of primary commodities within their territories, as evident in the majority of ‘resource rich’ countries in the Global South, to which the FSU and Uzbekistan unequivocally belong.

Section 1 identifies the changes in the material conditions of production in large-scale industry since the 1960s, especially following the 1970s microelectronics revolution, as crucial to the differentiation in the skill-set, hence the costs of reproduction, of the collective industrial labourer, including in gender-differentiated ways. This allowed for the geographic relocation of specific tasks in the industrial production process to some states in the Global South, whose fraction of the global working class possessed productive characteristics - relative cheapness, high discipline - specifically suited to working as appendages to the machinery or in the assembly of parts and components. As a result, a New International Division of Labour (NIDL) emerged with the meteoric industrialisation of the Asian ‘tigers’ and, more recently, China.

Section 2 investigates the specificity of accumulation in the rest of the Global South that (continued to be) integrated into the International Division of Labour (IDL) on the basis of the Classical International Division of Labour (CIDL), namely as ‘resource rich’ countries due to the relatively favourable conditions of primary commodity production/extraction within their territories. As such, pace dependency theory, these states have become sources of appropriation of the extraordinary mass of wealth inflowing into their territories (ground-rent) in virtue of the sale of raw materials on the world market, which in turn defines the specific qualitative form of capital accumulation therein, that is, as ‘small’ and technologically

72 ‘backward’ capitals by international standards only able to valorise via ground-rent subsidisation, thus largely manufacturing relatively expensive and substandard goods for the domestic market. This has been the case of the FSU and Uzbekistan since 1991.

Given the centrality of land for primary commodity production in these ‘resource rich’ countries, changes to land use have been crucial to mediating their integration into the IDL, resulting in the mass expulsion of the peasants from the land that ‘backward’ manufacturing capital has been unable to absorb due to the limited scale of the domestic market, thus turning these populations into (relative) surplus for the requirements of capital accumulation. As such, the informality, poverty, and mass rural outmigration prevalent in these countries are all national forms of the essential unity of global capital accumulation. The section dissects the gender-differentiated effects of these dynamics of transformation, particularly the centrality of women’s work for the reproduction of this relative surplus population, which has thrusted them to the centre of resistance to capital in the age of climate crisis, as well as capital’s encroachment on women’s survival strategies that risks precipitating a crisis of reproduction.

Section 3 focuses on how the theoretical approach expounded in this chapter within the methodology presented in the Introductory Chapter provides an important corrective to the literature on transition, contributing to the scholarly debate on the transformation of the FSU and Uzbekistan since 1991 and, in turn, to the broader literature on uneven development in the Global South. In short, only by surpassing transitology’s exceptionalisation of the FSU and Uzbekistan vis-à-vis its ideal-type (classless, gender-liberating, eco-friendly) democratic capitalism (Chapter 1), can the analysis organically explain national diversity and transformation in the region during the past three decades within the unity of global accumulation. The conclusion summarises the chapter’s main findings.

Methodologically, Chapter 2 starts from a higher level of generality, dealing with national differentiation in the Global South due to either the specific productive characteristics of a country’s working class or its relatively favourable conditions for the production of raw materials (Level 1/Section 1). It then ascends to a more concrete level (Level 2/Section 2) to engage with how the state’s mediation of the ground-rent form in ‘resource rich’ countries since the 1960s has defined the way in which capital accumulates therein.

73 1. FROM CIDL TO NIDL: EXPLAINING UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT IN THE GPE

In the capitalist system, capital accumulates surplus value via the exploitation of human labour (Marx 1894/1991: 248). While the ‘labour process becomes the instrument of the valorisation process[, that is,] the process of the creation of surplus value’ (Marx 2010: 424), this fundamental relation of production under capitalism appears in its inverted, fetishised, alienated form as capital’s ‘occult ability to add value to itself’, namely as capital’s self- valorisation (Marx 1867/1976: 255, 2010: 397). As ‘the alienated [i.e. indirect] content of social life becomes the production of surplus value’ (Starosta 2010: 442), in its constant movement for self-expansion capital reproduces private and independent individuals as members of antagonist social classes, namely capitalists and workers. As a result, class is the foundational divide in the capitalist system of production and social reproduction (Introductory Chapter).

The process of accumulation, however, is global in content and national in form (Introductory Chapter), so despite its fetishised appearance of independence, the state guarantees the valorisation of the national total social capital - ‘the sum total of the individual capitals’ (Marx 1867/1976: 726) operating in its territory - regardless of individual capitals’ specific accumulation requirements. In turn, ‘in the same way as individual capitals behave as aliquot parts of the total social capital, national total social capitals behave as aliquot parts of the global total social capital’, with ‘national states as political representatives of global total social capital’ (Caligaris 2016: 58). In other words, the state mediates ‘the formation of the International Division of Labour - the global unity of the process of capitalist development’ (Grinberg 2013: 180), guaranteeing the overall process of accumulation of the global total social capital, the true subject of the GPE, including the reproduction of the specific segment of the global working class residing within its territory as well as land use according to the material requirements of accumulation. This is the (global) unity behind the diversity evident in the uneven development of the different (national) spaces of accumulation, or ‘unity of the diverse’ (Introductory Chapter). As a result, state policies, institutions and bureaucracies - in a word, politics - are a social form of mediation of the class struggle (Purcell 2014: 167), as the global total social capital necessarily exploits the national fragments of the working class in order to self-valorise, resulting in a clearly gendered division of labour and the rise of material throughput as a function of the boundless accumulation process. Contra the literature’s ideal-type capitalism, the historical- materialist reality of the capitalist system relies, by definition, on the exploitation of labour in gender-differentiated ways, as well as land (and resource) use for capital accumulation.

74 Within the boundless nature of accumulation encapsulated in the growth imperative (Hay 1999: 172), capital constantly strives to revolutionise ‘[t]he technical and social conditions of the process and consequently the mode of production’ in order to increase the productivity of labour by curtailing ‘the necessary labour-time’ of production and, as a consequence, increase the amount of relative surplus value available for accumulation (Marx 1867/1976: 432). The ‘most potent form’ of relative surplus value production is found in large-scale industry (Caligaris 2016: 60; Marx 1867/1976: 492ff.), whose revolutionising of ‘the instruments of labour … attains its most highly developed form in the organized system of machinery in the factory’ (Marx 1867/1976: 517). By producing ‘machines by means of machines’, large-scale industry is able to ‘create for itself an adequate technical foundation’ (ibid.: 506) that radically transforms the division of labour in society and the world market. Modern industry ‘is continually transforming not only the technical basis of production but also the functions of the worker and the social combinations of the labour process’, thus ‘revolutioniz[ing] the division of labour within society’ (ibid.: 617). In parallel, it drives innovation in the means of communication and transportation (ibid.: 506-508) due to ‘an elasticity, a capacity for sudden extension by leaps and bounds, which comes up against no barriers but those presented by the availability of raw materials and the extent of sales outlets’ (ibid.: 579). As a result, ‘[a] new and international division of labour springs up, one suited to the requirements of the main industrial countries, and it converts one part of the globe into a chiefly agricultural field of production for supplying the other part, which remains a pre-eminently industrial field’ (ibid.: 580).

During Marx’s lifetime, the ‘main industrial countries’ whose requirements the ‘international division of labour’ (IDL) served were England, the main colonial power at the time and the locus of the first industrial revolution (1760-1840), other European countries such as Germany as well as the United States of America (USA), which in the second half of the nineteenth century experienced what became known as the second industrial revolution (Hobsbawm 1977: Chapter 2; Amsden 1989/1992: 3-4). This Classical International Division of Labour (CIDL) revolved ‘around the polarisation of the world economy into an industrialised “core” and a dependent “periphery” confined to the role of supplier of raw materials and staple foods’ (Charnock & Starosta 2016: 3). However, following the process of decolonisation in Africa and Asia, the rapid industrialisation of some countries that had hitherto remained at the margins of global capitalist development, particularly in East Asia, gave rise to a New International Division of Labour (NIDL) next to the CIDL from the 1960s onward. Drawing on the work of Iñigo Carrera and associated scholars (Introductory Chapter), I now turn to the material conditions that explain national differentiation in the Global South and the ensuing emergence of the NIDL.

75

1.1. The rise of the NIDL: Large-scale industry, labour, and uneven development

During the first two decades after the end of World War II (WWII), large-scale industrial production continued to be largely organised within the territories of the main industrialised countries of Europe and the USA, in line with the level of technological development in communication (telegram) and transportation (railways) at the time (Pirie 2007: 18-20, 69). Thus, within these material conditions, the CIDL continued to obtain within a GPE divided between the ‘classic’ countries of Western Europe and the USA in the industrialised Global North on the one hand, and the agricultural, raw-material-producing countries of the Global South on the other (Iñigo Carrera 2013; Charnock & Starosta 2016). While mechanisation had been progressing with ‘moving production lines’ and ‘special purpose machine-tools’ within the Fordist mass production system (Kaplinsky 1989: 13; Pirie 2007: 18), ‘machine calibration’ as well as the ‘assembly process’ were ‘still dependent on the manual skill of the worker’ acquired through lengthy on-the-job learning-by-doing processes, so that ‘the tool was still governed by the eye-brain-hand unit of the worker who put it into action’ on an assembly line that itself ‘was not yet a real machine’, that is, was not fully mechanised yet (Iñigo Carrera 2013: 61).

Until the 1960s, then, within the spatial (large nationally-based corporations) and technical (centrality of the workers as operators of machine-tools on the moving assembly line) conditions of Fordist mass production, the total social capital indiscriminately reproduced the different portions of the collective industrial workforce in the main industrialised countries. In turn, in virtue of these same material conditions, the latter exhibited high levels of unionisation through which it exercised a relatively strong bargaining power, as evident in the social democratic compromise based on tripartite corporatism16 that politically mediated the class struggle, including widespread welfare provisions (Jayasuriya 2001a: 105-106; Kagarlitsky 2008: 290; Pirie 2007: 21, 28; Iñigo Carrera 2013: 57-61). In other words, political arrangements in the industrial ‘core’ were not external to the material conditions of global capital accumulation, but an internally related expression thereof; put differently, the welfare state was not the result of the elites’ generous concessions, but of working class struggle (Iñigo Carrera 2013: 59-60).

However, technological developments in large-scale industry since the 1960s, and their acceleration with the microelectronics revolution in the 1970s, transformed the process of

16 Tripartite as it included the state, employers’ organisations, and labour unions.

76 large-scale industrial production with the computerisation of machinery calibration as well as the robotisation of the assembly line (Womack et al. 1990: Chapter 1; Iñigo Carrera 2013: 62; Starosta 2016: 87), particularly with the introduction of microprocessors, computer numerical control (CNC) machine-tools, and industrial robots (Alcorta 1999: 149-153). Since the revolution in the instruments of labour in large-scale industry ‘reproduces in a differentiated form the characteristics of the labour-force as an active subject in the productive process’ (Grinberg 2011: 32; Grinberg & Starosta 2009: 773; Iñigo Carrera 2013: 121-122; Charnock & Starosta 2016: 6), it engendered a new division of labour in society and, as we shall see, the world market.

First, this process expands, as a condition for its own continuous development, the productive characteristics of the portion of the labour-force involved in scientific and technological development (i.e. directly or indirectly involved in the production of the increasingly mechanised means of production) and in charge of the technical organisation of the progressively more complex (and scientifically based) production processes. Secondly, it increasingly reduces, at the same time, the skills required to operate the machinery or to work as an appendage of the mechanised systems, and in the manual assembly of inputs and parts. Thirdly, it progressively transforms into a surplus for the needs of the process of capital accumulation, the portion of the labour-force replaced by the increasingly mechanised systems of machinery and not reabsorbed by the expansion of the scale of production (Grinberg 2011: 32).

This radical skill differentiation at the core of the industrial workforce necessarily translated into the diversification in the costs of reproduction for ‘the different portions of the collective worker of large-scale industry’ according to their productive characteristics (ibid.: 110). First, a portion of the labour force underwent a process of upskilling (‘expanded subjectivity’) via longer education and training periods in order to acquire the specific productive characteristics necessary to produce and programme the new industrial machinery and plan the production based thereupon. This resulted in a shortening of their work-day given the increasing intellectual intensity of the tasks required, including decision- making and finding ‘creative’ solutions to facilitate or improve the production process, along with a commensurate increase in their wages and diversification in their consumption patterns (Starosta & Fitzsimons 2018: 109-110). The relative increase in white-collar vs. blue-collar workers in industrial plants confirms this trend, as evident in the relocation of these specific scientific-technological tasks from the shopfloor to the office. These workers’ physical (office) and material (skills, wage, consumption) separation from the other portions of the workforce encourages their self-perception as detached from the class of workers

77 selling their labour power to reproduce themselves, that is, the working class, weakening class solidarity (Grinberg 2011: 104-111; Iñigo Carrera 2013: Chapter 2; Starosta 2016: 93).

Second, the objectification of tacit knowledge - previously acquired with long on-the-job training and learning-by-doing stints - as an attribute of the mechanised machinery simplified and standardised several manual labour processes, while eliminating ‘simple (unskilled) manual labour … as materials transport/handling and machine feeding have been progressively automated and robotised’ (Grinberg 2011: 109). This significantly reduced the skills needed for a portion of the labour force (hence, with ‘degraded subjectivity’) to work either as operators and appendages of the newly mechanised machinery, or in the manual assembly of components and parts in those ‘production processes still subjected to the manual intervention of low-skilled labourers, like the assembly, testing and packaging of electronic micro-components and electronic appliances’ (ibid.: 110). This created the material conditions for the further gender-differentiation of the working class by enabling the incorporation of (especially young) women as low-skilled workers in the new sector of industrial-scale electronics production, alongside the more traditional textile and garment industries, as mediated by patriarchal norms about their docility and nimble fingers making them particularly suited to performing such repetitive labour (Mies 1986/2014: 117, 146; Kaplinsky 1989: 13; Wendling 2009: 156-159; Grinberg 2011: 213-216, 300-301, 305, 325, 327-328, 403-404; Mezzadri 2016: 1882). As a consequence, mechanisation opened the door for the exploitation of a largely un- and low- skilled, hence relatively cheap, labour force that capital could activate ‘in a process of work reduced in the extreme to the mechanical repetition of a manual task, [and] whose workday can be extended correspondingly’ (Iñigo Carrera 2013: 112). Thus, contrary to ‘expanded subjectivity’ workers, the form of integration of this ‘degraded subjectivity’ labour has been on the basis of longer working days on the shopfloor and lower salaries.

Third, as a direct effect of mechanisation, a final portion of the workforce has been expelled from, or has not been absorbed into, production despite the latter’s rising scale, swelling the growing numbers of the population that has increasingly become surplus to the requirements of global capital accumulation.17 This ‘relative surplus population exists in all kinds of forms. Every worker belongs to it during the time when he [sic] is only partially employed or wholly unemployed’ (Marx 1867/1976: 794, 782); it thus struggles to guarantee its reproduction through various forms of informal (under)employment or falls into

17 In the remainder of the chapter, I show how this process is linked to primitive accumulation, namely the ‘freeing’ of peasants from their land in order to meet global solvent demand for raw materials produced/extracted from said land.

78 unemployment and poverty (Iñigo Carrera 2013: 66, 2016: 47; Charnock & Starosta 2016: 8). While the relative surplus population forms ‘a disposable industrial reserve army, which belongs to capital just as absolutely as if the latter had bred it at its own cost [creating] a mass of human material always ready for exploitation by capital in the interests of capital’s own changing valorization requirements’, it also becomes a ‘lever of capitalist accumulation’ exercising a strong disciplining effect on the working class (Marx 1967/1976: 784).

1.2. National differentiation in the IDL

This fragmentation in the productive characteristics and related costs of reproduction of the industrial labour force enabled the geographical dispersion of the different moments of large-scale industrial production in the world market, in line with the concomitant ‘leaps and bounds’ in the development of information and communication technologies (ICT) and transportation (containerisation, oceanic shipping) that large-scale industry spurred (Pirie 2007: 19; Harvey 2010: 16, 62; Iñigo Carrera 2013: 64; Connell & Dados 2014: 124). Specifically, starting from the 1960s, some of the most simplified and, with time, increasingly complex, tasks in industrial production were relocated from the ‘classic’ countries of the Global North to some East Asian countries (Chapter 1), in view of the presence within their territories of a domestic working class whose productive characteristics - relative cheapness and high discipline - made it specifically suited to ‘the emerging material requirements of the accumulation of capital on a global scale’ (Grinberg & Starosta 2009: 772). This explains the meteoric rise of East Asian ‘tigers’ such as South Korea since the 1960s, as well as of the so-called second-tier ‘tigers’ and China at different points in time thereafter. ‘[A]s soon as a particular national working class became too expensive[,] capital started to relocate the simpler forms of labour-power to other countries which offered new similar sources of cheap and compliant labourers’, so production ‘in “unskilled-labour-intensive” industries contracted in [the original ‘tigers’], while it expanded in [the] others where surplus populations of peasant origin were still extensive and real wages lower’ (Starosta 2016: 93, 99-100, fn. 14).

Clearly, the combination of these productive characteristics in those Asian societies is crucial. If absolute cheapness were sufficient enough a condition for the industrialisation of (parts of) the Global South within the IDL, countries in e.g. Sub-Saharan Africa could be reasonably expected to be at the forefront of this process. Equally, along with relative cheapness, this workforce possessed specific productive characteristics that included ‘the habituation to intensive, collective and disciplined labour under harsh conditions’ typical of wet-rice cultivating societies (Starosta 2016: 90; Grinberg 2011: 34; Iñigo Carrera 2013: 66,

79 113), making it distinctly suitable to ‘be transformed into a labour force able to function as an appendage to machinery and in modern manufacturing’ (Iñigo Carrera 2013: 66) in the manual assembly of components and parts (Grinberg 2011: 55) on a collective basis. The presence of this labour force with specific productive characteristics is the decisive factor that explains the differentiation of national processes of capitalist development in the Global South since the 1960s (‘uneven development’), as well as the ensuing transformation in the IDL with the emergence of the NIDL alongside the CIDL (Starosta 2016: 81-82). As a result,

[s]ome countries have tended to concentrate within their boundaries the great bulk of the skilled labour-force and therefore of the most complex labour-processes (mainly the USA and the European Union but also partly in Japan lately). Other countries have been mainly transformed into sources of relatively cheap and disciplined labour for simplified, though increasingly complex, productions (e.g. East and then Southeast Asia [and China, particularly since the 1990s]). Yet, a third group of countries has remained [or, upon gaining independence, has become] integrated into the international division of labour as producers of raw materials [i.e. on the basis of the CIDL] … [thus being] increasingly transformed into reservoirs of surplus-population (for instance, most of Africa and parts of Asia and South America) (Grinberg 2013: 183-184; Iñigo Carrera 2013: 106-116).

With the fragmentation of the subjectivity of the global industrial worker along qualitative (skills and gender, hence costs of reproduction) and spatial-geographical (between and within countries) lines, the global total social capital reduces the overall costs of production, hence increases the rate of accumulation of relative surplus value on a world scale, regardless of the ‘nationality’ and profitability of individual capitals (Pirie 2007: 24ff.; Grinberg 2011, 2013; Charnock & Starosta 2018: 339-340). Simultaneously, this process of qualitative and spatial fragmentation splinters the working class along similar lines, shattering the unity at the core of its bargaining power vis-à-vis capital (Marx 1867/1976: 638; Starosta 2016: 94-96). As aliquot parts of the global total social capital and political representatives of their national total social capitals (Caligaris 2016), the various national states politically mediated these changing conditions of production in large-scale industry by guaranteeing the reproduction of their portion of the collective industrial labour force as the basis for their participation in the IDL. In this perspective, the role of the national state in the so-called age of globalisation (Chapter 1) has actually been reinforced ‘as the basis on which capital has been able to internationally fragment the labour-force according to the different costs and characteristics of its members’ (Grinberg 2011: 33; Iñigo Carrera 2013: 72, 81).

80 Therefore, first, the policy and institutional arrangements in the ‘classic’ countries have evolved in line with the new material conditions of production in the NIDL to mediate the differentiation in the reproduction of their industrial workforce between the portion with ‘expanded subjectivity’ dealing with the most complex production processes, such as scientific and technological work, and the portions of the labour force whose subjectivity has either been degraded or made redundant. While the timing and dynamics of this process varied between countries, one of its clearest outcomes has been the overall restructuring of the welfare state amid the crisis of corporatism, organised labour, and welfarism (Pirie 2007: 28; McNally 2009: 47; Erdoğdu 2010: 76; Streeck 2011: 17; Iñigo Carrera 2013; Connell & Dados 2014: 121; Marois 2015: 28; Bhattacharya 2017b: 90; Jayasuriya 2018: 588-589), hence of ‘democratic capitalism’ (Streeck 2011; Bruff 2014; Connell & Dados 2014: 128; Ayers & Saad-Filho 2015; Tansel 2017), that the scholarly literature has identified as the hallmarks of the neoliberal era. So, ‘[b]y the early 1990s … corporatism was in serious decline. Industrial workplaces structured around unionized, full-time, salaried employees with benefits and pensions were no longer the norm, even in industrialized democracies. Informal, non-unionized, part-time, and self-employed workers (an increasing percentage of them women) were far more prevalent’ (Helfer 2006: 706). In parallel, however, an increasing share of the total wage has been concentrated in the hands of a relatively smaller percentage of expanded subjectivity workers, along clear gender- differentiated lines (more on this below).

Second, the East Asian states mediated their integration into the NIDL as producers for the world market on the basis of a relatively cheap and highly disciplined labour force. In South Korea, for instance, a long ban on political organisations and trade unions, as well as the granting of dictatorial powers to the president to contain labour unrest, guaranteed the slow growth of wages and long working days often under hazardous conditions (Grinberg 2011: 53-61). Labour market reforms to control wages (i.e. reproduce a relatively cheap workforce), limit welfare and maintain employers’ rights to lay off workers with ease, as well as a specific emphasis on rigid ‘discipline and collective/collaborative work habits’ in the educational curriculum (i.e. reproduce a highly-disciplined workforce) have been central to this process since the 1960s, whether under the authoritarian ‘developmental’ state or the ‘neoliberal’ state more recently (Grinberg 2011: 207-208, 2016: 14; Pirie 2012: 375-376). Again, the crucial point here is that, contrary to the methodological nationalism of the developmental state and neoliberal literature (Chapter 1), these states’ policies, institutions, and bureaucracies did not initiate the process of industrialisation as part of an embedded yet autonomous (developmental), or a market-friendly (neoliberal), state external to the global market that engineered an industrial ‘upgrading’ beneficial to all. Rather, they

81 mediated the accumulation of relative surplus value on a global scale by reproducing their relatively cheap and highly disciplined fragment of the working class, specifically suited to the radically changed material conditions in large-scale industrial production that gave rise to the NIDL.

Third, most states of the Global South have either remained or, upon gaining independence, integrated into the IDL on the basis of CIDL, that is, as ‘resource rich’ raw material exporters (Coronil 2000). This form of integration has defined the specificity of the accumulation process within their territories as (a) these states have turned into ‘sources of appropriation of the extraordinary profits available there in the form of ground-rent’ (Grinberg 2013: 184), the portion of profit that capital needs to relinquish to pay a rent to a landlord for land use (hence the label ground, i.e. land, rent); this, in turn, explains the ‘backward’ nature of industrialisation within their borders, namely the fact that manufacturing capitals therein have been ‘small’ and technologically ‘backward’, producing substandard and relatively expensive goods largely for domestic market consumption (Section 2). Equally, (b) given the centrality of land for the production/extraction of primary commodities, these states have mediated the IDL via policy and institutional arrangements that enforced radical changes to land use within their territories, most notably the mass expulsion of peasants (primitive accumulation) and privatisation18 of the commons to the benefit of extractive industries and agribusiness. The combination of primitive accumulation and ‘backward’ industrialisation has translated into these countries’ tendency to concentrate populations that have been largely turned into (relative) surplus for the requirements of global capital accumulation. As the countries of the FSU, including Uzbekistan, unequivocally belong to this third group of states in the IDL,19 Section 2 focuses on the theorisation of these specific dynamics in ‘resource rich’ countries within the essential unity of capital accumulation, explaining key concepts such as ground-rent, ‘backward’ industrialisation, and primitive accumulation in detail.

Relations of competition among individual large-scale industrial capitals have been the most powerful forms of economic mediation of this global process of capital accumulation (Charnock & Starosta 2016: 6), driving the current staggering levels of concentration and

18 As it becomes clear in the rest of the chapter and the dissertation, privatisation does not necessarily refer to the legal form of land ownership, but to the very real ban on peasants from accessing the land. 19 As noted in the Introductory Chapter, the dissertation deals with all the FSU but the three Baltic countries.

82 centralisation of the global total social capital.20 These appear in the emergence of multinational/transnational corporations (MNCs/TNCs), ‘the so-called “national champions”, the recently emerging “global suppliers” and the “production networks” [and Global Commodity Chains (GCCs)] established amongst them’ (Grinberg 2013: 182; Starosta 2010), including global assembly lines in free trade and industrial zones (Federici 2012: 67). As ‘[t]he rates of profit prevailing in the different branches of production … are balanced out by competition to give a general rate of profit’ (Marx 1894/1991: 257), through competition these ‘normal’ industrial capitals set, and accumulate at, the general rate of profit (Starosta 2010: 443; Iñigo Carrera 2016: 26). Through competition, the process of concentration of the total social capital has accelerated, as evident in the fact that the number of TNCs jumped from 7,000 in the 1960s to 36,000 and 200,000 foreign affiliates in the 1990s (UNCTAD 1994: 8), and again to 78,000 and 780,000 in 2006, respectively (UNCTAD 2007: 12). By 2015, they ‘accounted for one-tenth of global GDP and their sales amounted to about half of global GDP’ (World Bank 2017a: 62), leading the rise in trade and investment of the past decades (Pirie 2007: 3, 31-32; UNCTAD 2016: 101-106). World merchandise trade leapt from 157 billion USD in 1963 to about 17.2 trillion USD in 2017 (WTO 2018: 122), while the world outward FDI stock increased from 1.78 trillion USD in 1990 to 16.2 trillion USD in 2007, with the bulk concentrated within developed countries and, increasingly, in a small number of so-called emerging markets in the Global South (te Velde 2006: 16; UNCTAD 2009: 219, Annex table A.I.5).

Equally, centralisation has advanced via the rapid growth in mergers and acquisitions worldwide, which rose from 2,676 in 1985, for a total value of about 347 billion USD, to 49,327 in 2019 with more than 3.3 trillion USD worth of transactions (IMAA 2019). As a result, ‘nearly 4/10 of the control over the economic value of TNCs in the world is held … by a group of 147 TNCs … an economic ‘‘super-entity’’ in the global network of corporations’ (Vitali et al. 2011: 3). As one of the world’s largest and most technologically advanced manufacturing industries (Tiberghien 2007: 181-182; Grinberg 2011: 133; Pirie 2013: 158- 160), the has been at the forefront of these developments. Competitive pressures - particularly ‘the escalating costs of developing new technological platforms’ that run ‘into the tens of billions’ (Pirie 2013: 159) - led to a wave of mergers and acquisitions in the 1990s that sealed the ‘global scope’ of the main ‘global suppliers’ (Sturgeon et al. 2009:

20 Marx (1867/1976: 776-781) clearly identified capital’s tendency towards concentration and centralisation within the boundless nature of accumulation. Concentration is ‘another name for [accumulation] on an extended scale’ that engenders ‘a positive [qualitative] growth in the magnitude of social capital’; centralisation, instead, ‘may result from a mere change in the distribution of already existing capitals[. …] In any given branch of industry centralization would reach its extreme limit if all the individual capitals invested there were fused into a single capital’ (ibid. 779).

83 9). By 2006, the industry exhibited staggering levels of centralisation with ‘12 companies produc[ing] more than 2 million vehicles each and together account[ing] for 75% of world vehicle production’ (ibid.: 19).21

The net result of this radical transformation in the material conditions of global industrial production, as mediated by the national states across the GPE, has been an overall reduction in labour costs for the global total social capital and the ensuing increase in the rate of relative surplus value accumulation. ‘The share of global income earned by workers has declined from 53.7% in 2004 to 51.4% in 2017. This implies that the share of capital income has increased from 46.3% to 48.6%’ (ILO 2019: 6). Equally, the qualitative and spatial differentiation of the collective industrial labourer effectively weakened working class solidarity, as evident in the overall decrease in unionisation across the world. With labour unions now ‘weak or nonexistent in large parts of the globe’ (Bhattacharya 2017b: 86, 88, 90; Mies 1986/2014: 146), in recent decades there has been a rise in ‘top income shares and less redistribution, while the erosion of minimum wages is correlated with considerable increases in overall inequality’ in most countries (Jaumotte & Osorio Buitron 2015: 4; ILO 2016: 21). In parallel, the differentiation in the costs of reproduction of the global working class continued apace, with expanded subjectivity workers concentrated in the ‘classic’ countries amassing the lion’s share of total wages, while many others across the world have been facing growing insecurity and precarity. Thus, in 2017 ‘the top decile earned 48.9 per cent of all labour income, whereas … the [bottom] 50 percent of global workers earn[ed] just 6.4 per cent’ thereof. ‘A worker in the global top decile (a group of approximately three hundred million people) earned an average of roughly US$89’000 (PPP) in labour income, whereas the global bottom decile earned US$266 (PPP)’ (ILO 2019: 31).

As a consequence, ‘[j]ob insecurity’ and ‘weakening employment protections’ have become the ‘new normal’ (McMichael 2016: 216), as evident in the rise in precarity with ‘[p]art-time and temporary workers [being] over-represented at the bottom end of the wage distribution’ (ILO 2016: 46; Connell & Dados 2014: 122; Charnock et al. 2016: 167-168; UNDESA 2020: 32). The mass of this relative surplus population in and (more often than not) out of (un- /low-skilled-hence-low-pay) work tends to be concentrated in the Global South, as confirmed in the relatively high incidence of informality and poverty in these countries. The ILO (2018: 48) estimates that ‘in developing and emerging countries the share of informal employment in total employment ranges from 50.4 per cent to more than 98 per cent’ with

21 The importance of these dynamics in the FSU in general, and Uzbekistan in particular, are explored in detail in Chapters 3-4.

84 ‘a clear positive relation between poverty and informality’. By 2018, 61.2 percent of the world’s active population, or two billion people, were working informally, particularly in Africa (85.8%) and in Asia and the Pacific (68.2%) (ibid.: 13-14); moreover, according to the global Multidimensional Poverty Index covering ‘101 countries, home to 77 percent of the world’s population’, approximately ‘1.3 billion’ thereof are poor with 83 percent living ‘in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, 67 percent in middle income countries, 85 percent in rural areas and 46 percent in severe poverty’ (UNDP 2019: 68).

Finally, women in those countries represent ‘the vast majority of poor, less skilled, insecure, informalised and flexibilised workers’ (Peterson 2005: 508; ILO 2016: xvii, 82, 2018: 69; Betti 2018). Thus, within the changing material conditions of production in large-scale industry, not only have women been incorporated into old (e.g. textile and garment) and new (e.g. electronics) economic sectors as appendages to machinery or as un-/low-skilled manual labour, but they have also borne the brunt of the overall precarisation and informalisation of work, which explains the ongoing ‘feminization of poverty’ particularly in the Global South (Federici 2004: 17). All these phenomena - the differentiation in the costs of reproduction of the various fractions of the working class and the increasing informalisation, precarisation, and pauperisation of the vast relative surplus population, all in gender-differentiated ways - are ‘the product of the full development of the global essence of accumulation’ (Iñigo Carrera 2013: 63), rather than of the underdevelopment of capitalism in ‘resource rich’ countries, as the literature on development and transition would have it (Chapter 1).

Crucially, this problematises the transition literature’s ideal-type capitalism as a classless and gender-liberating system of development for all (ibid.); instead, class is shown to be the foundational divide in capitalist society as capital accumulates via the exploitation of human labour, which, in turn, as a living social group, exists through many concrete particularities and determinations such as gender. Succinctly put, the latter is internally related to, hence co-constitutive of, the former. As such, the policies and institutions of the national state are social forms of mediation of the class struggle. As a result, the changing material conditions of large-scale industrial production in the GPE since the 1960s have reinforced the gender- differentiated exploitation of the working class, while simultaneously thrusting women to the forefront of the relative surplus population and increasing their ‘double burden’ of productive and social reproductive work, including in subsistence agriculture. The following pages detail how the latter has been crucial to guaranteeing the reproduction of the relative surplus population in ‘resource rich’ countries, catapulting women to the centre of everyday resistance to capital therein.

85

In Section 2, I turn to the specific national diversity of accumulation in ‘resource rich’ countries, to which the FSU and Uzbekistan unequivocally belong, within the essential unity of global capital accumulation (‘unity of the diverse’).

2. THE SPECIFICITY OF ACCUMULATION IN ‘RESOURCE RICH’ COUNTRIES: GROUND-RENT, LAND USE, SURPLUS POPULATION

To recapitulate briefly the argument so far, the radical changes in the material conditions of production in large-scale industry since the 1960s resulted in the overall threefold fragmentation of the productive characteristics (‘subjectivity’) of the industrial workforce and the ensuing diversification in its costs of reproduction. This enabled the geographic redistribution of increasingly complex tasks of large-scale industrial production according to the specific characteristics of some national segments of the global labour force, giving rise to the NIDL alongside the CIDL in which specific Asian countries - the Asian ‘tigers’ and, since the 1990s, China - experienced a meteoric process of industrialisation due to the relative cheapness and high-discipline of their portions of the global working class. The net result of this radical transformation in the GPE has been the increase in the accumulation of relative surplus value by the global total social capital and the ensuing decrease of labour’s total wages, which, additionally, have been increasingly concentrated in the hands of a small percentage of workers with expanded subjectivity along gender-differentiated lines. Equally, working class solidarity has been shattered via this qualitative and spatial fragmentation.

However, the majority of countries in the Global South - including the FSU since 1991 - have been integrated into the IDL on the basis of the CIDL, that is, as ‘resource rich’ raw material exporters, which defines their specific national diversity within the unity of global capital accumulation as sources of ground-rent for ‘backward’ industrialisation via changes to land use that largely turn their populations into surplus for the requirements of capital. Section 2 ascends to Level 2 of generality to theorise the political-economic specificity of these countries in the IDL, which is then deployed in the empirical chapters (3-6) on the FSU and Uzbekistan. Building on Marx’s analysis in Capital, Iñigo Carrera identifies ground- rent as the crucial form whose mediation by the state in ‘resource rich’ countries defines the specific form of accumulation in their territories.22 In brief, in view of the private monopoly

22 Probably due to the unfinished nature of the manuscript of Capital Volume 3, which was published posthumously, there are disagreements about Marx’s theory of ground-rent. I adopt Iñigo Carrera’s

86 on land, primary commodity prices must incorporate a ground(i.e. land)-rent to be paid to the landlord for the use of this irreproducible means of production, land. In turn this has defined how manufacturing capitals in these countries accumulate at the average rate of profit via ground-rent subsidisation, as mediated by the specific policies and institutions of the state. As a result, these capitals are ‘small’ and technologically ‘backward’ by international standards, so their intrinsically limited scale of production cannot absorb into the labour process the vast mass of the population expelled from the land in order to produce/extract raw materials, turning it into (relative) surplus for the accumulation requirements of the total social capital.

2.1. Forms of ground-rent in capitalism

Given the existence of the social institution of landed property, Marx proceeds to analyse how this ‘ownership of particular bits of the globe by certain individuals’ is economically valorised within the capitalist mode of production (Marx 1894/1991: 772, 752-753). In landed property, capital confronts a ‘barrier’, an ‘alien power’ that forces it to relinquish a ‘portion of profit’ that instead ‘accrues to the landowner’ in the form of ground-rent in virtue of the landlord’s private monopoly on land (ibid.: 896, 779).23 Thus, ground-rent is ‘the form in which landed property is economically realized’ in capitalism (ibid.: 756); the total social capital sacrifices a portion of profit to the landlord, but it preserves the sanctity of private property (Purcell 2016: 109). Every time land is used as a means of production in capitalism, its landlord is paid a (ground-)rent, notwithstanding the diverse legal forms of land ownership. Since in ‘resource rich’ countries it is common for land to be state-owned - as is generally the case in the FSU and Uzbekistan (Deininger 2003: 134-143) - ground-rent accrues to the landlord-state which, in turn, mediates its allocation within its territory in order to guarantee the valorisation of the total social capital, regardless of the accumulation requirements of specific individual capitals.

As argued in Section 1, however, in Marxian political economy human labour is the source of all relative surplus value in the capitalist system. As such, all ground-rent derives from relative surplus value produced by human labour in the labour process (Marx 1894/1991: 772-773). Put differently, while nature is crucial to production and social reproduction, ‘it cannot create value since no labour was used to produce it … . For example air has

original elaboration, but see e.g. Fine (1979); Harvey (1982, 2006: Chapter 11); and Campbell (2002) for alternative interpretations. 23 Clearly, ‘what we understand here by land also includes water, etc. in so far as this … appears as an accessory to the land’ (Marx 1894/1991: 752), so, with land use, I mean land and resource use.

87 unbounded use-value but, since no labour was used to produce it, has no value’ (Purcell 2010: 87). In this sense, all natural means of production ‘such as land, wind, water, metals in the form of ore, and timber in virgin forests’ hold use-value ‘without contributing to the formation of exchange-value’ (Marx 1867/1976: 312, 131, 751). By contrast, all raw materials extracted from (e.g. oil, natural gas, gold) or produced on (e.g. cash crops such as cotton) the land in the labour process bear surplus value as the result of the contribution of human labour to their production: they are ground-rent bearing commodities.

In short, the social origin of ground-rent must be found in human-labour-produced relative surplus value. I now turn to the different kinds of (ground-)rents and their respective social origins.

2.1.a. Absolute rent & Simple absolute monopoly rent

As ground-rent is the form in which landed property is valorised in capitalism, agrarian and mining capitals - that is, capitals that necessarily use land as a means of production - must pay a rent to the landlord. As such, the ‘prices of primary commodities are not regulated by normal but marginal conditions of production’ (Grinberg 2015: 800, emphasis added). In other words, given the monopoly of certain individuals (the landlords) on land, international prices of agricultural or mining commodities need to rise to such an extent as to cover rent including for the landlord of the worst (‘marginal’) land, in order for the latter to be brought into capitalist production in line with global solvent demand (Harvey 2006: 342; Purcell 2010: 96).

This absolute rent (AR) originates in the primary sector. Since, in capitalism, ‘sectors contribute to the total social surplus value according to the labour power they employ but receive surplus value according to the total capital they advance’ (Harvey 2006: 350-351; Marx 1894/1991: 257-258), labour-intensive sectors produce more surplus value than they can lay claim to, due to their mobilising relatively more labour than capital. In Marxian terms, these are known as branches of production with a lower organic composition of capital (OCC), namely the relation between the value of constant capital (e.g. machinery) and variable capital (labour) used in the sector’s labour process (Saad-Filho 1993: 131). On the contrary, capital-intensive sectors - with higher OCC, in Marxian terms - receive more surplus value than they contribute due to their investing relatively more capital hence mobilising relatively less (i.e. more productive) labour (Purcell 2010: 85). Historically, agriculture exhibited a lower-than-average OCC due to the sector’s labour-intensity, so agricultural products have generally traded at or above their prices of production, but below

88 their value (Swyngedouw 2012: 311-312). The ‘difference between the value and the price of production of agricultural goods’ is the AR that accrues to the landlord (Iñigo Carrera 2007: 16, 2017: 109; Ramirez 2009: 83), instead of being transferred to higher OCC branches of production via competition, as it would in the absence of the ‘barrier’ of landed property (Purcell 2010: 89). Therefore, AR originates in the relative surplus value produced by agricultural workers in the primary sector, namely agriculture (Iñigo Carrera 2007: 16; Grinberg 2011: 414).

However, in the case of capitals with higher OCC such as in mining (e.g. gold, copper) and energy (e.g. oil and gas), it would be wrong to assume that AR disappears altogether. In this case, the possibility and magnitude of ground-rent varies ‘according to monopoly ownership of landowners relative to the size of the demand from the global economy in general’ (Purcell 2010: 95). Contrary to agrarian landlords, landlords where, for example, mines and oil wells are located have a relatively stronger bargaining power, in virtue of the fact that they can more easily withdraw their land from production without losing their natural resources. As such, depending on the ‘demand of the purchasers and their ability to pay’ (Marx 1894/1991: 898; Ramirez 2009: 86) - that is, the level of solvent demand for raw materials on the world market - landlords may have ‘the capacity to impose a simple monopoly price above the price of production’ and ‘even beyond the value of the goods in question’ (Iñigo Carrera 2007: 14), accruing a simple absolute monopoly rent (SAMR) as a result (Iñigo Carrera 2017: 110). Thus, rather than the primary sector and pace dependency theory (Chapter 1), this SAMR represents an inflow of surplus value ‘generated by workers and capital of the importing countries where primary commodities reach individual and industrial consumption’ (Purcell 2010: 98).

AR and SAMR are inextricably related to differential forms of rents, to which I now turn.

2.1.b. Differential rents (DRI & DRII)

Differential natural conditions between land plots provide the natural basis for differential rents. As differentially favourable soil characteristics between intra-marginal - in relation to the ‘marginal’, i.e. worst - plots of land relatively increase labour productivity/reduce costs of production, individual capitals operating on these lands accrue a(n extraordinary) profit in direct proportion to the more or less favourable conditions prevailing thereon, which, in turn, translates into a proportionally higher/lower rent paid to the landlord. Whether from ‘the differences in fertility [and location] between types of land or successive investments of capital on the same land’ (Marx 1894/1991: 894), an extensive differential rent (the former,

89 DRI) and/or an intensive differential rent (the latter, DRII) arise due to the higher productivity of labour/lower costs of production on these intra-marginal lands, as compared to worst (‘marginal’) plots, on whose costs of production primary commodity prices are set (ibid.: Chapters 39-40). As a result, since international prices of agricultural and mining commodities must rise to include these extensive (DRI) and intensive (DRII) differential rents to satisfy global solvent demand, the latter represent an inflow of value - again, pace dependency theory - ‘from the surplus value of capital and workers in the countries where the primary export is destined for final consumption’ to the raw material exporting countries (Purcell & Martinez 2018: 14; Iñigo Carrera 2007: 15-16, 2017: 105-107; Grinberg 2011: 414; Caligaris 2016: 63).

Depending on conditions in the global market, energy-rich FSU countries such as Russia and Kazakhstan have accrued a combination of SAMR and DRI&II rents, whose fluctuating magnitude in line with international oil and gas prices has defined the evolving transformation in their political-economies in the past three decades (Chapter 3). Initially, as an agrarian landlord-state, Uzbekistan generally amassed AR and DRI&II from cotton production, with the former originating in the relative surplus value produced by peasants (dekhans) in cotton growing, specifically women dekhans who largely carried out the most labour-intensive activities in the cotton fields for small agricultural capitalists (fermery) leasing the land from the state (Chapter 5). As it gradually transformed into a mining landlord-state, Uzbekistan has been increasingly accruing SAMR and DRI&II rents from the export of gold and natural gas, as well as other non-ferrous metals (e.g. silver, copper, , zinc) (Chapter 4). As for the rest of the FSU, the changing magnitude of ground- rent in Uzbekistan in line with the international prices of its key raw materials is crucial to explaining the country’s political-economic transformation since independence (Chapters 4- 6). For simplicity, in the following pages and in the empirical chapters (3-6), I shall simply refer to ground-rent, with the understanding that what is implied are the various types and social origins thereof as theorised in this subsection.

Not only does this theorisation differ from dependency theory in that it posits an inflow of value (under the SAMR and DRI&II forms) into primary commodity exporting countries, but it also defines the social origin of all types of rents in human-labour-produced surplus value, problematising transitology’s classless accounts about the squeeze on e.g. agriculture as a sector in Uzbekistan to accrue cotton rents. Moreover, contrary to the transition literature (Chapter 1), the CICP theoretical framework enables the dissertation to avoid turning ‘objective economic outcomes’ (raw materials export concentration, rents) into ‘subjective political behaviour’ (rent-seeking) (Purcell 2010: 60), while explaining neither. Instead, as

90 the following subsections demonstrate, the CICP approach provides the basis for the further theorisation of the landlord-state’s mediation of the ground-rent form, via policy and institutional arrangements that directly and indirectly transfer this social value in order to guarantee the valorisation of the national total social capital. In other words, rent allocation (‘rent-seeking’) represents the form in which capital valorises in ‘resource rich’ countries, regardless of its legal status and ‘nationality’. It is to this that I now turn.

2.2. Ground-rent and ‘backward’ industrialisation: Labour, gender, and surplus population (1)

Within the essential unity of global capital accumulation, ground-rent defines the specificity of capital accumulation within the national territories of ‘resource rich’ countries (Grinberg 2013: 184). Thus, as the representative of the total social capital, the landlord-state puts in place an array of specific policy and institutional arrangements to mediate the allocation of the ground-rent produced in (AR) and, especially, inflowing into its space of accumulation as extraordinary profits (SAMR, DRI&II), in order to guarantee the accumulation of the total social capital. Simply put, the state lays claim to this mass of extraordinary profits - accrued to its national territory in the form of hard currency from the sale of raw materials in the world market - and transfers it to the manufacturing sector under the form of direct and indirect subsidies.

Among these policies are the overvaluation of the national currency and the imposition of export taxes, as well as the purchase of raw materials at lowered fixed prices in the domestic market for resale at international prices in the world market. The latter appears as an explicitly confiscatory policy (Caligaris 2016: 68), as has been the case for decades in Uzbekistan’s cotton sector, where - to the chagrin of individual agricultural capitals (fermery) - the landlord-state has exercised monopsony power in cotton purchases in order to subsidise ISI in various sectors of the economy, such as the automotive and electronics industry. This continues to be the case for specific extractive industries in the country, such as gold mining and natural gas production (Chapter 4). The crucial point is that, regardless of how specific policies may affect the accumulation requirements of individual capitals, ground-rent is allocated to subsidise the continuous process of valorisation of the total social capital. Such subsidies can take the form of the already mentioned overvaluation of the domestic currency, which allows for higher profits for e.g. MNCs upon repatriation in hard currency and whose higher purchasing power allows enterprises on the domestic market - no matter their legal status or ‘nationality’ - to acquire industrial machinery at lower prices on the international market; the provision of credit at low or negative interest rates by

91 domestic banks, as well as the selling of inputs and the supplying of utilities at subsidised rates by State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs); the protection of the domestic market via e.g. import tariffs and quotas; tax exemptions; and public spending to guarantee demand for domestic industrial production (Iñigo Carrera 2007: 18-22, 2016: 39-41; Grinberg 2015: 803). A combination of these policies has been enforced at different times during the last decades in all the FSU countries, including Uzbekistan (Chapters 3-4).

These ‘different mechanisms’ put in place by the state have ‘resulted in the establishment of domestic conditions for the circulation of capital within [the] national territories’ of ‘resource rich’ countries, in which ground-rent ‘appropriation could only be done by industrial capitals operating within those countries and whose circuit realised its final phase (ie the sale of commodities) on the domestic market’ (Grinberg & Starosta 2009: 770) or, at best, in an equally protected regional market or other markets with which the country in question had signed a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) (Starosta 2016: 81). In other words, within the protected and subsidised domestic market of primary commodity exporting countries, manufacturing capitals - regardless of their legal status and ‘nationality’ - have been ‘small’ and technologically ‘backward’ (‘backward’ industrialisation) by ‘normal’ international standards, thus being able to accumulate at the average rate of profit only via ground-rent subsidisation (Iñigo Carrera 2016: 40). It is worth emphasising that all manufacturing capitals in these spaces of accumulation have been ‘small’, including e.g. TNC-affiliates or JVs between foreign and domestic SOEs, as valorisation via ground-rent appropriation has been the main incentive for otherwise ‘normal’ capitals to invest their ‘fragments of specific restricted scale’ in ‘resource rich’ countries (ibid.: 42), where they have benefitted from e.g. an overvalued exchange rate to import machinery obsolete for world market manufacture and put it to use for domestic production. This explains why TNC- affiliates and JVs are as likely ‘to clamour for the protection of the national state of the country in which they have installed themselves’ as all other ‘domestic’ manufacturing capitals, ‘arguing their case as incipient industrial capitals in a struggle to consolidate themselves in the face of foreign competition’ (ibid.).

As such, ‘small’ capitals by international standards have mobilised labour with degraded subjectivity to operate obsolete machinery thus manufacturing relatively costly and substandard goods for the domestic market, as has been the case of the automotive industry in Russia and Uzbekistan (Chapters 3-4). Moreover, the introduction of (obsolete) industrial machinery has allowed the total social capital to exploit labour in gender- differentiated ways, as evident in the incorporation of (especially young) un- and low-skilled women into Uzbekistan’s electronics industry (Chapter 4). Not only is this form of ‘backward’

92 accumulation ‘structurally dependent on the evolution of the magnitude of ground-rent available for appropriation’, thus fluctuating upward and downward along with the ground- rent available for appropriation within the domestic market in line with the changing international prices of primary commodities; domestic costs of production also continue to rise in view of the widening gap in the scale of output between the national and the global market (Grinberg & Starosta 2009: 770, 2015: 245-246). As a result, the limited scale of production within ‘backward’ industrialisation fails to absorb the majority of the population into the labour process, which is turned into surplus for the requirements of capital accumulation. Uzbekistan’s car industry presents a useful case study to show these dynamics empirically (Chapter 4).

Therefore, ‘backward’ industrialisation has been the key qualitative form of manufacturing capital accumulation within ‘resource rich’ countries in the IDL, including in the FSU and Uzbekistan since 1991. In this regard, it is ‘backward’ industrialisation (objective economic outcome) that explains ‘rent-seeking’ (subjective behaviour), rather than the other way around, as transitology would have it (Chapter 1); equally, ‘backward’ industrialisation is not the result of a lack of transition in the FSU region, but rather ‘the product of the full development of the global essence of accumulation’ (Iñigo Carrera 2013: 63) in ‘resource rich’ countries, including the FSU and Uzbekistan. In this regard, the dissertation can show the ‘paradox’ of no transition and transformation to be of transitology’s own making. Finally, the evolving authoritarian state form found in the FSU republics, including Uzbekistan, represents the national political form mediating the global process of accumulation, rather than the literature’s failure of transition to democracy as the ‘end of history’ (Chapter 1). As the empirical chapters (3-5) reveal, whether via ‘liberalisation’ in the 1990s and ‘recentralisation’ since the 2000s in the energy-rich republics, or via ‘centralisation’ in the 1990s and then ‘liberalisation’ since 2016 in Uzbekistan, the authoritarian state was functional to the radical shift from the Fordist conditions of industrial production and indiscriminate reproduction of the working class during Soviet times, to the ground-rent subsidisation of the national total social capital after independence. This included the expulsion of the vast mass of the population from the land, which sharply differentiated the costs of reproduction of the working class, as well as the containment, and, at times of a perceived threat to the accumulation process, the outright repression of labour organisation and mobilisation. As such, the policies and institutions of the national state are social forms of mediation of the class struggle.

I now turn to the origin of the relative surplus population in ‘resource rich’ countries that, by and large, cannot be incorporated by ‘backward’ and capital-intensive extractive industries.

93 In the next paragraphs, I integrate insights from feminist and ‘green’ Marxists in the CICP approach in order to focus the theorisation on the gendered class stratification resulting from the rise of the relative surplus population, as well as the origins of the escalating global climate crisis along with the gendered resistance, and class-mediated vulnerability, to it.

2.3. Primitive accumulation, gender, and surplus population (2)

Given the specific importance of land (and resource) use to capital accumulation in raw materials exporting countries, changes to land use and ownership have been at the centre of their mediation of the IDL in order to satisfy global solvent demand for primary commodities. These include the implementation of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) across the Global South (Platteau 1995; Moyo 2000; Federici 2004: 70, 2012: 87, 101-103; UNCTAD 2009: 152; Connell & Dados 2014: 121), as well as the process of land decollectivisation in the FSU and Uzbekistan following independence (Federici 2012: 101), along with the broad dismantlement and/or privatisation of welfare provisions (Waylen 2004: 565; Connell & Dados 2014: 121). Despite the wide policy and institutional diversity, timelines of application, and lived experiences, this mediation has consistently entailed ‘the expropriation of the mass of the people from the soil’ (Marx 1867/1976: 934), or, in Marxian terminology, primitive accumulation. Peasants have been displaced from the land and the commons have been privatised - regardless of the legal form this has taken (Marx 1894/1991: 754)24 - in staggering levels (Pirie 2007: 27; McNally 2009: 52) to put land to use for capitalist production in order to meet global solvent demand especially from large- scale industry, in what Araghi (2000) aptly terms ‘the great global enclosure of our times’ (also Federici 2004: 11). In this perspective, the ‘most relevant concept for the analysis of peasant dispossession today is … rural displacement on a world scale’ (Araghi 2000: 147), which has ‘increased insecurity and vulnerability in rural areas across the globe’ (White et al. 2012: 627), helping to explain the origin of the mass of relative surplus population in ‘resource rich’ countries.

Across the Global South, such trends have been behind ‘the accelerated decline of peasant society and the massive growth of informal economies in the cities’ (Connell & Dados 2014: 133, 129-131; Hanieh 2015: 230) to which displaced peasants migrate, and one of whose most recognisable effects has been the rise of sprawling urban slums (Davis 2006) due to

24 This aspect is particularly important for the FSU in general, and Uzbekistan in particular, since the transition literature’s focus on the legal status of the land as state-owned (Chapter 1) misses the very real expulsion of millions from the land and the actual privatisation of (access to) land in rural areas (Chapters 3-6).

94 either the general absence of development of large-scale labour-intensive industry (urbanisation without industrialisation) (Levien et al. 2018: 857) or to ‘backward’ industrialisation. Equally, these dynamics have driven the surge in international migratory flows (WWAP 2019: 31-32), explaining the huge rise in remittances sent back by migrant workers to their countries of origin that significantly contribute to domestic demand as well as the reproduction of the relative surplus population. In low- and middle-income countries, remittances are now ‘more than three times the size of official development assistance (ODA)’ and ‘significantly larger than FDI flows’ (KNOMAD & World Bank 2019: 1, 3; Hanieh 2015: 232; IOM 2017: 31). In short, the more peasants are expelled from the land, the larger the relative surplus population that cannot be absorbed by no or ‘backward’ industrialisation, hence the higher the migration from rural areas and, often, the bigger the relative importance of remittances for a country’s economy.

Therefore, the different national forms of informality, poverty, and migration - as evident in ‘resource rich’ countries’ tendency to concentrate within their borders large relative surplus populations - are the direct outcome of the full development of global capital accumulation (Section 1), rather than the result of the underdevelopment of the capitalist system within these states, as the literature would have it (Chapter 1). As argued in Section 1, informality and poverty are directly interlinked, and so is the fact that women bear the brunt of informalisation as evident in the ‘feminisation of poverty’. In other words, contra the transition literature’s classless and gender-liberating development for all, the gendered exploitation of the working class lies at the heart of the process of capital accumulation. In short, the antagonism between capital and labour is the foundational divide in capitalism, with gender being internally related to the latter as one of their concrete forms of existence (Introductory Chapter).

In this context, with the radical changes in the material conditions of production in large- scale industry and the ensuing radical shift in land use for capital accumulation, not only have women suffered the worst consequences of informalisation and pauperisation, being more likely than men to be exploited as un- and low-skilled informal and precarious workers, including in specific sectors of large-scale industrial production (Section 1; Lahiri-Dutt & Macintyre 2006: 9-10; IACHR 2015: 168; ILO 2016: xvii; Achiume 2019: 18); their social reproductive work has also become increasingly crucial to guaranteeing the reproduction of the relative surplus population across the Global South, explaining the exponential increase in their ‘double burden’. Succinctly put, with the loss of the natural commons, ‘women themselves became the commons’ to be tapped into in the commons’ stead (Federici 2004: 97, emphasis original). Their escalating ‘double burden’ has been mediated via the

95 recrudescence of patriarchal norms that socialise their work ‘as a natural resource’ (ibid.), normalising their exploitation across economic sectors, including large-scale industry, much as their centrality to social reproductive work. Here is a ‘docile, tireless[ workforce] naturally suited to performing repetitive work with her [dexterous] hands’ (Robbins & Vickery 2005: 39, emphasis added) and nimble fingers, as well as naturally disposed towards all forms of housework and carework in the domestic sphere, however defined, including in subsistence agriculture (Mies 1986/2014: 117; Peterson 1996: 10, 2005: 501, 509, 517, 2013; Federici 2004: 8, 74-75, 115, 200; Ferguson & McNally 2013: xxx, xxxiii; Mezzadri 2016: 1887; Bhattacharya 2017a).

As ‘the subsistence farmers of the world’ (Federici 2012: 143; Chauvin et al. 2012: 69; World Bank & WTO 2020: 29-30), women have been

key to ensuring food and nutrition security at the household level. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) figures indicate that women provide up to 90 per cent of rice cultivation in South-East Asia and produce as much as 80 per cent of basic foodstuffs for household consumption and for sale in sub-Saharan Africa. Overall, women provide up to 90 per cent of the rural poor’s food intake (ILO 2017a: 4, emphasis added), that is, of the (relative) surplus population. Yet, they rarely have tenure rights on the land on which they toil to feed their families, as ‘[l]ess than 20% of the world’s landholders are women’ (WWAP 2019: 32; FAO 2011: 46-47), further exacerbating their precarity.

Finally, within wide variations between countries and regions regarding women’s mobility, internal and international migration flows have also acquired a distinct gendered dimension. ‘[D]eclining formal employment, precarious work, and crises of reproduction’ have forced the working poor, especially women, ‘to move across rural and urban spaces and between precarious wage labor, petty commodity production, and forms of informal nonagricultural self-employment to survive’ (Levien et al. 2018: 867; Federici 2011: 51-52), so both at home and abroad ‘women migrants [are] concentrated in low skilled, low paid and informal sectors, with limited social protections’ (Hennebry et al. 2017: 22). Equally, even when it is mostly men that engage in international migration - as is largely the case in the Central Asian republics including Uzbekistan - women end up shouldering most of the burden thereof as they are left alone to raise children and tend to the elderly, including the husband’s relatives, with decision-making in the household often still lying outside their purview (IOM 2017: 185). Uzbekistan has experienced all these broad dynamics - primitive accumulation (decollectivisation) and the emergence of a relative surplus population, as

96 well as gendered informality, rural poverty, and migration - in line with other ‘resource rich’ countries (Chapters 5-6).

2.4. Land use, gender, and everyday resistance in the age of climate crisis

As argued, industrial output and trade recorded a staggering expansion in the past decades with the rise of the NIDL, as mediated by the hugely concentrated and centralised capitals of MNCs and TNCs (Section 1). Clearly, as ‘resource rich’ countries participate in the IDL on the basis of the CIDL, the most common and potent forms of economic mediation of their integration as primary commodity producers have been ‘agriculture-based TNCs’ (UNCTAD 2009: 130, 152; UNCCD 2017: 135, 291), as well as extractive industries exhibiting high levels of capital concentration and centralisation, in line with trends in the GPE. Specifically, from the late 1990s onward, international prices for raw materials started to experience a significant upward trend that continued until the mid-2010s, when they fell to lower yet historically relatively high levels.25 China’s meteoric industrialisation was responsible for much of this commodity supercycle, as the literature labelled it (Rumer 2005: 29; Arboleda 2015: 31-32; Büyükşahin et al. 2016: 40; Pirani 2018: 159-161). Whereas China had previously largely satisfied its energy needs from domestic sources, this radically changed in the mid-1990s, when the country became a net oil importer, accounting ‘for approximately 43% of global incremental oil demand growth between 2009 and 2015’ (Collins 2016: 2). Equally, China’s natural gas imports grew by 10,349% between 2006 and 2017 (Milke & Kaplan 2020: 6), with a significant share of it coming from the Central Asia-China Gas pipeline since 2009 (Vasánczki 2011: 34-38), as China replaced Russia as the main export market for Central Asian gas (Pirani 2019).

As large-scale industrial production consumes ‘about 54% of the world’s total delivered energy’ (Conti et al. 2016: 113), this commodity supercycle provided the material conditions for the (re)centralisation of capital specifically in the oil and gas industry in ‘resource rich’ countries. As Singh & Chen (2018: 1087) notice,

[a]n important turn of events in the developing world since the 2000s has been the renationalisation of privatised assets in the mining sector and the reorganisation of the oil and gas industry in favour of direct state participation. [P]rior to these reforms, the neoliberal revolution in the early 1980s combined with a commodity price downturn compelled

25 The analysis stops at the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic.

97 economic restructuring in the global extractive industry. … [P]oor profits and industry decline were exacerbated by low commodity prices throughout the 1990s.

Soaring commodity prices on the back of the Chinese-demand-led supercycle radically changed that. On the one hand, international prices for raw materials began rising in order to account for the growing magnitude of ground-rent necessary to expand production/extraction in the worst (‘marginal’) lands and satisfy global solvent demand, particularly from China’s expanding industrial capacity. On the other hand, within this favourable conjuncture in the world market, mining landlord-states could leverage their monopoly on land in order to renegotiate the terms under which capital could put this irreproducible means of production (land) to use, including via renationalisation, vastly increasing the magnitude of the rents they accrued as a consequence.

This explains the overall trend of ‘renationalisation’ or ‘direct state participation’ that resulted in ‘strategic industries in the Global South [being] increasingly concentrated in the field of natural resource extraction. By 2014, more than three-fourths of the world’s crude oil stocks were held in SOEs’ (ibid.: 1081), with ‘some of the world’s largest TNCs in the oil and gas industry … owned and controlled by developing-country governments’, such as Gazprom in the Russian Federation (UNCTAD 2014: 21). Unsurprisingly, FDI flows into ‘resource rich’ countries have also been largely directed to the primary sector, especially mining and petroleum, or to industries related to the processing of raw materials such as oil refining (UNCTAD 2005: iv, 2019: 69-70). Equally, many of these states have established sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) that, particularly at times of high commodity prices, have amassed ground-rent in the form of hard currency accrued from the sale of raw materials on the international market, in order to use it for investment as well as financial sterilisation in the event of a crisis (Weiss 2012: 32).

This expansion in industrial output and trade has translated into the equally staggering growth in global material throughput in the GPE, which has ‘more than tripled from 27 billion tons in 1970 to 92 billion tons in 2017’ - with fossil fuels and metals extraction in the same period increasing 2.5 and 3.5 times, respectively - and, within current trends, is expected to ‘more that double from 2015 levels to reach 190 billion tonnes by 2060’ (IRP 2019: 9, 23). As a consequence, the Earth’s fragile ecosystem is being altered, as evident in the various phenomena broadly labelled as climate change, from increasingly extreme and unpredictable weather patterns (e.g. droughts, floods) to the non-reproduction of natural use-values (e.g. glaciers) crucial to the renovation of clean water sources and food production (Moore 2016: 104, 2017a: 608; Chapter 6). The response to climate change from

98 governments around the world has been informed by a techno-managerial optimism that turns capitalism from the cause into the solution to the problem (Gunderson et al. 2018; Moore 2017a: 598, 2018: 270; Patel & Moore 2017: 165-166; Trainer 2019). In this perspective, technological innovation would decouple production from material throughput and achieve ‘green’ growth; within the growth imperative of capitalist production, however, this is an impossibility, as once ‘the physical limits of resource efficiency are reached, continued GDP growth drives resource use back up’ (Hickel & Kallis 2020: 475; Fletcher & Rammelt 2017; Gunderson et al. 2018: 151; Vadén et al. 2020).

This is due to the boundless nature of the accumulation process, whereby ‘use values are only produced as means of obtaining exchange value, not of satisfying human needs, including the need for a sustainable and fulfilling coevolution with nature’ (Burkett 1999: 83; Foster 1999: 383; Clark & Foster 2010: 152). Since this process, as argued, finds its most potent form of mediation in large-scale industry, the growth of large-scale industrial production, extraction, and transportation has been driving the ongoing ‘acceleration of the impacts’ of climate change ‘everywhere in the world’ (Chevallier et al. 2014: 1504; Moore 2015, 2017a: 608), in spite of significant technological advances. Even accounting for ‘the use of more efficient technologies in production processes’ and other factors, the OECD (2019a: 15, 19-21) still projects that primary materials use ‘roughly doubles’ from 89 billion tons in 2017 to 167 billion tons in 2060 for all groups - fossil fuels, metals and non-metallic minerals, biomass - and, albeit to different degrees, in all major regions in the world, including OECD countries, with severe environmental consequences. In this perspective, by guaranteeing the accumulation of the total social capital, the policies and institutions of the national state in the FSU and across the globe actually exacerbate the climate crisis in spite of new technologies, heightening as a consequence the vulnerability of the poorest in society, particularly women, children, and the elderly. In short, these policies and institutions are not classless, gender-liberating, and eco-friendly, but rather social forms of the class struggle.

As such, the continuation and acceleration of environmental destruction in the FSU and Uzbekistan, in line with broader global trends, is not the result of the underdevelopment of capitalism in these countries (‘no transition’), as transitology would have it, given its theorisation of Western capitalism as the eco-friendly ideal-type opposite of Soviet communism (Chapter 1). Rather, production was always internally related to increased material throughput in both Blocs, notwithstanding the growing divergence between them in the degree of technological development that translated into it being more energy- intensive in the USSR than in the ‘West’ (Section 1; Chapter 1). This is clearly evident in

99 the continuation and acceleration of the global climate crisis three decades after the dissolution of the USSR.

Along with the multifarious impacts of a changing ecosystem, ‘resource rich’ countries feed into, and suffer from, climate change in ways specific to the extraction, production, and transportation of primary commodities within their territories. Overall, ‘[t]hrough the extractivism economy, host Government and private corporate actors oversee the destruction of ecosystems, including through water pollution (e.g. mercuric and cyanide pollution), explosions, dust emissions, deforestation, the destruction of biodiversity and food security, and soil pollution’ (Achiume 2019: 14; Shiva 1993: xx; IACHR 2015: 149, 153; UNCCD 2017: 43, 128, 130, 164). In particular, land use change for industrial food production erodes soil fertility and monopolises key resources such as water to grow food for export, undermining food security especially for the rural population, and for women and their dependents in particular (Federici 2004: 70, 2011: 43-46; Hanieh 2015: 231-232; IACHR 2015: 168). The agriculture-based TNCs and their agribusiness model accelerate land degradation as ‘the industrial system … and trade … provide agriculture with the means of exhausting the soil’, whose ‘vitality’ is squandered as it is ‘carried by trade far beyond the bounds of a single country’, so that ‘all progress in increasing the fertility of the soil for a given time [e.g. via chemical fertilizers] is a progress towards ruining the more long-lasting sources of that fertility’ (Marx 1894/1991: 950, 949, 1867/1976: 638). Equally, these corporations have been at the forefront of the development and patenting of transgenic seeds to boost yields and crop resistance to pests (UNCTAD 2013: 63, Figure 12), giving rise to the ‘complex cycle of pests, pesticides, new pests, soil exhaustion, chemical fertilizers, and water pollution’ (Wallis 1993, quoted in Burkett 1999: 87) that characterises contemporary industrial agriculture and resulting in the massive loss of biodiversity (Shiva 1993: xvii, xx; Mies 1993: xxvi-xxvii; IACHR 2015: 152).

As a consequence, 1.3 billion small-scale farmers are left on ‘degrading agricultural land [and] exposed to climate stress’, increasing ‘the vulnerability of millions of people, especially the poor, women, and children’ and threatening the reproduction of ‘rural households - perhaps a fifth of the world’s population’ (UNCCD 2017: 8, 11, 286) for whom subsistence agriculture is the main source of nutrition. Since it is women who shoulder the overwhelming share of subsistence agriculture to guarantee the reproduction of this relative surplus population, land use changes for capital accumulation via primitive accumulation and the privatisation of the commons - themselves forms of mediation of the global process of accumulation - have catapulted women to the centre of processes of informalisation and precarisation, hence making them specifically vulnerable to the ravages of climate change

100 (Nellemann et al. 2011), while simultaneously placing them at the heart of resistance to capital. These include a combination of actions such as direct protests and legal recourse against land grabs, as well as reclaiming parts of the commons for production for use, the deployment of alternative systems of food growing through collaboration instead of competition, and the conservation of biodiversity via agroecology (Federici 2011: 51-53, 2012: 143; Klein 2014: 117-119, 432, fn. 26; The Journal of Peasant Studies Special Issue 2015; FAO 2019a: 109-111; Human Geography Special Issue 2020). Women’s

embodied experience of [land and resource] depletion motivates them to organize. Also, their gendered and place-based knowledge gives them the means and ideas to resist and oppose the practices of the industry, often through small, individual, daily actions. While the resistance [often] is not overt, it is significant nevertheless. Women lack the resources to organize on a big scale and are often opposed even within their own community. However, they keep on going, all across the globe (Caretta & Zaragocin 2020: 4).

In turn, however, in the name of mitigation and adaptation to climate change, capital encroaches on these ‘locally adapted, appropriate and sustainable coping strategies and responses’ in order to incorporate them into the boundless process of accumulation (Nellemann et al. 2011: 58), which risks precipitating a crisis of reproduction specifically for the relative surplus population - ‘perhaps a fifth of the world’s population’ (UNCCD 2017). In this perspective, with the rise of this relative surplus population and the overall weakening of organised labour, women’s everyday resistance to guarantee their, and their households’, social reproduction represents a crucial ‘social space’ of contentious politics (Bhattacharya 2017b; McNally 2017), particularly in ‘resource rich’ countries. As we shall see, women have been crucial to social reproduction and everyday forms of resistance to capital in Uzbekistan, too (Chapter 6).

In the next section, I highlight how the theoretical-methodological approach expounded here informs the dissertation’s problematisation of the literature on transition, as well as its radically different empirical analysis of developments in the FSU and Uzbekistan since 1991.

3. BEYOND EXCEPTIONALISM: THE FSU AND UZBEKISTAN AS ‘RESOURCE RICH’ COUNTRIES IN THE IDL

As reviewed in Chapter 1, transitology frames the transformation of the FSU as a transition from the authoritarian communism of the Soviet command economy to the ‘normality’ of

101 Western democratic capitalism. Replicating the methodological nationalism of the development literature, as all states face the same ‘external’ environment in the global market, uneven development must be the consequence of internal factors. As such, the constant failure of the FSU countries and Uzbekistan to live up to the literature’s ideal-type system is construed as the result of a lack of, or a partial and incomplete, transition, hence the need for more reforms. This failure is evident in the reprimarisation of the FSU economies and the authoritarianism of their states, as well as in the deteriorating living standards of the population in general, and women in particular, and the accelerating environmental destruction linked to primary commodity production. In transitology, capitalism’s gendered labour exploitation and ecological devastation are externally related to the process of accumulation in a system that is idealised as classless, gender-liberating, and eco-friendly.

In this perspective, transitology continues to exceptionalise the countries of the region as unable to shed their Soviet legacy and enter the era of the ‘end of history’. Crucially, while the literature links rent-seeking to raw material production for export - the predominant economic activity in the FSU economies - it never explains why, despite their different transition ‘paths’, all FSU countries including ‘renegade’ Uzbekistan have integrated into the IDL as primary commodity exporters, nor how this has defined their political economies since 1991 (RQ1; RQ2; RQ3). Instead, the literature turns ‘objective economic outcomes’ (raw materials exports, rents, ‘backward’ industrialisation) into ‘subjective political behaviour’ (rent-seeking, corruption) (Purcell 2010: 60), explaining neither. As a consequence, it is left with the ‘paradox’ of no transition and transformation (Chapter 1), essentially presenting the result of capitalist transformation as its negation. Specifically for Uzbekistan, developmental transitology characterises Uzbekistan as a ‘miracle’ of successful industrialisation but equally externalises labour, gender, and the use of natural use-values from the country’s capitalist transformation, while failing to address the fundamental question as to why, if the Uzbek model was such a success, Uzbekistan continues to be a primary commodity exporter in the IDL.

Building on Iñigo Carrera’s pioneering work along with the CICP scholars, as well as on insights from feminist and ‘green’ Marxists, the dissertation adopts a novel approach that theorises the transformation in the FSU and Uzbekistan during the past three decades within the global process of capital accumulation. As such, national differentiation in the Global South since the 1960s (‘uneven development’) is explained according to these states’ participation in the IDL either as sources of relatively cheap and highly disciplined labour for simplified production or as sources of appropriation of the ground-rent largely

102 inflowing into their territories in virtue of their raw material exports. The latter is the case for ‘resource rich’ countries in the Global South, including the FSU and Uzbekistan since 1991. Put differently, national diversity is not the result of the underdevelopment of capitalism in these states, but the national form of realisation of the ultimate unity of global capital accumulation in raw material exporting countries (‘unity of the diverse’), which the state mediates through its policies, institutions and bureaucracies in order to guarantee the accumulation of the total social capital.

Therefore, any explanation of the FSU republics’ transformation (‘transition’) since independence must account for their incorporation into the IDL as primary commodity producers, hence as sources of appropriation of the extraordinary wealth in the form of ground-rent in their territories. Equally, the diversity of transition ‘paths’ between the FSU countries and the evolving forms of these ‘paths’ within them during the past three decades must be explained within this fundamental unity, thus in relation to the fluctuating magnitude of ground-rent available in their national economies in line with conditions on the world market. Ultimately, this means surpassing transitology’s exceptionalisation of the FSU as the ideal-type opposite of its normative democratic capitalism, embracing instead a new research agenda that investigates the diverse national forms that the underlying unity of global capital accumulation assumes in the FSU region in general, and Uzbekistan in particular.

First, far from being exceptional, the FSU countries exhibit the same qualitative form of economic concentration in raw material production and ‘backward’ industrialisation via ground-rent appropriation, in line with ‘resource rich’ countries in the Global South. While their extractive industries operate on the world market, manufacturing capitals in the FSU can only accumulate at the average rate of profit via the appropriation of a mass of extraordinary wealth (ground-rent) largely inflowing into their national territories (pace dependency theory) by dint of the international sale of primary commodities (Chapter 3). What set Uzbekistan’s initial transition ‘path’ apart from other FSU states was the centrality and specificity of cotton to the country’s economy, including the high level of coordination needed for cotton production due to the crop’s labour- and water-intensity. In essence, as an agrarian landlord-state, Uzbekistan had to put land to production in line with the seasonal alternation on which agriculture depends, or else risk losing cotton rents altogether. Despite this, the country has displayed the same qualitative form of raw material export orientation and ‘backward’ accumulation in the thirty years under investigation, as do all other FSU states (Chapter 4).

103 Second, this form of incorporation has been mediated by processes of primitive accumulation and privatisation of the commons (decollectivisation) that have transformed a large share of the population in the FSU into relative surplus for the requirements of capital accumulation, as evident in the rise of informality, rural poverty, and outmigration throughout the region. The class stratification along national/geographic and skill lines of the working class in FSU republics, particularly with the rise of a vast relative surplus population, eroded class solidarity, explaining the relative weakness of organised labour, which the authoritarian state keeps in check through various modes of control and, when needed, outright repression (Chapters 3-4).

Third, as analysed in the case study of Uzbekistan (Chapters 5-6), given the centrality of land use to capital accumulation, women’s ‘double burden’ for the reproduction of the relative surplus population escalated, particularly via subsistence agriculture, placing them at the centre of everyday resistance to capital. This is evident in their collaborative approach to face their overbearing ‘double burden’, as well as their engagement in organic agriculture to preserve soil fertility and the conservation of biodiversity in the context of climate change. In turn, however, as state policies and institutions have continued mediating the global process of capital accumulation, environmental degradation has escalated as a result despite, and often owing to, the introduction of new technologies. Likewise, capital’s encroachment on women’s survival strategies in order to incorporate them into the boundless process of accumulation risks precipitating a crisis of reproduction.

Through the novel theoretical-methodological approach expounded in this chapter, the dissertation can offer a radically different empirical analysis of developments in the FSU and Uzbekistan in the three decades since independence, presented as the specific national forms taken by the underlying unity of global capital accumulation in the region (RQ1, RQ2, RQ3). This is the subject of the empirical chapters (3-6).

4. CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I presented an alternative account of national differentiation in the Global South with the rise of a NIDL since the 1960s, as pioneered by Iñigo Carrera and other CICP scholars, along with insights from feminist and ‘green’ Marxists. With the computerisation of machine-tools and the robotisation of the assembly line, different tasks in the process of large-scale industrial production could be geographically relocated according to the newly differentiated productive characteristics, hence costs of reproduction, of the collective industrial labourer. The Asian ‘tigers’ and, since the 1990s,

104 China, underwent rapid industrialisation since their segment of the global working class possessed specific productive characteristics that made them particularly suitable for work as appendages of the machinery, or in the manual assembly of parts and components. Most other countries, instead, including the FSU and Uzbekistan after 1991, were incorporated into the IDL on the basis of CIDL, that is, as raw materials exporters due to the relatively favourable conditions for the production of primary commodities in their territories. The policies, institutions, and bureaucracies of all these states mediated the IDL by reproducing their material conditions of integration therein, namely the reproduction of a relatively cheap and highly disciplined labour force in the ‘tigers’ and China, and land use for the production of primary commodities in ‘resource rich’ countries, to which the FSU and Uzbekistan unequivocally belong.

As such, the economies of the latter group have been dominated by extractive industries as well as ‘small’ manufacturing capitals accumulating at the average rate of profit via ground- rent appropriation and producing for the domestic market (‘backward’ industrialisation). As processes of primitive accumulation and privatisation of the commons mediated the radical change to land use for the production of raw materials, the mass of the population expelled from the land as a result was turned into surplus for the requirements of capital accumulation, since it could not be absorbed by extractive and ‘backward’ industries. This engendered informality, rural poverty and migratory flows, with specific gender- differentiated effects that thrusted women to the forefront of work, particularly food production, for the reproduction of the relative surplus population, while simultaneously placing them at the core of everyday resistance to capital. In turn, capital’s encroachment on women’s survival strategies to incorporate them into the boundless accumulation process risks precipitating a veritable crisis of reproduction for the relative surplus population.

Chapter 2 moved from a higher level of generality, where it investigated national differentiation in the Global South since the 1960s (Level 1), to a more concrete level in order to theorise the state’s mediation of the ground-rent form in ‘resource rich’ countries (Level 2). Chapter 3 ascends to the next level of generality (Level 3) as it dissects the concrete determinations of the FSU states’ mediation of the ground-rent form since 1991 in order to address RQ1.

105 CHAPTER 3 ‘Unity of the Diverse’: The Post-Soviet Space in the International Division of Labour

0. INTRODUCTION

Chapter 2 argued that, since attaining independence in 1991, the FSU republics including Uzbekistan have been incorporated into the IDL as raw material exporters, in line with ‘resource rich’ countries in the Global South. Ascending to a more concrete level of generality (Level 3), Chapter 3 investigates why this has been the case and how the FSU states’ mediation of the ground-rent form radically transformed their political economies in the past three decades. By so doing, the chapter provides a cogent and exhaustive answer to RQ1.

Section 1 explains that the FSU countries and Uzbekistan integrated into the IDL as primary commodity exporters due to the relatively favourable conditions for raw material production/extraction within their independent territories, as well as the unsuitability of their fractions of the working class to produce for the world market, being relatively expensive and undisciplined. At the most fundamental, this process of integration mediated the shift from the Fordist conditions of industrial production and indiscriminate reproduction of the working class during Soviet times, to the ground-rent subsidisation of capital accumulation and the simultaneous differentiation in the costs of reproduction of the working class (class stratification) evident in the rise of a vast relative surplus population in the independent FSU republics. In this context, as Section 2 shows, despite their diverse ‘paths’ of transition, incorporation as primary commodity producers/exporters defined the qualitative unity of the FSU states’ and Uzbekistan’s political economy since 1991, namely reprimarisation of the economy, raw material export orientation, and ‘backward’ industrialisation. Within this qualitative unity, differences between the performance of the various FSU countries derived from the varying magnitude of ground-rent available in their economies, as reflected in the fluctuating international prices of their raw materials,26 whether mediated through the ‘liberalisation’ of the low-oil-price decade of the 1990s or via the ‘recentralisation’ in the wake of the Chinese-demand-led commodity supercycle from the 2000s onward. As Section 3 reveals, given ‘backward’ industrialisation’s limited scale, the majority of the population in the FSU countries has been turned into relative surplus for the requirements of capital accumulation, as evident in their struggle to survive amid un(der)employment, precarity,

26 As explained in the Introductory Chapter, in all empirical chapters (3-6), I use the available figures on total export revenue in USD as indicators of ground-rent circulation in the FSU and Uzbekistan.

106 and poverty, as well as rural (including international) outmigration. Divisions in the working class have weakened class solidarity, resulting in generally localised forms of class struggle in the context of plummeting unionisation, while, for its part, the authoritarian state has mediated conflict and, in case of a perceived threat, repressed labour organising to guarantee the process of accumulation of the total social capital on its territory. The conclusion summarises the chapter’s main findings.

1. THE POST-SOVIET STATES AS RAW MATERIAL EXPORTERS IN THE IDL

As Chapter 1 details, transitology construes the Soviet authoritarian command economy and Western democratic free-market capitalism as two irreconcilable ideal-type systems: the former’s defeat in the Cold War as sealed by the dissolution of the Soviet Union implied the need for it to transition to the latter, now as fifteen independent republics. While the debate as to whether the USSR was a genuinely communist alternative to Western capitalism is beyond the scope of this dissertation (Introductory Chapter), it is incontrovertible that, in the euphoria of the West’s ‘victory’ in the Cold War, the transition literature omits a number of similarities between the two Blocs as related to the general material conditions of industrial production and social reproduction, particularly in the decades immediately following the end of WWII.

First, Soviet communist utopianism notwithstanding, both systems were, at heart, modernisation projects to which industrialisation was central (Hoffmann 2000: 256-258; McMichael 2016: 49-50). Second, different degrees of efficiency notwithstanding, modernisation via industrialisation viewed and used ‘nature’ as a factor of production on both sides of the Iron Curtain (Chapters 1-2). Third, the revolution in the conditions of production in large-scale industry since the 1960s (Chapter 2) directly impinged on trade relations between the USSR and the West, with the former increasingly exporting raw materials to, and importing industrial machinery from, the latter. Put differently, the Soviets were lagging behind the ‘classic’ industrialised countries specifically in the large-scale industrial technologies that defined the rise of the NIDL, such as microprocessors, computer numerical control (CNC) machine-tools and flexible manufacturing systems, with the ‘quality gap’ being ‘widest for consumer goods, including electronics’ and cars, explaining the Union’s specialisation in primary commodity exports (World Bank 1996: 3; CIA 1989: 9-11, 19, 23, 29, 33; Shelburne & Pidufala 2006: 6).

Despite mutual suspicions and the fact that the USSR pursued economic self-sufficiency as the basis of political independence, trade between the communist and the capitalist blocs

107 increased significantly from the 1950s through to the 1980s, ‘a trend accompanied by sharply deteriorating terms of trade and rising debt across the Soviet-led zone’ (Moore 2018: 241, fn. 5), where growth levels had been steadily declining since the late 1960s (White 1986: 466). The Union mostly exported raw materials to the West, especially oil and natural gas, but also metal ores, timber, and cotton (Herman 1964; CIA 1982, 1985), in order to earn hard currency necessary to import billions of USD in industrial machinery and technology (CIA 1982: 17ff.). ‘The dramatic surge in Soviet trade with the West during the 1970s resulted largely from a growing dependence by the USSR on foreign machinery, technology, and farm products’ (ibid.: 1). By 1990, primary commodities ‘account[ed] for just under 80% of Soviet exports to the West’ (Bradshaw & Connolly 2016: 713; Kagarlitsky 2008: 300; Ermolaev 2017). Succinctly put, with all due provisos, the USSR was integrated into the IDL on the basis of the CIDL. At best, transitology mentions this fact in passing as the ‘context’ of development, focusing instead on ‘initial conditions’, policy implementation, institutional development, and the corruption of the post-Soviet elites to explain the alleged underdevelopment of democratic capitalism (the ‘end of history’) in the FSU (Chapter 1).

In the literature, history for the newly-independent FSU countries starts at its end in 1991, except for constantly rearing its ugly head in the form of a Soviet legacy impossible to shake off, hence the need for more reforms in a permanently failing transition toward an ideal-type democratic capitalism that, nonetheless, already by the 2000s appeared to be in deep crisis in the West itself (Chapter 2). The latter is a point that the transition literature ignores altogether, as it fails to frame the revolution in large-scale industrial production, the end of the USSR, and the integration of the FSU into the IDL on the basis of the CIDL as part and parcel of the same overarching unity of global capital accumulation. In other words, the subject of the GPE is not the state but capital; only by starting from the accumulation of relative surplus value on a world scale can the analysis capture the unity behind the national diversity engendered by the revolutionary changes that have transformed the GPE since the 1960s. In this, the FSU republics including Uzbekistan are no exceptions (Chapter 2).

1.1. Before ‘transition’: Decentralisation, fragmentation, dissolution

In the post-WWII era, much like in the ‘classic’ industrial countries, the territorial organisation of industrial production in the USSR was based on the technological levels of development in communication (telegram) and transportation (railways) at the time, though on a much larger national area. Equally, within the specificity of the planned economy, ‘[m]ost sectors of Soviet industry were set up from the start on the basis of Fordist technologies’ (Kagarlitsky 2008: 278) in which the worker’s skills were central to the process of production

108 (Chapter 2). The complete centralisation of Soviet total social ‘capital’, mediated through the collective ownership of industry and land as well as the ideology of communism, enabled the Union’s fast industrialisation and translated into labour’s relatively strong bargaining power therein (Gleason 2003: 21; Iñigo Carrera 2013: Chapter 4), as evident in full employment, job security, high levels of unionisation, and widespread welfare provisions (Arnot 1988; World Bank 1995; Moghadam 1996: 330; Robertson 2010: 175; Visser et al. 2015: 521). Succinctly put, ‘[i]n the USSR, as in other industrial economies, families derive[d] benefits from the state’s social security system’ (McAuley 1982: 194). This did not mean that labour unions were democratic institutions during Soviet times, as they largely acted as a ‘transmission belt’ between the party nomenklatura and the working class (Kubicek 2002: 607; Ashwin & Clarke 2002; Mrost 2017); however, as much as the plan’s production targets, this transmission belt delivered plentiful social services that, within full employment, guaranteed the indiscriminate reproduction of the working class much like in other industrialised states. Crucially, within these material conditions, workers exercised a relatively strong control over production processes (Arnot 1988: Chapter 2, esp. 32ff.; Filtzer 1992; Trevisani 2018), so much so that ‘[t]he infrequency of (illegal) strikes [was] matched by the prevalence of slacking and slowdowns when workers [were] dissatisfied or simply [saw] no material incentive to work harder’ (Portes 1976, quoted in Dyker 1982: 67; Holubenko 1975).

In this context, the social wages of collective industrial and agricultural workers rose for decades (McAuley 1982: 206, Table 8.3), both those that were ‘state determined, like health, education, transport or subsidised food’ and those ‘determined by the enterprise, for example housing, cultural and sporting amenities, holiday facilities, access to sanatoria and so on’ (Arnot 1988: 36; Morrison 2008: 44-45). In the countryside, the key forms of collective enterprises were kolkhozy (collective farms) and sovkhozy (state farms) that organised and maintained ‘the rural social infrastructure’ (Spoor 2004: 5; Spoor & Visser 2004: 519; Abdullaev et al. 2005: 104). The former were ‘multi-village collective farms, where production output and all assets (both productive and social, except land) were owned jointly by the collective’, while the latter were ‘state farms, where production output and all assets were owned by the state’ (Csáki & Lerman 1992: 9; Trevisani 2010: 67-68, esp. fn. 72), and which paid fixed wages to their workers as in other state enterprises (Kandiyoti 2002a: 11).

Although all land in the USSR was nationalised (Kucherov 1962: 377), it was ‘given to the kolkhozy for “eternal use”’ (Vucinich 1949: 11), so that the vast rural proletariat especially in the largely rural Central Asian republics was guaranteed access to it through ‘various forms of usufruct rights to common land’ such as land use for food production and livestock

109 grazing. This included access ‘to personal plots in compensation for their collective labour obligations … [via] some assistance with inputs such as tractors and fertilizer’ (Kandiyoti 2002a: 32, 11; Craumer 1992: 166; Marnie & Micklewright 1994: 405) thanks to ‘the symbiosis between the large-scale farm and the [household] smallholdings’ (Spoor 2004: 13). In short, ‘state and collective farms were much more than a production unit … [they] comprised a rural community … [providing m]edical care, housing, day care, schooling, and subsidized food’ (Wegren 1998: 80), along with ‘gas and water delivery [as well as maintenance of infrastructures] … and cultural events. They were social institutions, embracing practically all aspects of social and economic life’ (Spoor & Visser 2004: 519).

While the USSR’s centralised total social ‘capital’ largely continued producing within the material conditions of industrial Fordism and ideological communism that guaranteed the indiscriminate reproduction of the working class, technological developments had been revolutionising the material conditions of production in large-scale industry since the 1960s, leading to the fragmentation of the productive characteristics (‘subjectivity’) of the industrial workforce, hence to the diversification in its costs of reproduction (Chapter 2). As argued in Chapter 2, the net result of this radical transformation was the increase in the rate of accumulation of relative surplus value and the ensuing decrease in the overall labour costs for capital. Competition between large-scale industrial capitals mediated this emerging NIDL, driving the huge, and growing, levels of capital concentration and centralisation evident in the rise of MNCs/TNCs. Clearly, while the latter led the staggering pace of technological development, investment, and trade on the world market, the Soviet centralised total social ‘capital’ could not fragment the ‘subjectivity’ of its industrial workforce in order to shift from its indiscriminate, to its differentiated, reproduction, lest it undermine the communist ideology at the very heart of the USSR’s raison d’être (Iñigo Carrera 2013: 130). As Filtzer (1992: xi) perceptibly puts it,

the exercise of [workers’] considerable control over the way in which they execute their labour power … has become a fundamental source of crisis in the Soviet system. Indeed, the problem facing Gorbachev and the market reformers in today’s USSR is precisely how to change the workers’ relationship to the labour process, forcing them to cede greater power to management (emphasis added).

This explains the growing technological gap as well as worsening terms of trade between the Soviets and the ‘West’. Eventually, the confluence of the evolving NIDL and the low-oil- price decade of the 1980s, which deprived the already struggling Soviet economy of 20 billion USD per year in hard currency revenues (Gaidar 2007: 5; Reynolds 1998), ushered

110 in a period of terminal crisis for the USSR that would result in its demise. Crucially, while the transition literature largely focuses on 1991 as the beginning of the ‘end of history’, most of the symptoms of the coming collapse - the combination of industrial manufacturing crisis, rising unemployment, shortages, and the increasing importance of household food production - had clearly emerged at least since the perestroika years. Between 1987 and 1989, for example, ‘1.6 million people lost their jobs because of the closing of failing enterprises’ (Moskoff 1992: 21). In the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) alone - one of the Union’s most industrialised European republics - the total number of industrial workers fell from 23,095,000 to 20,998,000 between 1985 and 1990 (Suhara 2017: 43, Table 3.5).

Mass strikes broke out as a consequence of the collapse in living standards for the working class (Section 3), while weakness at the ‘centre’ also found expression in the incipient legitimacy crisis of communist ideology and the rise of nationalism in the ‘periphery’, including a series of irredentist movements as well as ‘ethnic’ tensions and conflicts (White 1986: 468; Robinson 1995: 174; Kremenyuk 1996: 153). In this context, more food was being grown on household plots since the unemployed fell back on subsistence agriculture as a safety net (Banerji 1994: 1153; Visser et al. 2015: 518), so the issue of ‘hidden unemployment’ in the countryside had already surfaced in the 1980s especially, but not solely, in the more rural republics such as the UzSSR (Lubin 1984: 105; Karimov 1993a: 230; Leonard 2011: 115; INT-26).

In short, Soviet total social ‘capital’ was experiencing a process of precipitous decentralisation. In simple terms, Soviet manufacturing was collapsing, as evident in widespread enterprise bankruptcies, closures, and plummeting overall production, resulting in strong centrifugal forces that, before the ‘transition’ even started, would eventually lead to the fragmentation of the USSR and its workforce into fifteen independent republics and fifteen working class fractions - now divided by newly-upgraded state borders and newly- cemented national identities (Mau 2002: 40-44; Iñigo Carrera 2013).

1.2. ‘Unity of the diverse’: Different ‘paths’ of transition, same form of integration

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, despite the wide diversity in terms of reform speed, sequence, and design (Chapter 1), the transition package continued mediating this overall process of decentralisation within the now-independent republics, including Uzbekistan, resulting in the acceleration of manufacturing collapse and the parallel reprimarisation of their economies. On the one hand, as the USSR once did, the FSU states

111 contained within their territories relatively favourable conditions for the production/extraction of raw materials to satisfy global solvent demand, now according to their national resource endowments. On the other hand, their portions of the global working class possessed radically opposite productive characteristics than those found in the Asian ‘tigers’ and China; around the same time of the USSR’s dissolution, the latter was rapidly becoming a new and almost ‘unlimited’ source of relatively cheap and highly disciplined labour power, spurring its vertiginous industrialisation in the past three decades (Starosta 2016: 100, fn. 14; World Bank 2013b: 76-77).

By contrast, even fragmented and with rapidly deteriorating working conditions and declining unionisation, former Soviet labour was highly unionised, relatively expensive, and relatively undisciplined. The ‘heavily unionized labor markets’ inherited by the FSU had ‘much higher [union membership] than in most high-income industrial or developing countries’, along with high ‘nonwage labour costs’, that is, social wages and benefits (World Bank 1995: 84, 123; Ashwin & Clarke 2002) to which, for instance, 90% of the Russian workforce was still entitled, as compared to 19% in China (World Bank 2002: xxi). Not only were the wages of former Soviet workers relatively higher than their Chinese counterparts’, but the former were known for their ‘lax labor discipline’ and absenteeism, including due to alcoholism (CIA 1989: 9; Morrison 2008: 72-73; Miller 2016: 61, 116). Even in cutting edge large-scale industrial sectors such as consumer electronics at the forefront of the ongoing development of the NIDL, relatively highly educated former Soviet workers could not compete with their Chinese peers (Hill 1998: 501); in short, the objectification of tacit knowledge - previously attained through long on-the-job training and learning-by-doing practice - as an attribute of computerised industrial machinery (Chapter 2), meant that the relative cheapness and high discipline of Asian workers were more suitable for the accumulation of the total social capital than the higher levels of education (hence costs) of the former Soviet working class.

The crucial point here is that the different policies and institutions of ‘shock therapy’ or ‘gradualism’ - the various combinations of macroeconomic stabilisation, privatisation, and price and trade liberalisation - were the political-economic forms of mediation of the FSU’s process of integration into the IDL. They did not determine the transition; they mediated it within the material conditions of capital accumulation in the world market in the 1990s. Within these conditions, only demand for the raw materials in the now independent FSU republics remained solvent, due to the relatively favourable conditions of primary commodity production within their territories. No such solvent demand existed for technologically backward former Soviet manufacturers, while the relatively expensive and undisciplined

112 FSU fragments of the working class were fundamentally unsuited for world market production. As a result, in the 1990s, the different ‘paths’ of transition continued mediating the process of decentralisation evident in the collapse of manufacturing and reprimarisation of the economy, along with the ensuing shift to the steep differentiation in the costs of reproduction of the working class (class stratification) (Section 3).

In the energy-rich republics, ‘liberalisation’ and privatisation secured the continuation of oil and gas exports to hard currency markets, as well as much needed loans and investment flows into the cash-strapped economy, particularly to the energy industry, at a time of low oil prices (RQ1). In the cotton growing republics, specifically Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan (Jones Luong & Weinthal 2001: 385-386), within a similar collapse of manufacturing though from a lower level of industrialisation, state intervention (the Uzbek and Turkmen ‘models’) guaranteed the labour mobilisation, input production (e.g. fuel and fertilizers), and irrigation coordination necessary to produce cotton for world market export, as the main source of hard currency for the economy (Chapter 4).27 In other words, as an agrarian landlord-state, Uzbekistan could only accrue cotton rents by putting the land to production according to the natural cycle of seasonal alternation crucial to agriculture, or risk losing all rents for the year (Iñigo Carrera 2007; Purcell 2010: 94), explaining the reason behind the introduction of the ‘Uzbek model’ (RQ2/Chapter 4). Whereas FSU mining landlord-states ‘liberalised’ in the 1990s, agrarian landlord-states ‘centralised’ the cotton sector and, to the extent possible, other economic activities in order to secure cotton exports, hence rents. Despite their different ‘paths’ of transition, however, the FSU countries including Uzbekistan were being incorporated into the IDL as raw materials exporters (‘unity of the diverse’), turning into ‘sources of appropriation of the extraordinary profits available there in the form of ground- rent’ (Grinberg 2013: 184) in line with ‘resource rich’ countries in the Global South (RQ1). As such, ground-rent is crucial to explaining the qualitative unity of the FSU states’ form of integration into the IDL (reprimarisation of the economy, raw material export orientation) and of their ‘backward’ industrialisation (via ground-rent subsidisation) since independence, regardless of individual capitals’ legal status (e.g. state-owned, private, JV) or ‘nationality’ (e.g. inter/national, JV).28

27 The Turkmen model is beyond the scope of this dissertation, but see e.g. Khalova et al. (1999) and Stronski (2017). 28 Another crucial part of this qualitative unity between the FSU states has been the tendency to concentrate within their territories populations that have become relative surplus for the requirements of capital accumulation. This is examined in Section 3.

113 Equally, in the three decades since 1991, ground-rent has also defined the quantitative diversity in the political-economies of FSU republics in line with the fluctuating prices of their raw materials or, simply put, the amount of hard currency accruing to each FSU country from the sale of their primary commodities on the world market. So, the steep rise in international commodity prices from the late-1990s onward provided the material conditions for the ‘recentralisation’ of capital in the extractive industries, particularly oil and gas, hence of the energy rents available to subsidise ‘backward’ industrial capital in the region (RQ1). As Pomfret (2010: 23) puts it, ‘[v]ariations in economic performance during the 2000s were overwhelmingly determined by energy endowments’, that is, by the different magnitude of ground-rent available in each republic. The fundamental difference between, for example, the Russian Federation and Uzbekistan in the decades since independence, then, lies in the former’s vastly larger natural resources, especially in oil and gas, compared to the latter’s (quantitative diversity), yet within the same qualitative unity of accumulation as both are integrated into the IDL as raw material exporters, thus exhibit the same ‘backward’ form of industrialisation. Qualitative unity and quantitative diversity, however, are not the outcome of a lack of, or a partial and incomplete, transition, as the literature would have it (Chapter 1); rather, they are the concrete forms taken by the full development of global accumulation in the FSU region.

In Section 2, I provide an overview of how the theoretical-methodological approach adopted in this dissertation (Chapter 2) helps to explain national diversity in the FSU countries over the past three decades within the global unity of capital accumulation, thus problematising transitology’s exceptionalisation of the FSU (Chapters 1-2).

2. GROUND-RENT AND ‘BACKWARD’ INDUSTRIALISATION IN THE FSU

As reviewed in Chapter 1, during the 1990s, the transition literature anticipated that the top reformers - namely, those countries that would apply the orthodox package to embrace the ‘normal’ development of democratic capitalism - would achieve ‘sustainable and significant economic growth’ (World Bank 1993b: 11). When this did not come to pass, transitology blamed the ‘crony capitalism’ of rent-seekers, similarly to the way in which the development literature had pointed the finger at crony capitalists for the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Neither literature, however, explained how the same elites responsible for rapid industrialisation (Asian ‘tigers’) or rapid reform (‘shock therapy’) could suddenly morph from successful bureaucrats or top reformers into cronies. Equally, when negatively exceptional Uzbekistan returned to growth faster than most other FSU states, including top reformers, transitology responded with the Uzbek growth ‘puzzle’, dismissing the possibility that what

114 it had defined as bad policies could have had anything to do with better outcomes. Clearly, Uzbekistan had grown in spite of the Uzbek model (e.g. IMF 1998).

During the 2000s, the transition literature anticipated that long-term economic performance would depend on the extent of each country’s long-term structural reforms; instead, sustained growth resumed across the region in the wake of soaring international commodity prices due to Chinese-led demand (Chapter 2). So, again, the literature theorised this as a ‘Eurasian growth paradox’ (Åslund & Jenish 2007), as the region grew despite the continuation of rent-seeking within weak institutions (‘state capture’), resulting in what transitology exceptionalises as neopatrimonial regimes or authoritarian state capitalism, namely bad copies of their ideal-type counterpart, democratic capitalism (Chapter 1). In short, as reality repeatedly failed to conform with the literature’s normative framework of democratic capitalism, transitology resorted to a series of ‘puzzles’ and ‘paradoxes’ instead of actually explaining the reasons behind developments in the FSU and Uzbekistan.

However, by the 2010s it was clear that, as Pomfret (2010: 23) concludes in relation to the Central Asian republics,

[e]xpectations that economic performance would be correlated with the speed and extent of transition were not borne out in the 1990s. … Expectations that longer-term growth rates would depend upon economic policies have also not been borne out in the second decade since independence. Variations in economic performance during the 2000s were overwhelmingly determined by energy endowments.

This section shows how the dissertation’s theoretical-methodological approach can explain the reason behind such performance during the past thirty years, revealing transitology’s ‘puzzles’ and ‘paradoxes’ to be of the literature’s own making. The analysis is broadly divided between (a) the low-commodity-price decade of the 1990s and (b) the 2000s until today, during which period international prices for raw materials rose on the back of the Chinese-demand-led supercycle to around the mid-2010s, fluctuating at lower yet historically relatively high levels thereafter (Chapter 2; Figure 3.1).29 In this way, this account explains the qualitative unity (ground-rent bearing raw material exports, ‘backward’ industrialisation) behind the quantitative diversity (ground-rent magnitude in line with commodity prices) in the FSU countries since 1991 (RQ1). Uzbekistan’s specific diversity

29 The dissertation stops at the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic.

115 within this unity, including the country’s choice of its own ‘gradual’ transition ‘path’ in the 1990s (the ‘Uzbek model’), is analysed in detail in Chapters 4-6 (RQ2; RQ3).

Figure 3.1. Selected International Commodity Prices in USD (1989-2019) Legend: bbl = barrel; mmbtu = million British Thermal Unit (approx. 28m3); troy oz = troy ounce (approx. 31 grams) Source: own elaboration based on World Bank data (data set in Appendix 4).

2.1. The 1990s: Decentralisation, manufacturing collapse, and economic reprimarisation

Following the turmoil of the 1980s, most FSU countries embraced a ‘modified form’ or another of the original Polish ‘shock therapy’ reform package (Sachs 1994: 267). This was neither imposed nor imported; the Fordist Soviet command economy was literally bankrupt (World Bank 1993a: 1-2; Reynolds 1998; Tikhomirov 2001) - low oil prices in the 1980s had brought the crisis into even sharper relief - and so was the communist ideology emanating from, and underpinning it, which had inspired countries in the Global South around the world for decades (Chang 2003: 13; Dahi & Munif 2011: 326; Connell & Dados 2014: 123). Despite the variety in the speed (revolutionary ‘shock therapy’ vs. evolutionary ‘gradualism’), design, and sequencing of reforms, the net result throughout the region was a collapse in manufacturing (deindustrialisation) and agricultural output, the reprimarisation of the economy, and the differentiation in the costs of reproduction of the working class

116 (class stratification) via the mass privatisation of economic activity and the decollectivisation of agriculture.

Specifically, the different reform packages continued mediating the ongoing process of decentralisation of social capital now at the level of the newly independent republics, manifesting itself in strong centrifugal forces therein or, as one observer dubbed it in the case of the Russian Federation, ‘a collapsing state … with an industrial structure poorly suited for a market economy’ (Frye 2010: 171-172). Thus, in Russia, the ‘sixteen autonomous regions and subregional units [were] reaching for greater independence - the more so the greater their resource riches’ (Fischer 1992: 78; Clarke et al. 1995: 7; Olcott 2004: 8; Robertson 2010: 149-152). The same dynamics were at work in Kazakhstan’s oil rich regions, where governors were pushing ‘for an increase in official levers of control over the economies within their jurisdiction’ (Jones Luong 2004b: 203, 194-196, 209). Rising nationalism and religiosity (Islam) - including ‘the re-emergence of pre-Soviet norms’ (Stefes & Wooden 2009: 23) and the trend of ‘re-traditionalisation’ that emphasised the foreign (read: Western) origins of ideas such as women’s liberation - were all forms of ideological mediation of this process of decentralisation; in some cases, this exploded into violence in the context of the overall weakness of the ‘centre’, with Tajikistan’s civil war and the war in Chechnya being among the most tragic examples thereof (Ilkhamov 2004: 160).

Throughout the FSU region, the net result of decentralisation was the overall collapse of output in manufacturing and agriculture to ‘40-45 percent of its pretransition level’ a decade later (World Bank 2002: 6; Marangos 2004: 229; Roháč 2013: 71; Popov & Chowdhury 2016), as well as the radical transformation of the productive structure from manufacturing to extractive industries. But ‘[p]erhaps the most visible sign of transition everywhere [was] the large-scale transfer of previously publicly owned assets into the hands of private agents’ (Mitra & Yemtsov 2006: 15), particularly via the privatisation of industry and the decollectivisation of agriculture. Clearly, workers bore the brunt of a transition that, throughout the region, turned into a ‘blessing for the few’ amid the misery of the many (Buccellato & Mickiewicz 2009; Clarke 2002: 272-273). Underemployment became the new normal within ‘the standard trade-off between unemployment and underpayment with wage arrears or significant delays in wage payments’ as in the Russian Federation (Gilpenson 2001: 25). Wage arrears and even non-payment were used ‘to strangle inflation and achieve IMF targets’ (Depoy 1996: 1149), effectively socialising the costs of transition, as state policies and institutions mediated the radical shift from the indiscriminate reproduction of the working class to class stratification, most evident in the rise of a vast relative surplus population. Thus, contrary to the literature’s ideal-type democratic capitalism as

117 development for all, these states’ politics have been social forms of mediation of the class struggle, with class as the foundational divide in the capitalist system (Section 3).

Clearly, the varying degrees of industrialisation of each country at independence (Zettelmeyer 1998; Alam & Banerji 2000; Gleason 2003: Chapters 2, 7; Broome 2010: 69- 70) influenced the ensuing transformation, with the historically more industrialised European republics (e.g. Russia) experiencing a marked shift from industry to services, whereas in the less industrialised non-European republics (e.g. Central Asia) the change was from a generally lower level of manufacturing to agriculture and services (EBRD 1999: 88-89; World Bank 2002: 5-6). The general trend, however, was one of output contraction and reorientation towards primary commodity production for export. In the Russian Federation, ‘the share of industry in GDP fell from about ½ in 1990 to about ⅓ in the mid 1990s, whereas within industry itself the share of the primary sector (fuel, energy, steel and non-ferrous metals) in the total industrial output increased from 25% to over 50%’ (Popov & Chowdhury 2016: 2).30 In other words, there was little to no solvent demand for former-Soviet manufacturers, which could not compete with the level of concentration and centralisation of ‘normal’ international capitals such as MNCs/TNCs (Chapter 2), while the relatively expensive and undisciplined portions of the labour force in the FSU republics could not produce profitably for the world market. As a consequence, post-Soviet social manufacturing capital largely disintegrated, as evident in the extent of asset stripping throughout the region (World Bank 2002: xviii, 34); a significant share of former-Soviet enterprises were now literally worth more as scrap metal than as productive assets.

The outcome was widespread deindustrialisation and the collapse of output (Karimov 1993a, 1995; Gleason 2003: 39, Table 3; Klein 2008: 237; Pirani 2011: 501; Chenoy & Kumar 2017: 170-171), while imports soared to compensate for the slump in production of Soviet consumer goods whose demand had plummeted against Western competition (Hill 1998: 495, 500; Rutland 1999: 193). Instead, demand remained solvent for primary commodities from the FSU region, so economic activity increasingly concentrated in extractive industries, to which investment, including international capital in the form of FDIs,

30 In what follows, I often use Russia as an example of the broader dynamics at play in the FSU. Russia’s is a particularly useful example since it (a) typifies the experience of the energy-rich republics; and (b), at least initially, neoliberal and developmental transitologists unanimously viewed its ‘shock therapy’ package in radical opposition to the Uzbek model (Chapter 1). While Russia is vastly richer in resources than the other FSU countries (Fischer 1992), it exhibits the same traits of raw material export orientation and ‘backward’ industrialisation found in the rest of the region, including Uzbekistan (qualitative unity). The main reason for variations in its performance, then, lies in its vastly larger natural resources and their fluctuating international prices, that is, in the changing magnitude of ground-rent available in its national space of accumulation (quantitative diversity).

118 overwhelmingly flowed in line with fluctuating commodity prices, as has been the case ever since (Brown 1994: 62-63; Reznikova 1996: 72-73 & 92; Rutland 1999; World Bank 2002: 6, 2013b, 2017e; Campos & Kinoshita 2003: 16-17, 20-21; Rumer 2005: 9-10, 15-18; Ahrend 2005: 591, 595; Spechler 2008: 100; Broome 2010: 123; Pomfret 2010; McGlinchey 2011: 166; Pirani 2011: 501; EBRD 2012; OECD 2013a: 15, 17, 2015: 9; UNCTAD 2019: 75).

Significantly, while the oil industry in the various FSU countries was also privatised during the mass privatisations of the 1990s (World Bank 2002: 76), it still maintained a relatively high degree of centralisation. On the one hand, the relative weakness of the central authority of the state and, in turn, the relative strength of the regions translated into the latter’s clamoring for, and attaining, more independence in the administration of their natural resources; on the other hand, only by preserving some degree of centralisation would the soon-to-be-privatised oil assets remain attractive to both potential owners and investors in order to compete on the international market to satisfy global solvent demand for energy. In the Russian Federation, out of the protracted privatisation process came twelve ‘vertically integrated oil companies’ that combined ‘oil exploration, production, refining, distribution, and retailing’, one state-owned (Rosneft) and the others in private hands (Hill & Fee 2001: 465; Moser 2017), while the gas sector remained a monopoly under state-dominated Gazprom (Freinkman 1995: 63).

Although the private owners of the various oil companies earned dubious reputations as oligarchs, due to the fabulous wealth they amassed in a very short time frame (Olcott 2004; Rutland 2013: 343), even amid low oil prices and the lawlessness of 1990s Russia, the energy industry was attracting the lion’s share of overall investments, including FDIs (Meyer & Pind 1999: 211; Hill & Fee 2001: 469). On the face of it, ‘[r]esource seeking investments [were] particularly sensitive neither to progress in transition nor to the level of corruption’ (Tøndel 2001: 39); instead, ‘many of the investments were into the oil industry, and as is so often the case in this cyclical sector, many of the transactions took place during periods of high oil prices’ (Moser 2017: 92).31 As a result, there has been and continues to be an unequivocally ‘strong correlation between international commodity prices, FDI, exports, and GDP growth’ in the FSU region as a whole (ADBI 2014: 88; Gevorkyan 2011: 54, 56, 2018: 190-198; Domínguez-Jiménez & Poitiers 2020: 5), which became even more striking during the commodity supercycle of the 2000s discussed below.

31 Clearly, this does not mean that corruption has no influence whatsoever on investments by some individual capitals, but rather that overall investments flow where there is a profit to be made.

119

While during the 1990s the magnitude of ground-rent flowing to the state coffers from oil and gas exports in the energy-rich republics was limited by low energy prices, economic collapse, and the privatisation of the oil industry, the Russian landlord-state retained ‘several significant levers of control over the oil companies’ throughout the decade, including ‘licences, taxes, pipelines and exports’ (Moser 2017: 107; for Kazakhstan, see Pomfret 2005b: 864). As the huge pipeline system remained under state control, ‘the Russian state used the mechanism of cutting off access to its pipeline network to put pressure on both oil companies (to pay taxes) and foreign governments (to pay transport tariffs)’ (Moser 2017: 100). Likewise, Russian oil companies accessing Gazprom pipelines were forced to sell to the state-controlled company ‘at low domestic prices, while Gazprom was able to sell on that gas internationally at several multiples of the domestic price’ (Moser 2017: 126, fn. 30).32 Thus, despite the relatively low windfalls from energy sources due to the severe post-independence recession amid low oil prices, the government used the available resources to keep afloat at least part of the manufacturing base in the country via various forms of (ground-rent) subsidisation (Clarke 1996: 9; Rutland 1999: 193; UNECE 2003: 127, 129-130; Robinson 2011: 445); crucially, this included ‘tolerating underpayments of tax … by energy-producing enterprises … as a quid pro quo for extending soft budget constraints to their manufacturing clients’ (Summers & Williamson 2001: 57) via e.g. the provision of subsidised energy (for Kazakhstan, see Pomfret 2005b: 866). This has been a common feature throughout the FSU region, including Uzbekistan, as

state financial aid to ailing state owned firms [came] as direct budgetary subsidies, debt forgiveness, subsidized government credit, accumulation of tax arrears and accumulation of credit arrears to state owned banks or other state owned firms, in particular utilities. In various combinations, all of these [forms of ground-rent subsidisation] exist in transition economies’ (UNECE 2003: 130, fn. 355, emphasis added) and have continued throughout the FSU since.33 Next to cheap oil and cheap credit, import subsidies including through the overvaluation of the rouble represented yet another form of ground-rent transfer to guarantee the reproduction of the total social capital in Russia (Åslund 1999: 8-11, 43). Finally, subsidised utilities for the whole population (Starodubrovskaya 2002: 619ff.) both raised the purchasing power of the working class for

32 This is called associated gas, namely, the natural gas that is very often found in oil deposits and extracted along with oil. 33 In 2019, utilities subsidies in Russia corresponded to 1.5% of GDP (or 24.1 billion USD), in Kazakhstan to 1.8% of GDP (or 6.6 billion USD), and in Azerbaijan to 4% of GDP (or 1.9 billion USD) (IEA 2019).

120 domestic products and lowered the costs of labour for capital, thus representing a further form of ground-rent appropriation by the total social capital.

The critical point here is that, from day one of the transition, the policies, institutions, and bureaucratic elites of the national state mediated the incorporation of the various FSU countries into the IDL as raw material exporters, guaranteeing the valorisation of their national total social capital via ground-rent subsidisation (Section 2), while differentiating the costs of reproduction of their working class fractions as evident in the rise of a vast relative surplus population within their territories (Section 3). ‘Backward’ manufacturing capitals have accumulated at the average rate of profit via ground-rent transfers as evident in the multiple forms of subsidisation listed above. This is not the result of the underdevelopment of capitalism in the FSU (‘crony capitalism’) due to a lack of, or a partial and incomplete, transition, as transitology would have it (Chapter 1); rather, this is the specific economic form taken by the essential unity of global capital accumulation in the FSU countries. This explains why, within the wide diversity in policies, institutions, and bureaucratic capacity in the region, the FSU republics exhibit the same qualitatively ‘backward’ form of accumulation via ground-rent subsidisation, including as concerns individual international capitals operating within their territories such as e.g. automotive MNCs/TNCs manufacturing in Russia, as detailed below (RQ1). Succinctly put, contra transitology, ‘backward’ industrialisation explains rent-seeking, rather than the other way around.

Equally, the process of decentralisation in the 1990s weakened the central authority of the state, as evident in the rise of some degree of participatory politics such as the creation of national parliaments and the holding of elections (e.g. Depoy 1996; Olcott 2004: 4-5; Bowyer 2008), reflecting the relative strength of alternative power centres, in particular the regions in line with their resource endowments. However, presidentialism unequivocally emerged as the preferred system of government especially in view of how unpopular the orthodox package - liberalisation, privatisation, decollectivisation - was with the broader public. As Rutland (2013: 348) argues, the ‘narrow social basis of support for market reform in Russia made it more dependent for implementation on the authoritarian Presidential branch’, which bypassed elected representatives to enforce most of the reform programmes by decree, responsibility for whose implementation lay with ‘the Central Bank or the State Privatization Committee … not directly accountable to the parliament’ (Rutland 1999: 192; Frye 2010; Levitsky & Way 2010: 191, 193). In other words, the authoritarian state mediated the process of capitalist transformation in the FSU, securing the shift from the Fordist conditions of industrial production and indiscriminate reproduction of the working class, to

121 the reprimarisation of the economy and the rise of a vast relative surplus population. Again, contra transitology, this is not the outcome of no transition, but the specific political form of mediation of the global process of accumulation in the FSU. As such, first, class is the foundational divide in capitalist society, contradicting the literature’s framing of transition as classless development for all (Chapter 1); second, the paradox of no transition and transformation is revealed to be of transitology’s own making, given its idealisation of democratic capitalism as the ‘end of history’.

I now turn to the next two decades of transition.

2.2. From the 2000s until today: Different forms, same content

At the end of the 1990s, demand for raw materials started increasing significantly, especially due to the meteoric industrialisation of China in the NIDL. As a result, international prices for primary commodities began rising in order to encapsulate the growing magnitude of ground-rent necessary to expand production/extraction in the worst (‘marginal’) lands and satisfy solvent demand (Chapter 2). Specifically, the price of oil rose 300% between 1998 and 2001 (Hill & Fee 2001: 466), peaking at 140 USD per barrel in 2008 (Pomfret 2010: 15) and then averaging upward of 70 USD in the 2009-19 period (Appendix 4), so as to account for the increasing costs of bringing a barrel of oil to the market under ever more challenging conditions (‘worst lands’) such as e.g. deep-sea and Arctic drilling (Wimmer 2012: 230-231; Patel & Moore 2017: 184). In turn, in order to meet these escalating costs and satisfy solvent demand, capital in the energy industry underwent a further process of centralisation, as ‘from over 10 large IOCs’ [international oil companies] five emerged following the ‘mega mergers between Exxon and Mobil in 1999 and Chevron and Texaco in 2001’ (Stevens 2016: 33, 16). As argued in Chapter 2, the same process of capital centralisation in extractive industries occurred across ‘resource rich’ countries in the Global South, including via resource renationalisation or increased state participation in production, as evident in the emergence of huge SOEs in the energy industry (UNCTAD 2014: 21; Singh & Chen 2018).

The FSU fits squarely within these dynamics, as high oil prices led to a process of capital recentralisation in the energy industry, as was the case with renationalisation in Russia under President Putin and increased state participation in production in Kazakhstan under the latter-day leadership of President Nazarbayev. Put differently, amid soaring global solvent demand for energy, the mining landlord-states of the FSU could exercise a relatively stronger bargaining power and renegotiate the terms under which capital could put the

122 irreproducible means of production (land) to use, hence the magnitude of the rents that they could accrue (Chapter 2). This explains the continuation of their primary commodity export orientation and ‘backward’ industrialisation (qualitative unity), as well as the significant growth of ground-rent inflowing into their national economies according to their diverse resource endowments (quantitative diversity) (RQ1). In parallel, the recentralisation of energy rents translated into the reassertion of the central authority of the state, whose increased ‘capacity’ allowed for the consolidation of authoritarian rule (Levitsky & Way 2010: 186, 197ff.). However, while the literature construes capital/rent recentralisation and strengthening authoritarian rule (‘neopatrimonial regimes’, ‘authoritarian state capitalism’) as the outcome of a lack of transition to its ideal-type democratic capitalism (Chapter 1), these were instead the political-economic forms mediating the changing material conditions on the global market in the FSU republics as raw material exporters in the IDL (RQ1). As such, the authoritarian state has been crucial to guaranteeing the process of accumulation in the different national spaces of the FSU, as it has managed the recurrent antagonism between capital and labour, including by repressing the latter to secure the accumulation of the former (Section 3). In other words, the (authoritarian) state’s policies and institutions are social forms of mediation of the class struggle.

Again, as it had expected long-term growth to be directly proportional to ‘good’ economic policies and inversely proportional to corruption (Pomfret 2010), for transitology the region’s economic performance in the 2000s represented a ‘Eurasian growth paradox’ (Åslund & Jenish 2007). Instead, within their generally low levels in relation to global flows (UNCTAD 2011: 3, Figure I.3, 2019: 55, Figure C),34 inward FDIs to the FSU region soared along with oil prices despite corruption, confirming once again the close connection between commodity prices, FDIs, exports, and GDP growth in the FSU (RQ1). As Moser (2017: 92) concludes in the case of the Russian Federation, it is beyond dispute that ‘[o]ne of the most important factors behind the performance of the economy during this period [1991-2017] was the international oil price’ (for Kazakhstan, see World Bank 2018b: xiv). Equally, while ‘[t]he effect of corruption [was] negative for growth’, it was ‘only marginally significant’ (Åslund & Jenish 2007: 25). Thus, the two top FDI receivers in the Caucasus and Central Asia, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, were also ‘the two largest oil exporters’ (Kunzel et al. 2018: 12), with their economies registering staggering growth on the wave of the Chinese- demand-led commodity supercycle (Pomfret 2005b; Hölscher 2012). In Kazakhstan, despite the oil sector being ‘the biggest and most corrupt part’ in the privatisation process

34 To this day, most FDIs still flow in and out of developed economies and a small number of emerging markets (Kaltenbrunner & Painceira 2018: 302; Alami 2019).

123 (Pomfret 2005b: 862) and the investment climate becoming increasingly difficult in the 2000s (EIU 2005c: 25-26; Sorbello 2018: 115), foreign investors flocked to the profitable Kazakh energy market (Pomfret 2005b: 867), while Western investments flowed to Azerbaijan’s Caspian Sea oilfields in spite of the country’s ‘“Wild East” reputation’ (Dawson 2005: 47; Hölscher 2012: 3-12). Likewise, while Russia’s investment climate arguably deteriorated under Putin,35 FDIs climbed from an average 5 billion USD per year until 2003 to 75 billion by 2007 in parallel with soaring oil prices, dipped during the 2009 financial crisis before rising again to 70 billion USD in 2013 and then tanking due to the ‘dual shocks’ of falling oil prices and Western sanctions over the war in Ukraine (Moser 2017: 92-93; IMF 2017: 4, 17).

As argued in Chapter 2, SOEs have been one of the most potent forms of mediation of this process of capital recentralisation (RQ1). In Russia, following a period of renationalisations, SOEs asserted themselves as the dominant oil and gas producers, going from ‘a low of 15%’ of total production in 2004, up ‘to 40% by 2008 and then to 57% in 2015’ (Moser 2017: 95); by 2019, they accounted for 67% of the country’s total energy output (Di Bella et al. 2019: 10, 24, Table 5). This process also led to the recentralisation of tax revenue, with a reversal in the power balance between the regional and the federal authorities in Russia. ‘By 2002, the Federal government received 62 percent of tax income and the regions only 38 percent’, compared to ‘at least 50 percent’ before a major overhaul of the tax system the same year (Robertson 2010: 152; Moser 2017: 101-102), with Gazprom alone accounting ‘for around 25 percent of total federal government tax revenues’ (Hill & Fee 2001: 468). In Kazakhstan, SOEs ‘dominate the economy, and state intervention is pervasive’ (World Bank 2018: xvii). In the wake of rising commodity prices, the state merged KazakhOil and Oil & Gas Transportation to create energy giant Kazmunaigas (KMG) at the start of the 2000s, which became the main vehicle of the state’s increased participation in production both ‘as investor and partner on several joint ventures’ (Kaiser & Pulsipher 2007: 1311). By 2016, the company controlled 29% of the industry’s total oil and gas condensate production, holding ‘a minority stake in virtually all major oil and gas projects in the country and a controlling stake in most of the projects initiated since 2000’ (Olcott 2007: 9; KMG 2016: 12, 22-25; Sorbello 2018: 117).

Finally, the same trend toward recentralisation surfaced in the agricultural sector, as evident in the growth of Russian agroholdings in the 2000s (Visser et al. 2015: 517), ‘a core

35 Following Putin’s election to the presidency in 2000, foreign oil companies have been increasingly allowed to operate on the Russian market only as junior partners to Russian SOEs (Olcott 2004: 25- 26; Moser 2017: 87, 89, 110).

124 consisting more broadly of large farms … a so-called 300 Club’ (Leonard 2011: 112, 106- 107; Dobrynin & Schreck 2019). This explains Russia’s rise since the early 2000s as a global wheat producer, whose exports ‘increased from 0.7 to 42 million tons between 2000 and 2017’ (Svanidze & Götz 2019), with fifteen companies monopolising 75% thereof (Pavenskyi 2017). The same overall dynamics have been at play in Kazakhstan, with large agroholdings emerging as the country’s largest wheat exporters since the 2000s (Wandel 2009: 10ff.; Petrick et al. 2018: 28, Figure 2.4; Araujo‐Enciso & Fellmann 2020: 496).

FSU states created specific institutions to accumulate the extraordinary wealth inflowing into their territories in the form of ground-rent particularly from the sale of oil and gas on the world market, as investment vehicles and for financial sterilisation, explaining the rise of SWFs and investment banks since the 2000s, along with the emergence of outward FDIs from the region (RQ1). Established in 2004, Russia’s Oil Stabilisation Fund (Reserve Fund since 2008) ‘receives revenue from the production and export of gas and oil products in addition to crude oil sales’ (NRGI & CCSI 2013: 3); equally, natural resources including ‘rent tax on oil and gas exports’ constitute a large share of Kazakhstan’s National Fund, the country’s SWF founded in 2000 (Azhgaliyeva 2014: 161), which, since being incorporated into Samruk Kazyna in 2008 - the SWF and the main holding for the country’s SOEs - has also been in charge of attracting foreign investors into joint ventures in the Kazakh market (Republic of Kazakhstan 2016). Finally, the Russian and Kazakh governments were co- founders of the Eurasian Development Bank in 2006 to invest in infrastructure and other projects (EDB website). Unsurprisingly, ‘[t]he oil and gas sector and the metal industry dominate’ Russia’s outward FDIs (Liuhto & Majuri 2014: 201), which have soared from 20 to 501 billions USD between 2000 and 2013 (ibid.: 200, Figure 1) in parallel to the rise of primary commodity prices. While much more modest, Kazakhstan’s outward FDIs are equally concentrated in resource extraction, with KMG a major investor in such projects abroad (ADBI 2014: 51).

With the huge increase in the ground-rent inflowing into the FSU states, so did the scale of investment in manufacturing capital since the 2000s (RQ1). For example, Kazakhstan provided ‘subsidies of different types worth over US$79 billion’ between 1997 and 2015 through ‘a wide range of instruments’, with ‘the frequency of interventions increas[ing] remarkably after 2007’, though ‘state aid attracted firms to supply the domestic market, while implying a limited capacity to benefit from scaling up or competing in world markets’ (EBRD 2017: 7, fn. 6, 5, 17). As everywhere else in the FSU, then, Kazakhstan exhibited the same qualitative form of ‘backward’ industrialisation via ground-rent allocation in the form of multiple direct and indirect subsidies, resulting in its manufacturing base producing

125 overwhelmingly for the domestic market. Likewise, by the mid-2000s, ‘one industrial sector in Russia [stood] out as a recipient of FDI in recent years, namely automobile manufacturing’, with Ford, General Motors (GM), Volkswagen, Renault, and Toyota all investing in new and old projects in the country (Christiansen & Bertrand 2005: 26-27; INT- 15). However, rather than a qualitative change in the ‘backward’ form of capital accumulation observed in the 1990s, this reflected the quantitative growth in the magnitude of ground-rent available for appropriation in the country. As Traub-Merz (2017: 140) succinctly puts it, ‘the Russian car miracle ha[s] been served on the platter of high oil prices’. As theorised in Chapter 2, regardless of capital’s legal status or ‘nationality’, ‘small’ manufacturing capitals by international standards have produced for the domestic market in the FSU in order to accumulate at the average rate of profit via the appropriation of an extraordinary source of wealth (ground-rent) in the form of direct and indirect subsidisation. The limited scale of this ‘backward’ industrialisation cannot absorb the majority of the population expelled from the land, turning it into a surplus for the requirements of global accumulation (Section 3).

In the Russian automotive industry, leading MNCs/TNCs could take advantage of a series of benefits such as cheap utilities, low-tariff or tariff-free import of machinery, inputs and components (Traub-Merz 2015: 15), as well as the overall overvaluation of the rouble exchange rate (Wood 2007: 53; The Economist 2014, 2015; Reuters 2017a; IMF 2017: 43) that contributed to higher profits in hard currency upon repatriation. Equally, these companies could recycle costly industrial machinery such as platforms now obsolete for world market production for use in vehicle assembly in the Russian market (Chapter 2). According to the Russian federal government, by 2018 approximately 40% of total domestic production was realised on the platforms of leading car manufacturers, such as Renault- Nissan’s B0 platform and Volkswagen’s PQ25 (RPRF-831-r 2018: 4). The PQ25 is an outdated platform that has been progressively replaced by the new MQB platform, which cost Volkswagen 72 billion USD to develop between 2009 and 2012, the year in which the company started rolling it out (Lampón et al. 2017: 6, 8, Table 1, 13). The Renault-Nissan Alliance launched the B0 in 2002 (Renault Nissan 2016: 24); when Renault agreed with the Russian authorities and the management of Avtovaz, a Russian manufacturer, on a restructuring deal for Avtovaz following the 2008 financial crisis, Renault ‘did not hand over any money, but provided technology, machinery and a [B0] production platform from its Romanian budget-make Dacia to the value of 240 million euros’ (Traub-Merz 2015: 19). As a result, obsolete technology in the country has mobilised ‘degraded subjectivity’ labour for the assembly of relatively expensive cars largely for the domestic market (Volgina 2011; RPRF-1877-r 2017: 6), while exports of cars and components - at 6.2% (2017) and 1-2%

126 of overall production, respectively - are extremely low and concentrated in CIS countries (Boutenko et al. 2013: 6; RPRF-831-r 2018: 7, 9-12).

Although labour productivity has grown ‘from 7.17 vehicles per worker to 18.5’ between 2005 and 2012 (Traub-Merz 2017: 138), wages have increased faster than productivity (Traub-Merz 2015: 13, 23), which anyway remains less that ⅓ of the average ‘normal’ international levels in the industry (Fitzsimons & Guevara 2016: 190, Table 8.3). Overall, the limited scale of production for the domestic market via ground-rent appropriation has translated into the Russian car industry’s growing cost, quality, and technology gap in relation to the industry’s international standards (Traub-Merz 2017: 145), where economies of scale reduce production costs and competition drives constant investments in technological change. This comprises the latest focus on transition to ‘zero-emissions’ electric cars (Miller & Campbell 2019),36 as well as the use of Artificial Intelligence including with the introduction of autonomous driving technology, commonly known as self-driving or driverless cars (Lanctot 2017; AJE 2018). Not only are these changes at the heart of what the business community has dubbed Industry 4.0,37 but they are also what the federal government has identified as the key areas in which the Russian car industry - regardless of capital’s origin - lags a long way behind global leaders (RPRF-831-r 2018: 31-38).

To recapitulate, the qualitative forms of integration into the IDL (economic reprimarisation, raw material export orientation) and ‘backward’ industrialisation (via ground-rent subsidisation) have been a constant feature in the FSU republics since independence, from decentralisation in the 1990s to recentralisation from the 2000s until today. National diversity within the underlying unity of global capital accumulation has depended on the quantity of ground-rent accruing to each republic in line with the fluctuating international prices of their primary commodity endowments. In Section 3, I turn to the various national forms of realisation of this unity in the FSU countries in terms of labour exploitation and the specificity of the class struggle therein.

36 Clearly, zero-emissions refers only to a car’s end use, as e.g. the extraction of lithium for the production of electric car batteries is devastating for the environment. 37 Industry 4.0 indicates the start of a fourth industrial revolution that will transform industrial manufacturing processes with autonomous systems based on big data and machine learning integrated via the internet and cloud computing.

127 3. DIFFERENTIATING THE COST OF REPRODUCTION OF THE WORKING CLASS: CLASS AND STRUGGLE IN THE FSU

Given the centrality of land for the production/extraction of raw materials, as in other ‘resource rich’ countries in the Global South, the FSU states mediated the global process of accumulation via specific policy and institutional arrangements. On the one hand, these enforced radical changes to land use via the mass expulsion of peasants and the privatisation of the commons (decollectivisation) to the benefit of extractive industries and agribusiness; regardless of the fact that land remains largely state-owned in the FSU, access to it has been effectively precluded to most of the population. On the other hand, they guaranteed the reproduction of the total social capital via allocation of the extraordinary wealth inflowing into their territories in the form of ground-rent from the export of primary commodities produced on, and extracted from, said land. This resulted in the creation of a vast relative surplus population that capital-intensive extractive industries and ‘backward’ industrialisation, due to its limited scale, have only been partially able to absorb (RQ1).

In short, the costs of deindustrialisation, privatisation, and decollectivisation were borne by labour. Overall, there can be no doubt that workers ‘lost their job security, part of their wages, much of their bargaining power and had to face a spectacular development of inequality in incomes and patrimonies’ (Durand 2003: 329). However, within the radical change in the material conditions of production due to the FSU republics’ integration into the IDL as raw material producers, losses were distributed very unevenly between cities and countryside, sectors of the economy, skilled workers and un- or low skilled ones, and between male and female workers (e.g. Clarke 1996: 8; Donova 1996: 41-44; Monousova & Guskova 1996: 88ff.; Bridger 1997: 45-46; Shelburne & Pidufala 2006: 4; Vasiliouk 2008: 30-32).38 As a result,

the initial ‘winners’ in the early post-Soviet period were workers in energy industries and the financial sector, as well as firm directors and senior managers, who saw their wages increase in both absolute and relative terms. The principal ‘losers’ were the already low-paid public sector workers such as teachers, manufacturing employees in the light industry, machine- building, and metalworking sectors, and workers in agriculture (Broome 2010: 92, 90).

This situation obtains to this day, specifically as concerns the differentiation in the costs of reproduction of the working class, as evident in wide wage inequalities in the region. In

38 The specific gendered outcomes of transition are analysed in detail for the case study of Uzbekistan (Chapters 4-6).

128 Russia, the top earning workers in 2007 - approximately 10% of the total working population - were paid between 141% (Russian-foreign JVs) and 188% (foreign companies) above the average salary at the time (OECD 2011: 16, 48, 54-56, incl. Figure 1.12). In 2017, employees in the extractive industries as well as in finance and insurance continued to be among the highest paid workers accruing a salary approximately double the country’s average, while accounting for a mere 1.6% and 1.9% of the total workforce, respectively (Rosstat 2018a: 147, 2018b: 91). The same dynamics have been at play in Kazakhstan, where workers in the extractive industries (mining and quarrying), as well as in finance and insurance, consistently pocketed higher salaries than the national average. For example, in 2019, these groups also earned approximately double the country’s average wage, while combinedly making up only 5.3% of the total workforce (BNS 2020) and with the latter being ‘highly concentrated’ in the two main cities of Almaty and Nur-Sultan (World Bank 2018b: 15).39 At the same time, ‘[a]round 28 percent of all employed workers earn below two-thirds of the median earnings’ (ibid.).

Therefore, in line with developments across the Global South (Chapter 2), the net result of the transition has been the radical fragmentation of the working class and the ensuing differentiation in its costs of reproduction. While a relatively large share of the total wage is concentrated in the hands of a small percentage of workers, a vast relative surplus population struggles to survive amid the proliferation of informality, precarity, and un(der)employment throughout the region (Mitra & Yemtsov 2006: 37; Rodgers & Williams 2009; Rasanayagam 2011; Aliyev 2015; Trevisani 2018), which, in turn, exert a strong disciplining power on the working class. In other words, despite the deteriorating working conditions for most formal workers, the latter would rather keep a low-paying, low-benefit job than have no job at all in the context of widening precarity, as evident in the presence of a relative surplus population ‘only partially employed or wholly unemployed’ (Marx 1867/1976: 794; Chapter 2). So, for instance, ‘Russian workers express very strong fear of losing their job and, if this happens, of not finding a new one of similar quality’ (Gimpelson & Kapeliushnikov 2011: 20). From a right and duty during Soviet times, work in the FSU region has become a privilege to be defended at all costs amid the proliferation of a mass of surplus population (Clarke 2002: 1; Spechler 2008: 83). Even in the FSU republics richest in resources, informality has become a permanent feature of life that has a direct bearing on living standards. In Russia, informal (under)employment ranges ‘between 15.1 and 21.2 percent, or between 10.9 to 15 million people’, while in Kazakhstan it stands at 30% of total

39 Known as Astana until March 2019, Nur-Sultan is the capital of Kazakhstan; Almaty is the country’s main commercial and cultural centre.

129 economic activity (World Bank 2019: 26). In parallel, there has been ‘a significant and growing wage gap between formal and informal workers, and a statistically significant association between informality, life dis-satisfaction, and household poverty among certain types of informal employment’ (Kim et al. 2019: 18).

The processes of primitive accumulation and privatisation of the commons via decollectivisation greatly contributed to these dynamics, resulting in the overall dismantling of infrastructure particularly in rural areas (UNDP 2002: 37-41; Dudwick et al. 2007: 56; Leonard 2011: 111; Kvartiuk et al. 2020), whose upholding was the responsibility of collective farms and enterprises (Section 1). Despite wide regional differences depending on relative resource wealth and percentage of rural population, the unequivocal trend throughout the region has been one of rural poverty and outmigration, in line with other ‘resource rich’ countries in the Global South (Chapter 2). Internal rural-urban migration noticeably increased throughout the FSU region given wealth concentration in the main cities and the higher incidence of poverty in rural areas (e.g. Becker et al. 2012: 70; Vargas- Lundius et al. 2018: 34-36). In Russia, one of the drivers of internal migration has been ‘the vast difference in lifestyles between [the] urban and rural populations’ (Becker et al. 2012: 64) in a country where ‘around one third’ of the population ‘is locked into a poverty trap’ (Kvartiuk et al. 2020: 1358) and 52.9% of households ‘cannot cope with unexpected expenses’ (Rosstat quoted in Rainsford 2019). Although the official poverty level stands at 12.9% (2018), ‘many individuals lack formal employment and many households remain close to the poverty line, suggesting a level of social vulnerability that will continue to require close monitoring’ (World Bank 2019: 22). Regional differences are equally important, as migrants largely move from the Far East, where raw materials are extracted, to the regions of European Russia in general, and to ‘the most desired destinations’ of Moscow and Saint Petersburg in particular, where most of the oil wealth is concentrated (Kvartiuk et al. 2020: 1358; Wood 2007: 56-57; Becker et al. 2012: 63-67). The gap between urban and rural areas obtains in Kazakhstan, too, where in 2015 ‘the poverty rate was 8 percent in Almaty and [Nur-Sultan] cities …, 15 percent in other urban areas, and 25 percent in rural areas’ (World Bank 2018b: xxi).

Equally, some of the relatively (resource) poorer and more rural Central Asian republics - Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan - have witnessed huge (largely seasonal) emigration to their (energy) richer northern neighbours, particularly since the 2000s oil boom and the ensuing construction spree in Russia and Kazakhstan (Kuchins 2007; Bissenova 2009; HRW 2009; Marat 2009: 25; Novikov & Kelly 2017: 26; Calderone 2018; Laruelle & Boonstra 2018: 5). Both internal and international migration flows are highly susceptible to the

130 fluctuation of international oil prices (Makhmutova 2013: 64, Table 1; IOM 2020: 83), that is, they ebb and flow in line with the magnitude of ground-rent available in the oil-rich republics, whither Central Asian migrants move to take up largely un- or low-skilled-hence- low-pay jobs, particularly in construction and trade, which locals mostly avoid given the small pay and the often dangerous working conditions (Laruelle 2007: 109; HRW 2009; EDB & UNDP 2015: 38-39; Naufal & Genc 2017: 67; UNDP 2018a: 111). In other words, the difference between the oil-rich FSU states and the poorer Central Asia republics has not been in the qualitative form of accumulation within their territories, but rather in the greater magnitude of ground-rent available in the former, especially Russia, due to their vastly larger oil and gas reserves. In this perspective, once oil prices soared in the wake of the Chinese-demand-led commodity supercycle, millions of those Central Asian peasants expelled from the land started migrating in search of opportunities unavailable at home, given that even a menial job paid in overvalued Russian roubles or Kazakhstani tenges could still contribute to their and their families’ survival. This explains why Central Asia is home to two of the most remittance-dependent countries in the world, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, where in 2018 remittances represented 33.6% and 31% of GDP, respectively (KNOMAD & World Bank 2019: 17, Figure 3.3), as well as why, at 3.9 billion USD in the same year, Uzbekistan’s own remittances dwarf ODA and FDIs (World Bank 2018a: 137, Figure 5.1). Again, ‘[o]il prices and remittance outflows from Russia have a strong correlation’ (KNOMAD & World Bank 2016: 7).

Finally, the splintering of the working class along multiple (national/geographic, in/formal, skill) lines and the ensuing differentiation in its costs of reproduction - as evident particularly in the relative surplus population’s struggle to survive amid poverty and un(der)employment - translated into the ‘more general decentralisation and fragmentation of organised labour’ with the ensuing weakening of its bargaining power observable in the significant drop in unionisation (Kubicek 2002: 614, 608; Ashwin & Clarke 2002: 86ff.), in line with dynamics across the GPE (Chapter 2). Clearly, this does not mean that workers have stopped resisting precarisation. Already under perestroika, mass strikes such as those organised by miners in 1989 broke out to protest worsening working and living conditions (Rutland 1990), with on average ‘65,000-75,000 workers on strike every day during the first half of 1990’ and ‘9.1 million’ workdays lost ‘in January and February 1990 alone’ causing ‘a one percent decline in Soviet GNP for this two month period in comparison with the same period in 1989’ (Moskoff 1992: 30, 29-41).

However, following the dissolution of the USSR and the acceleration in the division between and within the various working class fragments of the FSU republics, protests have tended

131 to be more spontaneous and largely localised than organised at the national level (e.g. Crowley & Olimpieva 2018). This was the case of the so-called ‘protests without movements’ in Russia between 1997 and 2000 over bread-and-butter issues, when millions came out to demonstrate yet nationally-coordinated campaigns were few and far between (Robertson 2010: 62-66). This is specifically because labour unions have become even more dependent than in Soviet times on political authorities for financial viability, the continuation of diminished hence even more crucial welfare provisions, and protection from the encroachment of independent unions (Robertson 2007: 786; Kubicek 2002: 610). As a result, ‘[i]f the story of the national movement is of a spectacular rise and equally spectacular decline, the struggle of workers on the ground for the most elementary rights and human dignities has continued at a much more even pace’ (Clarke et al. 1995: 12).

Whatever the case, strikes and protests have been largely focussed on making the government change course on specific issues, such as obtaining payment of wage arrears or continuing the provision of specific welfare policies (e.g. in-kind benefits such as free transportation for pensioners) (Robertson 2010: 174-178; Crowley & Olimpieva 2018: 354). The same applies to coping strategies by workers, such as, for example, the use of contacts within management for personal (vs. collective) advantage (Ashwin 1998: 195-196; Ashwin & Clarke 2002: 207). This need for protection in the context of precarisation, poverty, and worsening working conditions helps also to explain the generally wide (though shifting) appeal of authoritarian leaders such as President Putin including among working class Russians (Ashwin 1998: 196-197). In this context, rising nationalism and xenophobia have been the ideological forms mediating the breakdown of class solidarity, as evident in the divisions between ‘natives’ and the immigrant ‘other’ particularly from Central Asia on the basis of specific ‘ethnic’ and religious (e.g. Islam) markers (Galdini & Narinov 2018; Kingsbury 2019).

However, as (global) capital accumulation necessarily reproduces private and independent individuals as members of antagonistic social classes (Chapter 2), labour’s resistance continues albeit in highly uneven and disorganised ways throughout the different (national) states of the FSU region. In parallel, the authoritarian state has mediated the class struggle in order to guarantee the process of accumulation of the total social capital by using a variety of tactics, from the diffusion of conflict by addressing localised grievances, to the scapegoating of specific entrepreneurs and/or local authorities and, crucially, ‘the securitisation of labour relations’ (Morris 2017: 53). This may entail security services busting unions using anti-extremism or foreign-agent legislation (ibid.; Ovsyannikov 2018; Martus 2021), or the use of violence and repression to deter protests, prevent them from spreading,

132 or ruthlessly crush them whenever mobilisation is perceived to become a threat to the process of accumulation. One of the most brutal examples of the latter followed the months- long labour strike in the key oil and gas sector in Kazakhstan in 2011, due to low pay and management interference into trade union activity, which resulted in the police killing at least 12 people and wounding dozens of others, as well as the imprisonment of union leaders and the mass dismissal of workers for participating in the strike (HRW 2012; Satpayev & Umbetaliyeva 2015). Likewise, police brutality and mass arbitrary detention of protesters have been common tactics used in Russia any time organising has reached some critical mass, as was the case during the protracted mass strike by truck drivers against the increase of a road tax in winter 2015 and again in 2017, or currently following the arrest of opposition figure Alexei Navalny (Crowley & Olimpieva 2018; HRW 2021). While the immediate reasons for mobilisation have been diverse, socio-economic demands amid the ongoing deterioration in living standards for the working class have been, and continue to be, absolutely central (Crowley & Olimpieva 2018: 352; Bezrukova 2021; Budraitskis & Matveev 2021; Foy & Seddon 2021).

Chapters 4-5 show how, within the diverse specificity of the Uzbek case, all the dynamics analysed in this section have been evident in Uzbekistan, too.

4. CONCLUSION

Operating at a more concrete level of generality (Level 3), Chapter 3 provides a cogent answer to RQ1. First, the chapter argues that all FSU republics integrated into the IDL on the basis of the CIDL, that is, as raw material exporters due to the relatively favourable conditions for the production/extraction of primary commodities within their territories, as well as to the unsuitability of their relatively expensive and undisciplined fragments of the working class to produce for the world market. Second, this form of integration defined the qualitative ‘backward’ form of accumulation in the FSU states since independence amid the reprimarisation of the economy and its raw material export orientation (‘unity…’). National differences within this qualitative unity were the result of the changing magnitude of ground- rent in their territories in line with the fluctuating international prices of their resource endowments (‘...of the diverse’); this was the case during the ‘liberalisation’ of the 1990s amid low oil prices, as well as with the ‘recentralisation’ in the 2000s amid rising commodity prices due to Chinese demand up until today. Third, as ‘backward’ industrialisation could not absorb the mass of the population released from industrial employment (deindustrialisation) or expelled from the land in order to put it to use for capital accumulation (decollectivisation), it has been turned into surplus for the requirements of global

133 accumulation, defining the differentiation in the costs of reproduction of the working class, as well as the struggle of this relative surplus population to reproduce itself amid un(der)employment, informality, and poverty. In this context, although labour’s struggle against capital has continued, it has been weakened by the multiple (national/geographic, in/formal, skill) divisions of the working class and the ensuing declining unionisation, making it largely localised. For its part, the authoritarian state has guaranteed the process of accumulation by mediating conflict, weakening unions, or repressing labour in case of a perceived threat to the reproduction of the total social capital.

In short, Chapter 3 critiques the literature’s ideal-type democratic capitalism and its characterisation as classless development for all, against which transitology exceptionalises the FSU region as stuck in a permanent transition. Instead, the chapter shows how raw material export orientation and ‘backward’ industrialisation in the FSU region are national forms of the essential unity of global capital accumulation, to which labour exploitation is foundational. In this perspective, developments in the FSU region and Uzbekistan since independence are not exceptional, but the diverse national forms of this underlying unity. Having analysed these forms in the FSU in general, I now turn to their concrete determinations in Uzbekistan in particular.

134 CHAPTER 4 Ground-rent, Labour, and Uzbekistan’s ‘Backward’ Industrialisation in the International Division of Labour

0. INTRODUCTION

Despite transitology’s exceptionalisation (Chapter 1), the same trends prevalent across the FSU in the 1990s obtained in Uzbekistan, too, as the country experienced an initial collapse in output and the mass privatisation of former collectively-owned assets (RQ1). Section 1 argues that, within this unity, what set Uzbekistan’s initial transition ‘path’ apart from other FSU states was the centrality and specificity of cotton to the country’s political economy. As an agrarian landlord-state, Uzbekistan strictly depended on the natural cycle of seasonal alternation to produce cotton for export in order to accrue cotton rents; this explains the adoption of the Uzbek model as a ‘gradual’ path of transition, with the state as the leading reformer guaranteeing the high level of coordination needed for cotton production in view of the crop’s labour- and water-intensity. Again, the Uzbek model did not determine the transition; it mediated it within the material conditions of capital accumulation in the world market in the 1990s. As these conditions changed during the commodity supercycle of the 2000s and cotton ceded pride of place to gold and natural gas as the country’s main export commodities, the basis for the current ‘liberalisation’ was laid. Succinctly put, Uzbekistan was transforming from an agrarian into a mining landlord-state, allowing for the current relaxation in the most draconian form of ground-rent appropriation by the state amid relatively high commodity prices, as well as the liberalisation of the cotton sector. As Section 2 explains, however, Uzbekistan has continued to exhibit the same qualitative forms of raw material export orientation and ‘backward’ accumulation via ground-rent subsidisation in the three decades since independence, including under the current Mirziyoyev administration. Within this qualitative unity, the varying performance of the country’s economy has depended on the fluctuating magnitude of ground-rent available in the domestic market in line with the changing international prices of its primary commodities, particularly gold and natural gas. Section 3 empirically illustrates all these dynamics via the case study of Uzbekistan’s ‘backward’ car industry, explaining the rich diversity of its evolution since 1992 within the essential qualitative unity of ‘backward’ industrialisation. The conclusion summarises the chapter’s main findings.

Chapter 4 and the following empirical chapters (5-6) rise to the fourth, and last, level of generality (Level 4) in order to focus on the rich concrete determinations of Uzbekistan’s political-economic transformation since 1991 and provide cogent answers to RQ2 and RQ3.

135 Chapter 4 investigates how the state’s mediation of the ground-rent form secured the subsidisation of the total social capital within the country’s integration in the IDL as a raw material exporter; as such, while only a minority of (mostly male, city-dwelling, higher- skilled) workers could be absorbed in the ensuing process of ‘backward’ industrialisation, they amassed the lion’s share of the total wage. Chapter 5 dissects the changes to land use (decollectivisation) that mediated this form of integration, resulting in the expulsion of the mass of workers from agricultural collectives and the ensuing rise of a vast relative surplus population struggling amid un(der)employment, poverty, and migration. This differentiation in the costs of reproduction of the working class (class stratification) along in/formal, geographic (urban-rural, regional), gender, and skill lines explains the disorganised resistance of labour against capital in Uzbekistan, which the authoritarian state has either deterred or, in case of a perceived threat to the accumulation of the total social capital, brutally repressed. Finally, Chapter 6 reveals how land use for capital accumulation is feeding into the accelerating climate crisis, undermining the reproduction of natural use- values crucial to sustain human life, hence heightening the vulnerability of the relative surplus population. The uniting thread between the rich diversity of concrete dynamics analysed in these empirical chapters is the state’s mediation of the ground-rent form as a social form of class struggle. On the one hand, the state guarantees the process of capital accumulation in its territory; on the other hand, it enforces a process of class stratification internally related to gender and land (and resource) use. These are all specific (national) forms mediating the (global) accumulation of capital in Uzbekistan, which transitology exceptionalises as the outcome of no, or a partial and incomplete, transition. As such, these chapters provide vast empirical evidence problematising transitology’s ideal-type democratic capitalism as classless, gender-liberating, and eco-friendly development for all; in short, the ‘paradox’ of no transition and transformation in the past three decades is revealed to be of the literature’s own making.

1. ‘UNITY OF THE DIVERSE’: FROM THE ‘UZBEK MODEL’...

During Soviet times, huge resources were invested in the expansion and intensification of cotton cultivation in the collective farms of Central Asia, particularly in the Tajik, Uzbek, Turkmen, and southern Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republics. Cotton was either exported for hard currency or processed in the textile industries of the Union’s European republics in exchange for energy, food (including wheat), and finished goods ‘as part of an integrated national system’ (Abdullaev et al. 2005: 102) that guaranteed the indiscriminate reproduction of the working class within Fordist conditions of industrial production (Chapter 3). The state bought the crop at preferential prices in order to divert more farm land to its

136 production (Khan 1996, 2007), while a truly monumental canal infrastructure - spanning large areas of modern Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan - was built in order to reclaim land up-to-then unfit for agriculture and irrigate cotton plantations (Lubin 1984: 133), with ‘28,000 km of main and inter-farm irrigation canals and 168,000 km of in-farm irrigation canals’ (Umarov 2004: 127; Abdullaev et al. 2005: 114-115) in the UzSSR alone. Collective farm workers tended to the high labour-intensive crop during each production stage, from land preparation to sowing, weeding, and thinning cotton balls, with a veritable society-wide mobilisation at harvest time in autumn, including via forced labour (Pohl 2005; Spoor 2005: 57); in parallel, the Soviet state extended considerable investments in the mechanisation of the cotton harvest, which increased perceptibly through to the 1980s (Craumer 1992; Pomfret 2002; Swinkels et al. 2016a: 11), when the USSR found itself in the throes of an economic crisis that would prove its undoing (Chapter 3).

As a result, by the 1980s, the cotton sector overwhelmingly dominated the UzSSR’s economy (Karimov 1993a, 1995), producing ‘more than 65 percent of its gross output, consum[ing] 60 percent of all production inputs, and employ[ing] approximately 40 percent of the labor force’ (Ilkhamov 2004: 165), while contributing approximately two-thirds of total Soviet output including for export (Lubin 1994: 6). Equally, albeit limited, the republic’s industrial base was heavily biassed towards the growing, picking, and some processing of cotton fiber; this included ‘minerals and fossil fuels deposits … utilized as supplements for the cotton industry, providing workers with heating and cooking gas, and farmers with fertilizers and gasoline’ (Rustemova 2012: 139; Jones Luong & Weinthal 2010: 78), as well as the manufacturing of tractors, cotton harvesters, and textile machinery along with some textile industries locally processing ‘12 percent of [the republic’s total] raw cotton output’ (World Bank 1993b: 5; Pomfret 2002; Rustemova 2012: 136; INT-3). While women carried out the overwhelming share of manual work in the fields, by the late 1970s the UzSSR achieved ‘a level of harvest mechanization of 62 percent’ (Craumer 1992: 156), plateauing at about 42% between 1982 and 1988 due to a reduction in investment including for maintenance (ibid. 155-156, incl. Table 6.16) during the troubled low-oil-price decade of the 1980s (Chapter 3).

1.1. The why behind the ‘Uzbek model’

The centrality and specificity of cotton to the economy of the UzSSR explains the choice of the Uzbek model as the country’s own ‘gradual’ transition ‘path’ following independence (RQ2). Whereas mining landlords have a relatively stronger bargaining power, in virtue of the fact that they can more easily withdraw their land from production without losing their

137 natural resources, agrarian landlords can only secure their rents by putting land to capitalist production in line with the natural cycle of seasonal alternation central to agriculture, or lose all rents for the year (Iñigo Carrera 2007; Purcell 2010: 94). That is certainly the case for cotton, whose production cycle lasts for months, with fields being prepared in advance of planting in March-April and the vegetation period extending from April to September, followed by picking in September-October and into November (Chapter 6). In other words, only by retaining a strong presence in the organisation of economic activity could the Uzbek state ‘maintain a persistent supply of raw cotton to [meet solvent demand and] secure government’s export revenues’, that is, cotton rents (World Bank & IAMO 2019: 38; Karimov 1993a: 240, 1995: 226, 272, 302; Pomfret 1995: 137, 2005a: 229); this was particularly true in view of the huge organisational and mobilisational capacity required to produce cotton and the latter’s significance to the UzSSR’s industrial base.

Thus, state intervention would guarantee the production of inputs (e.g. gasoline, fertilizers), the running and coordination of the irrigation infrastructure to grow the water-intensive crop (Pomfret 1995: 137), and the mobilisation of labour necessary particularly during harvest season. For this purpose, the state continued setting orders and quotas for cotton production, while exercising monopsony power in order to pocket the difference between the state-fixed price of cotton on the domestic market and its (much) higher international price in hard currency, that is, ground-rent (EIU 2002: 22; Pomfret 2005a: 232). While the confiscation of ground-rent from farmers (or fermery) explains the ongoing conflicts between the latter and the authorities ‘around factors that determine the profitability of agriculture’ (Trevisani 2010: 219), with many struggling to profit from cotton and some even going bankrupt (Bloch 2002: 9-10; CER 2004: 33; ICG 2005: 5; Trevisani 2009: 130-131; INT-6),40 the landlord-state allocated it to guarantee the reproduction of the total social capital via the subsidisation of loss-making enterprises (World Bank 1993b: 32-33, 64, 67, 70, 83, 87), including through ‘inflationary financing’ (EIU 1997a: 103; Zhukov 2005: 316), in order to maintain overall production and, crucially, secure the continuation of cotton exports (World Bank 2002: 36).

In parallel, the GoU introduced state orders and quotas for wheat to switch significant land hectarage from cotton and achieve grain self-sufficiency (Karimov 1995: 208; Khan 1996; EIU 1997: 105-106; CER 2004: 9; Zhukov 2005: 304-305; Lombardozzi 2019: 64-65),

40 This has been the case despite the GoU’s provision of subsidised inputs such as water, fuel, and chemical fertilizers to farmers, as the state generally set unrealistically high production quotas and then purchased the full harvest at state procurement prices significantly below the international price of cotton (Guadagni et al. 2005; Frye 2010: 236; Lombardozzi 2020b). The same applies to wheat (Connolly 1997; Mirkasimov & Parpiev 2017).

138 sharply reduce wheat imports, and ‘redistribute the saved foreign exchange resources to tackle other urgent tasks for the republic’ (Karimov 1995: 208; Lombardozzi & Djanibekov 2021), that is, subsidise the total social capital. Again, while struggling to gain from wheat production, multiple cropping allowed (cotton and/or wheat) fermery to profit from the cultivation of other cash crops (Chapter 5). Instead, across the economy, the costs of transition were being socialised via the collapse in real wages and welfare, including wage arrears, outright non-payment or payment in kind, signalling a dramatic shift from the indiscriminate reproduction of the working class in Soviet times to the steep differentiation in its costs of reproduction following independence (Chapter 5). Succinctly put, as class is the foundational divide in the capitalist system, the working class was being squeezed to guarantee capital accumulation.

State intervention was equally important to sustain, and expand, the republic’s industrial base necessary to support cotton production amid the collapse of total social manufacturing capital and the reprimarisation of the economy across the FSU, given the lack of solvent demand for uncompetitive Soviet manufactures as well as the unsuitability of the relatively expensive and undisciplined fragments of the now-former-Soviet working class for world market production (Chapter 3). Thus, the energy industry was centralised in one vertically integrated state-owned enterprise (SOE), Uzbekneftegaz (UNG) (EIU 2002: 30; Sultanov 2017; INT-23), in order to achieve energy self-sufficiency, fuel the economy and, crucially, guarantee the fuel and fertilizers needed for cotton production for export. UNG’s natural gas extraction provided the feedstock necessary to boost production of chemical fertilizers for agriculture in cooperation with UzKhimProm, the chemical SOE (EIU 1997b: 29, 2002: 30- 31, 2008: 25, 30; IMF 1998: 11; Gleason 2003: 119; Kotz 2003: 34; Pomfret 2005a: 234, fn. 9; Spechler 2008: 151, fn. 7; Jones Luong & Weinthal 2010: 86; Lombardozzi 2016: 23; INT-23). Capital in the gold sector remained centralised in two major SOEs, too, the Navoi Mining and Metallurgical Company (NGMK) and the Almalyk Mining and Metallurgical Company (AGMK) (Hoen & Irnazarov 2012: 30; Section 2). As a result, despite some export differentiation including in manufacturing, most capital has been concentrated in the extraction and processing of natural resources (EIU 1997a: 108-109, 2002: 8, 10, 2004: 5- 6, 2005a: 5-6, 2006: 5, 2008: 36; Lord 2005: 23-24; World Bank 2013a), with primary commodities accounting for 77% of total exports in 2018 (Trushin 2019: 7). This explains why, in line with dynamics in the FSU region (Chapter 3), a close connection exists between raw material prices, FDIs, exports, and GDP growth in Uzbekistan, as ‘[t]he chief external factor affecting economic performance [in the country] is global commodity price trends’ (EIU 2013: 7).

139 Thus, within the unity of global accumulation, Uzbekistan’s different ‘Uzbek path’ of transition resulted in the same qualitative form of incorporation into the IDL on the basis of the CIDL, that is, as a raw material exporter whose ‘backward’ manufacturing capitals have since accumulated at the average rate of profit via ground-rent subsidisation, in line with the rest of the FSU region (Chapter 3). Again, the Uzbek model did not determine the transition; rather, it mediated it within the material conditions of capital accumulation prevalent in the world market in the 1990s. Only demand for raw materials from newly-independent Uzbekistan, particularly cotton (and gold), remained solvent; no such demand existed for Uzbek manufacturers given that the Uzbek fragment of the working class was relatively expensive and undisciplined, hence unsuited for world market production (Chapter 3). Differences in performance between the various FSU republics are thus a function of their respective resource endowments or, in other words, the result of the quantitative difference in the fluctuating magnitude of ground-rent available within their territory in line with commodity prices on the world market. So, with the state’s centralisation of cotton rents due to the crop’s specificity and centrality to the political economy of the newly-independent republic, Uzbekistan did experience a lower post-independence output contraction and faster return to growth than most other FSU republics, as, from early on in the transition, ground-rent was reinvested in ‘the large rise in oil and gas production [that] cushioned the fall in GDP’ (EIU 1997b: 29; INT-23), as well as in ‘backward’ (largely import-substitution) industrialisation such as in the automotive industry (Section 3). In line with other ‘resource rich’ countries, including in the FSU, ‘backward’ capitals manufacture substandard goods that are largely sold on the domestic market (Chapters 2-3).

Therefore, this formulation explains the why behind the Uzbek model (RQ2), while critically problematising the way in which the transition literature construes Uzbekistan’s trajectory since independence. On the one hand, neoliberal transitology argues that the country’s ‘mobile’ raw materials - cotton and gold41 - and their relatively high international prices at the time allowed the GoU to gain enough financial leeway to avoid reforms (Chapter 1). The problem is that, no matter how easily cotton can be exported to the international market - as compared to the huge pipeline infrastructure needed to export oil from neighbouring Kazakhstan - one must still produce it first. Given their exceptionalisation of the Uzbek model as no/slow/late reform and their ensuing expectation that ‘bad’ policies would translate into no growth, neoliberal transitologists can only frame Uzbekistan’s better-than-

41 Though cotton was dominant at the time, gold was also a major export item for Uzbekistan, whose importance has only grown in the years and decades since (Section 2). This does not change the overall argument advanced here, given the unquestionable centrality of cotton to Uzbekistan’s political economy at independence.

140 expected (by them) initial performance as the ‘Uzbek growth puzzle’, making it a ‘puzzle’ of the literature’s own ideal-type theorisation.

On the other hand, President Karimov never tired of contrasting the widespread deindustrialisation and collapse in living standards in other FSU and former socialist republics as a result of the orthodox reform package to the success of his own Uzbek model of ‘a socially oriented market economy’, that is, economic diversification, industrialisation, and a strong social policy for the most vulnerable strata of the population (Karimov 1993a: 188, 203, 215-216, 222-223, 1995: 165, 172-173, 191-192, 225-226, 270-273, 299-300, 311-312). However, albeit to a lesser extent due to a lower level of industrialisation (IMF 1998; Alam & Banerji 2000) and ground-rent subsidisation post-independence, Uzbekistan experienced the same overall trend of decentralisation of total social capital prevalent in the rest of the FSU (Chapter 3), resulting in the collapse of manufacturing output evident in the loss of a significant number of enterprises, particularly in light industry, and the ‘drastic decline in the numbers of basically all types of agricultural machinery (except intertillage tractors)’ (CER 2004: 16 & Table 3, 2009a: 14; World Bank 1993b: 63; Popov 2013: 15, Table 2; INT-6; INT-9). The drop was especially steep in the case of mechanical harvesters, whose production plunged from ‘2,000 … per year in the 1980s … to very low levels in the early 1990s’ (Pomfret 2002: 183, fn. 40, 185, Table 5); with maintenance also plummeting along with the dismantlement of agricultural collectives, by 2003 the number of harvesters stood at 12% of their 1997 figure (CER 2004: 16, Table 3). Thus, from day one of the transition, extractive and ‘backward’ industries dominated the Uzbek economy in line with the rest of the FSU.

Moreover, in the context of broad de-mechanisation, agricultural labour continued to be highly feminised as during Soviet times but grew exponentially, including for cotton picking (Chapter 5). In other words, the collapse in mechanisation was compensated by the availability of a vast relative surplus population ‘freed’ from the land and ready to fill the vacuum in order to reproduce themselves amid rising informality, precarity, and poverty, with women representing a huge share of this informal peasant workforce, including for manual cotton picking (Chapter 5). Thus, contrary to transitology’s common claim of an amorphous squeeze on agriculture and/or cotton as a sector, as well as specifically to developmentalists’ claim of a ‘socially oriented’ market economy (Chapter 1), agricultural production in general, and cotton production in particular, constitute a squeeze on labour, particularly female peasant labour who generally carries out the most labour-intensive activities in the cotton fields for small agricultural capitalists (fermery) leasing the land (Chapter 5). In order to fathom the extent of this squeeze, suffice to mention that, in e.g.

141 1999, Uzbekistan accrued 797 million USD from cotton exports, while the total cost of cotton picking for that year amounted to 3 million USD (Apostolou 2000).42 Succinctly put, capitalist transformation is neither classless, nor gender-liberating, as the transition literature would have it; rather, class and gender - the latter internally related to, hence co-constitutive of, the former - is the foundational divide in the capitalist mode of production.

Crucially, while some forms of the country’s political-economy - e.g. state orders, state ownership of the land, cotton picking - remained the same on the surface, their content radically changed, as the Uzbek model mediated the shift from the Fordist material conditions of production and indiscriminate labour reproduction during Soviet times, to the independent republic’s differentiation in the costs of reproduction of the working class most evident in class stratification and the rise of a vast relative surplus population (Chapters 3, 5). Again, along with the ‘Uzbek growth puzzle’, neoliberal transitology’s framing of the Uzbek model as the epitome of no/slow/late reform leaves it with the ‘paradox’ of no transition and the huge transformation observable in the country three decades later, since, given the former, the literature cannot possibly explain the latter (Introductory Chapter; Chapter 1). Instead, as in other ‘resource rich’ countries of the Global South, including the FSU, changes to land use (decollectivisation, i.e. primitive accumulation) were central to Uzbekistan’s transformation from ‘land for welfare’ - cotton production in exchange of indiscriminate social reproduction including via collective ownership of the land - to ‘land for capital accumulation’ - production/extraction of ground-rent bearing raw materials in order to subsidise the reproduction of the total social capital.

The policy and institutional arrangements of the Uzbek model are thus social forms of the class struggle that reveal the class character of the state. While ground-rent subsidisation guaranteed capital accumulation in the country, land use for raw material production excluded from the land most of the population, which ‘backward’ manufacturing capitals could only very partially absorb (this chapter). This resulted in the sharp differentiation in the costs of reproduction of the working class in the country, along in/formal, geographic (rural-urban, regional), gender, and skill lines, especially with the rise of a vast relative surplus population struggling amid precarity, poverty, and migration, and whose reproduction has been largely guaranteed by women’s hugely increased ‘double burden’. In parallel, the authoritarian state managed and, whenever a perceived threat arose, brutally repressed labour organising (Chapter 5). Equally, land (and resource) use for capital

42 The better quality (value) of Uzbek hand-picked cotton over mechanically harvested one is widely acknowledged in the literature (Kandiyoti 2002a: 8, fn. 11; Spoor 2005: 70; Lombardozzi 2016: 18).

142 accumulation fed into the increasing alterations to Earth’s fragile ecosystem evident in the escalating climate crisis, whose effects risk impinging on the future reproduction of this vast relative surplus population (Chapter 6). Succinctly put, class, as internally related to gender and land use, is the foundational divide in the capitalist mode of production, problematising transitology’s ideal-type classless, gender-liberating, and eco-friendly democratic capitalism.

1.2. State policies and institutions: ground-rent for ‘backward’ industrialisation

Rent centralisation enabled the power structure in independent Uzbekistan to remain highly vertical (and authoritarian). The President and his presidential apparatus, as well as the Council of Ministers headed by the Prime Minister, used decrees and resolutions to steer policy and allocate responsibility for implementation, monitoring, and reporting to other competent institutions (Karimov 1995: 181; Klugman 1998: 79; Melvin 2000: 32-33, 73-74; Kangas 2001: 134-136; Spechler 2008). For economic policy, these have been the Ministry of Economy (MOE), Trade (MFT),43 and Finance (MOF), as well as the CBU, the NBU and, since 2006, the Fund for Reconstruction and Development (UFRD), with their regional and local representatives or branches, including commercial banks linked to specific industries (e.g. Asaka bank for the automotive industry). State enterprises (e.g. SOEs), committees (e.g. geology), and associations have also been involved in the implementation of economic policy.

Therefore, despite the introduction of a national parliament and elections, the GoU’s authoritarian streak was more immediately evident since independence (Ilkhamov 2002), as the centralisation of cotton rents afforded it more leeway in subsidising the reproduction of the total social capital, hence mitigating the post-independence output contraction. While significant, centrifugal regional forces were more successfully managed by a ‘strong presidential rule’ that struck ‘a fine balance between concessions and reprisals’ with regional elites, particularly on the contentious centralisation of cotton rents previously redistributed to the regions by the Soviet ‘centre’ (Ilkhamov 2004: 163, 161, 181). As a result, regional governors enjoyed ‘relatively limited autonomy and typically remain[ed] dependent on central government resources’ (Klugman 1998: 79). Contra neoliberal and developmental transitology, this was not the outcome of no/slow/late transition to democratic capitalism (the former) or of a ‘socially oriented market economy’ within an ‘own

43 Since being created in 1992, the MOE and MFT have changed names half a dozen times each. As of 2021, the former is called the Ministry of Economic Development and Poverty Reduction and the latter the Ministry of Investments and Foreign Trade.

143 notion of democracy’ (the latter); rather, as ‘liberalisation’ for the energy-rich FSU republics, ‘centralisation’ under the Uzbek model was the political-economic form mediating Uzbekistan’s integration into the IDL as a raw material exporter.

With Uzbekistan being incorporated into the IDL on the basis of the CIDL, economic activity therein has been increasingly concentrated in primary commodity extraction/production, turning the country into a source of ground-rent appropriation in line with ‘resource rich’ states in the Global South in general, and the FSU region in particular (Chapters 2-3). This has defined the development of ‘backward’ manufacturing industries - such as automotive, textile, and electronics, including in JV with foreign capital (IMF 1998: 11, 13) - on the basis of import-substitution industrialisation (ISI) via ground-rent subsidisation. As a result, rather than production for the world market, manufacturing capital in Uzbekistan has been small by international standards, producing expensive substandard goods mostly for the protected domestic market, or for countries with which Uzbekistan signed an FTA, as is the case of the car industry (Section 3). The state has allocated ground-rent to subsidise manufacturing ISI in the form of implicit and explicit subsidies, preferences, and tax and other exemptions given to enterprises, in combination with varying degrees of domestic market protections such as tariff and non-tariff barriers, excise taxes, and import quotas.

One of the main policies for the state to appropriate ground-rent for ‘backward’ industrialisation has been to buy raw materials at lower fixed prices in the domestic market in order to resell them at international prices in the world market. In the crucial cotton sector, the Agricultural Fund (Selkhozfond) - a sub-department of the MOF whose leadership reported directly to the Finance Minister - set the procurement price for raw cotton at an ‘artificially low’ level (Muradov & Ilkhamov 2014: 12, 18, 20-21; CER 2004: 17; Jones Luong & Weinthal 2010: 90), while the state’s monopsony power allowed it to hoard most of the annual cotton production for sale on the international market via three ‘government- controlled trading companies’ under the MFT (Bendini 2013: 23; INT-30a). Apart from cotton, the GoU maintained state orders and production quotas for a number of strategic natural resources, establishing a cut-off price at which it would purchase the commodity, pocketing the substantial difference between it and international prices denominated in hard currency, that is, ground-rent (Chapter 2). For example, in 1992, state orders on gold were paid at 20% of market prices; for copper, lead and zinc at 40% thereof (World Bank 1993b: 161; Connolly 1997: 397).

Another policy to subsidise the reproduction of the total social capital via ground-rent has been the overvaluation of the national currency, which applies an implicit tax on exports and

144 an implicit subsidy on imports across the domestic economy. Until the presidential decree liberalising the national currency, the soum, in September 2017 (more on this below), an overvalued ‘official’ CBU exchange rate was part of a system of multiple exchange rates and obligatory hard currency surrender requirements (Pomfret 1995: 71; IMF 2000: 7, 92- 93; EIU 2002: 20; Gleason 2003: 124-125; Blackmon 2009: 144, 146; Jones Luong & Weinthal 2010: 91; World Bank 2013a: 25). So, in effect,

Uzbekistan operate[d] a system of three exchange rates. The official exchange rate [was] applied to all foreign exchange earnings from centralized exports (mainly gold and cotton) and centralized imports … . The slightly more depreciated commercial bank exchange rate [was] used for the obligatory surrender of foreign exchange earnings from all other exports … . All other foreign trade operations, in particular imports outside the foreign exchange quota and licensing system, [took] place at the illegal curb market exchange rate (IMF 2000: 78).

This draconian currency regime allowed the GoU to hoard the lion’s share of ground-rent from the export of strategic (centralised) and other (non-centralised) exports to subsidise enterprises of their choosing. Moreover, exporters had to surrender all or part of the hard currency earned in order to have it converted at the overvalued official exchange rate, which effectively constituted a further appropriation of ground-rent on top of the cut-off or procurement price (IMF 2000: 9, 15; EIU 2000b: 33; Rosenberg & de Zeeuw 2000: 4; World Bank 2013a: 25).

The overvaluation of the domestic currency in a multiple exchange rate system allowed enterprises to import capital goods purchased at lower prices on the international market as inputs for industrial development (EIU 1997a: 117, 2000b: 20, 2002: 32; Gleason 2003: 124; Lord 2005: 25; Broome 2010: 174-175). Moreover, machinery, equipment, and technology ‘face very low tariffs and individual enterprises are often granted tariff [and excise taxes] exemptions’ (IMF 1998: 119). Specific enterprises in ‘priority sectors’ identified by the GoU, such as the automotive industry, could also avail themselves of credit at preferential interest rates by domestic banks (INT-41). In this context, the CBU functioned as an institutional instrument of government policy, whose ‘most prominent quasi-fiscal activity [has been] the granting of preferential credits to priority sectors of the economy’ (World Bank 1994: 35). The CBU funnels investments via commercial banks ‘at subsidized rates’ (IMF 1998: 99) that effectively carry (very) negative interest rates (World Bank 1993b: 12, 29, 87). In parallel to the CBU, the NBU has undertaken ‘international financial business on behalf of the Government (export/import financing, foreign currency trading, and so forth)’, lending

145 ‘primarily’ to state enterprises (ibid.: 85; EBRD 2005: 18; Pomfret 2005a: 225-226). Both banks are answerable ‘to the Cabinet of Ministers and ultimately, the presidential apparatus’ (FH 1998: 650; EIU 2000a: 29).

The objective of these ‘producer subsidies’ (World Bank 1993b: 29) and ‘implicit tax “revenues” from Uzbekistan’s foreign exchange regime’ has clearly been ‘the subsidization of certain industries’ (Rosenberg & de Zeeuw 2000: 13), in line with ‘the [Uzbek] authorities’ emphasis on industrialization, development of import-substituting and targeted export- oriented industries, and diversification of domestic production’ (IMF 1998: 107; Karimov 1995: 292-293), that is, ground-rent subsidisation for ‘backward’ industrialisation. The establishment of three Free/Special Industrial and Economic Zones (FEZs) in 2008, 2012, and 2013, expanded many such subsidies, preferences, and exemptions to all foreign investors willing to relocate to the country, particularly in JV with domestic enterprises, such as three to seven year tax holidays depending on the level of initial investment (UNDP 2009: 21, 78; IFMR & UNDP 2014: 35ff.). Moreover, especially since 1998, significant subsidies, preferences, and exemptions have also targeted small and medium enterprises (SMEs), particularly in the form of substantial tax breaks and reductions, as well as bank loans ‘at heavily subsidised interest rates’ including for the purchase of equipment from abroad (OECD 2013b: 57; Estrada et al. 2013: 12; INT-27; INT-64; INT-67; INT-73a). Successive programmes of so-called ‘localisation’ - jargon for ISI - contributed huge subsidies and benefits to SMEs and SOEs in order to increase the local content of finished production, thus decreasing the costs of imports of parts and components (MoE 2018; UzKhimProm 2018; INT-16; INT-27; INT-39). As a result, of the hundreds of thousands of SMEs that came into existence since, 20.3% have been in manufacturing (Tadjibaeva 2019: 5), including in the industrial SME cluster that grew around the automotive industry (UzAuto 2018).

Furthermore, government monopolies and SOEs have provided subsidised utilities - particularly gas and ‘gas-fired’ electricity (Pirani 2012: 58) - as well as cheap inputs, two other crucial forms of ground-rent subsidisation for ‘backward’ industrialisation across the Uzbek political-economy. Priority industrial SOEs and a whole range of SMEs have benefitted from the provision of inputs and utilities at subsidised rates (World Bank 2013a: 16; Trushin 2018: 16). Despite problems in the smooth supply of both (IFC 2009: 19, 74-75, 84-88), the number of SMEs and their weight in total employment grew exponentially as a consequence, particularly in the service sector (more on this below). The provision of cheap inputs such as ammonia from UzKhimProm helped to spawn a large food and confectionery industry, as well as the domestic production of home cleaning products; likewise, the supply

146 of raw materials such as copper contributed to the domestic manufacturing of industrially- produced home appliances (OECD 2017: 31; INT-10; INT-15; INT-38a).

Finally, by promoting energy and grain self-sufficiency since independence (Karimov 1995: 173-174, 208), the GoU allowed for the circulation of ground-rent bearing natural gas and wheat at below international prices on the domestic market (World Bank 1994; Connolly 1997: 394, 402), including via the imposition of taxes on the export of foodstuff (Trushin & Trushin 2005: 345; Ganiev & Yusupov 2012: 8). While neither was ever completely achieved and the population in rural areas continue to experience gas and electricity shortages (IWPR 2011; Tynan 2012; Sadykov 2013; FH 2013: 613), subsidised utilities (World Bank 2003: 16-17; Pirani 2012: 50ff.; INT-23) and wheat - including price controls for e.g. flour and bread production (WFP 2008: 37; Mirkasimov & Parpiev 2017; Burkitbayeva et al. 2020: 16; INT-6) - contributed to increasing the purchasing power of the working class, at least partly explaining domestic solvent demand for relatively expensive Uzbek-manufactured goods such as cars, home appliances, and electronics. Put differently, higher prices for domestic goods represent yet another form of ground-rent appropriation by small manufacturing capitals in the Uzbek market (Section 3).

This account problematises the ‘dual economy’ theory found in neo-institutional accounts of state capitalism, where a state-controlled ‘core’ (SOEs) operates side by side with a private sector-dominated ‘periphery’ (SMEs), as well as developmental transitology’s claims of the Uzbek model’s success at industrial upgrading (Chapter 1). Instead, as argued, all manufacturing capitals in Uzbekistan - regardless of ‘nationality’ and legal status (e.g. SOEs or SMEs) - exhibit the same qualitative form of accumulation via ground-rent subsidisation as mediated by state policies and institutions. Accordingly, all such ‘small’ capitals by ‘normal’ international standards have largely mobilised labour with degraded subjectivity to operate obsolete machinery, producing relatively expensive and substandard goods mostly for the domestic market (Section 3). Not only has their production been dependent on the fluctuating magnitude of ground-rent available in the Uzbek market, in line with the changing international prices of the country’s primary commodities, but also their costs of production have tended to rise in view of the growing gap in output scale between the domestic and international markets (Chapters 2-3; Section 3). As a consequence of the limited scale of domestic production, ‘backward’ manufacturing capitals have failed to absorb a vast part of the population, which has turned into relative surplus for the requirements of accumulation (Chapter 5).

147 In this perspective, the theoretical-methodological approach adopted in this dissertation can simultaneously account for transformation (industrialisation) and its specific qualitative form (‘backward’), explaining what neither neoliberal nor developmental transitologists could. The former’s insistence that industrial policy under the Uzbek model represented the continuation of Soviet-style policies encouraging rent-seeking (no transition) left it with the ‘paradox’ of industrialisation in new economic sectors such as the automotive industry, including in JV with foreign MNCs. While the latter’s framing of Uzbekistan as a developmental state avoided this ‘paradox’, it still could not account for the ‘backward’ form of industrialisation via ground-rent subsidisation, hence for the crucial fact that Uzbekistan remains a raw material exporter in the IDL, hardly a sign of successful industrial ‘upgrading’. In short, ‘backward’ industrialisation is neither the outcome of a failed transition nor the result of a successful industrialisation strategy, but rather a form of the essential unity of global capital accumulation in the Uzbek national space of valorisation.

2. ...TO ‘LIBERALISATION’

During President Karimov’s time at the helm of independent Uzbekistan (1991-2016), the Uzbek model mediated the country’s integration into the IDL as a raw material exporter. However, changes in global demand, particularly the rise in international prices for raw materials linked to the Chinese-demand-led commodity supercycle (Chapters 2-3), along with the evolving material conditions in the Uzbek market as mediated by the Uzbek model, translated into cotton ceding pride of place to gold and natural gas as the country’s main export commodities. These developing material conditions account for changes since independence under the Uzbek model, as well as the process of ‘liberalisation’ once President Mirziyoyev came to office in 2016 after 13 years as the country’s Prime Minister. Crucially, these are all but the diverse national forms of realisation of the essential unity of global accumulation, as Uzbekistan remains incorporated into the IDL as a raw material exporter whose ‘backward’ manufacturing capitals accumulate at the average rate of profit via ground-rent subsidisation. As a result, the mass of the population expelled from the land continues to be surplus for the requirements of global accumulation, as evident - inter alia - in the country’s ongoing migratory flows (Chapter 5).

Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, the Uzbek model mediated profound changes in the country’s cotton sector, which resulted in a fall in crop production in both absolute and relative terms (Abdullaev et al. 2005: 115; Figure 4.1). First, as explained, significant land hectarage was transferred from cotton to wheat to achieve grain self-sufficiency. Equally, an increasing amount of land was gradually diverted to the cultivation of fruits, including in

148 intensive orchards, and vegetables, creating a lucrative agribusiness sector particularly for export to the Russian market (Yuldashbaev 2014: 3-4; Larson et al. 2015: 26, 28; INT-68b; INT-68c; Chapter 6). In parallel, investments in the textile industry, though slow and gradual, expanded the amount of cotton fibre processed domestically from 13% in 1996 to 30% in 2008 (EIU 2008: 30). Second, relative yields in the country flattened, due to a combination of ‘inadequate investment and maintenance of infrastructure and capital equipment’ (Golub & Kestelman 2015: 12; IFC 2019: 5), as well as a change in the differential natural conditions of the land, especially in terms of declining fertility owing to soil salinisation, itself the result of decades of cotton production for export as well as the introduction of multiple cropping, including wheat (Muradov & Ilkhamov 2014: 45; Chapters 5-6).

Figure 4.1. Uzbekistan’s cotton production (tons) (1989-2019) & cotton exports (mln USD) (1995-2018) Source: own elaboration based on IndexMundi and OEC data (data set in Appendix 5).

Third, and directly related, Uzbekistan lagged significantly behind competitor countries in the sector such as India and China (Baffes 2005: 31; Djanibekov et al. 2010: 8), at a time when genetically modified varieties and chemical fibers, particularly the cheaper polyester, were rapidly eroding cotton’s share of the global textile fibre market in the new millennium, which shrank from 49.1% in 1990 to 27.6% in 2015 (Ethridge 2016: 13, Figure 3), with China at the forefront of these developments, too (UNEP 2002: 73-74; Baffes 2005: 31, 34, Figure 2, 49; Chen 2017; Hughes 2017). The combination of these radical changes in the domestic

149 and international market led to Uzbekistan’s total cotton production being more than halved between 1990 and 2018, as well as its share of total world cotton exports dropping from 10.7% in 1990-91 to 3.9% in 2014-15 (Ethridge 2016: 16, Figure 10). As a result, cotton plummeted from 57.3% of the country’s total exports in 1996 to a paltry 2.14% in 2018 (Figure 4.1).

2.1. Different forms, same content

Parallel to these developments, starting in the late 1990s international prices for primary commodities began rising in order to encapsulate the growing magnitude of ground-rent necessary to expand production/extraction in the worst (‘marginal’) lands and satisfy soaring solvent demand, especially in the wake of China’s meteoric industrialisation (Chapters 2- 3). As a result, the ‘development of the hydrocarbons and gold sectors pick[ed] up speed’ (EIU 2005a: 6) in Uzbekistan, with centralised social capital in the form of SOEs continuing to dominate both sectors. The NGMK and the AGMK have combinedly produced 86% of the country’s gold output (EIU 2002: 22; Vorotnikov 2014), both for use as national reserves and, increasingly, for export, as the metal has become ever more important as a store of value amid global financial volatility, especially after the 2008 financial crisis. Ore processing capacity at NGMK, for example, increased by 86.7% between 1991 and 2015 (NGMK 2015); first national reserves rose to 22.5 billion USD by 2013 (World Bank data), then gold exports boomed along with international prices from 658 million USD in 2012 (or 12.3% of total exports) to 2.49 billion USD in 2018 (or 23.6% of the total) (OEC data; EIU 2013: 7).

The same dynamics emerged in the oil and gas industry, too. In the 1990s, with scarce FDIs due to low energy prices, the GoU poured enormous resources into the energy industry in order to fuel the economy and, crucially, sustain cotton production (EIU 1997a: 108-109; INT-23; Section 1). As the EIU (1998: 30) put it at the time, ‘[c]onsiderable investment would be needed to produce the large volumes of oil and gas for export which is unlikely given the cost of production in Uzbekistan and low world oil prices’, along with the country’s ‘distance from hard-currency oil and gas markets’. With the rise in solvent demand starting in the 2000s, commodity prices soared to account for the growing amount of ground-rent necessary to put these ‘worst lands’ into production in order to satisfy such demand. In Uzbekistan, the commodity supercycle contributed to significant joint investments between UNG and a number of foreign companies, SOEs, and development banks, particularly from Russia and Asia (EIU 2007a: 4, 2008: 36; UNECE 2010: 128; Pirani 2012: 32-35, 2019: 17- 19; INT-35), in the energy industry, which surged from 190 million USD in 2000 to 16.3

150 billion USD in 2016 in parallel with the rise in energy prices (UNG 2018). This included the construction of the Surgil Natural Gas Chemicals Project in the Ustyurt Plateau in the country’s west to ‘produce gas for commercial use and for conversion into chemical intermediates used in the plastics and textiles industries’ (ADB 2012; Reuters 2015; Abbasova 2016), providing cheap inputs for ‘backward’ manufacturing. In September 2012, Uzbekistan started exporting natural gas via the Central Asia-China Gas pipeline to China (EIU 2013: 18), which has since become the main export market for Uzbek gas (OEC data), as well as Central Asia’s (Chapter 2).

Figure 4.2.a. Uzbekistan’s & Turkmenistan’s FDIs in mln USD vis-à-vis natural gas price (1992- 2018) Source: own elaboration based on UNCTAD data (data set in Appendix 5).

FDI flows closely followed these trends. During the 1990s, they remained paltry due to low energy prices; from the 2000s onward, they perceptibly increased due to rising commodity prices. While the literature construes low overall FDI flows as mainly the consequence of the country’s non/slow/late transition (e.g. Jeffries 2003: 341-342; Lord 2005: 19; Pomfret 2005a: 226) and poor business environment (e.g. Burunciuc et al. 2018; OECD 2019b: 234; Trushin 2019: 21), by the 2010s the evidence had become indisputable that differences ‘in economic performance’ between FSU states ‘during the 2000s were overwhelmingly determined by energy endowments’ (Pomfret 2010: 23). Uzbekistan is no exception. So, the key to explain variations between the three Central Asian resource-rich republics -

151 Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan - is the latter two’s vastly larger energy endowments (EIU 1998: 30; Auty 2003: 262; World Bank 2013a: 16). While Uzbekistan has relatively small and dwindling oil resources, Kazakhstan holds 1.7% of the world’s total proved reserves (BP 2019: 14); equally, Turkmenistan boasts 9.9% of global proven natural gas reserves, as compared to Uzbekistan’s 0.6% (ibid.: 30). As a result, despite Kazakhstan’s business environment actually deteriorating in the 2000s (Chapter 3) and Turkmenistan having ‘one of the worst business climates and legal regimes in the former Communist bloc’ (EIU 1997c: 30), their FDIs soared in line with oil and gas prices (Åslund & Jenish 2007: 31); so did Uzbekistan’s, though to a lower extent proportional to its comparatively more limited oil and gas deposits (Figures 4.2.a, 4.2.b).

Figure 4.2.b. Kazakhstan’s FDIs in mln USD vis-à-vis oil price (1992-2018) Source: own elaboration based on UNCTAD data (data set in Appendix 5).

As in other resource rich countries including in the FSU (Chapters 2-3), Uzbekistan created a sovereign wealth fund (SWF) to accumulate the rising windfalls from raw materials exports during the commodity supercycle to be used as cheap credit and investments (ground-rent subsidisation), as well as for financial sterilisation in the event of a crisis. Established in 2006 by presidential decree, the UFRD is answerable to the Cabinet of Ministers (PP-350 2006). UFRD equity soared from an initial one billion USD to 20 billion USD in 2018 (Shaismatov 2018), largely accumulated from the difference between domestic cut-off prices and the international prices of raw materials on the global market (PP-350 2006: Art.

152 3; Shaismatov 2018; IMF 2019: 60; UNECE 2020: 59; INT-10; INT-12; INT-14; INT-26), that is, from the appropriation of ground-rent accruing from the export of gold and natural gas, as well as other primary commodities such as other non-ferrous metals (e.g. silver, copper, uranium, zinc).

Therefore, the state continued mediating the ground-rent subsidisation of more ‘backward’ capitals, including in the textile and electronics sectors, in the wake of the commodity supercycle. It is during this period that two of the now most recognisable enterprises on the Uzbek market appeared, namely UZTEX in 2009 - a ‘leading vertically integrated manufacturer of textile products in the CIS’ (UZTEX website n.d.) - and Artel in 2011 - ‘a leader in the production of household appliances and electronics in Central Asia’ (Artel website n.d.), producing for the domestic market and largely exporting to other CIS countries, with which Uzbekistan enjoys an FTA (Mogilevskii 2012: 8; Schroeder et al. 2018: 17-18, incl. fns. 40-41; World Bank 2020: 69; OEC data). Both businesses received an array of benefits and exemptions, including subsidised inputs and utilities, access to hard currency, and import of (e.g. Swiss, Italian, Japanese) machinery at lower prices via the overvaluation of the domestic currency (INT-25a; INT-25b; INT28; INT-74). As INT-37 puts it, ‘you can count such big entrepreneurs [who are] not linked to the government on [the fingers of] one hand’. But SME development received a boost in this period, too, particularly as the GoU tried to create the conditions for the absorption of the mass of rural labour ‘freed’ from the dismantlement of collective farms (Chapter 5), including with the introduction of a simplified tax system in the form of significant, and increasing, tax breaks (PKM-159 1998; IFC 2009: 90-92, Annex 3; INT-65b; INT-70; INT-71a). As a result, if in 2004 SMEs accounted for 35.6% of GDP and 61% of total employment (IFC 2005: 6), by 2007 these figures had reached 46% and 72%, respectively, with a staggering increase in the number of SMEs from more than 200,000 in 2004 to 392,000 on January 1, 2008 (IFC 2009: 25). By 2016, SMEs accounted for 56% of GDP (Holzhacker 2018: 5; INT-40b).

153

Figure 4.3. Uzbekistan’s cotton, gold, and natural gas exports as % of total (selected years) Source: own elaboration based on OEC data (data set in Appendix 5).

By 2013, gold and natural gas consistently surpassed raw cotton as the country’s main export commodities, a gap that has only widened since, with the former combinedly accounting for 46.9% of all exports in 2018, for an approximate value of 5 billion USD, against the latter’s 2.14%, or 225 million USD (Figure 4.3). Succinctly put, Uzbekistan was transforming from an agrarian into a mining landlord-state. Accordingly, despite changes in its export balance sheet, the country remains incorporated into the IDL as a primary commodity exporter, so ‘[r]aw material extraction and processing [continue to] dominate the industrial sector’ (Lord 2005: 41), with foreign investments largely concentrated in mining, energy, and related industries (e.g. oil refining, petrochemicals). Overall, ‘[f]oreign investors in Uzbekistan are mainly interested in natural resources’: out of 26.6 billion USD of greenfield FDI capital between January 2003 and September 2017, 49% went to coal, oil, and natural gas alone (OECD 2019b: 236-237), explaining the close and enduring connection between commodity prices, FDIs, exports, and GDP growth in the country, in line with dynamics in the FSU region (Chapter 3). While the magnitude of ground-rent available in the domestic market increased due to the commodity supercycle, as evident in the growth of the automotive industry (Section 3) and other manufacturing sectors (e.g. electronics) during this period, this quantitative difference ran in parallel to the continuation of ‘backward’ industrialisation, defining the qualitative unity of manufacturing capital accumulation in Uzbekistan since independence.

154

Following the death of President Karimov in 2016, President Mirziyoyev initiated some important changes to the country’s political economy under the banner of opening and reform. In this context, neoliberal transitology has continued exceptionalising the present ‘liberalisation’ as a case of authoritarian upgrading, in contrast to its ideal-type democratic capitalism; for their part, developmental transitologists have referred to the current changes without providing an explanation for the jettisoning of the ‘successful’ Uzbek model (Chapter 1). Neither has referred to the changed material conditions in Uzbekistan and the world market analysed at length in the previous paragraphs in order to account for reform under the Mirziyoyev administration.

First, as a result of significant gold and hard currency reserves amassed since independence, especially during the commodity supercycle, Uzbekistan now enjoyed a solid financial position that allowed for a relaxation of the currency regime. Most notably, a September 2017 presidential decree eliminated the multiple exchange rate system, one of the most draconian forms of ground-rent appropriation by the state (UP-5177 2017). Second, by 2016, cotton rents had become so marginal to the country’s export balance sheet that the sector could be privatised with no significant consequences for the reproduction of the total social capital, as ground-rent has been increasingly accrued through the export of other commodities, particularly gold and natural gas. A series of presidential decrees and resolutions started liberalising the cotton sector, introducing vertically-integrated clusters with the participation of local and international investors that would organise the production and processing of cotton along the whole value-chain, from the growing of the crop to the realisation of finished goods for export in the textile and garment industry (UP-5853 2019; Trushin 2019: 2; INT-3; INT-72a). The GoU declared their intention to eliminate the system of state orders and quotas in full in 2020, while keeping up the fight against the use of forced labour during harvest (Erdogan 2020; World Bank 2020: 71).

As such, ‘liberalisation’ is another (national) form mediating (global) capital accumulation in Uzbekistan. But despite these notable changes, policy making keeps being enforced top- down via decrees and resolutions issued by the President, the PM, and the Cabinet of Ministers, while the authorities continue advocating ‘a state-led model with gradual reforms’ (IMF 2018b: 40).44 Crucially, the country has remained integrated into the IDL as a primary

44 While these decrees and resolutions are now published in draft form online for comment from the general population before being finalised, this has not altered the essence of the country’s top-down policy-making process.

155 commodity exporter (PP-8839 2019), whose ‘backward’ manufacturing capitals accumulate at the average rate of profit via ground-rent subsidisation through many of the same policy and institutional arrangements.

First, the state keeps appropriating the lion’s share of ground-rent from the difference between domestic cut-off prices and the international prices of raw materials on the global market, particularly gold and natural gas. The CBU, NBU, UFRD, and the commercial banks then funnel it through the financial system in the form of credit ‘through policy-based lending operations and shifting deposits to banks … on preferential terms’ (IMF 2019). In this context, the UFRD functions simultaneously as a SWF and a development bank, extending credits at ‘highly preferential terms’ to e.g. SOEs (IMF 2018a, 2018b: 7), as well as participating in joint investments with foreign companies, SOEs, and investment banks, mostly in the extraction and processing of raw materials. Out of more than 100 projects for a total investment in excess of 35 billion USD between 2006 and 2018, the UFRD’s ‘primary focus’ has been in oil and gas (Shaismatov 2018). Combined, the latter and mining represent 47% of overall investments in 63 completed and ongoing projects, which is expected to rise to 55% for the 40 projects currently under preparation (ibid.). In 2019, the biggest greenfield FDI to the country was in the petroleum refining industry (UNCTAD 2019: 75). Second, government monopolies and SOEs continue to provide cheap inputs and subsidised utilities to enterprises, with the latter corresponding to 7.4% of GDP, or 4.4 billion USD, in 2019 alone (IEA 2019; UNECE 2020: xxxiii). Third, the GoU has exponentially expanded the number of FEZs from three to 21, including turning the entire Navoi region into a FEZ, while creating 143 small industrial zones throughout the country, effectively generalising the various direct and indirect subsidies, preferences, and exemptions - all forms of ground-rent subsidisation - for any investor, national or international, willing to start a business in the country (SEZ website; UP-5719 2019).

In other words, all manufacturing capitals in Uzbekistan still accumulate at the average rate of profit via ground-rent subsidisation, being ‘small’ by international standards and largely producing for the domestic market. As a result, the limited scale of production within ‘backward’ industrialisation has failed to absorb the majority of the population into the labour process, turning it into surplus for the requirements of capital accumulation (Chapter 5). I now turn to an analysis of the country’s car industry in the past three decades, as the epitome of ‘backward’ industrialisation.

156 3. A CASE STUDY IN ‘BACKWARD’ INDUSTRIALISATION: UZBEKISTAN’S CAR INDUSTRY SINCE 1992

The automotive industry in general, and the car industry in particular, provide a useful case study to analyse the ‘backward’ form of accumulation in Uzbekistan, in line with the rest of the FSU region. To date, it is by far the country’s largest manufacturing industry in terms of production capacity and people employed (CER 2013a: 18, Table 1; CAAN 2019; Turdimov & Dorokhov 2019),45 so the general conclusions drawn about it can be largely applied to other manufacturing sectors, such as petrochemicals (e.g. plastics) and electronics. Given the car industry’s centrality to the economy, its creation from scratch and subsequent development since 1992 (Appendix 6) has sparked an intense debate in the literature along the same negative vs. positive exceptionalism lines reviewed in Chapter 1. On the one hand, neoliberal transitologists framed their criticism of the industry within their broader opposition to the distortionary policies of the Uzbek model to subsidise ISI, as evident in the battery of benefits and exemptions that the state’s holding company UzAvtoSanoat has received for decades without achieving competitiveness in the world market (Trushin & Trushin 2000: 205-206; EIU 2002: 24; Zhukov 2005: 321; Pomfret 2005: 226).46 In this view, the low quality and high prices of the cars produced in the country have been due to the industry’s ineffectiveness, the imports of parts and components at higher than market prices, and the corruption of the company’s managers (INT-14; Yusupov 2018). On the other hand, the developmentalists argued that the creation of the car industry has been a ‘great historical event’ (Karimov 1997: 71) and ‘one of the main achievements of independent Uzbekistan’ (Karimov 2016), with beneficial spillover effects for the rest of the economy in terms of added value and employment, especially in view of the myriad SMEs producing parts and components in the growing automotive cluster (Karimov 1997: 74-75; INT-9; INT-15; INT- 20; INT-26). The GoU under President Karimov and a minority of scholars hailed the development of ‘a competitive export-oriented auto industry from the ground up’ (Popov & Chowdhury 2016: 5) as a definite success of industrial policy in Uzbekistan, in contrast to most other states in the FSU region due to the latter’s choice of an orthodox reform ‘path’ that led to mass deindustrialisation (Popov 2013; Chapter 3).

45 For the car industry, most of the data in the remainder of the section refer to the Asaka factory in the Fergana Valley, by far the largest in terms of volumes of production (Appendix 6) and number of workers (approximately 8,000) employed within the industry, compared to small (ISUZU) and large (Mercedes) buses, as well as heavy-duty (MAN) trucks. 46 UzAvtoSanoat (n.d.) owns shares in the more than 85 firms that work in the automotive industry in the country and employ more than 26,000 workers.

157 However different their conclusions, neoliberals and developmentalists select some specific aspects of the car industry’s short history in order to support claims of inefficiency and corruption (the former) or successful export orientation (the latter). Still, both avoid addressing a series of crucial questions, such as (a) why leading car manufacturing TNCs would invest in a market like Uzbekistan’s, especially in view of corrupt managers and a notoriously difficult business environment, per the neoliberal literature; (b) why these TNCs would require monopoly power, protections, subsidies, and tax exemptions like their Uzbek counterparts; and, (c) how car manufacturing capital could accumulate at a profit given its small size relative to international standards in the industry, and, equally important, how solvent demand for Uzbek cars could be sustained in the country, given their relatively high domestic prices compared to international ones. The following paragraphs argue that ‘backward’ industrialisation via ground-rent subsidisation provides a cogent answer to all these outstanding questions. The section also begins to investigate the issue of solvent demand, which is then addressed in more detail in Chapter 5.

3.1. Uzbekistan’s ‘backward’ car manufacturing

At independence, Uzbekistan had no car industry, so, once after intense discussions the decision was taken to build one from scratch (CER 2013a: 9; INT-20), the government actively looked for international partners to realise their plan. As a consequence, Uzbekistan’s car industry has been linked to two major international car manufacturers in JV with state holding company UzAvtoSanoat, namely Korean Daewoo Motor Company (DMC), until the Daewoo Group - of which DMC was part - went bankrupt in 2000, and subsequently American General Motors (GM) (Appendix 6). The authorised capital for the JVs that DMC (UzDaewooAvto) and GM (GM Uzbekistan) formed with UzAvtoSanoat were 200 and 266.7 million USD, respectively. While significant in the context of Uzbekistan, this initial capital was clearly small by the industry’s huge, and growing, international standards of concentration and centralisation, themselves among the most potent forms of mediation of global accumulation in the NIDL, as explored in Chapter 2. At the time when it started production in Uzbekistan in 1996, Daewoo Group’s total domestic automotive industry related sales - including trading, financing, resource development, investment, project organisation, and logistics - amounted to 12.5 billion USD, with exports by its overseas subsidiaries reaching 8.6 billion USD in the same year (Quelch & Park 1998: 19, Exhibit 3). Likewise, when GM sealed a JV with UzAvtoSanoat in 2007, its total equity hovered around 15.5 billion USD (GM 2007: 95); since then, it has grown almost three-fold to 42.7 billion USD (US-SEC 2018: 18), in line with general trends in large-scale industry in the NIDL (Chapter 2).

158

However, Uzbekistan’s integration into the IDL as a raw material exporter defined the qualitatively ‘backward’ form of manufacturing capital accumulation within its territory, in line with ‘resource rich’ countries in the Global South, including the FSU region (Chapters 2-3). As a result, ground-rent subsidisation has become the only way in which such ‘small’ manufacturing capitals could accumulate at the average rate of profit since independence, that is, make a profit and stay in business. This explains why all manufacturing capitals in the country - regardless of their ‘nationality’ and legal form - have clamoured for subsidies, preferential treatment, and exemptions, as has been the case with similarly small TNC- operated manufacturing capitals in other primary commodity exporters such as car manufacturers in Russia (Chapter 3) and Latin America (Grinberg & Starosta 2009: 777, fn. 49). Pace the literature, these policies are neither the result of the GoU’s ‘deeply engrained [sic] protectionist habits’ (O’Casey 2018) (‘rent-seeking’), nor are they temporary measures needed to build domestic capacity before a turn to competitive export-orientation (CER 2013a: 16, Chart 2); rather, they are the national forms of mediation of the essential unity of global capital accumulation in Uzbekistan.

Specifically, UzDaewooAvto and GM Uzbekistan, along with their foreign TNC partners DMC and GM, respectively, obtained long tax holidays that would start from the beginning of production. UzDaewooAvto and DMC were exempted from all taxes, including on profit and VAT, for a period of 5 years (PKM-509 1992: Arts. 6-7); UzDaewooAvto could even retain the 22.5% excise tax on automobile sales on the Uzbek market ‘to increase production, expand the range and increase the competitiveness of manufactured consumer goods’ (PP-244 2005: Appendix 12.1). GM Uzbekistan and GM also secured blank exemption from all taxes for a period of 10 years (PP-800 2008: Art. 8; IFC 2009: 39), which was then extended to another JV between GM and UzAvtoSanoat for the production of car engines, namely GM Powertrain Uzbekistan (PP-1020 2008: Art. 3). Many such subsidies and exemptions applied to SMEs in the automotive cluster (PP-800 2008: Art. 8; PP-1020 2008: Art. 3; CER 2013b: 9), often in JVs with Korean capital, whose number reached 160 within the localisation push to increase the local content of manufactured cars (UzAuto 2018), particularly during times of high commodity prices. Between 2008 and 2010, for example, more than 260 new types of parts and components were localised (CER 2013a: 17, 39, Appendix 5). Finally, all enterprises were provided with land and, where possible, old buildings to be repurposed for industrial production, as well as free connection to, and subsidised provision of, utilities such as water, gas, and electricity.

159 Equally, the overvaluation of the domestic currency and the multiple exchange rate system redistributed ground-rent to subsidise the import of capital goods such as machinery and equipment as inputs for the development of the car industry. Access to hard currency at the overvalued official exchange rate allowed UzDaewooAvto and GM Uzbekistan to import machinery and equipment at subsidised prices, while all inputs were exempted from import tariffs and excise taxes (PKM-509 1992: Art. 7; PP-800 2008: Art. 8). Likewise, the state provided guarantees for the purchase of parts and components from South Korea (PKM- 118 1996: Art. 2), on which the domestic car industry is still largely dependent to this day, while commercial banks - particularly Asaka Bank - extended credits at preferential rates for the import of machinery, parts, and components (PKM-509 1992: Art. 5b; PKM-118 1996: Arts. 8-9). Moreover, Daewoo Group and GM negotiated multiple ad-hoc privileges with the Cabinet of Ministers, including monopoly power within the protected domestic Uzbek market (UNCTAD 1999: 5-6; INT-2; INT-4; INT-8; INT-14; INT-27). This explains why ‘there is one big investor per sector’ (INT-27) or at least per market segment; so, in the automotive industry, Daewoo first and then GM monopolised the car and minivan segment, ISUZU (Japan) controlled the bus market, and MAN (Germany) dominated the commercial trucks’.

Therefore, otherwise small manufacturing capitals by international standards could operate at a profit via ground-rent subsidisation. Within the usual ups and downs linked to the business cycle, this has been the case for UzDaewooAvto, GM Uzbekistan, and GM Powertrain Uzbekistan. So, for example, in 1997, profit margins for two UzDaewooAvto produced models, the Tico and the Nexia, stood at 13.3% (Quelch & Park 1998: 14, Table C). The average profitability rate of the fourteen main enterprises in UzAvtoSanoat structure went from -15.2% in 2000, when DMC went bankrupt, to 7.3% in 2010 and 2.4% in 2012. In these latter two years, GM Uzbekistan earned a profit of 6.5% and 0.9%, respectively (CER 2013a: 19, Table 2); likewise, a KPMG (2019: 5) audit document for GM Powertrain Uzbekistan records profits for 54.6 million USD in 2017 and 21.8 million USD in 2018.47

Moreover, the Uzbek market offered these TNCs the opportunity to redeploy and valorise fixed capital and technology that had become obsolete by international standards, and whose import for their local affiliates could be subsidised via ground-rent appropriation. So, while Daewoo went on an 18-billion USD spending-and-acquisition spree in the 1990s (Brzezinski 1997), including the opening of a ‘brand new’ passenger car plant in Korea

47 Given GM Powertrain Uzbekistan’s ownership structure (Appendix 6), this would be divided as 28.3 million USD for GM and 26.3 million USD for UzAvtoSanoat in 2017; for 2018, this would be 11.3 million USD for the former and 10.5 million USD for the latter.

160 (Tiberghien 2007: 160), it was ‘able to reduce its own cash contribution to total overseas projects by around 15 per cent by contributing in kind: for example, by contributing machines manufactured by or dismantled from Daewoo’s subsidiaries in Korea’ (Jeong 2004: 148, emphasis added). As a result, while in Korea Daewoo Group launched 6 new proprietary cars between 1996 and 2000 (ibid.: 153, Table 7.3), with the help of newly acquired UK high-tech firm International Automotive Design (Grinberg 2011: 147), at the same time in Uzbekistan UzDaewooAvto started production of old Daewoo models like the Tico and the Damas (CER 2013a: 15, Box 2), which had been sold in Korea since 1991 (Jae-un 2010b), as well as the rebranded Nexia (CER 2013a: 15, Box 2). The latter had begun production in July 1986 under the LeMan brand with ‘chronic losses’ in Korea and the US in the 1987- 92 period bar 1990 (Jeong 2004: 140-144),48 with production being eventually discontinued in February 1997 (Jae-un 2010a), that is, shortly after machinery for its assemblage was moved to Uzbekistan.

The available evidence suggests that the same dynamics have been at play with GM, as the import of obsolete machinery and technology by international standards has been subsidised to manufacture car models for the Uzbek and CIS markets, which were either being discontinued or upgraded after years of sales in international markets. For example, in September 2007 UzDaewooAvto (soon to become GM Uzbekistan) and GMDAT (the GM-majority-owned successor to DMC after Daewoo Group’s 2000 bankruptcy) (Appendix 6) signed a contract for a total investment of 47.69 million USD for ‘the supply and delivery of machinery and equipment to organise the full production cycle of the Lacetti model’ (PKM- 219 2007: Art. 1). Codenamed J200 like the platform on which it was produced, the Lacetti had been sold in Korea and international markets between 2002 and 2009 under different brand names (Automobile Catalog n.d.), while GMDAT had promoted the J200 platform around the world half a decade prior to selling it to Uzbekistan (Wardsauto 2003). Delivery to and installation at the Asaka factory of this by-then obsolete machinery was completed between 2007 and 2009, with manufacturing beginning in two phases in 2008-2009 (PP- 741 2007: Appendix 3), in parallel to the introduction on international markets of the new generation Lacetti J300. Likewise, in 2014, GM Uzbekistan imported machinery and equipment for 104.2 million USD to begin the full production cycle of the T250 model under the brand Nexia and Ravon Nexia R3 for the domestic and Russian export market, respectively, in 2016 (PKM-260 2014; Azizov 2016). These models would be assembled on the T250 platform, which had been developed in the mid-2000s (Autoevolution 2020), that is, more than a decade before being recycled for production in the Uzbek and CIS markets.

48 The LeMan was itself ‘a minor variation of the Opel-designed Kadett’ (Jeong 2004: 140; INT-26).

161

As a result, according to a recent presidential resolution laying out a development strategy for the country’s automotive industry until 2025, ‘[t]he current range of car models are outdated [by an] average of 10-11 years’ (PP-4087 2019; Minchenko et al. 2013: 34). Put differently, in Uzbekistan small car manufacturing capitals by international standards have used obsolete technology that mobilises degraded subjectivity labour, thus producing substandard and relatively expensive cars, as any resident of the country will readily tell you (INT-30b; FW-2018). Since the only way for these small capitals to operate at a profit has been via ground-rent subsidisation, car manufacturing has been ‘structurally dependent on the evolution of the magnitude of ground-rent available for appropriation’ (Grinberg & Starosta 2009: 770), fluctuating upward and downward along with the available quantity of ground-rent within the domestic market in line with the changing prices of Uzbekistan’s primary commodities. Equally, as subsidisation has been mediated by the policy and institutional arrangements of the Uzbek model, car manufacturing has been structurally limited largely to the confines of the protected domestic market and, at best, to other CIS markets with which Uzbekistan signed an FTA. In turn, this limited scale of production has translated into increasing costs and a growing quality gap in comparison with the industry’s international standards (PP-4087 2019), where economies of scale reduce production costs and competition drives constant investments in technological change and innovation, as is the case with the current Industry 4.0 revolution (Chapter 3).

Figure 4.4. Uzbekistan’s car production/exports vis-à-vis total exports in mln USD (1996-2018)

162 Source: own elaboration based on data in CER 2013a, OICA, and OEC (data set in Appendix 6).

Thus, the performance of the Uzbek car industry has directly mirrored the volume of ground- rent available in Uzbekistan’s domestic market to subsidise its production, as the empirical data unequivocally show (Figure 4.4). Between 1996 - the year in which car manufacturing started at the Asaka plant in the Fergana Valley (Appendix 6) - and 2018, car manufacturing closely fluctuated upwards and downwards in line with the parallel oscillations in revenue from the country’s raw material exports, whose international prices reflect the amount of ground-rent carried by Uzbekistan’s main primary commodities available on the domestic market. So, for example, car production shows a steep uptick in conjunction with the commodity supercycle. During this 22-year period, there are only two exceptions when car production drops despite increasing export revenues, and these can be easily explained. In 2000, DMC went bankrupt, raising fears about the future of the Asaka plant and the country’s car industry in general (EIU 2005b: 18); in 2016, the ongoing economic crisis in Russia and Kazakhstan not only dampened demand for Uzbek cars in these key export markets, but also more than halved remittances from Uzbek migrant workers in Russia compared to 2014, undercutting solvent demand for durable goods at home, too.49

Likewise, the Uzbek car industry has manufactured expensive substandard vehicles that are uncompetitive in the international market (PP-4087 2019). First, the industry specialises in the assembly of several old lower-end models, whose aggregate production at the Asaka plant between 1996 and 2018 never reached full capacity at 250,000 vehicles (Appendix 6), let alone the industry’s standard of between 100,000 and 250,000 units per model (Naumov & Yusupov 2009: 5; Fitzsimons & Guevara 2016: 189, Table 8.2; PP-4087 2019), thus translating into higher than international prices. Equally, while the industry’s labour productivity averages around 60 vehicles per worker (Fitzsimons & Guevara 2016: 190, Table 8.3), the available data suggest that the average figure for Uzbekistan between 2008 and 2018 is about a third of that (22.1 vehicles/worker).50 The same applies to engines built by the GM Powertrain Uzbekistan JV, whose manufacturing capacity of 360,000 units/year is significantly below the industry’s economies of scale that run in the millions (PP-1020 2008; Sturgeon et al. 2009: 19; Grinberg 2011: 138, 147; Fitzsimons & Guevara 2016: 189, Table 8.1). Second, due to the low level of localisation of parts and components, which currently averages 42% (PP-4087 2019), the industry remains heavily dependent on their imports from GM Korea (OEC data; INT-5; INT-14; INT-16). Third, while the Uzbek car

49 I elaborate on solvent demand and labour in the car industry in the next subsection. 50 Own calculation based on average production volumes in 2008-2018 (Appendix 6), divided by the approximate number of workers at Asaka plant (8,000).

163 industry has increased its capacity over the years introducing stamping, welding, and painting technology, especially during times of abundant ground-rent due to high raw material prices, it is completely reliant on GM for design engineering and has no independent R&D facilities (CER 2013a: 7, 21, 29). Instead, the gap in technological development between the global automotive industry and Uzbekistan’s domestic car industry has been constantly increasing, with the latter operating almost entirely outside the innovations introduced with Industry 4.0 (Kambarov et al. 2018; INT-16). While the automotive industry has been at the forefront of the process of robotisation identified as crucial to the rise of the NIDL (Chapter 2), accounting for 40-45% of total deployment of industrial robots between 2010 and 2015, Uzbekistan ranks at the very bottom of world rankings for robot density in manufacturing industries (UNCTAD 2017: 48-49).

In this context, the steep increase in car production and exports in the 2004-2014 period (EIU 2008: 30; Figure 4.4) was not the result of ‘deep qualitative changes’ (CER 2013a: 36) that created a successful export-oriented industry (Popov & Chowdhury 2016), as the developmental transitologists would have it. Rather, manufacturing in the industry during this decade continued in the same qualitatively ‘backward’ form, growing in line with the general upward trend in ground-rent available on the Uzbek domestic market due to the Chinese-demand-led commodity supercycle (Chapters 2-3). In other words, rising exports were not a sign of the increasing competitiveness of Uzbek cars in international markets. First, these exports were overwhelmingly concentrated in Russia and, to a much lesser extent, Kazakhstan, two CIS market with which Uzbekistan enjoys low entry barriers in virtue of bilateral and, since 2014, a CIS-wide FTA (Russia-Uzbekistan FTA 1992; Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan FTA 1997; Schroeder et al. 2018). Second, exports were boosted through a specific policy to lower prices for exported cars (CER 2013a: 7, 20; INT-40a) and, more importantly, due to the overvaluation of the Russian and Kazakh currency, the rouble and the tenge (EY 2019: 31).

The empirical data are unequivocal as to the crucial importance of rouble and tenge overvaluation vis-à-vis the Uzbek soum for Uzbek exports to achieve a temporary, albeit easily reversible, ‘comparative advantage’. As long as the rouble and tenge were overvalued, despite a significant dip in 2009, exports remained buoyant through the global financial crisis and even after Russia’s introduction of a recycling duty on imported cars following accession to the WTO in 2012 (bne IntelliNews 2014). However, once the Russian economy went into recession in 2014-16 due to the ‘dual shocks’ of lower oil prices and Western sanctions for the war in Ukraine (IMF 2017: 4, 17), with Kazakhstan following suit in 2015 as a result of its close economic ties with Russia (Gordeyeva & Solovyov 2015;

164 Laruelle et al. 2019: 214-216), Uzbek car exports to these two key markets almost ground to a halt. Simply put, recession and the ensuing collapse in the rouble and tenge exchange rate vis-à-vis the Uzbek soum cancelled out the most important ‘comparative advantage’ that Uzbek car exports enjoyed in these markets. As the EIU (2007b: 12) correctly points out,

[a]lthough exports to Russia from the UzDaewoo automotive plant are growing robustly, the value added of the manufacturing sector remains generally low, and it is likely that the nominal rise in the external surplus is also being driven by high commodity prices (as well as increases in the volume of gas exports).

In other words, there can be no doubt that Uzbekistan has become a source of appropriation of ground-rent in the IDL, whose ‘backward’ manufacturing capitals accumulate at the average rate of profit (i.e. stay in business) via ground-rent subsidisation.

3.2. Ground-rent, labour, and solvent demand

In summary, the development of car manufacturing in Uzbekistan followed the fluctuation in the magnitude of ground-rent available to subsidise output, mobilising degraded subjectivity labour that operates obsolete machinery to produce substandard and relatively expensive vehicles. Thus, one outstanding question concerns the origin of solvent demand for Uzbek cars, especially given their carrying higher prices (‘relatively expensive’) than the industry’s international prices. Only a fraction of this solvent demand was met by the country’s export markets, as export sales to Russia and Kazakhstan rarely surpassed 50% of total production (2005-7, 2010-12). Instead, most solvent demand for the car industry output was domestic, originating from ground-rent and migrant workers’ remittances (World Bank 2013a: 4).

Following land reforms that privatised (access to) land, effectively turning the majority of the rural population into landless peasants, millions of people started emigrating from Uzbekistan to the country’s energy-rich northern neighbours, Russia and Kazakhstan, as the latter experienced a construction boom during the commodity supercycle (Chapter 3). As Chapter 5 details, since the mid-2000s migrant workers’ remittances, especially from Russia, have represented a key influx of hard currency into Uzbekistan next to revenues from raw materials exports, and far larger than ODA and FDIs. The surge in remittances has helped to sustain domestic demand for the country’s ‘backward’ manufacturers, at least partly addressing the weakness in demand for Uzbek cars reported at the start of production

165 (EIU 2002: 24). The GoU’s decision in 2007 to allow for cars to be also purchased in hard currency on the domestic market (Reuters 2017b; INT-30b) confirms the importance of migrant workers’ billions of USD in informal remittances for domestic demand in general, and this industry in particular.

Likewise, domestic demand has remained solvent due to subsidies in the form of ground- rent bearing commodities - utilities and agricultural goods - circulating at below international market prices within the Uzbek domestic market. First, the state invested in energy self- sufficiency from day one of the transition in order to guarantee subsidised utilities to maintain cotton exports and, gradually, ‘backward’ industrialisation; despite problems especially in rural areas during the winter season, cheap gas and gas-produced electricity were provided for the general population, too, an equally crucial form of ground-rent subsidisation. Second, as the result of both the state’s subsidised provision of wheat and derivative products (bread and flour), as well as (particularly women) peasants’ private production of most relatively cheap food sold on the Uzbek domestic market (Chapter 5), agricultural commodities have circulated on the Uzbek market at below international market prices.

Together, remittances and (ground-rent) subsidies have significantly enhanced the purchasing power of the country’s working class, particularly formal workers and, among them, higher-skilled male industrial workers, whose salaries have been among the highest in the country along with those of workers in related service sectors (GosKomStat 2018; Chapter 5).51 As a result, despite having a relatively low ratio of GDP per capita in current USD, which hovered around 2,500 USD in 2016 and 1,700 USD in 2019, the same figure in PPP in current international USD is significantly higher, namely around 6,500 USD and 7,200 USD, respectively (World Bank data). Put differently, the value of formal (industrial) wages in Uzbekistan as expressed in PPP indicates a higher capacity for consumption for domestic labour working in the formal economy than otherwise expressed in its USD exchange rate equivalent, particularly for industrial workers (Chapter 5). As a consequence, as domestic demand can be partially explained by ground-rent subsidisation, higher than international market prices for Uzbek cars and other goods are another form of ground-rent subsidisation of small manufacturing capitals in the Uzbek market, allowing them to make a profit and stay in business.

51 Alas, the GosKomStat does not publish disaggregated data per industry.

166 Relatively high wages in industry are directly linked to the huge investments in the subsidised import of machinery, equipment, and technology that - even when obsolete by international manufacturing standards as in the case of the car industry - in the context of Uzbekistan allowed for significant labour productivity growth across industries, particularly since 2004 (Ajwad et al. 2014: 6). However, this obtained in the context of capital-intensive, jobless growth (Trushin 2018: 18), which concentrated wage gains in the hands of roughly the same numbers of industrial workers. Labour productivity growth has been strong in the machinery building industry, whose main branch in Uzbekistan is car manufacturing, bridging the productivity gap between Uzbekistan and upper-middle-income countries (ibid.: 14). Still, industrial wages in the former have risen at a faster rate than productivity (Ajwad et al. 2014: 6), so between 2007 and 2016 wage growth in inflation-adjusted terms outpaced productivity growth in the machinery building industry in every single year but 2012-13 (Trushin 2018: 28, Figure 2.14). Overall, ‘in terms of wages in the manufacturing sector, in 2013 wages were 57 percent higher in Uzbekistan than [even] in its lower-middle income peers’ (ibid.: 14).

This confirms one of the key postulates of the theory expounded here, namely that small manufacturing capitals in the Central Asian republic cannot accumulate on the basis of a relatively cheap labour force, as industrial workers in Uzbekistan are actually relatively expensive. Instead, these ‘backward’ capitals can only accumulate via ground-rent subsidisation thus reproducing, and exploiting, degraded subjectivity labour engaged in low- end technological work, such as assembly, at the lowest scale and quality standard via obsolete equipment and technology, with no input into scientific and creative production. As the country’s ‘backward’ industries, including the automotive industry, lag behind in innovation (Industry 4.0) and productivity in the most technologically advanced industrial sectors, so does its higher education system reproduce labour with degraded subjectivity, as confirmed in the general ‘shortage of qualified engineering staff’ (PP-4087 2019) and the overall dearth of graduate specialists in the country’s manufacturing sector (World Bank 2014: 37ff.).

3.3. The car industry since 2016: new players, same game

With the election of President Mirziyoyev and the shedding of the Uzbek model, the stated aim of the GoU became to introduce new players in the automotive industry in order to stimulate competition on the domestic market and, eventually, boost exports (PP-4087 2019). GM Uzbekistan became an easy lightning rod for the new president’s criticism of manufacturing monopolies operating on the basis of protections, subsidies, and tax

167 exemptions (i.e. ground-rent subsidisation), despite failing to become competitive in the international market and create new jobs (Shaku 2018). As explained, the unification of the exchange rate regime and the end of the overvaluation of the soum in 2017 eliminated a key form of ground-rent subsidisation across the Uzbek economy; between 2018 and 2019, most tax exemptions were also revoked for GM Uzbekistan (Gazeta.uz 2018, 2019), coinciding with GM’s decision to exit the JV with UzAvtoSanoat (Shaku 2018). As a result, in 2019 GM Uzbekistan was renamed UzAuto Motors and, as of October 1 the same year, the latter began paying VAT on e.g. specific imported parts and components though within a 120-day period (PP-4397 2019: Art. 6, Annex 4).

Despite these changes, however, manufacturing capitals in Uzbekistan continue to accumulate in a qualitatively ‘backward’ form via ground-rent subsidisation, as the country remains integrated into the IDL as a primary commodity exporter. The car industry is no exception. UzAuto Motors maintains its overall monopoly position behind the protection of high tariffs that severely limit car imports, particularly in the small and family car segments that dominate the domestic market (PP-3818 2018: Appendix 1). Likewise, state investments and preferential credits remain crucial to the industry’s development. The MOE, MFT, and the MOF, UzAvtoSanoat, Asaka bank and other commercial banks continue collaborating in order to secure low-interest preferential credits from foreign banks and export-credit agencies, as well as GoU-guaranteed foreign investments with the aim of expanding production, increasing exports, and decreasing imports of parts and components by raising the ‘localisation’ level to 60% by 2025 (PP-3028 2017: Arts. 3, 15; PP-4397 2019: Arts. 1, 7; PP-4087 2019).

Crucially, as of 2021, the few new car manufacturers that have committed to entering the Uzbek market have located their production facilities within a FEZ, where all the various forms of ground-rent subsidisation formerly extended on an ad-hoc basis to specific investors - direct and indirect subsidies, preferences, and exemptions - are in place, with grace periods varying from 3 to 10 years depending on the scale of investment (SEZ website). So, for example, in 2021 construction is expected to start for a plant assembling Hyundai’s electric vehicles in Kokand FEZ, with the MFT and the Fergana municipality partaking in the investment (PP-4087 2019); likewise, assembly of Chinese brand Oshan vehicles should soon begin at an Austrian-Uzbek JV in Navoi FEZ (Fergana 2020). As investments for both projects surpass the 10 million USD threshold, for the former significantly so, manufacturers will benefit from a 10-year tax break, plus a further 5-year at a 50% reduction in income tax and single tax payment (SEZ website). Finally, UzAvtoSanoat and the Russian subsidiary of Volkswagen Group (VW) created a JV to

168 assemble light commercial vehicles at the Jizzakh FEZ (PP-4757 2020: Art. 5; UzAvtoSanoat 2020).

In line with the past three decades, however, the capital investment in all these projects pales in comparison to the ‘normal’ levels of capital concentration and centralisation in the industry, which run in the tens of billions of USD (Chapter 2). This is evident in the anticipated scale of production of the new JVs - which at 10, 30, and 20 thousand vehicles per year, respectively, is well below the industry’s international standards of between 100,000 and 250,000 units per model - as well as in the low-end technological processes involved such as assembly. As a result, the Uzbek car industry as a whole continues mobilising degraded subjectivity labour that engages in low-tech operations, namely assembly, stamping, welding, and painting (PP-4087 2019), thus manufacturing old models (Spot.uz 2019) that carry ‘a high monopoly price’ largely for the domestic market (ACRU 2020). Equally, the industry remains reliant on imports of more technologically advanced parts and components from GM Korea, which in 2018 amounted to 892 millions USD or approximately 5% of the country’s total import costs (OEC data; Choi 2019). Finally, while registering some growth in 2019 on the back of buoyant gold and natural gas exports (UzAvtoSanoat 2019), production volumes for both cars and engines continue to be well below the industry’s international standards (Kun.uz 2020). Therefore, ‘backward’ manufacturers fail to create enough jobs to absorb the bulk of the population, which is left in a situation of relative surplus in relation to the requirements of capital accumulation. The origin of this mass of relative surplus population is one of the main topics in Chapter 5.

4. CONCLUSION

Operating at the fourth level of generality, Chapter 4 offers an alternative account to the literature’s exceptionalisation in relation to Uzbekistan’s three-decade-long independent history. First, it explains the Uzbek model’s diversity due to the specificity and centrality of cotton production in the republic within the unity of global accumulation: as an agrarian landlord-state, Uzbekistan had to secure cotton production or risk accruing no rents. Thus, its ‘gradual’ transition ‘path’ via centralisation mediated the same qualitative integration into the IDL on the basis of primary commodity exports and ‘backward’ industrialisation, as in the rest of the FSU. Second, it accounts for the current ‘liberalisation’ policies within the changed material conditions in the country and the global economy, as cotton ceded pride of place to gold and natural gas as the main ground-rent bearing export commodities. Uzbekistan’s transformation from an agrarian to a mining landlord-state allowed for an end to the multiple exchange rate regime and the privatisation of the cotton sector, without

169 changing the country’s qualitative form of incorporation into the IDL and its ‘backward’ manufacturing capital accumulation. Third, it details all these dynamics empirically via the case study of the Uzbek car industry, which, recent changes notwithstanding, continues to exhibit the same ‘backward’ form of accumulation as throughout the country’s independent history.

Chapter 4 provides cogent answers to RQ2, while also beginning to address RQ3, specifically as concerns the differentiation in the costs of reproduction of the working class in relation to formal industrial male labour. The next chapter tackles this latter question in detail.

170 CHAPTER 5 Decollectivisation, Social Stratification, Class and Struggle in ‘Resource Rich’ Uzbekistan

0. INTRODUCTION

Chapter 5 continues operating at Level 4 of generality to explore the rich concrete determinations of Uzbekistan’s political-economic transformation since 1991. In particular, with the help of insights from Marxist feminists within the overall CICP theoretical framework, it focusses on land use changes as key to accounting for the gendered class stratification and struggle in the country since independence (RQ3).

Section 1 argues that the radical transformation of land use in Uzbekistan was a crucial form of mediation of the country’s integration into the IDL as a raw material producer/exporter. From collective access to, and use of, the land and commons for the indiscriminate reproduction of the working class during Soviet times, decollectivisation privatised access to land and shifted land use to capital accumulation, leading to the class stratification of Uzbek society. Section 2 highlights how this is evident in the steep differentiation in the costs of reproduction of the country’s working class along in/formal, geographic (urban-rural, regional), gender, and skill lines. On the one hand, a minority of largely industrial, higher-skilled, male workers mostly located in cities have been incorporated into extractive and ‘backward’ industries, garnering the lion’s share of the total wage fund; on the other hand, a majority of the population ‘freed’ from the land has been turned into relative surplus for the requirements of accumulation, thus struggling to reproduce itself in the large informal sector amid casual un(der)employment, poverty, and migration, including mass seasonal migration mostly to Russia and Kazakhstan. In this context, women’s informal agricultural work, including subsistence food production for the household, has become absolutely crucial for the reproduction of this relative surplus population. As Section 3 demonstrates, these divisions among multiple fault lines have weakened class solidarity, translating into labour’s resistance to precarisation being mostly spontaneous and localised, as well as the authorities exploiting these weaknesses. At the same time, the authoritarian state has deployed its full apparatus of repression to preempt labour organising or crush any dissent that may threaten the process of capital accumulation.

As such, the chapter problematises transitology’s ideal-type democratic capitalism as the classless and gender-liberating ‘end of history’. First, class is again revealed to be the

171 foundational divide in capitalist society, with gender being internally related to, hence co- constitutive of, class and the process of class stratification; second, as the political form mediating global capital accumulation in Uzbekistan, the authoritarian state has been functional to guaranteeing the process of valorisation of the country’s total social capital.

1. DECOLLECTIVISATION AND CLASS STRATIFICATION: THE RISE OF A VAST RELATIVE SURPLUS POPULATION

In the UzSSR, life largely revolved around the land. More than half of the population resided in rural areas, a figure that, while estimates vary, remains largely true to this day (McAuley 1994; Djanibekov et al. 2012: 96; Ilkhamov 2013: 263; Lombardozzi 2016; INT-10). With the collectivisation of agriculture, collective farms - kolkhozy and sovkhozy - had come to regulate not only economic activity, particularly the growing of the cotton crop for the industries of the Union’s European republics or for export to hard currency markets, but also to organise rural communities as a whole (Chapter 3). Within the Union-wide conditions of Fordist industrial mass production, the UzSSR grew cotton in exchange for the indiscriminate reproduction of the working class, particularly the rural proletariat, via the provision of full employment, social infrastructures, and welfare services (McAuley 1994: 188-189). Thus, kolkhozy and sovkhozy provided electricity, gas, and water delivery and infrastructure maintenance, including for the huge canal irrigation system, as well as housing, kindergartens, schools, clinics and hospitals, along with collective land usufruct rights for food production and livestock rearing, for farm workers and their families (Chapter 3; INT-62). Given this significant social wage accrued in the collectives (Zanca 2000: 2; Kandiyoti 2009a: 29), ‘an individual occupied in the agricultural or service sectors [could] often earn a higher income and sustain a higher standard of living in Uzbekistan than his industrial or urban counterpart’ (Lubin 1984: 225; Trevisani 2010: 67-68), explaining low rural outmigration in the UzSSR (Lubin 1984: 33-34; Craumer 1992: 162; Spechler 2008: 19), as well as Soviet Central Asia’s having one of the lowest migration rates in the USSR (Lubin 1984: 48-49; Laruelle 2007: 115; Ilkhamov 2013: 259; Abashin 2014: 230). As a result, despite rapid development, including industrialisation particularly in relation to the cotton sector (Chapter 4), indigenous nationalities such as Uzbeks and continued to prioritise employment in agriculture and services, while Russian immigrants came to dominate higher-skilled industrial and technical jobs (Lubin 1984: 77-79, 197, 206-207, 225; Ilkhamov 2013: 260).

Since the collectivisation of agriculture was central to the Soviet modernisation push, it placed significant emphasis on women’s liberation via their integration into the socialist

172 labour force. In the UzSSR, women went from having no presence in the economy before the Bolshevik revolution to representing 47% of all workers and employees by the early 1980s (Lubin 1981: 183), as ‘ideas that [they] did not belong in seclusion and did have a right to a place in public’ (Kamp 2006: 233) started taking root, despite resistance. Clearly, the provision of ‘an extensive network of medical and health care’ as well as pre-school facilities greatly contributed to these developments (Barbieri et al. 1996: 85; Soviet Education 1968: 12, Table 3). However, even as women entered the labour force in droves, they mostly took up employment in health and education (Khitarishvili 2016: 18) as well as ‘lower-skilled and manual jobs’ (Lubin 1981: 184), which allowed them to continue caring for their extended family in the Soviet version of the ‘double burden’. Patriarchal stereotypes continued mediating women’s incorporation as workers and, to a lesser extent, professionals, reinforcing the perception of their docile nature, propensity for care and domestic work, and hand dexterity suited for manual work and as appendages to machinery in e.g. the textile and garment industry (Morrison 2008: 79; INT-6). In terms of manual work, agricultural labour - including back-breaking cotton picking - is possibly the most crucial case in point for Central Asia, with women constituting ‘98.9% of the manual labourers on state farms’ in the UzSSR (Lubin 1981: 184). Still, while society-wide mobilisation became routine during the cotton picking season, huge Soviet investments resulted, on average, in half of the cotton harvest being mechanised in the 1970s and 1980s, with the figure never dropping below one third even during the economic crisis in the last years of the USSR (Lubin 1981: 193; Craumer 1992: 155-156, incl. Table 6.16; Pomfret 2002: 186, Table 6). Work in the food processing and textile industry is another case in point, though mostly for Russian rather than indigenous nationality women (Lubin 1981: 184, 190; Kandiyoti 2003: 246).

Therefore, on the one hand, within a ‘highly gender-segmented’ (Kandiyoti 2007a: 609) labour market, patriarchal stereotypes relating to women’s naturally docile nature, propensity for care work, and hand dexterity were perpetuated, along with the general consensus on what constituted a distinctly ‘feminised’ sphere of employment. On the other hand, ‘women’s emancipation [became] most readily ... equated with expectations of entitlements and benefits from the state to assist [them] in the performance of their maternal and communal duties’ (Kandiyoti 2007a: 610), in the context of ‘an all-round caretaker’ (Tresivani 2010: 216) welfare state providing for the indiscriminate reproduction of the working class. During the precipitating crisis in production and social reproduction of the perestroika years (Chapter 3), collective farms in the UzSSR continued the overall provision of social wages, while collective ownership of, and access to, the land cushioned the fallout from increasing unemployment in the industrial, construction, and transport sectors, as

173 people moved back to rural areas in order to ‘share[] work with the existing labour force’ or engage in subsistence agriculture (Khan 1996: 4), explaining the process of reagrarianisation (Kandiyoti 2003: 251) and the growing ‘hidden unemployment’ in the countryside in the 1980s (Lubin 1984: 105; Karimov 1993a: 230; INT-26).

These phenomena would accelerate after independence in 1991 within the radically changing material conditions of production and reproduction in newly-independent Uzbekistan, to which I now turn.

1.1. From collective agriculture to private farmers and landless peasants

During the first decade of the transition, the Uzbek model mediated the transformation of sovkhozy into kolkhozy and, gradually, into shareholding cooperatives named shirkats, ‘with the aim of reducing the government’s financial responsibility’ for collective farms and ‘reliev[ing] the state budget from expenditures’ (Djanibekov et al. 2012: 98; Ilkhamov 1998: 544-546). By 1994, sovkhozy had all but been eliminated (Khan 1996: 6, Table 3). The result was progressive labour retrenchment in the context of initial rounds of labour shedding that left part of the workforce ‘unemployed and landless’, giving rise to the ‘casualization of agricultural labour’ (Kandiyoti 2003: 233, fn. 20, 239-240, 253). In shirkats, as workers turned into shareholders of the collective, this effectively ‘did away with the obligation of the republican budget for wage payments’ (Spechler 2008: 68), which instead became the responsibility of management. Amid economic crisis and insolvency, wage arrears or outright non-payment became the norm (Ilkhamov 1998: 550, 552, 557, 2000; Kandiyoti 2003; INT-28), in parallel to the overall retrenchment of labour across the Uzbek economy, as evident in the dramatic reduction in real wages (underemployment), as well as pension and welfare payment arrears, outright non-payment, or payment in kind (World Bank 1993b: 15, 99, 103-104; IMF 1998: 80; Klugman 1998: 67; CSR 1999; Alam & Banerji 2000: 6, esp. fn. 4; EIU 2000b: 17; INT-38b; Section 3).

Thus, from day one of the transition, transformation revolved around the appropriation of cotton rents (Chapter 4); whereas during Soviet times cotton was produced in exchange for welfare, following independence the state centralised these rents to guarantee capital accumulation, gradually leaving the rural population to fend for themselves. For this reason, in parallel to the gradual transformation of collective farms, since the first years of independence many rural households were allotted plots for their private use, which ‘absorbed a significant part of the redundant labour force’ due to the production slump that followed the dissolution of the USSR, becoming ‘a safety-valve for the rural residents’

174 (Ilkhamov 1998: 556; EIU 1997: 102). While the practice of awarding smallholdings had been introduced during the final years of the Soviet Union (Craumer 1992), their size increased ‘from 110,000 ha before independence to 630,000 ha in 1994’ (Khan 1996: 7) to comprise about 3 million holdings or 10 percent of arable land (Kandiyoti 2003: 228, 230; Ilkhamov 1998: 551). Again, the objective was for the state to end the indiscriminate reproduction of the working class. As President Karimov (1995: 205) candidly opined, ‘[e]ndowing people with land played a truly revolutionary role, as it eliminated each individual’s dependence on the state’ (emphasis added).

The figure of the hokim (i.e. governor, Appendix 1) was central to the gradual process of transformation of collective agriculture. Appointed by the president (Bowyer 2018: 31), hokims presided over the reversal of Soviet redistribution policies, while guaranteeing the continuation of cotton production for export amid the overall decentralisation and fragmentation of social capital (Chapter 4). As INT-10 puts it,

when everything broke down, we were left with cotton. [The] over-centralisation of power [in the hands of the] hokims in the rural areas was necessary. The hokim was really the master who had to provide all the conditions: give water, give fertilizer, give tractors, give gas so that people could work.

In other words, as detailed in Chapter 4, the GoU and their representatives in the regions strove to maintain a certain degree of centralisation of social capital - kolkhozy, shirkats - in order to guarantee cotton production. While strong, centrifugal forces were counterbalanced by the state’s centralisation of cotton rents, as well as regional elites’ use of land and resources, including unemployed peasants shedded from the collectives, for their own personal profit (Ilkhamov 2004: 167-170). The result has been a highly vertical, and authoritarian, power structure in Uzbekistan since independence.

Tensions remained, as evident in the frequent dismissal of hokims (ibid.), but the real loser of reform was clearly labour, contrary to both neoliberal transitologists’ framing of transition as development for all and to developmental transitologists’ claim of a ‘socially oriented’ market economy (Chapter 1). Still, while the Uzbek model during the first half of the 1990s ‘undoubtedly unleashed forces of inequality in rural society’, at the same time ‘the guaranteed access to land … almost certainly limited these disequalizing forces. … Work sharing was widely distributed among the labour force, the great majority of whom were toiling within an overall framework of cooperative agriculture’ (Khan 1996: 6, emphasis added). Along with organising production of cotton and wheat according to state orders,

175 shirkats continued providing and maintaining at least part of the rural infrastructure and services so indispensable for the reproduction of the rural proletariat, including grazing rights and forage on the collective land as well as inputs (e.g. tractors, fertilizers) for private production on household plots (Ilkhamov 1998: 552; Kandiyoti 2002a: 16-17, 2003: 234, 241, 246; Spoor 2004: 3, 5, 10, 38; Veldwisch & Bock 2011: 585). Succinctly put, cooperatives still ‘“bound” a considerable part of [the] rural labour force’ (Abdullaev 2008: 15).

The introduction of the 1998 Land Law and a series of other legislations52 would radically change that (Lerman 2008: 5-7; Djanibekov et al. 2012: 99; Zinzani 2015: 100-105). The crux of the law entailed the gradual dismantlement of kolkhozy and shirkats in order to create private commercial farms responsible for cotton, wheat, and other agricultural produce on the basis of long-term leases varying from 10 to up to 50 years (Kandiyoti 2003: 231, 242; CER 2004: 10; Trevisani 2009: 129; Lombardozzi 2019: 64). Again, hokims played a crucial role in the implementation of this process, including in the allocation of the newly-created farms via specially organised district commissions (Kandiyoti 2003: 242; INT- 72a). While reform was uneven in terms of timing and geographical catchment area, at later stages also involving various rounds of ‘optimisation’ via an increase of the allotted hectarage to farms to achieve economies of scale, it demolished the foundation of collective agriculture, hence of collective ownership, access, and use of the land, turning the majority of the rural population into landless peasants (CER 2004: 24-26; Spoor 2005: 70; Kandiyoti 2009b: 157; Trevisani 2010: 225; UNDP 2010: 4, fn. 21; Djanibekov et al. 2012: 99-101, 103-104; World Bank 2017b: 11; INT-26; INT-50; INT-52a; INT-54a; INT-55a; INT-55d; INT- 63).53 In the poignant words of one of those peasants, ‘without [land], what do I do? Can’t you see that the [private] farmers have fenced off their land? It looks like a jail. There is no other land available. When this was a kolkhoz, it was different. There were no fences, there was land available’ (INT-51e).

Put differently, decollectivisation entailed a process of primitive accumulation and privatisation of (access to) the land and the commons, which resulted in the brutal mass ‘release of [millions in] excess labour force’ from agriculture (Karimov 1993a: 245; CER 2004: 28; IMF 2008: 28; INT-7; INT-8) and the ensuing creation of a vast relative surplus

52 These include the Law on Agricultural Cooperatives (Shirkats), the Law On Farming Enterprises, the Law On Dehkan Business Entities, and the Programme of Economic Reform in the Agricultural Sector of Uzbekistan for 1998-2000 (CER 2004: 10). 53 For an overview of the various phases of land decollectivisation, see e.g. Veldwisch & Spoor 2008: 428, Figure 3; Trevisani 2009: 128, Figure 7.1; Djanibekov et al. 2012: 102, Table 6.2.

176 population. As it mediated the accumulation of the national total social capital within material conditions on the world market - regardless of the specific requirements of individual capitals, their ‘nationality’ or their legal status (Chapter 4) - the Uzbek state began the gradual, yet relentless, withdrawal from the provision of full employment, social infrastructures, and welfare services for the working class. In this perspective, the policy and institutional arrangements of the Uzbek model mediated the radical shift from the indiscriminate reproduction of the working class during Soviet times to its steep differentiation via social stratification following independence (Trevisani 2010: 216; Abashin 2014: 232-233). Whereas some forms - e.g. cotton production - remained the same, leading neoliberal transitologists to frame the country as a ‘paradox’ of simultaneous non-reform and profound socio-economic transformation, their content was revolutionised as ground- rent went to subsidise capital accumulation rather than welfare, triggering the rise of a vast relative surplus population that splintered the working class along in/formal, geographic (urban-rural, regional), skills, and gender lines, and led to the differentiation in its costs of reproduction (Section 2). As such, ongoing processes of class stratification in Uzbekistan are part and parcel of the country’s post-independence transformation, revealing the class character of the state, whose policies and institutions are social forms of the class struggle (Introductory Chapter), and problematising the transition literature’s framing of capitalism as development for all or as the creation of a ‘socially oriented’ market economy.

Therefore, the ‘newly commodified context of a land lease market’ (Kandiyoti 2009b: 154; Trevisani 2005: 146ff.) spurred ‘a process of emerging class formation, as a small elite of medium-size f[a]rmers controls most of the arable land, while farm-workers-cum-dekhan- peasants comprise the poor’ (Veldwisch & Spoor 2008: 425-426; CER 2004: 12, 28; Spoor 2005: 70; Trevisani 2009: 131; Lombardozzi 2020b: 653-654; INT-8; INT-11; INT-30b). The former account for 5-10% of total rural households, while occupying about 85% of the sown area and concentrating most assets and income; the latter consist of the overwhelming majority of the population, divided in approximately 4 million small peasant (‘dekhan’) holdings on 12% of the sown area (CER 2004: 12, 28; Cornia 2006: 301; Trevisani 2010: 135-136; Veldwisch & Bock 2011: 581; World Bank 2020: 19-20). The brutal expulsion from the land of such a vast relative surplus population explains the proliferation of informality, precarity, and un(der)employment throughout the country, as well as an upsurge in internal and especially international migratory flows in the 2000s, even as agricultural exports increased. As Cornia (2006: 302) puts it, ‘[m]ost of the people made redundant depend upon casual work, have fallen back on household production using small plots or have migrated under distress to the daily labour market of Tashkent or to Russia or Kazakhstan’. As a consequence, informality, rural poverty, and outmigration did not occur despite the

177 Uzbek model - as the many otherwise excellent anthropological studies of rural transformation maintain, in line with neoliberal transitologists (Chapter 1) - but because of it.

Land ownership by the landlord-state allowed it to appropriate ground-rent for the reproduction of the total social capital regardless of the accumulation requirements of individual capitals (Chapters 2-4). Thus, while ‘backward’ industrialisation developed in old and new sectors of the economy via ground-rent subsidisation, private farmers (‘fermery’) struggled to profit from cotton and wheat production, with some even going bankrupt, as the state generally set unrealistically high quotas and then proceeded to purchase the total harvest at below market procurement prices - a crucial form of ground-rent appropriation (Chapter 4). This explains the ongoing conflict ‘between fermers and district authorities … around factors that determine the profitability of agriculture’ (Trevisani 2010: 219). With the ‘freeing’ of millions from the land and the introduction of the profit motive, however, fermery could squeeze a vast landless peasant population and limit the costs of inputs (CER 2004: 29; UNDP 2005: 3, fn. 10; Veldwisch & Bock 2011: 591) in order to establish several alternative avenues of accumulation. ‘With the acquired monopoly on large-scale agricultural production, fermer[y] have become the sole gatekeepers for de[kh]ans to a variety of income possibilities including agricultural wage labour, cotton stalks and grazing areas’ (Veldwisch & Bock 2011: 593).

Multiple cropping is a case in point. So, for example, ‘winter wheat was preferred by farmers as it offered space for follow-up cultivation of high-value crops such as maize, rice, vegetables, and potatoes after the wheat harvest in early summer’ (World Bank & IAMO 2019: 20; INT-54a; INT-54b; INT-55a), including via subletting the land to dekhans in exchange for part of the harvest, money, or a combination of both (Platonov et al. 2014; INT-51c; INT-55c; INT-55d; INT-68a). For example, in 2018, the going rate in the Fergana Valley was 200 USD per hectare (INT-6). Fruit and vegetables production for export became particularly profitable following the introduction of several pieces of legislation promoting it (EBRD 2002: 215; World Bank & IAMO 2019: 43; Lombardozzi 2020b: 641), in the wake of the commodity supercycle in the second half of the 2000s (Chapter 6). Likewise, cotton farmers could grow rice after the end of the cotton picking season (Veldwisch & Bock 2011: 585; Trevisani 2019: 127; INT-49b), while diverting finance and inputs meant for cotton or wheat to these alternative cash crops (Larson et al. 2015: 25). Finally, as access to the commons was privatised and land use changes resulted in the area for feed declining ‘by two thirds to 9% during 1991-2004’ (WFP 2008: 9; INT-52a), formerly free and available

178 cotton stalks and cereal straws for use as wood or feed for livestock became precious commodities to be sold, particularly during winter (INT-6).

1.2. A vast relative surplus population: peasants, daily workers, labour migrants

Next to the category of commercial farming, with the 1998 Land Law household plots were renamed dekhan farms (Kandiyoti 2009b: 148); by referring to ‘the pre-collectivized term’ dekhan, the GoU was emphasising rural households’ ‘ability and need to sustain themselves’ (Veldwisch & Bock 2011: 588, fn. 7, emphasis added), in the context of decollectivisation and the ensuing drawdown of the welfare state. In general, dekhan farms consist of a garden plot adjacent to the house (tamorka), including a shed with privately owned livestock and, when funds are available, a small greenhouse, as well as a subsidiary plot, with their combined size normally not exceeding 0.25 hectares in irrigated areas, though varying according to land availability, with the smallest being as little as 0.06 ha (Ilkhamov 1998: 554-555; Kandiyoti 2003: 230; Trevisani 2009: 129; Veldwisch & Bock 2011: 584; World Bank 2017c: 2, fn. 3; Romanova et al. 2017: 16; ADB 2018: 3).54

Despite occupying a small percentage of the arable land, dekhan farms have played ‘an important role in agricultural production, in terms of both subsistence farming for individual households and the cultivation of fruit, vegetables and livestock for the market. … [N]ot including wheat, household plots now produce more than 75% of all food output’ (EIU 2008: 21, emphasis added; Ilkhamov 1998: 551, 554),55 with women contributing a significant share of this agricultural labour (Section 2). In other words, as with decollectivisation agriculture was transformed into a ‘livelihood strategy’ for most of the rural population (Mirkasimov 2017), peasants have engaged in intensive small-scale farming in order to provide for their families including by selling their surplus produce on the market, significantly contributing to the circulation of agricultural products at below international market prices on the myriad dekhan markets throughout the country’s towns and cities. As such, since ‘the value of labour-power is the value of the means of subsistence necessary for the maintenance of its owner’ (Marx 1867/1976: 274), along with GoU-subsidised wheat and utilities (Chapter 4) dekhan farms have simultaneously participated in cheapening the costs of labour for capital, as well as in increasing the purchasing power of the working

54 In the literature, the term tamorka has been alternatively translated as (household) garden plot, kitchen garden, and backyard garden; the subsidiary (household) plot (in Uzbek, ko’sumcha tamorka) is also called additional plot or family orchard. 55 Despite fluctuations, this continues to be the case. In 2018, dekhan farms contributed 70% of total agricultural production (UNECE 2020: 292, Figure 13.4).

179 class, which has in turn satisfied solvent demand for domestic industrial goods (more on this below).

However, while supplying ‘more than a quarter of the food consumption of rural households’ (WFP 2008: 4), dekhan farms are far ‘too small and insecure to provide a reliable basis’ for subsistence particularly for larger households (Trevisani 2009: 129). As a result, the vast relative surplus population expelled from the land has struggled to secure its reproduction via a combination of casual, daily, and seasonal jobs in the large informal economy, whether in the agricultural, service, or industrial sector (Kandiyoti 2003: 232; INT-44; FW-2018). The late-Soviet phenomenon of mardikor (‘daily worker’) bazaars, formerly a way for e.g. rural students to complement their stipends, have become a permanent fixture in rural areas, towns, and cities across the country, where potential workers stand for hours at major road intersections, often next to main markets, waiting to be informally employed at a negotiated price mostly for unskilled work (ICG 2005: 25; Trushin & Trushin 2005: 365-366; Veldwisch & Bock 2011: 590, fn. 12; INT-18; INT-22; FW-2019). Mardikory hail from ‘households where labour resources far outstrip their access to land and where opportunities for alternative earnings are severely limited’ (Kandiyoti 2003: 239).

Equally, the privatisation of access to the land and the mass shedding of millions of workers from collectives and cooperatives spawned huge migratory flows from rural Uzbekistan to the cities and to third countries (Cornia 2006; Khajimukhamedov 2008: 142-143; Ilkhamov 2013: 260; Muradov & Ilkhamov 2014: 24; FAO 2019b: 15-16; Trevisani 2019: 130; INT- 45). In 2003, ‘only 7.2% of those workers who became unemployed due to the reorganization of 178 shirkats found jobs in non-agricultural enterprises and organizations’ (CER 2004: 30); overall, private farms could provide employment to ‘no more than 25% of the former shirkat workers’ (IMF 2008: 28). Despite the GoU’s increase in ground-rent subsidisation for ‘backward’ industrialisation and SME expansion in parallel to decollectivisation during the commodity supercycle of the 2000s (Chapter 4), the sheer scale of labour shedding was such that it overwhelmed the country’s job creation capacity (CER & UNDP 2011: 69; CER 2013c: 17-18). ‘In 2001-2005, employment in the informal sector grew by 31%, or by 1,340,000 people’ while ‘the number of temporary, casual and seasonal workers rose by 50%’, reaching a staggering 5,657,600 in 2006 (Maksakova 2008: 65, 66, Table 11; also IMF 2008: 44, Table 3.14; CER & UNDP 2011: 73). Informality, un(der)employment, and poverty are thus the unequivocal result of the radical shift from land use for the indiscriminate reproduction of the working class during Soviet times, to land use for capital accumulation via ground-rent subsidisation of ‘backward’ industrialisation after independence. This explains Uzbekistan’s tendency to concentrate a large relative

180 surplus population within its territory, in line with ‘resource rich’ countries in the Global South and the FSU, as the limited scale of production in ‘backward’ industries could only absorb a very partial share of the peasant population expelled from the land (Chapters 2-4).

Although precise statistics are lacking, the available data suggest that at least hundreds of thousands of people have been moving between rural areas and towns and cities across the country, especially the capital Tashkent. Due to stringent registration (‘propiska’) rules, however, internal migrants have preferred Tashkent’s outskirts and its satellite cities (UNDP 2005: 5; Maksakova 2008: 66-68), where accommodation is also more affordable and whence a veritable sea of commuters descend on the capital on a daily basis (INT-2; INT- 22; INT-31; INT-36; FW-2019). While the ‘propiska’ has linked a host of social services such as healthcare provision and pensions to a citizen’s official place of residence since Soviet times, its enforcement has become much stricter after independence (Turaeva 2011) for the specific purpose of the ‘administrative geographical containment of [‘freed’] labor in rural areas’ (World Bank 2013a: 9), replicating the countryside’s informality and precarity in the cities. As a consequence, ‘87% of domestic migrants have never been registered, while 79% never acquired a temporary right for residence’ (CER 2009a: 13), making them vulnerable to harassment and bribery from the police (Fitzpatrick 2011b; INT-2; INT-22; INT- 26; INT-58a).

In the wake of rising oil prices in the 2000s and the ensuing construction boom in the energy- rich northern republics, millions of (mostly seasonal) migrant workers emerged from the vast relative surplus population ‘freed’ from, and denied access to, the land and the commons. International migration from Uzbekistan has mostly been a male phenomenon, with 81% of migrant workers being male and 19% female in 2017 (Reeves 2010 in Mukhamedova & Wegerich 2014: 156; Nizamedinkhodjayeva et al. 2017: 41; FAO 2018: 54; UNDP 2018a: 107-108). Generally, they have taken up informal work in construction, trade, and agriculture in Russia and, to a lesser but still significant extent, Kazakhstan (Abdullaev 2008: 16; Marat 2009: 25; Veldwisch & Bock 2011: 590; World Bank 2013a: 10; Ajwad et al. 2014: 9-10; FAO 2018: 58; INT-8; Chapter 3), facing harassment and bribe-taking by the police at border crossings on their way to destination, as well as lacking social protection at home and in the host countries, where they toil in appalling conditions and experience discrimination in the housing market and in access to social services (Laruelle 2007: 110, 112; HRW 2009, 2013; UNDP 2018a: 107-108, 116). Tellingly, Uzbekistan’s migrant workers mention high unemployment and low wages as the main reasons for migrating (Ibragimov 2002; IMF 2008: 42; Ahunov et al. 2015: 20; UNDP 2018a: 115-116; INT-41; INT-51a).

181

Figure 5.1. Uzbekistan’s land use changes, migration, and remittances in mln USD (2000-2010) Notes: dismantled shirkats for 2000 = total for 1998-2000 period; migrant workers as per official number of work permits issued in Russia. Source: own elaboration based on data in CER 2004: 24, Table 6, 26, Table 9; UNECE 2007: 36, Table 18; Ivakhnyuk 2009: 59, Table 7; Ilkhamov 2013: 261, Table 1; Ryazantsev & Korneev 2014: 18, Figure 3.1 (data set in Appendix 7).

The exponential growth in their remittances in the 2000s from 79 million USD in 2000 to a gargantuan 6.7 billion USD - or 12% of the country’s GDP - in 2013 (UNDP 2018a: 113) confirms the unequivocal and direct link between decollectivisation, oil prices, and migration from Uzbekistan to Russia and Kazakhstan (Figure 5.1). As a result, remittances have far outstripped ODA and FDIs in Uzbekistan (Chapter 3); likewise, migration flows and the ensuing remittance levels have fluctuated in line with international oil prices and their effect on the performance of the Russian and Kazakh economy, for example dropping in 2009 due to the financial crisis (Marat 2009: 41ff.; Figure 5.1) and again in 2014-16 during the recession in Russia and Kazakhstan (UNDP 2018a: 107-108, 113-114; Chapter 4). These money transfers have been crucial to social reproduction particularly in rural areas, whence the majority of migrants hail, amounting to about 10% of overall income in the two poorest quintile households and providing especially for food and housing (Laruelle 2007: 107; UNDP 2018a: 113-114; Seitz 2019: 8-10, esp. Figure 2). Likewise, as argued in Chapter 4, to a lesser but still significant extent, remittances contribute to domestic solvent demand for

182 relatively expensive consumer goods such as cars, home appliances, and electronics (Juraev 2012: 13, 151ff.; Fergana 2013; Irnazarov 2015; Eurasianet 2016a; Reuters 2017b; Kakhkharov et al. 2020; INT-30b).

Therefore, Uzbekistan’s incorporation into the IDL on the basis of raw material exports turned the country into a source of appropriation of ground-rent, resulting in the development of extractive industries and the subsidisation of ‘backward’ industries unable to absorb the vast relative surplus population expelled from the land in order to shift it from production for welfare to production for capital accumulation. The state mediated the ground-rent form to transition from the indiscriminate reproduction of the working class during Soviet times to the sharp differentiation in its costs of reproduction following independence, as evident in the division between formal and informal workers - the latter belonging to a vast relative surplus population struggling for survival amid precarity, un(der)employment, and migration - as well as along geographic (urban-rural, regional), skills, and gender lines. Social stratification counters both the GoU’s claim of a ‘socially oriented’ market economy and neoliberal transitologists’ exceptionalisation of Uzbekistan as a Soviet non-reformer, given the country’s profound political-economic transformations from informality to mass migration, where neither existed in any significant shape or form in the USSR. It is to this social stratification that I now turn.

2. BETWEEN LABOUR AND SURPLUS: DIFFERENTIATING THE COSTS OF REPRODUCTION OF THE WORKING CLASS

As a national form of mediation of the global accumulation of capital, decollectivisation was crucial to shifting land use from the indiscriminate reproduction of the working class in the UzSSR to differentiating its costs of reproduction in independent Uzbekistan, resulting in the country’s profound social transformation in the form of class stratification. On the one hand, a vast relative surplus population struggles to reproduce itself amid informality, precarity, and un(der)employment; on the other hand, formal work has been turned from a right into a privilege to be defended even when it means long hours and unpaid overtime, with the presence of this vast relative surplus population having a disciplining effect on labour. Rural-urban and regional, as well as gender and skill differences cut across formal and informal lines, further splintering the working class, differentiating its costs of reproduction, and hindering class solidarity (Section 3). At this level of generality, the chapter can show the rich concrete determinations of class stratification in Uzbekistan, with gender internally related to class as one of the crucial ‘concrete particularities’ constituting labour (McNally 2015: 133; Introductory Chapter). As such, class stratification in gender-

183 differentiated ways is the direct consequence of the full development of global capital accumulation in Uzbekistan, as a ‘resource rich’ country in the IDL, rather than of the underdevelopment of a classless and gender-liberating capitalism therein, as neoliberal transitology would have it (Chapter 1).

2.1. Informal: geography, gender, skills

Decollectivisation mediated the transformation of the majority of Uzbekistan’s population into relative surplus for the requirements of capital accumulation, as evident in the high incidence of informality and unemployment in the country, as well as the precarious underemployment of casual, daily, and seasonal jobs including via migration. In 2018, the informal sector stood at approximately 60% of total employment, or 7.9 million people, particularly in daily, temporary, and seasonal (including migrant) work, with a further 9.3% or 1.4 million people unemployed (Dusmatov & Tagaev 2019: 34-35; INT-36), 67% of whom were women (Adaptation Fund 2014: 3). More than a quarter of the population works in agriculture, 35.6% of whom informally especially in ‘daily and seasonal’ jobs, making it the sector of the economy with the highest number of informal workers in absolute terms (UNDP 2018a: 125; GosKomStat 2018). As a result, ‘the poverty rate is significantly higher among rural population than urban population’ (Olimov & Fayzullaev 2011: 18; Cornia et al. 2003: 59-60; Kandiyoti 2009b: 157; Larson et al. 2015: 14), averaging 17.3% for the former and 10.6% for the latter in 2013 (FAO 2019b: 9, Figure 1).

This stands in clear contrast to the indiscriminate reproduction of the working class during Soviet times, when the absolute poverty and food insecurity that emerged following independence were virtually nonexistent (WFP 2008: 18, 37; Gevorkyan 2018: 162). Instead, with decollectivisation, an ‘all-round caretaker’ state ‘changed its role vis-à-vis the rural population’ (Tresivani 2010: 216), as the dismantlement of agricultural collectives and cooperatives led to the steep shrinkage of social services and welfare provisions, along with the serious deterioration of fixed assets and infrastructures for their delivery. In exchange, some targeted yet severely diminished assistance for the poorest strata of the population has been provided through the revival of an old institution like the mahalla (‘neighbourhood’) (IMF 2000: 28; Noori 2006), as well as specific schemes such as the ‘Low Income Allowance’, whose expenditures nonetheless ‘have fallen significantly since the 1990s, and were only 0.1 percent of GDP in 2009’ (World Bank 2016: 40), a figure that roughly remains the same today (INT-6).

184 As detailed at length (Section 1; Chapter 3), kolkhozy, sovkhozy, and - to a lesser but still significant extent during the first decade of transition - shirkats not only organised agricultural production but also provided the main institutional framework for life in rural communities. Since indigenous nationality women dominated low-skilled manual labour in agriculture, as well as services (e.g. health, education), in the UzSSR, while being primary beneficiaries of the Soviet welfare state, the radical transformation introduced with decollectivisation led to the dramatic increase in their ‘double burden’. As they were losing access to formal jobs and welfare provisions, women were simultaneously being squeezed into a combination of largely informal, low-skilled, low-wage jobs in ever greater numbers, including in specific industrial sectors, while having to compensate for the loss in services with even more reproductive work, turning their workday into a dawn-to-midnight undertaking, especially in rural areas (Nizamedinkhodjayeva et al. 2017; Kim 2018: 72; INT- 22). A recrudescence of patriarchal norms about the centrality of their reproductive roles as mothers, wives, and daughters(-in-law), as well as their ‘nimble fingers’, ‘dexterity’, and ‘docility’ being particularly suited to working in specifically ‘feminised’ sectors, ideologically mediated this radical transformation in the material conditions of production and social reproduction in the country, in which a woman’s labour is often subsumed under the family’s and her income, at best, complements the male breadwinner’s (Yusupov et al. 2010: 40; Tursunova 2012, 2013: 182). As Federici (2004: 97) succinctly puts it, with the loss of access to the land and commons, ‘women themselves became the commons’ (emphasis original).

The decline in rural infrastructures following decollectivisation (CER 2004: 6, 19-20, 46-47), along with the closure of industries located in the countryside, deprived women of most ‘formal jobs outside of agriculture’, particularly in the kindergartens, schools, clinics and hospitals linked to the collectives and cooperatives (Spoor 2004: 14; Kandiyoti 2003: 246, 248). Moreover, with the steep deterioration in the delivery of utilities such as gas, electricity, and water particularly in rural areas (Romanova et al. 2017: 51-52; UNDP 2018a: 68-69), household chores have turned ‘into a labour-intensive, full-time business for some [female] household members’ (Nizamedinkhodjayeva et al. 2017: 38, 43), as women engage ‘in cooking, washing dishes, and doing laundry. Focus groups suggest that women are generally responsible for household water treatment’, along with collection - often fetching it in buckets over long distances especially in unconnected rural areas - storage, and use (World Bank 2015: 58, 2016: 50; UNECE 2020: 375). In parallel, kindergarten coverage for children aged 1-6 collapsed from 35% in 1991 to 14.4% in 2013, with the figure for the same year as low as 8% in the countryside and access restricted due to high costs after privatisation (CER 2004: 40; IWPR 2006; UNDP 2018a: 64; World Bank 2020: 38), a

185 situation largely obtaining to this day (World Bank 2016: 11; INT-7; INT-62; INT-71b; FW- 2019); likewise, maternity leave was drastically reduced ‘from two years to 126 days, of which post-natal maternal leave can be no more than 70 days’ (Davletova 2019: 3).

As the material conditions of social reproduction without the Soviet welfare state and with the ensuing collapse in service provision imposed a dramatically larger onus on their time (FAO 2019b: xiv, 51), women - and young women in particular - have been increasingly pushed into the informal sector as daily (‘mardikor’), casual, and seasonal workers, including as internal migrants, with significantly lower pay and virtually non-existent social protection and benefits (CER & UNDP 2011: 33; World Bank 2016: 11, 2017b: 45; Romanova et al. 2017: 2, 37; UNDP 2018a: 68, 70, 83 incl. Figure 2.2.2). From a strictly male domain when they emerged in the late-Soviet period, following decollectivisation mardikor bazaars proliferated for both men and women (ICG 2005: 25; Eurasianet 2017; FAO 2019b: 26; INT-6; INT-18; FW-2019); equally, from being ‘the least mobile part of Central Asia’s population’ (Lubin 1981: 193), post-independence women started migrating and commuting to towns and cities in search of employment. This radical transformation appears in the feminisation of agriculture, unskilled agricultural labour, and poverty (Kandiyoti 1999: 517; Kandiyoti in Spoor 2004: 5, 34; Veldwisch & Bock 2011: 588; Adaptation Fund 2014: 3; Mukhamedova & Wegerich 2018; INT-6; INT-59a), as evident in the substantial gap in wages and incomes between women and men. In rural areas, women earn an overall wage ‘up to 50 percent lower’ than men (Swinkels et al. 2016a: 46), while young men receive ‘a monthly salary [that is] on average 60% higher than [young] women’s’ (UNDP 2018a: 89). In 2015, per capita gross national income for men was roughly double compared to women’s (7,668 USD vs. 3,891 USD) (UNDP 2016a: 211, Table 4).56

Therefore, as decollectivisation was pushing women out of the formal economy and men to migrate to third countries to earn a living, women saw ‘their share of work in the fields increasing’ (Trevisani 2010: 48; Ergashev 2017: 67), often with their labour subsumed under the extended family as ‘a unit of consumption, distribution and production’ (Trevisani 2005: 142, 2019: 130; INT-51d) with no right of ownership of either land or house (Kandiyoti 2003: 230, fn. 14; Tursunova 2013: 176). As a result, only between 7.2% and 10% of women managed to become fermery and head a private farm (Alimdjanova 2008: 8; Yusupov et al. 2010: 44; INT-31). As President Karimov (1995: 204-205) put it, endowing people with land ‘by expanding personal household plots’ attracted ‘surplus labour and the unemployed part of the population, mostly women and young people predominantly living in rural areas, to

56 The figures refer to the PPP rate of 2011 international USD.

186 socially useful work’ (emphasis added). As such, women peasants have tended to livestock and poultry as well as toiled in dekhan farms (tamorka and subsidiary plot) and, upon availability, in the ‘second-crop’ plot subleased from fermery after the main state-order crops of cotton and wheat were harvested, thus providing a crucial safety net for (particularly rural) households and, in parallel, a substantial share of the cheap food - fruit, vegetables, meat, milk, eggs - to the myriad dekhan markets across the country, where they sell their surplus produce (Ilkhamov 1998: 551; Kandiyoti 2003: 229; Spoor 2004: 13; EIU 2008: 21; UNDP 2008: 7-8; Rosenberger 2012: 59; Tursunova 2013: 176-177; Romanova et al. 2017: 17; World Bank 2017b: 88-89; Kim 2018; FAO 2019b: 35; Yakubov 2020: 667; INT-46b; INT- 55b).

Depending on distance and public transport, it has been common for peasant women to travel to towns and cities before sunrise, sell their crops at the dekhan bazaar, and return home in the afternoon to tend to the fields, the livestock and/or poultry, and all other house chores, as well as to their children and to the elderly in the house (Rosenberger 2012: 58; Tursunova 2012; INT-56; INT-58c; INT-58f; FW-2019). Alternatively, women small traders in towns and cities arise at the crack of dawn to buy fresh fruit and vegetables that dekhans sell wholesale in and around bazaars in the cities, which they then proceed to resell at a small profit in official and unofficial bazaars during the day (Rosenberger 2012: 45; INT- 58d; INT-58e; INT-58f). As Khitarishvili (2016: 13) notices, women represent ‘between 70 and 80 percent of bazaar vendors’ in Uzbekistan. Often, women traders are themselves small producers and would sell a combination of their own and other crops at the market, as about 60% of urban households also own a small subsidiary plot adjacent to the house (Yakubov 2020: 668, Table 1; INT-58f). In 2018, sales of surplus food crops at local markets accounted for up to 34.4% of total household cash income (Yakubov 2020: 666, Figure 1).

As a consequence, along with wheat and utility subsidies, women’s work has been absolutely crucial to dekhan production’s contribution to cheapening the costs of labour for capital, as well as meeting solvent demand on the Uzbek domestic market. First, women’s ‘free’ reproductive work, particularly in the tamorka, lowered the costs of the means of subsistence for the reproduction of the household and, by extension, the working class. In other words, as women produced considerable amounts of food for subsistence consumption, the average household had to purchase fewer such means, thus reducing the cost of labour’s reproduction and, as a result, the cost of labour for capital. Second, and equally critical, women’s cheap food production for market sale, whether from the tamorka, the subsidiary and/or ‘second-crop’ plot, contributed to the circulation of agricultural products on the domestic market at below international market prices, thus cheapening the

187 costs of the means of subsistence for the working class, hence the cost of labour for capital, and increasing the latter’s purchasing power, thus playing a part in satisfying solvent demand. With subsistence production largely from the tamorka, women lowered the ‘socially necessary labor-time expended in the production of means of subsistence’ (Starosta & Caligaris 2016: 331) by substituting it with their ‘free’ work; with market production in the tamorka and the subsidiary/‘second-crop’ plot, women complemented the ‘socially necessary labor-time expended in the production of means of subsistence’ (ibid.) by guaranteeing the circulation of agricultural products at below international market prices. The fewer (tamorka) and cheaper (tamorka and subsidiary/‘second-crop’ plot) the means of subsistence, the cheaper the cost of labour’s reproduction, hence the cost of labour for capital, and the higher the purchasing power of the working class (which helps to meet solvent demand for relatively expensive domestic manufactures).

The collapse in fixed capital assets (e.g. tractors, mechanical cotton harvesters) due to the slump in manufacturing (Chapter 4) as well as in maintenance following decollectivisation, led to the dramatic surge in the incidence of the most labour-intensive tasks in the fields, at a time when women were being thrust en masse into unskilled agricultural work also as a consequence of decollectivisation (CER 2004: 16, 33; Spoor 2004: 14). Due to the shortage of machinery and the general lack of funds in most households to be able to afford (renting) one (Yusupov et al. 2010: 39, Table 2.5), land tilling and harvesting have been increasingly done manually, and overwhelmingly so by women (Nizamedinkhodjayeva et al. 2017: 43- 44, incl. Table 4.2; INT-49a; INT-59a), who ‘frequently enter into labour exchanges and reciprocal harvesting arrangements’ in order to cope with their huge workload (Kandiyoti 2003: 236). Moreover, while a significant share of cotton was mechanically harvested during Soviet times (Section 1), it is now almost entirely picked by hand because of decollectivisation-induced de-mechanisation (Swinkels et al. 2016a: 11). Again, women represent the majority of manual cotton pickers - 71% out of 2.8 million in 2015 - with mahalla committees playing a central role in mobilising them during the picking season in autumn (ibid.: 42; ILO 2017b: 9).

Cotton picking is a particularly important opportunity for rural women to earn extra income, as reflected in the gender composition of cotton pickers. Voluntary workers were more likely to come from the ranks of the unemployed or otherwise not economically active (including many women who are otherwise occupied with domestic duties or family plots) (ILO 2017c: xii).

188 While the literature rightly deplores the use of forced (including child) labour in the cotton fields of independent Uzbekistan (Chapter 1), it largely fails to inscribe this old form within the radically new content of class stratification in the country, along with the gender- differentiated effects of informalisation, precarisation, and pauperisation that followed decollectivisation and de-mechanisation. In this context, ‘rampant socio-economic inequalities’ are absolutely crucial to explaining mass mobilisation to pick cotton (McGuire & Laaser 2018: 18), particularly since ‘for rural women, cotton picking constitutes 12.4 percent of annual income on average, and for low-income families this figure can be as high as 30 percent’ (Romanova et al. 2017: 15). The presence of this vast relative surplus (female) population ready to pick cotton to provide for themselves and their families at least partly accounts for the slow progress in the process of re-mechanisation to date, despite the GoU’s push via the introduction of cotton clusters; in 2019, for example, ‘only 5 percent of cotton was harvested by combines’ (World Bank 2020: 48).

On top of informal agricultural labour, women have also relied on self-employment, including home-based work, in order to ‘balance their domestic responsibilities with potential income- generating activities’ necessary to provide for their families (Romanova et al. 2017: 21; FAO 2019b: 25, 42), in the context of the collapse in the availability of formal employment and welfare provisions. According to available data, women took up 70% of the 45,000 new home-based jobs created by private enterprises in 2014. Individual or micro enterprises and cottage industry, whether formally registered or informally run, have also become important forms of self-employment for women (Alimdjanova 2008: 13; FAO 2019b: 25, 42; INT-61; INT-71c; INT-71e). As lack of ownership of assets such as a house and/or land renders it impossible for them to borrow via official channels, women have often resorted to informal networks in their extended families and neighbourhoods to raise cash for small-scale production in catering, food, sewing, knitting, dressmaking and other (handi)crafts. Occasionally, funding can be available from Microcredit Organisations, or through specific programmes organised by IOs and INGOs (Kandiyoti 2003: 247; Rosenberger 2012: 44-45; Romanova et al. 2017: 24, 41-42, 45; UNDP 2018a: 18-19; FAO 2019b: xiii, 40; INT-17; INT-34).

Finally, mostly (older) married women, divorcees, or widowers - often relying on young(er) women to tend to the household and the children - have joined the ranks of internal migrants (Tursunova 2013; Nizamedinkhodjayeva et al. 2017: 41), either temporarily moving or regularly commuting to towns and cities, especially Tashkent, for trade, including in the already-mentioned bazaars, or work in the service sector as waitresses, dish-washers, maids, and street sweepers (Maksakova 2008: 91; INT-22; INT-44; FW-2018, FW-2019).

189 Not only are those the kind of jobs that ‘city-dwellers wouldn’t do’ (INT-24), but they are also predominantly informal hence lacking any social security and being subjected to cut-throat hiring-and-firing procedures, given the availability of a veritable army of relative surplus population for capital to draw from (INT-2; INT-44; INT-51b). Moreover, due to their domestic responsibilities, women’s involvement in international migration ‘is generally shorter in duration and closer to home’ (Veldwisch & Bock 2011: 590). Shuttle trade e.g. in the Fergana Valley with neighbouring Kyrgyzstan epitomises this trend, which entails the purchase of various merchandise in the latter’s huge Chinese-goods-dominated bazaars for resale in domestic markets at a small profit. According to Khitarishvili (2016: 13; also INT- 6), ‘50 percent of bazaar-based shuttle traders in Uzbekistan are female’. While the few women who migrate internationally for longer periods of time mostly do so with their husbands and children (Nizamedinkhodjayeva et al. 2017: 41), international male migration directly weights on women’s workload, as they are left alone to run the household, including caring for the husband’s elderly parents, while often exacting a heavy social toll due to the increased likelihood of divorce in families with a migrant worker, as well as children growing up without a father for most of the year (UNDP 2018a: 65, 109, 116-117; FAO 2019b: 22; INT-53).

Similar fault lines along geographic, gender, and skill lines have been replicated within the formal sector prevalent in urban settings, to which I now turn.

2.2. Formal: geography, gender, skills

As detailed at length (Section 1; Chapter 4), the Uzbek model mediated the shift from land for welfare to land for capital accumulation via ground-rent subsidisation of ‘backward’ industries. Since Russian immigrants to the UzSSR occupied most higher-skilled industrial and technical jobs (Section 1), radical social changes had to occur for indigenous nationalities to be propelled into industrial labour and become a ‘modern working class’ (Karimov 1993a: 237), especially since following independence many Russians chose to leave Uzbekistan in order to become citizens of the Russian Federation (Laruelle 2007: 103-104).

Uzbeks are good famers, good craftsmen, and the best tradesmen in Central Asia [also Lubin 1984: 207; INT-71d], but there were few Uzbek industrial workers. We had to teach Uzbeks to work in the manufacturing sector, in industry. Uzbeks don’t like working in industry, we obliged them, we taught them, a huge social transformation took place in the framework of industrial policy (INT-10).

190

The ‘freeing’ of a mass of relative surplus population via decollectivisation lay at the heart of this transformation. While failing to absorb the vast majority thereof, extractive and ‘backward’ industries57 and related sectors of the economy - finance and insurance, as well as information and communication - have come to form the backbone of the formal economy, in which a minority of the working class (about 40%) is employed (Dusmatov & Tagaev 2019: 34) and wages are significantly higher than in the informal sector (ITUC 2017a: 1-2, 2017b: 3; UNDP 2018a: 125; INT-57a; INT-57b), despite recurrent problems with wage arrears (Section 3). Since independence, these industrial and related sectors have consistently recorded among the highest salaries in the country (GosKomStat 2018; Chapter 4). In 2017, they combinedly employed slightly above a fifth of the formal workforce, who nonetheless accrued more than a third of the total yearly wage fund (GosKomStat 2017). As of 2019, jobs in finance and insurance were paid more than double the national average, with the figure being 70.9% and 42.4% more for information and communication and industry, respectively (GosKomStat 2019a: 371).

As industries and related sectors are highly concentrated in the cities, particularly the capital Tashkent,58 interregional disparities have grown as has the wealth gap between cities and the countryside, leading to the already-mentioned higher incidence of poverty in the latter. While between a fifth and a quarter of the population in Tashkent city, Tashkent region, and Navoi region - the most industrialised areas in the country - was employed in industry in 2017, the figure was below 10% for poorer and more remote regions, such as Syrdarya and Khorezm provinces (GosKomStat 2018). As a result, in the same year, ‘per capita gross regional product in the country’s poorest regions … was more than three times lower than that of the capital city, Tashkent, and more than twice lower than that of the region of Navoi’ (Kanbur & Zhuang 2019: 43, Box 3.2; GosKomStat 2019a: 383). This also accounts for the fact that remittances in the latter constitute a much lower percentage of total income than in the former, with figures soaring from 4.8% and 5.8% for Navoi and Tashkent, respectively, up to 24.4% for Khorezm (GosKomStat 2019b: 400). Unsurprisingly, along with industrial workers, cities - and especially Tashkent - concentrate the largest share of the country’s middle and upper classes, too (CER & UNDP 2011: 59-60, 2014; INT-26).

57 As noted in Chapter 4, the GosKomStat does not provide disaggregated data per industry. 58 Clearly, extractive industries are located in the areas where raw materials are available, which include Uzbekistan’s remotest regions. However, the main offices are usually in the closest town/city, where workers often live with their families between shifts, while HQs are always in Tashkent (INT- 46a).

191 Higher-skilled employment in industry is clearly male-dominated, with men occupying the overwhelming majority of managerial and high-skilled posts (e.g. engineers, lab technicians, specialists) and the ‘proportion of women among management personnel’ being ‘negligible’ across the economy, including in industries where women represent a significant share or even the majority of employees (UNDP 2018a: 52, 53, Figure 2.1.3; World Bank 2020: 55, Table 23). Equally, men make up most higher-skilled-and-pay assembly line workers in industrial enterprises, as is the case in the automotive industry (ITUC 2017: 2; Chapter 4).59 Despite long working weeks that can often reach 60- to 72-hours with no overtime payment, as well as the common practice of disbursing part of the salary unofficially - for the company to pay lower taxes, in turn affecting a worker’s pension benefits - a formal job has become a privilege to defend at all costs amid rampant informalisation and precarisation, a far cry from the right and duty of (Soviet) yore (USDS 2017: 36; UNDP 2018a: 118; INT-44; INT- 74). As the un(der)employment rate is ‘very high, [workers] are afraid to lose their jobs. The presence of the unemployed affects the employed: if a protest mood is in the air, bosses can tell their workers that there is a huge number of unemployed people ready to take their place’ (INT-44). As a result, only a very small percentage of formal workers generally plan to find another job, with the figure being significantly lower for people in full-time jobs as compared to those in temporary ones (CER & UNDP 2011: 65-66).

Moreover, the introduction of industrial machinery in old (e.g. textile) and new (e.g. electronics) sectors allowed for the further gendered differentiation of the working class and its costs of reproduction, as, while men dominate in most heavy industries (e.g. automotive, petrochemical), women have been employed as low-skilled workers in specific industrial sectors. This is especially true of (often single) young women, whose employment rates in industry between 2006 and 2016 stood at 20% against 4% for young men (UNDP 2018a: 85, Figure 2.2.5). For instance, women have been incorporated into the industrial-scale production of electronics equipment and appliances, mostly engaging in the assemblage, testing, and packaging of electronics parts (Artel 2016: mins. 3:12-3:14, 9:43-10:05, 13:12- 13:18, 15:14-15:20; Romanova et al. 2017: 12; INT-25a; INT-74). Likewise, as Russian women used to dominate the textile industry during Soviet times, indigenous nationality women now account for 71% and 44% of the total labour force in textile and wear apparel, respectively, though again in ‘more casual, low wage’ jobs than their male counterparts (World Bank 2020: 54; INT-60a; INT-60b; INT-64; INT-65a; INT-65b; INT-66a; INT-66b; INT-70; INT-71a; INT-72b; INT-73b). In the fast-growing agribusiness and agrifood sector

59 Within ‘normal’ world market conditions, these are ‘degraded subjectivity’ workers (Chapters 2-4), who are nonetheless among the higher-skilled workforce in the context of the Uzbek domestic market.

192 (young) women have been absorbed into largely part-time, low-wage employment in greenhouses, as well as cold storage, sorting, processing, and packaging of agricultural production such as fruit, vegetables, and nuts (Maksakova 2008: 91; Lombardozzi 2020a; World Bank 2020: 39, 59; INT-18; INT-73b). This process of subsumption of female labour from the indigenous nationalities into industrial work has been ideologically mediated by the perpetuation, and retrenchment, of patriarchal norms about their ‘nimble fingers’, ‘dexterity’, and ‘docility’, as well as the centrality of their reproductive roles. So, for example, the turnover among young women in industry is relatively high as they tend to leave their jobs once they get married and have children (INT-60b; INT-66a; INT-74).

Finally, women have been concentrated in the tertiary sector, working in public administration, health, and education, where average salaries have consistently been at the lower end of the spectrum since independence (ADB 2018: 65; UNDP 2018a: 52, 53, Figure 2.1.3, 55, 89, 122; GosKomStat 2018). In 2017, health (and social services) and education comprised about 55% of the total formal workforce yet accrued 41.4% of the total wage fund (GosKomStat 2017); in 2019, the former stood at 34% and the latter at 20% below the national average (GosKomStat 2019a: 371). Public sectors jobs provide ‘low wages but lifetime employment’, even when entailing 60-70 hour weeks (Ahrens et al. 2016: 63-64), so though ‘the salary is paltry, at least it is something, people are happy they have a job and a salary’ (INT-44). As a result, women are half as likely as men to look for a new job (CER & UNDP 2011: 65); instead, their employment is often seen as complementing the male breadwinner’s, while allowing them to fulfil a series of other tasks, first and foremost tending to the household.

This general retrenchment of women’s position in society within the overall retrenchment of labour’s position in post-independence Uzbekistan, particularly following decollectivisation, has been ideologically mediated by the retrenchment of patriarchal norms. With the end of full employment, as well as the social infrastructures and welfare services that guaranteed the indiscriminate reproduction of the working class in the UzSSR through collective access to, and use of, the land and commons, women were thrust to the forefront of processes of informalisation and precarisation, as part of a vast relative surplus population struggling for survival and whose reproduction women have become crucial to guaranteeing by dint of their dramatically increased ‘double burden’. Within the household, the patriarch - the father and elder brother before marriage; the father-in-law and husband in close collaboration with

193 the mother-in-law60 after marriage - enforces this strict social hierarchy; at the local level, the revival of the mahalla replicates it across the country through its responsibility for social cohesion and control - including the prevention of divorces at all costs, even in cases of domestic violence (HRW 2001, 2003; FW-2019) - as well as for social security provision in the context of a severely diminished welfare budget (Pomfret & Anderson 1997: 26, 29; Coudouel et al. 1998: 4-5; Melvin 2000: 32-33; Kangas 2001: 135-136; Noori 2006: 534; Kandiyoti 2007b; Murtazashvili 2012: 88-89).

Thus, women’s reproductive roles have become ever more salient in defining their status in society as mothers, wives, and daughters(-in-law) within the extended family, under which their labour has largely been subsumed and for whose reproduction women must toil from dawn to midnight with little to no support from the state. In this context, the huge onus of domestic responsibilities as a specifically ‘feminised’ sphere impinges on the (largely informal) jobs and (low-skilled, low-wage) tasks within specific, and equally ‘feminised’, economic sectors, into which women have been absorbed to earn additional income to support the household, from formal jobs in services and industries to informal manual, including agricultural, labour (e.g. cotton picking) to migration. Again, this transformation has been mediated by the continuation and retrenchment of patriarchal stereotypes about their ‘nimble fingers’, ‘dexterity’, and ‘docility’ suited to carry out repetitive low-skilled manual tasks including as appendages to (industrial) machinery.

In this perspective, class stratification and its specific gendered effects - the feminisation of agriculture, unskilled agricultural labour, and poverty - are not the result of no transition and transformation (neoliberal transitologists), nor are they a necessary sacrifice on the path to an elusive industrial ‘upgrading’ (developmentalists), as though gender represented a discrete sphere separate from class and the other multiple ‘concrete particularities’ through which labour exists in society (McNally 2015, 2017). Instead, as labour lives through gendered social relations, the gendered class stratification - with gender thus internally related to, and co-constitutive of, class - in Uzbekistan during the past three decades embodies the country’s concrete political-economic transformation since 1991, as a ‘rich totality of many determinations’ (Marx 1857/1993: 100). Ultimately, this is the form that the mediation of global capital accumulation acquires in Uzbekistan and, as such, the direct outcome of capitalist transformation therein, rather than the negation of an ideal-type classless and gender-liberating capitalism, as the literature would have it (Chapter 1).

60 In Uzbekistan, it is quite common to hear stories about tyrannical mothers-in-law in relation to their daughters-in-law, or kelinki, who are generally expected to shoulder ‘the greatest burden of domestic chores’ in a household (Romanova et al. 2017: 21; Nizamedinkhodjayeva et al. 2017: 43, Table 4.1).

194

While the multifarious differentiation in the costs of reproduction of the working class along in/formal, gender, skill, and geographic lines has weakened class solidarity, labour has nonetheless resisted precarisation.

3. CLASS AND STRUGGLE

As argued throughout this chapter, transition in Uzbekistan, particularly via decollectivisation, marked the end of the indiscriminate reproduction of the working class and the differentiation in its costs of reproduction along in/formal, geographic (rural-urban, regional), gender, and skill lines. On the one hand, the dismantlement of agricultural collectives resulted in the collapse of the welfare state for the majority of the population; on the other hand, the maintenance and development of capital-intensive and ‘backward’ industries in old and new sectors of the economy only absorbed a fraction of the ‘freed’ peasants, as evident in the rise of a vast relative surplus population that struggles to survive amid precarity, un(der)employment, and poverty. The net result has been a dramatic shift from universal welfare coverage for the working class to limited benefits to specific categories of formal, especially (male) industrial, workers. As a consequence, from a right and duty during Soviet times, employment has been transformed into a privilege to be defended for a minority of workers, weakening class solidarity and defining the largely spontaneous way in which labour has resisted this ongoing process of precarisation.

In the USSR, trade unions functioned as ‘transmission belts’ between the state and the working class, relaying the plan’s targets but also providing a whole host of benefits and services that increased workers’ social wages for decades (Chapter 3). Following independence, however, not only has union membership in Uzbekistan collapsed in parallel to the informalisation and precarisation of the working class (ITUC 2017a: 1), but so have the welfare provisions accrued to a large share of members, too, so much so that, ‘in most cases’, the latter ‘are unaware of their membership as they neither receive any benefits nor contribute to [the] development of these movements’ (CER & UNDP 2011: 78, fn. 14). In other words, trade unions have only preserved, and perfected, their role ‘as an instrument of management rather than as a means of interest group-based collective bargaining’ (FH 2004: 8; World Bank 2002: 110), with a ‘revolving door’ operating between the leadership of the Federation of Trade Unions of Uzbekistan (FTUU) - to which all unions in the country are affiliated - and government and business (Mrost 2017: 5, 15; INT-43; INT-75).

195 Despite the lack of union organisation and the multiple fault lines dividing the working class, labour has mounted fierce resistance against precarisation, but largely in a spontaneous and disorganised way whose effects have been short-term and limited to a specific set of workers, rather than translating into the advancement of collective rights (Buketov 2018; LRMM 2018). ‘All protests are basically riots and spontaneous actions; nowhere have I seen a strike in the proper sense, following a collective agreement by the workers, who deliberately go on strike. Workers lack organisation, they are divided, they lost the sense of being a collective’ (INT-44), as was instead the case in Soviet times. Thus, with little to no organisational infrastructure, workers have spontaneously responded to economic hardship and repression with work stoppages and various forms of protest actions, from hunger strikes to sit-ins, blocking roads and even occupying government buildings, though their overall lack of nation-wide coordination - what Robertson (2010) dubs ‘protests without movements’ in the Russian context (Chapter 3) - has allowed the authorities to divide and, crucially, contain them as largely isolated incidents at the local level.

This was the case in the first half of the 2000s, when a mixture of economic hardship - exacerbated by austerity measures - and repression led to several waves of protests by industrial workers, state employees including teachers, and pensioners, due to wage arrears or non-payment of salaries and pensions (Memorial 2002a; FH 2004; RFE/RL 2004; Babajanov 2005; Khaidarov 2005; Mahnovski et al. 2006: 13; EIU 2008: 24; LRMM 2018). Likewise, the introduction of draconian taxes and licenses on, and for the resale of, shuttle- trader-imported goods, as well as the confiscation of significant amounts of imported merchandise by the local authorities, erupted in demonstrations. Tens of thousands of people took to several markets across the country due to the sheer number of families relying on income from petty trade in local bazaars, amid mass un(der)employment especially in the densely populated Fergana Valley (Memorial 2002b; ICG 2004: 17; RFE/RL 2004; Spechler 2008: 53, 83).

Given their prominence in specific sectors such as public employment (e.g. as teachers), shuttle- and small retail-trade, women’s presence has been sustained at protests, including as mediators at times of heightened tensions between demonstrators and local authorities. Crucially, due to their centrality to reproductive work, women have been at the forefront of smaller yet frequent demonstrations about housing demolitions, the recurrent cuts in utilities such as water and gas, as well as power outages particularly in the more remote regions and in rural areas during the freezing winter months (Memorial 2002a, 2002b, 2003a, 2003b, 2003c; RFE/RL 2004; Fergana 2006; Eurasianet 2011). Finally, brewing rural discontent as a result of the ‘new forms of social inequality and exclusion’ created with

196 decollectivisation (Trevisani 2010: 219; Zanca 2011: 77) also intermittently erupted into action when the government forced its hand, turning already abject poverty into outright hunger by, for example, confiscating the full wheat harvest from farmers (ICG 2001: 24; INT-75). In this context, women’s dramatically increased work in the fields as well as migrant workers’ remittances especially from Russia have maintained a fragile equilibrium by providing a crucial lifeline for rural households.

For their part, the GoU have exploited the protesters’ divisions and lack of coordination to their advantage, deploying a mixture of intimidation and mediation in order to break up demonstrations in the fastest possible fashion and, crucially, avoid their spread. Often, and particularly when mobilisation has achieved some critical mass, local authorities have met with protesters, listened to their grievances and, whenever possible, addressed them in order to deescalate the situation quickly (Memorial 2002a, 2002b; RFE/RL 2004; INT-44). ‘This proves that when people rise up, the management responds, in order to make them shut up. For the other workers [who didn’t mobilise], nothing [was] done’ (INT-44). This pattern of spontaneous protests followed by mediation and temporary localised solution and/or intimidation continues to this day, with wage arrears, housing demolitions to make space for large-scale redevelopment projects in city centres around the country, especially Tashkent, as well as gas and electricity cuts in the regions figuring among the top reasons for mobilisation (Ashur & Synovitz 2018; BBC 2019; Najibullah 2019; Jardine et al. 2020; RFE/RL 2020; Eurasianet 2021a; FW-2019).

But it is through its apparatus of repression that the state has consistently worked to undermine organising and, when mobilisation has been perceived to threaten the accumulation of the total social capital, ruthlessly crush it. Clearly, the massacre of hundreds of protesters in Andijan, Fergana Valley, in May 2005 is the most brutal example to date of the state’s readiness to suppress any perceived threat to the process of accumulation. Faced with local entrepreneurs creating a possible alternative power ‘centre’ and, especially, the mass mobilisation triggered by their expected sentencing within the context of growing poverty and mass un(der)employment in the populous valley, the state’s reaction was ruthless (HRW 2005: 3, 8; Blackmon 2011: 43; Markowitz 2013: 100-101, 120).61 Still, repression has been a constant feature of life in Uzbekistan since independence. In this context, rights activists have been fined, harassed, beaten, confined to psychiatric hospitals, arrested and sentenced to lengthy prison terms on trumped-up

61 An analysis of events in Andijan is beyond the scope of this dissertation, but see e.g. HRW 2005; McGlinchey 2011: Chapter 4; Markowitz 2013: Chapter 5; for an alternative account, see Akiner 2005.

197 charges, including of ‘Islamic extremism’, forcing some to flee and find political asylum abroad; others have been tortured and even died in custody for their activism (Fitzpatrick 2011b; HRW 2011, 2014).

Labour rights activists have been subjected to particularly vicious attacks for their monitoring of forced labour during the cotton harvest (Atayeva & Belomestnov 2010; Kelly 2015), a particularly sensitive subject for the GoU given the centrality of cotton as a key ground-rent bearing export commodity for decades and the partial success of the Cotton Campaign - a global coalition against forced labour in cotton production - to lobby for the ongoing boycott of Uzbek cotton ‘by more than 300 apparel manufacturers and retailers’ (Reuters 2020). As a result, no trade union independent of the FTUU has been established in Uzbekistan in the past three decades. One attempt by two prominent labour rights defenders to create a union protecting the rights of mardikory and migrant workers - a significant share of the population with huge potential for mobilisation - was crushed by the authorities. The pair was quickly arrested and sentenced to more than 8 years in jail on human trafficking charges, after being allegedly tortured in pretrial custody; in 2017, one of the activists died in prison (HRW 2014: 42-43, 2017).

Therefore, the authoritarian state in independent Uzbekistan is not a relic of the Soviet past, but the specific political form of mediation of (global) capital accumulation within the radically new conditions of production and social reproduction in the country as a raw material exporter in the IDL (Chapter 4). As this entails the differentiation in the costs of reproduction of the working class, including by thrusting the majority of the population into the ranks of relative surplus, the state has assured the accumulation of the total social capital via a system of pervasive control and repression; when fear of repercussions failed to preempt action, a whole host of repressive tools has been deployed to stop mobilisation. In this perspective, despite its appearance of autonomy and independence, the ‘essential feature of the state is its class character’ (Clarke 1991: 186), so its policies and institutions are social forms of the class struggle that guarantee the process of accumulation in the country, including by mediating the recurrent antagonism between capital and labour or outright crushing the latter when it may threaten the valorisation of the former.

4. CONCLUSION

Continuing to operate at the fourth level of generality, Chapter 5 focussed on the radical change from the indiscriminate reproduction of the working class under conditions of Fordist industrial mass production and collective agriculture during the USSR, to gendered class

198 stratification in independent Uzbekistan, particularly with the rise of a vast relative surplus population. With decollectivisation, the majority of the rural population was expelled from the land, whose use was shifted to the production/extraction of raw materials for capital accumulation. As a result, the working class underwent a steep differentiation in its costs of reproduction along in/formal, geographic (rural-urban, regional), gender, and skill lines. A minority of (largely formal, urban, skilled, male) labour was subsumed under extractive or ‘backward’ industries; the majority was instead transformed into relative surplus for the requirements of accumulation, struggling to survive amid un(der)employment, poverty, and migration within Uzbekistan as well as to Russia and Kazakhstan. Women suffered the brunt of informalisation and precarisation, as evident in the feminisation of agriculture, unskilled agricultural labour, and poverty, along with the huge increase in their ‘double burden’, all mediated by the recrudescence of patriarchal norms about their propensity for care work and hand dexterity specifically suited to manual work. In this context, their role in the reproduction of this relative surplus population and, by extension, the working class, particularly via food production, has become absolutely crucial. Finally, as a consequence of this stratification, class solidarity has been weakened. This accounts for the largely spontaneous and localised forms of resistance to precarisation that have punctuated Uzbekistan’s independent history, which the authorities have been adept to exploit in order to avoid mass unrest and guarantee the process of accumulation, or, at times of perceived threat thereto, have crushed with the state’s full apparatus of repression.

Chapter 5 addressed RQ3 via a focus on why decollectivisation is crucial to explaining class stratification and struggle in Uzbekistan since independence. Next, Chapter 6 turns to the centrality of land use changes to understand the accelerating climate crisis in the country during the past three decades in general, and the relative surplus population’s specific vulnerability to it, in particular (RQ3).

199 CHAPTER 6 Class, Food In/Security, and Everyday Resistance in ‘Resource Rich’ Uzbekistan in the Age of Climate Crisis

0. INTRODUCTION

Decollectivisation lay at the heart of the Uzbek model’s mediation of the country’s integration into the IDL as a raw material exporter. As Section 1 explains, on the one hand, land (and resource) use change from the indiscriminate reproduction of the working class to the ground-rent subsidisation of the total social capital guaranteed capital accumulation in Uzbekistan, while meeting solvent demand for primary commodities in the world market; on the other hand, the intensification of raw material extraction and production, including cash crops, contributed to accelerating the current trends of environmental devastation. The net result has been the altered reproduction or outright non-reproduction of natural use-values, in particular the increasing salinisation/decreasing fertility of the soil as well as the retreat of the glaciers feeding Central Asia’s main river systems, along with the acceleration in the frequency and intensity of extreme events, especially droughts. Put differently, natural use- value exploitation is internally related to the process of accumulation, which, within the current levels of capital concentration and centralisation most evident in large-scale industry, is precipitating the climate crisis. Section 2 argues that, since the GoU and the literature find a rare point of agreement in turning capitalism from the cause of climate change into its solution, they put forward techno-managerial policies that often allow for the intensification of raw material production, thus exacerbating, rather than solving, the ongoing climate crisis. Crucially, as national forms of mediation of the global accumulation of capital, such policy solutions fail to challenge the contradiction between production for accumulation and production for use at the centre of the current acceleration in environmental breakdown, whose effects have been impinging on the most vulnerable strata of society - the relative surplus population in rural areas and, among them, women, children, and the elderly in particular. As Section 3 shows, given their centrality in the reproduction of this relative surplus population, women have been catapulted to the centre of this very contradiction revolving around land and resource use, where they have carved out a space for everyday resistance to capital in order to secure the reproduction of the household. In the name of mitigation and adaptation to climate change, however, capital is encroaching on women’s survival strategies in order to integrate them into techno- managerial solutions at the service of the boundless accumulation process, with the potential of precipitating a crisis of reproduction for the relative surplus population. Again, rather than the literature’s transition as classless, gender-liberating, and eco-friendly

200 development for all, class is the fundamental divide in capitalism, hence crucial to accounting for the differential vulnerability of the relative surplus population in Uzbekistan to climate change; equally, as co-constitutive of, hence internally related to, class, gender is a key concrete determination through which this differentiation in vulnerability plays out in the country.

Chapter 6 continues operating at the fourth level of generality to explore the rich concrete determinations of political-economic transformation in independent Uzbekistan. As such, it focusses on why land use changes have been key to explaining the acceleration of, and differential vulnerability to, the climate crisis in the country, incorporating insights from feminist and ‘green’ Marxists into the overall CICP framework (RQ3).

1. LAND AND RESOURCE USE AND DEPLETION IN ‘RESOURCE RICH’ UZBEKISTAN

The growth of large-scale industrial production, extraction, and transportation in the GPE, as evident in the hugely concentrated and centralised capitals of MNCs and TNCs, has been driving the accelerating climate crisis (Chapter 2). In line with other ‘resource rich’ countries, as a raw material exporter in the IDL Uzbekistan has fed into, and suffered from, climate change in ways related to the production, extraction, and transportation of primary commodities, with cash crop production and extractive industries being at the forefront of these dynamics. This has led to natural use-values either reproducing under altered forms, such as the increasing salinisation/decreasing fertility of the soil, or failing to reproduce altogether, as evident in particular in the disappearing glaciers that feed water into the region’s main rivers. At this point, it is worth reiterating that these diverse phenomena are not the result of the underdevelopment of an ideal-type eco-friendly capitalism (‘lack of transition’) in Uzbekistan, as neoliberal transitology would have it (Chapter 1), but rather the direct outcome of the full development of global capital accumulation therein.

1.1. From Aral Sea desiccation...

As reviewed in Chapter 1, neoliberal transitology frames the continuation of the desiccation of the Aral Sea in Uzbekistan as a clear consequence of the Soviet system that the country kept pursuing after independence. By construing Soviet communism and Western capitalism as two opposing ideal-types - with the former’s price-distorting mechanisms unable to achieve the latter’s efficient use of resources for ‘green’ growth - the literature then argues that the continuation, and acceleration, of environmental devastation in independent Uzbekistan is yet another item in the long list of consequences linked to the

201 country’s lack of transition. Since, methodologically, it starts with the nation state, not only does the literature fail to (internally) relate the changing material conditions of large-scale industrial production in the world market with the accelerating climate crisis (Chapter 2), but it also ignores how the Uzbek state’s mediation of (global) capital accumulation via land (and resource) use changes has been severely affecting natural use-values (e.g. soil fertility) in the country, threatening the food security particularly of the vast relative surplus population in the medium-to-long term (Section 2).62

In this context, as the drying up of the Aral Sea was a clear case of colossal state-led mismanagement of cotton production in the USSR (Chapter 1), had Uzbekistan actually liberalised its agricultural sector following independence - that is, transitioned to capitalism by establishing legal private ownership of the land - the profit-maximising instinct of truly private actors would have resulted in the better management of scant resources, such as water, and, if not in the reversal, certainly in the mitigation of environmental destruction. Subsidised water in agriculture translates into waste that could be avoided with the proper use of the price mechanism. However, the ‘implicit suggestion … that reductions in cotton exports and the production behind them might free supplies for the Aral Sea’ is demonstrably flawed. ‘Even if policy changes to reduce cotton exports, it is much more likely that any water “saved” from reduced cotton production will instead be used to produce other crops, as has been the pattern to date’ (Abdullaev et al. 2009: 62, emphasis added; Djanibekov et al. 2010: 12) and since.

Even accounting for the significant losses of the aging irrigation system, the empirical data unequivocally support this conclusion, as water use for agriculture increased by more than 20% between 2009 and 2017, despite the considerable decrease in land hectarage allocated to cotton cultivation since independence (UNECE 2020: 295, Table 13.4; Nurbekov et al. 2018: xx, Table 1). In other words, as production was always internally related to increased material throughput in both the Western and the Soviet Blocs, it has continued and even accelerated in independent Uzbekistan with the growing capability of large-scale industrial production, extraction, and transportation in the world market. In view of the boundless accumulation process, whereby ‘use values are only produced as means of obtaining exchange value, not of satisfying human needs’ (Burkett 1999: 83; Chapter 2), this has exacerbated the contradiction between land and resource use for capital

62 While developmental transitologists disagreed on the specific charge that the Uzbek model represented a continuation of Soviet policies and institutions, they did agree with neoliberal transitologists that the Aral Sea disaster was the result of Soviet mismanagement (Chapter 1), hence on the need of better management and technologies to ensure future ‘green’ growth (Section 2).

202 accumulation and land and resource use for social reproduction (food security), specifically of the relative surplus population. Thus, as the state mediated Uzbekistan’s integration into the IDL as a producer of raw materials, whose exports have fed large-scale industrial production as well as guaranteed the reproduction of the national total social capital, it has contributed to, and suffered from, the acceleration of resource depletion in the country amid the ravages of a globally changing climate (PKM-484 2019: Arts. 37-38).

Given the importance of agriculture to the Uzbek economy, the production of cotton and other cash crops has been at the centre of these dynamics. On the one hand, cotton and wheat cultivation guaranteed the ground-rent subsidisation of the total social capital, regardless of the accumulation requirements of small agricultural capitals (fermery); on the other hand, decollectivisation and the introduction of the profit motive enabled fermery to exploit a vast landless peasantry to diversify their accumulation strategies via multiple cropping (Chapters 4-5). As a consequence, not only did ‘the drying out of the Aral Sea … not stop or decelerate’ (Spoor & Krutov 2003: 599), but also crop diversification increased systemic stress on the irrigation system and accelerated environmental destruction within the radically changed material conditions introduced with decollectivisation, such as the diversification in the costs of reproduction of the working class. Social stratification, including along geographic and gender lines, has rendered the landless peasantry and, in particular, women, children, and the elderly, specifically vulnerable to climate change. Thus, land and resource use in the age of climate crisis lies at the heart of women’s ever increasing ‘double burden’, as well as their everyday resistance to capital (Sections 2-3).

As the GoU pursued grain self-sufficiency to guarantee the circulation of winter wheat (henceforth, wheat) and derived products at below international market prices on the domestic market, a crucial form of ground-rent subsidisation of the total social capital (Chapter 4), the different vegetation periods and irrigation needs of cotton and wheat impinged on water use and the monumental canal system originally conceived to cater mostly to cotton (Platonov et al. 2014).63 As a consequence, the introduction of wheat

negatively impacted the irrigation and drainage (I&D) network. Earlier, under cotton monoculture, during the non-vegetation period of October-March, there were no crops in the field, and the I&D network was cleaned and prepared for the next season during the fallow fall-winter months. Currently, winter wheat is grown from the fall (October) to the next

63 The vegetation period for cotton is April-September; winter wheat’s is September/October-June.

203 vegetation season (June). … Therefore, the I&D network is operating almost 12 months a year, leaving little time for cleaning or minor repairs (Frenken 2013: 197).

This happened in parallel to the dismantling of collective farms (decollectivisation), the institutions in charge of the maintenance of the huge canal infrastructure (Chapter 5), while fermery had little capacity and/or incentives to fill the vacuum, except for the canals directly involved in watering their land (Wegerich 2000; Spoor 2004: 36; Swinkels et al. 2016b: 10; INT-33). As a result, the canal system has been overused and underserviced, which explains why ‘[a]t least 50% of water losses are as a result of damaged infrastructure’ (Adaptation Fund 2014: 10), while provision can vary significantly between a canal’s head (closer to the water source, i.e. the river) and tail end (Platonov et al. 2014: 91), significantly affecting production. In parallel, as soil ‘[s]alinity is closely related to drainage conditions’ (Frenken 2013: 197), the result has been the acceleration of soil salinisation across the country, as ‘[b]etween 1990 and 2001, the area of saline lands in Uzbekistan increased by 33 percent, while the area of highly saline lands more than doubled’ (Nkonya et al. 2011: 101); currently, saline land comprises 65.9% of the irrigated area (SCNP & UNDP 2008: 47; EJF 2005: 27; INT-49a; INT-49d).

Moreover, while struggling to profit from cotton and wheat production, private fermery could exploit a vast landless and increasingly precarious relative surplus population to guarantee the reproduction of their small agricultural capitals (Chapters 4-5). For instance, cotton farmers could grow rice as a cash crop after the end of the cotton picking season (Veldwisch & Bock 2011: 585; Trevisani 2019: 127); wheat farmers could instead follow up with ‘cultivation of high-value crops such as maize, rice, vegetables, and potatoes after the wheat harvest in early summer’ (World Bank & IAMO 2019: 20; Lombardozzi 2020b). With multiple cropping (Figure 6.1), competition over water use escalated as did intensive land use (Abdullaev et al. 2009: 49; Platonov et al. 2014; Muradov & Ilkhamov 2014: 12, 45), further increasing systemic stress on the canal infrastructure and significantly damaging soil fertility. Whereas during Soviet times land was either left fallow or cultivated with lucerne/alfalfa for fodder after the cotton harvest, which contributed to restoring soil nutrients, following independence land and resources have been used year-round to guarantee capital accumulation (SCNP & UNDP 2008: 43; World Bank & IAMO 2019: iv, 28, 32).

204

Figure 6.1. Uzbekistan’s land use change for key crops/1,000 ha (selected years) Source: own elaboration based on data in Nurbekov et al. 2018: xx, Table 1 and Khan 1996: 7 (data set in Appendix 8).

Finally, in line with decollectivisation and the privatisation of access to land, livestock rearing was decoupled from cotton cultivation, depriving the soil of manure, another natural fertilizer (World Bank & IAMO 2019: 32). Instead, in parallel to the two-third decline in the area allotted to growing feed between 1991 and 2004 (WFP 2008: 9), the emergence of multiple private actors following the dismantlement of collectives led to the abandonment of past seasonal pasture rotation practices and the overgrazing of available pastures close to populated areas, including along roadsides and ditches, as well as at foothills and in low mountains (UNECE 2010: 102, 2020: 250; Yusupov et al. 2010: 73-74; SCNP 2015: 20; FW-2019). Overgrazing and salinisation accounted for a 13% reduction of available pasture land between 2000 and 2016, further exacerbating the problem (Yusupov et al. 2010: 79- 80; GEF 2019: 18). Clearly, dekhans are also participating in overgrazing, but for them milk and meat production are yet another strategy for survival amid lost access to land and the commons, rather than a further opportunity for capital accumulation, as is instead the case for fermery. The same applies for the ‘removal of vegetation for fuel and firewood’ that contributes to soil erosion (UNECE 2010: 108), in the context of fermery’s sale of cotton stalks and cereal straws previously freely available on the collectives, as well as the regular gas and electricity cuts in rural areas (Chapter 5).

205 1.2. Agribusiness and industry

Cotton and cash crop production for export have combined to accelerate environmental devastation in Uzbekistan, in the context of the precipitating climate crisis due to the increasing capacity of large-scale industrial production, extraction, and transportation in the GPE. As Marx (1894/1991: 950, 949) puts it, ‘the industrial system … and trade … provide agriculture with the means of exhausting the soil’, whose ‘vitality’ is squandered as it is ‘carried by trade far beyond the bounds of a single country’. Thus, decades of cotton production have had devastating effects on soil fertility in Uzbekistan, with ‘significant tracts of land becoming unfit for agriculture’ (Muradov & Ilkhamov 2014: 45), though under radically different material conditions of production and social reproduction (Chapters 4-5). Within the Fordist conditions of production in the USSR, cotton was produced in the UzSSR in exchange for the indiscriminate reproduction of the working class. Following independence, the Uzbek state has instead mediated the ground-rent subsidisation of the total social capital via cotton exports, as well as the ensuing differentiation in the costs of reproduction of the working class, while Uzbek cotton has met global solvent demand from Europe’s textile industry (Chapagain et al. 2006: 201), before the boycott of Uzbek cotton came into force (Chapter 5), and, increasingly, from Russia and Asia. This is particularly the case with Bangladesh and China, as the latter’s textile and apparel industry boomed especially since the 2000s in the context of the country’s meteoric industrialisation (Gurney 2012: 3, 16-18; Zhang et al. 2016: 89, 96, Figure 7; Chapter 2). While cotton production has more than halved since independence, it now continues within the cluster system (Chapter 4), along with the ensuing environmental stress on Uzbekistan’s water and irrigation system. In 2020-21, one million hectares are forecast to be allocated to cotton to grow 3.1 million bales or 673,000 metric tons (Erdogan 2020: 2).

In parallel, the GoU has encouraged the development of horticulture into a multi-billion export market, further compounding the problems of declining soil fertility and water stress. In 2000 the GoU ‘exempted the export of fruits and vegetables from foreign exchange surrender requirements’, boosting export earnings for producers (EBRD 2002: 215). Crucially, since the commodity supercycle, it has provided preferential tax treatment, including customs and tax exemptions, as well as subsidised credit - all forms of ground- rent subsidisation - for selected fermery to expand industrial agriculture with the importation of high-quality seeds from leading agriculture TNCs, as well as high-yield seedlings and rootstocks of dwarf and semi-dwarf fruit trees for high-density orchards, along with planting materials and equipment (Larson et al. 2015: 25-28; World Bank & IAMO 2019: 43; Agro Kontinent 2020; Lombardozzi 2020a, 2020b: 641, 647; INT-18). Such trees are planted

206 more densely ‘so that there is room for more trees’ on the same plot of land, resulting in higher yields per hectare (JICA et al. 2017: 49). Again, land use change was gradual and differed from region to region (INT-18), yet between 2004 and 2013 fresh and processed fruit and vegetable exports rose from 72,000 to 548,000 tons for a value of 1.5 billion USD (Yuldashbaev 2014: 3-4; Schroeder et al. 2018: 5-6). Currently, horticulture clusters are being created in the agrifood sector, with the aim of expanding exports of fruits, vegetables, dried fruits and nuts to 5 billion USD by 2022 and further to 20 billion USD by 2030 (Mirziyoyev 2019; UP-5853 2019; World Bank 2020; INT-49c).

On top of the damage to soil fertility and the stress on water use, the rise of intensive fruit orchards and horticulture via the importation of alien seeds and species for export production has been identified as one of the main causes of biodiversity loss in Uzbekistan (SCNP 2015: 27, Figure 7; Tursunova 2012: 159, 319; INT-26). Another cause is natural resource extraction and transportation, particularly of oil and natural gas, due to the degradation and fragmentation of natural habitats that come with exploration and the construction of large-scale infrastructures such as roads and pipelines, which significantly impact the surrounding ecosystems and animal migratory routes. This threat has clearly escalated with the commodity supercycle and the ensuing growth in joint-investments in the energy industry between Uzbekneftegaz (UNG) - the SOE that dominates oil and gas - and a number of foreign companies, SOEs, and development banks, especially from Russia and Asia (Chapter 4). The upsurge in natural gas exploration, extraction, and related infrastructure in the Ustyurt Plateau in the country’s west, as well as the 1,840 km-long Central Asia-China Gas pipeline, 530-km of which traverse central Uzbekistan, are clear cases in point (CNPC 2009, 2011; SCNP 2015: 19, 27, Figure 7, 30; Williams & Marmazinskaya 2015: 5; Teo et al. 2019).

Likewise, while agriculture is responsible for approximately 90% of water use in Uzbekistan, extractive industries and, to a lesser but still significant extent, ‘backward’ manufacturing industries are responsible for most of air, soil, and water pollution (UNECE 2020: xxxvi- xxxvii, 175, 269, 272-277). Industrial production comprises ‘half the total final energy consumption’ in the country, with the energy sector overall accounting for more than 80% of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (ibid.: xxxvi, 272). Among the top GHG emitters are UNG and the Almalyk Mining and Metallurgical Company (AGMK), which specialises in the extraction of gold and other non-ferrous metals (SCNP & UNDP 2008: 22-23, 27). UNG produces the fuel that powers ‘backward’ domestic industries, most crucially natural gas, a key ground-rent bearing commodity whose exports to China have also significantly risen in recent years via the Central Asia-China Gas pipeline (Chapters 2, 4). Equally, mining leads

207 to severe soil degradation due to the removal of ‘large amounts of soil and vegetation for open pit mining’, as well as soil contamination ‘with heavy metals … in the areas located in close proximity to industrial enterprises’ (UNECE 2020: xliii).

This includes the mining of gold, another crucial ground-rent bearing raw material, with the Navoi Mining and Metallurgical Company-operated (NGMK) Muruntau mine being one of the biggest open-pit gold mines in the world. Although specific information is limited, extractive activities produce massive tailings ponds of toxic industrial waste, as is the case with NGMK and AGMK, along with waste dumps that affect local habitats and cause ‘loss of biodiversity and arable lands’ (ibid.: 209-210, 330). As a result, the level of soil contamination and the concentration of industrial waste are higher in and around industrial regions, such as Tashkent, particularly the capital city, and Navoi (ibid.: 330-331). Finally, while at 1.4% the industrial share of total water use is ‘negligible’, still ‘water pollution from the chemical, oil, manufacturing and metallurgical industries is a major issue’ (ibid.: xliii), with industry figuring as ‘one of the main sources of contamination of surface and ground water’ in the country (BCEOM et al. 2003: 12).

1.3. … to glacial retreat

As Uzbekistan keeps feeding the productive capacity of large-scale industry in the IDL with raw materials produced on its soil (e.g. cotton) and extracted from the bowels of its land (e.g. natural gas), which, in turn, guarantee the ground-rent subsidisation, hence accumulation, of the total social capital in the country, it simultaneously contributes to, and suffers from, the escalating climate crisis. On top of the decreasing fertility/increasing salinity of the soil, this appears in extreme weather patterns (e.g. droughts, floods), and, crucially, the changing (snow, rain) precipitations and the ensuing accelerating retreat of the glaciers providing most of the water for the country, and the Central Asian region (Karimov 2008: 226).

Historically, given the low levels of rainfall characteristic of the region’s continental climate, agriculture in Central Asia has heavily relied on irrigation (Mirzabaev 2013: 34-37). The two main regional rivers, the Amu Darya and the Syr Darya,64 have traditionally provided more than 80% of Central Asia’s water (Turayeva 2011: 59-60), which has been channelled by the complex Soviet-era canal system for cotton production and continues to be the main source for irrigation in the region, including in Uzbekistan. In turn, the headwaters of the

64 In antiquity, they were known as the Oxus and the Jaxartes, respectively.

208 Amu and Syr Darya largely originate in the glaciers and snow covered peaks of the Tian Shan, Alai, and Pamir Mountains located between Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and (Alford et al. 2015: 1-5). However, rising global temperatures and changing precipitation patterns are simultaneously accelerating snow and ice melting and precipitating glacial retreat. Whereas in the short-term this is increasing surface runoff during spring and summer, heightening the risk of flooding and waterlogging, in the medium-to-long term it is predicted to result in the dramatic drop in ice volume, hence in the total water available in Central Asia (Alford et al. 2015: 13; Luo et al. 2018; UNDP 2018b: 26-27; INT-33; INT-54c).

Using modelling from the World Climate Research Programme (WCRP), Farinotti et al. (2015: 721) found that ‘total glacier ice volume estimated to be present in the Ti[a]n Shan today’ would be halved by the 2050s. Put differently, during Soviet times, so much water was drawn from the Amu and Syr Darya to grow cotton that the Aral Sea dried up; today, global capital accumulation is changing the Earth’s ecosystem to such an extent that the very sources of water for the region’s main rivers are vanishing. This compounds a series of interconnected changes to the country’s ecosystem, from rising temperatures and desertification to an increase in the incidence and intensity of salt and dust storms - themselves linked to the drying up of the Aral Sea (Craumer 1992: 84) - as well as of droughts (WHO & UNDP 2010: 1; Hijioka et al. 2014: 1344; UNFCCC 2018). As the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 2007: 478) anticipated, ‘[t]he projected decrease in mean precipitation in Central Asia will be accompanied by an increase in the frequency of very dry spring, summer and autumn seasons’, that is, droughts. The available evidence suggests that this is already a reality in Uzbekistan, as droughts ‘have become more frequent during the summer and autumn periods’. If during ‘the 1980s and 1990s droughts were observed on average two years in ten[, f]rom 2000-2012 [they] occurred four times - in 2000, 2001, 2008, and 2011’ (FAO 2017: 15; UzHydroMet 2016: 124; Novikov & Kelly 2017: 41, 45; INT-54a).

Clearly, the combination of all these interrelated changes holds potentially calamitous consequences for agriculture, which ‘critically depends’ on water availability in the region’s main river systems (Sutton et al. 2013a: 22). However, not only have land and resource use changes since independence accelerated environmental devastation, but they have also spearheaded a process of class stratification (Chapter 5) that has translated into the sharp differentiation in the population’s vulnerability to climate change.

209 2. TECHNO-MANAGERIAL ‘SOLUTIONS’, CLASS STRATIFICATION, AND FOOD IN/SECURITY

Although the literature and the GoU acknowledge the serious risks of the escalating changes to the Earth’s, and the country’s, ecosystem to food security in Uzbekistan, they find a rare point of agreement in turning capitalism from the cause of the crisis into its solution. Mitigation and adaptation measures are thus steeped in a techno-managerial optimism whereby, since the Aral Sea disaster was a clear-cut case of water mismanagement by the Soviet state, better management and technological innovation would guarantee the sustainable use of scant resources in a local version of ‘green’ growth (PKM-484 2019: Art. 55; Chapter 1). In its Strategy for the Development of Agriculture for the years 2020-2030, for instance, the GoU commits ‘to switching to the practice of sustainable water resources management and resource-saving technologies in crops cultivation’ in order to ‘minimise the negative consequences for the environment and climate caused by the unsustainable use of natural resources’ (UP-5853 2019; also UNFCCC 2018: 1). As argued in Chapter 2, however, within the current levels of capital concentration and centralisation in the global economy, whose most potent forms of mediation are industrial MNCs/TNCs, including those involved in industrial food production, ‘green’ growth is impossible to achieve since, as soon as ‘the physical limits of resource efficiency are reached, continued GDP growth drives resource use back up’ (Hickel & Kallis 2020: 475).

Instead, as the OECD (2019a: 15, 19-21) found, in spite of technological improvements and other limiting factors, material throughput is expected to almost double by 2060 for all categories of materials (fossil fuels, metals and non-metallic minerals, biomass) and everywhere in the world, including in the OECD, but particularly in emerging and developing economies (Chapter 2). As many of the latter, including the FSU and Uzbekistan, are integrated into the IDL as raw materials exporters, growth in the production, extraction, and transportation of primary commodities will remain at the heart of these countries’ feedback loop into and from climate change. This is clearly the case in Uzbekistan, where oil and gas, mining, and agriculture continue to be considered the main growth sectors for the economy, whose exports simultaneously meet solvent demand in the global market and subsidise ‘backward’ manufacturing on the domestic one via ground-rent. In this perspective, since the country’s mineral resource base is considered a key ‘competitive advantage’ for the republic’s development, the introduction of advanced technologies for the prospecting and exploration of new mineral deposits (GosKomGMR 2018: 13, 20) actually contributes to exacerbating, rather than mitigating, the climate crisis.

210 Not only has the development of oil and gas been the primary focus for the Fund for Reconstruction and Development (UFRD) in collaboration with domestic and foreign investors, but also oil, gas, and mining combined are expected to account for 55% of the 40 new joint projects currently under preparation at the UFRD (Chapter 4). While the GoU has committed to improving energy efficiency to diminish losses e.g. from natural gas (UNFCCC 2018: 4), this can hardly offset the environmental impact of multi-billion USD investments aimed at further expanding gas extraction, processing, and transportation volumes. Along with foreign investors, the GoU are envisaging both an increase in exploration of new territories for new gas reserves, as well as the use of advanced technologies to find new formations in gas fields already under development, in order to raise exports as well as production for domestic manufacturing, both as energy provision and as chemical intermediates for the plastics and textile industries. Equally, in view of dwindling oil production, Enhanced Oil Recovery (EOR) technologies such as fracking and horizontal drilling are to be deployed to maintain current oil production levels (Shaismatov 2018; PP- 8839 2019; Griffin 2020; Chapter 4).

Finally, given the centrality of gold as one of the country’s main ground-rent bearing commodities, gold production is receiving a massive boost, along with the mining of other non-ferrous metals. Several pieces of legislation have been passed to organise a huge increase in gold production, as well as in the extraction of silver, copper, and uranium, at the NGMK and the AGMK, with a combined investment of 5.7 billion USD. As a result, total gold production at the two SOEs is forecast to rise by approximately 47% from 89,9 tons in 2017 to 132 tons per year by 2026 (GosKomGMR 2018: 6, Table 1, 8; Djulibekov 2020; PP- 4731 2020: Arts. 1-2).65 Therefore, despite technological innovation and, often, precisely because of it, environmental devastation is poised to accelerate in Uzbekistan alongside the increase in the production, extraction, and transportation of primary commodities on its territory.

The same situation obtains in agriculture, particularly horticulture, which the GoU and IFIs continue to identify as a key growth sector (Karimov 1993a: 240, 242, 1995: 176; Schroeder et al. 2018: 6; Trushin 2018: 5, 11, 21; MFT-C 2018). Following the introduction of the 1998 Land Law (Chapter 5), at the turn of the millennium the GoU established Water Users’ (later Consumers’) Associations (WCAs)66 with significant involvement from donor agencies in order to coordinate water use, avoid conflict and, crucially, save resources (Spoor 2004:

65 Own calculation based on official data (data for AGMK for 2025). 66 Water Users’ Associations were renamed to WCAs following the revision of the Water and Water Use Law of Uzbekistan in December 2009 (Djumaboev et al. 2017b).

211 36-37; Abdullaev et al. 2005: 113-114; Zinzani 2015; Djumaboev et al. 2017a: 6, 2017b). ‘If before there were kolkhozy, now the land is fragmented and distributed into private hands, resulting in an organisational vacuum [that] strains water management. [This] is why [the state] introduced new reforms to create Water Consumers’ Associations, including fermery and dekhans’ (INT-33). Thus, for the authorities, and the donors, the main issue lies in the ‘crucial institutional gap’ in the ‘management of land and water resources’ (Spoor 2004: 36) left by the dismantlement of agricultural collectives. However, such a managerial approach to this gap, important as the latter certainly is, allows for the fundamental contradiction between intensive, and growing, resource use for capital accumulation (multiple cropping) (Chapters 4-5) and environmental degradation to be left untouched, hence contributing to worsening, rather than solving, the problem.

Instead, in former President Karimov’s words, ‘the most important route to sustainable and effective development in agriculture is to shift to intensive management methods via the introduction of modern agricultural technologies and the provision of high-performance agricultural machinery’ (quoted in UNDP 2016b; see also Karimov 1998b: 112-113, 2002: 351). As a consequence, in parallel to high-yield seeds, dwarf and semi-dwarf trees for high density orchards (Section 1), investments have been scaled up to import water-saving technologies such as drip irrigation, while laser-guided land levelling has being introduced for ‘improved water distribution, negligible water losses and a high irrigation water application efficiency’ (Devkota et al. 2015: 245-246; Larson et al. 2015: 26; JICA et al. 2017: 53; UNDP 2018b: 66-67, 104; Lombardozzi 2020a; UNECE 2020: xli; INT-7; INT-33; INT-46b; INT-72a). Again, as in extractive industries, advanced technologies have come in the context of a massive rise in production, particularly of fruit and vegetables for export, which the GoU plan to increase further to 20 billion USD by 2030 (Section 1; Chapter 4), thus offsetting resource-saving and, actually, contributing to the exacerbation of the problem that they were ostensibly deployed to mitigate.

In a paper discussing one of its own horticultural development projects in Uzbekistan, the World Bank (2017d: 28-29) notices that

[e]xpansion of areas under horticulture and intensified horticulture practices could result in increased water use and use of inputs, including pesticides and chemical fertilizers. The project may also support import of alien varieties of fruits, nuts and vegetables, which could result in loss of native species biodiversity and introduction of new pests and diseases, which could be aggravated by climate change effects already being seen in Uzbekistan.

212 These are all dynamics already present in the country as a consequence of multiple cropping and, crucially, the steady growth, and diversification, of agricultural production including for export. As a result, due to declining soil fertility and increasing salinisation, mineral fertilizer use in the country ‘was 60-70 per cent higher than the world average’ in the 2009-16 period, while the pesticides area for cotton and wheat rose ‘from 3.4 million ha to almost 5.0 million ha nationwide’ between 2016 and 2018 (UNECE 2020: 291, 293-294, Figure 13.5; INT-26; INT-48). Likewise, heat- and drought-tolerant crops, as well as varieties resistant to pests and diseases are being introduced to mitigate the impact of the deteriorating climate crisis on output (JICA et al. 2017: 60; World Bank 2017b: 19-20).

However, as ‘all progress in increasing the fertility of the soil for a given time [e.g. via expanded use of chemical fertilizers, enhanced crop varieties, etc.] is a progress towards ruining the more long-lasting sources of that fertility’ (Marx 1867/1976: 638), the planned intensification of horticulture for food export risks further escalating the already critical feedback loop into and from climate change, precipitating the ‘complex cycle of pests, pesticides, new pests, soil exhaustion, chemical fertilizers, … water pollution’ (Wallis 1993, quoted in Burkett 1999: 87) and biodiversity loss associated with contemporary industrial agriculture. Not only do the GoU’s and donors’ techno-managerial ‘solutions’ to climate change fail to address the contradiction between land (and resource) use for capital accumulation and food security, but, within the capitalist growth imperative and the material conditions of large-scale industrial agriculture in the global economy, they actually end up reinforcing the overall escalation of the climate crisis.

According to the available data, the repercussions for agricultural production and food security are going to be catastrophic (UNFCCC 2018: 1; PKM-484 2019: Art. 38; PP-8839 2019). By 2040, Uzbekistan is expected to be among the world’s most water-stressed countries (PP-5853 2019), with agricultural output estimated to experience ‘potential yield reductions of 20-50 percent by 2050 for nearly all crops’ (Sutton et al. 2013b: 97), along with a further rising risk of extreme weather events and ensuing water and food shortages (Hijioka et al. 2014: 1344; UzHydroMet 2016: 141). This comes on the backdrop of the already growing effects of climate change on the ‘food and nutritional security of the people in Uzbekistan particularly due to impact on water quality and water supply hampering the agricultural production especially during droughts and winter season’ (Malberg Dyg et al. 2011: 10).

However, these dramatic changes are occurring in a society that has undergone profound transformations in the past decades as a consequence of the radical shift in land use from

213 the indiscriminate reproduction of the working class during Soviet times to capital accumulation following independence. On the one hand, this led to the differentiation in the costs of reproduction of the working class including along rural-urban and gender lines, amid the rise of a vast relative surplus population with little to no access to the land and commons (Chapters 4-5). On the other hand, this process of gendered class stratification has translated into this vast relative surplus population - specifically the millions of landless dekhans in rural areas - being significantly more exposed, and vulnerable, to the ravages of the climate crisis, particularly in terms of food in/security (EJF 2012: 14; Adaptation Fund 2019; GCF & UNDP 2019: 3; GEF 2019: 19). Succinctly put, as the foundational divide in capitalism, class defines vulnerability to climate change. Given their crucial role in guaranteeing the reproduction of this relative surplus population, as well as men’s mass seasonal migration to work in Russia and Kazakhstan (Chapter 5), this has especially affected women as, along with children and the elderly, they ‘stay behind and are exposed to crop failures, extreme weather and natural disasters’ (Novikov & Kelly 2017: 10). In other words, while the state’s mediation of global capital accumulation contributed to the ongoing changes to the country’s, and the Earth’s, ecosystem via land and resource use for raw material extraction and transportation, as well as cash crop production, it is the relative surplus population in rural areas, and women chiefly among them, who have been most exposed to the climate crisis, particularly in terms of vulnerability to food in/security.

A case in point are the increasingly frequent and severe droughts, whose devastating effects on food security and water availability for people and livestock have been felt particularly in the poorer rural provinces (Alimov 2005; Adaptation Fund 2014: 52; Eurasianet 2016b; INT-13; INT-46a; INT-46b; INT-47; INT-52b; INT-54c). In Khorezm, for example, ‘in 2000-1, 2008, 2011 we had droughts. For the whole region, the production was less than half, plus we had problems with drinking water for people’ (INT-47). Moreover, it was ‘the farmers at the end tail of the canals’ who experienced the most serious shortages, ‘as the little water available would not reach their fields’ (INT-46b). Kashkadarya province was hit by severe droughts in 1998-99, 2000, and again in 2011.

During 1998-99, the Amu Darya river carried 70% less water than in 1997, up to 20-30% of the river was shallow waters. This devastated the harvest, as all agriculture there is based on irrigation. … In 2000, the cotton and grain harvest was 20% less than in 1998-99, and 40% less than in 1997. We didn’t have problems with irrigation only, but also with drinking water for people and for animals (INT-13).

214 Crucially, with the switch to land (and resource) use for capital accumulation (Chapters 4- 5), water allocation via male-dominated WCAs has privileged (particularly cotton and wheat) fermery, overwhelming men, to the detriment of dekhans, where women’s presence is significant in general, and dominant as concerns subsistence agriculture in particular (FAO 2019b: 39-40). Again, this gendered division of labour has been mediated by the retrenchment of patriarchal norms identifying irrigation as a quintessentially male sphere (Alimdjanova 2008; Mukhamedova & Wegerich 2014; INT-47). As a result, ‘despite the fact that women are often the primary users of water (as de[kh]an farmers and t[a]morka owners and/or workers)’, their participation in water management and irrigation is ‘limited’ (World Bank 2017c: 12; Mukhamedova & Wegerich 2014: 155). Thus, not only have household plots often suffered from ‘poor soil or water conditions’ (CER 2009b: 20), including for being located on non-irrigated land, but they have also come last in the order of priority for irrigation from the canal system, with the negative effects overwhelmingly affecting women given their preeminent role in household, and especially subsistence, agriculture (Alimdjanova 2009: 4; Swinkels et al. 2016b; Kim 2018: 73-74).

In many irrigation schemes, households are at the middle or the tail end of the water distribution canal; this is reflected in the priorities of the WCAs, who allocate water to household de[kh]an plots only after larger farms receive water. … [Q]uality farmland with irrigation infrastructure has already been allocated to men; if women have been allocated land, it is generally at the tail end of an irrigation scheme or in a highland area. Therefore, … if irrigation schemes fail or fail to deliver sufficient water, women are more negatively impacted than men (Lefore et al. 2017: 13).

The consequences of this can be devastating. Less water directly hampers production for consumption and/or for sale on local markets for extra income (Romanova et al. 2017: 16- 18), adding to the already precarious situation of women and their families. As a WCA accountant put it when describing women’s struggle to water their plots, ‘the woman cannot just not go to the gateway and not water the t[a]morka. In this case the family will starve’ (quoted in Swinkels et al. 2016b: 60, Box 6, emphasis added). In the event of a drought, this can spell disaster. In the Kashkadarya region, for example, ‘[d]uring the 2011 drought, home and school gardens - upon which families and children depend for nourishment - were left barren’ (UNDP 2018b: 103, emphasis added). As a result, since water allocation unequivocally prioritises capital accumulation, extreme events have a disproportionate effect on the rural population in general, and women in particular, since they are responsible for household water collection, treatment, storage, and use, including for subsistence agriculture (Chapter 5).

215

Therefore, as land and resource use lies at the core of capital accumulation via primary commodity production within the IDL as well as of women’s social reproductive work particularly via subsistence agriculture, the former’s boundless growth imperative is increasingly impinging on the latter as it accelerates soil exhaustion and monopolises irrigation water, driving up resource use that feeds into the precipitating climate crisis despite - and often because of - the techno-managerial policies designed to solve it. As a consequence, women’s reproductive work has been turned into a crucial ‘social space’ for everyday resistance to capital, as they push back against the privatisation and plunder of the commons in order to guarantee the reproduction of the relative surplus population; in parallel, capital encroaches on women’s survival strategies of everyday resistance in order to subsume them under the boundless process of accumulation.

3. WOMEN AND EVERYDAY RESISTANCE BETWEEN CAPITAL ACCUMULATION AND SOCIAL REPRODUCTION

As the state mediated the country’s integration into the global market as a raw material exporter, land and resource use radically shifted from the indiscriminate reproduction of the working class in the UzSSR to capital accumulation in independent Uzbekistan (Chapter 4). As a consequence, the latter has contributed to the ongoing, and accelerating, climate crisis in line with the extraction, production, and transportation of primary commodities, including agricultural crops, while the effects of the crisis have been largely borne by the relative surplus population, particularly in rural areas, and especially by women, aggravating their already precarious situation due to landlessness and poverty. In this way, changes to the country’s, and the Earth’s, ecosystem due to land and resource use for capital accumulation, most evident in the altered or non- reproduction of natural use-values necessary for the sustenance of life, risks threatening the very reproduction of this relative surplus population.

Given the centrality of their reproductive work for the survival of this relative surplus population, (especially dekhan) women have found themselves at the centre of where the contradiction between use for accumulation and use for social reproduction is playing out in the context of the precipitating climate crisis: land. It is here that women have carved out a ‘social space’ (Bhattacharya 2017b; McNally 2017) of everyday resistance to capital’s encroachment on their and the household’s survival, pushing back against the privatisation and plunder of the natural commons that turned women themselves into commons, while collaborating in order to cope with their ensuing dawn-to-midnight ‘double burden’ and

216 striving to preserve soil fertility for subsistence production so central to the reproduction of the relative surplus population.

Against privatisation and competition, women have deployed sharing and collaboration to manage their huge ‘double burden’. As the collapse of fixed assets following decollectivisation increased reliance on manual labour for land tilling and harvesting, particularly for poorer households who could not afford renting a tractor (Chapter 5), women have frequently resorted to ‘labour exchanges and reciprocal harvesting arrangements’ on household plots in order to cope with their vast workload and provide for all their families (Kandiyoti 2003: 236). Equally, since their general lack of ownership - of the land on which they toil and the house in which they live - forbids them from borrowing money from official sources, they have developed alternative support networks in their extended families and neighbourhoods (Chapter 5), as well as relied on traditional women-only informal groups now functioning as ‘mechanism[s] for livelihood resilience and social and economic empowerment’ in the radically changed material conditions ushered in with decollectivisation and increasingly exacerbated by climate change (Tursunova 2012: 221, 255). Through them, women pool and redistribute resources, including money, in order to alleviate poverty and face financial uncertainty or unexpected shocks, including due to extreme climate events (ibid.: Chapters 5-6), thus mitigating some of the worse effects of insecurity and precarity.

Moreover, against privatisation, women have responded by reclaiming the commons. The use of privatised (fermer) land or any green patch of available land along water ditches for livestock grazing is a case in point (Ilkhamov 2004: 168; FW-2019), given the lack of access to land and the cost of fodder formerly freely available on the collectives (Section 1). This has been particularly important in regard to water, whose allocation after decollectivisation has privileged capital accumulation, thus impinging on the food security of the relative surplus population especially in view of the escalating climate crisis. In parallel to the feminisation of agriculture and unskilled agricultural labour, decollectivisation simultaneously spurred millions of newly-turned landless peasants, mostly men, to migrate to third countries to sustain themselves and their families amid rising precarity, un(der)employment, and poverty (Section 2; Chapter 5). As a consequence, while their share of work in the fields has significantly increased, women have also organised to carve out a space in male-dominated domains such as irrigation (Mukhamedova & Wegerich 2014, 2017; Nizamedinkhodjayeva et al. 2017: 43), where they have been fighting over water allocation outside the institutional setting of the WCAs that exacerbates the contradiction between water use for capital accumulation and its use for social reproduction

217 by prioritising the former over the latter (Sections 1-2). Unsurprisingly, it is here that most ‘irrigation water conflicts’ have occured since independence in relation to ‘water supplies to de[kh]an farms where women’s involvement prevails’ (Alimdjanova 2008: 13).

In this context, women have deployed a variety of strategies to secure at least some degree of water provision. In the words of a WCA member, ‘women discuss over water with men, as if the two men would argue on water it might lead to a fighting [sic]. With women it is easier, another man will not beat a woman’ (quoted in Mukhamedova & Wegerich 2017: 50, emphasis added). Put differently, women dekhans have been operating in the interstices of the very patriarchal norms that define specific ‘feminised’ sectors of activity, hence exclude them from irrigation, while enforcing a strict social hierarchy in the extended household and the neighbourhood, whereby only ‘her’ man - and no(t an)other - is allowed to beat ‘his’ woman (Chapter 5), lest a conflict arise between households. Within this social space, (especially older) women have been at the forefront of negotiating access to water and mediating the frequent conflicts arising with fermery over water, including via lobbying the competent authorities, up to the level of district governor, to guarantee water for their communities. In parallel, (younger) daughters-in-law have instead resorted to opening the gateways of the canal system without permission, effectively stealing water to irrigate their tamorkas so central to their domestic agricultural production, with the tacit consent of older women and, if present, behind the backs of the men in the household. Crucially, instead of competing, especially at the tail end of the canal system where the problem of water availability for reproduction is most severe, women have joined hands across generations and households to guard their access to water (Mukhamedova & Wegerich 2014: 166-167, 2017: 49-51). In these instances, collaboration between women of different ages and families has been fundamental since, due to ‘their position along the ditch/street’, it was extremely likely that ‘individual activities would fail’ (Mukhamedova & Wegerich 2014: 167).

As conflicts over water allocation become even more acute during drought years (Mukhamedova & Wegerich 2017: 51), women’s livelihood strategies have been clearly enmeshed with the escalating climate crisis and its effects on food security. In this context, women have applied indigenous knowledge in order to preserve biodiversity as well as soil fertility on their plots and guarantee the reproduction of the household. For instance, women have used organic methods to adapt to a changing climate, secure their harvest, and protect biodiversity, from the planting of local seeds instead of transgenic ones, to washing fruit trees with water and soap instead of applying chemical pesticides in order to combat the increasing amount of insect pests (Tursunova 2012: 159-162, 214, 319). Moreover, dekhan agriculture, where women’s contribution is crucial, has generally relied on organic fertilizers

218 such as manure rather than the chemical ones provided as inputs to large-scale fermery, thus helping with the maintenance of soil fertility and the conservation of water resources (Larson et al. 2015: 25; UNECE 2020: 292). Equally, in contrast to fermery who plant modern varieties, particularly those imported via GoU’s ground-rent subsidisation (Section 2), dekhan farms mostly grow, and preserve, ‘the heritage varieties of fruit and vegetables’ that form part of the country’s rich biodiversity (Larson et al. 2015: 18, 22, 66). Clearly, lack of access to funding and steady income may at least partly explain women’s reliance on indigenous knowledge and organic agriculture; yet, it is indisputable that one of the most crucial aspect thereof must be found in women’s ‘self-interest in cultivating the small plots in a way that ensures longer-term fertility’ of the soil (Visser et al. 2015: 519), given the centrality of subsistence agriculture to the reproduction of rural households, which make up the bulk of the country’s relative surplus population.

In parallel, the GoU and the donors have been progressively acknowledging ‘the crucial role women are playing’ in the process of climate change mitigation and adaptation, so their aim has been to ‘involve them in every aspect of this process’ (Zholdosheva et al. 2017: 13; UNDP 2011, 2018b: 104; GCF & UNDP 2019: 12; FAO 2019b: xv, 54). Specifically,

[n]umerous assessments, conducted in various regions of the country, show that rural inhabitants (including women) have a much higher social capital than city dwellers both in terms of their relationships with one another and their attitude and willingness to cooperate … in order to overcome the shortage of water and engage in joint activities to combat drought (FAO 2017: 37).

As such, women are increasingly expected to apply ‘their valuable knowledge’ and ‘innovative strategies’ (Stock et al. 2015: 33) as part of the techno-managerial policies for climate change mitigation and adaptation designed by the GoU and the donor community, which leave unaddressed the fundamental contradiction between production for accumulation and production for use within the boundless growth imperative of the capitalist mode of production. Put differently, women’s survival strategies - collaboration, indigenous knowledge, biodiversity conservation - are being recruited to prepare for, mitigate, and, when relevant, respond to the ravages of climate change, while guaranteeing the continuation, and expansion, of the process of capital accumulation driving the climate crisis in the first place.

Therefore, on the one hand, women have been carving out a social space for cooperation and biodiversity conservation that pushes back against the privatisation and depletion of

219 the commons in order to use them collaboratively for the reproduction of the relative surplus population, in the context of the radically changed material conditions of landlessness and the accelerating climate crisis. On the other hand, however, in the name of mitigation and adaptation to the latter, capital is encroaching on women’s knowledge and survival strategies to put them at the service of the boundless accumulation process. It is between capital’s boundless growth imperative and women’s struggle to sustain the social reproduction of the household that a key social space of resistance to capital keeps being reproduced, in the shadow of the escalating changes to Earth’s ecosystem that hold the potential to precipitate a crisis of reproduction in the country.

4. CONCLUSION

Continuing to operate at the fourth level of generality and building on insights from feminist and ‘green’ Marxists within the overall CICP approach, Chapter 6 addresses the question of why land use changes account for the acceleration of, and differential vulnerability to, the climate crisis in the country (RQ3). Rather than the literature’s transition to a classless, gender-liberating, and eco-friendly ideal-type capitalism, the chapter shows how land and resource use is internally related to the process of accumulation, which, within the current levels of capital concentration and centralisation in large-scale industrial production and the boundless growth imperative, is radically altering the Earth’s ecosystem, thus escalating the ongoing climate crisis. As a result, the current process of expansion in the extraction of gold and natural gas, as well as in the volume and diversification of agricultural production, aided and abetted by the introduction of new technologies, is actually compounding the climate crisis in Uzbekistan. Equally, not only is class key to accounting for the differential vulnerability of the relative surplus population to climate change, but also gender - as co- constitutive, hence internally related to, class - is a crucial concrete determination through which this differential vulnerability is experienced.

First, in Uzbekistan, land and resource use changes (decollectivisation) allowed for the continuation, and increase, of raw material extraction and the production of multiple cash crops, feeding into, and suffering from, the process of environmental breakdown observable in the decline in soil fertility and the increase in extreme events, as well as in the accelerating disappearance of the glaciers providing water to Central Asia’s main rivers. Second, not only are the GoU’s and donor community’s techno-managerial policies failing to address the problem, but they often exacerbate it by enabling the continuation, and even the expansion, of primary commodity production in line with solvent demand; in other words, as national forms of mediation of the global accumulation of capital, these policies leave

220 unaddressed the fundamental contradiction between production for accumulation within the boundless growth imperative and production for use. Instead, as it monopolises land and resource (e.g. water) use, the former is increasingly impinging on the latter, particularly for the social reproduction of the relative surplus population and, among them, women, whose landlessness and ensuing precarity has made them more vulnerable to climate change. Third, given their centrality to the reproduction of this relative surplus population, women have been thrust to the heart of this very contradiction - land and water use - where they have carved out a space for everyday resistance to capital in order to secure their reproduction and that of rural households. In turn, under the banner of mitigation and adaptation, capital has been encroaching on women’s survival strategies in order to subsume them under techno-managerial policies at the service of the boundless accumulation process, with the potential of precipitating a crisis of reproduction for the relative surplus population in the country.

Chapter 6 concludes the empirical part of the dissertation, in which I addressed the three research questions, from the FSU countries’ integration into the IDL as raw material exporters despite their different ‘paths’ of transition (Chapter 3/RQ1), to Uzbekistan’s same trajectory in spite of its own ‘gradual path’ (Chapter 4/RQ2), along with the centrality of land use changes (decollectivisation) to account for class stratification and struggle (Chapter 5/RQ3), as well as for differential vulnerability to the climate crisis (Chapter 6/RQ3) in the country in the past three decades. The Concluding Chapter summarises the dissertation’s main arguments to answer the RQs, as well as its contribution to the scholarly literature on uneven development in general, and on transition in the FSU and Uzbekistan in particular, along with possible future areas of research.

221 CONCLUDING CHAPTER Capital Accumulation in the Post-Soviet Space: Towards a New Research Agenda

0. INTRODUCTION

This chapter concludes the dissertation. Section 1 outlines the arguments developed in the thesis to address the three RQs. Section 2 highlights the dissertation contribution to the debate on ‘uneven development’ in the Global South in general, and to the literature on the FSU and Uzbekistan in particular. Finally, Section 3 broaches the contours of a future research agenda that moves beyond the exceptionalisation of the FSU found in the transition literature, focussing instead on analysing the region’s rich national diversity as part of the ‘uneven development’ of the Global South within the unity of global capital accumulation.

1. MAIN ARGUMENTS AND ANSWERS TO THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The general argument that runs throughout the dissertation concerns the need to surpass the transition literature’s exceptionalisation of the FSU and Uzbekistan. The CICP framework expounded in Chapter 2, along with insights from feminist and ‘green’ Marxists, enables the dissertation to problematise transitology’s methodological nationalism and external relations underpinning its ideal-type theorisation of democratic capitalism as a classless, gender-liberating, and eco-friendly system, which leads to the ‘paradox’ of no transition and transformation reviewed in Chapter 1. Instead, the dissertation shows that the FSU region, including Uzbekistan, exhibits the same general dynamics found in other ‘resource rich’ countries of the Global South incorporated in the IDL on the basis of the CIDL, that is, as primary commodity exporters, explaining the radical political-economic changes in the FSU countries since 1991 as different national forms of the full development of global capital accumulation (‘unity of the diverse’). Within this framework, the dissertation accounts for the rich totality of these diverse concrete forms in Uzbekistan.

I now turn to the specific arguments that addressed the three RQs.

1.1. Research Question 1

Chapter 3 develops three specific arguments to provide a cogent answer to RQ1, namely:

222 Why, despite their different transition ‘paths’, have all the post-Soviet states including Uzbekistan become primary commodity exporters, in line with ‘resource rich’ countries in the Global South? Why are international commodity prices crucial to explaining these states’ political-economic transformation since independence?

The first argument is that, with all due provisos, the USSR was already integrated into the IDL as a raw material exporter. Not only did trade between the Western and Eastern Blocs significantly expand between the 1950s and the 1980s, but also the terms of this trade markedly worsened for the Soviet Union as it increasingly exported primary commodities to the West in exchange for machinery and technology. In parallel, changes in the material conditions of large-scale industrial production from the 1960s onward - specifically, the computerisation of machinery and the robotisation of the assembly line - were giving rise to a New International Division of Labour (NIDL). On the one hand, some specific tasks in industrial production were relocated to countries in the Global South such as South Korea and, more recently, China, whose fractions of the working class was relatively cheap and highly disciplined, hence specifically suited to working as appendages to this new machinery or in the assembly of parts and components; this explains these countries’ meteoric industrialisation. On the other hand, the differentiation in the skill-set (‘subjectivity’) of the collective industrial labourer as a consequence of these material changes in the production process translated into the differentiation in their costs of reproduction, allowing for the global total social capital to decrease overall labour costs and increase the rate of relative surplus value accumulation.

As a result, the most skilled workers - largely located in the ‘classic’ industrialised countries of Europe and the USA - accrued the lion’s share of the total wage; the East Asian states continued reproducing their relatively cheap and highly disciplined fractions of the working class; and, finally, most countries of the Global South remained or, upon gaining independence, were integrated into the IDL as commodity producers, thus as sources of appropriation of the extraordinary mass of wealth (ground-rent) largely inflowing into their territories - pace dependency theory - from the sale of raw materials on the world market. As such, a vast mass of the populations of these ‘resource rich’ countries was reduced to the condition of relative surplus for the requirements of capital accumulation, as their capital- intensive extractive industries and ground-rent-subsidised ‘backward’ industries could only absorb a small portion thereof, leading to widespread informalisation, precarity, and poverty. As a primary commodity producer, these latter dynamics were already evident in the USSR in the 1980s, as the Union’s centralised total social ‘capital’ could only continue manufacturing within the material conditions of industrial Fordism and indiscriminate

223 reproduction of the working class (high unionisation, welfare state, increasing ‘social wages’), lest it undermines the communist ideology at the heart of its existence. This explains the growing technological gap, hence deteriorating terms of trade, with the West, as well as the enterprise bankruptcies, mass layoffs and strikes, and plummeting living standards already prevalent in the decade before the collapse of the USSR. Put differently, amid low oil prices and against the staggering degree of capital concentration and centralisation mediating the NIDL, the Soviet total social ‘capital’ started experiencing a process of precipitous decentralisation, eventually resulting in the disintegration of the Union itself into fifteen independent republics.

Therefore, the second argument deployed in the chapter is that the FSU republics - by which I mean all the independent FSU states but the three Baltics - integrated into the IDL on the basis of the CIDL, namely as raw material exporters in line with ‘resource rich’ countries in the Global South. First, this was due to the relatively favourable conditions for the extraction/production of primary commodities within their newly-established international borders, as evident in global demand remaining solvent for such commodities following independence. Second, no such demand existed for Soviet manufactured goods, since, even fragmented, the different fractions of the former Soviet working class were still highly unionised, hence relatively expensive and undisciplined, so wholly unsuitable for world market production, particularly at a time when China was fast becoming a virtually unlimited source of relatively cheap and highly disciplined workers. As such, the different ‘paths’ of transition mediated the FSU states’ incorporation into the IDL in line with the material conditions of production in the world market in the 1990s.

As a result, the FSU republics were being transformed into sources of appropriation of ground-rent, explaining the qualitative unity of their political-economy since independence evident in the reprimarisation of the economy, the process of ‘backward’ industrialisation via ground-rent subsidisation, and the collapse in living standards of the working class. Likewise, ground-rent clarifies the quantitative diversity between and within the FSU republics during the past three decades on account of the fluctuating international prices of their diverse resource endowments, hence of the hard currency accruing to each FSU state from the sale of primary commodities on the world market. Qualitative unity and quantitative diversity represent the concrete forms taken by the full development of global capital accumulation in the different FSU countries. In the energy-rich republics, this equally applies to the ‘liberalisation’ of the 1990s amid low oil prices, as well as to the ‘recentralisation’ of the 2000s onward in the wake of the Chinese-demand-led commodity supercycle. As such, the sustained growth levels that the region experienced from the 2000s onward were no

224 ‘Eurasian growth paradox’ (Åslund & Jenish 2007), but the direct result of the soaring magnitude of ground-rent inflowing into the different FSU economies. The same ‘strong correlation between international commodity prices, FDI, exports, and GDP growth’ (ADBI 2014: 88) has informed the political-economy of the FSU region as a whole in the past thirty years.

The third argument focussed on the radical shift from the indiscriminate reproduction of the working class under Fordist conditions of production in the USSR, to the post- independence process of class stratification. However diverse the specific policies and institutions of the FSU states, they mediated changes from land use for social reproduction to land use for capital accumulation. While the ground-rent available in their national territories in virtue of the production/extraction of raw materials went to subsidise the accumulation of the total social capital, including via ‘backward’ industrialisation, peasants were expelled en masse from said land, turning into a vast relative surplus population since only a fraction thereof could be absorbed by extractive and ‘backward’ industries. Succinctly put, the costs of economic reprimarisation and decollectivisation were primarily borne by labour. In this perspective, contra transitology’s classless development for all, the policies and institutions of the national state appear as forms of mediation of the class struggle, signalling the centrality of class as the foundational divide in capitalist society.

As a consequence, while a small minority of skilled urban workers in extractive, ‘backward’, and related industries have since acquired the lion’s share of the total wage, most others have struggled to survive amid un(der)employment, precarity, and poverty, as well as mass rural (including international) outmigration. The quantitative diversity between the various FSU republics has been in line with each country’s resource endowments and their fluctuating international prices, explaining variations between and within the FSU states during the last three decades amid the overall informalisation of economic activity and impoverishment of the working class, particularly the relative surplus population, common to all the FSU region. In this context, the poorer (and more rural) Central Asian republics - Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan - witnessed the emergence of vast migratory flows to their vastly energy-richer northern neighbours, particularly Russia and Kazakhstan, following the latter’s construction boom in the wake of soaring energy prices from the 2000s onwards. While labour has resisted this relentless process of precarisation, the many divisions in the working class along in/formal, rural-urban, and skill lines, as well as the ensuing collapse in unionisation have defined the largely spontaneous and localised nature of strikes and protests, which have often focussed on solving specific grievances rather than addressing issues of importance for the collective. In parallel, the authoritarian state has

225 mobilised to deter labour organisation and secure the reproduction of the total social capital, including by repressing the former at times of a perceived threat to the latter, confirming once again that, despite its appearance of independence, the ‘essential feature of the state is its class character’ (Clarke 1991: 186).

I now turn to RQ2.

1.2. Research Question 2

Chapter 4 answers RQ2, namely:

Why did Uzbekistan follow a ‘gradualist’ path of reform? Why has the country recently embarked on a series of ‘liberalising’ reforms?

The first argument advanced in the chapter is that, given the centrality and specificity of cotton to the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic (UzSSR), the ‘Uzbek model’ mediated the integration of independent Uzbekistan into the IDL. As an agrarian landlord-state, Uzbekistan depended on the natural cycle of seasonal alternation central to agriculture, hence the need to ‘centralise’ the cotton sector and economic activity in order to put the land to use for cotton production lest no rents be accrued for the year. With the Uzbek model, the state guaranteed the labour mobilisation, irrigation coordination, and input production necessary for the crop to be produced for export, which, in turn, secured the ground-rent subsidisation of the total social capital regardless of the specific accumulation requirements of individual agricultural capitals, particularly cotton farmers. However diverse the specific policies and institutions of the Uzbek model from other FSU republics’ transition ‘paths’, the country’s integration into the IDL on the basis of the CIDL resulted in the same qualitative forms of raw material export orientation and ‘backward’ industrialisation that have characterised the other FSU states, as well as the collapse in the living standards of the working class (next RQ).

Instead, the centralisation of cotton rents provided the financial wherewithal for the centralisation of political authority, too, enabling the authoritarian state to assert itself over the regions and to start a programme of ISI early on in the transition by investing in ‘backward’ industrialisation, including in new sectors such as the automotive industry. This explains the country’s faster return to growth than most of the FSU region (quantitative diversity), which the literature exceptionalises as the ‘Uzbek growth puzzle’ after predicting that the Uzbek model’s unorthodox policies had ‘no chance of success in bringing about

226 sustained economic growth’ (IMF staff quoted in Broome 2010: 144-145). Thus, this is a ‘puzzle’ of the literature’s own making. The chapter advances a second argument about the current ‘liberalisation’ of the cotton sector and the currency regime in the country under the new administration of President Mirziyoyev. As the Uzbek model mediated the changing conditions of capital accumulation on the world market, including the rise in commodity prices from the 2000s onward, cotton ceded pride of place to gold and natural gas in the country’s balance of trade, whose combined rents went to solidify Uzbekistan’s financial position via the accumulation of gold and hard currency reserves in the CBU, NBU, and UFRD, as well as to subsidise the reproduction of the total social capital. Succinctly put, Uzbekistan was being transformed from an agrarian into a mining landlord-state.

As such, the multiple exchange rate regime - one of the most draconian forms of ground- rent appropriation by the state - was abolished on account of the country’s solid finances; likewise, the cotton sector has been liberalised to allow for the production of finished textile goods for export, as the importance of cotton rents for the state budget dramatically declined. Throughout its independent history, however, the country has remained integrated into the IDL on the basis of the CIDL, exhibiting the same ‘strong correlation between international commodity prices, FDI, exports, and GDP growth’ (ADBI 2014: 88) evident in the rest of the FSU since 1991 (qualitative unity). This has defined the ‘backward’ form of industrialisation in Uzbekistan since 1991, as the case study of the car industry during the past three decades confirms in concrete empirical detail. Since inception, ‘small’ car manufacturing capitals have used obsolete technology by international standards, mobilising ‘degraded subjectivity’ labour that produces substandard and relatively expensive cars mostly for the domestic market. In the context of Uzbekistan, this largely urban male labour toiling in ‘backward’ industries, as well as in extractive industries and related service sectors such as finance and insurance, have been among the higher skilled workers, earning the lion’s share of the total wage, while the vast majority of the population has been turned into relative surplus for the requirements of accumulation. This starts addressing the process of class stratification in post-independence Uzbekistan raised in RQ3, to which I now turn.

1.3. Research Question 3

Chapters 5 and 6 pick up where Chapter 4 leaves off to answer RQ3, namely:

Why are land use changes key to accounting for class stratification and struggle in Uzbekistan since independence? Why are land use changes also crucial to

227 explaining the acceleration of, and differential vulnerability to, the climate crisis in the country?

The first argument advanced in Chapter 5 regards the radical shift from land use for the indiscriminate reproduction of the working class in the UzSSR to land use for capital accumulation in independent Uzbekistan. This crucial form of mediation of the country’s integration into the IDL resulted in the steep differentiation in the costs of reproduction of the working class in the country (class stratification). While the ground-rent available in the Uzbek market in virtue of the production/extraction of primary commodities for export subsidised the accumulation of the total social capital, a vast mass of the population was expelled from the land, (access to) which was privatised along with the commons to be put to capitalist production. As the country’s extractive and ‘backward’ industries could only absorb a fraction of this population, it was turned into relative surplus for the requirements of capital accumulation, as evident in the rise of informality, precarity, and poverty, as well as mass rural outmigration particularly to Uzbekistan’s energy-rich northern neighbours, Russia and Kazakhstan, with migrants’ remittances providing a vital lifeline for the rural population. Landless peasants, daily workers, and labour migrants epitomise this relative surplus population and its struggle for survival, in clear contrast to the minority of skilled industrial workers introduced in Chapter 4.

Therefore, the second argument developed in Chapter 5 highlights how this process of class stratification via decollectivisation splintered the working class along in/formal, geographic (rural-urban, regional), skill, and gender lines. Specifically, the dismantlement of collective farms marked the collapse of the rural infrastructure - kindergartens, schools, and hospitals, as well as water, gas, and electricity provision and infrastructure maintenance - which provided women with formal employment and supported their reproductive work during Soviet times. As a result, not only did women bear the brunt of the informalisation of economic activity, but their informal agricultural work for food production became absolutely crucial for the reproduction of the relative surplus population. In parallel, the hugely expanded onus of domestic responsibilities impinged on their (largely informal) jobs and (low-skilled-and-wage) tasks within ‘feminised’ sectors of the economy, from formal jobs in industries such as electronics and the agrifood sector to informal work, as evident in the feminisation of agriculture, unskilled agricultural labour, and poverty following independence. In Federici’s (2004: 97) apt characterisation, with the loss of the real commons, ‘women themselves became the commons’ (emphasis original). The recrudescence of women’s material conditions, within the general recrudescence of labour’s, has been mediated by the recrudescence of patriarchal norms about women’s

228 propensity for care work and hand dexterity suited to manual work. This problematises the literature’s ideal-type classless and gender-liberating capitalism as development for all, showing instead that class is the foundational divide in capitalist society; likewise, as one concrete form of labour’s existence, gender is co-constitutive of, hence internally related to, class. As social forms of the class struggle, the policies and institutions of the national state mediate the process of global capital accumulation, guaranteeing the valorisation of the total social capital while reproducing the antagonism between capital and labour, as appears in the process of gendered class stratification in independent Uzbekistan.

In this context, the chapter deployed a third argument dealing with how the multiple divisions in the working class, along with the collapse in unionisation, translated into the generally localised and spontaneous nature of labour mobilisation against the ongoing process of precarisation in the country. This explains the short-term effects of labour protests that, by and large, have benefitted specific sets of workers on specific issues (e.g. wage arrears) rather than advancing collective labour rights. In parallel, the authoritarian state has utilised a combination of mediation and intimidation in order to avoid the spread of demonstrations; crucially, it has employed its full apparatus of repression to deter, undermine, and, at times of a perceived threat to the process of accumulation, crush labour organising. In this sense, the authoritarian state has been a key political form of mediation of Uzbekistan’s integration into the IDL as a raw material exporter.

Since the radical shift in land and resource use from the indiscriminate reproduction of the working class to capital accumulation was a crucial form mediating this incorporation, it directly contributed to the intensification of the climate crisis in Uzbekistan. As a fourth argument developed in Chapter 6 clarifies, while it satisfies global solvent demand for raw materials in line with the levels of capital concentration and centralisation most evident in large-scale industrial production, the country feeds into, and suffers from, the escalating climate crisis. This is resulting in the altered reproduction or outright non-reproduction of natural use-values in Uzbekistan, specifically the increasing salinisation/decreasing fertility of the soil and the disappearance of the glaciers providing the bulk of the water to Central Asia’s river systems, along with the acceleration in the frequency and intensity of extreme events such as droughts.

In this perspective, Chapter 6 advances a fifth argument concerning how, as national forms of mediation of the global process of accumulation, the ‘green’ policies implemented by the GoU and the donor community have failed to address the contradiction between production for accumulation and production for use. Instead, better management of resources and new

229 technologies for their extraction/production allow for the continuation and even the intensification of natural use-value exploitation, exacerbating the climate crisis that they are ostensibly deployed to solve. Although it is presented as a key move from water-intensive cotton to more sustainable crops, the ongoing process of diversification in agricultural production fits this pattern, as it actually adds to the multiple competing priorities for water use, while stress to the irrigation system keeps rising in view of the boundless growth imperative. The same applies to the introduction of innovative technologies enabling the increase in the extraction of gold, natural gas, and other primary commodities. In other words, contrary to the literature’s ideal-type eco-friendly capitalism, natural use-value exploitation is internally related to the process of capital accumulation, while the growth imperative eventually drives overall material throughput up despite improved resource management and the use of ‘green’ technologies.

The effects of the climate crisis, however, have been playing out in a society that has undergone dramatic changes in the past three decades as a consequence of the radical shift in land and resource use. As such, the relative surplus population and, among them, women, children, and the elderly, have been the most exposed to the risks of climate change. Given their increasing centrality to food production crucial for the reproduction of this relative surplus population, women have found themselves at the centre of the contradiction between production for use and production for accumulation, with the latter’s constantly growing volume increasingly impinging on the former. On the one hand, this has translated into women developing collaborative survival strategies to reclaim the commons, as well as preserve soil fertility and biodiversity as the basis for the reproduction of their households. On the other hand, in the name of mitigation and adaptation to climate change, capital has been encroaching on these strategies to incorporate them into techno- managerial policies at the service of the boundless accumulation process, heightening the risk of a full-blown reproduction crisis for the relative surplus population. In other words, the sixth argument presented in Chapter 6 underscores how, as the foundational divide in capitalism, class mediates differential vulnerability to climate change; likewise, as co- constitutive, hence internally related to, class, gender represents a concrete determination that informs the way in which this differential vulnerability is experienced.

Having presented the arguments deployed in the dissertation to answer the RQs, I now turn to its original contribution to the scholarly debate.

230 2. CONTRIBUTION TO THE LITERATURE

The dissertation enriches the scholarly debate on ‘uneven development’ in the Global South in general, and in the FSU and Uzbekistan in particular, with two original contributions.

1. The first contribution is empirical. The dissertation applies a novel approach grounded in the discipline of political economy to explain the transformation of the FSU and Uzbekistan since 1991, problematising the dominant transition paradigm found in the literature; equally, to date, the CICP framework has been mostly used for case studies in Latin America, East Asia, and Europe. On the one hand, deploying the CICP approach enables the dissertation to move the debate from national transition to global capital accumulation in the FSU states, including Uzbekistan, surpassing transitology’s exceptionalisation to investigate the rich empirical diversity of the region’s political-economic transformation within the unity of capital accumulation (‘unity of the diverse’). On the other hand, this empirical contribution provides significant evidence supporting the potency of the CICP approach to analyse ‘uneven development’ in the GPE. In this perspective, change in the FSU region during the past three decades can be explained beyond ‘paradoxes’ and ‘puzzles’ of the literature’s own making; so can the case study of Uzbekistan, whose quantitative diversity is accounted for within the qualitative unity of its incorporation into the IDL as a raw material exporter, in line with the other FSU states and ‘resource rich’ countries of the Global South. 2. The second contribution is theoretical. The CICP approach can benefit from the insights of feminist and ‘green’ Marxists to dissect the rich concrete determinations of class stratification in ‘resource rich’ countries. This applies both (a) in relation to the specific gendered outcomes of the rise of the relative surplus population, as mediated by the recrudescence of patriarchal norms and stereotypes, as well as (b) concerning the origins and development of the escalating climate crisis within the current levels of capital concentration and centralisation, specifically in terms of the gendered resistance, and class-determined differential vulnerability, to it. In turn, the CICP approach enhances the analytical potency of these insights, as it offers a unified theorisation within which to explain the different national dynamics in the Global South as the product of the essential unity, hence the full development, of global capital accumulation (Iñigo Carrera 2013: 63). As such, while expanding on the feminist and ‘green’ Marxist traditions, the dissertation moves some way towards a contribution to the CICP approach as a ‘“unified field theory” of uneven development’ (Charnock & Starosta 2018) in the GPE.

231

Finally, I turn to possible avenues for future research.

3. BEYOND EXCEPTIONALISM: TOWARDS A NEW RESEARCH AGENDA

Three decades after the collapse of the USSR, the methodological and theoretical straight- jacket of the transition paradigm continues to prevent transitology from providing an explanation to the ongoing transformation in the FSU countries beyond ‘puzzles’ and ‘paradoxes’. By insisting on the exceptionalism of the FSU countries, transitology has both perpetuated its status as the specialised literature on the region and kept framing the scholarly debate around the same dichotomy between ideal-types, with the FSU being constantly re-produced as the un(der)developed and authoritarian doppelganger of the capitalist and democratic West. In this way, beyond issues of great power rivalries or connectivity on the ‘Silk Road’ and the War on Terror (Cooley 2012; Heathershaw & Montgomery 2014; Cooley & Heathershaw 2017; Pomfret 2019), discussions on the FSU appear to occur largely in isolation from the broader literature on the ongoing transformations in the GPE (‘uneven development’), as though it were still ‘separate’ from the ‘normal’ flow of history.

More recent work (e.g. Yurchenko 2018) has started to reclaim the importance of GPE approaches in accounting for the transformation of the FSU since 1991, while in turn using the latter’s rich empirical evidence to feed into the development of more nuanced theoretical frameworks. In this spirit, this dissertation hopes to move the future research agenda beyond the transition paradigm in order to investigate the national diversity of the FSU states as part and parcel of the essential unity of global capital accumulation, while contributing to the advancement of a ‘unified field theory’ of uneven development that builds on insights from the region, too. In what follows, I briefly broach some specific topics for further investigation in the FSU region and Uzbekistan, and then connect them to broader themes for future research.

The 30-year overview of the main dynamics of transformation in the FSU states following the collapse of the Soviet Union found in Chapter 3 can offer a point of departure for future stand-alone or comparative case studies, where developments in specific states in the region are dissected in their rich totality at a more concrete level. Both stand-alone and comparative case studies could benefit from the quantitative calculation of the fluctuating magnitude of ground-rent available in each republic at different points in time since independence, in order to offer a more nuanced analysis of the concrete changes between

232 and within FSU states in the past three decades, grounded in the material conditions of production in the individual case studies within the global capitalist market. This applies both to the specific national economic forms of mediation of global capital accumulation, as well as ‘the specificity of political projects within the national form, but global content, of capital accumulation’ (Purcell 2010: 277, emphasis added).

At this more concrete level, case studies could include developments in specific manufacturing industries; the gendered effects of class stratification; and the class-informed vulnerability to climate change of the relative surplus population in each FSU country, with a simultaneous focus on the rich diversity of the single/comparative case studies within the broader unity of these dynamics underpinned by the global accumulation of surplus value. At a more general level, a comparative study of the CEE and the FSU could probe the specific material conditions of production and the labour ‘subjectivity’ of the different working class fractions in the two regions in the decades before the end of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact. Such research would aim to explain why the former turned into ‘a new South- East Asia on [the EU’s] doorstep’ (Richardson quoted in Yurchenko 2018: 9) while the latter integrated into the IDL as raw material producers,67 as well as how this form of integration defined these regions’ political-economic transformation since the late 1980s-early 1990s.

The ethno-national dimension as a crucial ‘particularity and determination’ through which labour exists, hence co-constitutes and is internally related to class, represents a fruitful avenue for further research in the FSU region in general, and Uzbekistan in particular. More analysis is warranted into the fragmentation of the latter’s working class along ethno- national (Uzbek-Tajik) lines, both in regard to ‘backward’ industries and the relative surplus population. Equally, the ongoing ‘liberalising’ reforms of the current administration touched upon in Chapters 4-6 should be subjected to more in-depth analysis. Of particular importance are (a) the GoU’s current push for the mechanisation of cotton picking, which holds the potential to drastically reduce demand for already informal and seasonal dekhan manual labour, particularly women’s, thus increasing their precarity (INT-72a); and (b) a new draft bill to abolish lifetime tenure and inheritability rights for dekhan farms, allowing them to be leased for cash crop production instead (Abduazimova 2020), with potentially dire consequences for the already precarious relative surplus population, especially in the context of the climate crisis. Moreover, as the liberalisation of the national currency contributed to the country achieving a credit rating and issuing its first international

67 Richardson was the former Secretary-General of the European Round Table of Industrialists (ERT), a lobby group comprising some of Europe’s largest businesses (van Apeldoorn 2000).

233 sovereign bonds (LSEG 2019), as well as to soaring imports and a negative balance of trade (INT-12), the class dimension of debt and finance promises to become another key field of investigation. Finally, the country’s possibile entry into the Eurasian Economic Union - to date comprising Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Armenia - could inspire research that goes beyond analyses of regionalism as a vector of Russian influence (Cooley & Heathershaw 2017) and instead further explores the material conditions behind regional integration projects by expanding on recent work about global capitalism in Central Asia (Sanghera 2017; Sanghera & Satybaldieva 2018). Such studies could start investigating how the EEU provides a market to absorb relatively expensive and substandard manufacturing goods uncompetitive on the international market, while formalising seasonal migration from Central Asia’s poorer republics to energy-rich Kazakhstan and Russia, along with remittance flows in the opposite direction.

In turn, examining the region beyond the transition paradigm can enrich the theorisation of ‘uneven development’ in the GPE. The dissertation touches upon different ideological forms mediating the changing material conditions of production in the FSU region, whether neoliberalism in the energy-rich FSU republics or developmentalism in Uzbekistan, as well as their relation to broader debates in the GPE; equally, the recrudescence of patriarchal norms are shown to mediate the worsening material conditions for women, within the collapsing living standards of the working class in the FSU as ‘resource rich’ countries. Future research should expand on the relation between the (global) material conditions of production and (national) ideas/ideologies, with a focus on how the diversity of the latter mediates ‘uneven development’ in the GPE within the essential unity of capital accumulation. Moreover, further study is needed into the multiple concrete particularities and determinations of the working class, including the relative surplus population, as co- constitutive of, hence internally related to, class, with the aim of reasserting class as the foundational divide in capitalist society, while simultaneously accounting for the rich diversity in which class exists in society. Gender- and ethnicity-informed studies of the FSU countries can contribute to theorising and realising such a research agenda.

Finally, the escalating ravages of the climate crisis in the FSU ‘resource rich’ countries should be further investigated within the global accumulation of capital, hence as internally related to the overall rise in material throughput as a result of the current levels of capital concentration and centralisation in line with the boundless accumulation process. It is in this context that ‘green’ growth and ‘decoupling’ could be also analysed as ideological forms mediating global capital accumulation. Equally, the differential vulnerability to climate change, particularly in regard to the relative surplus population, would further refine the

234 theorisation of class as the central divide in capitalism. This includes the ongoing forms of resistance to capital’s subsumption of land and resources under the process of accumulation, particularly the agroecology and collaborative practices proliferating across the Global South (McMichael 2020: 142), in line with empirical dynamics in Uzbekistan. The effects of climate change in the FSU region - from the increase in forest fires, floods and droughts to soil erosion, salinisation and desertification (Kiselev et al. 2013; Safonov & Safonova 2013; Moore 2016: 267) - renders this new research agenda all the more topical and pressing.

In the end, this research agenda can only prove its mettle in critique as a form of struggle. In that, the unity of the working class, including the relative surplus population, remains crucial, as does organisation. As the euphoria of the ‘end of history’ gives way to the gloom of the ‘end of the world’, particularly in view of the escalating climate crisis, this dissertation hopes to be a contribution, however small, in imagining the end of capitalism instead (Moore 2017b). As such, its critique of bourgeois society is meant to contribute to the ongoing struggle to surpass it.

235 APPENDIX 1 Map of Uzbekistan

Source: http://www.maps-of-the-world.net/maps/maps-of-asia/maps-of-uzbekistan/ large-detailed-political-and-administrative-map-of-uzbekistan-with-roads-cities-and-airports.jpg.

Note. Uzbekistan gained independence on August 31, 1991. The first president of independent Uzbekistan was Islam Abduganievich Karimov (1991-2016). After he died in 2016, his long-serving Prime Minister Shavkat Miromonovich Mirziyoyev was elected president. The next presidential elections are due to be held on October 24, 2021 (Eurasianet 2021b).

Administratively, the country is divided into 12 regions (oblast/viloyat), plus the Autonomous Republic of Karakalpakstan, and the city of Tashkent. Regions are further subdivided into a total of 163 districts (rayon/tuman). The country has 120 cities and towns. Regional and district governors, as well as city/town mayors, are known as hokims, while the regional and district governments are known as hokimiyat (IOM 2014: 13).

236 APPENDIX 2 Fieldwork: List of interviewees and conferences Note. All interviews were held in English and/or Russian unless otherwise stated. When Uzbek or Tajik are mentioned, interviews were conducted with the help of an interpreter. The bracketed figure indicates the number of times the interviewee was met/contacted, if more than once.

JUNE 28, 2018 London

INT-1. Former minister and ambassador.

SEPTEMBER 10-DECEMBER 15, 2018 Tashkent and Tashkent region

INT-2. Former senior analyst at think tank; consultant for IFIs (3 plus follow ups via email). INT-3. Former minister (2). INT-4. Programme coordinator in the UN system (3 plus follow ups via email). INT-5. Former deputy director at think tank; founder and director of independent think tank; consultant for international organisations (2 plus follow ups via email). INT-6. Former university lecturer; consultant for the UN system; officer in services multinational (3 plus follow ups via email). INT-7. Head of cluster, UN system. INT-8. Senior researcher, academy of science of Uzbekistan. INT-9. Assistance representative, UN system. INT-10. Former research coordinator at think tank; founder and director of independent think tank. INT-11. Head of cluster, UN system. INT-12. Senior economist in an IFI (plus follow ups via email). INT-13. Former minister; general director of association (2). INT-14. University professor of economics. INT-15. Head of directorate at ministry. INT-16. Senior economist at IFI. INT-17. Coordinator at INGO. INT-18. Head of university department. INT-19. Deputy director at think tank. INT-20. Senior expert at think tank. INT-21. Director at think tank. INT-22. Internal migrant worker (2). INT-23. Expert at think tank. INT-24. Expert at think tank. INT-25a. Director at private enterprise. INT-25b. Member of the board at private enterprise. INT-26. Former researcher at think tank; consultant for UN system (3 plus follow ups via email). INT-27. Senior banker at IFI. INT-28. Vice chairman at SOE. INT-29. Head of department at ministry. INT-30a. CEO of private company. INT-30b. CEO of private company. INT-31. Director at independent think tank; consultant at IFI (2). INT-32. Expert at think tank. INT-33. Programme specialist at international organisation. INT-34. Chairperson at business association. INT-35. General director at MNC.

237 INT-36. Expert at government NGO. INT-37. Country officer for IFI. INT-38a. Head of department at SOE. INT-38b. Deputy head of directorate at SOE. INT-39. Head of department at chamber of commerce. INT-40a. Head of department at ministry. INT-40b. Head of department at ministry. INT-41. Head of department at think tank.

Conferences attended

- ‘Central Asia in the system of international transport corridors: strategic perspectives and unrealized opportunities’, International high-level conference organised by the Ministry of Foreign Trade of the Republic of Uzbekistan (MFT), Tashkent, September 20, 2018 (MFT-C 2018); - ‘Mechanisms and ways to create an innovative economy in light of the implementation of “the Strategy of actions in the priority areas of development for the Republic of Uzbekistan in 2017−2021”’, 10th Forum of Economists organised by the Institute of Forecasting and Macroeconomic Research (IFMR), Tashkent, October 26, 2018 (IFMR-F 2018); - ‘Social science knowledge and sustainable agricultural development along the Silk Road’, conference organised by the Tashkent Institute of Irrigation and Agricultural Mechanization Engineers (TIIAME), Tashkent, October 30-November 1, 2018 (TIIAME-C 2018); - ‘International Conference on Issues of Ensuring the Competitiveness of Uzbek Producers in Foreign and Domestic Markets’, conference organised by the Center for Economic Research’s (CER)68, Tashkent, November 22, 2018 (CER-C 2018).

DECEMBER 2018-FEBRUARY 2019 WhatsApp & email interviews

INT-42. Former Italian diplomat (2). INT-43. Union activist. INT-44. Human rights defender in exile.

MAY 16-JUNE 17, 2019 Cities of Tashkent, Urgench, Bukhara, Samarkand, Jizzakh, Almalik, Fergana, Andijan, as well as towns and villages in their surrounding areas or provinces

INT-45. Independent journalist and editor. INT-46a. Senior researcher at university and INGO. INT-46b. Expert at INGO. INT-47. Coordinator at INGO. INT-48. Economist at hokimiyat, fermer (Russian/Uzbek). INT-49a. Fermer (Russian/Uzbek). INT-49b. Fermer (Russian/Uzbek). INT-49c. Fermer, entrepreneur (Russian/Uzbek). INT-49d. Director of farm belonging to SOE (Russian/Uzbek). INT-50. Fermer (2). INT-51a. Dekhan, migrant worker (Russian/Tajik). INT-51b. Dekhan (Russian/Tajik). INT-51c. Dekhan (Russian/Tajik).

68 CER has since been renamed the Center for Economic Research and Reforms (CERR).

238 INT-51d. Dekhan (Russian/Tajik). INT-51e. Dekhan (Russian/Tajik). INT-52a. Former fermer. INT-52b. Fermer. INT-53. Doctor, head of NGO. INT-54a. Fermer (Uzbek). INT-54b. Fermer (Uzbek). INT-54c. Fermer (Uzbek). INT-55a. Fermer (Uzbek). INT-55b. Dekhan (Uzbek). INT-55c. Fermer (Uzbek). INT-55d. Dekhan (Uzbek). INT-56. Former university lecturer; head of NGO. INT-57a. Qualified worker at SOE (Russian/Uzbek). INT-57b. Qualified worker at SOE (Russian/Uzbek). INT-58a. Woman mardikor (Uzbek). INT-58b. Woman mardikor (Uzbek). INT-58c. Bazaar seller (Uzbek). INT-58d. Bazaar reseller (Uzbek). INT-58e. Bazaar reseller (Uzbek). INT-58f. Bazaar re/seller (Uzbek). INT-59a. Former tractor driver and head of sovkhoz brigade; woman fermer (Uzbek). INT-59b. Woman fermer (Uzbek). INT-60a. Private company manager (Uzbek). INT-60b. Founder and owner of several private companies (Uzbek). INT-61. Head of private company (Russian/Uzbek). INT-62. Former head of kolkhoz brigade; woman fermer (Uzbek). INT-63. Former member of sovkhoz; woman fermer (Uzbek). INT-64. Woman manager of private company (Uzbek). INT-65a. Woman manager of private workshop (Uzbek). INT-65b. Woman founder and owner of private company (Uzbek). INT-66a. Former tailor; woman founder and manager of private company (Uzbek). INT-66b. Co-founder, co-owner, and co-manager of private company (Russian/Uzbek). INT-67. Woman founder, owner, and manager of private company (Uzbek). INT-68a. Former accountant at cooperative; woman fermer (Uzbek). INT-68b. Former member of sovkhoz/shirkat; woman fermer (Uzbek). INT-68c. Fermer (Uzbek). INT-69. Woman fermer and entrepreneur, representative of district business association (Uzbek). INT-70. Former tailor; woman fermer and entrepreneur (Uzbek). INT-71a. Woman entrepreneur (Uzbek). INT-71b. Head of district committee (Uzbek). INT-71c. Woman entrepreneur (Uzbek). INT-71d. Artisan (Uzbek). INT-71e. Entrepreneur (Uzbek). INT-72a. Former head of kolkhoz; investor, owner, founder of diversified industrial group, including cotton cluster (Russian/Uzbek). INT-72b. Manager of private company (Uzbek). INT-73a. Woman SME entrepreneur (Uzbek). INT-73b. Former accountant in a kolkhoz; woman fermer and entrepreneur (Uzbek).

239

FEBRUARY-JULY 2019; JANUARY-FEBRUARY 2020 WhatsApp & email interviews

INT-74. Assembly line worker at private enterprise (5). INT-75. Former journalist, political refugee (2).

240 APPENDIX 3 GDP growth (annual %) in selected CIS countries (1991-2018)

Year Russia Belarus Ukraine Kazakhstan Uzbekistan Kyrgyzstan 1991 -5.00% -1.20% -8.40% -11% -0.40% -7.90% 1992 -14.50% -9.60% -9.60% -5.30% -11.20% -13.80% 1993 -8.60% -7.60% -14.20% -9.20% -2.30% -15.40% 1994 -12.50% -11.70% -22.90% -12.60% -5.20% -20% 1995 -4.10% -10.40% -12.20% -8.20% -0.90% -5.40% 1996 -3.70% 2.80% -10% 0.50% 1.70% 7% 1997 1.40% 11.40% -3% 1.70% 5.20% 9.90% 1998 -5.30% 8.40% -1.90% -1.90% 4.30% 2.10% 1999 6.40% 3.40% -0.20% 2.70% 4.30% 3.60% 2000 10% 5.80% 5.90% 9.80% 3.80% 5.40% 2001 5.10% 4.70% 9.20% 13.50% 4.10% 5.30% 2002 4.70% 5% 5.20% 9.80% 3.90% 0% 2003 7.30% 7% 9.50% 9.30% 4.20% 7% 2004 7.20% 11.40% 12.10% 9.60% 7.40% 7% 2005 6.40% 9.40% 2.90% 9.70% 6.90% -0.10% 2006 8.20% 10% 7.40% 10.70% 7.40% 3.10% 2007 8.50% 8.60% 7.50% 8.90% 9.40% 8.50% 2008 5.20% 10.20% 2.30% 3.30% 9% 8.40% 2009 -7.80% 0.20% -14.70% 1.20% 8% 2.80% 2010 4.50% 7.70% 3.80% 7.30% 7.50% -0.40% 2011 4.30% 5.30% 5.40% 7.40% 7.70% 5.90% 2012 4% 1.60% 0.20% 4.80% 7.30% 0% 2013 1.70% 1% 0% 6% 7.50% 10.90% 2014 0.70% 1.70% -6.50% 4.20% 7.10% 4% 2015 -1.90% -3.80% -9.70% 1.20% 7.40% 3.80% 2016 0.10% -2.50% 2.20% 1.10% 6% 4.30% 2017 1.80% 2.50% 2.40% 4.10% 4.40% 4.70% 2018 2.50% 3.10% 3.40% 4.10% 5.40% 3.70%

Source: https://data.worldbank.org.

241 APPENDIX 4 Selected International Commodity Prices in USD (1989-2019)

Natural gas Crude oil (Europe) Year (average) $/bbl $/mmbtu Gold $/troy oz Cotton $/kg

1989 22.4 2.62 478.99 2.1 1990 27.67 3.41 463.84 2.2 1991 23.65 3.8 442.16 2.05 1992 22.79 3.07 411.94 1.53 1993 19.51 3.09 416.77 1.48 1994 18.97 2.92 458.63 2.11 1995 18.69 2.97 417.93 2.31 1996 22.65 3.15 429.97 1.97 1997 22.31 3.19 385.34 2.03 1998 15.9 2.94 357.99 1.76 1999 22.42 2.64 345.9 1.45 2000 35.48 4.85 350.72 1.64 2001 31.8 5.3 353.88 1.38 2002 32.94 4.03 409.57 1.35 2003 36.3 4.91 456.57 1.76 2004 44.38 5.03 481.28 1.61 2005 60.88 7.21 507.21 1.39 2006 71.49 9.42 672.04 1.41 2007 74.52 8.96 730.09 1.46 2008 94.32 13.04 847.68 1.53 2009 64.02 9.03 1008.65 1.43 2010 79.04 8.29 1,224.66 2.28 2011 93.71 9.47 1,413.76 3 2012 95.31 10.41 1,515.33 1.79 2013 94.88 10.74 1,286.72 1.82 2014 88.93 9.29 1,169.48 1.69 2015 51.86 6.97 1,186.07 1.59 2016 45.53 4.85 1,328.24 1.74 2017 54.26 5.87 1,292.17 1.89 2018 67.15 7.55 1,247.03 1.98 2019 61.73 4.83 1,399.81 1.73

Source: https://data.worldbank.org.

242 APPENDIX 5 Uzbekistan’s cotton production (tons) (1989-2019) & cotton exports (mln USD) (1995-2018)

Year Cotton production (tons) Cotton exports (mln $)

1989 7,605 1990 7,317 1991 6,628 1992 5,851 1993 6,067 1994 5,778 1995 5,740 954 1996 4,813 1,460 1997 5,228 1,440 1998 4,600 994 1999 5,180 797 2000 4,400 826 2001 4,900 713 2002 4,600 518 2003 4,100 729 2004 5,200 966 2005 5,550 986 2006 5,350 1,180 2007 5,350 1,140 2008 4,600 549 2009 3,900 279 2010 4,200 908 2011 4,000 770 2012 4,600 715 2013 4,100 590 2014 3,900 381 2015 3,800 557 2016 3,725 192 2017 3,860 183 2018 3,375 225 2019 3,500

Source: https://www.indexmundi.com; https://oec.world.

243 Uzbekistan’s & Turkmenistan’s FDIs in mln USD vis-à-vis natural gas price (1992- 2018)

Year Uzbekistan’s FDIs Turkmenistan’s FDIs Natural gas (Europe) $/mmbtu

1992 9 0 3.07 1993 48 79 3.09 1994 73 103 2.92 1995 -24 233 2.97 1996 90 108.1 3.15 1997 166.8 107.9 3.19 1998 139.6 62.3 2.94 1999 121.2 125 2.64 2000 74.7 131 4.85 2001 82.8 170 5.3 2002 65.3 276 4.03 2003 82.6 226 4.91 2004 176.6 353.7 5.03 2005 191.6 418.2 7.21 2006 173.8 730.9 9.42 2007 705.2 856 8.96 2008 711.3 1,277 13.04 2009 842 4,553 9.03 2010 1,636.4 3,632.3 8.29 2011 1,635.1 3,391.1 9.47 2012 563 3,129.6 10.41 2013 634.7 2,861.4 10.74 2014 808.7 3,830.1 9.29 2015 1,041.2 3,043 6.97 2016 1,662.6 2,243.2 4.85 2017 1,797.3 2,085.9 5.87 2018 624.7 1,985.1 7.55

Source: https://unctad.org.

244 Kazakhstan’s FDIs in mln USD vis-à-vis oil price (1992-2018)

Year Kazakhstan’s FDIs Crude oil (average) $/bbl

1992 100 22.79 1993 1,271.4 19.51 1994 659.7 18.97 1995 964.3 18.69 1996 1,136.9 22.65 1997 1,321.9 22.31 1998 1,160.9 15.9 1999 1,437.7 22.42 2000 1,282.5 35.48 2001 2,835 31.8 2002 2,590.2 32.94 2003 2,092 36.3 2004 4,157.2 44.38 2005 1,971.2 60.88 2006 6,278.2 71.49 2007 11,119 74.52 2008 14,321.8 94.32 2009 13,242.5 64.02 2010 11,550.7 79.04 2011 13,973.1 93.71 2012 13,337 95.31 2013 10,321 94.88 2014 8,489.4 88.93 2015 4,056.6 51.86 2016 8,511.5 45.53 2017 4,669.3 54.26 2018 3,756.8 67.15

Source: https://unctad.org.

245 Uzbekistan’s cotton, gold, and natural gas exports as % of total (selected years)

Year Cotton Gold Natural gas Total exports in bln $ 1996 57.30% 5.17% 2.63% 2.42 2000 39.90% 7.83% 9.85% 1.98 2005 27.10% 5.87% 13.50% 3.63 2010 14.90% 2.93% 4.43% 6.1 2015 9.06% 30.80% 9.48% 5.85 2018 2.14% 23.60% 23.30% 10.5

Source: https://oec.world.

246 APPENDIX 6 History of Uzbekistan’s car industry since 1992

Year UzAvtoSanoat DAEWOO MOTOR GENERAL MOTORS (est. 1994) COMPANY (DMC) (GM)

1992 UzDaewooAvto created (50% SelkhozMash69; 50% DMC) Registered capital: 200 million USD

1996 Car production starts at Asaka plant in the Fergana Valley

November 2000 DMC goes bankrupt

November 2000 GM Daewoo Auto & Technology (GMDAT) (42.1% GM; 14.9% Suzuki; 33% Daewoo creditors represented by the Korea Development Bank)

2005 Uzbekistan government buys out DMC’s 50% share of UzDaewooAvto; continues to source parts from GMDAT in South Korea

October 2007 GM Uzbekistan created (75% UzAvtoSanoat [200 million USD]; 25% GM [66.7 million USD]) Registered capital: 266.7 million USD Operations start in 2008

2009 GM Powertrain Uzbekistan created (52% GM; 48% UzAvtoSanoat) Registered capital: 100 million USD

2011 GMDAT becomes GM Korea GM Powertrain Uzbekistan starts production

31 December 2017 End of 10 year exemptions for GM Uzbekistan (as granted since start of operations in 2008)

2018 UzAvtoSanoat buys 15% of GM shares in GM Uzbekistan, announces it will buy the remaining 10%

In December 2018, all tax exemptions (but VAT) for GM Uzbekistan are eliminated. GM sells off its last 10% share in GM Uzbekistan to UzAvtoSanoat

69 Trust for the production of agricultural machinery on whose land and infrastructure the Asaka plant was built.

247 2019 In June 2019, the VAT tax exemption is eliminated, too GM Uzbekistan is renamed UzAuto Motors (100% UzAvtoSanoat)

Ongoing discussions about UzAvtoSanoat’s possible acquisition of GM’s share in GM Powertrain Uzbekistan

2021 End of 10 year exemptions for GM Powertrain Uzbekistan (as granted since start of operations in 2011)

248 Uzbekistan’s car production/exports vis-à-vis total exports in mln USD (1996-2018)

Year Total car production Total car exports Total exports in mln $

1996 25,344 880 2,420 1997 64,883 14,607 2,530 1998 54,444 8,785 1,710 1999 44,433 9,927 1,490 2000 32,273 11,422 1,980 2001 41,005 9,946 1,920 2002 29,554 12,418 1,480 2003 46,474 17,002 1,990 2004 80,724 35,659 2,830 2005 95,814 53,092 3,630 2006 110,000 82,537 4,610 2007 184,900 109,005 5,650 2008 208,038 96,007 6,690 2009 117,90070 40,079 4,920 2010 156,880 80,995 6,100 2011 179,560 107,831 6,540 2012 164,180 108,544 4,780 2013 246,641 84,129 5,860 2014 245,660 55,000 6,140 2015 185,400 6,10071 5,850 2016 88,152 3,05072 7,110 2017 140,247 26,800 8,380 2018 220,667 10,500

Source: CER 2013a; http://www.oica.net; https://oec.world.

70 The official figure of 205,011 for 2009 (CER 2013a) is not credible, given the financial crisis engulfing the world during that year, as mirrored in the drop in Uzbekistan’s export revenues, and contemporary reports of a sharp decrease in production in the first months of 2009 (Eurasianet 2009). 71 Own approximate calculation based on total car export revenue for this year. 72 Own approximate calculation based on total car export revenue for this year.

249 APPENDIX 7 Uzbekistan’s land use changes, migration, and remittances in mln USD (2000-2010)

Year Dismantled shirkats Migrant workers Remittances in mln (official work permits, $ Russia) 2000 2173 6,100 79 2001 52 10,100 148.3 2002 86 15,500 186.3 2003 178 14,600 295.1 2004 284 24,100 594.6 2005 354 49,000 830.2 2006 382 105,100 1,573.5 2007 344,600 1,666 2008 642,700 3,007 2009 666,300 2,071 2010 511,500 3,834

Source: CER 2004: 24, Table 6, 26, Table 9; UNECE 2007: 36, Table 18; Ivakhnyuk 2009: 59, Table 7; Ilkhamov 2013: 261, Table 1; Ryazantsev & Korneev 2014: 18, Figure 3.1.

73 Total for 1998-2000 period.

250 APPENDIX 8 Uzbekistan’s land use change for key crops/1,000 ha (selected years)

Year Cotton Wheat Fruit Vegetable Intensive Household s orchards plots

1991 1,720.50 226 50 165.6 0 110

2000 1,444.50 1,027.80 139 34.8 0 630

2010 1,450.30 1,155.60 180.2 172.9 15.32 630

2015 1,444.50 1,145 261.9 194 21.41 630

2016 1,423.10 1,135 266.9 205.4 24.24 630

Source: Nurbekov et al. 2018: xx, Table 1; Khan 1996: 7.

251 BIBLIOGRAPHY Note. All online material last accessed in December 2020. The original title of foreign language sources (Russian, Spanish, Italian) has been put at the end of the reference in square brackets. All translations in the dissertation from any language other than English are mine.

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