Nations in Transit Brief

Nations in Transit brief

August 2017

Uzbekistan: The Year After Bakhtiyor Nishanov Deputy Director for Eurasia, International Republican Institute

Source: The Kremlin, Moscow

• A year ago, Islam Karimov, who had ruled Uzbekistan for 27 years, passed away with no designated or apparent heir. After a few days’ of uncertainty, then prime minister Shavkat Mirziyoyev took over and was subsequently elected president in December 2016. This was the first change of power in Uz- bekistan’s post-Soviet history and its aftermath was closely watched by those following the country’s politics. • There are signs of positive change in Uzbekistan, particularly in the media space. Uzbekistan’s media outlets are now publishing pieces indirectly or—much more rarely—directly criticizing legacy policies and advocating changes, unseen and unheard of during the Karimov years. The new president has also relaxed some trade and economic regulations, particularly export procedures, and has taken steps toward floating the national currency. Additionally, Uzbekistan significantly improved relations with neighboring states. • Yet none of these changes constitute systematic reform in any one area and are seemingly only designed to strengthen Mirziyoyev’s hold on power. It seems clear that the Mirziyoyev government has chosen the path of China and, to an extent, Russia, with a heavy focus on growing the economy and carrying out only as much political reform as needed to boost these policies. In addition, by increasing the transparency of some government operations and slightly cutting back on corruption that has traditionally enriched law enforcement, Mirziyoyev may be looking to weaken the entrenched elites and transfer wealth to his support base—a more dynamic, pro-trade, pro-business elite. • In the process of opening up the tightly controlled media, exploring previously taboo topics, and expanding freedoms, the Mirziyoyev government may inadvertently change Uzbeks’ expectations of their government and could, in the longer term, face increased demands for a more democratic system of governance. Thus, in an effort to purge the old elite, secure its own power base, and redistribute wealth, the Mirziyoyev government could unintentionally build the foundations for true change in Uzbekistan. • Nonetheless, overpromising and then failing to carry out substantive political reform would not only be a mistake but could, in fact, lead to security challenges in Uzbekistan’s very young and growing population. The international community should acknowledge positive changes in the country but continue nudging the government toward a full-scale reform to ensure a prosperous, secure, and pluralistic Uzbekistan. 2 nitanalyticalbrief dicate that Mirziyoyev cared about the perception of its legitimacy at home and, more importantly, abroad, in it does difference the is negligible, figures While the election. in centKarimov2015 received the had in per 90.4 the below vote, the of percent 88.6 Mirziyoyev won that interesting in also was itself result The campaign to get peopleto vote. minister.a celebrity-touted also there was campaign, election an of constitute semblance wouldwhat a In directly criticized Mirziyoyev, they voiced criticism of certain policies implemented under his watch as prime never candidates opposing three the slightly,different platforms.nonetheless, While only but on ran who candidates four were there 2016, In him. for support their announce publicly hand Karimov’s would competitors where picked elections, past the from departure a were it to prior campaign the and election that may leave events even the bymultiple most skeptical of analystsmarked questioninghas been their pessimism. Already, the rule December presidential 4 presidential then and unofficial initially Mirziyoyev’s Signs of aThaw Mirziyoyev rule,have theanalysts intheireternal skepticism beenwrong? of the a year purposes, practical all for and death Karimov’s after year a is, then question trajectory.The democratic and record rights human country’s the in changes positive or reform economic or social tive substan for hope little be would there and policies Karimov’s continue would Mirziyoyev that concluded ceived as the status quo candidate and emerge victorious. Central Asia watchers and analysts had therefore It is more than likely, ultimately, that the lower profile was the main factor in allowing Mirziyoyev to be per prominence astheface ofUzbekistan innegotiations with international financial institutions. gained had who Azimov Rustam rival would-be his than profile lower a maintained had He regions. qand Samar then and Jizzakh the of governor as serve ranksto the through rising years,formanyquickly circle Mirziyoyev, who was appointed prime minister in 2003, had been part of the late president Karimov’s inner genuine competition” andMirziyoyev became president, winningtheelectionhandily. as of “devoid evaluated (OSCE) in Europe Cooperation and Security the Organization the for that election likely to continue Karimov’s policies and maintain the political status quo. In December, Uzbekistan held an clear that Mirziyoyev was a consensus figure agreed upon by the ruling elites as he had been seen as more is approved It quickly parliament it. the unconstitutional but an move wasMany this expertsbelievedthat announced president.interim Senate made preferdeferenceMirziyoyevMirziyoyev’swouldbe thatin to he that experience, the of chairman the unexpectedly, not Interestingly, but days. 90 within election an person of the upper chamber of the parliament would step in to take over the responsibilities and organize chair the reasons), other and health (for govern to incapable is president the case in that dictates tution Consti Uzbek The country’smedia. the in prominence overallgiven was and foreigndignitaries,receiving in and ceremonies organization multi-day burial the outsized the rolein an of had He rule. the overtaking Yet,Mirziyoyevevidentthatbecamedays be it woulddeath,the following formal of announcementin the prominent political leaders ofany rank, there were onlyindirect signsofanemerging leader. deliberately been of devoid had president and one seen only had that country a successors. In mentioned widely most two the became time, the at minister prime deputy Azimov,Rustamthe and minister prime dest daughter of the president and once-presumed successor, under house arrest, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, then who would succeed Karimov after about he infighting, had passed alone away. let discourse, internal With much no was heir there apparent if and Gulnara unclear is Karimova, it the el- time, the at rumors Despite Old Guard New President worst humanrights violators haschanged. world’sthe way, of any one how,in analyze toif aims and Uzbekistan in year past the at looks paper This was indirectly confirmed by the Uzbek government’s own 11-month remembrance events on July 27, 2017. tember 2, it is widely speculated, and is likely more accurate, that he passed away on August 27, 2016. This onSep hedied officially While was. passing his of date actual the what clear not still is political system, it Central republic’s Asian the of opaqueness the years. heavy-handed 27 Symptomatic of autocratic of ruler This month commemorates the one-year anniversary of the death of Islam Karimov, Uzbekistan’s ------nitanalyticalbrief 3 - - - In November, November, In 3 space. space. The step was welcomed by by welcomed was step The 2 Perhaps the area where the signs of the signs of where the area Perhaps the thaw are most visible is the media most are the thaw in spring 2017 signaled that things may in Tashkent to include students, students, include to Tashkent in propiska - 5 Of course, as it 4 in a country as restrictive as Uzbekistan, even the smallest hints at a regular- elec at a hints the smallest even as Uzbekistan, as in restrictive a country 1 propiska or city isregistration another legacy policy that denies Uzbekfrom citizens theregions their Mirziyoyev Mirziyoyev also released Samandar an Kukanov, opposition activistafter years23 in jail. years 19 after government, criticizing the in prison who ended up in prison after a banking pioneer Usmonov, and Rustam trips multiple With neighbors. Uzbekistan’s with relations repair to sought Mirziyoyev steps, first his Among to Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan Kazakhstan, Mirziyoyev demonstrated Uzbekistan’s desire to cooperate on regional issues long ignored by The Karimov. reopening of the borders and more cordial and friendly intraregional relations have allowed Uzbek citizens to visit their families andtrade with the neighboring gov the limited, Mirziyoyev were with links neighboring nations transport While under countries. Karimov these countries. to routes and plane train new establish to fast moved ernment Some of the most relevant and acute issues facing many Uzbeks have been the the toreceivewhich Uzbek issue a The requires citizens of Ministryso-called exit of visa propiska. is a Soviet legacy, exit visas and the Interior issued insticker their passport being before ableto outside This travel the processcountry. is and intimidation, government corruption, of sources largest the of one and best at dubious constitutionally For it control. example, is a practicewell-documented that the Uzbekgovernment will refuseto issueexit gov 16, 2017 the Uzbek On August activists. rights human visas to January, visa starting abolish the exit announced it would ernment 2019 and introduce passports for foreign travel. tion process are important. important. are tion process and journalist independent an Bekjan, Muhammad of prison from release the saw some later, months Two regime.” the for test litmus true “the as leader, opposition exiled an of brother many many as Bekjan had been languishing behind the bars since 1999 on trumped up charges. have have changed, even The if case, slightly. initiallyswept under the rug,reemerged on the- general prosecu Normal- perpetrators. the to justice bring government the that media social on demands after agenda tor’s the authoritieswouldly, ignore suchrequests but this time, given thescale they of responded the outcry, of the on This of case. the by opening level progress a a criminal handful and case of providing statements was was the case with the Turkmenistan, abolishment of the exit visa - of move freedom expanded mean automatically not does policies serve yet may passports travel foreign to-be-introduced The ment. exit visas do. purpose as and stick” the same “carrot The Uz the of violation direct a is policy this Again, Tashkent. capital, the in property buy and work, live, to right to address steps small took government Mirziyoyev The corruption. of source a major and constitution bek receive can who people of list the expanded it First, problem. this buying anyone to registration issue to promised also It categories. other some and employees, government buildings. built apartment in newly property inspired Possibly space. media the is felt and visible most are thaw the of signs the where area the Perhaps by and taking Mirziyoyev’s words about the need for critical mediaat theface value, many Uzbekistan’s policies. government criticizing rarely—directly more or—much indirectly pieces publishing started outlets and to the economy mostly has been limited repercussions fearing without be criticized could that Policies social policies. media Similarly, have started to openly criticizeregional governors and otherstate institu form of remark criticizing receivinga speech or himselfa “blessing”in the tionsafter only from Mirziyoyev curren- failing the topics—including taboo previously many that is clear it Yet, institution. or official said the cy policies, exchange hostilerelations with the neighboring countries, or the large number of Uzbek labor migrants in Russia—are now openly discussed and citizens areto encouraged provide theirfeedback and opinion on them. Observers have also noted a slight opening for civic activism. While previously any sign of active citizenry was brutally suppressed, public outcry following a brutal murder - care was a the election While undermine. certainly significantly would result a 90-plus percent something the electionrestrictive of in awhich the highly OSCE “the said event media that covered fully orchestrated hear to opportunity the voters provide not did narrative state-defined the and environment, controlled and viewpoints;” alternative responsiveness was unprecedented for Uzbekistan and gave hope to many for potential changes toward a fairer justice system.

There also seems to be a greater opening for religious freedom in Uzbekistan. For years, the Karimov government had restricted religious freedoms by prohibiting religious clothing and attending Friday prayers for public employees, students, univer- sity professors, and others. Religious service at mosques was also limited in its scope. Any person suspected of not following the government-spon- sored version of Islam was imme- diately targeted by the authorities and, in many cases, labeled an “ex- brief analytical tremist.” Human rights organizations criticized these policies as violating the tenets of Uzbekistan’s own con- nit stitution.

While it is too early to talk about the reversal of these egregious policies, for the first time in many years the government allowed all-night prayers during Ramadan—something previously banned. It also started a semblance of a conversation about labeling everyone a “ter- rorist” and “extremist,” reportedly Source: Pixabay removing more than 4,000 from so-called blacklists that contain people suspected of “radical Islamist affili- ations.”6 The importance of this for the people who had been blacklisted cannot be overstated, as a former imam told EurasiNet. “People removed from blacklists can now work where they want and they will no longer have to go to the police station to give reports on their doings. They will be eligible for welfare benefits and they can visit public events in their region.”7 In early August 2017, for example, the prominent Uzbek journalist Khayrulla Khamidov was removed from the list and received permission to work in the National Radio and Television Company.8

Seemingly, then, there is a thaw in Uzbekistan. But the question is whether this is simply a thaw with no sign of a spring bloom or—even worse—only a brief respite before the coming re-freeze.

Tempering Expectations

In a country that for the last two decades has become synonymous with systematic human rights abuse, dictatorial rule, and a stagnating economy, any sign of a positive change is welcome. And, indeed, that has been the case for many Uzbeks and the more skeptical Uzbek diaspora abroad: The ever so slightly freer media punctuated by the launch of a 24-hour news channel that was quick to deliver on the criticism of the Karimov-era policies; the relaxing of export and travel regulations; the overall dynamism the new president brought to the political arena are certainly lifting the spirits of many. This however should not take away from the fact that to this day, none of the changes mentioned above added up to a substantive systematic reform in political, social or economic spheres. The Mirziyoyev government seems intent on fixing the most obvious and egregious problems of the post-Karimov reality in Uzbekistan, but is not too quick to undertake systemic reforms that will bring true change to Uzbekistan.

One example is the now infamous “public complaint boxes.” Upon taking office as interim president, Mirzi- yoyev announced that there would be an electronic complaint submission system on the prime minister’s website, where any person can submit a complaint about anything. The move proved popular and soon all government ministries followed suit. Initially touted as a communication tool, the boxes became an instru-

4 nitanalyticalbrief 5 ------The only area where the seems government on intent bringing about real specifi change is the economy, removing years—and many for recommended has IMF the currency—something national the floating cally trade barriers to boost exports. This could the be to of trajectory development understanding key Uzbeki has chosen government the and of path suggests the that stan China Mirziyoyev and, Russia, to an extent, with a heavy focus on growing the economy and carrying out only to boost pro-growth policies. as In addition,bymuch increasing the transparencypolitical of some governmentreform operations as needed and thus some removing of the corruption mechanisms enriched traditionally thatlaw have enforcement, A Tested Model or Building True Change? Model or Building True A Tested ment ment of populist appeasement that would allow people to let some steam off but alsocollect unverified on localofficials information laterand use attack, remove criticize,it possibly and to theirfrom them jobs. theEssentially, boxes into transformed usefultools for spreading thenarrative of “the good king, bad of ficials.”Were the Mirziyoyevgovernment cer serious is about however, This, reform data. the on efforts, based priorities policy itits align and couldreceiving is it collectdata of amounts massive and analyzethe tainly not the reshufflingthe constant of case. government officials,Moreover, sometimes in less than six months on the job—while contributes to a sense of dynamism and government responsiveness to citizen plan. reform and transformation a lack of a cohesive complaints—reveals With the bar for media freedom in the Uzbekistan so small low, signs of the expanding independence are outlets While criticism. and media the for zones no-go certain are there that obvious is it Yet, encouraging. him Mirziyoyev president topic any matter, that for or, regulations Karimov-era governors, local criticize can whether media, the that obvious is It president. the of criticism of lack clear very a is there of, critical is self through self-censorship or through direct instructions, are doing their bestto further contribute “good king”to narrative being the created in Uzbekistan. Theof irony, course, is that while slowly undermining new cult of personality. a in the creation assisting are they legacy, Karimov’s The release of political prisoners—while certainly first an the in importantterms development—was prison donemulti-year sotheir in for areasons manner unfair and arbitrary the condemn or discuss not did that place. This does not give hope that the persecution of does activistsstart not willstop a and, importantly, judiciary. subservient and corrupt reform the to efforts, alone specific let conversation, government a of indicative also are movement of freedom addressing efforts of starts and fits constant The that is trying to correct the wrong, but is doing so with minimal Atatreform. effort al actual, substantive most a year of the rule, Mirziyoyev Uzbeks are yet to be able to move freely within their own country and internationally. travel Majlis, Oliy parliament, the of ineffectiveness the about spoken has occasions few a on Mirziyoyev President which serves as a for rubberstamp decisions.executive He has also encouraged political parties define to their ideologies In and July compete with 2017, each with experimented Uzbekistan other. the - live broad level a certain brings this continue, will practice the if clear not is it while and hearings parliamentary of cast of transparency to the work of the were the Yet, body. Uzbek government serious about its commitment to free and fair politicalcompetition, wouldit allow true opposition partiesregister to operate and in the Russia, of that to similar democracy,” “managed a in result best at will that of short anything Doing country. but none of the substance. system with all the semblance of a competitive When it comes to one of the the humanmost flagrant rights violations in that forced labor, of Uzbekistan, new administration hasyet to address it.- prac Uzbekistan legacy is The onecotton. harvest of to theforced annually world’s largestemployees cotton government exporters,and with teachers, doctors, students, tice, much criticized by human rightsorganizations, not only own violateslaws, Uzbekistan’s but has also forced avoid to officials government up paying well-off the with instrument, segregation facto de a become Ending labor. this practicewould send thestrongest and mosttangible signalyet that the Uzbekgovern of reform. is indeed on the path ment Mirziyoyev may be looking to weaken the entrenched elites and transfer wealth to his support base—a more dynamic, pro-trade, pro-business, “new” elite.

Contrary to what some had thought would happen in a post-Karimov Uzbekistan, a year after his death not much fundamental change has occurred in the country. The dynamism of constant small modifications to what essentially is the Karimov-era government and governance systems masks the fact Mirziyoyev has yet to address the true structural democratic and human rights challenges in the country. Thus, a more skeptical observer will likely conclude that the above-mentioned and yet-to-come changes are superficial in nature and are designed to strengthen Mirziyoyev’s hold on power. This may be true. There is, however, a silver lining: in the process of opening up the previously tightly controlled media, expanding freedoms, exploring previously taboo topics, the Mirziyoyev government may inadvertently change Uzbeks’ expectations of their government. Mirziyoyev has already announced with big fanfare the appointment of two 20-somethings to deputy minister positions. He is clearly trying to portray himself as a champion of the youth and win over their support.9 Yet, by raising expectations, Uzbekistan’s government may find itself in a position of actually having to respond to public concerns and face increased demands for a more democratic system of governance.

Hence, it may yet be the case that the Mirziyoyev government, in an effort to purge the old elite, secure its own power base, and redistribute wealth could unintentionally build the foundations for true change in Uzbekistan. However, with the very young and growing population, which is expected to reach 40 million by 2050, overpromising and failing to deliver may in fact lead to violence. The international community should acknowledge positive changes in the country but continue nudging the government toward a full-scale reform to ensure a prosperous, secure, and pluralistic Uzbekistan.

1 Mirziyaev Declared Winner of Uzbekistan’s Presidential Election. RFE/RL, December 6, 2016,https://www.rferl.org/a/uzbekistan-pres - idential-election-2016-mirziyaev/28156160.html 2 Will Mirziyoyev Bring Change to Uzbekistan? The Carnegie Endowment for Democracy. December, 201,. http://carnegie.ru/commen- tary/66493 3 Uzbekistan: Free Long-Imprisoned Journalist. Human Rights Watch. December 16, 2016, https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/12/16/ uzbekistan-free-long-imprisoned-journalist 4 Uzbekistan to Introduce Foreign Travel Passport in 2019. Kun.uz, August 16, 2017, http://kun.uz/news/2017/08/16/uzbekis- ton-2019-jildan-horizga-cikis-pasportlarini-zorij-etadi 5 In the spring of 2017, a 17-year-old Jasurbek Ibragimov was brutally beaten by his classmates and subsequently died of the sustained injuries. 6 Uzbekistan: Thousands of Suspected Radicals Rehabilitated, EurasiaNet, July 28, 2017, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/84536 7 Ibid. 8 Узбекистан: Журналист Хайрулла Хамидов исключен из «черного списка» и хочет снова работать на телевидении [Uzbekistan: Journalist Khairulla Khamidov taken off of “blacklist” and wants to work again on TV], FerganaNews, August 8, 2017,http://www. fergananews.com/news/26722 9 In an August 9, 2017 speech, Mirziyoyev said he was looking to replace every official in the country with somebody “young and who is a patriot” within the following two years, see: http://kun.uz/news/2017/08/09/ikki-jildan-kejin-amma-zojga-es-vatanni-sev- gan-kadrlar-keladi-prezident

Nations in Transit is the only comprehensive, comparative, and Freedom House is an independent watchdog multidimensional study of reform in the 29 former Communist organization dedicated to the expansion of free- states of Europe and Eurasia. To read our most recent report, go dom and democracy around the world. to http://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/nations-transit-2017, and follow us on Twitter at @FH_NIT. 1850 M street NW, Fl. 11 This brief is made possible with the generous support of the U.S. Washington, DC 20036 Agency for International Development. [email protected]