Opportunities and Limits of Cooperation Between Uzbekistan and Russia
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Opportunities and Limits of Cooperation Between Uzbekistan and Russia “Cooperation between Uzbekistan and Russia is characterized by a steady rise and certain breakthroughs, and this is the main difference between the current stage of Uzbek-Russian relations. At the same time, relations are still concentrated at the bilateral level, and the refusal to join Russian-centric structures is the continuity of Uzbekistan’s foreign policy strategy”, Ildar Yakubov, an Uzbek expert, said in an article written specifically for the analytical platform CABAR.asia. in the field of international relations. Presidents of Russia and Uzbekistan Vladimir Putin and Shavkat Mirziyoyev at the 2018 Interregional Cooperation Forum in Tashkent. Photo: Mikhail Metzel The first presidential term of the head of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev demonstrated the consistent expansion of the country’s foreign policy and foreign economic relations. The openness of the new Uzbekistan is called the main distinguishing feature of the country’s foreign policy over the past five years. Russia traditionally takes the leading place for Uzbekistan. Both states are united by historically established political, economic and cultural ties. In this regard, it is of interest to study the changes in Uzbek-Russian relations that have been observed under the presidency of Shavkat Mirziyoyev. Opportunities and Limits of Cooperation Between Uzbekistan and Russia The legacy of the “old” Uzbekistan Uzbekistan’s first president left a controversial legacy in relations with Russia. Some observers note the uneasy interaction between the countries, which has become a “calling card” of foreign policy under Islam Karimov. He was probably the most uncomfortable partner of Russia in Central Asia. Nevertheless, it should be noted that Karimov has developed a close relationship with Vladimir Putin in recent years, which is important for political regimes in which key foreign policy decisions are made personally by the head of state. It seemed that both sides accepted the established rules of the game, in which Tashkent tacitly recognizes the role of Russia, and Moscow takes for granted Uzbekistan’s emphasized distancing from global centers of power. Russia also recognized the reality formed in Uzbekistan for its political leader, in which some problems related to bilateral relations and the region, but which do not fit into the picture of the world and the place of Uzbekistan in it, are denied. For example, the problem of labor migration or an overestimation of one’s own role in Central Asia, including in the security sphere, which was expressed, in particular, in unsuccessful attempts to resolve border problems by force. Pro-Russian orientation? The very first steps of Shavkat Mirziyoyev, who took power in Uzbekistan in the fall of 2016, could inspire Moscow to expect important strategic changes. It seemed that its patience should be rewarded: Mirziyoyev was called pro-Russian[1] immediately when discussing the issue of Karimov’s successor, and the “multi-vector” nature of the previous course was replaced by expectations of an accentuated focus on Moscow[2]. Changes in Uzbekistan’s foreign policy, refusal of self-isolation and the principle of “openness” entailed a revision of relations with Russia. The change in the nature of relations was reflected in the dynamics of contacts, regular meetings at the highest and high levels, intergovernmental, interparliamentary, interdepartmental contacts, forums of representatives of business circles, and the actualization of interregional cooperation. Uzbekistan’s interest in investments led to the rapid development of relations formed during the premiership of Shavkat Mirziyoyev with Russian oligarchs of Uzbek origin, who acquired industrial enterprises and developed socially significant projects. Opportunities and Limits of Cooperation Between Uzbekistan and Russia Russian-Uzbek meetings began to be filled with specific content and large-scale projects. A flurry of initiatives and proposals from the new head of Uzbekistan following the Uzbek side’s readiness to discuss previously closed topics, such as joining the EAEU or labor migration, aroused additional enthusiasm in Moscow. A reflection of the dynamics and development prospects was the visit of Vladimir Putin to Tashkent on October 18-19, 2018, which ended with the signing of contracts worth $ 27 billion. Enthusiasm about the prospects for Uzbek-Russian relations is well reflected by the phrase in one of the Russian media: “astronomical figures and stratospheric plans”[3]. Presidents of the Russian Federation and Uzbekistan Vladimir Putin and Shavkat Mirziyoyev during the launch ceremony for the construction of the first nuclear power plant in Uzbekistan in October 2018. Photo: president.uz That said, $ 11 billion were future loans for the already forgotten nuclear power plant construction project, which even initially looked like a contradictory long-term construction. Foreign projects for the construction of nuclear power plants are distinguished by their duration, associated both with the approval of documentation, including with the IAEA, and with the construction of the facility itself. Opportunities and Limits of Cooperation Between Uzbekistan and Russia In particular, the Russian project for the construction of a nuclear power plant in Egypt was approved in 2015, the cost of $ 25 billion was to be secured by loans from the Russian side, but the start of construction is constantly being postponed[4]. Growth of trade and economic cooperation Shavkat Mirziyoyev liberalized foreign economic activity, developing large-scale cooperation by the standards of Uzbekistan with all centers of power and in all directions, which was reflected in the growth of trade and economic ties with Russia. It is significant that, in contrast to the previous period, the upward trend in trade turnover remains stable, as does the growth of the negative trade balance of Uzbekistan. Bilateral trade is growing despite the controversy over joining the EAEU or the pandemic, which has affected the cooperation of almost all countries in the world. In particular, in 2020, trade grew by more than 15% compared to 2019[5]. As can be seen from the table, the growth of trade turnover is largely due to imports from Russia. In 2020 alone, the negative balance for Uzbekistan increased by 25.89% (707,010,864 US dollars), imports increased by 19.24%, while exports to Russia grew by 3.82% compared to 2019[6]. At the same time, the attempts of the Russian Federation to involve Uzbekistan in its integration project - the Eurasian Economic Union - have so far been unsuccessful. EAEU: "for" or "against" The accession to the Eurasian Economic Union was actualized by the efforts of the Russian side almost immediately after Mirziyoyev came to power. Among the goals of the EAEU are "comprehensive modernization, cooperation and increasing the competitiveness of national economies and creating conditions for stable development in order to improve the living standards of the population of the member states"[7], and this fully meets the stated goals of the leadership of Uzbekistan. However, in practice the EAEU is the union of Russia and the countries belonging to the European, Caucasian and Central Asian subregions of the former Soviet Union, in which Moscow appears as an informal core and the main initiator of the integration ideas. Thus, an important indicator of the effectiveness of regional integration is the volume of mutual trade. At the end of 2018, it amounted to $ 59.7 billion, while the volume of foreign Opportunities and Limits of Cooperation Between Uzbekistan and Russia trade in goods with third countries reached $ 753.4 billion[8]. Consequently, the trade turnover within the EAEU is less than 10% of the external trade turnover. This indicates insufficiently effective integration, which still has significant untapped development potential. Indeed, the main integration processes are associated with Russia, in addition to it, the trade turnover of, for example, Kyrgyzstan and Armenia (two member states of this economic bloc) is extremely insignificant, and, naturally, does not play a significant role in the trade turnover of these republics. In this regard, joining the EAEU would mean abandoning the fundamental principle of "equidistance" of Uzbekistan's foreign policy and granting economic and political exclusivity for Russia. To compensate for the asymmetric dependence settlement of certain issues, such as labor migration, it is not quite an adequate solution. In addition, migration issues turn out to be less acute thanks to bilateral cooperation with the relevant departments of the Russian Federation and the opening of new consular missions, their provision of practical assistance to citizens, even despite the persistence of the problem: according to official data, the annual surplus of labor is about 200 thousand people, and it should compensated by external labor migration[9]. What is even more important in the context of joining or not joining the EAEU is that the possibility of competition with Russia in the economic field for modern Uzbekistan is permissible only if structural reforms are carried out, which in practice would confirm the declared theses of economic modernization. It seems that the rejection of liberal economic reforms and the rejection of joining the EAEU look like interrelated events. In these conditions, it would be difficult for the political and economic elite to compensate for their losses from joining