University Microfilms, a XEROX Company, Ann Arbor, Michigan

71-0626

2 1 FCAKj M ic h a e l G e o rg e , 1917- TERMINATION OF MEMBERSHIP IN THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND UNITED NATIONS : A STUDY OF THE WITHDRAWALS AND LONE EXPULSION.

The American University, Ph.D., 1970 Political Science, international law and r e la t io n s

University Microfilms, A XEROX Company, Ann Arbor, Michigan

MICHAEL GEORGE ZIFCAK

Michael George Zifcak

Submitted to the

Faculty of the School of International Service

□f The American University

in Partial Fulfillment of

the Requirements for the Degree

Doctor of Philosophy

International Studies,

Signatures otffthe Committee:

^—) /JL£w- C l . O/^Deati of the School

Date =______J

Washington, D. C.

W! PREFACE

Grateful appreciation 1 g expressed to the faculty of the School of International Service, and especially to Professors Durvrard V, Sandifer, James R. Joss and Mary E, Bradshaw for their assistance during my course of study at The American University, which is termin ated with the research project contained in this study* Appreciation is also extended to Omar Matowidjojo for assistance in research of documents of Indonesian origin In Chapter VIII of thl3 study. Thanks are extended to members of the staff of the School of International Service and The American University for their patience and answers during my doctoral program,

1 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface ...... • ...... 1

Chapter

1 . INTRODUCTION ...... 1

Nature and Purpose ...... «<« 2 T h esis ...... 3 Substantive Review of the Study ...... 4

I I . THE LEAGUE IS FORMED...... 7

Acceptance of Warfare ...... B International Law • 10 Functional la m ...... 14 The I n d u s tr ia l R evolu tion ...... 16 The Balance o f Power Concept ...... IB The Hague C onferences ...... 20 War and the Guilt Complox ...... 24 The S ecret Treaty o f L o n d o n ...... 25 The Future, Projected in Thought ...... 26 Approaches Toward a Peacy Treaty 32 The C o v en a n t ...... 41

I I I . JAPANESE IMPERIALISM ...... 47

Problems in the Far E ast ...... 47 The Paris Peace Conference 54 The Washington C onference ...... 55 The Twenty-One D em ands ...... 59 The Chinese C iv il W a r ...... 50 The P o s itiv e P o l i c y ...... 51 Renunciation of War ...... 61 Japan in Manchuria and Mongolia ...... 63 The In cid en t o f September 16 ...... 65 The C hinese A ppeals ...... 67 The Assembly and the Lytton Report ...... 70 Japan Opts Out ...... 73

IV. GERMANY AND THE LEAGUE...... 75

Political Clauses for Europe ...... 76 Military Clauses ...... 08

i l The Subjective Frames of Reference , 97 The A n s c h l u s s * . 104

V. ITALY CHALLENGES THE LEAGUE ...... 113

The Corfu Incident 115 The Inter-crisis Period 131 Prelude to the Itallan-Ethiopian War 133 The I talc-Ethiopian War a . i ...... 146 The Hungarian Withdrawal ..a.**..'*..* 152 The S zen t-G otth ard I n c i d e n t ...... 153

IV, THE LATIN E X IT S ...... 164

F in an ces o r th e Monroe D octrine? *...*■* . * 165 The Quest for Status 167 A Case of Unequal Treatment » , . * , , • , . . < 174 The Economic Durden ■ 190 The I n e f f e c t iv e L e a g u e ...... 195 The F in a l L a tin E x i t s ...... 201

V II. THE SOVIET UNION IS EXPELLED...... 203

The Form ative Y ears 204 Political Disputations ...... 207 Functional Participation 213 Prospects of Soviet Membership ...... 216 Cautionary Participation 221 Soviet Membership in the League ...... 231 Membership Terminated 236

V III, THE INDONESIAN C A S E ...... 244

The Bandung Conference 247 Guided Democracy *»,,*, , 251 Problems of Alignment ,»». *>.*,<*,** 255 The New and Old F orces ,i*. »..*,<*>•* 260 "Crush Malaysia" and a W ithdrawal ...... 265 Cessation of Co-operation ».»*•«.<*,,« 276

IX, CONCLUSIONS...... 278

Political Motivations 230 Value Perceptions ...... »i» . 2 90 Failure of the League 303 Success of the United N ations ...... 310 General Operative Rules ...... 314

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 321

H i I

INTRODUCTION

The life of the League of Nations, a product of the inter national political situation in Europe for several centuries, was marred by a total of nineteen withdrawals, a ll but one of which was volu n ta ry .

The League was man '3 first real attempt at universal organi zation for peaceful purposes* The subject had been mentioned at various times but was considered too expansive to warrant any more than lip service. The historic decision to form the League filled the hearts and minds of many peoples with visions of a warless exis tence in the pursuit of life's goals* All 3igns indicated that man finally had reached that level of political sophistication at which ha would have control over his destiny and could shape the world to conform with the desires of the majority who desired peace*

The restoration of peace and tranquility after a devastating war, supposedly the last to be suffered by mankind, gradually was transformed from a political dream into a horrible nightmare too realistic to be confined to the realm of slumber.

The quest for stability, fortunately, did not die with the embers of peace on the second round (World War II). In spite of the difficulties faced by the previous universal organization, the League

1 of Nations, the world contained too great a number of leaders who considered it their destiny to shape a second universal organization that might re-kindle the spirit of friendly and peaceful political

Intercourse among the nation-states of the world* Their dreams have not received complete fulfilment but many rest with the pleasure of knowing that their product, while not perfect, has suffered only one rejection by a member* The Indonesian rejection, it must be admitted, can be debated as to whether it actually was a withdrawal, which will receive elaboration in this study*

Nature and Purpose

This study focuses upon the fundamental theoretical problem

□f assessing the political motivations of the various actors who with drew from the League of Nations and the single debatable withdrawal from the United Nations* The major conceptual problem w ill be tc determine the actual effect of the withdrawals upon each of the two universal organizations, and simultaneously assess the value of membership in universal organizations as perceived by the members, especially the departing members.

The empirical aspects of the analysis of the withdrawals from the League of Nations, including the forced withdrawal of the Soviet

Union, w ill include concentrations on the political, legal and social factors prevalent during existence of the League which inhibited the life expectancy of the League*

The study w ill be brought Into the contemporary context by analyzing the lone so-called withdrawal from the United Nations, In 3 this case, the domestic and immediate regional situations w ill be studied for clues involved in the decision-making process terminating with the decision to saver relations with the United Nations and its sponsored activities.

The combined theoretical-em pirical approach not only permits observations concerning the necessary political requisites for effective permanency of an international organisation but also pro vides insights of the easily reached political demarcations estab lished by the departing members, member's value perception of each organisation, the extent to which they are willing to sacrifice so- called national sovereignty in return for continued membership and the various interests of the members.

T h esis

The thesis developed in this study is that a universal organ ization must possess the capability of retaining its membership if it is to enjoy a respectable degree of international political life expectancy, No universal organization can suffer withdrawals beyond an u n sp e c ifie d a b so lu te minimum, hardly q u a n tifia b le , and expect to retain the respect and allegiance of the balance of the membership,

On the other hand, each nation-state, once it has accepted membership in the universal organization, must possess the capability of delicately balancing its national interests with the collective interests of the membership of the international organization. Each member must be certain of its strategic, long-range goals and must be sufficiently competent in evaluating the advantages of membership vis-a-vis tho so-called loss of sovereignty supposedly sacrificed as a result of active membership in that type of organization.

Collectively, the nation-states members must not be restricted

In their competitive pursuits of their individual national interests.

The competitive pursuits, however, must be followed without loss of consciousness of the objectives of the international organisation.

Stated in other words, each member has the responsibility of asses sing the value of membership in the international organization, the extent to which it has freedom of action and the demarcations and goals it must establish for itself so as not to impair the vitality, nor seriously damage the life expectancy of the universal internation al organization.

The inability of the universal organization to retain its membership, the inability of establishing self-imposed lim its beyond which the member w ill not proceed and/or the over-ambitious competi tive bilateral or multilateral pursuits of national interests will plare the universal organization in jeopardy until such time as a halt in loss of membership may be effected or a working equilibrium is regained in the dichotomy of interests between members, or member(s) and the organization.

Substantive Review of the Study

A brief introduction and review of the general developments in Europe leading to, and the actual formation of the league of

Nations provides a meaningful context, in Chapter II, For analyzing the topic. This chapter also contains a review of the constitutional provisions of the Covenant of the League pertaining to withdrawal and expulsion from that organization* The primary focus concentrates on the events leading to the First World War and the characteristics of the arrangements made that acted as an escape valve in event too massive problems were encountered by the members of the newly formed universal organization,

Chapter III revolves around a study of the problems faced in

Japanese-Chinese relations in which the Japanese preferred a political procedure detrimental to China and as exclusive of the League as pos sible without sanction of the League or alienation of partners to international agreements favorable to Japan.

The relationship of the principal defeated Power of the First

World War and its relationship with the League, adherence to the

Treaty of Versailles and its membership in the League form Chapter

IV, This chapter on Germany also includes a short examination of its relations with Austria, leading to the union of Austria with Germany*

Italy repeatedly challenged the League during its membership.

Its actions during the Corfu Incident, prior to and after invasion of

Ethiopia will receive attention In Chapter V, which also Includes the

Hungarian withdrawal, chiefly because of the close relationship be tween Italy and Hungary during the inter-war period.

The Latin American exits are included In Chapter VI, A case of confused financial problems or rejection of the Monroe Doctrine caused a withdrawal* A frustrated quest for status and a case of unequal treatment then are explored. Economic burdens proved too 6

g rea t and r e s u lte d in s e v e r a l w ithdraw als. Then came a case in which a member considered the League too ineffective and elected to leave the international organization. The chapter is terminated with a very brief discussion of the final two Latin withdrawals.

The League expelled the Soviet Union, the only case of this type in the history of universal organization, The participation of the Soviet Union receives attention in Chapter VII as well as the action of the League in the dismissal and the effects of the expulsion upon the expelled.

The study is brought into the contemporary context in Chapter

VIII when the writer analyzes the Indonesian case. This case, of necessity, includes a short discussion of the absence of any specific provisions in the Charter of the United Nations for voluntaiy with drawal from the United Nations and an examination of certain domes tic factors and circumstances which illuminate the predicament into which the Indonesian leader placed himself and from which he had little choice of action reserved for himself. The United Nations reaction has been the topic of many discussions with contradicting legalistic views which adds depth to this research.

The study is terminated in Chapter IX with a review of the problems faced relative to membership in universal organizations and the difficulties posed by the required correlation of national interests vls-a-vi3 other member's, or members' interests and the

Interests of the universal organization. The chapter also includes an examination of the League's failures and terminates with views on prospects for the future as far as the United Nations is concerned. II

THE LEAGUE IS FORMED

A study of the withdrawals from the League of Nations and the

United Hations must be initiated with a political recapitulation of

circumstances which led to the formation of the League of Nations,

man’s first real attempt at universal organisation in his efforts to

halt the bloody carnage that had plagued Europe for centuries, long

before creation of the nation-state system at the Treaty of West p h a lia in

The study of the atmosphere in the international political

market place of Europe during the centuries prior to formation of the

League of Nations is strange and gruesome, It pictures man, the so- called social being, or social animal, in a strange duality, It has him posed as a developer of mankind while simultaneously acting as a destroyer of himself and his fellow man* He was procreator and devel oper of life and yet he encouraged participation of that product of his own flesh and blood in contests of conquest on a field where death in combat supposedly symbolised the ultimate attainment of glory, a carryover from ancient Greek mythology.

The study of international relations during this dark period of history can best be described as a syndroms that characterized the political relationships in Europe and made quite remote the

7 possibility of success for the future League of Nations* The syn

drome contained a sizable number of signs and symptoms, lucid

dichotomies that contributed to the international political disease

infecting the Europe of the pre-League period. There are several

causes that may be listed which have a direct bearing on this study.

Acceptance of Warfare

The European land m ss of the pre-lG40 years, and centuries,

had been plagued by a number of ills , the worst of which was the fre

quent carnage suffered in many localities. Princes feuded and kept

the European mainland in virtually constant turmoil. Greed and vin

dictiveness turned Prince against Prince, in many cases the feuding

Princes were of the same blood and even of the same family. The sit

uation among these principalities had deteriorated to such an extent that the Church in Rome was farced to take steps to alleviate the

circumstances. Various attempts emanating from Rome had failed to

have any real effect, steps which included the Truce of God, declared

in 1027.^ Virtually all attempts, whether initiated by the Church in

Edward A. Walsh. The History and Nature of International Relations (hew York: The Hac^nilian Company, 19S2), pp. 76-77, Pre- vious attempts, including the threat of excommunication from the Catholic Church, had f a ile d to dampen th e a d v e n t u r is t ic s p i r i t o f th e fe u d in g Princes, Authority was delegated by the Pope to local bishops to ef fect the excommunication. Seeing less than satisfactory results, various synods of Europe met at intervals and the final result was a proclamation of a Truce of God in 1027. Having the Pope's blessing, this Truce of God amounted to what soma might call a three-day work week. All arms were to be set aside on Wednesday evening and battle could not be resumed until Monday morning. In spite of the Truce of God, brutality continued even though m ilitary action gradually abated* It might be added that the in itial version of the Truce of God revolved around the weekend only, fighting was allowed during the five g

Rome or any civ il authority resulted in failure and forced European humanity to look elsowhere for a solution»

A hoped-for solution supposedly came in 1648 when the Thirty

Tears1 War was terminated and a new concept was formulated at the

Treaty of Westphalia. The Treaty called for groupings of various principalities within acceptable territorial limits* Those groupings, commonly known as nation-states, were to bo governed by central auth orities in each case* Those central governments supposedly would have complete control over a ll residing within the territorial lim its in each case* This now nation-state concept hopefully would cure a ll the ills of the previous loose, almost anarchical Papal-guided system*

Papal control, however, would not be broken until a revolution rocked one of the greatest of the nation-states. It required over a century but it finally came In 179 9 with the French Revolution* The spell of

Rome was broken, but in being broken, it was not immediately elim inated, nor was it replaced by a system of peace and security, There just could not be peace If the old glorification of battlefield ex ploits were to be honored. Neither could there be hopes for peace if nation-states were to reserve to themselves the right to resort to violent action as an acceptable recourse to damages suffered, This being the case, which history proves is true, the nation-state system proved that it was not successful in eliminating war* It only suc ceeded in consolidating warfare, making it more vast in territorial days of the week proper* The Truca of God gradually was integrated into statutes and ordinances until 1257 when Saint Louis prohibited a ll private wars on French soil* 10

measurement, more savage in over-all results and much more difficult

to control when the central authorities had directed the decision-

making process in that direction*

It would be fallacious to state that Europe did not have the

opportunity to cure its internal ills , the cancer which continued to

grow and plague it* The somewhat informal Concert of Europe wa3

formed with the objective of periodic meetings, as required, or des

ired, during which various leaders would gather and discuss political

matters but only if not embarrassing to the more powerful members.

Voices o f the weaker members were heard, but only co u rteo u sly heard,

forgotten almost as soon as expressed. There was to be no infringe

ment upon the r ig h t s and d e s ir e s o f th e more pow erful members, members

who did not see it below their dignity to form new alliances without

previously serving notice that former agreements had to be terminated,

And in most instances, these powerful members retained exclusively

the right to resort to violence whenever such was deemed justified.

There was no accepted law sufficiently binding to force an approach

to the conference table in lieu of the arena of combat, no inter national law with sufficient force to preclude violent action.

International Law

International law, on the other hand, must not receive the full brunt of our wrath. Attempts had been made to force a recession in the violence of warfare* Although international law was not recognized as such we can trace its roots back to early Greece when

Fla to sought some sanity in the violent actions occurring between and 11 2 among various city-states of Greece, Amphictyonic councils also sought to establish rules of conduct, even though religiously based, to govern actions of the city-states, Rome accepted these practices during the days of the Roman Empire (31 B.C.-476 A.D.), when it resorted to the Collegium Fctiales, a College of Priests, a body charged with the responsibility of guiding Roman rulers on such serious matters as u warfare. Both Greece and Rome, incidentally, based their treaties

^Robert Maynard Hutchins, ed. Great Books of the Western World, Plato (Chicago* Encyclopaedia Britanhica, Inc,, 1952), pp. 640-52, Book I (Law s), P la to , born in to th e era o f warfare among Greek city-states, sought to lim it wars to those with "barbarians," or non-Greeks, He considered war among Greeks as 11 disease and d is cord," Plato went on to suggest that wars among Greeks, if unavoid able, should be fought with moderation, q A. E» R, Boak, "Great Interstate Association and the League of Rations," American Journal of International Law, XV (1921), p, 377, See a ls o Coleman P h illip so n , In te r n a tio n a l Law and Custom o f A ncient Greece and Rome ( London* The Macmillan Company, Ltd*, 1911), ch ap ~ XVII, and especially William Evans Darby, International Arbitration, International Tribunals (London: J, M. Dent £ Company, 19Q4\ p. 109. The Amphictyonies were chiefly concerned with protection of their places of worship, but gradually concentrated attention to rules of warfare among the city-states and especially protection of such vital needs as fresh water for the non-combatants, Destruction and/or inter ference with the sources or flow of clear water were considered just causa for warfare against the guilty party.

^V als)op. cit,, p, 62, See also Phillipson, o£^_cit_, tpp, 200-01, The Collegium F etia lo s was fu lly o p era tio n a l fo r an unknown period to the end of the rule of Roman kings In 549 B.C. The priests not only were required to act as advisors to their rulers but on many occasions they supposedly were required to act as representatives to non-Roman neighbors on s e n sitiv e m atters. In f a c t, th e p r ie s t , o r priests were required to perform self-desecration if he or they hap pened to commit an error that could adversely affect either side in the dispute, Phillipson attributes much of the success of the Roman Empire to the College of Priests, who, through their cool and calcu lated reasoning, took deliberate pains to guard against hasty action in a declaration of war. It is extremely difficult to establish the enact date when the College of Priests no longar was utilized by Roman rulers, They gradually were replaced by representatives desig nated by the Roman Senate, 12

upon a religiously-based pacta aunt servanda (treaties must be ob

served, as recognized In modern international law) under which the

Greeks and Romans of the Roman Empire feared the wrath of the gods

if they violated a treaty into which they had entered. The emphasis

in the Holy Roman Empire, of course, switched from the wrath of the

gods to God as the feared element.

It was not until the 17th century that any one person ex

pressed his views on warfare in anything resembling international

law as wo now know it* This period, as previously stated, was marked

with violence and Church attempts to control that violence. And once

again the Church came forward with one of its servants* In this case

it was a Spanish Jesuit who spoke out against indiscriminate action

by the rulers, Francisco Suarez, in 1612, sought to impress upon

his ruler the requirement for moderation when dealing with other

peoples. Suarez is noted not only for the fact that he expressed

his views to his ruler, but because he expressed them in such a way

as to give the impression that an international community of nations

existed in which the Spanish ruler was constrained and required to

seek, in mutual harmony with other rulers, a means by which a solu

tion could be reached, or, at minimum, the other party should be 5 allowed to display good w ill.

5 Janies Brown Scott, ed, The Classics of International Law (New Vork: Oceana Publishers, Inc,, 1964), Suarez* S^^^orTs^from Three Works, II, pp, 213-21, 22^27, 315-17, 831-32, Suarez con sid ered n atu ral law as b ein g d erived from God, I t was common to a l l men even though difference in ability to reason caused deviation in application. All men, including rulers, were obligated to treat mankind in consonance with natural law, a love-thy-nelghbor approach 13

In spite of attempts by Suarez to preclude impulsive resort

to violence, history books generally allude to Hugo Grotius as the

father of modern international law, much of this being based on the

fact that he directed some of his attention to peace,6 His is con

sidered the first concrete attempt to allocate some importance to peace* His emphasis remained concentrated heavily on war as the chief topic. It remained for Ralph Souche, writing in 1550, only

that should be extended to all, Suarez recognized warfare but only in a just cause, in retaliation for a wrong suffered. Ho man or ruler should wage war without a just cause, Suarez believed that "in a world as a whole, there must exist, in order that the various states may dwell in concord, some power for the punishment of injuries inflicted by one state upon another, , , the power in question must reside in the sovereign prince of the injured state, * , , 11 This, however, did not relieve the sovereign prince of a ll responsibility Iti declaring war against the offending state, He believed that the ruler of the offended state should select three judges, generals were acceptable, whose responsibility it would be to advise the ruler on the proper course of action, He did not rule out a conference attended by the offending ruler. In fact, he suggested that the moral obligation placed upon the three advisors was of such magnitude that wisdom could not be abandoned. Presence of the offending ruler might contribute tremendously toward a fully- reasoned judgment, Suarez also insinuated in these remarks that presence of the offending ruler in such a somber conference might well lead to a reconciliation and arbitration by means other than violent action.

6Hugo G rotiu s, Commentary o f th e Law o f P r iz e and Booty ( O xford t At the Clarendon Press, 1950j transT by Gwladys L, Williams), pp, 27-29, Grotius, in the Prolegomena, stated that; "Neither the state nor any citizen thereof shall seek to enforce his own right against another state or its citizen, save by judicial procedure." In this same Prolegomena, Grotius took vir tually the same stand as Suarez by stating that a person had a right to self-defense. In fact, Grotius used many sources previously quoted by Suarez, these sources being quoted on the page margins In each ca se, 1^

four years after Grotius, to downgrade warfare by elevating peace

7 to a position equal In status with that of war.

International law, however, proved inadequate in coping with

the international political situation, a fact as true today as in

former times, after creation of the nation-state system, Rulers of

Europe chose to accept the tenets of international law only if such

were beneficial to themselves. On the other hand, international law was discarded with no hesitation if it became a hindrance, There were no compulsory binding elements in International law* Violence could be selected freely as the solution to a grievance, real or imagined. What this a ll meant was that other means had to be sought to create and sustain more stability in international relations.

Functionalism

Although there have been many approaches to the study of international relations, there is one which certain political theor ists relish above others. These political scientists, especially those interested in international relations, w ill state that function alism contains a built-in factor which provides for a beneficial spill-over into the political sphere of activity. They believe that frequent contacts made in normal economic relations stimulates

^Scott, ed. Classics of International Law (Washington, B.C.; Carnegie Institute of Washington7 19H)i Exposition of Fecial Law and Procedure, or of Law Between Nations, and Questions Concerning the Same. Zouche, a noted British law professor and member of the High Court of the Admiralty prior to, and during Lord Cromwell’s era of influence in England, treated the entire subject of international law, placing equal emphasis on peace as on war and other legal topics. 15

Increasingly friendly relations in political intercourse.0 One can

find concrete examples of success in this approach, merely by check

ing history books. For instance, one such procedure, of a combined legal-econom ic-political nature, was the Law Merchant, an outcome of the lex mercatoria, a set of rules established to guido commercial

relations between Rome, during the Roman Empire, and its vassal holdings along the shores of the Mediterranean. This Law Merchant was

important chiefly because it dispensed immediate justice in the many

°David Mitrany, A forking Peace System (London; National Peace Council, 1946 j 4th ed,}, pp. 7, 9, 14, 40-13, 51, 63, Mitrany believes that nation-states can be brought together through areas of mutuality where common interests act as cohesive links involving the pragmatic development of special"purpose organisations, which "tend to evolve their own distinctive structural pattern, procedural sys tems, and areas of competence in accordance with the inherent require ments of their functional missions." In effect, he stresses a form ation of supranational authoritative universal institutions that would be of a political nature sufficiently capable of governing the world, The end result, he believes, would be an elimination, or at lea3t a prevention of war, Ha is vary explicit in his vision of the transfer of sovereignty from state to universal organizations, believing that it can be accomplished only through the curing of the many Ills suffered by mankind, such as poverty, illiteracy, discrimination, social injustice, health problems and insecurity caused by economic distress. Solution of economic problems would lead to a resolution of political problems, in his view, Mitrany1 s views are debated by other theorists. □ Arthur Nussbaum, A Concise History of the Law of Nations (Mew Yorks The Macmillan Company, 1958)7 PP* 297 75T I 37* See a ls o Theodore F, T, Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law (Boston) L i t t l e , Brown and Company, 1 9 5 6 ), 5th e d ., pp. 663-55, Courts in England ware based on common law as applied to mercantile relations. These operated quite effectively during the 14th to 17th centuries in England. Thereafter they became targets of attack by the common law jurists. The idea expanded from England to the continent and was known for its rapid consideration of charges, decisions and collec tions of fines imposed, The courts were composed of merchants, not legally qualified, who wore interested in, and acted in the interests of commerce. Periodic elections were held at various commercial cen ters and foreign merchants in the area during the elections were allowed to vote, Tha courts gradually were absorbed into the legal systems of the various nation-states involved, 1G courts located In the various mercantile centers of Europe during

the 12th to the 19th centuries. The rapid dispensation of Justice left virtually no time for political repercussions to develop.

While the Law Merchant solved many problems, other problems were developing as a result of industrial development.

The Industrial Revolution

The Industrial Revolution stimulated research and technology.

The American experience demonstrated that tliose countries possessing the technological capability could advance by tremendous paces* The welfare of mankind could be improved and his future prospects brigh tened to such an extent that tha results could prove well worth the expense involved.

The Industrial Revolution was late in coming to Europe, having arrived toward the middle of the lBth century# The old estab lished modes of production were reliable and the conservative ment a lity of tha Europeans dictated that a wait-and-see approach should bo the order of the day, When it finally was ascertained that the

American experience was showing signs of success, the British decided that it perhaps could work In Great Britain. Continental Europe,

however, was a pace or two behind and proof of success in England was required before France would take the necessary steps to engage

Itself in the new industrial effort. The French venture signaled the possibility of success elsewhere on the Continent, particularly in Germany, and thus began the race for industrial status. 17

The coining of the Industrial Revolution in Europe indicated a great need for expanded industry to help improve the welfare of

European mankind, The old economic system no longer was adequate to handle the new requirements for what was then considered exotic pro ducts that served to make life more pleasant and enjoyable. The industrializing countries of Europe also fully realized that the

European markets were limited in scope, chiefly because of the dupli cation of effort in the economic sphere. No coordinated plans had been established and, as a result, each tried to manufacture the same products, thereby eliminating a coordinated European-wide market place for the manufactured goods, Industry grew with such rapidity that the European countries had to look elsewhere for expanded markets for the expanded industrial effort, The new era was here and tha indus t r i a l community o f Europe had to expand to meet th e demandG,

The search for new markets and sources of raw materials be yond the continental lim its of Europe introduced a new factor. The industrializing countries had to protect their overseas markets and sources of raw materials required in the manufacturing process. The result, more so for Groat Britain and France than for Germany, was a rush into colonialism, which then instigated wider competition,10

10V. I, Lenin, Imperialism, The Highest Stage of Capitalism (New York: International Publishers, 1939), Chap. VI7 See also Raymond Aron, Feaca and War (New York: Doubleday E Company, Inc,, 1950), p, 274, The competition was by no means of the intensity envisioned by Lenin, who believed that conflict between the industrializing countries was inevitable. It is possible that Lenin’s view may have alerted the industrializing countries of the danger he predicted, Aron challenges Lenin by stating that monopolistic exclusion was rare even during the phase of expansion and rising prices* 18

The national interests of each country dictated that each had to be

first in prospective areas and had to employ whatever means of pro

tective measures required to insure success in each prospective area,

Military forces were enlarged in the process of expansion of these

important areas, and associated problems developed.

The duplication of effort in the industrial field also meant

that each country had to devise methods of protecting its factories and industries on the national level. Ho common denominator could be e s ta b lis h e d among th ese c o u n tr ie s . The r e s u lt was a s c r ie s o f com petitive tariff barriers and other measures inhibiting positive aspects of functionalism. The gates were being closed to interna tional intercourse on the international level and the little that was carried on was performed on a strictly formal basis, almost completely devoid of warmth and friendship. Conflicts of interest nearly com pletely obliterated possibilities of normal economic and political relationships between the various countries. And the military grew in strength.

The Balance of Power Concept

The increased military might of various industrialized countries of Europe gradually led to a balance of power doctrine,

Military power became the watch word for these countries of Europe,

But the balance of power doctrine frequently deteriorated and a desire for a preponderance of, and predominance of power filtered

into the minds of the leaders concerned, Tha realities of power in sufficient abundance began to suggest realpolitik, which is exactly IS

what happened in Germany, especially during the reign of Bismarck,

who proved himself a master at Imposing his w ill upon others in an

effort aimed at placing Germany in an enviable, and a feared position

in Europe. The belief in Teutonic superiority was coupled with a

sufficient predominance of m ilitary power to enable Bismarck to suc

cessfully utilize his covert political offensive against all of the

European powers of that period, even Austria and Italy, his partners

in tha Triple Alliance.^

The Triple alliance provided an awesome amount of potential

power in Europe and caused much concern to other actors, especially

Prance, and particularly after it (and England) had awakened to real

ity in Europe after Russia's loss to Japan in the Russo-Japanese Jar

in 1904. Germany, then being m ilitarily strong, possessing bold

leadership, while not being ad absorbed as France and England in

foreign colonial efforts, could resort to ideology (the superiority of the German people) and power in the practice of realpolitik, which also encouraged another approach.

The teachings of Nicolo Itach lave 111 in the later 15th and early 16th centuries had become an accepted, and indeed a welcome and respected method of dealing with other political actors in the inter national sphere, Bismarck proved that it was not below his dignity to resort to implementation of such devious methods as political duplicity

^Sidney Bradshaw Fay, The Origins of the World War (Kaw Yorks The Macmillan Con^any, 1928), I, pp, 2bt 34f, BOff, 105, llO f, llaff, 132, 13Bff, 215ff, 448ff, 20

in his desire to place Germany in the exalted position. He succeeded

in forcing Italy to sever its former cordial relations with France.^

Bismarck also used his talents on the Russian Czar Alexander III

during the early years of the 1890 decade. In the resulting league

of tha Three Emperors, Bismarck, Franz Joseph of Austria and Alexander

agreed to the Reinsurance Treaty which required the other two of the

Emperors to maintain a benevolent neutrality if any third of the three

waged a war a g a in st a fo u rth pow er, e s p e c ia lly F r a n c e ,^ T h is, in

effect, meant that Russia was committed to the Triple Alliance, even

though Russia and Austria both were competitively interested in the

Balkans, Bismarck continued to plant his seeds of mutual suspicion

in the relationship between Russia and Austria, thereby keeping both

off balance while simultaneously allowing the German ruler to contrive

against France, Only after a decade or more of such duplicity did

Czar Alexander finally visualize how great a role he had been duped

into in Bismarck's Pavlovian manipulative exercise. By that time the

German dream of predominance and position had become a reality.

The Hague Conferences

Czar Alexander, having finally realized that Russian relations

with Germany had been virtually completely in Germany's favor, and had placed Germany in the exalted position in Europe, then decided to seek a conference of various political leaders, a conference somewhat

similar to the informal meetings held during the nebulous Concert of

^Loc. cit, 13Ibid, , pp, 53-BO, 21

Europe system* The first of two such conferences was hold at The

Hague in 1899,14

One of the chief topics on Alexander1□ agenda was a lim ita

tion of armaments over a three-year period* He later agreed to a

five-year period* In both cases the First Committee involved in

debating the subject suggested that the goal desired would inpose too 15 great a burden upon the leading powers* The only concrete result of the conference was an agreement to form a permanent court of arbitration for the pacific settlement of international disputes, to bo located at The Hague, under the title , Permanent Court of Arbitra tion, to which the disputants could turn for assistance whenever desired,^®

Alexander, s till concerned about the Russian position in world affairs, suggested a second meeting at The Hague, This occurred

in 1907, Although most of the leading powers of Europe hoped for a continuation of the armaments debate, they wore unpleasantly surprised to find that the Czar refused to consider such a topic for the agenda.

^**lbid., p, 3N7, See also Carnegie Endowment for Inter national Peace, The Proceedings of the Hague Peace Conferences (Hew Yorki Oxford University Press, 1920}, The Conference of 1099, p* 9, The relative importance attached to Alexanders invitation can be appreciated from the fact that a total of twenty-six countries of the world were represented at the Conference, such as the Governments of Germany, the United States of America, Austria-Hungary, Belgium, China, Denmark, Spain, France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, Greece, Italy, Japan, Luxemburg, Maxico, Montenegro, the Netherlands, Persia, Portugal, Roumania, Russia, Serbia, Siam, Sweden and Norway, Switzerland, Turkey and Bulgaria*

15Ibid*, pp. 90, 305-OS, 315. 16Ibid., pp. 234-V6, 22

In fact | the opposite was to become a part of the discussions, The

Czar repeatedly was concerned with the degree of latitude that Russia could enjoy In converting vessels being used for commercial purposes 17 to combat use. He also was overly concerned In land and sea warfare,

Much as Alexander was concerned with the strength of Germany and the Russian position in world affairs, there was a second reason for calling the second meeting at The Hague, All the rulers of Europe were becoming aware of the weakness of Turkey, Turkey had been a power in the Balkan area for decades, Its prominence gradually had deteriorated. If Alexander was to enhance the Russian position in the Balkans, hi 3 immediate task had to revolve around strengthening

17 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, The Proceed ings of the Hague Peace Conferences (Hew Torkt Oxford UrTivarvsTty Press, 1920), The Conference of 1307, II, pp, 1120-21, 1133, See also British Documents on the Origin of the War, 1699-1914 (London 1 H.M, Stationary Office, 1932), VIII, Arbitration and Neutrality and Security, pp. 199, 221-25, 223, 230, 23B-39, 271, 273, 2GB-B9, 295- 97, 2 99-300, 303, 562, 575, The agenda proposed by the Czar in cluded topics such as "Improvements . . . respecting the pacific settlement of disputes,11 "additions • , , to the Convention of 1399 respecting the Laws and Practices of Land Warfare," "elaboration , ■ , respecting the Laws and Practice of Haval Warfare," This last included special naval warfare, transformation of commercial vessels into war ships, private property of belligerents at sea, passage of commercial vessels after the outbreak of hostilities and the rights and duties of neutrals at sea. The Czar also desired that these topics be adjusted where relative to Include practice in land warfare, The British representative suggested that armaments be discussed, It had the sympathy of other representatives but not the Soviet represen tative who, by diplomatic protocol, had the initiative in selecting the topics for the agenda, tost of the items proposed by the Russian Government were included in the final protocols, These clearly indicated that the countries represented were resigned to the fact that war was evident and due in the course of time. £3 the Russian military for an eventual march against Turkey and possibly against Austria-Hungary, which also was groatly interested in the 18 Balkan situation. Warfare still being an accepted means for satis fying political desires, required a military strength as equal or nearly as equal as other powers on the world scene, which Russia did not possess.

A third reason for Alexander's action in calling the conference in 1907 rested in the fact that both France and England had considered

Russia too unreliable as a member of a military alliance. Russia had been defeated by Japan, a country vastly sinaller than Russia* The humiliation of defeat had alerted France and Britain to tha weakness of Russia* The defeat also had alerted the Czar of the requirement of regaining the confidence of England and France, One method open to him without overtly alarming the other powers, and especially the

Triple Alliance powers, was through the legal channels of the second con feren ce a t The Hague* This con feren ce h o p e fu lly would servo not only as a vehicle for bolstering the Russian position in tho French and

British political approach to alliance with Russia, but also could be used to enhance Russia’s chances in the Balkans where it already had 19 its agents at work.

^ British Documents on the Origin of tha War, 1899-191»+. p, 300* The Russians sought British backing at the Conference of 1907 for Russian demands for indemnities against the Japanese as a result of the Russo- Japanese War of 19C+.

^Ibid*, p* 299* The Russian foreign minister confirmed what the B r itis h had known fo r some tim e . Although th e R ussian fo r e ig n m in iste r admitted to the presence of Russian agents in the Balkans, the Russian foreign minister would not divulge any further information concerning those agents, Vfar and tha Quilt Complex

While England and Prance were busy looking outward for new markets and raw m aterials, the situation had been worsening, which they realized but at too late a date to resolve the situation. The political situation was beyond control and war finally came.

The coming of the First World War was accompanied by attempts, in 191h, on the part of several leaders to purge themselves of a ll 20 blame for the war* Various books, designated by color, were rapidly and hastily published in serialized form, the total number varying with each of the main European actors involved. The British Blue Book was considered the mo3t accurate, but the others contained many in a c c u r a c ie s and in some c a s e s f a ls e docum ents. Some o f th e s e books were republished by new numbers, quite extensive in the case of the

French Yellow Book, an effort which lasted well into the inter-war p e r io d .

Various historians, undoubtedly fascinated by the attempts made by the various actors to purge themselves of guilt, have studied the events leading to the First Vforld War, Several have concluded

2°Great Britain* Foreign Office. Collected Diplomatic Documents Relating to the Outbreak of the European War (London> H,M, Stationary Office, 1915), pp. 124-25, 29S-97, 370-73,404-07, See also British Documents on the Origin of the War, IS99-1914, pp. 3-13, 22-23, 36—M-S, 444-45, See pp. 3-13 of the second document noted above for the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia, This ultimatum violated one of the most important rules of diplomacy in that it was so severe that it left virtually no choice to Serbia but to resist the Austrian demand or capitulatQ, The British efforts to secuns an Austrian modification of its stand (pp, 22-23, 36-45, and 40-49 of the second document noted) were unsuccessful, 25 that no European power really wanted war* Though none wanted war, a l l had to share some g u il t due to circu m stan ces and a t t it u d e s . The inability to coma to terms with other governments, the greed assoc iated with nearly a ll governments, the desire to exert imposing influence upon other governments, treachery in politics and the antag onistic alliances of the European continent all combined to bring into existence that war, These historians also agreed that the degree of 21 guilt in each of these related fields varied among these governments.

The most important point to bear in mind here, however, is the fact that many of these factors mentioned would be repeated by the same and/or different actors at a later period of history.

The Secret Treaty of London

One other event of importance occurred during the war years*

This occurred in 1915 when France, Great Britain and Russia succeeded in breaking Italy away from the Triple Alliance and enlisting its aid in th e f ig h t a g a in st Germany and Austria-Hungary* Though t h is tr e a ty , commonly known as the Secret Treaty of London, seemingly promised much to Italy, it would prove to be quite embarrassing to Italy, 22 France and Great Britain for at least two decades coming* It would

^Luigi Albertini. The Origins of tha War of 1914 (London: Oxford University Press, 1952), Preface* See"also Fay, op* c lt,, II Chap* 12, Both authors provided a relatively objective analysis of tha causes of the First World War,

^U.S. Department of State* Foreign Relations of the United States (tfashington, D,C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1917), I, suppl* 2, pp, 495-500. The treaty, signed in April, 1915, is officially known as the Treaty Between Italy, France, Great Britain and Russia, It frequently is called the Secret Treaty of London, Several of the sixteen articles of the treaty enumerate the gains to 26

bo embarrassing to each of tha three during the peace discussion

terminating tho First World War( It also would cause considerable

embarrassment during the middle of the 1930 decade, which w ill be

discussed later*

The Future, Projected in Thought

The war years period also was noted for a trend tliat began

taking shape midway through the war and gradually gained momentum

a s th e war became more d ev a sta tin g and l o s s e s began t o mount and a s

the possibility of a stalemate matured* Thoughts were turning toward

formation and development of an International organization which, if

formed, might, with sufficient interest and membership, preclude

recurrence of what mankind was suffering on the fields of France*

The general trend in itially was toward an international organization

of limited size* The development of the thought, however, gradually

drifted toward a more expansive type, with as great a membership as

p o ssib le *

be enjoyed by Italy at the future peace conference. France, Great Britain and Russia promised Italy the province of Trentino, all of the southern Tyrol up to the Brenner, Trieste, counties of Gorizia and Gradisca, most of the I stria and several Adriatic islands, Dalmatia and several Dalmatian Islands were to be ceded to Italy* Italy also was to be given full control of the foreign affairs of A lbania when A lb an ia became an independent s ta te * I t a l y was to receive portions of Turkey which, by the treaty, would allow Italy to exert some influence In the Mediterranean political balance of power* Italy was to receive all rights and privileges in Libya* Italy then would be given full rights to claim portions of Eritria and Somaliland as compensation from Germany in German held colonies, if France and England also sought such compensations from Germany* Final portions of the treaty dealt with leas important concessions in the Mid-east and a loan from England to help finance Italy’s participation in the war, 27

Although thoughts wore being focused on an international

organisation it was not until 191B that concrete suggestions were

offered. These are interesting because they demonstrate the trends

of thought that wore current during the early stages leading to the

formation of the League of Nations, They also are interesting when

viewed from tho fact that some of the opinions expressed and sugges

tions made in that period of history later would be either completely

bypassed or violated by either the suggesting participants or by one

or more members and non-members of the League.

One of the earliest suggestions offered was the Phillimore 23 Plan, named after its sponsor, Lord Phillimore, This plan called

for a convention to form a League of Nations, Among the eighteen

proposed articles was one (Article 2) which would have directed the

League to consider a ll members at war with any member which might

break the covenant by attacking another member. An interesting element of the Phillimore Plan (Article 6 ) was the suggestion that

th e proposed body convene when req u ested by a member. In r e a li t y t h is

suggested that the proposed body be a revived Concert of Europe, but

with more formality and with threat of retaliation on a large scale,

C olonel Edward M. House, Woodrow W ilson 's a d v iso r , then

suggested an assembly of representatives that would meet when war

was rumored or threatened, or when any power informed the delegates

^3Havid Hunter Hiller. The Drafting of the Covenant (How Yorki G» P, Putnam's Sons, 1928)V IIV PP» 3-6, The Phillimore Plan was made public in March, 1918, n(i that a medting in the interest of peace was advisable. The House

proposal also called for an international court to discuss not only

topics concerning peace but commerce as wall, Article 15 was unique

since it called for a complete blockade of atiy power that might de

clare war on another power without having first submitted the dispute

to the international court proposed in his Article 10. It might be

noted here that this stipulation certainly did not conform with those

accepted standards of international law which left the prerogative

of dealing with a nation-state at war up to Individual members of the

in te r n a tio n a l community not a t war w ith e it h e r or any marchers a t

war. One other point should bo mentioned here. Tha House recommenda

tion against secret treaties appears as the initial introduction of

what was destined to become one of Wilson's Fourteen Points, 25 President Wilson then submitted his first of four drafts,

Wilson's first draft was unique in several aspects. Article 2 called

for regular meetings at the seat of government of a country to be

agreed upon, Hon-scheduled meetings could be held, however, and if

held, these could be held on a very temporary basis at the seat of government of one of the members. His Article S would have required that all disputes be submitted to three arbitrators for resolution,

Tha draft was somewhat similar to the House draft requiring a

2l*Ibid. t pp, 7-11

25Forelgn Relations of the United States, Paris Peace Con ference, 1919," I , pp, h97-501, Other drafts submitted by Wilson contained changes but add little to this study and are excluded. 2 9 complete blockade of a power having declared war without having sub mitted the dispute to the board of arbitrators,

David Hunter H iller then sent a length/ suggestion to

Colonel house, hie draft suggested an Association of Nations and was the first to suggest Ambassadors and Ministers as representatives.

Although K iller also suggested meetings at the seat of government of an a greed-to member* he also raised the question of what should be done if that country selected as the meeting place should happen to be an offending party in a dispute. In fact* H iller ' 3 plan was composed of a sizable number of questions which required answers. Miller also attached a tentative draft concerning open diplomacy, A second draft dealt exclusively with trade conditions. It might be noted here that

Hiller's was the only plan calling for an Association of Nations,

Other official correspondence to and from Wilson's advisors and to and from the Secretary of State contained the term League of Nations, which denotes a more solid organization than an association.

General Jan C, Smuts, the South African soldier and statesman, 27 offered a plan in December, 1510, The Smuts Plan was a lucid ex ample of tha g r e a t knowledge ha had of world affairs. His keen in sight was evident in the reasoning offered in substantiation of each suggestion, which included such Ideas as self-determination, protection

^sIbid. , pp, 5Q1-05, H iller's draft was forwarded to House on November- 30, 1918,

27I b id ,, pp, 5 0 5 -1 1 . 30 to be offered by the League of Nations to non-govemed territories and peoples, an effective reduction of armaments and m ilitary forces and the composition of the League*

In spite of the soundness of his proposition, thore were several fallacies in his plan* It contained no concrete guarantee of peace* On the othar hand, it would be oriented toward war- power,

Although Smuts suggested self-determination, he was less than complimentary toward the Pacific and African colonies under German control* These ware considered barbarian with people he believed in capable of governing themselves, Nor did ha consider them capable of becoming self-determinate in the sense of the Europeans*

Smuts also had an aversion to Austria, Russia and Turkey, which ho considered decomposed with p olitically incompetent people*

The four Allied powers, with Japan and an expected stable democratic

Germany, he believed, had to consider themselves responsible for these states for the time being* History, with such great names as Kemal,

Lenin and Masaryk, would prove Smuts erroneous,

Italy also had specific and very interesting offerings to make during the formal discussion on the drafting of the Covenant,

Section III of the "Draft Scheme for the Constitution of the Society o f N a tio n s , 11 the most outstanding component of the Italian proposal, for the purpose of this study, was composed of four articles and 31 20 dealt with sanctions. Article 29 was the most outstanding, being

g o forceful In Its composition that a state suffering the full

treatment would have had to capitulate Its International political

standing or suffer prolonged agony until its political demise as a

2 9 n a tio n - 3 tate, Italy, in 1923 and 1935, should have considered

Miller, op. clt., pp. 252-54. Article 27 suggested that the Council warn the offending State to conform with an obligatory deci sion of the Conference (suggested for resolution of disputes) or the Council (Article 17) or of tha International Court of Justice, with a prescribed period for compliance possible. Article 28 would have left It to the Council to decide what measures would be taken against the offending 3tate.

^Ibid. The seriousness of the Italian draft Article 29 is considered of such vast magnitude that it warrants a fu ll quote. The elements were; (a.) Rupture of diplomatic relations with the recalcitrant State. (b ,) Withdrawal of the exequator conceded to the recalcitrant State's consular agents. (c.) Suspension of the treaty rights of the recalcitrant State. (d.) Imposition of a pecuniary indemnity or other form of fine on the recalcitrant State. (e.) Sequestration of property, whether real or otherwise, of the recalcitrant State, situated or being in the territories of the States loyal to the Convention, and the refusal of a ll credits to the Former, (f.) Police supervision or expulsion of the subjects of the re calcitrant State, Prohibition to the same to enter Into or to take up their residence within the territories of the loyal States, Restric tion on the economic and legal rights of the same. {g,) Closing of ports to the ships of the recalcitrant State, and the withholding from the latter of raw materials and other necessaries. (h.) Prohibition of a ll official quotations of the Government stocks of the recalcitrant State. (I.) Economic and commercial boycott, partial or total. (j.) Embargo on all ships or cargoes belonging to the recalcitrant State or its subjects^ and on goods destined for the said State in the ports and territorial waters of the loyal States. (k.) Blockade of the recalcitrant State by the naval forces at disposal of the Council, (1.) Exclusion of the recalcitrant State from the Society of Nations, (m,) Joint war on the recalcitrant State by a ll the loyal members of the Society of Nations, The article went on to state that the Council should have the authority to take any measures beyond those mentioned to overcome the resistance of the recalcitrant State, The seriousness of the recom mendation, if adopted, is apparent. 32

i t s e l f mo3 t fortunate that its suggestions had not been accepted

and enforced in their entirety.

There were other offerings, but each was repetitious , to a

certain extent, to what had previously been offered. What was more

important, especially for this study, were the approaches taken toward

peace. These approaches, prior to cessation of hostilities, upon

termination of the war and during the period when the various views

pertinent to the formation of an international organization were

being discussed, gave evidence of what the main actors expected of

the future and unsuspectingly forecast the future of an international

organization and the international political situation,

Approaches Toward a Peace Treaty

The French, having suffered the most in material destruction and damage to their society, naturally sought a political, military and economic settlement of the war on a most favorable basis for 30 France, They s tr e sse d p o l i t i c a l p e n a ltie s a g a in st Germany to such an extent that Germany never again would dare upset the political

stability of Europe once it was again attained* France wanted political guarantees inserted into the peace treaty which would in hibit any future German aggression in Europe* This could be accom plished through a thoroughly disarmed Germany, an occupied Germany and a demilitarized zone of Germany along its western borders with

France and its smaller neighbors to the north of France,

^°Etionne Hantoux, The Carthaginian Feaco (tfow York: Charles Scribner's Sona, 1952), pp, 20-21, 33

Tha French also felt that certain military protective measures

wore required ae safeguards against Germany* They were not greatly

concerned with the German eastern front, chiefly because the Soviet

Union presented a formidable front against Germany, or would as soon

as internal political matters were resolved in the Soviet Union* On

the other hand, the French feared future German action if tha western

sector ware not secured through alliances* These alliances, however,

would bo powerless if not backed with the military might of Great 31 Britain and especially the United States.

In an effort to regain its economic composure, Franco sought

heavy reparations from Germany. Those would be used to rebuild its

industry and to restore its domestic life to as close to the pre-war

l e v e l a 3 possible, taking circumstances into consideration, of

c o u r se .

In both the political and economic spheres France would meet

with mined reactions* It bad tha sympathy of Italy but only because

Italy had its own claims and would need support. The British were

sp lit, which w ill be discussed later, and Woodrow Wilson was generally

sympathetic toward the French while suggesting French restraint for

the present.

The Italian representatives took an approach somewhat sim ilar

to the French, They sought political stability In Europe and would

submit an elaborate plan for a Society of Nations, Where they differed

31 Arnold Wolferc, Britain and France Between Two Wars (Hew York: W, W, Horton £ Company, Inc, ,~~1966), pp, 16-17* with the French, however, was in the proposed approach to the rule of

law* Whereas the French would have the present laws interpreted to

meet the occasion, the Italians would have an international court of In justice revise the laws at w ill, as it saw fit under the circumstances.

The Italians also had other motives, political but also terri

torial in nature* They had been promised much territory in the Secret

Treaty of London and the time was considered appropriate to collect

what was considered Italy's just compensation and reward . 33 These

Italian claims were considered quite exaggerated by Woodrow Wilson, especially when viewed from the small contribution made by Italy during the war, Wilson also was opposed on moral grounds. He actually attached little validity to secret treaties, regardless of who made r them, and went so far as to include this interpretation as one of his

Fourteen Points,

The Italian delegation was not to be denied* It was not con vinced and continued its demands for the territories It had been

'“ Alfred Zimmern, The League of Hat ions and the Rule of Law, 1913-1935 (London: Macmillan and Company, L td ., 1 9 4 5 ), pp. 259-59, 33 See Supra, footnote 23, and Foreign Relations of the United States, Paris Peace Conference, 1919, I, pp. 64, 421, 424-31, 443, 447- 48, 452-55, 462-63, 466-70, 466; II, pp* 80* 90; VI, pp, 102, 106-07, 759-61; IX, pp* 860, 922* 923, 935, 939-40, 1009-10, 1012, 1016,

^Foreign Relations of the United States, Paris Peace Confer ence, 1919, I, p* 130; V, pp, 34-89* 93-94, 96-101, 106, 10B-09, 135-36, 149-50, 202-03, 211*12, 214* 216-22, 354, 411, 427-28, 431-33* 456, 482, 579-81, 565, 709-11, 750-59; VI* pp. 48-52, 79-79, 90-92, 210-15, 244-45, 733-39, 759* Hot only did Wilson believe Italy’s claim disproportionate to its contribution, but he stated that the Italian dasire would have to conform with the general interest during the peace conference* 35 35 promised* So groat was the clamor for reward during the peace con ferences and discussion of the Covenant that Wilson became too pertur bed and refused to associate himself with the Italian delegation* So strong we re his feelings toward the Italian delegation that he took the unprecedented step of appealing directly to the Italian people.

The Italian representatives* Vittorio Orlando and Sydney Sonnino, met with little success, especially after David Lloyd George and

Georges Clemanceau suggested that Italy awaken itself to reality*

The German proposal for a League of Hat ions, submitted on May

9, 1919,3^ with an obligatory settlement of International differences and a ban on secret treaties as two important elements, was followed closely by German observations on the responsibility for the war just co m p leted , 30

3 5Ibid,, I, pp. 64-65, 337-30, 417, 419-31, 431-50, 452-56, 459- 62, 467-69, 471-87; V, pp, 64, 80-101, 106-09, 135-37, 149-51, 154, 2 0 2- OS, 210-27, 291, 353-54, 407-14, 426-36, 451-59, 465, 569, 482, 567-61, 505, 621, 707, 709-11, 756, 650-59, 769-70; VI, pp. 28-30, 47-53, 78- 82, 90-92, 102, 105-06, 210-17, 234, 240, 242, 244-45, 249-51, 264-65, 272, 295, 472, 485T06, 701, 707, 714, 738-39, 759-62; IX, pp. 75-77, 119, 237, 394, 431-33, 440-41, 529, 83Q, 841-47, 059-62, 921-24, 934- 35, 930-40, 943-51, 982, 999-1002, 1009-17; XI, pp. 55, 1B5, 423, 663* This Is an indication of the Italian persistence*

3 6Ibid,, VI, pp. 150, 203, 222-27, 407-08. Joint Clemsnceau, Lloyd George and Wilson Statements are contained in this same volume, pp* 240, 244-45, 249-51, 264-65, 272, Clemenceau also expressed his opinions in V, pp. 90-91, 136, 212-16, 224, 453-54, 580; VI, pp, 28-29, 47, 52-53, 214, 272, 714, 738* In addition, Lloyd George expressed singular opinions toward Italy’s claims in V, pp* 91-94, 98-100, 106, 108-09, 135-37, 149, 202, 212-22, 224, 354, 430-34, 452-53, 469, 580-81, 707, 710, 756, 759, 769-70; VI, pp. 70-00, 211-15, 245, 738-39. Wilson, after taking the unprecedented step of appealing to the Italian people, had the satisfaction of experiencing a gradual abatement of the Italian claims*

3 7Ibid., VI, pp. 765-80. 38Ibid,, pp. 781-94. 35

The Germans, with an arrogance untarnished by defeat* and

s till influenced by their belief in Teutonic superiority, challenged

the merit of the successful A llies 1 investigation of the question

of the responsibility for the outbreak of the war, chiefly because

they felt that the Allies had been a party to the war and were subject

to partiality. The balance of the German challenge sought to absolve

both Gar many and Austria of responsibility. The real perpetrators,

according to the Germans, was the Russian government which had decided

to mobilize its troops. This, they argued, served to vitiate any

German attempts at resolution of the Austrian-Serbian crisis, chiefly

because of the Austrian sense of insecurity and fear of a possible

joint Russian-Serbian action against Austria, which considered itself

incapable of repulsing simultaneous multi-directional attacks by

R ussia and S e r b ia , The Gormans, se n sin g A u stria rs predicam ent, had no choice but to side with the Austrian 3 , according to the German dispatch to tho Peace Conference*

The Russian mobilization also had a second more direct effect

upon Germany, The Germans suddenly found them selves fa c e d w ith the danger of a war on two fronts, caused by the simultaneous mobiliza tions of Russian troops on the eastern front and French troops being

m o b ilized in France on th e w estern fr o n t o f Germany, T his supposedly

left no choice to tha Germans but to preempt an attack In self defense.

The simultaneous mobilizations also signified the requirement for

Germany of fully supporting Austria in its dispute with Serbia, which the Germans felt would enjoy the support of the Russian government,

long noted for its interest in the Balkans, 37

A sacond fascinating point, beyond tha repulsive German a tti tude previously mentioned, is noticeable In the German observations just described. This point, more implied that explicit, Involves almost a confession that German politics and international relations perhaps were not what they should have boon. The German Chancellor in o f f ic e in 191*1, accord in g to th e German o b se rv a tio n s, had made an honest effort to rectify the German political conditions of the immediate pre-war period. This, in effect, amounted to a direct allocation of guilt to Bismarckian duplicity and realpolitik in a truly pejorative sense,

The German delegation then submitted its observations of the 39 con d ition s o f p ea ce. The Germans ch a llen g ed th e peace tr e a ty r e quirements calling for the coding of territories to Poland, Belgium and Franca, This, they felt, was in contradiction to the Wilsonian concept of self-determination, Basing their views on irredentism, the Germans argued that tha parcels of land Involved wore German in residential majority. While they could accept reparations of coal to

France, thoy felt that the requirement of turning over the Saar, and especially the German residents of that coal-mining region, was excessive punishment. The Germans declared themselves prepared to disarm, make reparations and fu lfil other portions of the treaty requirements, but they believed justice, a more equitable type than they envisioned in the treaty being discussed, should be the basis for the final traaty,

39Ibld., m i , pp, 39-U4, 36

The German a tt itu d e once again was obviou s In I t s approach.

They offered to negotiate on the basis of the Covenant being discussed, but on the condition that Germany be admitted to the League with rights equal to other powers Immediately upon German acceptance of the treaty.

The Allied and Associated Powers wasted little time in reply ing to the Germans , 140 They informed the Gorman delegation that there never had been any intent to preclude indefinitely membership to any

S t a t e , Yet th er e were c e r ta in p o in ts th a t th e Germans had to remem ber, Tha Germans had violated ethical standards of international relations by fermenting instability in Europe and, when achieved, decided to attack neighboring States even though, in the case of

Belgium, the German government was in fact one of the guarantors of

Belgian neutrality, Germany, furthermore, could not expect reaction to be anything but justice. All that was required was a sober, ob jective re-Bvaluation of the ruthless savagery perpetrated by Germany against mankind in general. Though not delighted with the response, the Germans realized that their past actions had not been conducive to international friendship.

We can now discuss the British views on peace and the proposed

League of Nations. The British, because of the insularity they en joyed, took a view toward peace treaties in general, and not only the

Versailles Peace Treaty, which was dissimilar to that of the French,

Whereas the French sought an unquestioned preponderance of power, concentrated on both a Idas of Germany, the British relished the idea

4 0Ihid,, pp, UH-54. 39

that the Versailles Peace Treaty was an acceptable beGinning and that

the causes militating against peace could be diminished or actually

removed on a progressive basisIt is well to note here that there

were divergent opinions in the British Parliament, which changed with the administrations and that the British became progressively and

increasingly split in their views toward the Versailles Peace Treaty and the League of Nations. This w ill receive additional attention later in this study,

This loaves ono approach open to discussion, that is, the

Wilsonian approach, Wilson's name has been so closely associated with the Fourteen Points that mention of his name almost automatically makes one think in terms of those points, It would be erroneous to state that those Points were the lim itation of his thoughts on peace.

Various speeches signify that he had other thoughts,

Woodrow Wilson believed that a viable peace should be based on self-determination, which, of course, was one of the Fourteen

Points, This was only a segment of his thoughts on peace , however.

Self-determination, especially on the scale proposed at Versailles, in his views, would certainly lead to collective security, a collec tive security which, being indigenous basically, would have been suf ficiently strong to provide safe measures against a resurgence of the

ji 2 balance of power concept, Balance of power signified too

^Wolfers, op. c it., p* 4*

Edward H, Buebring, W ilson’ a Foreign P o lic y in P ersp ectiv e (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1957), pp, 141-76* Sir Llewellyn Woodward expressed the opinion that, like many of the Brit ish, perhaps Wilson did not fully understand the balance of power *40 particularistic a view, What he sought was something of value to the weak as w e ll as the str o n g . Ila was more in te r e s te d In th e gen eral than the particular. Self determination would provide the general good and the balance of power, being available only to particular nation-states, would be relegated to a position of obscurity, These thoughts would leave him exposed to bitter criticism s , 1+3 concept and could not take an objective view, Whereas the actors involved in the settlement of the Thirty Years' War regarded the balance of power doctrine as a norm calling for unity of action to insure an equilibrium, others, including Wilson, associated the doctrine with the diplomacy of the pre-war period, a diplomacy that, while constantly in search of an equilibrium, ultimately lad to war rather than stability through equilibrium, It should be noted that Llewellyn's views are in sharp contrast with the unwarranted and biased views of John M. Keyies, who resorted to personal attack against Wilson* 11 ^ Walter Lippmann. United States Foreign Policy (Boston i L i t t l e , Brown and Company, 1943), pp. 3 3 -3 9 , See a ls o Wans J, Horgenthau, "The Mainsprings of American Foreign Policy,” American Political Science Review, <44 (December 1950), pp. 933-54, and Robert E, Osgood, Alliances and American Foreign Policy (Baltimorei Johns Hopkins Press, 19&B), pp, 2-3, 29-30. Lippmanncriticised Wilson because Wilson supposedly overlooked the fact that the United States had been and was particularistic* The United States, in his view, went to war to remove the German submarine threat from the Atlantic* Secondly, the United States went to war iti its own defense and not to make the world safe for democracy, Finally, the United States had little interest in the League of Nations* American security was its real motive for entering the war, These point to a particular istic rather than a general approach, according to Lippmann, who was acting his typical role as an after-the-fact advisor. Morgenthau, a staunch supporter of the balance of power, ostracized Wilson's views* He equated Wilaonianiam on the same low level as isolation- alism* Neither was of any value, according to Morgenthau, because they failed to consldor the needs of international society. For an opposing view we may turn to Osgood who considers the North At lantic Treaty Organization and the Organization of American States as examples of what Wilson desired in Europe, The heavy indigenous composition of these two international organizations was what Wilson envisioned for Europe, according to Osgood* hi

Ons would surmise that Wilson detested power. And yet tha opposite was true* As Inis Claude notes, Wilson frequently voiced N4 his opinions in favor of power* But the power he strongly urged was that type which could be aggregated in tines of peace to insure that peace, and in tines of stress to insure a second consideration by those who would infringe upon the political interests of others and disturb the political tranquility. One could sum up Wilson as being an idealist (self-determination), a realist (power i 3 a necessity), and also a disciple of the status quo (collective security to insure stability).

The final outcome of the various suggestions for an interna tional organization and the approaches to peace were the Versailles

Peace Treaty and the League of Nations with a Covenant hopefully aimed at peace and security.

The Covenant

The Covenant, when compared with the Charter of the United

Nations, was rather short, with a preamble and only twenty-six articles, The preamble and several articles warrant a brief dis cussion, chiefly because they wore directly Involved in later actions of the Members withdrawing from the League,

The preamble was noble but presumptions, International co o p eration was to be promoted and in te r n a tio n a l peace and s e c u r ity

44Inis L. Claude, Jr. Power and International Relations (New York, Random House, 1962), pp* W-lOG* It is apparent that Wilson visualized power as military forces in being. i+2 li5 were to bo the goals of the League, The means toward these ends

included an obligation not to resort to war. Open, just and honor

able relations among nations also would serve as a means toward the

goals of the League, It was believed that international law, fully

understood, would serve as a guide to Members in maintenance of

justice and an unstinting respect for all treaty obligations,

Notably absent from the preamble was the Japanese sponsored

amendment concerning "equal and just treatment to all aliens who

happen to be the nationals of the States , , , fully qualified to

become Members of the League, making no distinction on account of

race or nationalitytt|(^ This suggestion was aimed specifically

U5 Foreign Relations of the United States. Paris Peace Conference, 1919, XIII, pp, 69-92.

‘^ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1910, I, Supple ment I, 12-17, The most logical method of explaining tha Japanese attitude is through a sequential recapitulation of the United States immigration laws as they pertained to the Japanese, with reference and capsule summary in each case. Ibid, , 1921, II, pp* 323ff, A commercial treaty between Japan and tho United States was signed in 109'+, giving each the right to restrict entry into its country by nationals of the other party. U.S., Congress, Senate. Japanese in the City of San Francisco, 59th Cong,, 2d sess, , 1933, pp', 4ff, The San "Francisco public school sy stem 1 s Board of Education, acting in behalf of irate parents of white school children, issued an order, on October 11, 1906, excluding a ll Japanese school c h i l d r e n from attending the same public schools as the white children, The Japanese children, and other Oriental children as well, wore to be sent to schools designated for those c h ild r e n . Foreign Relations of the United States, 1906, I, pp* v ii ff. President Roosevelt's attempt to pacify the Japanese Government by having Congress nullify the San Francisco segregation order served only to Increase the ire of the people of California, especially in San Francisco. U.S., Congress* Congressional Record, 33d Cong., 2d sess, , 1907, p. 2£109, Roosevelt, in an attempt at domestic conciliation, and to combat the loopholes in the immigration laws, persuaded Congress to 1+3

at Wilson's Point V on the "interest of the populations con

cerned*11^

The First article in the Covenant proper dealt with member- 1+8 ship and withdrawal. Though membership was open to any Fully

self-governing State * Dominion or Colony, each was required to

guarantee its sincere attention to observe its international obli

gations i Each also was required to abide by League-prescribed regu

lations concerning its m ilitary, naval and air forces and armaments*

add an amendment to the Immigration Law of 1907, which empowered the President to exclude from entry through any United States pos sessions emigrants if such entry would be to the detriment of labor conditions within the United States, U*5*, Immigration Commission (now Immigration and Naturalization Service), Annual Report of the United States Commissioner of Immi gration, 1909, pp, 125-25* See also Foreign Relations of the UniTed States, 1921, II, p, 329. The Gentlemen's Agreement, an Executive ord er, wa 3 an understanding between the United States and Japan, The Japanese Government agreed to exercise great care in issuing pass ports, not to issue passports to laborers except to those domiciled in the United States, and the fam ilies of such persona, and to sus pend all further emigration to Hawaii, a source of entry into the United States, Hawaii long had been concerned with the influx of Japanese into the islands, Foreign Relations of the Uhited States, 1913, pp, G25-27, A new commercial treaty with Japan was signed on February 21, 1911. It modified the Gentleman's Agreement, which had modified the commercial treaty of 1894, but retained clauses requiring the Japanese Government to use discretion in the issue of passports to Japanese laborers. The above acts motivated the Japanese at the Peace Talks to question the United States policy toward races other than the white race, Modifications made in 1917, mors favorable to the Japanese, wore construed by the Japanese as insufficient evidence of good faith on the part of the United States, 47 ♦ Foreign Relations of the United States, Paris Peace Con ference, 1919, XIII, pp. 288-91* US Locjcit* The balance of the discussion on the Covenant is based on material contained in the reference specified in the previous footnote. 44

The last element appears to be slightly misplaced. It would have

been more appropriate to delate It and restore it to its rightful

place in Article 8 (Reduction of Armaments).

Voluntary withdrawal appeared relatively easy. A two-year

notification was required. This, however, could have been more dif

ficult than suspected. The Member selecting withdrawal supposedly

was required to fu lfil a ll its international and Covenant obliga

tions at the time of its actual withdrawal* Several withdrawing

Members did not fu lfil this last obligation, as will be discussed

later in this study.

Membership on the Council was to be a dual component affair.

Four were to be permanent Representatives and four were to be Mem

bers. Representatives were to be permanent while the Members were to be replaced periodically by the A ssem bly. The composition of both

Representatives and Members gradually increased but the substance of

the article remained the same. This article became the basis for a

withdrawal at a later date.

Reduction of armaments was an Important concern to tha League

founders, especially those adjacent to Germany. Article 0 assigned the task of formulating plans for reduction of armaments to the

Council, Flexibility was involved through a stipulation that the sev eral governments would consider and act on thaso plans. This was l i t t l e more than a return to th e Hague Conference o f IB99 during

which various governments were allowed to select their courses of action on this very same subject, The League would discover at a 45 latar date that a ll Members would not be sincere in living up to this article and would not interchange fu ll and frank information on their armaments* m ilitary programs and Industries capable of adop tion to warlike purposes*

The guarantees against aggression* required in Article 10* also would be violated on several occasions and would lead to with drawals of Members.

Collective action (Article 11) would be utilized in several cases* either through Council action or through the imposition of sanc tions and expulsion (Article 16). Utility of either ultimately would fu rther c r ip p le th e League, N either would c e r ta in Members r e s o r t to judicial settlement called for in Article 12 1 nor would they de pend on the diplomacy stipulated in Article 13 for a satisfactory solution of problems, There really was no cause for alarm since

Article 15 left matters up to the Members of the League as to what action they would take if any Member disregarded the recommendations of the Council.

In summarizing the pertinent portions of the Covenant one easily can sue that much was left to the individual Members. These

Members were suhject to risk when violating the Covenant but there was little beyond sanction and expulsion as implements of punishment,

The Members violating any of tha articles had little reason to fear violent action in retaliation for aggressive acta perpetrated against any other Member or non-member except perhaps from the violated

Member or non-member, Any cause far fear wa 3 neutralised by the lack M6 of requirement for collective security* Retaliation on a large scale was not required in the Covenant* Though Article 11 dealt with col lective action, it wa 3 left to the League to take any action it deemed wise and necessary to safeguard peace* Thera was nothing ex plicit in this article that might cause panic or concern to an aggres sor * The basic underlying idea appeared to be a belief that all

Members would practice the golden rule and that a new chapter of international brotherhood was emerging.

The spirit of compromise further is evidenced by the fact that

Wilson's views on force are nowhere apparent in the Covenant* His many remarks on the need of force to deter a return to a balance of power concept apparently became only a speculation that perhaps a desire for peace would prove a sufficiently strong incentive for a voluntary pooling of power when the international political situation required resort to such a measure,

In essence, this was the Covenant and these were the various elements that would bo involved in future withdrawals from the League*

We now can discuss the withdrawals. I l l

JAPANESE IMPERIALISM

The mere title of this chapter signifies to a great extent the chief reason for the Japanese withdrawal from the League* Its international policies were inimical with the scopo and intent of the

League* This# however# is an over-sim plification of the problem which must be more c lo s e ly a n a ly sed to more f u lly understand th e Japanese problem and its reason for opting out of the League,

Problems in the Far East

The Japanese and Chinese have had a long history of mutually antagonistic relations. But in spite of this we can draw a line for the purpose of this study and use the mid-point of the 1090 decade as an appropriate and clearly definitive line of departure*

The Japanese and Chinoso became embroiled in a war as a result of several acts perpetrated by the Chinese* Japanese diplomatic per sonnel were suffering ill treatment at the hands of the Chinese# them selves torn by dissatisfaction and internal strife* Japanese students in China also were subject to harassment in certain provinces. Warn ings by the Japanese Government had little effect upon the Chinese*

This continued until the latter part of 1894 when Chinese action off the coast of China resulted in loss of Japanese naval vessels, which

47 48

proved to bo action too severe for tho Japanese to overlook, especially

in view of the fact that China wa 3 moving troops into Korea, an indi

cator of possible future action against Japan*

War was declared in November, 1094 and the Japanese wanted

little time in overpowering the Chinese* Within five months the

Chinese were ready to negotiate. Japan, having forced a rapid Chinese

decision toward ending the war, suddenly found itself in an embarras

sing position* One of the Chinese delegates visiting Japan for the

negotiations became the target of an unsuccessful assassination attempt

by a Japanese fanatic. The Japanese Government, in an effort to regain

its posture, quickly accepted the Chinese offor and signed the Treaty of Peace Between China and Japan, at Shimonoseki, which then was rati fied by both on May 9, 1895, China, in addition to many trade conces

sions to Japan, gave up its right in Korea, and ceded Formosa (Taiwan) and other Islands in the vicinity to Japan*^ In a short span of only

six months the Chinese had lost more than would have seemed possible.

The Chinese losses, however, ware not yet terminated, Thera were more t o como,

Turmoil continued within China, with riots occurring in various provinces, due chiefly to the inability of China to produce a single,

strong national loader* Factions were in conflict and foreigners were in danger of physical harm*

Among the foreigners in China were missionaries from various countries who visualized China as a land requiring their services*

-*■ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1095, I, pp, 199-203, 49

Although some missionaries were subjected only to minor harassment,

two of them, Germans, were put to death during rioting in one of the

provinces (Shantung) in Hovember, 1897*

German retaliation was rapid. German warships entered and

occupied the city of Kiaochou, Among the German demands imposed were

the lease of Kiaochou, and adjacent territory extending inland, for

a period of ninety-nine years, The Germans required free access to

the port for all German vessels and the positioning of warning devices

where warranted at danger points in the bay. The Chinese had little

choice but to honor the German demands, which triggered off a new

scries of actions*

The ease with which the Germans had obtained Kiaochou and the adjacent territory, coupled with the rapidity with which Japan had defeated China in 1B94-95, and the degree of internal strife and tur moil plaguing China, appeared to bo a signal for the entry of other actors on the scene, Several powers decided to secure exclusive rights 3 in certain areas to the exclusion of other participants.

The United States, having had commercial interests in China, took a view not In consonance with the secularised approach of the other powers, Secretary of State John Hay issued a statement in which he suggested that all participants guarantee, and honor, the principle of equal opportunity of commerce in China, and honor the preservation of China's territorial and administrative integrity. This became

2Ibid*t 1899* pp, 187-90, 3 Ibid,, 1099, pp. 12Q-43,

^Ibid. Hay had received indirect assistance from Alfred E. Hippisley, a British customs official quite familiar with the Chinese problem, when forming his Open-door doctrine* 50

known as the Open-Door Policy* Certain other governments were loos

than enthused with the United States attitude and practiced to varying

degrees their choice of restricted access to other powers within thoir

individual sectors of influence* The British Government concurred

in the policy of tha United States.

Japan continued its interest in China* But it now had a poten tia l menace with which it had to contend* The Russians were encroaching upon Manchuria and Korea, both of which rated high in Japanese inter e sts*

The scene then shifted to other parts of China and also India, both of which were areas in which the British were extremely sensitive about possible Russian expansion. The Japanese, during this period, enjoyed a privileged position among a ll walks of life in Great Britain, which eased the risk for both in arriving at a decision to form an alliance, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of January, 1902, under which the other partner would maintain a strict neutrality if one partner became involved in a war in defense of its respective interests in the 5 Far East*

The Russo-Japanese War of 1901-5 resulted in a complete with drawal of a ll Russian forces from Korea, thereby leaving Korea solely to tha Japanese, Tha Russians also withdrew from Manchuria, which

5Ibid,, 1902, pp* 514-15. The British considered this a lli ance as precautionary in content and scope rather than aggressive* The treaty was renewed In 1905 and expanded to include a ll of East Asia and India, The British recognised Korea as being of prime import ance to Japan* 51

helped placate Japan to such an extent that the Agreement Between

Japan and Russia Relative to Manchuria was signed in 1910.® The

status quo in China was the main subject of this agreement,

The Japanese were becoming increasingly engrossed in the

Chinese mainland, In fact, the outbreak of the First Uorld War

provided Japan with the opportunity of forwarding an ultimatum to

Germany in which Japan in s is te d upon the r e le a s e o f a l l German h old ings

in China and their turn-over to Japan. Denial of the ultimatum by 7 Germany resu lted in a d ecla ra tio n o f war a g a in s t Germany.

The Chinese Government was the next to act. It sought to re

gain the leased German holdings and notified the Japanese Government

of its intent to impose a state of neutrality over the Shantung pro

vince. The Japanese not only lodged a strong complaint against the

Chinese action but presented China with its Twenty-One Demands, These

bid, , 1910, p. 035, Both Japan and Russia agreed that the status quo in China was of utmost importance, Should the situation be disturbed, both parties were committed to restoration of the status quo to its previous level.

7Ib id ,

®Ibid., 1915, pp. 175-201, The Demands, composed of twenty-one articles, were classified into five groups. Group One dealt with Shan tung and demanded that China consent to any agreement entered into by Japan and Germany in relation to Shantung, It also sought to forbid the ceding of Shantung to a third power* Group Two required certain freedoms for Japanese (residence, travel, farming and mining) in South ern Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia. It also required previous Japanese clearance prior to Chinese employment of p olitical, financial or military advisors in those two areas. Railway rights to Japan also were involved. Group Three required that conversion of the largest mining operation In China bo made a joint Chinese -Japanese company. Group Four prohibited the ceding or leasing to a third power of any harbor, bay or island along the Chinese coast. Group Five would have required u tility of influential Japanese as the advisors specified in Group Two, Joint arsenals and police departments also were included as demands. 52

demands were so severe that had China accepted then in their entirety

it virtually would have surrendered its sovereignty to Japan. The

Chinese Government insisted that it could not accept all of the demands

for, in so doing, it would be surrendering its sovereignty* A revision

of the demands by Japan, under which China agreed not to cede any por

tion of Shantung to any third power, but agreed to modifications made

by Japan pertaining to railway and occupational matters and prior con

sultation on advisors, was accepted by China after several exchanges

between the two Governments, it might be noted that the exchange of

notes, in the form of ultimatums by Japan and replies by China was

terminated in toy, 1915 with a complete rejection of Group five of the

Demands* The Japanese wore n o t c o n ten t, however, and p ressed fo r fu r ther concessions, in 191E3, including a review of Group Five*

The United States, particularly interested in its trade rela

tions with China, and, not baing committed to a war during 1915, as

was true with the European powers, kept a close watch on the Chinese-

Japanese situation, notifying both of its interest in maintaining the

status quo in the Far East and its desire not to have its treaty

rights impaired, The United States also warned both of its desire to

hold intact the principles of the Open-Door Policy, These views did

not pass unnoticed in Japan*

The United States, baing the only real obstacle to Japanese aggression in Asia, gradually became the target of Japanese wrath,

The anti-American feeling grew steadily and the latter half of 1913 and early part of 1919 were punctuated by verbal and editorial attacks S3

upon this country* In fact, feelings were aroused to such intensity

within Japan and Japanese-occupied sections of China that President

Wilson himself became the chief villain ,9

There also were warnings against the danger of an American

attempt to replace Germany as the next actor seeking to display its

strength* Among these warnings were those which depicted the United

States as guilty of attempting to overcome JapanTs prominent position

in the Far East* Japan, according to one of Japan's most eminent

financiers of the time, was entitled to a recognised position of abso

lute superiority in China, chiefly because such a position was a vital

necessity for Japan. These ultra-nationalistic sympathies, extending

into the universities and the Japanese legislature, included views on

the League, about to be discussed in 1919,10

Widely prevalent among the publicists, and prognosticating other than good fortune for the League, was the feeling that the League,

while being a gratifying achievement toward world peace, faced too many artificial barriers Imposod by mankind in general. These barriers were composed of obstacles such as race relations, in the form of immigra tion laws inhibiting movement of the Tellow Race into White Race

9Ibid., 1919, I, pp. 370-71, 6Q6-715. So bitter was the feeling toward America in certain cases that one Japanese newspaper, operating in Japanese occupied China, accused the American President of being f1a boaster and a hypocrite,11 The American legation in China succeeded in obtaining a disguised apology from the newspaper involved after the Japanese Minister admonished the newspaper for its abusive article, Other articles accused American missionaries and military personnel of subversive activities, such as collaboration with Russia against Japan.

^ Ib id ,, Paris Peace Conference, 1919, I, pp, 499-94* 5^1 domains* and preservation of the territorial status quo, which would det er future development of nations afflicted with limited land-mass areas* or those countries less prosperous than others.^" The subject of territorial status quo would be a topic on Japan’s agenda at the Peace

Conference.

The P a r is Peace Conference

Japan entered the Peace Conference negotiations with one spec ific objectiva in mind from which it would not deviate* It was intent upon winning a complete concession from a ll other leading actors when topics such as the re-distribution of Chinese land areas and facilities 12 leased to Germany were being considered* It had sufficient support

Ibid* Those publicists felt that the League of Nations would circumscribe rather than provide assistance to those nations economically poor and m i l i t a r i l y weak* Strange as i t may seem, when con sid erin g th e Japanese interest in China, a poor and weak nation, the Japanese pub lic ists resorted to terminology such as manifest destiny when referring to the prospective rights of countries, other than China, that is,

^ Foreifsn Relations of the United States* 1919* I, pp« 715-23j VI* pp, 316-19, The Japanese approach was a continuation of its earlier attitude toward these German holdings in China. The Japanese Government had issued an ultimatum to Germany on August 15, 1914, The German refu sal to turn its leases over to Japan, and its half-hearted attempt to return it3 holdings back to tha Chinese Government, resulted in a Japan ese declaration of war against Germany during September, 1914. It might be noted that the Japanese sought to molify Chinese apprehension by 3tating that it did not seek to infringe upon Chinese sovereignty in the disputed area. This, however* was nullified quito effectively when the Japanese presented China with the Japanese Twenty-One Demands in April of tha following year, Tha Japanese, throughout the period of this study, exemplified the practice of political flexibility and man euverability in its most extreme style, It manipulated the British delegates with veiled threats associated with possible rejection of the League of Nations on a basis of inequality of treatment and inequality of races* Arthur Balfour* assisting David Lloyd George, expressed appre hension of Japanese public opinion which, according to information he received from the Japanese delegation to the Peace Conference, could 55 from Groat Britain, It'ance and Italy to overcome the objection of

President Wilson.

Wilson, of course, had committed himself in the Italian desire for compensation it deemed warranted under the provision of the Secret

Treaty of London, There had to be continuity and Wilson had little choice but to object to the Japanese desire for a foothold in China*

The Chinese delegates to the Peace Conference clearly recognised

Wilson's predicament and, though they appealed to Wilson's sympathy, and Wilson was more inclined toward China than Japan, they finally realized that the Japanese enjoyed more support in the dispute. The ensuing A rticles 15G to 153 of the Peace Treaty awarded all former

German possessions in the Chinese province of Shantung to the Japanese,13

The Japanese were sufficiently kind to Wilson to agree that these awards would, at a future date, be returned to China. prejudice Japanese participation in the Conference and future League membership if Wilson were to deny Japanese claims to former German holdings in China. This was a clear case of political duplicity on the part of the British delegation, which was prepared to make a ceremonial sacrifice of the rights of a sovereign nation for the saka of its own international position in the area under considera tion* Tha British national interest in the Far East was paramount and exceeded Chinese wishes and desires*

^ Ibld*, Paris Peace Conference, 1919, XIII, pp* 298-301, It might be added that, though there were sim ilarities between tho Italian and Japanese approaches toward territorial acquisition after the war, in the case of the Japanese, Wilson was faced with the already existent partial Chinese willingness to concede to Japan the leases previously held by Germany* China recognized its weakness and internal turmoil and ill cculd afford a war with Japan* One night say that these circumstances eased, to a certain extent, the task of Wilson in dealing with Japan while simultaneously enabling him to retain his position vis-a-vis the Italian demands. 56

Thus Japan accomplished a desire with limited expense, since it had exerted a limited effort during the war just ended* Thoughts now could be turned to other topics of importance by a ll concerned, topics such as lim itations of armaments*

The Washington Conference

ho real success had been noted in matters concerning armaments reduction. The United States, noting the Inability of the League to take effective action at an early date, became increasingly concerned, espec ially in view of the fact that it believed that lim itations of armaments was a logical method of checking Japanese militarism and imperialism in IN- the Pacific, Formal invitations were sent during the summer of 1921 to eight countries having vital interests in the Far East, Limitation of Armament and the Pacific and Far East Questions were the main topics on the agenda,

The discussions, which began on November 11, 1921, resulted in the Nine-Power Treaty on China as tha most important achievement. The participants agreed to respect China’s rights and the United States was successful in solidifying the Open-Door Policy it had initially intro- 15 duced at the turn of the century, In effect, this treaty was

m J* T* Sbotwell, War as an Instrument of National Policy {New Yorki Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1929), p, 211,

^ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1922, I, pp, 276-81, The first article contains that chief clue as to the contents of tha Treaty* It read as follows; tf 1, To respect the sovereignty, the independence and the territorial and administrative integrity of China, "2, To provide the fu llest and most unembarrassed opportunity to 57 predicated on a policy of self-denial against aggression by a strong power against a weaker power* Though Japan signed the treaty, its desires for expansion were not abated* They gained expression in later years*

Among other treaties resulting from the Washington Conference was the Four-Power Treaty*10 Tha main elements of this treaty were

Articles I and II, The first article called for a conference of the other signatories If any two of the four were unable to resolve through diplomacy a problem antagonistic to those two signatories at odds with each other in the region of the Pacific Ocean, Article II called for a meeting of the signatories to determine collective action to be taken if any of the rlghrs of any one or more signatories were threatened by any other power in that same area,

China and to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government, "3, To use their influence for the purpose of effectually establi shing and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of a ll nations throughout the territory of China, " 4* To refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge thQ rights of subjects or citizens of friendly states, and from countenancing action inimical to the security of such states," Japan and China were signatories of the Treaty, as well as the United States, Belgium, Great Britain, France, Italy, Netherlands, and Portugal*

10U,S,f Department of State, Statutes at Large of the United States (Washington, D,C, : Government Printing Office7 1925), XLlII, part 2, pp. 1646-50, The signatories of this treaty were the United States, Great Britain, France and Japan, This treaty had side effects not included in the troaty contents. It allowed both Great Britain and Japan to disengage themselves from their still-valid Anglo-Japane3e Alliance, Britain could have disengaged itself from Japan without danger of offense to Japan and Japan could have disengaged itself without facing the possibility of international political isolation in the Pac ific* Finally, tha United States could feel more elated with Japan now committed to a m ulti-lateral treaty with the great powers of that era* 58

A third treaty of importance to the League of Nations as well

as the United States was the Five-Power Treaty, with the United States,

Great Britain, Japan, France and Italy as signatories, The treaty 17 established a ratio of naval ships for each of the signatories,

Ona final treaty, seemingly of immense importance to Japanese-

Chinese relations, as well as the League of Nations, was completed at

this Washington Conference, This was the Treaty Between Japan and 18 China for the Settlement of Outstanding Questions Relative to Shantung,

On the surface this treaty meant much to China, Article I of the treaty

stated that Japan would restore to China the former German-leased terri

tory of Kiaochou, Commissions, to be established by each nation, were

to be coordinated in an effort to return the former German-leased territory to China not later than si* months from date of signature of the treaty, which occurred on February 4, 1922, Other provisions of the treaty, composed of thirty-eight articles, an annex of six articles, and an enclosure of understanding in six articles, not only called

^ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1922, I, pp, 274-75, 1931-41, The ratio 5iS;3jl,7S meant that for every five ships operated by tho United States and Great Britain, Japan would be allowed three and France and Italy 1.75 each, class by class. The Japanese would terminate their adherence to the Five-Power Treaty on December 29, 1934 at the London naval conversations of 1934, during which lim ita tions on naval armaments was the chief topic, 18 Ibid, , 1922, I, pp, 940-60, See also League of Nations, Appeal of the Chinese Government (Genevaj League of Nations, 1933), VII (2), p, 16, An interesting adjunct of this treaty was the statement by the Japanese delegation that irJapan renounced certain preferential rights in South Manchuria” and ”in coming to this decision, Japan had been guided by a spirit of fairness and moderation, having always in view Chins*s sovereign rights and tha principle of equal opportunity,11 59

for the return of a ll former German-leased properties, railways and

facilities to China but also stipulated that all Japanese troops would

be withdrawn from these areas and F acilities within six months, pro

vided that China reimburse Japan over a fifteen-year period for the

properties and expenses incurred by Japan,

The treaty promised much and provided a stimulus for China's

desire for concessions in other spheres, such as previous agreements.

The Twenty-One Demands

The Chinese, enthused by miscellaneous troop withdrawals and

the ratification of the above treaty on June 2, 1922, and the Agreed

Terms of Understanding Recorded in the Minutes of the Chinese and Jap anese Delegations Concerning the Treaty for the Settlement of Outstand

ing Questions Relative to Shantung, signed by both signatories on

December 1, 1922, then appealed to the Japanese to abrogate the Agree ment of May 25, 1915,9 This agreement was the result of the Twenty-

One Demands made upon China when Japan became overtly interested in the 20 German rejection of the Japanese ultimatum. The Chinese were appeal

ing to Japanese compassion and injected the belief that more cordial relations would result if the agreement were abrogated. The Japaneae rejected tho Chinese overtures, expressing surprise that China should make such a request, especially in view of the fact that both Govern ments had signed and ratified the Agreement of May 25, 1915, The only

^ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1923, I, pp, 82&-3Q,

2 0 Supra. See footnote B above, this chapter. 60

manner of promoting cordial relations, according to the Japanese, was

through continuity of that agreement.

The Chinese request, strange as it seems, was considered as contrary to the accepted principles of international intercourse*

Completely forgotten by the Japanese, apparently, was the Covenant of the League, Its self interest was more important* It would continue its interference in Chinese internal affairs, interference that would be f a c i l i t a t e d by c i v i l war*

The Chinese Civil War

Internal turmoil had grown in China* The troubled relationship with Japan, and the inability of the League to resolve the situation, was coupled with tho unavailability of a strong central government,

Factions ware in contention for decades and civil war, the inevitable in such a situation, broke out in 1 9 22 7 1 , The Allied Northern armies, under General Chang Tsoiin, opposed the Southern Nationalist forces under General Chiang Kai-shek, who had rejected Soviet support, much

□f which then was diverted to the northern forces.

Compounding the deteriorating effects of the civ il war was the 22 so-called Japanese "positive policy,” This policy, described by

^Foreign Relations of the United States, 1927, II, pp, 1-44, 7G-77; 192B, II, pp, 119-78, 1B0-81, 216-17, 219-21, 224-32, 234, 242, 245-47, 252, 256-60, 263, 265-66, 2B3, 311-13, 331, 407-09, 412-13, 413, 420-21, 422-23, 425-26, 420, 4B4j 1929, II, pp* 123-86, 230, 333,

22lbld., 1927, II, pp. 26-27, 37-38, The American consul in Mukden believed that Japan was facing a pressing population problem at home and was forced to turn to Manchuria and Mongolia, and possibly Siberia, for living space, 61

American consulate personnel In Manchuria as Japanese economic imper

ialism* wa3 invoked by the Japanese to allow for its economic expan

sion Into Manchuria and Mongolia*

Tha Positive Policy

The Japanese "positive policy" meant that Japan would have to protect its expansionist policy. It therefore sent troops into Man

churia to protect those people operating the extensive Japanese facil

ities, Those procedures had an important side effect which was the arousal of passions in Manchuria against the Japanese who were assigned 23 the supervisory tasks leaving the menial tasks to tho Chinese,

Manchurian unrest and hate was aggravated further when General

Chang Tso-lin* the general commanding tho Chinese A llied Northern

Armies* was murdered on his return north to Manchuria, The Japanese were blamed for the incident. The subsequent reactions by the Chinese then forced tho Japanese to increase their troop commitments In Man churia* especially in the vicinities of their industrial holdings where large settlements of Japanese civilians were clustered* Full scale warfare bo two on China and Japan appeared to bo imminent if events con tinued and if the League failed to find a solution.

Renunciation of War

The League was making almost no progress on the lim itation of armaments. Agreement was too d ifficu lt, even though League Members

53 Ibid* The Japanese controlled the principal arteries of com munication in Manchuria. They had large concentrations of forces along Japanese owned railways* and had numerous Japanese settlem ents along these lines. 52

realized the vital importance of the subject, Unlike armaments con-

trol| however| it suddenly appeared that progress had been made in

1928 In an allied field* The United States, having witnessed the ob

vious failure of the League to effectuate soma semblance of collective

security that might at least warrant some promise of success, introduced to the League, through Aristide Briand, a French Delegate to the League, the Kellogg Pact, or the Pact for the Renunciation of War, later more conntonly known as the Kellogg-Briand Pact,

The Kellogg-Briand Pact, with Japan as one of its signatories, contained two specific articles of prime importance in international relations* In Article 1, all signatories agreed to renounce war "as 24 an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another,11

IF war no lon ger was to be the means o f so lu tio n then th ere had to be another way out of a dilemma. The solution was contained in Article

2 in which the signatories agreed that "the settlement or solution of a ll dispute or conflicts * * * shall never be sought except by peaceful means*"

Although independent of the Washington Conference and its Nine-

Power Treaty, the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the former were identical in their subject matter* The latter supplemented the former but on a groatar scale* It was global in scope rather than regional in nature

24 Ibid*, 1928, I, pp, 153-7* Japan was one of tha original sig natories of this Pact, officially known as the Treaty Between the United States and other Powers, See also U.S., Congress, Senate, Treatiest Conventions, International Acts* Protocols and Agreements Between the United States of America and Other Powers, 1923-1937, 7Sth Cong*, 3d sess, 1937, IV, pp, 5130-4* S3

as was tha Iline-Power Treaty* It now appeared that tha League had a more solid Foundation upon which to build its hopes For peace and

security, These hopes 30 0 1 1 would be stifled by imperial ventures,

Japan in Manchuria and Mongolia

Even though Japan had been one oF the original signatories of the Covenant and the Kellogg-Briand Pact* it continued its penetration of Manchuria and Mongolia, this, in spite of mounting danger of open warfare with China, In fact, the Japanese viewed the Chinese civil war as posing a great danger to Manchuria, a danger they felt they were 25 not ready to allow, The danger visualized by the Japanese Government, according to Baron Tanaka, was the possibility of harm to the Japanese populations in Manchuria* This was considered sufficient reason for deployment of a Japanese division to Manchuria at that specific time period, May, 1929.

The Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, in June, 1929, made an appeal to tho United States for an interpretation of tha Kellogg-Briand

Pact. This was motivated by the discussion of the Pact in the Japanese

Privy Council where the Japanese Government had decided that it was authorized a broad interpretation of self-defense under the Pact, Self- defense allowed tho Japanese to exercise their right when Japan's special interests were affected *T h is, the Japanese believed, was true even if those special interests were outside the territorial lim its

^ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1928, II, pp, 224-25, 220- 32.

25lb id .. 1929, III* pp. 249-53* 64 of the Japanese Empire* Tha position of the United States, of course, was that self-defense implied that an attack already had been suffered and that the Japanese, because of the complicated situation in Southern

Manchuria, was authorized the positioning of Its troops in that area by international agreement between China and Japan, the result of

Japan's Twenty-One Demands in 1915, Thi3 meant that China would have to accept, under the tenets of international law, the Japanese inter pretation or unilaterally abrogate the international agreement and hope that conditions somehow would prevent the development of warfare or oven occupation of China by the Japanese,

The Japanese Government, suffering at this time period (early

1931) from internal confusion, caused by an attempt at control of the government by the military, bowed to the demands of the m ilitary and 27 began a systematic flow of additional forces into Manchuria, Ho longer were tha military leaders content with tokon forces sufficient only to inhibit attacks upon Japanese personnel and facilities in Man ch u ria ,

Troops and supplies were shipped to Manchuria on a continuous schedule under emergency rules. The military had the upper hand and exigencies of the situation took preference over legal, and political s a n ity and rea so n . So g rea t was th e movement o f troop s th at th e Japan ese were capable of instituting full scale operations in and around virtually all cities and/or industrial centers in Manchuria* The troops deployed were sufficient to patrol all Japanese-owned railways

a7lbld,, 1931, III, pp. 1-715, 014, 843-44, 080-83, 65

while simultaneously affording protection to the non-combatants of

Japanese origin* The Covenant and the Kellog-Urland Pact were being

relegated to the same status accorded waste material. The stage was

set for the eventuality of serious consequences caused by an incident.

The Incident of September 18

What had been feared by the Chinese Is precisely what occurred, 28 It became known as the Incident of September 18, 1931, One can

understand the ludicrousness of this incident only after examining

the lugubrious Japanese explanation of what occurred that evening*

Garrisoned at the outskirts of the city of Tsinan, in Manchuria,

was a force of Chinese soldiers, approximately 320 in number, Also

located in Mukden was a Japanese-owned railway, which ran in the vicin

ity of the Chinese garrison, just a short distance from the blocked off

west wall of the garrison. Guarding the Japanese-owned railway ware

Japanese troops who periodically patrolled the railways to insure un

interrupted continuity for the trains, These factors would be combined and terminating therefrom would be the incident,

On tho night of September 10, one of the Japanese patrols,

with a Japanese lieutenant in charge, was proceeding along the rail

bed, heading south toward Mukden, only a short distance from the garri

son, The patrol was advancing and supposedly heard an explosion only

2 n League of Nations, Appeal by the Chinese Government (Geneva! League of Nations, 1932), pp, 66-B3* The Chinese version indicated that the attack on the garrison was unprovoked. A later investigation by a League-sponsored commission would accept the Chinese version, 66 a short distance to their rear* According to testimony presented by the patrol leader, a segment of one of the rails, approximately thirty inches in length, had been blown away by a bomb* Coincidental with the discovery of the blown section was the receipt of rifle fire from the north of the patrol, The patrol leader supposedly found himself torn between two decisions, whether to neutralise the source of hostile fire or flag down a Japanese train approaching at full speed* While his patrol engaged the reported hostile troops, the patrol leader supposedly attempted to stop tho train, but was unsuc cessful* His efforts, however, were not wasted* The train was said to have h it th e bombed out s e c t io n , i t wavered, and con tin u ed on i t s way*

The leader, returning to his patrol, and realizing that he was outnumbered, then called for reinforcements, The immediate task of the reinforcements was the elimination of the hostile forces, supposedly originating from the Chinese garrison nearby. The result was a slaughter of the Chinese garrison by the Japanese troops, who apparently allowed only about twenty to survive with various degrees of wounds inflicted, even after the Chinese troops bad been completely disarmed*

The action of the Japanese reinforcement clearly was in con travention of the content of the Agreement Between China and Japan (the

Twenty-One Demands) which authorized Japanese troops but only along the actual rail beds. The Chinese garrison was well outside the lim its of the zone running parallel to the rail bed* A later investigation also 6?

would reveal that the Japanese explanation contained many discrepan

cies and left much to be desired In justification of the Japanese

action against the garrison, The incident left the Chinese little

recourse but to appeal to the League of Nations,

The Chinese Appeals

It took less than twenty-four hours for the Chinese represen

tative to the Council of the League to request a session of the

Council, under provisions of Article 11 of the Covenant, to discuss

the situation in China and prevent "the further development of a sit- u a tio n endangering the peace of nations,"

The Council, after receiving the views of the Chinese and

Japanese Delegates, issued a draft resolution on September 30, 1931, requesting that both parties hasten to restore relations and furnish further periodic Information to the Council as to the development of the situation.

The Japanese representatives suggested that the Council assemble information from persons located in Manchuria, such as diplomatic and consular personnel, such information to be forwarded through Individ ual delegations which had personnel located in Manchuria,

The Council, meeting again during the following week, drafted a resolution, on October 22, calling for the immediate withdrawal of

2 Q League of Nations, The Monthly Summary of the League of Nations (Geneva: League of Nations), XI, 9, (September 1931), pp, 24G-49* Article 11 authorised the Secretary-General to call a session of the Council when requested by any Member of the League concerned with any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the CSembers of the League or not* G8 a ll Japanese troops from the zones agreed on by international treaty between China and Japan* The Chinese Government was directed to establish effective administration within the zones to be evacuated by the Japanese in China* The Council, however, failed to establish a deadline for the complete withdrawal of Japanese troops into the rail zones, a fact that Japan noted with relish, and of which the Japanese took advantage by seeking approval of delayed action baaed on the stated danger to Japanese troops of too rapid a withdrawal,

Seeing less than satisfactory action on the part of the Japan ese, the Chinese delegation than decided to inject Articles 10 (Guaran tees against aggression) and 15 (Disputes not submitted to arbitration

3 0 or judicial settlement), A complete rupture of relations between

China and Japan was feared, since the dispute, as noted by the Chinese delegation, had not bean submitted to arbitration or judicial settle ment in accordance with any of the articles of the Covenant,

The Council reached tho month of December without arriving at a definite decision, Both sides had rendered the meetings confusing by their claims and countorelaims* Finally, on the 9th of December, tho Council President offered a draft resolution in which he proposed a Commission of five Members to study the situation, on the spot, and report to the Council any circumstances affecting international rala- 31 tions and threatening the peaces between China and Japan. China and

q n Ibid., pp* 301-06j XL, 11 (November 1931), pp, 318-20; XII, 1 (January 1932)”," pp* 21-29,

31Ibid,, XI, 12 (December 1931), pp. 333-37, Lord Lytton, of Great B r ita in , was s e le c te d to head th e Com m ission, Members a ls o sen d 6 9

Japan were invited to nominate one assessor each to assist the Commis

sion, This Commission became known as the Lytton Commission,

The Japanese attitude during these discussions was one of

watchful and opportunistic anticipation, Promises were made but with

no compliance, Each statement made by the Chinese delegates was care

fully countered in an effort to present a view of repeated Japanese

willingness effectively stifled in each case by Chinese actions aimed at

increasing the danger to the Japanese in Manchuria.

Several actions were initiated by the Japanese which finally 32 alerted the Council Members to the real danger faced by China, The

Japanese, rather than withdrawing from outlying areas and back into their railway zones, actually occupied wider areas around several cities,

including Shanghai, These movements of troops, being bolstered by continuous shipments of fresh troops from Japan and Korea, whore the

Japanese Government was in fu ll control, made war too great a possibil ity to be taken casually.

Appeals to the Japanese to honor the Covenant, the Pact of

Paris (Kellogg-Briand Pact) and the Hine-Power Treaty of the Washington

Conference of 1922 only met with Japanese replies that it had to pro tect its interests in China, The Japanese claimed that they had not received equitable treatment since joining the League, External econ omic competition in Central and Southern China supposedly had forced ing representatives were Germany, Spain, France, Italy and Norway, all of which favored the formation of the Commission.

32Ibid,, Jill, 1 (January 1932), pp. 21-29; XII, 2 (February 1932), pp,“41^52, 70

Japan to turn to Manchuria for trade privileges equal to those en joyed by other countries. This Japanese claim made it apparent that

Japan viewed the League as a catalyst for preferential treatment rather than an instrument for the prevention of war, the chief basis for its initial formation*

The Japanese delegate, describing the Japanese as a devoted friend of peace, declared Japan an adherent to the League since the

Japanese were on the defensive and not acting contrary to the Nina-

Power Treaty of Washington* The Japanese delegate then implied that

Japan a c tu a lly was doing China a favor by Its interests in China, chiefly because of the disunity of, and lack of control exercised by the Chinese Government,

The Council, at the request of the Chinese delegate, finally decided, on February 19, 1932, to submit the Chinese request to the

Assembly for consideration*

The Assembly and the Lytton Report

A special session of the Assembly convened on Kerch 3, 1932 and, unfortunately, much time was spent in long harangues about the danger evident in China. Deliberations continued until March 11, when it was decided that perhaps a smaller body would more effect- 33 ively perform the task, A Committee of Nineteen was established.

33Ibld., XII, 3 (March 1932}, pp. 80-110, especially 107, See also U.S, , Department of State, Hanchurla* Report of the Commission of Enquiry Appointed by the League of Nations (Washington, D.C.i United States Government Printing Office, 1932), The Committee was comprised of the President of the Assembly, the Members of the Council other than Japan and China, and Switzerland, Czechoslovakia, Colombia, Portugal, Hungary and Sweden* 71

This Committee, with Its Connell Members, would be little more than a

glorified and reinforced Council, but with more authority and prestige.

It would report directly to the Assembly* The Committee did little .

Though it held meetings during April and Hay, the Committee was await

ing the report of the Lytton Commission.

Elsewhere there seemed to be 3omo progress apparent. The

Chinese and Japanese came to an agreement at Shanghai, This agree

ment called for the withdrawal of Japanese troops from the Shanghai

area into the International Settlement outside the Shanghai area per

iphery. The Chinese troops would remain in place. The action supposed

ly would be completed by May 28, 1932,

The summer months passed without any real progress, It was

not until the 16th of September that the Japanese delegate to the

Council notified the Council of a change effected by his Government*

It wa3 not the type of change desired by the Council, Manchuria had

been recognized by Japan as the Manchukuo Government, which the Chinese

Representative protasted. Nothing was done by the Council, since the

Lytton Report was being forwarded and the Japanese Government had

requested a six-week period in which to formulate its opinion on the

Lytton Report*

The Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Sino-Japanese

Dispute, more commonly known as the Lytton Report, was based on a de

tailed study of the problems caused by Chinese-Japanese relations in

34 The Monthly Summary of the League of Nations, XII, 5 (May 1932), pp. 163-6*1, The ajppeement was o fficia lly known Vs The Agreement Concern ing the Definitive Cessation of hostilities at Shanghai, concluded on May 5 , 1932. 72 35 China. The Commission had investigated the Incident of September

IB, 1931 and rendered a decision against Japan. Evidence pointed to the fact that Chinese troops had not taken any action against the

Japanese patrol along the railway in the vicinity of Mukden on that evening. Even though there may have been an explosion, the Commission refused to indict the Chinese garrison later slaughtered by the Japan ese reinforcements,^®

The Commission then listed ten general principles required for any satisfactory solution in the problem,37 The most important of these wore the recognition of Japan's interests in Manchuria and Manchurian autonomy, Under the former the Commission reminded a ll that Japan had rights and interests in Manchuria which could not be ignored. New treaty relations therefore would have to be established, taking these rights and interests into consideration. In commenting on this element of the Report, one easily can recognise the British sentiment for

Japan, represented by Lytton, a British subject, Getting back to the

Roport, the Commission, on the other hand, suggested that the Govern ment of Manchuria had to be modified in consonance with the sovereign and administrative integrity of China (the Opan-Coor Policy and Nine-

Power Treaty of the Washington Conference) but with a large measure of autonomy to meet local conditions. This last, somewhat identical to the findings in the Incident of September 10, was a blow to Japan ese intentions and desires in Manchuria,

35Ibid., XII, 10 (October 1932), Supplement.

36Ibid,, p. 6 37Ibld,, p, 12 73

The Report had been rendered end it was now left to the

Assembly, the Council, China and Japan to act, China was leaving

further action to the League, It was accepting the Report and await

ing the Japanese views,

The Japanese, having received a copy of the Report, chal

lenged the Commission's findings on the Incident of September IQ,

1931, Japan claimed that the Chinese had provoked the Japanese and

had forced the Japanese to automatically set in operation their emer

gency plan for such a situation.30

The Japanese Government also challenged that portion of the

Report which suggested a semi-autonomous Manchuria. Neither could it

wait until a strong central government was formed in China, The sit

uation In Manchuria and China proper was considered too dangerous by

the Japanese Government,

The relationship between the League and Japan was deteriorating

r a p id ly , Whereas Japan fo rm erly had been extending some semblance of

respect toward the League, even though it was to a very limited degree,

it now openly defied the League. The pattern and trend could only lead

to ona possible conclusion, and that was a withdrawal by Japan,

Japan Opts Out

The Japanese Government took the occasion, in December, 1932 of

notifying the League Assembly that, should it accept the Lytton Report, the League would have to assume the responsibility for it3 execution,30

3aIbld., Annex, pp. 33 9-41, 39Ibid,,XII, 12 (Dec. 1932), p,35Q 74

A vote was taken during February, 1933 on the Lytton Report* Forty-

four Members of the Assembly accepted the Report* Japan voted against

It* Only one Member abstained* The League had decided almost unani

mously against Japan.

The spirit of compromise, so vital in international relations,

was notably absent in virtually a ll of Japan’s contacts with the League

and with China, This being the foundations upon which the Japanese had

built their external policy, the inevitable soon was to come*

The Japanese Government evidenced its displeasure by notifying

the League, by telegram, dated March 27, 1933, that It was exorcising

its rights under the provisions of Article 1, paragraph 3 of tho

Covenant* I t was w ithdraw ing from the League.The League, according

to the Japanese Government, had failed to grasp the realities of the

situation in the Far East. In other words, forty-four Members were

wrong and only one, Japan, was right.

Thu League had been dealt Its first severe setback, and the

Japanese action would sat the precedent for two other similar actions of the same magnitude at later dates, both of which w ill be discussed,

40Ibid., XIII, 3 (March 1933), Annex I, p. 84. IV

GERMANY AMD THE LEAGUE

The form of negotiations conducted during the Peace Conference

Mas n ot e x a c t ly what th e Germans had d e s ir e d , Tho C o n d itio n s fo r Peace facilitated German suggestions that hopefully would modify quite dras tically the victorious Powers' approach* German observations that per haps Germany was being tr e a te d to o s e v e r e ly were cou n tered w ith th e

Allied and Associated Powers' direct and pointed reminder that Germany had been the aggressor and perpetrator of precedent shattering behavior more brutal than ever had been witnessed* This caused the German peace delegation to reply that:

Yielding to superior force, and without renouncing in the meantime its own view of the unheard of injustice of the peace conditions* the Government of the German Republic declares that it is ready to accept and sign the peace conditions imposed*1

In other words* this was a dictated peace.

Germany believed the dictated peace unjust for several reasons* a ll of which were included in the Treaty of Versailles. Political clauses were inserted in the Treaty which not only stripped Germany of certain possessions but restricted or eliminated political rule in several areas. Military, naval and air clauses were also injected.

^U.S., Department of State. The Treaty of Versailles and After (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing O ffice, 19U7), pp* 26-27*

75 76

Other areas of lesser interest were included but are of minor interest

to this study and w ill not be treated! thereby allowing an examination

of the political and military clauses and the German record in com

pliance with the Treaty obligations, both of which will illuminate the

German attitude toward the Peace Conference and the League,

Political Clauses for Europe

The political clauses of the Treaty affecting Germany were

concentrated on the severance of various areas from German control*

Belgium had bean neutralized as a result of a treaty signed on April

2 19, 1839, The fact that Prussia, which later was integrated with other principalities and formed the nation-state of Germany, was a guarantor of Belgian neutrality meant little to Ger;nany in 1914, The

Germans were more interested in necessity, even though they realized 3 f u l l y th a t t h e ir a c tio n was a breach o f in te r n a tio n a l law*

One of the early tasks of the delegates to the Peace Conference 4 was to right the wrong done by Germany. Various articles not only

^Great Britain, Foreign Office. British and Foreign State Papers (London: II.H. Stationery O ffice, 1B39), XXXII", p, 1000* The treaty, signed by Austria, Belgium, France, Great Britain, Prussia and Russia, made the signatories guarantors of Belgian neutrality*

^Foreign Relations of the United States, Paris Peace Conference, 1919, XIII, p. 135*7 The German Reichstag was told, on August 4, 1914 that "We are now in a state of necessity and necessity knows no law. Our troops have occupied Luxembourg, and perhaps have already entered Belgian territory, Gentlemen, this is a breach of international law . . , The wrong-“I speak openly--the wrong we commit we will try to make good as soon as our m ilitary alms have been attained*11

4Ibid., pp* 135-44, These articles of the Treaty of Versailles not only severed the political connections between Go many and Belgium, but also ceded certain small areas to Belgium, such as Moresnet, Eupon and 77

abrogated the Treaty of 1039, but also covered a ll connections with

Germany, The neutrality of Belgium was ended, thereby making Belgium

a completely sovereign nation-state.

Ej Luxembourg also was granted its complete sovereignty, In

this case the change in status involved a total of eight treaties to be

abrogated, a ll of which had favored Germany, either through a customs

union or railroad rights in Luxembourg*

The Germans lived up to those Treaty articles involving Belgium

and Luxembourg until 1941, well after its withdrawal from the League,

The French, seeking a complete detachment of German territory

west of the Rhino Rivar from Germany, agreed to a compromise in which

that area and a hand of land fifty kilometers wide (approximately thirty

miles} extending along the east bank of the Rhine ware demilitarized

Included in the demilitarised area west of the Rhine River was

the Saar Basin* an araa extremely rich in coal, This coal mining area,

under Articles 45 to 50 of the Treaty, was ceded to France in compensa- 7 tion for the earlier German destruction of ora mines in Northern France.

Halmady, th e la s t two because of an a n ti-P r u s s ia n f e e lin g o f th e p op u la tion, The nationality of certain of the residents of the ceded areas was changed automatically, while that of others either was not or a later option of nationality wac offered* 5 Ibid. * pp. 144-40, See also Articles 40 and 41,

^Ibid. , pp, 148-51, See Articles 42 and 44,

7Ibid., pp. 162-02, and VI, pp* 820, 025, 915, 042, The Germans believed this award Far out of proportion to the damage done to the French mine3, The Allied and Associated Powers replied that the Germans construed j u s t ic e in su ch a manner a s t o preclude r e c o n c ilia t io n , The Irony of the German destruction of the French ore mines was the fact that the ore required German coke from the Saar Basin area for proper 7S

The Saar Basin was to remain under French control for a period of

fifteen years after which a plebiscite by the residents would determine

the future of that area*

The Council of the League, in 1920, established a commission,

with Members elected annually, to govern the Saar,

Another area immediately adjacent to the demilitarized zone was

Alsace Lorraine. This area had been lost to Germany as a result of the

Treaty of Frankfurt, 1871, which terminated the German was with France*®

The German delegation at the Paris Peace Conference admitted that

Germany had not considered the desires of the people of Alsace Lorraine

when they took possession of that area in 1Q71, In spite of this, the

German delegates asked for a plebiscite in which the residents of that area might decide their future status*9 The delegates of the victori ous Powers disagreed with the Germans at the Peace Conference and returned

Alsace Lorraine to French control, complete with a ll archives and other administrative records associated with that area and free of a ll public 10 debts the Germans had accumulated therein* Other problems, such as smelting. The resulting metal had been used by French and Germans alike. These facts made the Gorman destruction of the ore mines appear foolish and wanton,

SIbid, ,}QII .pp* 183-202* See Articles 51-30, 9Ibid* ,VI,p, 029,

^QIbid, , XIII, pp. 102-98, German nationals residing in the area were required to gain French permission to remain in the area. French nationals who had remained in that area during its period of German rule were to regain their French residential status retroactive to November 11, 1910* The Gorman Government was required to assume the burden of a ll pensions earned by a ll residents during the period in which Alsace Lor raine was a part of Germany* After considering such matters as railways and other communications, factories and mines, the Peaco Conference specified clauses involving option of nationalities for French and German nationals residing in Alsace Lorraine, 79

communicationa, factories and residential nationality status also were

cleared in tha various articles of the Treaty,

Having completed discussion of changes in political status along the western sector* we now can turn to the eastern sector and

describe the changes effected* the most important of which, for the purpose of this study, were East Prussia, Hemal, Danzig and a strip of land ceded to Poland,

One of the most difficult decisions made by the victorious delegates at the Paris Peace Conference, and the most hated by the

Germans, was that involving East Prussia, an integral portion of Ger many since 1866. A decision made at the Peaca Conference stipulated that the new boundaries of Germany would bo such that that country no longer would be one complete territorial unit. East Prussia would be separated from Germany proper and a strip of land, later to be pejor atively called the Polish Corridor by the Germans, would become a part of Poland,11

The Germans acrim on iou sly p r o te sted the severance o f East

Prussia from Germany proper, stating that Germany could never allow it ,1®

^ Ib id ,, p. 132, Article 28 awarded an area of nearly 43,000 square kilometers just west of the City of Danzig to Poland, This area, of nearly three million residents, provided Poland with on outlet to the Baltic Sea, Gdynia later would be developed by the Poles as an alter native to Danzig, especially after the German dock workers in Danzig ei ther refused or delayed movements of Polish cargoes at the Danzig docks*

12lb id ,, VI, pp. 037, 940j XIII, pp. 230-36 (Articles 94-98). Plebiscites were held in eleven Kreise (equivalent to our countries). The vote overwhelmingly indicated a preference to remain East Prussian, Using the plebiscites as a basis, the Conference of Ambassadors awarded four small villages to Poland and allowed the eleven kreise, minus the four small villages, to remain East Prussian, E30

neither would they agree to a plebiscite suggested by Wilson and his

partners, presenting as a basis for their argument the view that East

Prussia had been a part of Germany for about 500 years. The Allied

Powers wasted little time in reminding the German delegation that it

was slightly in error since East Prussia had not been integrated into

Germany until 1866, making the German time differential incorrect by

approximately four and a half centuries.

The Allied Powers also challenged the German delegation for

its refusal to accept plebiscites in those sectors to ba ceded to

Poland, especially in view of the fact that the Germans had been voci

ferous in accepting Wilson’s thesis of self-determination, The German contention of harm to ba suffered by the separation also was countered by the Allied assertion that most of East Prussia’s trade with Germany had been accom plished by sea ,

The final decision of the Allies provided for plebiscites with

in certain sactora along the proposed border between East Prussia and

Poland. To effect unhindered plebiscites, the A llies required the evacuation of a ll German troops from the questioned areas, Tha Gorman contention that the separation of the two land areas would lead to

Polish acquisition of East Prussia was countered by the requirement for

Polish-German conventions, under the supervision of the Council of the

League, which would provide for land Ilnk3 betwe

Germany through Poland,

The territory of Mental also was an area of dispute for the

Germans, Kernel, situated on the east coast of the Baltic Sea, was the 81

only port available in that area, due chiefly to the sandy coast and

the Inadequate depth to accommodate ships in localities other than

JJemel, Past attempts to establish other ports along that sector of

the Baltic coastline had met with failure. Tides shifted sand back

into excavated areas H3 rapidly as machinery was able to dredge selec

ted areas for potential port facilities*

The German delegation once again argued unconvincingly that

Hemal also was fla purely German city” belonging neither to Poland nor

Lithuania.13

The Allied reply, without considering that the cession to

Lithuania might couflict with the principle of nationality, awarded

Hamel to Lithuania, chiefly because the Allies believed that Hamel

always had been a p art o f Lithuania and, sec o n d ly , Hamel was th e o n ly

sea outlet for Lithuania*

The award| accepted by Lithuania, nevertheless created some problems for the League. Lithuania objected to the convention offered

by the Conference of Ambassadors to affect the transfer, The Govern ment of Lithuania sought to effect an annexation free of any encum

brances that might be suffered at a later date If the League or any

13Ibid., VI, pp.838, 949; XIII, pp, 237-41 (Article 99). See also League of Nations, O fficial Journal, V (1924), pp, 121, 361, 409, 539, 590. A governor was selected by the Government of Lithuania and was charged with the responsibility of enforcing the principles of the Lithuanian Constitution* A Chamber of Representatives, elected by the residents of Hamel, enjoyed equal opportunity with the governor in initiating legislation* The territory had its own police, court and school systems. Freedom of transit through the Me Kiel territory was accorded other nation-states at Uarcelona, April 14 and 20, 1921, under provisions of a treaty concerned with transportation problems* 82

other* international convention of any type were too heavily embedded

in the transfer of Jfemel, The Council of the League then created a

Commission to study the question which finally was resolved In 1924

through constitution of the Memel Territory,, the city and an adjacent area ceded to Lithuania under the condition that Lithuania enjoy

sovereignty over the territory, Lithuania, unlike France in its

re-acquisition of Alsace Lorraine, had to assume a sizable portion of

the financial costs of transfer of Memel and the reimbursement of

moneys as compensation for former German-owned properties, Other pro

visions included the resolutions on nationality, a subject familiar

in all territorial transactions of the time.

There remains one territorial transfer of importance to this

study, a transfer especially bitter to the Germans, since it supposedly

was one of the esteemed German cities of the old Hanseatic League, This city of Danzig, long one of the cities on the old Hanse trading route, dating back to medieval days, on the Baltic coast, if severed from

Germany, would "lead to violent resistance and to an enduring state of war in the Eaet," so claimed the Germans,^

Foreign Relations of the United States, Paris Peace Conference, 1919, VI, p"i 950; XI II~^ jip, 241^62" (A r tic le s - 100-103)• A req u est fo r permission to manufacture 50,000 rifles within the Free City of Danzig, destined for Peru, was refused by the Council of the League In July, 1921. D ifficulties encountered by the Polish Government in 1920 in the unloading of war supplies destined for the eastern front, where Poland was at war with the Soviet Union, resulted in authority granted Poland, in 1924, to use the Westerplatte Peninsula for unloading, storing and forwarding of war materials to Poland, A protocol was signed in 1932 authorizing Poland access to the port of Danzig for its war vessels. The problems encountered by Poland in the Free City of Danzig prompted a Polish decision to develop the port of Gdynia, about a dozen miles west of Danzig, Con tinued development of Gdynia, and the gradually diminishing Polish use 03

Once again the German arguments wera wasted. The A llies

countered the German claltnn by declaring Danzig a free city, making It

a v a ila b le to Germany and E ast P ru ssia a s w e ll as Poland. The Free C ity

of Danzig, composed of the city, dock area and facilities, as well as

an area about thirty tnilea long, facing the Baltic Sea, by ten to

thirty miles deep in one area, was placed under a Commission composed of a High Commissioner and two members appointed by the Principal A llied and Associated Powers, and one member each appointed by Poland and

Germany. The Free C ity was p laced under th e p ro tectio n o f the League, and especially the Council of the League,

Although the Free City had certain rights, such as electing

its own Volkstag, a unicameral legislature, and establishing Its own constitution, subject to the Council's approval, it was severely res tricted in certain other matters, such as use of the Free City as a military or naval base, erection of fortifications and the manufacture of munitions and var material in the territory, A sevore limitation wa3 placed on the police force employed within the area*

Poland was awarded free use of the waterways, docks, basins, wharves and other works within the territory* It also was awarded control of the railway system in the Free City and the postal, tele graphic and telephone systems within the Free City that ware connected with the similar systems in Poland, of Danzig port facilities, became the subject of bitter feelings be tween Germans in the Danzig port area and the Poles in the Free City* G If

Those Germans selecting to remain in the Free City automatically

lost their German nationality and became nationals of the Free City,

Those Germans who preferred German nationality were presented a two-

year period in which to opt for Gorman nationality or remain within tho

Free City as nationals therein*

Completion of the discussion of the transfer of the various

territorial areas to France, Lithuania and Poland now allows an examin ation of the German record with specific emphasis on its long range

acceptance or rejection of the Peace stipulations. This w ill allow a

determination of whether there was a state of war as prognosticated by

the Germans during discussions of the Danzig problem at the Peace

Conference.

Although there may have been miscellaneous incidents in

Belgium and Luxembourg, on the whole Germany accepted the rulings of

the Peace Conference in both countries*

The German record in the demilitarized zone along both banks of the Rhina was not as good as In Belgium and Luxembourg, One of these incidents involved the presence of musicians from the German

Army in the neutralized zone in 192h. The violation was resolved by tho Conference of Ambassadors of the League which informed the German 15 Government of the infraction,

One other incident resulted in a rapid move by the French

Government, The German Government had sent detachments of it3 troops

into the demilitarized zone in the vicinity of Duisberg and Eussaldorf,

15Ibid*, XIII, p* 161, as

Germans in those areas, objecting strenuously to the dictates of the

1 R Peace Treaty, began demonstrating in 1921. The German Government,

fearing an expansion of the demonstrations, dispatched Gorman troops

to the affected areas. Order was regained but Franco objected and

com pleted f o l l o w - u paction by occupying such German cities as Trier,

IVankfurt and Hanau, where they remained until France was convinced

of the danger of its continued occupation of those cities,

The Saar Basin area, being under the jurisdiction of the

League's Governing Commission, experienced only two incidents, neither of which caused any repercussion. The first incident involved a miners' 17 strike in 1925, Although individual German discontent undoubtedly was th e co n trib u tin g f a c t o r , no se r io u s damage was su ffe r e d . The other incident involved the formation of the Saar Railways Defense

Force in 1927, The Germans, however, were not the motivating force.

In this case they were the accusers, France was accused of using ex cessive military force in tho Saar area. The Council resolved the dispute by forming a Saar Railway Committee and a Railway Defense Force, the latter replacing several French military formations,

16Ibid., 1920, I, pp,209-96, 297, 303-11, 313-16, 325; 1922; II, pp.105-96, 216. The French demand for extensive control in the demilitar ized zone of the Rhineland exacerbated an already tense situation in which German riots were numerous. The German Government sent in troops to res tore order, which led to the French occupation of Frankfurt and Darmstadt at the eastern edge of the demilitarized zone, German protests helped bring pressure upon France and the situation gradually returned to a semblance of normalcy. The French, however, voiced their intention of occupying the Rhineland for a long period after United States evacuation. This did not materialize, chiefly because tho Inter-Allied Commission evacuated the area In 1926, France also gradually withdrew its forces,

^ Ibld. , XIII, p. 167, See also League of Rations, The Saar Plebiscite (General League of Rations, 1935), pp. 5-41, BG

French complaints of excessive German activity in the Saar area were accepted but required little action, due chiefly to the fact that the German residents of the Saar1 were yearning for a return to

German control* They ware merely expressing their feelings without ca u sin g damage*

All disputes in Alsace Lorraine were resolved with virtually no difficulty encountered, Both Governments resorted to conferences which dealt with, and eliminated points of contention with little delay and risk involved,

The loss of Memel was a bitter blow to Hast Prussia a3 well 33

Germany, Conditions within the area began to deteriorate at an early stage* Much of this waa caused by the access to the League granted to the German elements in the Memel Territory,10 The situation was aggravated by the autonomy granted the Memel Territory by the League, thereby leaving the Territory with an inadequate means of control as it would have enjoyed had it been ceded to Lithuania, The danger to the Territory, caused by the two German leaders in Memel, resulted in action by tho Lithuanian Government, especially after its failure to ach ieve su ccess in i t s d e lib e r a tio n s w ith Germany on th e Memel problem,

The result, in March 1922, was the Formation of a purely Lithuanian legislature in Memel, replacing the previously mixed Lithuanian-German legislature, Although the Gorman Government took no action in dissolving the previously mixed legislature in [femel, the action by

^Foreign Relations of tho United States, Paris Peace Confer ence, 1919, XIII, pp. 239-40; 1932, II, pp. 466-BG. 37

the Government of Lithuania remained high in priority for H itler at a date long after Germany*a withdrawal from the League*

Whereas moderation was exercised in a ll cases except perhaps

Memel, the Germans were especially bitter and critical of the League action in Danzig and the Polish Corridor, The first two years were a 19 period when innovation was uppermost in the minds of virtually a ll.

The Treaty imposed circumstances had to be evaluated prior to Treaty implementation. This approach then received alteration when one of the leading Germans in Germany and the League expressed an opinion*

The German b it te r n e s s was c le a r ly en u n ciated by th e German F oreign

Minister Gustav Stresemann, in 1925, when he exhorted the Germans to live up to the Versailles Treaty, but look to the day when Gerrrtiny would regain a ll its lost possessions and twelve m illion Germans would 20 be re-united. A period of tension followed,

It would be erroneous to state that the Germans alone caused tension in Danzig, Poles in Danzig felt that they too had been de prived by the Versailles Treaty* They had hoped for a direct annexa tion of Danzig by Poland* The creation of the Free City left them with only one avenue for the venting of their bitterness, and that was through a gradual process of conversion of Danzig from German to Polish custom and outlook. The League acted a3 the peacemaker and forestalled

i^Christoph M, Kimmich, The Free City (New Haven and London: V ale U n iv e r sity P ress, 19GB), Chap* 3,

2(>W. M* K night-Pat te r a on* Germany From D efeat to Conquest (London: Georga Allen and Unwin, Ltd*, 1945), p* 343, 88

German as well as Polish designs In Danzig until 1981 when the relationship between Germans and Poles deteriorated to a dangerous low*

This was the period of the Nazis in Germany and the period of exces sive propaganda* coupled with Danzig German gains in tho Danzig Sahm

(unicameral legislature) and an unannounced v isit of German naval vessels in Danzig without a Polish permit, which increased the Polish feeling of insecurity, especially after certain Danzig Gormans proposed a Nazi government for DanzigNazi gains in the 1933 election fur ther increased the skepticism of the Poles.

The ultimate outcome of the situation* though outside the pur view of this study was the German invasion of Poland in 1939* with re possession of Memel* Danzig and the Polish Corridor uppermost in the mind of Adolf' Hitler, the chief architect of the German Nazi move ment.

The invasion of Poland was made possible through the assistance of German agents in those areas* which facilitated the daring German action by a wall-oquipped military force* which leads us into the next section for study, the military clauses of the Versailles Tteaty*

M ilitary Clauses

Termination of the 11 war to end a ll wars*" the hope of Wilson and many liberals of the United States who sanctioned the United States entry Into the war on that stipulation* left the Peace Conference with

21Foreign Relations of the United States* 1931, I, pp. 595-604; 1932, I, pp. 861-64; 1933, I, pp. 88* 111, 448-51. 89 a second major task even greater than the re apportionment of territories,

This gigantic chore involved the disarming of tho German war* machine*

The Peace Conference began its tedious task by formulating rules, Articles 159 to 213, to be used as guidelines by the German 22 Government* Articles 159 to 163 stipulated the demobilisation pro cedure and time period for such action, Articles 1G1; to 172 specified the types and amounts of weapons, combat vehicles and equipment and naval vessels Germany was authorised and which of these materials could be converted to industrial use* Recruiting and military train ing (Articles 173 to L79) were followed by an article on fortifica tions (180),

Haval clauses, such as release of the majority of German m ilitary vessels and submarines to the Allied and Associated Powers, mine clearance, reduction of certain naval fortifications and lim ita tions placed upon further naval training were included in Articles

101 to 197.

Having presented a so-called thumb-nail sketch of the Versailles- imposed restrictions upon the German military machine, we now can analyse the German reaction in compliance with tho lim itations, for it is here where we find evidence of the genuine German attitude toward the Versailles Treaty and the League of Nations,

There were several agencies charged with the responsibility of establishing the maximum quantities of armaments and m aterial, the lim itation on military personnel and the lim its Germany could enjoy in

^ Ib id ,, Paris Peace Conference, 1919, XIII, pp* 301-51, 90 naval vessels and submarines and aircraft, These were the Military

Inter-A llied Commission of Control, the Naval Inter-Allied Commission of Control and the Aeronautical Inter-Allied Commission of Control*

These commissions, operating under the Allied M ilitary Committee of

V ersailles, in turn answering to the Conference of Ambassadors, also were given the added responsibility of supervising the destruction of various military fortifications, the conversion of certain items of military property and factories to civilian use or the release of 23 many naval vessels of a ll types to the Allied and Associated Powers,

The tasks of these Commissions and Committee, in the majority of the cases, was made nearly impossible by the actions of the German military and the German Government,

There was little difficulty experienced by the Naval and Mili tary Inter-Allied Commissions in inspecting the demolitions of the v a r i o u sfortifications, Those were stationary and easily identifiable, making inspection relatively easy. The same cannot be said of other aspects of the Versailles imposed sanctions, making a complete descrip tion of the German delinquencies extremely difficult, The task, however, is not impossible and a picture can be presented by piecing together information from several sources.

The e a r l i e s t in fr a c tio n o f the r u le s by th o Germans was noted in

1920 when the German m ilitary high command issued a decree conferring

23 Ibid, , VII, pp, 356-57, These commissions, committees and the Conference of Ambassadors had been established during the Peace Confer ence, the last named being charged with the responsibility of executing the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, 91 the powers of a commander-In-chief to the head of the army director- 24 ate. This was contrary to the stipulations of Article 160 of the

Versailles Treaty which required the dissolution of the Great German

General Staff, Action by the Conference of Ambassadors resulted in a cancellation of the decree.

On the surface it appeared that the Germans were complying with the order of the Conference of Ambassadors to dissolve the German

General Staff, A later inspection produced evidence to the contrary.

The Inter-Allied Military Commission, making an inspection during the last quarter of 1924, was able to ascertain that the General Staff 25 never had been dissolved* The General Staff had been retained, but in a different form, In complete disregard of Article 16 D of the Peace

T reaty,

Closely allied with the foregoing violation ware others noted by that same Commission, the first of which involved the production of war material within Germany, Although Article 168 prohibited the pro duction of war material, the Military Commission also ascertained that 26 the production of such material bad been resumed in 1923,

24Ibid,, K ill, p* 321, Tho decree was Issued on August 11, 1920, The decrea exceeded that portion of Article 160 which prohibited any com manders or staff organizations above the Divisions and Army Corps levels. It is not too difficult to understand the German military desire for a command above tho Corps level, Article 160 allowed the Germans seven in fantry and three cavalry divisions. In view of the fact that a Corps usually includes three divisions, the German military undoubtedly was somewhat difficult to handle. Three separate Corps without a central control could have created many severe problems,

2^Knight-Patterson, Op* d t ., p, 396. oc Ibid* There were several difficulties encountered by the Military Commission. The shortage of Inspectors was compounded by the 92

Article 162 was quite specific in designating the reorganiza tion of the police and the lim itations on the training tho police would r e c e iv e . This posed no problem fo r th e German Governmant which not only increased its total police force, from 150,000 to 100,000 men, 27 but also militarized the force. The effect of this action was of great impact since, in essence, it nearly tripled the ceiling number o f 1 0 0 ,0 0 0 men allo w ed th e German army under A r tic le 100 as m odified and extended by mutual agreement.

The Inter-A llied M ilitary Commission reported one additional violation in its report for 1924, This violation involved the exten sive training of the German army, which the Commission felt was being 2 B prepared as a nucleus for a future grossly enlarged army. In this case, it is apparent that the Commission had been exposed to verbal and visual evidence that indicated projected plans, into the future.

There was one fin al area in which the German Government delib erately and overtly challenged the Peace Treaty and the League. While

A rticle 179 prohibited the German Governmant from sending military, naval or air missions to foreign countries, Germany allowed itself elasticity in the interpretation of this specific article. Military missions in foreign countries provided an opportunity to many of tho large numbers of factories to be examined, Tho difficulty further was made more complex by the fact that pilot projects could be completed and, when completed, the plans could be stored for future full-scale utiliza tion if tho situation allowed such an effort, A variation on this last aspect will bo discussed later in this chapter.

27Ib id

2^Ibld. This suggested violation is much more difficult to explain, bone of the articles of the Peace Treaty actually spelled out distinctly the real lim itations to bo Imposed. 03

German military officers to continue their training, unabated and

2 9 unhindered by the Versa!liea Treaty or the League*

These violations, somewhat overt in nature, also had facsim iling,

but of a covert type. Being covert, the latter were more difficult to

detect, chiefly because of the methods used by the actors involved.

L ittle time was wasted by the Krupp Works, Germany's leading

manufacturer of armaments, In gaining a position in Sweden, In 1919,

shortly after the Versailles Treaty was completed, the German manufac

turing firm sold its licenses and patents to a Swedish steel works

which had a branch concentrating its efforts on gunpowder and explo-

s iv e s , The d isp a tch o f German e n g in e e r s to Sweden had th e bonus

effect of allowing experimentation by the Germans, A second dividend

would be enjoyed at a later date when the results of experiments

conducted in Sweden would bo used in German factories after the with

drawal of Germany from the League and the consequent full-scale German rearmament»

The stage had been set and the passage of time indicated to the

German m ilitarists and the Government that freedom of action could be enjoyed if the same procedure were used as in Sweden, especially if

diversionary tactics were a prelude to the desired, but illegal course o f action *

29Foraign Relations of the United States* Paris Peace Confer ence^, 1919, XIII, pp. 332-3* See also Charles H. Levermore, Third Year book of the League of Nations (New Vorkt Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 1923}, pp, 219-20, The League of Nations warned Bolivia on the continued use of German officers as army and navy advisors.

^°Knight-Patterson, op* c it*, pp, 400-03, 94

While the A llied and Associated Powers were experiencing dif

ficulties in determining a concrete course of action to be taken via-a-

vis Germany and the revolutionary government in the Soviet Union, the

two outcasts (Germany and the Soviet Union) signed an agreement in 1922 31 at Rapallo, Italy* While the contents of the German-Russian agree

ment indicated that each government agreed to waive a ll claims against

the other for compensation as a result of the past war, and included the

by-now common nationality clauses, this agreement was only the first of

several agreements completed by the two partners* Tho other agreements,

a ll secret and unpublished, in contravention of the preamble of the

Covenant and Wilson's distaste of secret treaties, would prove how flex

ib le the Germans and S o v ie ts cou ld be in t h e ir in te r p r e ta tio n o f th e word

"economic*11

The s e c r e t economic t r e a t ie s ju s t m entioned provided Germany an unhindered opportunity for training its m ilitary, testing new weapons, tactics and procedures, and vastly increasing its future war potential.

On the other hand, it also presented the Soviet Union what it needed moat and could not obtain from other countries. It was gaining the very same material and experience that it afforded Germany, but on a more legitimate basis, since the Soviet Union was not a Member of the

League, History has indicated that the economic treaties actually were military agreements that would benefit both countries,

31League of Nations. Treaty Series, XIX (1923), pp. 248-52* The Agreement is more commonly known as the Treaty of Rapallo, although it was one of two treaties signed at that location. The other, involv ing Italy and Yugoslavia, was signed in 1321, and resolved a border dispute between the two partners to the treaty, This treaty also is known as th e Treaty o f R apallo, 95

The so-called economic agreements meant that such military hardware as tanks, artillery weapons, munitions and aircraft armaments 32 would be manufactured in the Soviet Union, As with the Krupp agree ment with the Swedish firm, so too with the Soviet Union, the German

Government would provide technical assistance in construction and admin istration of the factories* The products then would be tested in a joint effort with the German military officers acting in the added o f f i c i a l c a p a c ity o f a d v is o r s , German m ilita r y p erso n n el a ls o would receive unit and joint field training., using the Soviet manufactured items of m ilitary hardware. Rotation of German military personnel would enable a larger number of German officers and enlisted men the oppor tunity of gaining field experience otherwise precluded by the Versail les Treaty,

The Soviet Union also would assist the Germans in other ways in their dream of a re-m ilitarised Germany, It would take on the added responsibility of establishing a completely adequate poison gas works 33 as Trotsk, German engineers, technicians and workers also would work side-by-aide with their Soviet counterparts in the manufacture and test ing of the poison gas*

Perhaps the greatest effort of a ll would be expended in the manufacture of aircraft. It was in this field where much concentration

q L was exerted. Several factories were established in the joint effort,

^Knight-PatterHon, op, c it, , pp* m)0-03. See also Louis Fischer, Russia's Road From Peace to War fltew York* Harper £ Roe, 1963), Chap, X*

33Ibid, 3>4Ibld. 96

The results gained by the Germans In this aspect of their disregard of

the League of Nations would be evidenced during the dive-bombing pro

cedures , perfected in the Soviet Union, and utilized by the Germans

in 1939 and the following years*

There ware other violations by the Germans and there were other

partners, accessories to the violations* Taking the manufacture of

a ir c r a ft a s an exam ple, Germany enjoyed s p e c ia l r e la t io n s w ith four

countries other than the Soviet Union in the manufacture of the complete

assemblies, or parts, and a fifth country in the manufacture of air

craft armaments. Factories for complete aircraft assembly were located

In Turkey, Holland, Sweden and Switzerland, while a Copenhagen firm was

principally concerned with mounting sections and parts, such as machine

gun turrets, light cannon and bomb racks on aircraft that had been 33 manufactured elsewhere* Sweden and Turkey undoubtedly rated second and third in importance after the Soviet Union* Both countries afforded

the German pilots the opportunity of extensive flight training.

One additional point can be mentioned, which involves Sweden and the manufacture of additional armaments. Agreements also were concluded with Swedish firms for the manufacture of cannon, anti-tank

guns and anti-aircraft guns, a ll of which could bo tested on proving 36 grounds established for that specific purpose.

The German submarine menace of World War I was duplicated, but on a larger scale, during the Second World War. This was possible

because of the agreements concluded with two Spanish firms which

35Ibid. 3 **Knight-Pat ter son, loc. cit. 97 37 manufactured and assembled submarines for the Germans, Two addition al shipyards in the Soviet Union were performing the same task for the

Germans, Although there is no evidence available which would Indicate the availability of tasting facilities for submarines in the Soviet sh ip yard s, th e Germans were rep o rted ly allow ed to t e s t th e submarines at the Vigo, Spain facility.

This completes the discussion of the violations by the German military and governmental officials* Perhaps it would be wise to delve not only into the German political approach, which w ill present evidence of the German attitude toward the League, but also the general a tti tude of the collective membership of the League toward the international situation and especially the German position therein.

The Subjective Frames of Reference

On the German side the campaign against the despised dictated peace began during the discussions held at Versailles during 1919,

The Germans, not victorious, but also not defeated to such an extent that they no longer believed in their Teutonic superiority, began a systematic battle against the Versailles Treaty, The individual efforts of the military to inhibit the many sanctions Imposed upon the

Germans received several boosts from a new-comer in German p olitics,

Adolf Hitler concentrated much of his attention on the abroga tion and elimination of the Versailles Treaty, From his early days at Munich he consistently expounded the thesis that the German people deserved equal rights and that the Treaty of Versailles waH an

37Ibid, 98

instrument* the u tility of which could serve only to ruin the German 38 nation. The three demands upon which Hitler based his party program

were the setting aside of the Peace Treaty* the unification of all

Germans (irred en tism ) and a program of territorial expansion which

would provide land and soil to feed the nation,

The so-called Injustice of the Treaty of Versailles was attac

ked from yet another direction* The Nazi Party adopted a symbol of

hatred fo r c e r ta in Germans in Germany* The Jew ish people became the

target of the wrath of Hitler and his followers, many of whom themselves

either were fully or partially Jewish by birth* Ho Jews ware safe.

Hone could any longer enjoy the freedoms formerly protected* In spite

of the fact that the League had noted a flaw in the Treaty of Versailles, and had acted in 1921 to overcome this flaw by Council resolution* re

peated in 1925, in an effort to protect minorities* the Nazi Party

openly professed the superiority of the pure Germans and denounced the 39 German Jews, History, of course, recorded to what extent this pro

gram was carried by Hitler and the Nazi Party*

3 B U*S*, Office of the United States Chief of Counsel for Prose cution of Axis Criminality* Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression (Washington, D,C*i United States Government Printing Office* 194G), I, Chap. VII, See also Allied Control Authority for Germany, Trial of the Major War Criminals (Nuremberg: International Military T*ibunal7 1947), 1, p* 30. hitler continued to excite the frenzy of the Germans in his inflammatory speeches during the 1920s* His party, the National Socialist German Workers Party (National-sozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterparteie), also commonly known as the HSDAP, and later commonly recognized as the Nazi Party, was growing in importance during the 1920 decade* chiefly be cause of the inability of the German Government to control the nation, Ineffective leadership was an outstanding aspect of the post-World War I Germany, 39 Ibid* See also League of Nations, Protection of Linguistic, Racial or Religious Minorities by the League of Nations (Geneva: 99

Germany, during the immediate post-war period, was suffering

from a political myopicism* The hatred toward the Treaty of Peace

might have been controlled if Germany had had a semblance of effective

political leadership with sufficient power and backing to harness the

m ilitants and divert political attention to more constructive means,

such as a more rational approach toward European international affairs*

The Gormans did not have the approach even though they did have the

ta le n t*

Among th e ta le n te d , and one who made an h o n e s t attem p t a t

g u id in g Germany toward a more m oderate c o u rse o f a c t io n was G ustav

Stresemann. Stresemann had taken the political helm, during the 1923-

25 period, but tho obstacles in his path were too great* The four re

maining years of his life were spent in the foreign service, as the

Foreign Minister of Germany*

In spite of the fact that Stresemann did attempt a moderate

course, he was not, and could not be considered completely supporting

the League. He did express sympathy for the Germans in Danzig and the

Polish corridor and, although he did espouse a period of fulfilm ent,

he d id 3 0 with the intent of enhancing the German argument vis-a-vis the

League sanctions. He sought the day when Germany would be free from occupying forces and also a Germany capable of dealing with other pow ers but on a bilateral basis rather than through the m ultilateral

League framework.

League of Nations, 1929, 1931), I, pp. 8, 10. All treaties after 1920 contained provisions pertaining to the treatment of minorities. Several treaties, mostly bilateral, were completed, between various Members of the League during the middle of the 1920 decade* 100

Strcseman lived long enough to see the initial step taken to-

wards the evacuation of foreign troopn from the Rhineland. In the sec

ond goal he was more successful* He succeeded in his revisionism , a

moderate type of revisionism, when he managed the completion of the Loc

arno Treaty,^ a treaty which served to placate other European powers,

especially Trance* And this was done outside the League structure, even

though the blessings of the League were bestowed upon the Treaty*

One here can question the attitude, or the subjective frame

of reference, of the leading European powers other than Germany. Why

did they sign the Locarno Treaty? Why did they not challenge Germany,

both during the discussion period and after the Treaty had been rati

fied, even though later evidence substantiated the fact that England and France were aware of Germany1s duplicity in its so-called economic

agreements with the Soviet Union described earlier in this chapter*^

^Great Britain. Foreign Office. Papers Respecting the Pro p o s a ls fo r a Fact o f S e c u r ity Hade by th e German Government on February 9, 1925 (Londoni II,H* Stationary Office, 1925), See also Foreipn Re lations of the United States, 1925, I, pp, 20-21 and U.S., Department of State ~^The Treaty of Versailles and After (Washington, D.C.i United States Government Print ingT O fficef 1947), pp~* 941-45 * The Locarno Tteaty was o f ficia lly registered as the Treaty of Mutual Guaranty Between Germany, Belgium, fTance, Great Britain and Italy* The Treaty, based on Articles 2, 3, 4, 15, 16, 42 and 43 of the Treaty of Versailles, generally was a collective security pact guaranteeing collective action against the at- tackar of any one or more of the signatories of the Locarno Treaty. The German Government approached the other signatories bilaterally rather than through the Peace Treaty framework. The Germans also approached france through the British, who the Germans early recognized as more conducive to more cordial relations toward Germany than the French.

^ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1931, I, pp* 59B-60S, The Polish leadership, in 1931, warned the United States of the German threat to Europe and of the German passions being aroused within the Polish Corridor by representatives of the German Government* The Polish Government, and the United States Department of State both acknowledged that Great Britain and France long had been aware of the German-Soviet 101

The only answer that can be given is that hope took priority over caution. The European powers had hoped that the Locarno Treaty would

Instill in the Germans a new sense of security and of acceptance on a basis of equality,

Whatever change of feeling in favor of the League that the

Germans may have experienced as a result of the Locarno Treaty and the evacuation of foreign military forces from Germany, the change benefit- ting the League did not last. The evacuation of the Rhineland was completed in 1931, just when the nations of the world wore suffering most from the economic depression. This state of domestic affairs us ually opens the way for radical action. In Germany, radical action came from the Nazi Party, fully prepared with its propaganda apparatus and band-wagon fa n a tic s to c a p tiv a te th e im agin ation s o f Germans s t i l l blinded by the feelings of oppression as a rasult of the Peace Treaty, cooperation in military affairs which had been initiated shortly after the Treaty of Rapalio, which tends to substantiate the Allied and Associated Powers' desire to believe well of Germany, See footnote 30, this chapter for a brief description of the Treaty of Kapallo,

**2Ibid. , 1930, III, pp, 76-89, 92-97j 1932, II, pp, 230-97, Various German political leaders began a two-pronged foreign relations program in 1930, On the one hand, they attempted to effect a cleavage between France and other powers by accusing the French of being the source of misrepresentations concerning the Gorman Nazi Party, These same leaders also sought to lull other powers into a false sense of security by assuring those powers that the Nazi Party had no ulterior motives in Europe, even though they admitted that they felt that the w a r -g u ilt complex a g a in st Germany was u n j u s t if ie d and th a t th e Peace Treaty had to be modified. The political smoke-screen became oven more intense just before Hitlar became the uncontested political loader of Germany, in 1933, when he unleashed his propaganda experts. 102

The acceptance of the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1920 by Germany, the loss of Gustav Stresemann In 1929, and the ineffectual leadership in Germany, when coupled with the growing popularity of H itler's radic alism, resulted in a successful bid by Hitler in gaining control of the political leadership In Germany*

The League, prior to, and during this period of 1931, was en gaged in an attempt toward the control of armaments. The Preparatory

Commission had sought to ensure a smooth transition for a disarmament conference that hopefully could arrange a rapid agreement that might ease the developing troubled conditions already noticeable in Europe,

The Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, successor to the Preparatory Commission which had labored since 1924, became operative on February 2, 1932, and continued In operation through 1933, Germany participated in the Conference, which reviewed previous accomplishments, such as the Washington Conference of 1922, 43 and continued in operation through 1933* Germany participated in the

Conference, which reviewed previous accomplishments, such as the Wash ington Conference of 1922 and the Naval Treaty of London (1925), and sought to impose further restrictions on armaments and warfare upon all participating Members, The problems became so great, due chiefly to the enormity of the envisioned program, that the Conference stalled

In October 1932, especially after the Bureau of the General Commission

^League of Nations, The League From Year to Year (Geneva: League of Nations, 1933), 1933, pp, 4Q-61{ 1934, pp, 16-25, 103 had notified the General Commission of the lack of progress by the

Technical Committee on National Defense Expenditure,

The Attempt to effect a lim itation on the expenditures on arm aments was the act that placed the Germans on the offensive, against the Conference, They had made their in itial approach, not only with the goal of gaining equality of rights, which they felt no longer existed in October, 1932, but, more importantly, general disarmament, a disarmament program under which a ll Members would pare down their armaments and establish a semblance of equity,

A period of conciliation between the Conference and Germany was initiated, during which the Conference Bureau suggested parallel and supplementary negotiations. The Conference also offered to author ise a German military increase from 100,000 to 200,000 personnel, but this was 100,000 short of the German goal, both in number and service time stipulations, The period from December, 1933 to March, 1934 also had Germany tu rn in g down a l l su g g ested lim it a t io n s upon i t s armaments, th ereb y making i t d i f f i c u l t fo r such Members a s France t o come to any agreement w ith Germany, e s p e c ia lly in view o f th e fa c t t h a t Germany was o v e r tly rearm ing at an alarm ing p a c e ,

^Ibid,, 1934 , pp, 16-24, See also Foreign Relations of the United States, 1933, I, pp* 159-64, and League of Nations, The Monthly Smmtary of the League of Nations, XIII, 10 {October 1933), pp, 211-212, All sports activities, clubs, police and other associations became subjected to intensive military training and propaganda, Verbal blasts against tbs Versailles Treaty also became a daily occur rence* The official notice to the League was a very brief note, com pletely formal, with no explanations for the action. 104 45 The German withdrawal came in October, 1933, Recognition of

its failure In accomplishing either of its goals resulted in a notifica

tion, on Octobar 14, of the German intent of withdrawing from tha Dis

armament Conference, This notification was followed shortly by a second n o t ic e , on th e same day, th a t Germany not o n ly was d is a s s o c ia tin g I t s e l f

from the Disarmament Conference but also was withdrawing from the League of Nations, The second notice was accompanied by a verbal repudiation of tha war guilt complex.

The German notification of withdrawal, however, did not termin a te German-Laague r e la t io n s , Germany made i t s presence f e l t in such a way that the relationship between another Member and the League was a ffec te d *

The Anschluss

There are several underlying causes for tha Austrian termina tion of membership in the League of Nations, most of them date back to the First World War or before*

The first of these reasons revolves around the close ethnic relationship between the Germans and the major portion of the Austrian

League of Nations, The League From Year to Year, 1933, p, 57, See also Foreign Relations of the United States, 1933, IV pp, 264-65, 270-07, and U.S., Department of State, Documents on German Foreign Policy (W ashington, D,C ,i United States Government Frinting Office, 1959), Series C, II, pp, 1-2, It is interesting to note one report, emanating from a German who had been closely allied with League affairs in Germany, th at dom estic in te r n a l problems in Germany had been o f such magnitude that Hitler had resorted to the frequently used method of taking drastic international action to divert attention from domestic problems, even if only for a short period, which at times allows a recuperative period. The same id ea was expressed by th e then Ambassador to Germany (Dodd) in his analysis of the German withdrawals. 105 populations* Tha Gar man language was predominant In both and a close kinship was established over a period of centuries* The fact that

Austria had been so closely allied to the Hungarians during the long era of the Austro-Hungarian Empire had little effect upon the affection f e l t toward th e Germans by many Austrian®, The common lan gu age, in spite of the difference in dialects, served as a cohesive bond, to a certain degree, between the two*

A second reason for the close bond had Its basis in the form of past alliances* Austria had turned to Germany when in danger and had found some consolation in the fact that it had received assurances from

Berlin, The Triple Alliance can be mentioned as one, even though Aus tria had been the victim of unscrupulous manipulation by the German leaders during the last two decades of the 19th century, There re mained in many Austriana a debt of gratitude toward the Germans for the security provided against possible encroachments by France and potential

Russian interference in the Balkan area, considered by Austria as an integral territorial segment within the Austrian area of influence*

This second reason can bo developed further from a source ex ternal to both Germany and Austria, even though it formerly was a part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire* Two very prominent statesmen, Thomas

G, Masaryk and Edouard Bene If, voiced no o b je c tio n during th e e a r ly stages of the First World War toward a union between Germany and Austria,

Royal Institute of International Affairs, Documents on Inter national Affairs (London: Oxford University Press, 1935), 1934, pp * 276-B1, Dr, Bene£, speaking on March 31, 1934, to tha Foreign Affairs Committee of the Czechoslovak Parliament, discussed the various possi b ilities that might have helped solve the Austrian crisis of the inter war p eriod , 106

The idea was abandoned by both early in 1917, mostly because of French and Italian opposition, bolstered by British and Russian rejection of the idea of Anschluss (Austrian incorporation into Germany),

The thought of Anschluss received soma conaideration during the

Peace Conference when the Germans challenged the conditions of peace in 47 their observations* The German delegation, in its haughty approach, sought both to encourage future Austrian overtures toward union with Ger many and challenge the Allied and Associated Powers' approach toward a completely sovereign Austria* It sought to insure the Austrian^ of fav orable consideration should the people of Austria desire to establish the union with Germany. The German delegation, in its suggestion of future German-Austrian relations, sought to In still in the Austrians the right of self-determination, one of Wilson's strong point3, as a

3afety valve should it desire to ally Itself with Germany*

The A llies' reply merely noted that portion of tha German declaration which stated that the Gormans never intended to altar the

Gorman-Austrian frontier. The subject probably would have become dor mant had not the German Reich, in the Hew Constitution adopted at

Weimar, on July 31, 1919, authorized Austrian participation in the

Foreign Relations of the United States, Paris Peace Confer ence, 1919, VI, p, 032* In the observations of the German Delega tion on the Conditions of Peace, dated Kay 29, 1919, the German delegation challenged many facets of the Peace Treaty, several of which were dis cussed in Chapter H of thi3 study* 107

German National Council with a number of votes directly in proportion MB to the Austrian population.

This paragraph raised the ire of the Supremo Council of the

Principal Allied and Associated Powers which, on September 2, 1919,

considered it in violation of Article 90 of the Versailles Treaty and

required its elimination from the Weimar Constitution. Incompatibility

with the independence of Austria was given as the first reason for the

Supreme Council action. A second basis for the Council action was its

belief that a political tie and common political action between Germany

and Austria would infringe too heavily upon Austrian independence.

What the above prohibition meant was that Austria, stripped of a ll its international power and prestige, partitioned through the

formation of CzeeheSlovakia, as an example, and forsaken by its former partner, Hungary, now had to wage a fight for political survival. In l e s s than th ree years i t became c le a r ly apparent th a t A u stria was on the verge of complete economic and political collapse* Precipitate action was required. It came from three directions, north, south and west, in the form of three treaties with Great Britain, France, Italy and Czechoslovakia, multilateral treaties which guaranteed respect for

Austria's political independence and a loan to insure Austrian economic

4aIbid., XIII, p. 199. Article 61 of the so-called Weimar Constitution included the paragraph: "German-Austrian after its union w ith tha German Commonwealth w ill r e c e iv e th e r ig h t o f p a r tic ip a tio n in the National Council [Reichsrat] with the number of votes corres ponding to its population. Until that time the representative of German-Austria have a deliberative voice," 109 viab ility, but only with an Austrian pledge not to compromise its 49 independence.

While these treaties provided Austria much needed assistance, they did not completely 3 tultify the thoughts of Anschluss, or union o f the two c o u n t r ie s , a thought s t i l l popularly h e ld by many Germans and Austrian 3 * The Germans, fearful of a Danube federation that might endanger Germany's predominant position in Central Europe, an idea ex pressed on various occasions even before World War I, now flexing their muscles under the tutelage of Hitler, even though not yet in power, bocame more obsessed with the thought of a union with Austria. Austria, on the other hand, s till struggling from military defeat, visualized the potential value of close alliance with Germany. The growing might of the German Nazi Party appealed to many Austrian Germans, The result was a p r o t o c o l, sign ed by Germany and A u stria, a t Vienna, on March 1 9 ,

The British Government objected to the Vienna protocol, inter preting it as inimical to the Restoration of Austria treaties of 1922,

49League of Nations■ Treaty Series, XII (1922), pp* 396-411. Restoration of Austria, Protocol Ho. I (Declaration), guaranteed respect for the political independence, territorial integrity, and financial reconstruction of Austria* Protocol No. II, the second treaty, signed by the same powers, on the same date, October it, 1922, provided for a combined-effort, guaranteed loan to Austria. Protocol Jio, III, the third treaty of the same date, contained the Austrian acceptance of the loan and resulting obligations 11 to abstain from any economic or finan cial engagement calculated directly or indirectly to compromise this independence *rr

^°Foraign Relations of the United States, Paris Peace Conference, 1919, XIII, p. 2 0 0 . The Germans and Austrians agree "to enter into nego tiations for a treaty to assimilate the tariff and economic policies of their respective countries * 11 109 just described above* The question was submitted to the Council of the

League, along with a French challenge on legal, economic and political grounds* The Council, however, felt itself incapable of rendering a decision and appealed to the Permanent Court of Justice, which decided, by a bare majority of one, that the proposed customs union agreed on by

Germany and A u str ia in th e Vienna p r o to c o l was in im ic a l to th e 1922 51 Restoration of Austria treaties, The essential existence of Austria was a strong point m ilitating against the customs union during the Court discussion of the proposed union*

Tha Court decision was preceded by a joint German-Austrian decision, just two days prior to the Court announcement against the customs union, which indicated an end to any current or future negotia tions by the two countries cn the subject of a customs union*

In an effort to ease the Austrian burden and placate those

Austrians so anxious for unity with Germany, four European countries provided for a second loan to Austria. Great Britain, France and Italy, this time accompanied by Belgium rather than Czechoslovakia, once again came to the assistance of Austria* The treaty, commonly known as the

Lausanne Protocol, included a preamble which re-affirmed the intent of the parties concerned, including Austria, to respect those portions of the first Restoration of Austria Treaty of 1922 concerning the political E 2 independence of Austria. The four signatories, alarmed over the close

51 League of Nations* The Monthly Summary of tha League of Nations, XI* 5 (May 1931 >, p p .1 1 7 -1 0 , 149 { XI, 6 (june 1931), pp * 157 j XI, 7 (July 1931), p.190; XI, a (August 1931), p.213; XI* 9 (September 1931), pp.259- 60, The Permanent Court rendered its decision on September 5, 1931*

52League of Nations. O fficial Journal, XIII (1932), p. 1451. 110

vote in the Permanent Court of International Justice on the customs

is s u e , now sought to p la c e le g a l r e s t r ic t io n s upon A u stria, le g a l r e s

trictions sufficiently binding to preclude any action by Germany, or

Austria, or both, that might enhance the prospects of future action

leading toward a customs union. The four signatories, however, had a

force much greater than legal action under the tenets of international

law with which to contend. Hitler was not to bo denied*

A ccess to p o l i t i c a l c o n tr o l in Germany provided H itle r the opportunity for laying an international smoke screen which concealed his true intent and covert activities in Austria. While stating, in

1935, th a t Germany had no d e s ir e o f in t e r fe r in g In A ustrian a f f a i r s , he simultaneously had Nazi agents active within Austria, seeking to make th e A u strian s r e s t iv e and d esiro u s o f A nschluss w ith Germany. Favorable results wore achieved and an agreement was reached on July 11, 1936 in which Austrian sovereignty supposedly was fully recognized by Germany.

Behind the facade the Germans were laying the groundwork for entry of

German troops into Austria. The new National Socialist Government in

Austria, having witnessed the entry of German troops into Austria on

March 12, 1938, waited until the following day to proclaim Austria as part of the German Reich, The German Government also published a law to tha same e f f e c t on th a t same day* S3

S3U.S., Congress, House, Attitude of the United States Toward Austria, 7Bth Cong., 2d sess*, 1930,, pp, 1-5* Sea also U*S*, Depart ment of State, Trial of War Criminals (Washington, D,C *1 United States Government Pr in ting 'Office’,’" 194 5 ) ,p * 32, and Royal Institute of Inter national Affairs, Documents on International Affairs, 1933, pp. 3B6-99, Dr. Engelbert Dollfus, the Chancellor of Austria succeeded' in publishing a decree prohibiting the German Nazi Party in Austria (June 19, I l l

The German law, officially known as the Federal Constitutional

Law of March 13, 1938, contained a stipulation that Austria officially would become a part of the German Reich upon promulgation of that law*

The law was promulgated on March IB, 193B, Notification of the law and i t 3 promulgation was forwarded to the Secretary-Gen oral of the

League of Nations on the date of promulgation* The final sentence of the communication to the League, added following the signatures, statedt

"On the date of the promulgation of this law, tha former Federal State of Austria ceased to be a Member of the League of Nations , " ^ 4

Hitler had succeeded in yet another of his goals* Austria no longer was sovereign* But the loss of sovereignty supposedly posed a new problem for Hitler since, under accepted practice in interna t io n a l law , th e d eb ts o f th e absorbed S ta te become th e burden o f the ab so rb in g S ta te * T his would mean th a t H it le r 's Germany had o b lig a tio n s to the League of Nations and other sovereignties, formerly the respon sib ilities of the sovereign Austria, which it was required to liquidate*

But international law meant little to H itler, who unilaterally decided that the debts incurred by Austria prior to the Anschluss were problems of the debtors, and, if negotiable at a ll, were to be negotiated under

1933). DoIlfus, seeing the danger of the Nazi influence, sought to increase the armed forces from 23,000 to 30,000, the lim it stipulated in the Treaty of St* Germain* No resistance was met from Great Britain or Italy. Tha chief objection came from the German Nazi Party* Dollfus was murdered on duly 2S, 1934, during the unsuccess ful coup d'etat by indigenous Nazis in Austria*

sl*League of Nations* The Monthly Summary of the League of Nations, XVIII, 3 (March 1938), p. 62, 112 terms established by Adolf Hitler,the same H itle r who n ea rly two decades earlier had decided to establish a political collision course th a t would have ser io u s r e p e r c u ssio n s not o n ly fo r Germany and the

League but a ll of humanity,

^ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1938, II, pp, 403-515; 1939, II, pp. 559-66, See also Attitude of the United States Toward Austria, 10, 20-23; U.S. National Archives, Federal Register, V, 93 (Kay 11, 1940), pp, 1677-B, and Department of State, Department of State Bulletin, IV, p, 103 (June 14, 1941), p. 71B[ V, 112 (August 16, 1941), pp# 125-32; and V, 129 (December 13, 1941), p. 477, Neither the United States nor Great Britain recognized the Anschluss as legal or do jure under the Atlantic Charter* The United States felt that the "annexation 11 was a violation of Germany's treaty obligations. It considered Austria forcibly deprived of its sovereign right and self-government, Churchill agreed with President Roosevelt, The Austrian debt to the United States was set at $26 million with several million in bonds owed to citizens of residents of the United States, All German, Austrian and Italian assets in the United States ware frozen on June 14, 1941 by Executive Order No,8399. Needless to say, World War II negated the possibility of collecting the debts except through the confiscation procedures, V

ITALY CHALLENGES THE LEAGUE

Tha Italy of the nineteenth and first four decades of the twentieth centuries had been plagued by a number of political problems

which affected that nation In Its domestic and international relations.

On the domestic scene, Italy had been a kingdom until just after the

First World War and, as is the case with many kingdoms, the ruling class was incapable of meeting the challenge of change and progress,

The spirit of status quo infested the internal structure and stagna tion Inhibited the mobility of the population* Malcontent led to acceptance of a new leadership in 1922 which was not the cure for the cancerous deterioration. The new leadership, being fascist and radi cal, caused more harm than the leadership it had replaced,

International affairs also had played a major role in Italy,

It had been completely unprepared for the rola into which it was cast by other actors on the stage of international political intercourse,

France, Great Britain and Russia had convinced an otherwise neutrally inclined Italy that It could be the recipient of rewards completely out of proportion to the effort it would have to expend if it became active in the First World War, but only if it sided with those three powers a g a in st Germany and A u str ia ■ The S ecret T reaty o f London was the proverbial pot of gold at the end of the rainbow, both of which

113 114

blinded Italy to tha political reality which signified that the prize offered is not always guaranteed even though promised in sincerity.

The rude awakening after the war was over shook the confidence of the nation which suddenly wondered why the prize was so elusive,

Tha International scene also contained another element which affected post-war Italy, This involved one man and a movement initial ly, and then several men and that same movement later. In the initial s it u a t io n , th e man was Woodrow W ilson and the movement was th e attem pt to establish an international organization that might help divert man's energies from tho battlefields of the past, When the Italian delega tion to the Peace Conference became too vociferous and demanding,

Wilson found that he had the backing of David Lloyd George and Georges

Clemencaau who suggested that the Italians awaken themselves to reality and drastically modify their claims under the Secret Treaty of London,^

The r e a li z a t i o n th a t th e y were b ein g d e ser te d by th e very same p o l i t i cal salesmen who had done such a fine job of convincing the Italians of the wisdom of marching to the battlefield, combined with what they construed to be tho cold ruthlessness of Wilson, changed the mental outlook of the Italians toward the proposed League of Nations, The sug gested international organization slowly took on a new status, It gradually became a symbol of defeat for Italy, while simultaneously representing Wilson, the prime mover for a League of Nations, who did so much to frustrate the Italian attempt to collect its promised

J'See supra. Chapter II, pp, 25-26, 34-35t for a discussion of the Secret Treaty of London and the Italians at the Peace Conference, 115 reward. In spite of the fact that It had lost much of Its esteem for the new International organization, Italy nevertheless joined with the hopes that a favorable solution eventually would bo gained* It was a form of political marriage of convenience, glamorous in appearance but somewhat frivolous beneath the surface, especially after the ascendance to power of the Fascist Party of Italy.

The stage, in 1922, had been sot for an interesting relation ship between Italy and tha League* This relationship would include two acute violations of the Covenant, suspected undercover shipments to

Hungary, the Italian withdrawal from the league and the availability of sufficient sympathy between Italy and Hungary &r a withdrawal, Thus, the examination of the first serious violation of the Covenant by Italy, more commonly known a s th e Corfu in c id e n t now can be i n i t i a t e d .

Tha Corfu In c id e n t

A brief resume of events that had transpired through a decade of years must be presented to fully comprehend what had led to the

Corfu crisis.

Albania had been established an one of the results of the

Balkan Wars of 1912-13, Tho complicated situation concerning the bor ders of tha newly established State required a solution* The Great

Powers decided to organize two delim itation commissions which would 2 demarcate tha exact boundaries of Albania* The southern boundary was

^Jaroes tiarros. The Corfu Incident of 1923 (Princeton: Prince ton University Press, 1953 ) t p* 1 0 0 , The boundary had been e s ta b lis h e d on paper by the Protocol of London but had to be marked on the ground. The approach of winter precluded completion of the work on the north ern lim its of Albania, 11B

completed by December 13, 1913 but work on the northern boundary was

held up because o f c o ld weather c o n d itio n s. The work would have been

completed the following year but tha World War forced a delay until

termination of hostilities,

Albania acted immediately after tha War by appealing to the q Paris Peace Conference for a final settlement of ita boundaries.

Other problems ware considered of more importance and no decision was

reached by the Peace Conference on the Albanian request. The Albanian

Government came to an agreement with the Italian Government under which a ll Italian troops were withdrawn from Albania, In the area not de marked the situation was different. Yugoslav troops occupied areas

suspected of being Albanian and disturbances were prevalent. The east ern border also was of concern to Albania, especially the northern sec tion where difficulty was being experienced with frequent Yugoslav r a id s .

The crux of the problem now revolved around interpretations of the border In the areas adjacent to Yugoslavia and Greece, The two contended that the old boundaries were obsolete while Albania claimed tho pre-war boundaries valid but in need of demarcation. Tension con tinued and repeated confrontations along the north and eastern borders of Albania forced the Assembly of the League to take action. The bor ders were fixed on paper by the Conference of Ambassadors and a

3Gerhard P, Pink, The Conference of Ambassadors (Hew York: Columbia University Press, 1942), p," 107, See- also Royal Institute of International Affairs, Survey of International A ffairs, 1923 (London: Oxford University Prees,ri925y, p. 344, 117 Li Commission of Delimitation was established. General Enrico Tellini, an Italian, was made president of the Commission which had to delay

its work until Hay, 1933 when the weather again would permit continuity of the task of marking tha border*

Tellini had decided that the British and French representatives should work along the Yugoslav-Albanian border while ha and his Italian assistants would mark the Greek-Albanian border which had been the scene of many Greek and Albanian forays and was considered a dangerous area.

This latter area was considered so dangerous that the Governor General of the Epirus area of Greece had cautioned Tellini not to depart without e s c o r t . 5 Four days later, on August 27, Tellini and his staff were murdered while en route to a point along the border, The Conference of Ambassadors received notification of the murder later that same day.

The Investigation that followed failed to uncover the murderers or any witnesses to the act. It did, however, net the stage for political repercussions involving the League as well as Italy and Greece,

Under normal conditions and circumstances, events probably would have proceeded with a minimum of exacerbation. The injured State would have demanded restitution through normal diplomatic channels.

The injured State also probably would have suffused its demands with

^Survey of International Affairs, 1923, pp, 344-6, See also League of Nations, Offacial Journal, 11(1921), p, 1196,

5George Glaskow* The Janina Hurders and the Occupation of Corfu {London; The Anglo-Hellenic League, 1923), p, 19. See also Waiters, A History of the League of Hationa, pp, 244-5 and U.S., National Ar chives, Records of tne Department of State Relating to Political Rela tions Between Greece and Other States, 1910-29 (WaeHlngton, B.C.; The National Archives, 1963), File 76B»7515/54," 118 sufficient publicity to satiate the public appetite—and the case gradual ly would have decreased in importance, But the circumstances were novel during that period, especially in Italy where Benito Mussolini s till was attempting to consolidate his power as the leader of Italy, Mussolini's poor qualifications, when coupled with the undertainty faced by virtually all diplomats after the First World War, and his desire to "startle the diplomatic world , 11 resulted in a condition in which the course of events

g could not be predicted with any reasonable amount of certainty. It also

Gordon A* Craig and Felix Gilbert, eds. The Diplomats i 1919- 1839 (Princetoni Princeton University Press, 1953), pp. 214-7, 266, See also G, A, Borgese, Goliathi The March of Fascism (New York: The Viking Press, 1937), 254; Count Carlo Sforza, Contemporary Italy (New York: E, P. Dutton and Company, 1944) trans, Drake and Denise de Kay, p, 347; U.S., National Archives, Records of the Department of State Relating to Political Relations Between Italy and Other States, 1910-1929 (Washington, B.C.: The National Archives, 1963), File 765. 60/22, 765.68/24, 765.68/124, 768,7515/44, 768,7515/45; and Hanley 0* Hudson, "How tha League of Nations Met the Corfu C risis," World Peace Foundation Pamphlets, VI, 3 (1323), pp. 189-200, The career dip lomats of Italy during this period were more pessim istic than Mussolini* They entertained no illusion concerning Italy's inadequate military and financial position in Europe and were more conservative than Duce Mussolini, Many of them favored a closer political friendship with Great Britain, a friendship that might correspond to the cordial rela tions between Italy and Franca. While most were stable the same could not be said of the Italian Ambassador to Greece (Montagna) who, affected by earlier anti-Italian press articles in Greek newspapers, apparently allowed bis Imagination to overcome discretion# The incident was la beled as political, Montagna 1 s report to hia Government led the Duce to form a close link between the anti-Italian press and the murders. The United States Chargd in Rome (Gunther) noted that the Italian Foreign Minister (Salvatore Contarini) was absent from Rome throughout the Corfu inaident. The Charg^ felt that had Contarini, noted for thinking two stages ahead of most diplomatic adversaries, been in Rome, advising the Duce, the course of events undoubtedly would have taken a much more moderate course, most likely within the League structure, which is exactly what Mussolini did not want, as may be seen in his massage to the Italian Minister in Berne, Switzerland, trThe Italian Government has had no intention and does not now intend to submit Its dispute with Greece to the League of Nations. As this dispute is solely a question of the upholding of Italian 119 meant that Italy's diplomats, or those who so desired, could play upon the emotions of Mussolini* One who chose this course of action was

Signor Guilio C. Montagna, Italy's Ambassador to Greece, whose apparent dislike of Greece was not too well concealed. It was Montagna's avarice toward Greece, readily apparent In his communications to

Mussolini, which seemed to set the stage for Italy's demands to Greene and Italy's cliallenge to the League, the first real test for that international organization.

The Greek Government, immediately upon learning of the murders, sent Its regrets to the Italian Government and a promise that the mur derers would be punished* The Italian nation, now in a state of frenzy, due chiefly to the incitement by Mussolini, was in no mood for regrets and promises which perfectly suited Mussolini, who undoubtedly translated the situation into prospects of grandeur for himself. Hot waiting for the Conference of Ambassadors to take action, and apparent ly ignoring the fact that this general area had been the source on many occasions of problems to the Greek Government, Mussolini sent a list of seven demands to the Greek Government with deadlines to be met in two prestige and honor and has not heen accompanied by any act or threat of war, the Italian Government does not consider that tha dispute falls within the competence of the League In accordance with the pro visions of the Covenant *11

7League of Nations* League of Nations Political A ctivities (Geneva: League of Nations Information Secretariat,"Y9237"*- pp, 93-111 j Treaty Series, XXVIII (1924), pp, 247-8 and Groat Britain, foreign O ffice, British and Foreign State Papers (London: H*M* Stationery O ffice), LIV, pp, 24-25, 120 a of tho demands* An official apology was to be accompanied by a formal funeral service and honors to the Italian flag* An inquiry was demanded in the presence of an Italian military attache, which had to be com pleted within five days* When caught the murderers were to receive capital punishment* Italy also demanded indemnity of fifty million lire with a five day deadline also stipulated* As a final demandt the

Italian Government sought full military honors for the victims. The

Greek Government was given a period of twenty-four hours for a reply*

The Greek Government replied within tha specified time but took exception to certain implied elements of the Italian demand. It found three of tho seven demands offensive to the Greek Government,

The Italian demand for an immediate inquiry, in the presence of an

Italian military attache, the Italian insistence of capital punishment of the murderers and the indemnity of fifty million lire (about $2,27 million at that time) were interpreted by the Greek Government as an insinuation of guilt for the atrocities and a violation of the sover- q eignty of the Greek State, The Greek Government therefore felt com pelled to reject the three demands and appealed to the League of

N a tio n s,

0Hudson, "How the League of Nations Met the Corfu Crisis," pp, 179, 201-2, See also Records of the Department of State Relating to Political Relations between Greece and Other States, 1910-29, F ile 7 6 0 ,7 5 1 5 /4 5 , 768*7515/^6, The I t a lia n sev en -p o in t demand was made on August 29, 1923,

Hudson, op. c it,, pp, 202-3, The Greek reply was made on August 30, 1923, 121

The Government of Greece appealed to the Secretary-General for

assistance* The appeal contained a very brief resume of what already

had transpired and expressed the Greek desire that the Council of the

League be convened, under the provisions of Articles 1 2 and 15 of the

Covenant, to act on the dispute

While the appeal wub being communicated from Athens to the Per

manent Greek Secretariat in Geneva, and then being prepared for presen

tation to the Secretary-General, two other events occurred. The

Conference of Ambassadors requested that the Greek Government in itiate

an immediate inquiry into the murders* The Conference notified the

Greek Government that it (the Conference) would reserve for itself a

decision on the penalties that Greece should pay,^ This makes it

appear that the Conference of Ambassadors was inclined toward accusing

the Greek Government even before an investigation could be completed.

The second event was of much more serious nature* It involved the occu

pation of the Island of Corfu by Italian military forces.

The occupation of Corfu is difficult to explain* There are two

versions, one Italian and one Greek, and they do not correspond in cer

ta in aspects,The Greek version stipulates that the Italian naval

bid., pp, 205-5. Article 12 authorised Members to submit a dispute likely to lead to a rupture to the Council. Article 15 allowed Members to submit a communication to the Secretary-General who then would request action by the Council in an attempt to resolve the dispute. The Greek Government appealed to the Secretary-General on September 1,

■ ^ Ib id ., p, 1 7 9 .

l 2Ibid., pp* 205-9. See also League of hations, Greek Refugee Settlament (Genevai League of Nations, 1926), Chap. I-IlTT The shift ing of territorial borders and minority groups after World War I had 122

officer, during his visit to the Prefect of Corfu, was notified, prior

to the Italian naval bombardment, that the two fortresses on the island

contained several thousand refugees as well as an orphanage occupied by

several hundred children. The Greek Prefect informed the Italian

naval officer that he would seek instructions from hie Government*

The Italian version indicates that the Prefect was Instructed

to evacuate the refugees and children but actually fled for safety

rather than carry out the Italian instructions* At any rate, the forty-

five minute warning given by the Italian naval officer appears to have

been totally insufficient time to evacuate that many refugees and

children* It also appeared to be a demand totally out of context with

normal political procedures, since the Prefect undoubtedly felt that

th e white f la g demanded by th e I ta lia n n aval o f f ic e r could be d isp la y ed

only by authority of the Greek Government,

The I ta lia n bombardment which was in it ia t e d a t fiv e o 'c lo c k ,

exactly forty-five minutes after the visit by the Italian naval officer,

r esu lted in a number o f deaths and c a s u a ltie s among the refu g ees and children. Tho island then was occupied by the Italian naval fleet*

Corfu had been occupied and the task now fe ll to Mussolini to offer an explanation to the international political community as to why

Italy had taken such a step* Mussolini began by instructing his Ambas

sador at Geneva on the steps to ba taken to mellow potential hostile caused a masa o f confusion fo r Greece * The refugee problem was a prob lem of great enormity for a country the size of Greece to handle* Greece was at the end of ten years of military effort and was exhausted* It requested Council assistance in February, 1923, 123 attitudes toward the Italian action. The British and French Represen tatives were to be warned that "tha dignity and honor of Italy" were involved and that the question would be resolved by Italy at the earl-

1 3 ieat possible date. They also were to be warned that a hostile attitude against Italy at the League might be harmful to the League and perhaps cause Italy "to review its position in the same Society,

The question of the Corfu action did not fall under the purview of the Covenant, according to Mussolini.

A legal basis for the Italian action would have benefited

Italy and the Dues had the answer. The Italian occupation of Corfu, supposedly pacific in nature and provisional in character, being a sequel to an unwarranted Greek action, was viewed as an accepted prac tice in international law. As proof, Mussolini offered examples such as the French occupation of Mytiline Island in 1914 and the United

States occupation of Vera Cruz, also in 1914. Several other cases also were cited by the Duce. There was one important point that was overlooked by Mussolini, The International legal status of Corfu was in no way identical to that of the other previously affected areas, as

I q Barros, op, c lt., p, 99, Barros presents a vivid expose of the many intricacies invo 1ved in cases of this nature,

^ Ibld. Mussolini also stated, and he insisted that his am bassadors do likewise when not in Council meetings, that should Italy submit the question to the Council it would constitute a precedent, so dangerous that a ll States would in the future be bound to submit a ll questions Involving national honor and prestige to an international organization for resolution. 124 noted by Barros * ^ Corfu had been perpetually neutralized as a result of a treaty between Austria-Hungary, France, Great Britain, Greece,

Prussia and Russia, signed on March 39, 1B64* This treaty s till was in affect in 1923 in spite of the fact that a change in 3 tatus for Corfu was discussed during the Treaty of Lausanne, which had not been ratified when Italian forces occupied the island*

Mussolini now turned his full attention to the Council of the

League to which the Greek Government had appealed* The C ou n cil, accord ing to Mussolini, was "absolutely incompetent" to deal with the crisis, which the Italian leader considered alien to the contest of the Cove-

16 nant. The Duce then left the question of Italian membership to the

Councili Should the Council decide that it was competent to act on the question, then Italy would have to decide on whether it should remain a Member of the League or withdraw, Mussolini apparently favored with draw al.

^ B a rr o s, op. c i t . t pp, 100-04. See a ls o Edward H e r tsla t, The Map of Europe by Treaty

^6Barros, op, cit*, p. 124, Mussolini challenged the Council's right of acting upon the question from yet another approach* He felt that the Conference of Ambassadors already had begun an investigation and was the logical body for the investigation, due chiefly to the fact that Tellini had been a member of that group and tho Conference was more knowledgeable of the area and circumstances prevailing, 125

In spite of Mussolini's aversion to the Council, that body did

discuss the crisis, Suggestions were made by the Greek Representative

that a neutral commission be appointed by the Council to supervise and

follow through the investigation already being completed by the Greak 17 Government, Many of the smaller Members favored this proposal,

especially in view of the fact that It had been suggested by Greece, a

weak Member of the League. Mussolini did not appreciate tho Council

discussion and once again threatened an Italian withdrawal, A ll that

was required to precipitate such action, according to the Duce, was

"any marked show of h ostility 11 toward Italy, which would be answered

by "protests and withdrawal from the Assembly chamber*"^®

The scene then shifted to Paris where the Conference of Ambas

sadors met on September 5, 1923* Although one might pay little atten tion to such a M ating, the fact remains that the Conference was meeting during the same period as the Council, in fact on the same day, to discuss the vary same issue as the Council, The Conference discussion drifted from a note delivered by Greece to the Conference, in which it stated its willingness to make restitution if that course were decided on by the Conference of Ambassadors, a promise considered by the French and Italian representatives as a veiled admission of guilt, to a dis cussion of the composition of a special board of disinterested represen tatives who might investigate tho crisis, and finally, to accusations

^League of Hat ions* O fficial Journal. V (1924), pp* 1203-5*

iaBarros, op. cit*, p. 140, 126 of incompetence on the part of the Greek Government in the conduct of 19 the investigation. The meeting terminated with the composition of a note of reminder that States are responsible for the acts of their citizens and a caution against a judgment prior to findings to warrant a judgment, The note wan forwarded to the Council of the League,

The scene then shifted back to Geneva where the Council met on the following afternoon, September 6 , Quinones de Leon, the Spanish 20 Representative, then made several proposals, Greece was to forward its regrets directly to the governments of the three powers represented on the Delimitation Commission rather than to Italy* Ha next suggested that these same three governments participate in the investigation.

His third recommendation would have the Permanent Court of Justice rule

□n the amount to be paid by Greece as compensation, Finally, Greece should be compelled to deposit fifty million lire in a bank in Switzer land, said money to be used in accordance with the decision of the

Records of the Eapartment of State Relating to Political Re lations Between Italy and Other States, 1910-29, File 765.69/22, 765, 68/40. See also Records of the Department of State Relating to World War I and Its Termination, 1914-2 B,' (Washington, D,C. t fHelTatlonal- Archives, 1962), File 763,72119/12020, Annex E, and League of Nations, O fficial Journal, IV (1923), p* 1294, The combined efforta of the French and Italian representatives at tho Conference meetings apparent ly injected a degree of confusion and unfair castigation of Greece even prior to a full-scale investigation being completed, What is surprising here is that the British representative did not inject his habitual sympathy for Greece which would have had an influence on the outcome of the meetings. In all fairness to the French representative it must be stated that he did, in his note of the proceedings, recog nize the fact that Greece was not guilty until evidence substantiated such guilt. Greece, in the meantime, had called the murders an insane act, devoid of politics, suggested a commission composed of three representatives each from the powers on the Conference of Ambassadors to investigate the Incident, It also made itself ready to pay if found g u ilt y , 20 Halters, op, cat., p, 249, Permanent Court* A decision was made to forward these suggestions

to the Conference of Ambassadors in Paris even though they had not

been adopted by tho Council, chiefly because of the opposition raised

by the Italian delegate as to the Council's competence In this crisis*^

The Conference of Ambassadors, on September 6 , once a g a in met

and let it be known that wisdom at times should be given preference

over procedure, It accepted the suggestions of the Council even

though they had not been adopted. The urgency of the situation was

appreciated. After a certain amount of heated discussion, with sug

gestions irade and rejections voiced, the Conference arrived at a

decision that would incorporate several demands, an invitation, assur- 22 ances and a s a t is f a c t io n o f demands* S ix demands were to be made

against Greece, Apologies were to be forwarded to France, Great

Britain and Japan, the three powers with representatives in the Delimi

tation Commission, In retrospect, this would be a victory for the

League and defeat for Italy, A second condition would require a

Catholic sorvlce for the Italian victims in Athens, as previously de

manded by Italy, Greece then would be required to present a twenty-

one gun salute to each flag when the French, British and Italian ships arrived at the Greek port for return of tho bodies. Military honors also were to be rendered during embarkation of the bodies, The fifth demand required an expeditious investigation by Greece, The sixth and final demand required that Greece submit its investigation to supervision

2lLeague of Nations, Official Journal, IV (1923), pp,1294-1301, 22 Barros, op. c it,, pp, 18Q-201, See also Hudson, op, c lt,,pp,lBB 129

by the delegates of the Delimitation Commission who would bo accompan ied by an Italian delegate*

Satisfaction was not achieved until an invitation was extended to Greece to accept tho terms of the Conference demands. An assurance also was demanded of Greece* This could be satisfied by dispatch of notes to France, Great Britain and Japan, notifying each of the Greek

Government's good w ill and intentions, The Greek Government, in turn, would receive assurance from Italy that the occupation was temporary in n a tu r e , T his a ssu ra n ce was made a p a rt o f th e note to Greece* In its final aspect the Greek acceptance of the Conference demands would provide a satisfaction to Italy that it was receiving redress for wrongs done its three citizens on the foreign soil of Greece,

Although the Conference and the League would have appreciated an immediate Italian approval of the Conference note and demands upon

Greece, Mussolini decided that the evacuation would be completed only 23 after completion of the investigation* Although it appeared that progress was being made, and that Mussolini had accepted a modification of five of his original demands, the Conference and the League had a long way to travel,

A definite date for the evacuation was desired by the Confer ence, but Mussolini remained elusive on this point, even though his delegate to the Conference sought an early end to the discussions. One week had elapsed since the Conference had drafted and forwarded Its

^ Records 0f the Department of State Relating to World Har I and Its Termination, 1914-29, Fila 763*72119/12029, 129 demands to Greece, a week filled with tension In the League, which had hoped for a more rational approach than that taken by Italy in this d isp u te »

The Conference of Ambassadors now directed attention from i t self to the Council through its note to the Council, The Council ex pressed pleasure that the Conference had enjoyed success, especially in view of the fact that Greece had assured the Italian Government of its acceptance of the Conference demands, Mussolini, on the other hand, remained somewhat skeptical of the Council and decided to impose con ditions upon the Council, Not only did he demand that the Council consider the question closed but he insisted that the Council refrain from sending the matter to the Assembly, Reference of the question to the Assembly, according to the Duce, would result in unilateral ac tions by Italy In its relations with his former partners of World War I, 24 Strange as i t may seem, th e C oun cil accep ted M u sso lin i's demands* The

League, in effect, had accepted Mussolini's dictum that the League was not competent to deal with the problem,

Responsibility in the dispute now rested with the Commission of Inquiry and the Conference of Ambassadors, which finally decided, on the following day, that the Greek Government had been negligent and should award Italy the amount It demanded, Italy received the fifty million lire on the 27th of September and evacuated Corfu on the same d a te, 25

Barros* op. c it,, pp, 254-0,

2 ^Hudson, op, c it., p, 192, 130

Tho case was not yet closed* Tho question of competence had not been resolved* The President of the Council, the Japanese Delegate, therefore decided to subnit the question of Council competence to a

Committee of Jurists, composed of representatives from all of the 26 Council Members, Italian attempts to block the Council action were unsuccessful, and this suggests an irony in tho whole affair, since

Italy in itially questioned the competence of the Council, At any rate, the Committee of Jurists decided in favor of the Council* 27 The whole affair had repercussions in Italy and the League,

In Italy, the Italians felt the brunt of world opinion, virtually com pletely hostile toward Italy, which caused Italians to question their own foreign policy approach, Mussolini had underestimated the unity of opposition he had to face in the Assembly of the League* The League, on the other hand, realized for the first time how little tho Covenant could be valued by one of its Members which dared to challenge it*

Thu League also found itself subject to the vacillations of its member ship, Tho French, interested in support of its occupation of the Ruhr, and desiring Italian support if the question came up for discussion, helped prolong the agony of tho League in its discussion of the Corfu crisis. Tho British, on the other hand, early realized their weakness and wore forced to switch from complete allegiance to Greece to a posi tion of compromise with French views. The end was not in sight for the

League, More was t o come.

^ Ibid., pp. 193-5, See also Walters, op. cit. , pp. 251-4*

S7Waltcrs, op. cit., pp* 254-5, 131

The Inter-Crisis Period

Relations between Italy and the League during the years be tween the Corfu incident and the second major crisis, to be discussed shortly, was a period of mutually subdued acceptance* Italy partici pated in League functions but the spirit of compromise was effected from the purview of maintaining the status quo in Europe* In this sensa Italy was not far off the course being pursued by France and

Great Britain, more so the latter than the former. The League, domin ated by France and Great Britain, looked to Italy as a necessary partner in maintaining stability in Europe, with France as a more active Member than Great Britain.

The Treaty of Locarno is a prime example of the search for security in Europe. 2 0 Though consummated outside the League structure, the aims of France, Germany, Great Britain and Italy were identical— stability in the western sector of Europe* The League, though not directly the forum in which tho Treaty was engineered, was a benefic iary through prospects of peace and security afforded by the Locarno

Fact*

The next act of importance involving Italy and the League oc curred in the League a little over three years later* The Kellogg

Fact, an aftermath of tho Briand proposed pact between the United States and France, which would outlaw war between the two, was a m ultilateral pact introduced in the agenda of the League's Assembly and adopted in

^sSee Chap* IV, footnote 40 and associated information* 132 29 the latter part of 1926* In this case Italy acted in the 3 ame manner as virtually a ll other League Members* The Pact amounted to an addi tional safeguard for Italy beyond that already gained through the Treaty of Locarno* The Pact also proceeded one step beyond by allowing Italy a more secure timetable in which to increase its military strength through increased armaments*

The problem of armaments had been on the League agenda for about six years, evon though it had enjoyed some prominence in the desires of the League founders for a longer period* The Italian atti tude during much of this period, whether in the League discussions or outside the Organization, was one of carefully deliberate inaction. It had not been subjected to any inconvenience by the various treaties of 30 the Washington Conference of 1922* The ratio established at the

Conference had left Italy content with the lim itation of naval vessels imposed. Italy, in fact, had been given a limited authorization to expand* It had no resentment toward the Washington Conference. The ratio, when computed in actual lim itations allowed, meant that Italy could possess a number of ships larger than it already had*

In spita of Italian content with the results of the Washington

Conference, the nearly stagnant progress of the League's Preparatory

Commission, and the Locarno and Kellogg Pacts, times were changing and

Italy found the Disarmament Conference, a League function, more

^W olfers, Britain and France Between Two Wars, p. 1&3. See also oupra. Chap.III, footnote 24 and allied information. 30 See supra, Chap* H I, footnote 14-18 and allied information* 133

challenging* The Soviet Union was taking an active interest in matters

involving peace and a reduction of armaments rather than a lim itation.

The new approach caused a revaluation of the European situation, espec

ially in view of the fact that a new menace, Hitlerism, was growing in

in t e n s it y in Germany* The danger posed by th e German demand fo r e q u ity in armaments became more acute and ominous after the German withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference and the League,

Italy's alarm over the German action was quite similar to the reactions of other Members. Southeastern and Southern Europe ware in danger If Germany should rearm and once again become a leading power in

Europe, Any intentions of German expansion to the south could not be challenged by Italy which, as early as 1933, was preparing for a war 31 in Ethiopia where it had been quite active for nearly ten years.

I t a l y wa 3 too occupied with its plan of colonial expansion in Africa— an expansion which precipitated a second major crisis involving Italy and the League.

Prelude to the Itala-Ethiopian War

Although the relationship between Italy and Ethiopia, formerly known as Abyasinia, dated back to about 1870, the first real conflict

Walters, op. c it., p, 624, See also Wolfers, pp. cit., pp. 313-4, The British had, in 1824 and 1925, responded favorably to Italian demands for British concessions in Africa, and particularly in Ethiopia. The Italian demands were based on the Secret Treaty of London o f 1 9 1 5 , The French were not as ready to make concessions to Italy as were the British* The French yielded in 1935 but the Ethio pians appealed to the League, contesting Italian action, precluded completion of an agreement between Italy and EVance, 131+

between the tra occurred In 1396 when a much larger Ethiopian force

■■a n mot and defeated an Italian force at Adowa. The victory has bean

considered the greatest in Ethiopian history* The defeat, caused par

tia lly by an unwarranted miscalculation by the Italian Government,

became a blemish on Italian honor that one day would have to be avenged , 3 3

Even though Italian honor would have to be avenged, Italy found itself

with competition in Eastern Africa* France and Great Britain also had

visions of expansion in that area, The only rational approach would

involve an agreement, which is what occurred in 1906 when Prance, Italy

and Great Britain signed a tripartite agreement under which each sig- 34 natory enjoyed certain rights in East Africa.

32 George F* Berkeley, The Campaign of Adowa and the Rise of Manejik (London; Constable £ Co,, Ltd,, 1902), P * 256, 33 John A, Thayer, Italy andjthe Great War: Politics and Culture, 1870-1915 {Madison; University of Wisconsin Press, 1964), pp. 73, 206-7, 252.

3 <*A, J , Barker, The C iv iliz in g M ission (Mew York* The D ial Press, 1968), Appendix 1, The Agreement Between the United Kingdom, Franco, and Italy Respecting Ethiopia, signed in London on December 13, 1906, dealt with the maintenance of the political and territorial status quo In Ethiopia, based on nine previous agreements, conven tions, treaties and notes, a ll bilateral, involving any combination of Ethiopia, France, Graat Britain and Italy* Perhap 3 the chief under lying point immediately obvious in this tripartite agreement was the extremely liberal attitude entertained by the three powers toward each other in matters involving Ethiopia, which, for reasons bast known to the three participants, was not a signatory to the agreement* Although references were made of prior bilateral agreements with Ethiopia, the Ethiopian Emperor was not given the benefit of expressing his rightful desires, Clausula rebus sic stantibus, known in international law as change in circumstances, frequently used as a basis for revising or nullifying a treaty, apparently was completely non-existent in London on December 13, 1906* 135

In spite of the fact that Ethiopia had not had a voice in the tripartite agreement of 1906, it survived through the next seventeen years and was admitted to the League of Nations in 1923, even though

Great Britain strongly objected, France and Italy, suspicious of Bri tish aims in Ethiopia, solidly supported membership for Ethiopia * 35

Membership in the League should have been construed as a clear title to internal freedom of action. This, however, was not the case,

British and Italian interests in Ethiopia became more apparent and the Ethiopian Government decided that the time had arrived for a complaint, not only to Great Britain and Italy, but to the League as 36 well. The British reply, recognizing the fact that it had reached an agreement with Italy in 1925 in their endeavors in Ethiopia, sugges ted that Ethiopia had a recognized right to limit the activities of any foreign State or enterprise within Ethiopia and that the agreement of

1925, between Italy and Great Britain, was reached with the aim of avoiding competition that might imperil economic enterprises* The explanation apparently placated Ethiopia, which than saw fit to con- 37 elude, with Italy, a Treaty of Friendship and Arbitration* The crux of this treaty of 1929 was Article 3 which made increased trade a matter

3 5Walters, op. c it. , p. 25B*

36League of Nations. O fficial Journal, VII (1926), pp. 1517-25*

^League of Nations* Treaty Series, XG1V (1929), pp* 414-21, 424-45* Tho Treaty was accompanied by a second treaty for construction of a road close to 500 miles long, over 400 miles of which were in Ethiopia, with Ethiopia financing that portion of the road within its own boundaries. The second tr e a ty was o f f i c i a l l y known a s th e Road Convention, Between Abyssinia and Italy. 136

of concern to each signatory. The financial outlay required of Ethiopia

under this treaty placed the longevity of the treaty in immediate doubt,

The foreign affairs of Italy during the next five years Mere

directed toMard an attempt to enhance the position of Italy in Europe,

The approaching failure of the League sponsored Disarmament Conference

loft Mussolini in a frenzied state of mind, Mis esteem of the League,

never great in any sense of the word, already severely reduced by the

League actions during the Corfu crisis of 1923, now was at an extreme

low. Ho therefore sought to bypass the League and establish a four-

power pact that would include France, Germany, Great Britain and Italy,

France could not afford to arouse the fears of its friends in the Little

Entente, Groat Britain was suffering from internal political and econ omic problems, while Germany was more interested in its future prospects at home and in Central Europe, What Mussolini gained was a pact which 30 resembled his original idea in little more than name. Failure and

30Crain and Gilbert, eds* The Diplomats, 1919-1939, p* 3B4, See also G, M, Gat home-Hardy, A Short" History International Affairs, 1920-1939 (Hew Fork: Oxford University Press, 1964), pp, 365-B, ”and Great Britain, Foreign O ffice, Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918- 1945 (London: H, M, Stationery Offico, 1959), Series C, III, p. 766, The Four-Power Pact, signed on June 6, 1933, did not contain the differ entiation between strong and weak powers so sorely desired by Mussolini, Nor did it represent the Italian desire of a strong grouping that could disregard the League of Nations while simultaneously dictating the pro gress of Europe. Mussolini, already disenchanted with the League concept of conference diplomacy, also became disenchanted with H itler for whom he had authorised tho training of slightly more than 100 German air per sonnel in secret bombing techniques. This training was discontinued in 1934, It might also be noted that Mussolini was facing a dilemma in his approach to conditions in Italy, Social and economic reforms long had been required in Italy, In attempting to exert himself in Europe or Ethiopia, he was faced with the prospect of domestic fractious passions. Mussolini's position was tenuous. 137

frustration caused Mussolini to turn elsewhere* Elsewhere, in this case, meant East Africa. Ethiopia once again took an Importance far

beyond its actual value, especially after the Disarmament Conference ended In failure In early 1934,

Any remaining hopes for an Italian position of prominence in

Central Europe were dashed with the attempted coup d'etat by the Nazis

In Vienna In July, 1934, The Duce had little choice but to soak fame and prestige through utility of imperialism as the catalyst. A time table was established and preparations for war against Ethiopia were in well under way in 1935,

While the preparations were in effect, however, the Duce had been presented what be considered a justification for an attack upon

Ethiopia* This occurred at Wal Wal on December 5, 1934 when a skirmish broke out between Italian troops in the vicinity of the many water wells 4 0 as Wal Wal and Ethiopian troops facing them*

39 Lord Robert Cecil* A Great Experiment (Londoni Oxford Uni versity Press, 1941), p, 264,

!*°League of Nations, O fficial Journal, XVI (1935), pp, 250, 750-1, 755-9, 13Q2, 1304-5, 1445, 1460, 1463, 1471, 1730-9, 1542-5, See also Foreign Policy of the United States, 1934, II, pp* 760, 765j Great Britain, Foreign "Office, Documentson German Foreign Policy (London: H.M* Stationery Office, 1959), Series C, III, p, 543, A British-Ethiopian commission, demarking the border between British Somaliland and Ethiopia arrived at the wells at Wal Wal on November 22, 1934, The commission left Wal Wal three days later, leaving behind an Ethiopian force of approximately 400 men who had assembled to protect the commission. This force remained in pace and gradually swelled to about 1,500 men* Aftor ten days of facing the Italian troops occupying the area the tension apparently was too great and a shot by one of the Ethiopians started a battle that lasted until the following morning, December 6, 1934. The Italians suffered about 30 dead while the Ethiopians lost a little over 100 killed. 130

The Ethiopian Government protested to the Italian Government

under the provisions of Article 5 of tho Treaty of Amity, Conciliation,

and Arbitration, which had been signed by Italy and Ethiopia on August

2, 192B. Tho Italians countered the Ethiopian protest by demanding

tnoral and material satisfaction. The British and French suggested

that Ethiopia accept the Italian demands* Haile Selassie, the Ethio pian Emperor, rejecting the British, French and Italian suggestions,

turned to the only possible outlet of satisfaction—the League of

Nations. Tho Ethiopian appeal to the Council, under paragraph 2,

Article 11 of the Covenant, was submitted on December 14, 1934, the same 4 1 date Italy rejected the Ethiopian protest*

The absence of action by Italy caused a second appeal by Ethio pia. This appeal, however, was of greater magnitude than that submitted

under paragraph 2 of Article 11, The Ethiopian Government, highly sue-

picious of Italian intent, decided to quote paragraph 1 of Article 11,

This paragraph was predicated around a threat of war and was much more demanding than paragraph 2, This paragraph also indicated a greater magnitude than paragraph 2 by making the problem a matter for the whole

^League of Nations. O fficial Journal, XVI (1935), pp. 270-4. See also Foreign Relations of the United States, 1934, II, pp. 770, 773, Paragraph 2 states that: It is also declared to be the friendly right of each member of the League to bring to the attention of the Assembly or of the Council any circumstances whatever affecting international rela tions which threatens to disturb international peace or the good under standing between nations upon which peace rests.

^League of Nations, O fficial Journal, XVI (1935), p. 72Q* It might be noted that Italian preparations for war were too groat to be concealed at the time of this second request (January 11, 1935), 139

League rather* than either the Council or tho Assembly. Tho League was

faced with a problem of immense proportions.

The Ethiopian Government, under pressure from France and Great

Britain, decided not to exert too much pressure in the League, now under the secretary-generaIship of Joseph Avenol, perhaps the poorest ever to occupy that chair. It left the way open for mediation under the 1929 u \ pact between Ethiopia and Italy. * Italy, on the other hand, finally was convinced, after a week of delay, to accept arbitration under the

1928 pact. A major problem seemingly had been averted. Italy had gained a diplomatic victory, Ethiopia had gained a delay but it lost much, especially when viewed from the fact that a neutral zone was established in Ethiopia, entirely in Ethiopia. The Wal Wal incident, however, was not settled,

The Ethiopian Governrnent, alarmed by the Italian intransigence, both during these proceedings and after, waited only three days to I^Lj. submit another appeal to the League. This appeal also reflected the urgency of the situation* Two articles wero invoked. Ethiopia placed ths responsibility for maintaining peace squarely upon the League by specifying Article 10 of the Covenant, Peace could not be maintained if the independence of Ethiopia was in danger. Believing its indepen dence In peril the Ethiopian Government decided to Invoke paragraph 1

^ Ibid. , pp. 37, 162-3, 735-9, 742-3* The agreement was reached on March 13, 1935, which evidences the delaying tactics of the Italian Governemnt,

J>J*Ibid. , pp,571-0* This appeal was submitted on March 17, 1935*

^Ibid* of Article 15* Ethiopia once again sought to prove its sincerity by

declaring itself ready to accept the decision of the League* Ethiopia

once again was fr u str a te d fo r t h i s was the p eriod o f Gorman m ilita r y

expansion in direct violation of the Treaty of Versailles, S till con

sidering the situation serious, Ethiopia again appealed to the League

on March 19*

Ethiopia remained in a state of uncertainty. The latast appeal

appeared to have fallen on deaf ears* The only logical choice for

Ethiopia was to contact the Secretary-General (Avenol) for action* The

Ethiopian request of April 3 for inclusion of its appeals in the agenda of the scheduled April 15 meeting of the Council was countered by an 46 Avenol reply that the Council would establish its own agenda* He stated that he would inform the Council of the Ethiopian request*

History has proved itse lf more than an adequate source from which to extract excuses for certain actions. In this case Mussolini found a perfect excuse for initiating action leading to a conference which would aid him in keeping the Ethiopian conflict out of the League, temporarily if not permanently* The German re-m ilitarization provided ths Duce with an excuse for calling a conference of leading European powers, hut only for purposes of discussion* The conference was held at Stress, Italy, from April 11 to 14* The importance of this confer ence at so critical a time was that the League gave it a sense of prio rity* Prance and Great Britain also acted in the same manner, This en abled Mussolini to accomplish his desire of diverting attention from 141

Ethiopia to Central Europe* He also tested France and Great Britain and found both reluctant to broach the problems associated with Italian- 47 Ethiopian relations, Italian uncertainties relative to Ethiopia therefore were dispelled,

When the Council mat on April 15 it took up the Ethiopian appeal.

Little could be expected of the Council, It was too completely obstruc ted by four Members (France, Great Britain, Italy and the Soviet Union) [I g and Avenol, a facsimile of a Secretary-General and little else*

Mussolini, recognizing his exalted position among the other leading powers at the Council, once again resorted to his proven method of prom ising action through a commission to arbitrate with Ethiopia, Ethiopia once again found itself at the mercy of the League and Italy and decided to withdraw its appeal. The Council had foolishly accepted tho Italian promise and lad allowed that promise to forestall its assigned duty of 49 safeguarding peace, The road to Ethiopia now was nearly clear of all obstacles, or so thought Mussolini,

The Italian military preparations just could not be concealed.

These preparations were as obvious as ths Italian delays in arbitration.

The time now became critical for Ethiopia, which felt it necessary to

|i 7 Geoffrey Thompson, Front-Line Diplomat (Londoni Hutchinson Publishing Group, Ltd,, 1959), p, 99* France was too concerned with tho rising danger posad by German re-m ilitarization to challenge Italy, which, if it had occurred, might have had a severely damaging effect upon French expectations of Italian support in Europe,

^Walters, op, c it,, p, 632,

Ir9League of Nations, O fficial Journal, XVI (1935), pp, 546-50, 142 appeal to the League for "protection against aggression,1,50 Mussolini replied by naming two arbitrators. The Italian action was grounds for an Ethiopian request for League assistance in establishing the indepen dence of Ethiopia, but without actually invoking Article 15 of the

Covenant, Ethiopia once again was acting in good faith, in a spirit of conciliation, and expected the same of Mussolini, Ethiopia, however, finally became suspicious and did not rule out completely the invoking of Article 15, It desired such an invocation if Italy did not proceed with arbitration. Article 15 wag to be a safety valve, ready for use when required--so thought tho Ethiopian Emperor,

The French and British attitudes now became conspicuous, France

C I was concerned lest it damage its relations with Italy, The British, on the other hand, slowly were awakening to the fact that they had been in a semi-coma in their approach to Italo-Ethiopian relations and final ly decided to warn Mussolini that (unlike France) it would not hesitate indefinitely in seeking a League Council solution to the Italo-Ethiopian problem. The threat had its impact upon Mussolini who agreed to two

^ 1bid. , pp, 720-1, See also Foreign Relations of the United States, 1935, I, p, 600, Tho date now was May 20, 1935.

^Arnold Toynbee. Survey of International A ffairs, 1935 (London: Oxford University Press, 1936), II, pp. 152-3, Boo also Anthony Eden, The Eden Memolres; Facing the Dictators (London: Cassell L Company, 196:2)y^Tp, 206-12, and League of Nations, O fficial Journal, XVI (1935), pp, 640-2, An important note must be injected at this stage* The roles of France and Great Britain appeared to be reversing. France, long a staunch supporter of the League, now was turning its attention to the periphery. Great Britain, on the other hand, now appeared to be^ reversing itself from believing that the League was a temporary instru ment, until something better could be devised, to a firm supporter of the League as a catalyst for stability and security. 143 resolutions placed before the Council, the first allowing non-Ethiopians on the arbitration committee, acting for Ethiopia, and the second reso lution granting authority to the two parties in resolving the situation,

The second resolution thereby placed Ethiopia on equal status with

Italy, a point long desired by Ethiopia but denied by Italy,

If this were to be viewed as a victory for Ethiopia, then It world have to be classified as a hollow victory, This was the third ti>"i Italy had agreed to arbitration, as specified under Article 5 of the 1928 Italo-Ethiopian Treaty of Friendship and Arbitration, It also was, as noted by Walters, the first time that Italy had openly defied the

Council when, during discussion of the two resolutions, the Italian

Delegate warned the Council that "steps taken by Italy to ensure the d efen se o f her t e r r it o r y could not be su b ject to comment by anyone whom- 52 soever." War was much closer and yet the League was incapable of pre venting it, Italy had until August 25 to carry through its share of the two resolutions or alter its activities and actions as it saw fit in direct disregard of the Council.

In spite of Italy's antagonistic approach to the Council, it did allow its two delegates to the arbitration commission to sit in discussion of the Itulo-Ethioplan problem, Composition of the commis sion, two each from Italy and Ethiopia, quite naturally led to a dead lock which continued until August 20 when Italy appointed a third

^Walters, op. cit,, p, 634. The Italian Delegate's warning was an echo of a speech made by Mussolini several days earlier in which he expressed the same views of Italy's freedom of action, 1 4 4

delegate, A compromise proposal finally was reached on September 3,

and Italy was shocked. Its own delegates had agreed not to place tho

blame for the Wal Wal incident on either Italy or Ethiopia, Italy

had hoped that Ethiopia would have been branded as the aggressor,

The League was now loft with the task of arriving at a deci

sion and solution to the conflict which, in September, 1935 already

was of a nino-month duration, The Council met on September 4 for a

general examination of the Italo-Ethiopian problem* Italy, realizing

the rather flimzy basis upon which it had acted in Ethiopia, took the

opportunity of attacking conditions in Ethiopia and declaring the Ethio

pian Government incompetent and incapable of neutralizing its threats

to Italy's security, rights and dignity.^ The long list of complaints

filed by Italy, which included topics such as slavery in Ethiopia,

stunned the Ethiopian Delegates but not the Soviet Delegate who sympa

thized with Ethiopia and reminded the Council Members that the Covenant did not authorize a scrutiny of an internal regime such as suggested by

Italy. Self defense, he noted, was the only justification for military operations* and Italy had no such justification in this case. The

53Pitman B, Potter* Wal Hal Arbitration (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 193G), pp. 93-149, Insuf ficient evidence pointing to any one person as the one who fired the first shot was the main basis for the commission's final decision.

^League of Nations, O fficial Journal, XVI (1935), pp, 1133-7, 1142, 1145, 1355-15B4, 1595-1601. See also O fficial Journal, XVI (1935), Special Supplement No, 130 (Records of “the Sixteenth Ordinary Session of the Assembly, Plenary), pp, 46-B41 Foreign Relations of the United States. 1935, I, pp, 639, 647-B. 145

British and French Delegates unfortunately did not coma prepared and the

Council saw fit only to appoint a committee of five to study the situa

tion *

The British and French during this period could not decide on

sanctions to be employed against Italy* Neither wanted to take a

course of action that might lead to war. It would have appeared that

both wore deserting the League and the Covenant. Tho British Delegate,

Samuel Hoare, however, had news for the Italians, which he delivered on

September 11* The British, in his words, were prepared to defend the

Covenant, an o b lig a tio n imposed upon each Member, T his o b lig a tio n in

cluded a clear view of the problem such as that being discussed, which

ho considered economic rather than political and territorial and should

be considered in an atmosphere of calm rather than under the shadow and threat of war. Collective maintenance of the Covenant, he assorted, was the responsibility of the League and Great Britain was ready to exert itself in "collective resistance to all acts of unprovoked aggrea- 55 sion*1’ The French took the rostrum on September 13 and asserted the

French view that the Covenant had to be defended.

The Council completed its work on September 18. Its report con tained a list of suggestions for tho League, the most important of which were an assurance of Ethiopia's independence and territorial integrity, administrative reforms for Ethiopia under League supervision and develop-

^League of Nations* O fficial Journal, XVI (1935), Special Supp lement Ho* 138, pp, 43-6, 65-6" The French first, British second rela tionship In full support of the League now was virtually completely reversed, this being accomplished in only several days. 1H6 ment of economic and financial affairs in Ethiopia* Much of this* according to the report, could be enhanced by a major re organisation of the internal security forces in Ethiopia, which would insure against 56 indiscriminate action by persons along the borders of Ethiopia.

Mussolini, however, had made up his mind on the previous day to reject the recommendation of the committee. The talk of compromise, accord ing to him, tti3 too late, The door was closed to negotiated compromise,

The time for action by Italy was approaching, War was only about two weeks in coming*

The Ita lo -E th io p ia n War

What Ethiopia and the League expected occurred on October 2 and 3, 1935. Italian troops crossed the Ethiopian border in the vicin ity of the Eritrea-Ethiopia-French Somaliland border triangle. The

Ethiopian Emperor notified the Council and suggested that the Council verify this information through observers of the Franch Somaliland

Government, The Italian Government denied the Ethiopian report on the following day*

Italy took other actions on the following day, Orders were issued during the early morning hours which authorized the movement of Italian troops on a large scale into Ethiopia, Aerial attacks

^SLeague of Hations, O fficial Journal, XVI (1935), pp* 1620-7, See also Foreign Relations of the United States, 1935, I, pp* 652, 752- 61. Security against IndiscfiMnato acts by Ethiopians along the bor der would allow the Ethiopian Government to emphasize stress on reform elsewhere, on activities such as eradication of slavery and other social and economic ills .

57O fflclal Journal, XVI (1935), pp. 1603, 1613. 147 also occurred and the war was on. Italy's second act of that day took place in the Council of the League where the Italian Delegate accused

Ethiopia of an aggressive and warlike spirit. This, he stated, was exemplified by the Ethiopian mobilization of the previous week which supposedly represented a

, , , direct and immediate threat to the Italian troops with the aggravating circumstance of the creation of a neutral zone w hich, in r e a l i t y , was o n ly a s t r a t e g ic movement intended t o facilitate the assembly and the aggressive preparation of the Ethiopian troops. As a result of the order for general mobili zation, the continual and sanguining aggression to which Italy had been subjected in the last ten years manifestly involved grave and immediate danger against which it was essential For elementary reasons of security to take action without delay. Con fronted by this situation, the Italian Government found itself ob liged to authorize the high Command in Eritrea to take the neces sary measures of defense, 0

From the Italian report it would have appeared that Ethiopia, repetitious in its approach toward conciliation with Italy during the previous nine months, suddenly had become aggressive and Italy, which consistently had frustrated a ll Ethiopian overtures, miraculously had become the poor, depressed and violated victim. This left it up to the Council and the League to consider what it had sought and attempted to circumvent after each of the Ethiopian warnings. The emergency had a r r iv e d and th ose Members who had sought not to antagonize I t a l y , th e denigrator of the League, now Found that they had been duped by the Euce,

Eft Ibid, , pp, 1225-6, See also U,S*, Department of State, Peace and War, United Foreign Policy, 1931-41 (Washington, D,C.j United States Gov ernment Printing O ffice, 1342), pp. 23-24, 31, An arms embargo authoriza tion for the President was passed by Congress in 1933 but never enacted, The outbreak of war between Italy and Ethiopia was followed by a procla mation by President Franklin D, Roosevelt, in accordance with the pro visions of the Neutrality Act (August 31, 1935), which placed into effect an embargo on the export of arms, ammunition and implements of war to the two belligerents. 140

The situation left to the Council the taGk of determining the

aggressor, A committee of six Menhers was appointed on October 5 and,

after only two days of examination of the fact, it came to the conclu

sion that Italy "had resorted to war in disregard of its covenants 59 under Article 12 of the League of Nations,1' The conclusion was accep

ted by the Council (unanimously by the Members other than the two

parties to the dispute whose votes, by technical rules, did not matter) and sent to the Assembly for action.

It was during the Assembly discussion of the Council findings on

October 10 that the Italian Delegate presented a new twist to the crisis,

Italy, he stated, relied on Articles 1 and 23, and paragraph 4 of Article 60 16 of the Covenant in its action in Ethiopia, Furthermore, and this

59Ibid,, pp, 1225-6,

60Ibid,, pp, 1357-91, 1620, 1626, The Italian Delegate speci fied several treaties, dating back to the General Act of Berlin, 1895, assigning Italy as a protectorate over Ethiopia, as bases for Italy’s actions in Ethiopia, The Convention of May 15, 1902, delimiting the frontier between Eritrea (Italian) and Ethiopia supposedly had been vio lated by the Ethiopians. It might here be noted that the boundary never had been marked. The Italian Representative then specified the Conven tion of May 16, 19D3, the basis for the boundary between Italian Somali land and Ethiopia as another treaty violated by Ethiopia when it attacked Italian troops at fcfal tfal. Here too, it might be noted that the Italian assertion is without basis, Wal tfal was located scores of miles from that border, well within Ethiopia, Italy had some justification for complaint when it mentioned the Klobukowski Treaty of 1900, between Ethio pia and France, portions of which dealt with the satisfactory treatment of Italian nationals, subjects and protected persons while in Ethiopia, these portions later being incorporated into the Italo-Ethiopian Traaty of Amity (192B), official known a3 the Treaty of Friendship, Arbitration and Conciliation, Italian consular personnel and property had been sub jected to treatment that violates international law. The final basis for the Italian complaint, in which it sought to rally the support of Great Britain, and drive a wedge among the League Members, was the Anglo- Itallan Protocols of 1891 and 1894 in which each recognised the other's rights in Ethiopia and the Tripartite negotiations between France, Great W9

apparently was a ploy to create a split in the Assembly, Italy supposed

ly had legal and political rights with other neighboring powers, this

la3t being a hint that France and Great Britain had in years past given

their blessings to Italy in its future endeavors in Ethiopia, Declara

tions by other Members le ft only the question of what action should be

taken by the League against Italy,

The Assembly acceptance of the Council conclusion that Italy

had resorted to war contrary to Article 12 of the Covenant was followed

by selection of a Committee of Co-ordination tender Article 11 of the

Covenant) which in turn selected a smaller committee (of eighteen mem bers) to suggest proposals that might be taken under Article 16, The period October 19-31 was spent in arriving at and discussing the fivo proposals, the first of which dealt with trade in arms and war materials with Italy* Proposal two concerned loans and credits to Italy* The third proposal involved imports from Italy, while the fourth specified m aterials, such as iron and other metals that should not be shipped to

Italy, The fifth and final proposal suggested renewed efforts to com pensate for losses suffered by any Members because of lost trade due to sanctions against Italy, Though each of the five proposals was accepted by the majority of the Assembly Members a strange fact was painfully evident. Oil and other petroleum products were not included in the em bargo,T here is little doubt that Italy would not have survived had

Britain and Italy, Paris, August 10-17, 1935 in which Italy's particular and special interests in Ethiopia were to be recognized,

6^League of Nations, Monthly Summary of the League of Nations, XV, 10 (October 1935), pp, 253-7i XV, 11 (November 1935)7 PP* 296-301 j 150 these Items been included in the sanctions, if the sanctions had been enforced voluntarily and to an extreme by each Member agreeing to the sa n c tio n s.

Application of the sanctions continued but the fact that many of the leading powers, both in the League (France, Great Britain, the

Soviet Union and Latin American Members) and outside the League (the

United States) increased their export of o il to Italy all but crippled the intended effect of the sanctions.

The war continued into the new year and, as so frequently happens in wartime, tha belligerents filed complaints to the League,

Ethiopia was the first to file a complaint, Italy, according to the

Ethiopians Government, had used poison gases in violation of the accep ted rules of warfare in international law, Italy countered by accusing

Ethiopian forces of physical atrocities and torture as well as use of 62 unathorized dum-dum bullet3, League action on the complaints

XV, 12 (December 1935), pp. 325-0, See also Feaca and War, United States Foreign Policy, 1931-41, pp, 31-2, Secretary of State Cordoll Hull noted that, in spite of the United States course, which was independent of that of the League of Nations on the embargo, a considerable increase was no ted in the export of oil, copper, trucks, tractors, scrap iron and scrap steel, a ll essential war material, was being exported for war purposes, tills being directly contrary to the policy of the United States Govern ment, In analyzing the sanctions imposed by the League Members it read ily emerges that the sanctions did not resemble to any degree those suggested by Italy during the Peace Conference as previously discussed in Chapter II, footnote 29 and allied information.

G2League of Nations, O fficial Journal, XVII (1935), Ethiopia's charges against Italy are contained on pages 375, 378-9, 302, 30 9-93, 477-0, 627=30, 644, 65S-9, Charges by Italy against Ethiopia aro on pages 251-3, 375, 379, 306-7, 772, 774, 779-00, Many of the atrocities reportedly perpetrated by the Ethiopians were brutal and beyond rational behavior with violations of the body performed during torture. Photo graphs produced as evidence indicate the barbaric rituals practiced by 151

resulted In a dispatch of observation teams to Ethiopia to study the

conduct of war.

Tha application of sanctions continued on a modified basis until

May 12 when the delegation from Chile suggested that, in view of the

fact that sanctions were not having the desired result upon Italy, per- S3 haps it would be wise to discontinue the sanctions. Discussions on

the sanctions lasted until July 4 when Mexico offered the Assembly a resolution that would eliminate the sanctions. The Assembly, faced with

the facts of the sanctions, decided, on the same day, that the sanctions

wore a fa ilu r e fo r th e Leaguo and th a t th e Members should con cen trate on

an economic recuperation without considering the League failure in the

Ethiopian crisis so inhibiting that the League was crippled. Thus the

sanctions were lifted but the outstanding aspect of the situation was

the fact that the sanctions were lifted while the war still was progres

sing, In other words, Italy now could expect support in its efforts to

subdue another Member. Italy had gained a victory over the League,

Italy also won another victory, which occurred in Ethiopia,

where it defeated Ethiopia, Tha victory over Ethiopia, coupled with

the moral victory Italy had won over the League in the application of

sanctions, left Mussolini in an exhilarated and exuberant state of mind. The League held little charm for the Duce* Nothing was left but

tha Ethiopians, Tha Italians, on the other hand, also used severely cruel treatment, such as the severing of both hands, in some instances,

League of Nations, Monthly Summary of the League of Nations, XVI, 7 (Ju ly 1936), pp. 200-9. to discard tha League* This occurred on December 11, 1 9 3 7 , The

League had suffarad another crucial blow.

The Hungarian Withdrawal

A problem faced in duscussing tha Hungarian withdrawal is one of format* The action docs not warrant a separate position of promin ence , even though Hungary's distaste for the results of World War I are recognized. A compromise therefore i3 warranted and the close ties with Italy, especially during the 1930 decade, which w ill be documented during the discussion of thi3 case, is considered sufficient justifica tion for inclusion of the withdrawal within the context of this chapter on the Italian withdrawal*

The collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Eircpire, now fashionably known as the Dual Monarchy, was inevitable, according to R, Vf* Seton-

Hatson, one of the most knowledgeable students of Central European E5 5 affairs* The decadence of Austria-Hungary had reached such propor tions that internal disintegration was inevitable. In fact, as Seton-

Hatson notes, the Hungarian Emperor and his Foreign Minister were

6l+Leaguo of Nations* O fficial Journal, XVIII (1937), pp* 265-7 XIX (1938), pp. 10, 333-5, 338-47, 535-50* See also Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy, p* 33. A number of the League Members recognized, in the League,'Italy1s sovereignty over Ethiopia, This action bouyud Mussolini, now united with Hitler and the inevitable withdrawal of Italy from the League then occurred. The United States did not recognise the Italian sovereignty over Ethiopia*

^5R, W, Seton-Uatson, Treaty Revision and the Hungarian Front iers (Londons Eyre and Spottiswoode, Ltd*, 1934), pp* 18-33* 153

surprised that the complete collapse occurred late In 1918 rather than

early 1917 as they had expected.

Termination of the war was followed by completion of separate

treaties of peace between the victorious and defeated powers. The

treaty of peace involving Hungary was signed at Trianon and is commonly

known a s the Treaty o f Trianon,**5

The Treaty of Trianon contained Important human , p olitical and military elements* Hungary was forced to relinquish control over large numbers of races and ethnic groups which had been subjected to less than kind treatment under Magyar rule, The Treaty contained important p olit

ical clauses which stripped Hungary of territory at a ll points of the compass* So great was the loss of territory that Hungary actually was reduced to approximately one-half of its pre-war size. The military section of the Treaty provided for effective reductions in military personnel and armaments and also placed a joint responsibility upon

Hungary and the League, Hungary was required to reduce her forces, prohibited from importing and exporting arms, munitions and war material of all kinds and equally responsible for reporting progress and changes 67 to the military Inter-Allied Commission of Control*

e®U,S,, Congress, Senate, Treaties, Conventions, International Acts, Protocols, and Agreements Between the United States of America and Other Powers, 1910-1923, 67th Cong,t 4th Sees,, 1923 (document Ho,348) III, pp, 3539-3697, The Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and Hungary, official title of the treaty, was signed at Trianon on June 4, 1920, The preamble of the treaty stipulated that ", * « The form er Austro-Hungarian Monarchy has now ceased to e x i s t , and has been replaced by a National Hungarian Government, , , 67 Ibid, Article 11B, the most important of the military clauses in the Treaty of Trianon, read) "The importation into Hungary of Arms, munitions and war m aterial 1 5 4

The human and political aspects of the Treaty were the bases

for conflict between Hungary and Czechoslovakia, Rumania and what

eventually would become Yugoslavia as early as March, 1919, over a year

before the Treaty was signed by Hungary and the signatories of the vic

torious powers. Both the Communist Government* under Bela H, Kun, and

its successor government, under Admiral Nicholas Horthy, actively

sought to preclude the territorial settlements during discussion and 60 after completion of the Treaty of Trianon. Irredentist movements against Czechoslovakia and Rumania, during the five months in which the

Kun Government was in power, resulted in armed clashes between Hungary and its two neighbors to the north and tha southeast. The Horthy

Government, while not prepared to take steps as drastic as its pre decessor* nevertheless did allow nationalist organizations to flourish and advocate reversal of the Trianon territorial settlements. Preju dice blinded the decision-makers of both the Kun and Horthy Governments.

Neither considered tha possibility that the former Hungarian territories contained certain shrewd and alert diplomats who, in August, 1920, took concrete steps to form the Little Entente, of all kinds is strictly forbidden. "The manufacture for foreign countries and the exportation of arms, munitions and war material shall also be forbidden Article 135 required action by the Hungarian Government to expedite the work of the Inter-Allied Commission while A rticles 137 and 13a designated the duties of the Military and Naval Inter-Allied Commissiona in the supervision of Hungary1s adherence to the Treaty, 60 H. W, V, Temperley. A History of the Peace Conference of Paris (London; \l, FTowde, and Hodder £ IFtougHton* 1920-24J, IV, Chap, IX, part 2, 155

Eduard Uenes, protoga of Thomas G. Masaryk, first President of

the newly-formed Czechoslovakia, noted, as early as October, 1918 the

desirability of protective alliances against future Hungarian action.

Czechoslovakia, of course, had been a part of Austria-Hungary and

memories of past existence under Austrian and Hungarian rule led BencS

and Hasaryk to believe that alliances were a future necessity* Con

ferences ware hold and the results wore incorporated into three separate

treaties which drew Czechoslovakia and the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats,

and Slovenes (which later became Yugoslavia) into a protective a lli

ance against Hungary. Czechoslovakia then co-ordinated with the Kingdom

o f Rumania and a second a llia n c e r e s u lt e d . The Kingdom o f Rumania

jointed the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes and the result was

a third alliance* These alliances effectively joined the three States

into what collectively became known as the L ittle Entente, based on a

motive of collective self-defense,

69 League of Nations. Treaty Series. VI (1922), pp, 210-3, 216-9^ VII (1922), pp. 78-03; XVIII (1922), pp, 12-13, 82-3, The first alliance was completed on August lb, 1920, The second was signed on April 23, 1921 and the third on Juna 7 of the same year. Each of the threa al liances were of two-year duration but were renewed at the end of the two-year periods. It might be noted that the three treaties provided more freedom of mind for the three parties concerned if vie wad in conjunction with two other treaties of the same general period, France and Poland had signed a political agreement on February 19, 1921 and Poland and Rumania had sign ed a d e fe n siv e a llia n c e on March 3, 1921, Taken c o lle c tively, this meant that what was to become Jugoslavia, Rumania, Czecho slovakia, Poland and France, about which Benes had been apprehensive because of its overtures to Hungary, now ware closely joined by pacts requiring assistance if attacked by a third party, even though the first two Little Entente treaties ware aimed initially at possible Hungarian action while the third specified Hungary and Bulgaria as pos sible enemies, 15D

The Little Entente partners were faced with a serious political problem in January, 1921, Benes challenged the right of the Hungarian

Government in placing Archduke Joseph 3 G the administrator of the

Hungarian Crown, BenoS viewed this act as the in itial step toward 70 restoration of ex-King Charles, The fears of Denes were confirmed on {-larch 27, 1921 when Charles re-appeared in Hungary, Threats of joint

C^echoslovak-Yugoslav blockades and military action resulted in the de parture of Charles, Charles would not remain anonymous, however, and his re-appearance on October 20, 1921 was the signal for a further com plaint by the Little Ententes, A threat of military action against

Hungary by th e L it t l e Entente was met w ith a la c k a d a is ic a l approach by the Conference of Ambassadors, and pressure was exerted against Hungary by the Conference only after repeated and more serious threats by

Bene£, The former King Charles finally wa3 removed from Hungary and remained in Spain until his death in April, 1922, The Little Entente succeeded in obtaining a Hungarian renunciation of the former Hapsburg dynasty, It also succeeded in forcing Hungary to accept provisions of the Treaty of Trianon which eliminated the former monarchy.

The terrible state of economic affairs in Austria had become evident in 1922, The economic situation in Hungary became noticeably

70Arnold J, Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs, 1920-1923 {London; Oxford University Press, 192!j), ppT 287-303, The chief reason for the intransigence of the Conference of Ambassadors was the fact that Hungary had appealed to the Conference for protection from the L ittle Entente. Tha Conference interpreted this action as signifying a noed for the Conference to act as a protector of a threatened Hungary from vengeful neighbors. 157 acute only about one year later, Hungary also required a financial solution to its problems. Two protocols were signed on March 14,

1924, The leading powers showed their apprehension by making the first protocol strictly political, Hungary was required to agree that it

, , , undertakes, in accordance with the stipulations of the Treaty of Trianon, strictly and loyally to fu lfill the obligations contained in the said Treaty, and in particular the military clauses, as also the other international engagements. It is understood that Hungary w ill maintain, subject to the provisions of tha Treaty of Trianon, her freedom in the matter of customs and commercial or financial agreements, and, in general, in a ll matters relating to her economic regime or her commercial relations, provided always that aha shall not violate her economic independence by granting to any State a special regime calculated to threaten this independence,"1

From ths foregoing it can be seen that suspicion of the Hungarian at titude toward the League dictated a portion of the protocol. The second paragraph should be familiar. It was identical to that included in the earlier loans to Austria and was aimed at precluding a customs union with Germany, The second protocol contained administrative and financial elements of the loan and does not warrant further comment, except that the loan, combined with League guidance in the person of an

American banker, enabled a Hungarian economic recovery,

The very authoritative Hungarian Government of this period continued its pre-war oppressive practices on the internal scene and sought political companionship on the international level. The Germans sought Austrian friendship but shunned Hungary* Hungary also faced tha

^League of Nations* Treaty Series, XXV (1924), pp,429-40. The lending powers were Great Britain, France, Italy, Rumania, the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, and Czechoslovakia* 158 threat posed by the Little Entente, which also had Poland and Trance tied to it through the Franco-Polish and Polish-Rumanian treaties men tioned earlier In this section* With Hungary facing hostile Serbs,

Croats and Slovenes to the south, it was strategically advantageous for

Hungary to turn to Italy, The Italians, on the other hand, apprehen sive of Austria, and s till bitter toward the League because of frustra ted expectations associated with the Secret Treaty of London, looked toward Hungary for psychological support. This would lead to an embar rassing position for the League, Hungary and Italy, more so for the first two than the last,

The Ssent-Gotthard Incident

Szent-Gotthard (St. Gotthard) was a small rail station on the

Hungarian side of the Austrian-Hungarian border* A cargo train, which left Verona, Italy, entered Austria at Arnoldstein, and had arrived at

Graz, Austria on January 1, 1923. It was allowed to proceed to Szent-

Gottbard where a joint customs inspection was conducted, ThaAustrian customs officials, during a random inspection of the five cars loaded with cases supposedly containing machinery, discovered machine gun parts and associated equipment in two of the many cases on tho train which had 72 been allowed to enter and cross Austria because of false documentation.

Discovery of the equipment was followed by an Austrian request for return of the train to Austrian soil for further investigation, The

Hungarian refusal to honor the Austrian request resulted in official publication of the incident in newspapers on January 3, 192B,

7^Ibid, , IV (1923), p. 547. 159

The Little Entente powers, s till cautious of Hungarian revis ionism, then appealed to the Secretary-General of the League in an effort toward inclusion of the question on the agenda of the Council of the League. Moral and legal bases were stipulated by the Little

Entente for the requests, These powers felt that a lack of action by the League might affect public confidence in the value of international treaties. They also believed that Leagua intransigence might serve to accelerate identical event3 in the future by one or more of the de feated powers which night consider such acts morally correct if not investigated and legislated by the League, Tho Little Entente then turned to tha legal foundations upon which they based their request.

The League was reminded that it bore a responsibility, under articles of the various peace treaties to investigate military violations of the peace treaties by the defeated powers, Article 113, Treaty of

Trianon, had been violated by Hungary, which had allowed the introduc- 7 3 tion of the material across its border, they claimed.

The Council, meeting in March, 1920, decided that a Committee of Three (the Netherlands, Chile and Finland) should investigate and

*7 3 Trcatloa, Conventions, Intornational Acts. Protocols, and Agreements Between the United States of America and Other Powers, 1910- 1923, p. 162. Article 119 of the Treaty of Trianon (See supraTj this chapter, footnote S7) prohibited introduction into and shipment of this type of cargo from Hungary. Article 143, Treaty of Trianon, iden tical to Article 190 of the Treaty of Versailles, authorized League investigations into violations of armaments clauses In the peace treaties, Both were expanded by rules adopted by the Council on September 27, 1924 and March 14, 1925 and December 11, 1926. Though those applied specifically to military affairs in Germany, they ware used as a precedent in this Szent-Gotthard incident, 1 6 0

report Its findings during the next session of the Council. The

Council did succeed, during the Interim, in precluding a sale by

Hungarian authorities of the machine gun parts and equipment.

Evidence uncovered by the Committee of Three signified that the material was of pre-war and wartime origin. The shipment had originated at Verona, Italy and supposedly was bound for a firm in Hove Mesto,

Czechoslovakia, For further shipment to Poland* The Committee also found that eight essential parts wore absent thereby precluding assembly of the parts in the shipment into completed assemblies. The Committoe also discovered that Hungarians had damaged thousands of the parts and had intor-mixed the parts in heaps which made accountability impossible, or, if attempted, the task would have been sc enormousth a t veek3 would have been spent in sorting and grouping the various parts involved.

The a c tio n by the Hungarians becamo even more su s p ic io u s when view ed from the fact that the damage and inter-mixing of the parts had been accomplished without League approval, even though a scheduled sale of 74 parts had been halted by the League, Little could be done by tha

Council but to reprimand, by resolution, the Hungarian Government for having taken the incident too lightly rather than as a violation of

Article 110 of the Treaty of Trianon, an article Hungary was obliged to honor, The Council also noted, with regret, that tha destination of the material could not be ascertained without an element of doubt,

^League of Nations. O fficial Journal, IX (1920), pp* 906, 91G, 1014, 1022* The Committee of Throe submitted Its report on April 25, 1928, which signifies a period in excess of three months during which Hungary was allowed to treat the material as it saw fit, League Intran sig e n c e once again was e v id e n t, 161

due chiefly to the circumstances caused by tha Hungarian action. The

Hungarian Delegate, a military officer, obstinately refused to accede

to the resolution, which could have been expected, and which meant

little since he was not a Member of the Council,

The relative importance of this incident can bo appreciated

when viewed from the aspects of treaty violation, stability in Europe

and disarmament. Hungary clearly was wrong in taking the action it did.

The incident shrouded Hungary with suspicions as to its true intent in

this case* Hot only was a violation of the Treaty of Trianon evident

but an intent in fomenting problems in the political situation in

Central Europe also was once again surfaced, as during the immediate

post-war period, which led to formation of the Little Entente, Finally,

these were the days of disarmament conferences when the chance of suc

cess in this field seemed brightest but yet quite elusive because of

the inability to c a m to agreement, revisionism being an abstract

m ilitating against success in the disarmament conferences. The Hungarian action did little to alleviate the tensions and problems of that period.

And, incidentally, one also can wonder why no action bad been taken

against Italy, a signatory of the Treaty of Trianon, which could have resorted to sea surface transportation to Poland, if Poland was the

true destination, rather than violate a peace treaty. On the other

hand, Italy did not hold the League or the treaties in great esteem.

M u ssolin i was more in te r e ste d in gain in g th e support o f Hungary*

The amount of support that Italy eventually gained from Hungary,

even though overt Italian action in favor of Hungary is not documented, 1 6 3

Is evidenced during the discussion of sanctions against Italy by the

League in October, 1935. Hungary, referring to its age-long Friend

ship with Italy, declared itself unable to associate itself with the

decision of the majority of the League Members in the application of

sa n c tio n s . 75

Two e v e n ts o f importance to Hungary occurred a fte r sa n ctio n s against Italy had been suspended. The first of these was the with drawal of Italy from the League, in December, 1 9 3 7 , The other event was th e p o s itio n o f stran gth engineered fo r Germany by H itle r who had succeeded in bringing Austria into the German fold. These events meant that Hungary no longer had to fear tha Little Entente. It did mean, on th e o th er hand, th a t Hungary was in a p o t e n tia lly more em barrassing position, especially after the political marriage of Hitler nod Musso lin i, Hungary then found itself effectively Isolated from the western s e c to r o f Europe by th e band o f land composed o f Germany, A u s tr ia , and

Italy, with tha neutral Switzerland completing that band, Hungary also found itself lying squarely in the path of H itler1s planned approach to tha Balkan area. The embarrassing position of Hungary, especially after the German occupation of Czechoslovakia in March, 1933, meant that

Hungary no longer could expect any support from the Leaguo, if ever it really did. The inevitable occurred on April 11, 1939, Hungary withdrew from the League. 77

^League of Hat ions, Tho Monthly Summary of the League of nations, XV, 10 (October 1935), p. 251. 7R See supra, this chapter, footnote 64 and associated information,

77Loague of Uations, The Monthly Summary of the League of Nations. XIX, M (April 1939), P. 142, and Official Journal. XX (1939). p. 205, 163

The withdrawal from the League wa s not a neat action. It was

In arrears in its contributions to the League budget and failed to con tinue its annuities aftor Its withdrawal notice under the conditions of withdrawal, which required withdrawing Members to continue annuities through the two-year period between notification and actual termination d a t e .78

A review of the Hungarian relations with the League points toward a revisionist policy during the initial several years and less than enthusiastic support of the League thereafter. The final predica ment in which Hungary found itself may have altered Its attitude to some extent, in favor of better relations, but the European situation already had deteriorated, and the League had become too weak to afford

Hungary any advantages, Hungary had set its own course.

70 Foreign Relations of the United States, Paris Peace Confer ence, 1919, XIII, p. 76. VI

THE LATIN EXITS

The r e la tio n s h ip o f L atin American Members w ith th e League can be characterised as troubled and perplexing. Certain of the relations were quasi-legal in nature, based on executive acts rather than con stitutional procedure. Others were symptomatic of a lack of knowledge of the type of contract being entered, later resulting in burdens re quiring action detrimental to the League and Members adversely affected.

S till others were characterised by a metaphorical see-saw relationship, one of approval, followed by criticism and withdrawal on the one hand, and approval, withdrawal and favorable reappraisal on the other hand.

Finally, one or more of the Latin Members defied the League by chal lenging the Covenant and/or physical structure of the League and, when satisfaction was not gained, officially placed themselves completely or partially outside the League. In other words, the number of Latin

American Members which remained com p letely f a it h f u l t o th e League throughout its existence was minimal.

The study of the League-Latin American relations introduces problems faced by the Latins, such as the Monroe Doctrine, a quest for status, a case of unequal treatment, an economic burden, a so-called ineffective League and final exits that were made but without reasons s p e c if ie d ,

16>+ IBS

Finances or the Monroe Doctrine?

Costa Rica was one of the early signers of the Covenant, having become one of the Members on December 16, 1920, It also was an early

Member opting out of the League, In fact, it was the first Member of the League to withdraw. The official date of complete withdrawal was

December 31, 1926, The dates of Costa Rica's action pose no difficulty*

The sane cannot be said of the reason, however, since Costa Rica had problems in meeting its assessment and later posed a question on the

Monroa D o c tr in e ,

Costa Rica fe ll behind in its payment at an early stage. Al though its assessment was one unit ($4, 675,90), Costa Rica apparently could not afford membership in the League, It was in arrears for the year 1922. The years 1923 and 1924 were no better, even though it was able to more fu lly meet ita commitment, The Fifth Assembly mat in

September, 1925 and the first item on the agenda was a resolution asking the Secretary-General to make an urgent request to Costa Rica for pay ments due,^

The request from the Secretary “General to Costa Rica (and four other delinquent Members) was met with a reply from Costa Rica* The letter from Costa Rica, dated December 24, 1925 was accompanied by a 2 check in payment of the contributions owed by Costa Rica* The final

"^League of Nations, O fficial Journal, VI <1925), pp, 949-50,

2Ibid,, Special Supplement No, 33, pp, 101-02, 109-10, The chock from Costa Rica to the League for liquidation of its debts was in the amount of $10,677*37, Although no reason was given for with drawal, It can be assumed that Costa Rica early realized that member ship in the League may have been a mistake. 156 paragraph of the latter notified the Secretary-General that Costa Rica was withdrawing from the League, effective on January 1, 1925 with withdrawal becoming complete on January 1, 1927.

The League continued to function and Coats Rica continued its aloof attitude toward the League. The League then, in 1926, decided to contact Brazil and Spain in efforts to bring the two former Members back into the fold and, while at It, Invite Costa Rica to resume membership*^

The Costa Rican reply was dated July 19, 1920. After thanking the Council President for his courtesy, a political etiquette, Costa

Rica challenged the Secretary-General in tha League's application of

Article 21, the Monroe Doctrine* It questioned the inclusion of the

Monroe Doctrine in the Covenant, just as Honduras had done in 1919* The

President of the Council sought to assure Costa Rica that the Monroe

Doctrine did not take preference over the Covenant. The opposite wa3 true. It also was true that the Covenant conferred upon each Member the same degree of obligation and the same equality in rights. The Covenant, through its preamble, sought to promote international cooperation and the achievement of international peace and security.

The President's explanation apparently satisfied the Costa Rican

President. His reply to the Council President informed the Council that the Costa Rican Government would ask the Costa Rican Congress to allocate sufficient funds in future budgets to allow a resumption of Costa Rican

^League of Hations. The Monthly Summary of the League of Nations. VIII, 4 (April 1920), p. 03.

^Ibld, pp. 223-4. See also this chapter, footnote 45 and 50 and a11ie d informat ion. 167 5 membership in the League. No fu rth e r word was heard From Costa Rica

and its membership was no re-instated,

The Costa Rican withdrawal was the first suffered by the League

of Nations. It was unfortunate that Costa Rica could not continue mem

bership* Facts must be accepted though, and the League was fortunate

that it was not a more important Member that would damage more seriously

the League through the withdrawal.

The Quest fo r S ta tu s

The Council of the League was constituted of Four Permanent

Members (Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan) and four non-Fermanent

Members to be selected by the Assembly from time to tiroe,^ The original

four non-Permanent Members of the Council at its in itial meetings, under

Article ■+ of the Covenant, ware Belgium, Brazil, Spain and Greece*

They were to remain, under the original plan, until the Assembly had

had an opportunity of electing replacement non-Permanent Members*

The General Assembly, during its first assembly, in 1920, was

so impressed with the work of the Council that it re-elected three of the four non-Permanant Members (Belgium, Brazil and Spain) to another term,^ The second year of the Council, however, was not as fruitful

5League of nations* Ninth Assembly Records Plenary Meetings (1920), p* 130. g Foreign Relations of the United States, Pari3 Peace Confer ence, 1919V XIII, pp, 79-60, The United States, as one of the Principle Allied and Associated Powers, would have been the fifth permanent mem ber if it had joined the League,

*1 Walters, A History of the League of Nations, p. 127, 168

as the first year, due chiefly to the many uprisings by militant

Germans in various cities along the Rhine River, In spite of this

poor showing by the Council during this second year (1921), a good portion of which could be traced to the ineffectiveness of the various commissions appointed by the League to insure compliance with the Treaty of Versailles by the Germans, the position of Brazil as a non-Permanent

Member of the Council gradually became conspicuous* Brazil was selected 0 as a non-Permanent Member of the Council for six uninterrupted years.

It would have appeared that Brazil undoubtedly would have been able to look forward, in 1925, to a permanent seat on the Council if a reorgan ization of the permanent Member seating were completed.

Whether or not Brazil realized that its prominent position and p olitical chance of selection as a Permanent Member of the Council were being jeopardized as far back as 1922 is unknown and of little relative importance to this study. What is important is the fact that the groundwork was being formed, starting in 1922, for a crisis which would lead to Brazil1s withdrawal from the League,

Wilhelm Cuno, the German Chancellor, suggested, on December 19,

1922 that Germany, France and those other Groat Powers into rested in the Rhine should agree not to wage war for a generation unless a pleb- g iscite agreed to such a course of action, French objections to the nebulous scheme resulted in a second proposal by Cuno, on May 2, 1923, which called for arbitration and mediation to resolve differences between

^League of Nations, O fficial Journal, VII (1926), p. B97,

%ans Wehberg. The Outlawry of War (Washington, D.C.i Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1931)",' p. 33, 169

F'rance and Germany, The French once a g a in were n o t en th u sed w ith t h is

suggestion! nor with Gustav StresemannTs effort, on September 2( 1923, t o expand on Cunors s u g g e stio n s.

There were, during 1924 and 1925! certain changes being exper

ien ced w ith in Germany. The German Government was opposed to th e Dawes

Flan, calling for a resumption of heavy German reparation payments.

It believed that German membership in the League might convince the

League Members of the wisdom of modifying their attitude toward Germany and eventually would negate t partially or completely, Article 231 of the

Treaty o f V e r s a ille s ! under which Germany and i t s a l l i e s had acknowledged their responsibility for the war. The German Cabinet therefore deemed it necessary to effect an early German entry into the League. The

German Cabinet also felt that the chances for a permanent seat on the

Council for Germany wera well within ths realm of possibility. In fact, so certain was the Cabinet that it sent letters to each of the Permanent and non-Permanent Council Members solicitin g th eir views on German chances o f a permanent s e a t. Each o f th e C o u n cil Members r e p lie d in 10 the affirmative to Germany's probe. It must here be noted that Brasil was one o f th e non-Permanent Members which agreed t o th e German d e s ir e ,

T his undoubtedly was th e i n i t i a l moment o f B r a s i l ' s d e s ir e f o r a perma nent seat on the Council,

Correspondence between Geneva and Berlin then began to increase and the German Government decided that the time was ripe for negotiations

10Yfalters, op. c it., pp. 277-BO, The time, for purposes of orientation! was late 1924, 170

leading to a triumphant entry into the League. Streserann was given

the authority to carry on the work started by Cuno. He therefore, on

February 9, 1925 suggested that those Powers interested in the Rhine,

especially Great Britain, France, Italy and Germany, might agree ,fnot

to make war upon each other during a period to be determined later,

with 1he United States acting as a trustee,'1^ Stresemann also sugges

ted th a t a r b itr a tio n t r e a t ie s between F rance, Germany and o th er S ta te s

be included, Germany, he declared, was ready to guarantee the existing

status of the Rhine. The liquidation of details lasted for several

months until October 16, 1925 when the Pact of Locarno was signed, The

Pact of Locarno, however, had a price. Paragraph 2, Article 10 stated

that th e Pact would come in t o forcw when Germany became a Member o f

the League,

Most of the deliberations concerning Germany's permanent seat

on the Council wars held during the Fifth Assembly meetings during

1925 and 1926, w ith the o b je c tiv e o f s e a tin g Germany in tha Assembly

and Council in September, 1926, In spite of such, one can describe

Brazil's reaction toward the fact that only Germany was being allowed a

^Hehberg, op, clt, , p, 33, See also Foreign Relations Of the United States, 1925, I, pp. 20-21 i and International Conciliation, CCxVl (1926), pY 17, The Gorman Ambassador t

permanent seat on the Council and Brazil was being defeated in its

belief that it would be accorded the prestige of a permanent seat,

The First Committee was assigned the responsibility of study

ing the German application for membership* The task assigned the

Committee was so ludicrous that it bordered on triviality and consti- 12 tuted a waste of time and effort* Is the application in order? Is

the German Government recognized da jure and de facto? Does the country

possess a stable Government and well-defined frontiers? Is it fully

self-governing? A last question dealt with acts and declarations of

the German Government regarding international engagements. Any person

with any amount of intelligence could have predicted favorable action

by th e Committee* Germany had th e backing o f Great B rita in and France,

th e two pow erful Members o f th e League* The rep o rt o f th e F ir s t Com

mittee was accepted by the Assembly on March 17, 1926 with no objections.

Brazil by now had found itself defeated and had lost a ll of its fight.

The study of this League action must include the views of

Brazil to more fully appreciate what actually was involved-in tho- - ___ __

L eague's accep tan ce o f Germany t o a permanent sea t and th e r e je c tio n

of the Brazilian request for Identical status,

^League of Nations* Seventh Assembly Records Plenary Moot ings (1926), pp. 25-34, 46, and O fficial Journal/ VII (1926), Special Supplement Ho, 43, p. 29, Certain articles of the Treaty of Versailles also were altered to accommodate Germany as a Member of the League Assembly, Council and specialized agencies. The open arms of the League were evidenced by tho fact that the report of the First Committee was approved and Germany was accorded a permanent s e a t on th e C ouncil, by resolution, without the usual reference to a committee. The increase in non-permanent seats also was increased, in this case to nine* 172

The Government of Brazil forwarded a letter to the Secretary-

General, dated June 10, 192G in which the views of Brazil were aired, 13

Brazil, after having served six years on the Council, and then in its

seventh year, had hoped that the Western Hemisphere soon would have a

permanent representative on the Council* As then constituted, only

Japan rep resen ted a non-European Power in th e C o u n cil, A permanent

seat for Brazil would provide more balance on that body.

B ra zil had accepted Germany a s a p r o sp e c tiv e member o f the

Council, but it had done so with the expectation that the Council re

organization would include Spain and Brazil as permanent Council Mem

b ers a s w ell a s Germany,

Brazil objected to the Pact of Locarno for a specific reason.

Although it was happy to see the prospects of peace embodied in the

Treaties of Locarno, It did not enjoy seeing the Pact of Locarno being

used by th e Germans in th e ch aracter o f an order fo r rapid adm ittan ce

of Germany to the League and Council.

B ra zil then voiced i t s opinion on j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f Germany t o a permanent seat on the Council, How could Germany be justified as a

g reat power, and a permanent s e a t on th e C ouncil when Germany was pro

h ib ite d from p o ssessin g a la rg e army or navy?

^League of llations. Official Journal. VII (192G), pp, 9B7-9, 1003-7, Spain decided to withdraw at the same time* It too felt de feated in its bid for prestige doomed warranted by its long record in the Council as a non-permanent Member, 173

The f in a l p o in t made by B r a z il wug one previously made by Argen tina*^* Too great an amount of power was concentrated in the stronger powers in the League Council, The general interests thereby arc matia to suffer for the sake of specific or particular interests* Interests of the Permanent Council Members, The only logical solution* according to Brazil* was the abolition of the permanent seating arrangement and institution of a non-permanent arrangement throughout tho Council*

Brazil, in its letter, admitted defeat and saw no other recourse but to resign from the League,

The work of Brazil in the League was missed and the Council

President* in 192Q* saw fit to issue an invitation to Brazil to renew 15 its membership in the League, Brazil* In spite of Its refusal to accept the Invitation* declared itself willing to cooperate with the

League.

A few thoughts are deemed warranted in this case of withdrawal,

One* for instance, can challenge the League action in accepting Germany as a permanent Member of the Council, In spite of its past it now had

^League of Nations, First Assembly Records Plenary tieetings (1920)* pp* 261-2* 27G -9, 51*4, Sea a ls o The Monthly7 Summary o f th e League of Nations* XIII, 9 (September 1933), p, 139, Argentina liatf suggested* during the First Assembly, that a ll sovereign States be admitted to the League, Including by inference, Germany and a ll other States, When this universality was not accepted, Argentina left the Assembly without withdrawing. Argentina once again became active in September, 1933.

^5The Monthly Summary of the League of Nations, VIII* 3 (March 192B)* pp. 04-5, A similar letter had been sent to Spain. Spain accepted the invitation and continued Its membership prior to the final date of its previous notice of withdrawal, thereby nullifying the intended withdrawal. 174

a veto in the Council. It is not completely inappropriate to wonder

why Germany had not been given a non-permanent seat on the Council.

Without tha permanent seat would Hitler have been able so rapidly to

g a in power in Germany? Would a tem porary s e a t have fo r c e d upon him a

much more cautious attitude in domestic and world affairs? Would a

H itler, more restrained by a lesser amount of freedom of action and a

smaller degree of trust and confidence have been able to thrust tho

world into the inferno of World War IT? These questions would be inter

esting facets of study in the simulation approach to tlie study of inter

national relations*

A Case of Unequal Treatment

The case involving the withdrawal of Paraguay was strange from

its inception through to the actual withdrawal. The case, in its appli

cation, did not begin with a complaint by any Member of the League. It

began in the very top echelon. The Secretary-General had become aware

of a situation developing and had submitted the information to the Coun-

cil for consideration. The focal point of the possible case was the

Chaco, a territory resting between Bolivia and Paraguay.

^League of Nation s. O fficial Journal,X (1929), p. 21* Students of administrative functions of the United Hations, especially the Sec retariat, and more specifically the Secretary-General, readily will recognize the oddity of the Paraguayan case, Whereas the Charter of the United Nations authorizes initiative action by the Secretary-General, and, in fact, charges him with the responsibility, under Article 99, such was not the case under Article 6 of the League1a Covenant. The action should have begun with a notification from one of the Members, under Article 11 (Collective Action) or one of the disputants under paragraph 1, Article 12 (disputes). 175

The President of the Council dispatched telegrams to Bolivia

and Paraguay. Both, however, forwarded letters to the President prior

to receipt of the Council telegrams, Paraguay was the first to act by 17 accusing Bolivia of an attack upon Paraguay on December 5, 1929,

Paraguay also insisted that it had invited Bolivia to join Paraguay

in summoning a com m ission c a lle d for in the Convention o f May 3* 1923

(Convention of Montevideo), which might resolve the problem of the Chaco, the demarcation of which never really had been resolved, according to th e Government o f Paraguay,

Boliviars letter accused Paraguay of attacking Bolivian troops 10 and a fort well in the Chaco area on the Bolivian side of the border.

Bolivia also accused Paraguay of moving its army headquarters close to the border, in preparation for military operations against Bolivia.

Bolivia then stated that it had appealed to the Convention of Montevideo but had receiv ed no s a t is f a c t io n . This le t t e r was fo llo w ed by a t e l e gram seeking to assure the Council that Bolivia had not deviated from the principles and obligations of the Covenant, It also warned the

Council that Paraguay had committed an aggression in violation of Articles

10 and 13 of the Covenant, The President and Foreign Minister of Bolivia then assured the Council that Bolivia would abide by the recommendations

17Ibid,, pp* M0-m, Paraguay, in its letter of December 11, 1929, claimed that the delimitation of the borders between the two countries in the Chaco area never had been resolved in spite of the fact that several treaties had been signed, over a period of several decades, by the two countries.

1&Ibid, , pp* 253-5. The Bolivian letter wan dated a day later, December 12, 192B. 176

of the Council end would abide by tha stipulations of the Covenant,

Bolivia would repeat these last two point3 on several occasions, which

later would be the basis for favorable Council action toward Bolivia,

Several letters were received by the Council during May, 1929,

These letters, coming from both Bolivia and Paraguay, contained accusations from both disputants of further attacks in the Chaco area,19

The situation became more stable during the latter part of

1929, The President of the Council had suggested arbitration, but out side the League structure. The distance involved was the determining factor in the President’s choice of arbitrators, Circumstances, in this case, proved to be of advantage to the League, since a conference was available that might assist the League in resolving the dispute.

The Pan-American Arbitration Conference was meeting in Washington and the Council President requested that Argentina and the United States 20 act as intermediaries for the Council, Both Bolivia and Paraguay in dicated acceptance of arbitration by the Conference,

The Council was subjected to several additional complaints during the latter part of January, 1930, Both of the parties in the dispute filed charges and countercharges, accusing the other of further

19Ibld,, pp, 077-0,

?0Ibld., pp, 264-5, 269-70, Q77-B, See also U,S,, Department of State, The International Conference of American States on Conciliation and Arbitration (Washington, D,C, i United States Government Printing Office, 1929), pp, 90-9B, Bolivia and Paraguay agreed to a protocol calling for a commission of Investigation and conciliation composed of two delegates each from Bolivia and Paraguay and one each from the United States, Mexico, Colombia, Uruguay and Cuba. Both sides were to suspend h ostilities during tha work of the commission. 177

unprovoked attacks* Both swore by the Covenant and the Council con-

tlned its work in other fields for the balance of the session.

VJhen the Council met for its fifty-ninth session, Hay 12,

1930, the President reminded the Council, during its discussion of

the agenda, that the dispute had been resolved. The Government of

Uruguay had utilized its good offices and diplomatic relations between 21 Bolivia and Paraguay had been restored, The dispute appeared to be

resolved, at least for tha present*

Incidents continued throughout 1931 but It was not until Decem

ber that the stage was sot for a return to a critical state of affairs

between the two countries. The foundation for a dispute was created

when the Delegate from Paraguay sent a letter to the Secretary-General

in which the Government Invited a movement of Russian refugees from 22 China to the Chaco area* The Bolivian Government immediately pro

tested this invitation by notifying the Secretary-General that the Chaco

was Bolivian territory and Paraguay had no basis for its offer to the

Russian refugees, Paraguay, in rebuttal, stated that the northern

^League of Nations. The League of Nations Prom Year to Year (Geneva: League of Nations, 1930), October 1st, 1928-September 30th, 1930), pp. 130-h,

220fficial Journal. XII (1931), pp, 2297-9; Kill (1932), pp,l339- h2, 1760-1, Paraguay claimed that Menonltes and other religious groups had settled In that area and, since the refugees were of similar religious beliefs, no difficulties should be encountered by tho displacement of the refugees from China, which was having its problems with Japan, to the Chaco area. The Council, being in Geneva, decided that it would be more appropriate for a body closer to the scene to negotiate an agree ment between the two disputants* It therefore requested that Colombia, Cuba, Mexico, the United States and Uruguay for a Commission of Neutrals to study the situation* 178

demarcation o f th e Chaco never had been r e so lv e d and was under Para-

guyan administration. The Russian refugees, according to the Paraguyan

Government, would be moved to the northern sector through Paraguay,

without violating Bolivian sovereignty*

Tho situation continued to be tense and potentially explosive

while delegates from Bolivia and Paraguay were negotiating with the

Commission of Neutrals in Washington during June and July, 1932* Colombia,

Cuba, Mexico, the United States and Uruguay had been asked to form tho

Commission of Neutrals to act as an agent for the League in seeking a 23 solution to the dispute.

The Commission of Neutrals made several suggestions to the feuding neighbors. Both were invited to Washington where each of tha delegates could present his Government'a views on the dispute and afford 24 the Commission a chance for fuller coordination* Tha Commission next suggested a suspension of hostilities within forty-eight hours after completion of the meeting with the Commission, with ratifications at a later date* The Commission then suggested a withdrawal of forces from the Immediate border areas and a mutual demobilization of troops. The

23Ibid., XIV (1933), p, 257,

24Ibid., XIII (1932), pp, 1993-2000, See also Tha League of Nations from Year to Tear, 1931-1932, pp, 177-8, The Council enjoyed virtually no success during the June to September period. The only encouragement received by the Council was the assistance being rendered by neighboring Latin American republics which were seeking a solution to the dispute. The President of the Council, noting the difficult position of the Council during 1932, caused chiefly by the unstable International political situation, appointed a Committee of Three (Irish Free State, Guatemala and Spain) to study events and follow developments In the Bo11via-Paraguay dispute. 179 Commission also suggested a Commission of Experts to be sent to the

area. Should the dispute continue, then the dispute would be submitted

to the Permanent Court of Justice at the Hague.

The Commission suggestions were accompanied by appeals from the

Council President! which drew immediate replies from the two feuding

neighbors. Paraguay insisted that it had furnished sufficient proof

of its good intentions by offering to resolve the dispute by legal ac

tion or by arbitration. It also rejected certain of the Commission

suggestions and stated that it would remain armed and prepared. Bolivia

took a slightly different attitude. It notified tha Council that it

had agreed to a suspension of hostilities as suggested by the Commission

of Neutrals, Bolivia continued to display a more conciliatory attitude

toward the League than Paraguay.

The Council resumed discussion of the dispute in February*

1933 with Bolivia introducing evidence of the extreme sums being ex pended by Paraguay for armaments. Nearly 32 percent of the Paraguayan

budget was diverted to the military while moot other countries used 25 between 5 and a little over 7 percent for the same purposes. Para guay | of course, replied to Bolivia's accusation by accusing the Commis

sion of Neutrals of favoritism in awarding most of the Chaco to Bolivia,

The Commission also was accused of neglecting the most important ques tion, which was the question of responsibility for the conflict. Para guay1 s attention then was directed toward Bolivia which supposedly had claimed territory previously awarded Paraguay by several treaties.

250fficial Journal, XIV (1939), pp. 253-63, 373-81, Paraguay offered a suspension of hostilities but only if Bolivia

surrendered soveral of its outposts to Paraguay, Paraguay’s belliger

ent attitude, whether toward Bolivia or the Secretary-General, bad

not abated,

Both France and the United Kingdom realized that little progres

was being made and suggested that a suspension of hostilities bordered on the impossible since each side feared a possible re-armament by the other. This being the situation, Britain, backed by the French, sugges ted a study of measures that might be taken under Article 11, such as a prevention of sales of arms and war material to both Bolivia and 26 Paraguay, Additional support for Britain and France came from the

Committee of Three which suggested the Council Ignore Article 4, under which it had been acting and act under Article 11 of the Covenant,

The Council debate continued throughout April with each side accusing the other of aggression. The most serious charge was made by

Bolivia which accused the Government of Paraguay of requesting a declar 27 ation of war by the Congress of Paraguay, The acute situation was apparent to Argentina and Chile, both of which sought to effect an end to the hostilities by suggesting that the dispute be resolved by the

Permanent Court of International Justice, but with an armistice and withdrawal of troops during the process,

^ The League from Tear to Year, 1933, p» 176, Article 4 (4) merely stated that the Council should deal with any matter within the sphere of action of the League, Article 11 concerned collective action concerning a war or threat of war.

^O fficial Journal, XIV (1933), pp, 623-6, G32-4, 771-2, 181

The Council was shocked by a Bolivian telegram, dated toy 10,

1933, which notified the Council and the League that Paraguay had declared war on Bolivia. This was followed by a telegram, two days later, from Paraguay, notifying the Secretary-General of tho declara tion of war* Bolivia also produced additional evidence of Paraguayan intent by introducing a Paraguayan published pamphlet which indicated a plan to attack Bolivia,

. . . at the most favorable moment. , , * [in which] our jurists and diplomats will justify our conduct In the interna tional sphere in accordance with the wise counsels of Machiavelli, bearing In mind that, in any event, victory is tho supreme and final justification of our a c tio n s .

Bolivia, as could be expected, accused Paraguay of placing itse lf out side the Covenant and suggested Article 16 be invoked by the League against Paraguay,

The confused state of affairs in the Chaco area became more evident during the latter part of Hay when the Council declared that the declaration of war would have to be rescinded If the League wore expected to mediate, The Council then was astounded when it heard the

Paraguayan Delegate state that Paraguay actually had not declared war

^ Ibid, , pp, 752-60; XV (1934), p, 256, Several of the neigh boring Latin American countries immediately declared neutrality, which later facilitated action against Paraguay, The declaration of war by Paraguay was the result of a Paraguayan awareness of the rapid growth of Bolivia's military forces. Bolivia had been importing large quanti ties of munitions through Argentina, Chile and Peru, Although a ll neighboring countries declared neutrality in the dispute, and Argentina discontinued sales and transit of munitions, Chile and Peru did not feel obligated to such an extent and allowed continued transit of muni tions through their respective ports and over their communications facilities. 132 but merely had denounced the 3tate of war with Bolivia which had existed since June 15, 1932*29

Tho Council wont into extraordinary session during June and

July, 1933* The first ordor of business for the Council was to call for a Commission of Enquiry to investigate the circumstances in the field-*-in the Chaco area, Bolivia agreed to arbitration by tho Council and a Commission of Enquiry* After receiving an affirmative reply from

Paraguay, the Council suggested each side attach an assessor to the

Commission of Enquiry during Its investigation. The vision of progress being made, however, was shattered prior to termination of the extra ordinary session when Paraguay suddenly notified the Council that it was rejecting the Council's recommendations,'*0 Hew actions in the field by

Bolivia was stated as the reason for the change of mind by tho Para guayan leaders, Bolivia, in turn, notified the Council that Paraguay once again had gone on the offensive,

Discussions continued after resumption of the normal session in

September, A heavy volume of letters From the two belligerents and neighboring countries was received and discussed by the Council during which Bolivia remained quite cooperative in its relations with the

Council and its neighboring countries, Paraguay’s attitude was of a different nature and wa3 not conducive to a satisfactory solution to the crisis. It insisted upon a complete withdrawal of Bolivia from the Chaco and suspension of hostilities by Bolivia as preconditions to discussions.

2gIbid. t XIV (1933), pp. 7GO-Q9.

SOlbid., pp. 1072-9, 1002-99. 103

Bolivia imposed no such restrictions upon the Council and agreed to talks while hostilities were in progress* It appeared that Paraguay was stalling and finding nearly a ll recommendations unacceptable in some manner. 31

In the field the response was the same, Bolivia accepted a

Chaco Commission suggestion for a one-week armistice during the last week of December* Paraguay continued its operations, thereby severely curtailing beneficial results expected of the Chaco Commission* The cooperation of both belligerents was required if the Commission wa3 to be of assistance to the League*

The 78th session of tho Council began in January, 1934, The

Committee of Three submitted its report to the Council and reported that both sides had accepted the Committee's three proposals) 1) a settlement of the substantive question by legal procedure, 2) a security settlement affecting the military situation of the parties, and 3) an endeavor to devise measures to improve communications of the two coun- 32 tries with the outer world* Bolivia, apparently in a defensive pos ture in the field, appeared to be complying with tha Council’s desires while simultaneously reporting violations by Paraguay of the rules of land warfare in the treatment of prisoners of war* The Council, of course, was being beseiged at this time by complaints from China against continued Japanese intervention and also had to contend with a dispute

31Ibid*, pp. 1553-92J XV (1934), pp, 251, 256-65,

32Ibid*, XV (1934), pp. 242-71* 10<4

bat wean Colombia and Peru over the Leticia territory bordering tho so

two countrlso.

The Chaco Commission continued its work in the field. Despite the d ifficu lties encountered in its relations with Paraguay, it drafted a treaty during the March-May period. Paraguay once again displayed its contempt toward any settlement by proposing changes more favorable to Paraguay* Bolivia, on the other hand, suggested a different approach.

It proposed a study of the cause of the war, which, up to the present time, had not been accomplished* The efforts of the Chaco Commission could not be classified as futile* Its final recommendation of tho draft treaty involved a suggested embargo on arms to the belligerent s .3 3

Great Britain, having made such a suggestion during February of the previous year, once again offered a proposal concerning the 3 tf export and transit of arms and war material to the belligerents.

Anthony Eden noted that both belligerents were incapable of manufactur ing their own weapons but yet both sides possessed new weapons easily purchased from other American republics and European countries, In spite of Eden's reminder that he had suggested the embargo the previous year, the Council rebuffed hin by suspending action on an embargo pending outcome of the Commission of Enquiry study of the situation in the field*

Eden, realizing less than favorable results from tha Council as a whole, then appealed to all countries to terminate shipments of

33I b i d ., p p . 75<4-5* * ^ I b id , , p* 765, 105 35 arms to both belligerents, The response to Eden’s appeal was more

than gratifying. Bolivia accepted the plan but suggested that it be

based on an equity of armaments possessed rather than an arbitrary

coverage identical for both belligerents. Twenty-seven of the 35

countries contacted agreed to place an embargo, some conditional,

Others agreed to embargo direct shipments while certain countries agreed to embargo direct and indirect shipments* A final group agreed to an unconditional embargo,36

The Council then went into its 18th extraordinary session during May 30-June 7. The third meeting of the session, June 1, was punctuated by an appeal by the Bolivian Government under Article 15 of 3 7 the Covenant* This meant that the Secretary-General now was

35Ibid,, pp, 762-4, 027-43, 1534-7, 1502-1611, Canada and China agreed but stipulated that the embargo would be terminated to the bel ligerent which complied with the Covenant, which almost automatically would have eliminated Bolivia from the embargo, chiefly because of its willingness to assist the Council and accept the Council’s suggestions. Argentina prohibited sale and transport of war material through its territory. Austria replied that it could not, by law, export war material* Brazil had Federal and State laws prohibiting export and supply of material directly or indirectly to the belligerents. Denmark, Spain and the United States prohibited the sale of war material to the belligerents, The Irish Free State, Guatemala, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia raised no objection to the embargo. The Netherlands and Uruguay stated that other States had to comply to make their embargo effective* Australia, Blegium, Finland, France, Italy, Norway, the United Kingdom, Poland and Czecho slovakia agreed with the Netherlands and Uruguay. Germany declared that it had been willing to impose ths embargo the previous year, Chile based its intent upcit that of Germany, Italy and Japan, Japan (through its Consul-general in Geneva) stated that Japan never had shipped war material to the belligerents and the embargo did not apply to Japan.

3sIbid*. pp, 704-0, 845-51,

37l b l d ., pp. 1530-2, 106

responsible for the Investigation of the dispute. Thu Council, without

usurping the power of tha Secretary-General, also agreed that it would

continue to act under Article 11 in the hopes of reaching a satisfac

tory conclusion to the dispute,

Bolivia, s till not happy over the progress being made in the

Council, now began to stress paragraph 9 of Article 15, It wanted the

Council to bring the dispute before the Assembly, Bolivia received

the satisfaction of a Secretary-General's acknowledgement that the question

would be on the Assembly agenda on September 10, two months hence, during

which time much damage could have been suffered in the field.

Paraguay, as could have been expected, based on its continued

but unfulfilled promises and its evasive actions, requested a legal

opinion as to the applicability of Bolivia's appeal under Article 15, and Bolivia's request that tho question be transferred to the Assembly,

Bolivia received the support of the Committee of Three of the 3 0 Council when that Committee declared the Bolivian appeal legally valid.

The Committee apprised the Council of tha fact that it now was bound to

turn tha dispute over to the Assembly for further action. The Committee of Three then reported the results of its consultations with League

Members on a possible embargo of arms and war material against the two

belligerents, The results virtually duplicated those earlier reported,

with the only exception being that additional support had been received

in favor of an embargo, What really had won the support of the Commit tee of Three for Bolivia was the fact that Bolivia had stated its case

38Ibid,, pp, 049-51, 1530-2, IS 7

In such a way that there was little chance of a rebuttal of Bolivia's appeal, Bolivia had asked for the application of Article 15 with the obje ctive of making the application of Article 13 (Arbitration or

Judicial Settlement) possible. Bolivia was acting exactly as the

Council desired by showing its willingness to cooperate in the interest of justice and rationality,

The dispute became the official responsibility of tho Assembly on September 7 when it declared the matter duly submitted to the

Assembly, Tha Assembly then referred the dispute to its Sixth Commit tee which suggested a committee composed of the Council, tho Washington

Committee of Neutrals and four other Members of the League (China, Irish 39 Free State, Sweden and Venezuela)* The resolution of tho Sixth Com mittee was adopted on September 27 and the new Committee began to fu n c tio n ,

Bolivia continued to impress the League by suggesting a four- point program to effect a cessation of hostilities, It called for!

1) conciliation or judicial arbitration; 2) with reciprocal guarantees of security; 3) international policing of the whole Chaco territory; and, 4) complete demobilization by both Governments,**®

39Ibid,, XV (1934), Special Supplement No, 123 (Resolutions and Recommendations Adopted by the Assembly), pp, 19-19, The special committee suggested by the Sixth Committee, and approved by the Assembly, then established a Conciliation Sub-Committee to collect data for presentation to the Assembly,

^ Ibid, . XV (1934), pp, 794-8, The Bolivian four-point pro gram was suggested on October 2, 1934, 1B0

The dispute was brought to the floor of the Assembly during the latter part of November, 1934 with a report adopted by the fu ll 41 Assembly on November 24* Although the report was composed of a length y summary o f th e d is p u te , i t d id co n ta in extrem ely im portant suggestions* Part IV called for a cessation of hostilities and measures of security by and fore both belligerents, But perhaps Part V was the most important* It noted that practically all of the governments that had expressed willingness to impose a sanction against each belligerent in the shipment of arms and war material already had done so, a point heartily approved by the Assembly as a whole. Part VI would be of extreme importance at a later date* It provided for an advisory com mittee with which each government active in the embargo should coordin ate prior to the lifting of the embargo* The Secretary-General also notified a ll concerned that the dispute was being submitted to the

Permanent Court of International Justice for an opinion under Article

14 of the Covenant,

One paragraph of Part V very easily could have been overlooked.

Its importance, when combined with Part VI, was paramount* It suggested, im plicitly, that Members engaged in the embargo consider the actions of each of the belligerents upon the Assembly's recommendations* In other words, If one or both of the belligerents promised to abide by the

Assembly action, such action could be grounds for the lifting of the embargo,

4^Ibid,, Special Supplement No, 123, pp, 47-50, See also League of Nations, The Monthly Summary of the League of Nations, XIV, 11 (November 1934), Supplement, pp, 1-10, 189

Bolivia assured the Secretary-General of it3 willingness to

abide by the findings of the Permanent Court of International Justine,

while Paraguay equivocated as it previously had done on each occasion*

Bolivia also was willing to accept the recommendations fo the Chaco 42 Commission* The willingness of Bolivia to cooperate with the League

had a beneficial influence upon the Advisory Committee of the General

Assembly which bad been charged with the responsibility of studying the situation* The Advisory Committee, in its second part of its report, on January 16, 1925 suggested that B olivia's cooperation war ranted the liftin g of the embargo against Bolivia* The suggestion was transposed by the Secretary-General into letters, on January 26, to the

Members engaged in th e embargo, s o l i c i t i n g t h e i r v ia w s. Many Members were in favor of declaring an end to the embargo against Bolivia, The

Secretary-General thereby declared the embargo against Bolivia termina ted*

The CommitteeTs action so angered Paraguay that it declared, on February 23, 1935 its Intent to withdraw from tho League. It considered unfair the liftin g of the embargo against Bolivia and con tinuation of the embargo against Paraguay* Paraguay later sent a telegram, dated February 19, 1937, to the Secretary-General in which the Government of Paraguay considered it3 withdrawal from the League complete and definite.

42 Ibid.. XV (1934), pp. 822-7; XVI (1935), p, 451; and Special Supplement Mo* 133 (Resolutions and Recommendations Adopted by tho Assembly), p, 49,

43Ibid., XVI (1935), p, 451; XVIII (1937), p. 260. 190

The aftermath of the in itial notice of withdrawal waa a peace conference at Buenos Aires in June-October, 193S with a cessation of hostilities in October, 1935, The aftermath of the second notice of withdrawal was the fact that Paraguay remined delinquent in its pay ments duo the League, which never was able to collect the monies assessed against Paraguay and which Paraguay was obligated to pay until all arrears and assessments had been liquidated through to the date of complete withdrawal.

The Economic Burden

The League of Nations enjoyed the companionship of twenty Latin

American countries during its two and one-half decades of existence, the majority of which joined during 1920, Guatemala, having joined in

1919, with ratification on January 20, 1290, tha date considered to be the birth of the League, was one of the original list, El Salvador followed shortly thereafter by joining on March 10, 1920, Honduras and

Nicaragua became Members in November, 1920, All four therefore can be termed as early signatories to the Covenant, This now allows us to analyze the performance of the four Members,

Honduras made an early impression upon the soon-to-be-formed

League of Nations when it challenged tho principal sponsor of the League.

This occurred during tho discussion of the Covenant, especially that 45 portion involving the Monroe Doctrine, President Wilson repeatedly

4l4Ibid, . XIX (1938), pp. 690-700,

4E*II,S. Foreign Relations of the United States, Paris Peace Con ference, 1919, III, pp, 310-13, 191 insisted upon inclusion of the.Monroe Doctrine as part of the Covenant*

Wilson had tho support, wholehearted or otherwise, of Great Britain and France, Honduras, on the other hand, took a different view. It interpreted the Monroe Doctrine as an instrument at the disposal of the

United States for the domination of Latin American countries. The fact that Wilson, during the previous year, had sought to assure Mexico of 46 United States sincerity meant little to Honduras, America13 past record of intervention in Latin American affairs was too vivid in the minds of the Delegate of Honduras, The Monroe Doctrine, of course, was included in the Covenant as Article 21, It again would become the basis for dispute at a later date when another of the Latin American

Members would ch allen g e i t s u t i l i t y in th e Covenant,

The assessm en ts imposed a g a in st the Members fo r su p p ort o f th e

League waa based upon units, Each of the four Members here being con sidered was assessed one unit ($4,675,90), The amount does not appear excessive in modern time3 but circumstances were quite different in

1921 and El Salvador found it quite difficult to meat the financial obligation. Its difficulty in meeting its financial obligation there fore became tho basis for an appeal to the League for a reconsideration of the system of assessments, stating in it3 communication to the

Secretary-General that it did not feel itself bound to support the

International Labor Organization or the International Labor Office*

Ibid, , 1918, pp, 577-80, Wilson, speaking to Mexican jour nalists on June 7, 1918, admitted that the United States had instituted the Monroe Doctrine without prior consultation with Latin American leaders* He sought to allay the fears of Latin Americans by suggesting the Monroe Doctrine as a potential basis for partnership in resolving future problems encountered. 192

It based its conclusions on the fact that it had not signed the treaty U7 under which they had been established.

The reply received by El Salvador, during the following year, wa3 of little consolation to El Salvador, or any other Member having difficulty in meeting its financial obligations to the League, The

Special Supervisory Commission, composed of five Members, one of which bad to be a financial expert, under Assembly control, was charged with the responsibility, under Article 16, Chapter IV of a resolution on adoption of the Budget, of analyzing various segments of tho coming 40 budgets as submitted by the various agencies. The Special Advisory

Commission also was required to submit copies of the proposed budget to the Council and Members of the League at least three months prior to regular sessions of the League, The satisfaction gained by El

Salvador was questionable*

The question of fu ll acceptance of the League by the four Mem bers here under consideration can be exploited a little further,

Guatemala and Nicaragua thought enough of the League to assign per manently accredited representatives to the League. The same could not be said of El Salvador, which, as late as 192B, had reorganized its foreign office so as to provide for a League of Nations section In the foreign affairs ministry with special duties in conducting necessary business with the League at Geneva,1^

47Ibid.. 1923, IV, pp. 190-9, 244-6. ‘+0Ibid,, 1924, V, pp.79-99

49World Peace Foundation. Yearbook of the League of Nations, XII 1 (1929), p. 1920, 193

Acceptance also can be measured In another way. The Kellogg-

Briand Pact, or the Pact of Paris, or the Pact for the Renunciation 5 0 o f War, was introd uced to th e League in 1923, I t was accepted q u ite rapidly by many of the League Members. Ratification of the Pact was recognized as July 24, 1929, Nicaragua was the first of the four to sign ratification on May 13, 1929, followed shortly thereafter by

Guatemala on July IB, 1929, Honduras adhered to the pact on August 5, 51 1929, with El Salvador following suit during the same month,

Quantification of support for the League could be measured by another means, especially in the case of Guatemala. Guatemala contrib uted quite heavily toward peace in Latin America. It was very active in affairs associated with the Conference of American States on Concil iation and Arbitration, held in Washington during December 10, 1929 to January 5, 1929,^ The Conference was instrumental in seeking a halt to hostilities in the Bolivia-Paraguay dispute just previously discussed in this chapter* Guatemala not only participated in the Conference but offered itself as a mediator in the Leticia dispute between Chile and

Bolivia, to be touched on only briefly later in this chapter*

The Groat Depression had an adverse effect upon most of the world, Guatemala was no exception. The economy of Guatemala became so

5 0 , See supra, Chapter III, especially footnote 24 and allied text information.

^Foreign Relations of the United States, 1929, I, pp, 156-7,

52Ibid., pp, 621-44j 1929, I, pp, 653-69, It might be noted that Honduras, Nicaragua and El Salvador also participated in the Con ference. Their contributions were far below that of Guatemala, 194

disorganized that Guatemala, in 1933, appealed to the Socretary-

General for assistance* It requested the assistance of a League expert

who might analyze Guatemala's fiscal system for possible reorganization.

This request by Guatemala, an example of Guatemala's respect for the

League, was not extraordinary when viewed in conjunction with tho s it

uation in Mexico, which found it extremely difficult to maintain mem-

bershlp in tha League. S3 Mexico later requested its letter of possible

withdrawal be disregarded.

The burden o f a ssessm en t became to o g reat fo r a l l fou r Members

and each decided that it no longer could afford the assessments re

quired to support the League, The exit of the four began with Guatemala

which notified the Secretary-General of its withdrawal on May 13 and 14,

1936, Honduras and Nicaragua followed Guatemala on Juno 22 and 26,

1936 respectively, and El Salvador made its announcement on July 26,

54 1936, An aftermath of the withdrawal of tha four Latin Members was

a League resolution in which the League Assembly decided to refund a

portion of the assessments to each of the four if warranted, Honduras

and Nicaragua did not qualify since both were in arrears to the League at the expiration of their memberships.

In evaluating the withdrawals <£ the four Members within such a

short period, it is too difficult to ascertain the magnetism of the new

53League of Nations, Official Journal, XIV (1 9 3 3 ), pp, 395, 1600-9; XV (1934), p. 420,

54Th& Monthly Summary of the League of Nations, XVI, 5 (May 1935), p. 132; XVI, 7 (July 1936), pp, 106, 209; XVII, 0 (August 1937), p. 169, See also Official Journal, XIX (1930), p, 700, and Foreign Relations of the United States, Paris Peace Conference, 1919, XIII, p, 76, 195

approach toward Latin America as announced by President Franklin D, CC Roosevelt on January 30, 1936, It also is impossible to evaluate the

effect new trade agreements completed by the United States with several

of the Latin countries had on the League-Latin American relations.

Finally, the fact that the Western Hemisphere was not allowed a perma

nent seat on tho Council had an effect upon the Latin American Members,

but, as with the two previously mentioned variables, the quantification

factor m ilitating against cordial Leagua-Latln American Members cannot

be specified.

One final note may be added, Each upheld the high principles

of the Covenant while withdrawing from the League,

The Ineffective League

Chile, one of the original signatories to the Covenant, became

embroiled In a border dispute in 1920. The border between Bolivia,

Chile and Peru had been settled by the Treaty of Peace signed by the

three on October 20, 1904* Bolivia, cut off from the sea by that Treaty,

now sought Assembly action, under Article 19 (Review of Treaties) in an 55 attempt to revise the Treaty. Bolivia also sought the assistance

55 U.S., Department of State, Report of the Delegation of the United States of America to the Inter-American Conference for the Main tenance of Peace (Washington, D,C , t United States Government Printing Office, 1937), p, 1, For United States-El Salvador trade agreements, see Foreign Relations of the United States, 1934, V, pp. 257-62* United States-Guatemala trade agreements are noted in Foreign Relations of the United States* 1934, V, pp. 260-92; 1935, IV, pp. 585-613; 1936, V, pp. 584-98, Trade agreements between the United States and Honduras are included in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1934, V, pp* 372- 1935, IV, pp, 729-49. Trade agreements were also signed with several other Latin American countries during the 1933-38 period,

®^League of Nations, First Assembly Records Plenary Meetings (1920), pp, 595-6, 196

of the Permanent Court of International Justice in resolving the

border dispute,

Peru* in its letter to the Secretary-General* dated November l f

1920* also sought a redress of a border dispute with Chile, It also*

like Bolivia, sought Assembly action in revising a treaty, in this case

the Treaty of 1893 under which Chile had gained the Department of Tara-

paca and occupation of the Provinces of Tacna and Arica* The plebis

cite called for in IB93 never had occurred and Peru was blaming Chile

C rf for enforced sections of the Treaty*

Chile opposed any reference of the dispute to the Permanent

Court of International Justice, It also was opposed to any action by

the Assembly, so much so that it threatened to withdraw from the League

if the Assembly included the dispute on its agenda* The Chilean protest

was remarkable in the respect that the protest was based on Article 21

(Monroe Doctrine) of the Covenant* Chile referred to the

. * . principle of American international law according to which non-American States and* consequently* the Assembly* cannot interfere in questions exclusively affecting countries in the Hew World,

The Assembly worked itself out of a delicate situation by

deciding* on September 22, 1920* that the Bolivian request was not

in order, The contracting signatories to a treaty* according to the

Assembly* were the only parties capable of changing or modifying a treaty unless the treaty no longer could be executed* The Assembly

57I b id ,» pp, 5 95-7*

50Ihid,* pp, 560-1* See also Charles H* Levermore* Second Yearbook of the League of Nations (Hew York: Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 192-2)V PP*" 13V-5* 197 could act, under Article 19, if international conditions, caused by the treaty In question, threatened the peace of the world. 5 9

Chile and Peru decided to resolve their differences within the framework of the In ter'-American Conference system and no further action was required in the League. Bolivia, on the other hand, was not content and It once again appealed to the League, without invoking any article of the Covenant. It took the opportunity, in a letter of September 8,

1922, of appealing to the Secretary-General, again demanding that the

Treaty of 1904 be revised by the League. Chile countered by addressing a letter, dated September 19, once again refusing to regard the Treaty of 1904 open to discussion, Chile’s refusal left no action open to the League but to divest itself of further action of any type, The topic was not placed on the agenda.

Chile’s international political attitude next came to the attention of the League during the dispute between Bolivia and Paraguay.

Tho majority of the League Members, the views of which had been requested by the Council during that dispute, had agreed to curtail all sales to and/or transit of war materials, bound for ono or both of the belliger ents, through their countries. Chile (and Peru), while declining fur ther sales of the materials to both of the disputants, decided that its ports and transportation facilities should remain open to both parties to the dispute.*30

59 * Lovermore, op. clt.

*^See supra, this chapter, footnote 2B and allied information. 190

Chile also was conspicuous in yet another sense, This involved

the use of elements of the military of Chile in the dispute between

Bolivia and Paraguay, Chilean officers performed military duties with fl I the Bolivian army during the combat operations in the dispute* Chile

want a step furthar by allowing many of its nationals the opportunity of active employment in various occupations within Bolivia , thereby freeing male Bolivians for military duties. Theso incidents occurred while the League sought to effect a halt to military operations and a declaration of neutrality among neighbors of the two belligerents,

Chile’s participation in the League after Bolivia and Paraguay had coma to terms (shortly after Paraguay's withdrawal from the League) was leas than lustrous. When called upon to express his opinion con cerning H itler's re-arming of the Rhineland (in March, 1936), the

Delegate from Chile evaded a commitment by stating that Chile had not been a signatory to the Pact of Locarno and the German action had tio effect upon Chile,chile would wait another year before making it self heard and noticed.

Reform of the League had become a thought in the minds of many during this period* Mussolini had suggested it in 1933. The thoughts on reform took various forms. Some desired a change in structure while others desired a severance of the League from the Treaty of Versailles which, to them, had sarvad its purpose and should be discarded. S till

^William L* Langer* An Encyclopedia of World History (Boston: Houghton M ifflin Company, 1960), p. 1066.

^Walters, op. c it,, pp. 691-2* 199

others believed that tho League should turn to a form of univcrsalism

under which all sovereign States, they believed, should be accorded

the opportunity of participating In the League whether or not Members,

Reform, then, was a view that was not novel and the League should not

have been so surprised when the Delegate from Chile called for its 63 inclusion in the agenda in September, 1937.

Universality in the League was a view first expressed by Argen

tina during the First Assembly, It also was expressed by Chile on

several occasions, both in the Assembly and the Council, The only

difference was that the League now had an aroused Chilean Delegate

with which to contend, Chile no longer was willing to stand by and

withdraw into the shadows because of a League not willing to listen to

Chile's appeal for a reorganization.

The lack of universality mado the League sterile, especially

in view of the fact that the League supposedly was universal in charac- 64 ter and composition, according to the Delegate from Chile, The world

situation was becoming too acute for the League, or any of its Members,

to overlook the principle of universality, There was no time to waste and hasty action by the Council was required, he stated.

The subject was delegated to the Council for discussion and the

Chilean Delegate was invited to attend the May, 1938 session, It is

^League of Nations, O fficial Journal, XVIII (1937), Special Supplement No, 168, pp. 35-36, The Assembly resolution called for an examination of the subject by the Council, Section II of the same reso lution stated that, in case of war, or throat of war, the League would contact, without delay, non-Members in the common aim of maintaining peace.

I b id ., XIX (1930), pp, 113-4, 200 most likely that the Council was not prepared to hear what the Delegate 65 from Chile had to say,

The Council was reminded that one of the great European Powers

(Germany) already had withdrawn from the League and another (Italy) algo was in the process. The League therefore was not facing political reality, he stated. The lack of decision on the part of the League in both instances indicated that the Members were evading their responsi b ilities to the League by allowing the withdrawals without exerting additional effort toward retaining those memberships. The result, he stated, is that collective security is an illusion caused by the depart ure o f th e se lo s t Members.

The fa c t th a t C hile was prepared was evid en t when i t s D elegate produced an abbreviated history of disputes dealt with by the League,

Of the forty-two political disputes which have been dealt with by the League since it came into existence, eleven (relating almost without exception to matters connected with the liquidation of the great war) were the subject of a decision by the Council, Tlie other thirty-one disputes have been either settled by direct negotiation between the parties, or have been referred to other international organizations, or have led to a note signifying withdrawal from the League of Nations, or have been abandoned or left in suspense,

The L eague's I n s iste n c e upon the s ta tu s quo, he s ta te d , in d ic a te d a willingness of the League to retain in the Covenant certain articles

^5Ibid., 319-24, and Special Supplement Ho, 1G0 (1939), pp. 5, 23-24, 37. Chile was moat unhappy with tho work of the Assembly Com mittee of Twenty-night which had been delegated the task of studying Chile'3 suggestions. The Chilean Delegate accused the Committea of an attempt to shelve tho Chilean proposal*

66Ibid., XIX (193B), pp. 375-8, S16. 201

which wore unenforce able but continued to be retained in theory in the political structure of the League.

The course of events therefore left Chile no other course but E7 to withdraw from the League, according to the Chilean Delegate* Chile promised that it would continue to respect the lofty aims of the League

Covenant.

The F in a l L atin E xits

Peru had been one of the original adherents to the Covenant with

Venezuela signing on in March, 1920, Venezuela had remained a Member in good standing but had no record of outstanding achievement* Peru, on the other band, became conspicuous, In a derogatory sense, when it, like

Chile, had kept its ports and communications facilities open to transit of munitions and war materials to Bolivia and Paraguay during their d ispu te*

Tho withdrawals of Venezuela and Peru do not warrant excessive attention, Venezuela announced Its withdrawal on July 11, 1938 and eg Peru informed the League of its intention to withdraw on April 8, 1939,

There Is little doubt that the criticism of the League by the Delegate from Chile had an adverse effect upon Venezuela and Peru, even though no specific reasons were given by either of the two in their notifica tions of withdrawal* Tho only consolation offered the League by each was tho promise to cooperate with the League,

^ Ibld, The date of the notification of withdrawal by Chile was Kay 31, 193B,

63Ibid., p. 661; XX (1939), p. 204, 202

There is a possibility that the new approach of the United

States toward the Latin American countries may have been a contribut or ing factor, since trade agreements were signed with each* The bene ficia l effects of Roosevelt's new look in United States-Latln American affairs undoubtedly had some effect 3 ince more could be gained from the

United States than the League which now was in its lowest ebb*

One final note concerns Peru. It was in arrears at time of withdrawal and remained indebted to the League in its annual payments*

G9For United States-Venezuela trade agreements see Foreign Relations of the United States. 1936, V, pp* 955-62; 1937, V, pp* 746-98; 1938, V, pp. 956-84. United States-Peru trade agreements are contained in the same publication, 1935, IV, pp* 932-45; 1936, V, pp* 828-33; 1938, VII, pp. 931-73* vri

THE SOVIET UIII01! IS EXPELLED

The history of Soviet relations with tho League of Nations is punctuated with one indelible metaphor, Thera was nearly no love between

the two prior to the Soviet entry into the League and less than an abundant amount after the Soviet Union became an active Member,

A study of the relationship also indicates other factors, The

Soviet approach in itia lly was one dominated with excessive suspicions of the League and its Members, Soviet suspicions abated to a certain degree, but never completely* Membership normally would have been ac

companied by a lessening of tensions and an increase in cooperation,

This, however, was not the case with the Soviet Union, It remained cautious in its dealing with the League* Membership for the Soviet

Union meant that it would participate in League functions on a purely utilitarian basis, It would seek the maximum gain possible, in its own national interest, without sacrifice, while simultaneously attempting

to reduce the capabilities of other Members not completely in conson ance with the Soviet views*

The overview therefore provides a preliminary sketch of the relationship and allows an examination of the initial detractions in volved, the following attractions, and tho ultimate kinship between

the Soviet Union and the League of Nations.

203 2D4

The Formative Years

The formative years includes approximatsly two years during

which ideas of a League of Nations wera pondered and tha early years of

the League's actual existence when it was struggling for longevity,

This was a period during which the Russian Bolshevik Party spokesmen engaged in polemics opprobriously expressed against the League of

Nations* It would be erroneous to state, however, that these comments were unjustified*

The earliest Soviet expression of distrust toward the future

League of Nations was expressed by Georgi Chicherin, the Russian For eign Minister, who addressed a note to President Wilson in 191B in which he expressed fear that capitalists within the United States and other countries were planning "policies of encroachment and super profits in China and in Siberia * * . and other territories and other peoples* * *

Though the Chicharin note appears to be slightly ridiculous, it must be remembered that external military forces had been active in

Siberia and had sought to secure a position of superiority for the

Mensheviks at the expense of the Bolsheviks {Communists}, These forces were representatives of the capitalist countries, sent to Russia for

^■Jane Degras, ed, Soviet Documents on Forolgn Policy (New York: Oxford University Frees, 1951}, 1, pp, 112-20. The note/"dated October 24, 1913, warned President Wilson to: ft* . , be aware * * , that the cap italists of your country are planning to apply , * * policies of encroach ment and of super-profits In China and in Siberia* * , * You are no doubt aware of similar plans of the capitalists and ruling circles of other countries with regard to other territories and other peoples* * . * We propose, therefore, Mr* President, that the League of Nations ba based on the expropriation of the capitalists of all countries," 205

that purpose, Chicherin also viewed with distaste the success of

various countries In China during the Open-Door period, countrios that

enjoyed success sought for but not attained by Russia, tho very same

countrios, such as France and Great Britain, which were showing inter

est in the future League of Nations,

Certain prominent figures from among the Allied and Associated

Powers took a dim view of the attitude of the Bolsheviks and proposed

action that would neutralise the Bolsheviks* Marshal Ferdinand Foch,

Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces in World War I, received the

support of Winston Churchill and Georges Clenenceau, each of whom sug

gested military action against the Bolsheviks. Wilson and Lloyd George

did not share these sentiments, Wilson believed it unwise to use m ili

tary forces against the Bolsheviks, especially without a prescribed

course of action, Lloyd George agreed with Wilson and offered the

League of Nations as the most logical instrument to neutralize the 3 "poison of Bolshevism," What a ll this meant was that two groups

2 R* S* Baker, Woodrow W ilson and World S ettlem en t (New York) Doubleday, Page and Company, 1923), I, pp* 166-57. See also David Hiller, My Diary at the Paris Peace Conference (New York) privately published, 1924), XIV, 448, 450, Foch, on the first day of the Peace Conference, wanted an allied force, composed mainly of United States troops, Churchill suggested military sections be charged with the responsibility of establishing "a plan for concerted action against the Bolsheviks,11 Clemenceau did not favor "the policy of leaving Russia to her own devices." He suggested "a policy of encirclement; the policy of setting up a barrier around Russia," £ II, V. Temperley* A History of the Peace Conference of Paris (London: Henry Frowde and Hodder and Stoughton, 1924), Vi, pp, 579-80, "If we are to offer Europe an alternative to Bolshevism we must make the League of Nations into something which w ill be both a safeguard to those nations who are prepared for fair dealing with their neighbors and a menace to those who would trespass on the rights of their neighbors, whether they are im perialist empires or im perialist Bolsheviks,11 206

suggested action against the Bolsheviks, even though the methodologies

differed* The first group suggested overt action through direct inter

vention, while the second group, headed by Hllson and Lloyd George,

stressed defensive action, covertly, through the League, against the

spread of Bolshevism,

The Soviet leadership saw little difference in the two courses

of action, chiefly because both were directed against the Bolsheviks*

They retaliated by forming the Communist International, more commonly

known as the Comintern, which hopefully would counter t(* , • tha efforts of the black International [the League of Nations], , * , a league of bourgeois robbers for the oppression of nations, * , , for tha division of the world, For the enslavement of the workers, , , , for the strang- ling of tha proletariat revolution.11

Joseph Stalin, in 1919, described the world as being divided into two irreconcilable camps, "tha camp of imperialism, and the camp 5 of socialism .11 The League of Nations, according to Stalin, signified that imperialism was in its death throes and was clutching at the last straw (the League), Imperialism supposedly was trying to unite the robbers of all countries into one alliance, Failure was the inevitable

^Degras, ed* The Communist In tern a tio n a l* 1919-1943: Documents (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956-60}, I, pp, 1-2, 51, The First Congress was convened by necessity, according to the Bolsheviks, Tlby the alliance of capitalist states, which are banding together against the revolution under the hypocritical banner of the 'League of Nations' , , , [which] compel us to take the initiative in placing on the order of the day the convening of an international congress of revolutionary pro letarian parties."

5J. V. Stalin, Works {Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1952-55), IV, pp, 243-44. 207

outcom e, he b e lie v e d , sin ce im p erialism supp osedly was doomed to in

evitable destruction* This meant; by implication, that the League had

no chance. The best that one can say about Stalin's statement is that

it was another lucid example of the acerbity emanating from Moscow

toward the League of Nations.

From what has been stated thus far it would appear that there

was an impossibility of reconciliation between the leading elements in

Moscow and Versailles, And yet there were attempts at a meeting of the

minds, The Allied and Associated Powers, expecting a rapid decline of

the Bolsheviks, sought to come to an agreement with them eveti though

they preferred a democratic Russia as a prospective member of the League,

It was hoped that the White Russians, the Mensheviks, would overcome

the Bolsheviks and create a democratic Russia that would be a welcomed

member with fu ll rights of representation in the Assembly and the Council

as an original member of the League.^

Political Disputations

Political invectives against the League continued, V, I, Lenin

took up the task as chief spokesman for the Soviet Communist Party. To

him the international organization newly formed was a "robber League of

Nations11 which had been formed by impermissible and treacherous com promises "for the specific purpose of suppressing" the revolutionary

^Temperley, op. clt*, VI, pp. 311-1B, See also Louis Fischer, The S o v ie ts In World A ffa ir s (P r in c e to n , M,iJ. i Princeton University Press, 1551), I, Chap, 4; C, K. Gumming and Walter Petit, eds,, Russian- Americon Relations, 1917-1920 (New York! Harcourt, Brace and Howe, 1920) p. 339, and Miller, op. clt*, XVIII, p. 4h5, 2oa 7 proletariat and its causes, Lenin* however, did not exclude compromises.

He did see value in compromises with capitalists under varying circum stances. The League of Nations, he felt, did not warrant his or the 6 Communist Party support.

The suspicions of Lenin continued through the rest of his life.

The League supposedly was a myth, based completely upon the predication that it would divide the world, but had failod, chiefly because of the 9 cross-purposes existing among the Members of the League, There had, however, to be an explanation for the fact that the League had not in vaded Soviet Russia, which seemed to have been the fear of the Bolsheviks,

The fact that the League already had met successfully, not once but twice, also required an explanation which Lenin felt obliged to present at this time, Credit was due the Bolsheviks, he felt, because of Soviet-League coop eration and th e fa c t th a t th e League Members were more concerned with the gains enjoyed as a result of the past war,1^1

77, I, Lenin. Left-Wing Communism, An Infantile Disorder (Hew York) In tern a tio n a l P u b lish e r s, 1 9 3 4 ), p, 51,

°C, Dale Fuller* "Lenin's Attitude Toward an International Organisation for the Maintenance of Peace, 1914-1919.11 Essay, Columbia University, 1948, p, 59. See also V, I. Lenin, Imperialism? Tho High est Stage of Capitalism (Hew Yorki International Publishers, 1939), p. 119, Lenin1 s "obsession with the dangers posed by the League of Nations is evidenced by the fact that though the League had not yet actually performed any business, nor had it held a meeting, it was an enemy of the Bolsheviks, Furthermore, it was, in bis words, a "truce in periods between wars." Peaceful alliances, as far as he was concerned, paved the way for wars. In addition, alliances grow out of war3, thereby making one the condition for the other,

^Lenin, Selected Works (New York) International Publishers, 1935- 39), VIII, pp.80-31, The year was 1920 and the League had held two meetings.

^°Ibid. The cooperation is not explained. It can be deduced that this was an early example of nebulous explanations that later became the 209

In 1919, the International Labor Office bad decided to aid the

Russians by sending a commission to Russia to investigate industrial

conditions* Its chief concern was to aid the Russian Government* Rather

than act on its own the Labor Office decided to allow the Council of tha

League to arrange such formalities as communications, notification of

extent of the inquiry and security of guarantees for the commission,

The Council, apparently pleased at the prospect of normalizing relations

with the Soviet Government, forwarded a telegram* A reply was long in

coming. It was not until Hay, 1919, from January of the same year, that

word was received by the Council, The Council was stunned by tha Soviet

r e p ly .

The Soviets noted that they had been attacked by Polish military

forces representing the Polish Government, a Member of the League, and

that the League, rather than condemning the Polish Government, had

allow ed some o f i t s Members to support th e P o lish a c t i o n ,^ T his, the

metaphoric trademark of the Marxists not only in tha Soviet Union but world-wide. It also can be construed as an early example of word usage in which the interpretations of the Marxists and non-Marxists varied extensively,

^League of Nations. Council Meetings, 1920, Procas-Vcrbal of the Third Session, Annex 21, p* 23; Annex 23, p, 25; Procee-Verbal of the Fifth Session, Annex 39, pp, 113-5; Annex 33b, p, 119; Proces-Verbal of the Sixth Session, Annex 63, p* 47; Annex 63a, p, *49; and Fifth Assembly Records Plenary Meetings, 1920, p. 274. See also Eagras, The Communist Interriational 1919-194 3; Documents, I, p, 140, The Council was the first body ¥o" meet but its duties were limited by tho chief Members (France, Great Britain and Italy) to such lesser matters as boundary problems, reparations and payments and other business exclusive and de tached from such an important international affair as assisting in tho settlement of the Soviet-Polish dispute. No reason, except perhaps that the French were more sympathetic to the Poles than the Russians, can be offered for the Council intransigence. The Russians, of course, did not differentiate between French action in conjunction with former Triple 210

Soviet leaders felt, was sufficient reason for rejecting the presence of League representatives at that time, It is easy to see that non-

League activity was relegated by the Soviet leaders to the same category as League-sponsored activities. Renewed attempts by the League met with failure, chiefly because of the continued Polish military operations against the Russians, construed by the Russians as League sanctioned.

The Soviet mistrust of the League continued. Events concerning the Aaland Islands, Vllna (Lithuania) and the Eastern Karelia indicated that the Soviets would deceive themselves even if they could be the recipients of favorable League action.

The predominantly Swedish inhabitants of tha Finnish Aaland

Islands led Sweden to claim the Islands, Tha Council took the dispute under consideration and Finland was allowed to retain control, Tho

Soviets had been spared any participation in this case, Normally, it would seem that the Russians would appreciate tho League's ability to resolve the problem. This, however, was not the ca3e, Chicherin,

Russian Foreign Minister, criticized the League Council for not having 12 asked Soviet participation in the case, It is difficult to visualize just why the Soviets became interested in a case in which no Soviet

Entente sympathy with the Poles and French action as a Member of the League. Degras noted that Lenin considered the League as nothing more than an Insurance contract under which each Member guaranteed the o th er g* spoils of war, The League Assembly, when it met a year later, did express regret that the Council did not take positive action in the form of intervention during the Russo-Polish military activities, 12 Degras, The Communist International, 1919-1943; Documents, I, pp. 276-77. 211 interests actually were involved, except perhaps for the purpose of criticizing the League,

The seizure of Vilna, in October, 1920, by Polish troops led to a second Council action, Lithuania's request to the Council resulted in the proposed dispatch of 1,500 men to the city of Vilna. This small detachment would replace the Polish troops in accordance with the deci sion arrived at by the Council and would guarantee a fair plebiscite in tha city* The Soviet Government, after warning the League that neither it nor the Lithuanian Government would allow foreign troops In

Vilna, then notified the League, through Poland, that it considered foreign troops a potential danger, in the form of new hostile action, to 13 the Soviet Republics* The League Council decided against further action and the Polish troops, more of a hazard to the Soviets than would have been the League-sponsored contingent, remained in the city,

Finland's complaint, on November 26, 1921, concerning Russian treatment of Finns in Eastern Karelia, an autonomous territorial unit within tha Soviet Union, under the Treaty of Dorpat, signed by Finland and Soviet Russia, was considered a hostile act by the Russians. Cbi- cherin called the possibility of League-sponsored troops in Eastern

K arelia,

A wholly unprecedented attack on the sovereign rights of tho RSFSR {Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republics] and

^League of Nations, Council Meetings, Proces-Vorbal of the Eleventh Session, 22 and Annex 129k, p, 6, 212

an attempt to get representatives of hostile Powers into an inalienable part of it3 territory,^

The League Council then suggested that Poland or one of the

Baltic States lend its good offices to effect a solution. This was re

jected by the Soviet Government. The League took no further action until the following year when Finland requested the Council obtain a decision by the Permanent Court of International Justice, The Council agreed to the Finland request, The Soviets, with continued animosity against the League, now vented some of their fury upon the Permanent

Court, considering it with the same mistrust and suspicion as the League,

Thus, the Court, unable to discuss the case without a Soviet representa tive present, considered itself incapable of reaching a decision or 15 opinion. This was another example of the low regard held by the

Soviet Union for the League.

The political attacks upon the League continued into 1923, The

League as a political unit continued to be looked upon with mistrust,

Each occasion was interpreted by the Soviet Government as an opportunity for a perverted attack upon that body. H ostility toward the League was the order of the day, even in functional activities,

l4Degras. The Communist International, 1919-1943i Documents. I , pp, 28Q-S1, 15 League of Nations. O fficial Journal, IV (1923), Special supplement Ho, 19, p. 29, See also O fficial Journal, III (1922), pp. 107-09; IV (1923), pp. 577, 660-01 (Annex 499a), pp, 663-4 (Annex 439b); Charles Prince, "The U.5.S.R, and International Organizations," American Journal of International Law, XJiXVI, 3 (July 1942), p. 432; K. Davis, The Soviets at Geneva (Geneva) Libraries Kundig, 1934), pp, 99-101, Article XVII of the Covenant was used as a basis for the Permanent Court decision not to discuss the case or render an opinion or decision, Funct ional Part i cIp at ion

Tha Soviets, during this period from 1920 to 1923, while p o liti

cally castigating the League at evary opportunity, did participate in

a very limited sense in functional activities, but with a selfish motive

in each case.

One example of Soviet action by which one could judge the Soviet motive concerned the repatriation of former prisoners-of-war after the

F ir s t World War. Though i t took about two y e a rs to r e p a tr ia te n ea rly one-half a million former prisoners-of-war, the Soviet Government was noted for its ability to cooperate with the League in repatriating prisoners-of-war remaining in Central Russia and Siberia, The Soviet

Government appeared eager to exchange the prisoners and not only atten ded meetings but reportedly was very active in furnishing transportation to complete the huge task involved.^ The advantages being gained by the Soviet Government caused a nearly complete reversal in its approach to relations with the League,

Closely associated with the problem of prisoners-of-war was that of the refugees, of which there were approximately two million in

Europe, all of Russian origin, In this case, as with the repatriations, the Soviet Government cooperated quite closely with the League's rep resentative in charge of the refugee problem.

^League of Nations* Council Meetings, 1920, Froces-Verbal of the Fourth Session, p, 43; Proces-Verbal of the Sixth Session, Annex 64, p. 53; Procea-Verbal of the Tenth Session, Annex 109, pp. 78-91, See also First Assembly Records Plenary Meetings (1920), p, 139, and Second Assembly Recordg~~Fle_nary M eetings (1 9 2 1 ), p . 175, 214

There was one other serious problem, of only a 3lightly differ ent nature, which attracted League attention at this time, This was the Russian famine of 1921, the result of a disastrous drought along the

Volga River. Further complicating conditions in Russia were the after effects of tha civil war between the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, or anti-Bolsheviks, following the October Revolution of 1917,in which the

Bolsheviks seized power. The peasants were faced with the harmful ef fects of the New Economic Policy of 1921, under which the Government sought to politically neutralize the vast majority of peasants. This last was of relatively leGser importance, since the program became fully effective the following year.

Tho famine itself struck with such severity that the Communist

International (Comintern) appealed to all workers of the world for 17 assistance. Appeals to the League Assembly by F. Nansen, who had represented the League in the repatriation and refugee problems, appa rently fell on mute ears, even though private worldwide organizations had offered as much assistance as was possible.’*'® The burdens of the previous war was given by several governments as the reason for no action while others refused to float loans based on such questionable bases. Mistrust of the Bolsheviks was apparent. Hansen finally ap pealed to tho Assembly Members to divert about one-tenth of their

^E, H, Carr. Tho Bolshevik Revolution (Baltimore! Macmillan £ Co., 19S3; Penguin Books), III, pp. 341-43.

^sFridtjof Nansen. Russia and Peace (New Yorkt Macmillan £ Company, 1 9 2 4 ), pp. 2 2 -3 3 , 37, ais

appropriations for military hardware to aid for the victims of tho 19 Russian famine, The only result achieved by Nansen was an Assembly

action of referral to a conference meeting in Brussels which would

investigate the situation, Nansen, the following year, appealed to the

Council, but this only resulted in a Council authorization to the

Secretariat to place emphasis on the famine in a report on economic

conditions in Russia. The League took no action beyond a report on the

conditions observed. The invisible message to Moscow undoubtedly was

quite clear. Tho Bolshevik mistrust of, and political viatrics toward

the League now were in the backlash stage in a most explicit form,

The Russian famine of 1921, with its great toll of lives, in

troduced a new danger. The possibility of epidemics, making geographical

populations vulnerable rather than just the local population, as was true

in the case of the famine, caused the League to alter its approach. It

sought to assist Russia and all neighboring States in combatting the 20 possibility of epidemics through its Health Organization, Typhus was

prevalent in Russia and League attempts met with a political rebuke from

Chicherin, who insisted that any Russian cooperation in this humanitarian undertaking would in no way affect the Soviet dislike of the League, nor could the League display any of its League of Nations placards and signs

in any of the conferences and, furthermore, there was to be no inter mediary action between the Soviet and external national delegations by

^League of Nations, Second Assembly Records Plenary Heatings (1922), pp, 170, 547j and Official Journal. Ill (1922). dp. B09-10.

Davis, op. clt, , pp, 45-46, Sec also Prince, op, clt., p,43B, 216 any of the members of the League of Nations delegation, Tha Soviet

Government declared itself the only competent political unit capable of fighting the problem, Mensheviks and units in exile were considered

incapable and unqualified to deal with the problem. Wisdom, however, prevailed over the Soviet political maneuvering, Medical aid offered by League-sponsored doctors and technicians was accepted through the next several years until the epidemic was arrested*

The League-sponsored International Labor Organization, even though it had failed in its 1919 attempt to assist Russia through the

League's Commission of Inquiry, established its own internal section to study the Russian economy and conditions affecting tha Russian labor forces, In this case the Soviets again were quite aloof oven though 21 they did exchange in format ion with the Labor Organization,

The foregoing thus indicates that the Soviets, even though ex tremely cautious in their contacts with the League, and ready to exer cise their right to politically condemn the League, could conceal pride sufficiently long to accept Home assistance from tha League. This being the case, we might now examine the prospect of Soviet membership in the

League.

P ro sp ect 3 of Soviet Membership

Any prospects of early membership in the League were jolted at the European Economic Conference held at Genoa, Italy, during April, 1922*

^Davis, op. c it., pp. 40-52, 61-57. The Soviets, showing their mistrust of tho League, formed a unit under the Comintern (Communist International) charged with tho responsibility of studying Russian labor conditions, 217

Evan though the Conference was not a La a gun-'Sponsored activity* Lloyd 22 George felt that Russia had to be Included in the Conference* The

general feeling appeared to be that perhaps a political relaxation by

the Russians might be an outcome of the Conference if the Conference

were a success. League Members at the Conference were shocked when they

learned of the Treaty of Rapallo, signed by the Germans and Soviets on

April 16, 1922, a treaty which provided for most-favored-nation status

for both signatories and declared the ill effects of the past war as

events of the pa3t to be forgotten by both parties to the treaty* The

Treaty of Rapallo not only upset the League Members present but was the

major factor leading to failure of the Conference*

There was no remorse on the part of the Soviets over the failure

of the Conference of Genoa. In fact, they were quite pleased about tho

results* They had accomplished what they had desired most, an agree

ment with particular advantages to the Soviet Government, an agreement 23 consummated outside the "fictitious League of Rations.11 The treaty

was bilateral and would set the pattern for many more of this type*

Only occasionally would tha Soviets become party to a m ultilateral type,

which apparently the A llies ware contemplating at Genoa* Bilateral

treaties contained a promise far more valuable for the Soviets than

22Temperley, op* c it., VI, pp* 327-28, Sea also F, P, Walters, A History of the Loague of Nations (London: Oxford University Press, I960)* p* 1GU, and L, Shapiro, Soviet Treaty Series (Washington, D.C*: Georgetown University Proas, 1950), pp, 168-69. TITe Treaty of Rapallo received some attention in Chapter IV and w ill receive only the atten tion required for clarification of events In this chapter*

2^Degras, Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, I, pp, 319-20, 219

any that could be extracted from multilateral treaties, Tha Soviets

could gain more through the bilateral treaties, chiefly because It cou ld use th ese t r e a t ie s more r e a d ily t o i t s own advantage. I t i s much easier to outwit one partner than several, a game at which the Soviets would become masters.

Without United States membership, the League was left with two

European powers as an unofficial steering committee, France and Great

Britain sought to guide the League, each with its own motive. One point, however, became apparent during 1924, Both had recovered suf ficiently from the early shock of the Bolshevik victory in Russia and both now were convinced that the Soviets could be accepted as a Member of the League, The British Prime Minister and the French Premier both expressed confidence that the Soviet Union could become a welcome part- 24 ner in the League* In fact, the French Premier even went to the ex tent of hinting that the League had been too impatient with the Rus s ia n s ,

The Soviet reaction to British and French overtures was not very promising, even though the Soviet Government felt that an inter national organization was desirable. But the type of international organization the Soviets suggested was quite different from the League,

Such being the case, the Soviet Union could not join the League but

^League of Rations, Official Journal V (1924), Special Sup plement Ho, 23, pp, 42-3, 54, Ths French Premier, Edouard Herrlot, stated in part, that: "A policy of freedom, a return to normal con ditions of life , mutual intercourse, and, above a ll, patience and steady caution must be our weapons In the struggle against excesses, • would have to act bilaterally as each problem became apparent,25 This

actually was the Treaty of Rapallo procedure to be held in reserve and

a p p lie d when req u ired .

The Soviet Government then applied its principle of individ

uality by concluding several treaties of neutrality and non-aggression

with Turkey, Afghanistan, Lithuania and Persia, a ll bilateral and out

side the League structure. Out yet the League was becoming an organi

zation of value to the Soviets even though it was minimal, Chlcherin,

in 1925, was paving the way for continued Soviet profit from the League

when ho stated that an observer could be sent to the League "for purposes

of information only,1'2^ On the other hand, the Soviets apparently did not want it to appear that they were anxious to join the League. They

s till considered It an Instrument of the imperialist powers*

There were two events occurring at this time which had effect upon the Soviet outlook* One was tho deep Interest in disarmament by the League, to be discussed shortly, and the second was the pending

German membership in the League,

The prospect and eventual membership of Germany in the League placed tho Soviet Union in a state of trauma, especially after signa ture of the Treaty of Locarno in October 1925* The coming entry of

Germany into the League, a pre-requisite of the Locarno Treaty, imposed

ftp Degras, Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, I, p* 432; II, p, 60, The Soviets opprobriously viewed the League as based on a measure of constraint exercised by certain Members against others. 220

by the other four partners to that treaty, signified additional respon

sib ilities to the Germans in the maintenance of peace. It meant some

thing else to the Soviets who interpreted the pending German membership

a s a tra n sfo rm a tio n o f a p r e v io u sly fr ie n d ly Germany In to a new Germany

a t tho hands and mercy o f tho League, a Germany th a t would be req u ired

to carry out League resolutions automatically, even if directed against 27 th e S o v ie t U nion, The Germans o b jected to t h is view and sought to

soothe the Soviets by concluding a trade agreement with the Soviet

Union,

The Soviet fears also were partially alleviated in 1926 when the

Germans signed the Treaty of Berlin, with the Soviet Union as the other

s ig n a to r y , Germany p roclaim ed once again i t s n e u t r a lity w ith tha S o v ie t

Union and the European powers, More conviction was required by the

Soviets and was furnished by Stresemann, the German Foreign M inister,

who n o tifie d : th a R u ssian s th a t Germany would he i t s own m aster and would

participate in League sanctions against the Soviet Union only by Its own

consent, if over that action were required, Germany reserved the right 2 0 to act even in the event of aggression by the Soviet Union,

The Soviets remained unconvinced, Nikolai Bukharin continued

tha scurrilous attack upon the League by picturing the German entry as a further consolidation of the capitalist forces of Europe that, even

2^Xenia Eudln and H* Fisher, Soviet Russia and the West, 1920- 1927 (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1957), pp, 273-74.

20M, W, Graham, Jr, "The Soviet Security System," International Conciliation, CCLII (September 1929), pp, 405-07, See also Lionel Kochan, Russia and the Weimar Republic (Cambridge: Bowes and Bowes, 1954), p . 117, 221

though they were directed partly against United Staten economic com

petition, the bulk of their efforts were concentrated against the Soviet 29 Union and its working masses*

The Soviet Union was not ready for membership* The League just

was not the type of organisation to which it could be attached. Yet,

on the other hand, the Soviet Union was not completely detached. Dis

armament bad heen a topic of prime importance to the League. It also

enjoyed high priority in Moscow and the corollary led to limited parti

cipation by Soviets in League affairs.

Cautionary Participation

A discussion of this section must revert to the Paris Peace Con

ference where Georges Clemenceau announced that a general reduction and

lim itation of armaments was required not only of Germany but a ll coun-

tries. This, ha felt, was the only sure preventive of war. 30 This was a result of a German protest against the Peace Treaty and the proposed* and later finalized version of Article VIII of ths Covenant which

called for a reduction of armaments*

The League efforts began with the establishment of the Permanent

Advisory Commission for M ilitary, Naval and Air questions and the Tem porary Mixed Commission on Armaments* N eith er was a b le to accom plish any satisfactory results.

2 9 T* A. Taracouzio* The Soviet Union and International Law {New Yorkt The Macmillan Company, 1 9 3 5 ), p",~~2S2* 30 Temperley, op. c it*, II, p* 303* 222

Shortly thereafter, from November, 1921 to February, 1922* the world was treated to what appeared to be real progress during the Wash ington Conference, 'Turing which agreements had been reached as to armaments ratios and Japan and China apparently had been brought closer together, both of which already have been described in Chapter III of this study. Results achieved in VTashington stirred Lloyd George, who proposed a Genoa conference for European countries, The Soviet Union accepted the challenge and sent Chicherin, its Foreign Minister, The meeting, o fficia lly known as the European Economic Conference, touched on briefly earlier in this chapter in conjunction with the Treaty of

Kapallo, was to deal chiefly with economic situations in Europe, Chi cherin decided otherwise. Peace, to him, was too irrevocably connected with economics, trade and disarmament and a clear separation was im possible. With this in mind, he proceeded to elaborate on the import- 31 ance of a general limitation of armaments, This was a repetition of the Hague Conference of IB99 in which a weak Russia sought to bring a ll other powers down to her low level of preparedness. The Soviet proposal to add disarmament to the agenda was rejected, The Soviets would not leave the abortive Conference without some form of gain, how ever, and they combined their talents with an eager German delegation to sign the Treaty of Rapalio.

The Soviets, less than completely happy with their failure to include armaments In the agenda at the Genoa conference, then proposed a conference at Moscow and invited Poland, Finland and Estonia to

3^Degras, Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, I, pp, 249-51, 223 attend* Disarmament was to be the only topic For discussion* The conference was held in December, 1922, but the antagonistic approach of Maxims Litvinov, who accused the capitalist States of a double standard which fomented conflict while also preaching disarmament, left the three capitalist States representatives little choice but to 32 reflect upon the Russian revolutionary activity and propaganda. The conference ended in failure, in spite of a Soviet proposal for a 75 percent reduction of a ll land forces within a two-year period, after the Soviets accused other nations of cheating on their proposed reduc tions of military hardware and forces, This contempt was unacceptable to th e oth er Members o f th e c o n fe r en ce .

The League then sponsored the Rome Naval Conference of 1923, to which the Soviet Union had been invited. The Soviet reply, ack nowledging its acceptance of the invitation, also contained the usual oppugnant approach in which it stated that it proposed to deal with individual States even though they were Members of an "alleged League 33 of Nations." This Conference also failed, especially after the

Soviet Union demanded that, rather than reduce it3 naval forces, it should be allowed to enlarge these forces* This Soviet approach, in retrospect, was identical to the Russian approach during the Hague

Convention of 1907, It was an aspiration for equality. The Russian approach a t each o f th e Hague C onventions now had been rep eated .

32L enin, c t a l* The S o v ie t Union and Peace ( Londont Lawrence £ Hishart, 1930), pp. 117-19,

33Dogras. Soviet Documents on Foreign P o licy , I, pp. 381-02, 224

The League once again took the initiative and drafted a Treaty

of Mutual Assistance, which it sent to the Soviet Union, which once 34 again rejected the League overtures. Chicherin's reply once again

suggested a world organization composed of congresses to replace the

League, a world organization with which the Soviet Union could do

business and obtain satisfactory results.

Continued effort by the League resulted in establishment of the

Preparatory Disarmament Commission In December, 1G25, The Soviet Union

was invited to attend meetings of this Preparatory Commission for the

Disarmament Conference, as It officially was designated. The Soviets

objected to any meetings which might be held in Switzerland, due to a

quarrel it had had with Switzerland, and it was not until November, 1927

that a Soviet delegation attended, after the quarrel had been resolved,

The Soviet delegate va&ted no time in attacking the League ap

proach toward the lim itation rather than reduction of armaments, This,

to the Russians, meant the continuation of the status quo which tended 35 toward perpetuation of 11 armaments regimes," The only logical answer.

3K League of Nations, O fficial Journal, V (1924), Special Supple ment No, 16, Annex i, p» 113, See also Degras, Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, II, p, 35. The Soviets considered this League attempt at disarmament as a "trap," which would strengthen the imperialist States and enable them to oppress the weaker States and people,

^Eudin and Fisher, op, c lt,, p, 309, See also Degras, Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, II, p, 270-BO, This was during the fifth session of the Preparatory Commission, The Soviet suggestion for a com plete disarmament can be more f u l l y understood when viewed from two other angles. The Soviets had just announced a Five-Year Plan that would require a concentration of financial resources to insure success of that plan. Little support could be given to armaments which the Soviets sorely needed. Secondly, the Soviets were more interested in keeping Germany, her main trading partner, disarmed* A disarmed Germany afforded the Soviets a more relaxed outlook on the European political scene. they fe lt, was total disarmament, which the proposed, a scheme for

general and complete disarmament, calling for the dissolution of all

land and air forces and the destruction of a ll military weapons and supplies. The Soviet proposal was porous. It did not contain any administrative or control provisions and left much to be desired.

Rejection by the League was a foregone conclusion.

Rejection of the Soviet plan for total disarmament by the

League did not discourage the Soviets who were prepared to accept par tia l satisfaction in lieu of complete satisfaction, which would become an integral part of all Soviet political negotiations, Litvinov there fore suggested partial disarmament on a progressiva reduction basis, involving m ilitary armaments and forces of the great, medium and small powers, The Soviet proposal once again sought to reject the League as a participant and suggested a "permanent International Commission of qe Control" to enforce the suggested disarmament plan of the Soviets,

This plan was sim ilar to the previous Soviet plan for complete disarma ment in two respects. It sought to replace the League as the control clement and, secondly, it did not include any administrative and con trol qualifications. The League participants became more guarded and circumspect of tho Soviet proposals, duo chiefly to the recurrent Soviet vilification of the League during a period when the Soviets would have been the beneficiary if a more liberal outlook toward the League had been displayed,

^League of Nations. Documents of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Confarence, Series IV, ppT~312-7t Series Y, pp* 9-12 Series VI, pp. 324-39. 226

The scene then, In 192B, was shifted away from the Preparatory

Commission to the General Assembly of the League where the Kellogg Pact, also known as the Kellogg-Briand Pact and its official title "Pact for the Renunciation of War,11 had been introduced, Though the Kellogg Pact was considered less than satisfactory by the Soviets, the Soviet Govern ment wasted little time in ratifying it. The Soviet Government actually 37 was the first to ratify it. The Pact was ideal, in most respects, since it did not place the Soviets under any obligations and allowed them, and all signatories, unilateral action without restrictive compli cations normally found in international treaties and agreements.

The Preparatory Commission ended its work with the Sixth Ses sion in December, 1930, Though it had prepared a draft convention for the Disarmament Conference, stressing a lim itation of armaments, it did not have the support of the Soviet Union which objected to the League as the proper organization to consider the to p ic,T h ere is little doubt that the Soviets were consistent in their belief that the League was not the proper agency with which they wanted to deal,

37 Lenin, ot al. The jaovlet Union and Peace, pp. 240-9, 253-5, also Degras, Soviet Document^ oh Foreign Policy, i i , pp, 345-6. Fischer, The Sovieta in World Affairs, I~lT pp^702-4^ Both Chicherin and Litvinov criticized-the- Kellogg Pact as inadequate, deceptive and considered it as a preparation for war. They also felt that it fell far short of total disarmament, Litvinov proceeded a step further by suggesting an agreement, identical to the Kellogg Pact, to be completed between the Soviet Union and its neighboring States, The Litvinov Protocol, its official title, called for Rumania, Poland and other border States to apply the contents of the Kellogg Pact among themselves without waiting for its universal ratification. 30 Documents of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference, Faft 2 Series A, pp. 326, 509-32, 400-03* The Soviet re jection this time was aimed more specifically at a part of the League, The 227

The Disarmament Conference began its work in January, 1931 by requesting data from a ll governments concerning locations of armaments within their respective territorial areas. Information received from the Soviet Union was far from complete, It remained obsessed with the attitude that other countries were hostile toward the Soviet Union and release of information concerning a ll of its armaments would place the

Soviets in a delicate position at the potential mercy of a stronger state or an alliance, which Litvinov felt could institute aggression against the Soviet Union under conditions that might render discovery of the aggrossor nearly impossible, due mainly to the fact that an inter national organization, such as the League of Nations, could assist the aggressor government which might seek to detach itself from the guilt

q q of a perpetrated aggression* History would be replete with examples of Soviet resort to both types of aggression and concealment, especially in the satellite and wars of liberation contexts of the post-World War

II period, the very same actions which the Soviets were expecting of other actors on the international political stage,

Though the Soviet plan for a general and complete disarmament was rejected by the Disarmament Conference, the Soviets received some shift of responsibility from the Assembly, which had supervised the work of the Preparatory Commission to the Council, which now became responsible for the Disarmament Conference, meant that the Soviets also had to attack the Council, They objected to the shift to "any organ of the League of Nations,"

39League of Nations, Conference for the Reduction and Limit ation of Armaments. Conference Documents, I, pp. 113-6, 124-9j Series A, I, pp, B4-5"i 22a satisfaction from the fact that Herbert Hoover, then President of the

United States, submitted a plan, in June, 1932, thereafter known as the

Hoover Flan, under which a ll offensive weapons would be destroyed and 40 other armaments would be reduced by one-third. The fallacy of the

Hoover Plan, Ilka most of the Soviet sponsored plans, was that it lacked vision. Security was not an integral element of the plan and very few,

If any countries actually w ill even consider sacrificing their national interests, and security, to effectuate any international agreement.

The Disarmament Conference was making no progress, not only because of the Soviet malcontent, but also because Germany, now becoming more bold under the tutelage of Adolf Hitler and the National Socialist

Party (Nazi), was proclaiming equality a necessary requisite for Germany*

Though Germany announced its withdrawal from the Conference in 1932, it did attend the 1933 Conference meetings but with a demand for equality of rights*^

The German demand for equality, and the French fear of the course of action being taken by Germany, i,e ,t re-m ilitarization, now had a profound effect upon Litvinov who sought to provide the world with something that never ha3 been achieved under international law*

Litvinov sought to define aggression by stating that an aggressor is the State which is the first to use military force. The questionable element in his definition was that portion which stipulated that a

40Ibid,, I, pp. 122-23, 129.

41Ibid,, I* p, 1S0; Series 0, II, p. 200. The Nazis now had completed their goal of attaining control of Germany and the rem ilitar iz a t io n o f Germany had begun. 229

previous non-military provocation, regardless of type, could be speci-

fied aQ a justification for an attack by one State upon another.

The Soviet definition was rejected, as could be expected, since its

range was too restrictive and left too many aspects of international law

□pen to violation without protective safeguards,

October 14, 1933 became a day of which a new relationship be tween the Soviet Union and the League of nations was instituted. This

was the date o f th e German announcement th a t Germany no lo n g er was a

Member of the Disarmament Conference, That date also was punctuated by 43 the notification of the German withdrawal from the League of Nations.

The German announcements should not have been a surprise to the Soviets,

They had had a d ir e c t hand in th e re-arm ing o f Germany even though i t had been carried through covertly under the secret treaties between

Germany and the Soviet Union following the Treaty of Rapallo,

The German withdrawal and the rapid pace of the German re m ilitarization and rearmament signified the requirement for an immediate change in outlook for the Soviet Union, What it had feared most, the rearming of Germany, was happening. The Soviet Union had little choice but to turn to tha League, which it did by suggesting that the Dis armament Conference enjoy tenure by being made a permanent assembly.

**2Ibid,, I, pp, 237-30, 262, Violations of the inviolability of diplomats and envoys, foreign representatives and persons, property rights, commercial interests and many other protections afforded under international law could be perpetrated under the Soviet-sponsored defin itions without the danger of retaliation, chiefly because they could be claimed as being non-military acts,

‘43lbid., Series C, II, pp, 105-86, 230

As for the League, Litvinov felt that the Disarmament Conference should

not replace tha League but should be considered an organ of the League.^

This was a complete reversal of the Soviet stand. It no longer wanted

the League abolished. It now suggested that the League be made perma

nent.

Much as the Soviet Union may have desired continuity of the Dis

armament C onference, i t gradually faded in to o b liv io n a f t e r June , 1934,

The work of the Conference was entrusted to several committees which

also phased out during the first half of 1935. The coming challenge

□f Germany was much too important to give disarmament a second thought.

The focus of Soviet international relations now was diverted elsewhere, not by choice but through necessity. Events made it pain

fully apparent to the Soviets that H itler’s prophecy might pose prob lems for the Soviet Union. German expansion into Soviet Russia, pre dicted in Hitler’s book, became an increasingly hideous possibility and

l i t was cause for alarm among certain Soviet spokesman. It also modified

Stalin’s views of the validity of the League which, he believed, could

become the factor in either Inhibiting or preventing an outbreak of hostilities, Other Soviet statements indicated a Soviet recognition

llU Ibid., Series B, pp, 659-60, 45 Degrasi Soviet Documents on Foreign Policyt III, pp* 46-40 f 55-57, See also Stalin, Works, XIII, p. 206, and Karl Radek, "The Bases of Soviet Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs, XII, 2 (January 1934), p. 204. Both Molotov and Litvinov expressed fear of possible German infringement upon Soviet sovereignty. Radek earlier, in 1934, had expressed concern over the intentions of Germany and Japan, both of which were becoming more a g g r essiv e. 231

that tha League was the only positive obstacle in the path of forces

bent on war, Tha entry of the Soviet Union into the League of nations as a Member was only a matter of time.

S o v ie t Membership in th e League

The actual entry into the League was not as smooth as could be expected, Several of the Members vividly remembered the bitter scorn and contempt which the Soviet Union had held toward the League for a decade and a half. They also were without diplomatic representation in the Soviet capital and Soviet membership appeared to be anything but an overnight p ossib ility,1*5 Both factors were overcome through an in vitation sponsored not by the Assembly but in the name of those Members w illin g to a ccep t the S oviet Union a s a Member, a means by which both the League and the Soviet Union were spared humiliation, Litvinov, then in Geneva, accepted the invitation in behalf of the Soviet Govern ment* The League had a new Member,

The brunt of the Soifiot participation was concentrated almost completely on political and security problems at the expense of func tional matters, so much so that it early became obvious that Soviet membership had become an outlet for the dispensing of propaganda. This, when combined with the provocative attitude of the Soviet representatives to the League, caused leading powers, such as France, Great Britain,

**^F* P, Ualters, A History of the League of Nations (London i Oxford University Press, 1950), pp, 580-3, See also League of Nations, O fficial Journal, XV (1934), p, 835; Minutes of the Sixth Committee, Fifteenth Assembly, Special Supplement, Ho* 130, p, 97, 232

Italy and Poland, and othor lesser Members to remain aloof from tho

Soviets oven though other reasons also were included* The Soviet Union,

on tha other hand, did almost nothing to dispel any of the suspicions

held a g a in st i t by th ese Members o f the League, An uneasy p artn er

ship existed,

Tho Soviet fooling of uncertainty In relations affecting Its

international political status became more aggravated during 1935,

Three events occurred which were of deep concern to the Soviets, The

first of these was the Stresa (Italy) Conference of April 11, Franca,

Great Britain and Italy, meeting at the call of Italy, surprised the

Soviets, who had hoped for a determined stand against Germany, by 47 taking an extremely mild attitude toward the continuing German threat*

The second event, also not at a ll pleasing to the Soviets, was the new

Anglo-German Naval Agreement, consummated outside tha League structure,

which allowed Germany to expand its fleet to thirty-five percent of tha

British Navy fleet. The third avant involved the Italian action in

Ethiopia, which would prove to be a major defeat for the League and which severely jolted any confidence the Soviet Union had in the League, e s p e c ia lly a fte r in d iv id u a l Members were allow ed freedom o f a c tio n , a s each saw fit, in applying sanctions against Italy. F\iture aggressions,

^League of Nations, Official Journal, XV (1935), pp. 551-2, 1142; Special Supplement No, 145, pp. 27-28; Special Supplement No, 146 p. 10, See also Degras, Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, III, pp, 154-9, and Halters, op* c it,, p. 613. The Soviet Union was not as firm in its application of sanctions as it sought to make others believe. It continued to supply Italy with such an important commodity as o il, The lack of universality In tha application of sanctions was specified as the reason for continued oil shipments to Italy. 233 in the Soviet view, were a certainty. In considering this third event it must be added that the Soviet Union made an exceptionally rapid recovery and became one of the chief sources for such an essential product as o il, without which Italy could not have survived the s a n c tio n s •

The Treaty of Locarno now was subjected to the action of the

Germans who decided to re-m ilitarize the Rhineland in a unilateral violation of that Treaty* The French naturally became alarmed but

Great Britain was m ilitarily weak and could do nothing to force a

German retreat. Italy, also a signatory of the Locarno Fact, was busy in Ethiopia and Mussolini preferred to concentrate his attention in that area where he enjoyed relative freedom of action* The Soviets, although not a signatory of the Treaty of Locarno, ware perplexed over the inability of the leading European powers, s till Members of the

League, to defend th e Covenant a g a in st I t a l y and Germany* C on sid erin g the Italian and German actions as breaches of international obligations,

Litvinov sought to negate the Council’s ’’collective capitulation" to hQ treaty violations* The Council merely referred the matter to Great

Britain, which appeared indifferent to the German action, due chiefly to its extremely weak m ilitary posture, and Italy, which now was openly hostile toward the League, There wa3 little that the League and the

Soviets could do* The collective security that the Soviets had hoped for from their in itial membership in the League remained as elusive as

40League of Nations, O fficial Journal, XVII (1936), pp* 319-20, 326, 328, 37B-80, See also Degras, Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, III, pp, 132-3. 2 3 4 a dream. I t was now fa c in g a th r e a t from Germany to th e West and Japan

to the East, a Japan which by now was well established in Manchuria and

Korea. The Soviet Union rapidly was losing Interest In the League.

The year 1936 also was a year of problems for the League and the Soviets in another section of Europe. A civil war erupted in Spain

In the summer of that year with the insurgent forces under the leader

ship of General Francisco Franco receiving extensive aid from Hitler and Mussolini, both of whom used the Spanish battlefields to train their military Forces and perfect such tactics as dive bombing attacks which had been practiced during earlier years in the Soviet Union under the

3ecret agreements following the Treaty of Rapallo. Tho Soviets, who previously had contributed so much to potential German rem ilitarization, now found themselves supporting the loyalists, enemies of tho German and Italian supported rebels in Spain.

Great Britain and France proposed a non-intervention pact which all European countries accepted without hesitation, Britain and France, realizing the danger to the League#prevailed upon Spain not to intro duce the civil war as a topic in the League, and so the League did little to effect a termination of that war, When it became apparent that

Germany and Italy would not honor the non-aggression pact, the Soviet

Union decided that It too should provide further assistance to the

Spanish loyalists, the side it had selected to support.

The Spanish Government reconsidered and decided to make an ap peal to the League. The Council thereupon left the matter to the Non-

Intervention Committee, established in London by the British and French 235 at an earlier date, outside the purview of the League,1*9 The Assembly

Finally took up the Spanish request and threatened to take action against the intervening countries. This amounted only to a threat.

Ho tangible action was taken by the League, which was dominated by

Britain and France, neither of which considered Spain with any feeling bordering on affection, The Soviet Union had lost yet another round by supporting the loyalist forces, The same also may be said of the League, not because it supported the loyalist forces, but because it had not been able to accomplish anything of a constructive nature In the Spanish problem .

The year now was 1938 and It soon became even more painfully evident to the Soviet Union and tho League that collective security was a figment of the imagination* The League could not preclude the seizure of Austria by the Nazis* Groat Britain, bacoming more of a symbol to which certain of the European countries turned, was led by a leader who believed in a policy of appeasement, The French were much weaker than they had realized, and Hitler was oven more daring than any of the leaders cared to believe. He was challenging either the League as a whole or any of its Members to take counter-act ion. Hot only did he have his day at Munich but he also posed a challenge to tho Sudetanland

In Czechoslovakia and a ll of East Europe,

^Jalters, op. cit*, pp* 721-22, See also League of Nations, O fficial Journal* XVIII (1937), pp. G-9, 16-17; Minutes of the First Committee* S even teen th A ssem bly, p , 49, and S p e c ia l- SuppleTmen^ Ho, 169 (Eighteenth Assembly, Plenary), pp. 58-59, 79-BO, 99-100* 236

Only one voice could be beard in the League during this latter portion of 1630. The voice belonged to Litvinov who tried to arouse the Assembly to its rightful duties of protecting "all nations against SO aggression*1’ The League appeared to be in a state of paralysis and inertia and incapable of any protective action* The relationship be tween tha Soviets and the League wan on the verge of collapse with

Soviet Membership in an identical status*

Membership Terminated

Soviet membership continued in the League but almost exclusively

□n a formal basis. The League had proven itself incapable of meeting any of the desires of the Soviet Union, especially in such areas of activity a3 collective security. Collective security, not available within tha League structure, forced the Soviets to look elsewhere, in this case, Germany, with which the Soviets signed a Russo-German Pact on August 23, 1939, a Pact which was incompatible with tho Covenant of the League, The Pact, as unexpected as the Russo-German Treaty of 51 Kapallo, wa3 a treaty of friendship and non-aegression, Tha Pact was much more fa v o ra b le to th e Germans t h a t th e S o v ie t s , s in c e i t n eu tra lized the Soviets and allowed Hitler to proceed with his timetable for

5^League of Nations, O fficial Journal, XIX (1938), pp* 323-1115 and Nineteenth Assembly Records Plenary Meetings (193B), pp* 74, 76-70,

^ A rn old W olfers* B r ita in and France Between Two Wars (Hew York: W, W* Horton 6 Company, Inc,, 1966), pp, 131, 304* See" also Degras, Soviet Documenta on Foreign Policy, III, pp* 359-71,and Max Beloff, The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia,1929-1941 (How York: Oxford University Press, 1947-1949), II, pp* 359^71, Beloff presents an excellent summary of the events leading up to and including this period of Russo-German c o u r tsh ip , 237

conquest of Eastern Europe. The Pact had two other important aspects

involving the Soviets and the League, The Pact contained a secret

protocol in which the two partners agreed to a division of East Central

Europe between tho two partners. In a second aspect of the Pact the

Soviet Union for a ll practical purposes had repudiated the League and

no longer was looking to that body for collective security,

This did not mean that a ll contact with the League had been

severed. Formally speaking, the Soviet Union s till was a Member of the

League, but t h i s membership was about to come under q u estio n .

The Soviets, no longer able to place any reliance on prospects

of collective security, now had to divert their attention to unilateral

or individual security, Tho political situation was growing more dan

gerous and suspicion was growing that Hitler was not very reliable.

The Soviets therefore sought to strengthen their borders against pos

sible German action from the direction from which it most likely would

come. This meant that the Baltic approaches had to be protected,

The S o v ie ts made demands upon L ith u a n ia , L atvia and E sto n ia , each of which, after evaluating the situation, assented to the Soviet

demands. The series of events involving Finland proved to bo more

involved than with the three Baltic States just mentioned, Finland,

after approximately a year of negotiation, during which the Soviet

Government demanded a 30-year lease on the port of JIanko, where it hoped

to build a Soviet naval base, and tho exchange of a strip of land bor

dering Leningrad for an almost worthless section of real estate on the

Isthmus of Karelia, in the north, turnod down the Soviet overtures, 230

except for some very miscellaneous demands, and negotiations became 52 stalemated, The only course of action, in tho Russian analysis of

the situation, was to forcefully take, by military action, what they

could not obtain by political negotiation spiced with coercion. A

m ilitary attack was launched by Soviet forces on November 29, 1939*

Russian land forces ware supported by air units which also bombarded

Helsinki. The tactics used undoubtedly were based on lessons learned

during the Soviet -German cooperation during the 1920 decade, after the

Treaty of Rapallo.

The Soviet accusation that Finnish troops had fired across the

border at Soviet military units won the sympathy of very few* Univer

sal public sympathy was nearly unanimously with the Finnish* The

5^Degras, Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, III, pp* 395-97, Sea also Walters, op* cit*, pp* B04-Q9; Foreign Relations of the United States, Paris Peace Conference, 1919, XII1, pp, 90-91i League of Nations, The Monthly Summary of the League of Nations, XIX, 12 (December 1939), pp, 16, 24-41j and George Ginsburgs, ^A Case Study in the Soviet Use of International Laws Eastern Poland in 1939," American Journal of International Law, LI I, 1 (January 1959), pp, 69-94"! The Soviets had demanded the port of Hanko and the strip of land in the vicinity of Leningrad, which they considered of strategic value to the Soviet Union, the latter being classified as a strategic menace to Leningrad when In the hands of a foreign State* Finland thereupon decided to examine the Pact of Non-aggression, entered into by the Finns and Soviets on January 21, 1932, valid until the end of 1345, The Treaty was de nounced by the Soviet Union on tho day of the attack upon Finland, The Pact of Non-aggre3sion was a treaty reinforcing the Treaty of Peace at Tartu in 1920, In dwelling on the reason for tho Soviet action against Finland, one can gain a lucid insight of motivations prompting the Soviet action by noting, as did Ginbburgs, that even though tha Soviet Union had no legal basis for its occupation of a section of Eastern Poland, on September 17, 1939, neither the League of Nations nor any Individual State had seriously challenged the Soviet action in the League or Permanent Court* This may have been a factor considered by the Soviet leaders prior to the attack upon Finland, 239

Finnish therefore appealed to tho Secretary-General for assis- 53 tance*

The Secretary-General, acting under the provisions of Article

11 of the Covenant, summoned a meeting of the Council. The seriousness

of the situation, and the general international situation, convinced

the Secretary-General that perhaps a meeting of the Assembly was In

order*54

The Council, meeting on December 9, responded to the Finnish

request by invoking Article 15, paragraph 9 of the Covenant by rafer- 55 ring the dispute to the Assembly* The Assembly, attempting to avoid

confusion, and desiring a fu ll report of what really had transpired

batween Finland and tha Soviet Union, decided to create a Special Com

mittee for that purpose* The Assembly met two days later, on December

13, with the Soviet-Flnnish problem as its only topic, The Argentine

Delegate was tha chief speaker of tho meeting and, after reviewing the

world situation, reminded the Members of tha flagrant violation of the

Covenant just perpetrated by the Soviet Union, The Argentine Delegate

then proceeded to make a suggestion and issued an ultimatum to the

Assembly, His suggestion was thatthe Soviet Union be excluded from the

53 Idem*

&4League o f Nations* The Monthly Summary of the League of Nations, XIX, 12 (December 1939), p, 17,

55Ibid*t pp* 42-47, The Soviet Union, even though invited to attend the discussion, chose not to send a representative to the Assembly and Council mootings. The Special Committee, in the meantime, sought to bring about a stop to the hostilities, but without positive r e s u lt s , 240

League because of its action against Finland, another League Member.

In fact, the Argentine Delegate felt so strongly about the Soviet case that he declared, in his ultimatum, that the Argentina Republic no longer would consider itself a Member of the League as long as the c e Soviet Union enjoyed the status of a Member, The Argentine proposal was forwarded to the Special Committee for consideration.

The Special Committee then took up the question of what was required to resolve the problem. The situation was studied in detail and a resolution was submitted to the Assembly, The resolution con tained a brief resume of the Soviet violation of the Covenant, It also implied a sentence of guilt against the Soviet Union for not having accepted the League invitation to attend the discussion of the Soviet-

Finnish dispute. The resolution then declared that the Soviet Union, by its own action, not only had violated tho Covenant but placed itself 57 outside tho Covenant, The Special Committee recommended that the

Council be charged with the responsibility of deciding the issue.

Tho Assembly now had to take the next step in tha sequence of acting upon the Finnish complaint to the League, It did so on tho 14th of December, The report of the Special Committee was approved and the 58 resolution supposedly was adopted by unanimous action, The fact that

Mexico had declared exclusion too drastic a measure, and several Members had abstained, would make it appear that the resolution was less than unanimous. The final action then was laft to tha Council,

5SIb id ,. pp, 49-61, 57Ib ld ,» pp. 62-66.

5BIb id ,. pp. 67-70, The Council of the League took up tho Assembly approved rosolu tion of the Special Committee on the aame day, immediately after the

Assem bly had a c te d on i t . The C ou n cil, in i t s d e lib e r a tio n , was bound by paragraph 4 of Article 16 of the Covenant which stated that)

Any member of the League which has violated any covenant of the League may be declared to be no longer a Member of the League by a vote of the Council concurred in by the Representatives of a ll the other Members of the League represented thereon,5^

Normally this would mean that each Member of the Council would have to veto in favor of exclusing the Soviet Union or declaring tho Soviet

Union as having w illfully placed itself outside the League through its own volition, But there were not normal times and apparently the

Council felt that way* It Found that, "by its act, the Union of the

Soviet Socialist Republics has placed Itself outside the League of

Nations, It follows that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is no lo n g e r a Member o f th e L eague,”00

The President of the Council interpreted the draft resolution, containing the above-quoted paragraph of Gelf-exclusion, as having bean arrived at by unanimous vote, even though the Yugoslav and Chinese

Representatives abstained from voting* In what appeared to bo an ad mission of error, or guilt, or both, the President of the Council took the pain of announcing that the abstentions wero not takon into account in establishing unanimity*

A few words are in order in discussion of tho after-effects of tho exclusion* The Soviet Union, evan though it had been declared 2i+2

in a non-grata status, nevertheless was invited to continue participa

tion in the League activities, Using a metaphor, this was similar to

whipping a child while simultaneously handing it its favorite candy,

The Soviet Union had little about which to worry in the exclusion,

In normal times the stigma of the exclusion may ahvo caused some harm*

But, as was stated previously, these were not normal times. In addition, the Soviet Union was not in a solitary state of existance. Three of the lead in g Members o f th e League (Japan, Germany and I ta ly ) alrea d y had l e f t the League, by their own volition, and had not suffered any apparent harmful effects. The Second World War, with the necessary quest for allies, would curtail any harm to be suffered as a consequence of the exclu sion *

The exclusion of the Soviet Union, on the other hand, had a double effect upon the League, The exclusion meant that the League had lost a powerful Member at a most critical time. The loss of membership a ls o was compounded by f in a n c ia l a s p e c ts , The e x c lu sio n o f th e S o v ie t

Union meant that the two-year financial obligation between notice of withdrawal and termination of that two-year period, under Article 1, paragraph 3 of the Covenant, was not applicable In this case because of tha forced rather than voluntary withdrawal. This financial portion of the discussion of the effect of the forced withdrawal upon the League must be looked upon more realistically, however, since it is doubtful if the Soviet Union actually would have lived up to its financial obli gations under a voluntary withdrawal. The m ilitary requirements of

World War II would have prohibited liquidation of financial obligations by the Soviet Union under a voluntary withdrawal, even if the expulsion had baon voluntary in 1939. The Soviet Union already was preparing for war in that period. VIII

THE INDONESIAN CASE

One of the puzzling problems facing the delegates attempting to frame a constitution for the proposed United Nations, during the

Dumbarton Oaks Proposals in San Francisco, was the question of with drawal *^ The history of the many withdrawals suffered by the League of Nations remained fresh in the minds of the delegates and the prob lem revolved around whether an article pertaining to withdrawal should be included in the constitution being developed*

Three arguments were offered against inclusion of an article 2 on withdrawal. The first involved the concept of universality* The withdrawal of a mombor supposedly tends to diminish the universality of the international organization. This argument could be neutralized merely by stating that the League had been far from universal and it was too presumptious in 1945 to believe that the United Nations would be universal* The second argument offered against the withdrawal clause or article suggested that withdrawal could be used as a tool of politi cal blackmail against tho United Nations, Recalcitrant members could

^■U.S*f Department of State* The United Nations Conference on International Organization (Hashing ton, ~D. C", t United States Government Printing Office, 1946), pp* 506-07*

2 I b id *

244 245 throatan to leave the International organization, gambling on the

possibility that concessions could be gained as incentive for retain-

ing member ship* this actually being the real motive for the announced

plan for withdrawal. The third argument pictured withdrawal as a political escape valve. Members could uso withdrawal as a catalyst for escape from obligations associated with membership,

Discussions revolved around two possible courses of action.

One group of delegates suggested that the right of withdrawal should be

included in the Charter, with no restrictions involved, A second group suggested that the means of withdrawal be provided but only under cer tain conditions* These were in those cases when the rights and obliga tions of a member were altered by amendment which it did not approve and which it could not accept, A second set of conditions suggested involved amendments. If an amendment were offered which was of prime importance (constructively) to a member, and did not receive necessary r a t if ic a t io n s i th en th a t member should be a llow ed t o withdraw from th e

United Nations.

Committae E/2 held its discussions on withdrawal interm ittently during the period May 22 to June 22, 1945, Uruguay was the first to express apposition to inclusion af an article on withdrawal in tho 4 Charter, The topic then lay dormant from May 23 until Juno 17 when

3I b id ,

^United Nations, Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organisation* San Francl'sco, 1945 (Haw York) United hat ions, 1945) , pp * 8 B- B a, it again was discussed* Ecuador believed that a withdrawal clausa g would weaken the Charter, It, however, believed that it should be included. Venezuela, Turkey, Haiti and Greece agreed with Ecuador.

Canada wanted a withdrawal clause included in the Charter, It received support from Australia and Peru, the latter supporting inclusion but only to facilitate agreement on a Charter, Belgium, with the support of the Soviet Union, United Kingdom, Egypt, China, Danmark, United

States, France and Uruguay, once again, were opposed to such a clause, with various reasons stated by several* The United Kingdom, Egypt and

China opposed the clause because they fe lt each member had certain rights but that voluntary withdrawal was a faculty, or power, which each member enjoyed and th e r e fo r e , by in fe r e n c e , was not deb atab le and need not be included* The United States, with France agreeing, believed that the Charter should state what rights the United Nations should have rather than the rights of States members* A vote was taken on the

Canadian suggestion for inclusion but was defeated on tho same date, nineteen for and twenty-four against*

Belgium then offered textual amendments which should not be included in the Charter proper but should be made known to all original g and future members. In essence, the Belgian proposal stipulated exceptional circumstances, inevitable dissolution of the United Nations,

^Ibid*, pp. 262-7*

6Ibid., pp, 2B7-91* See also U.S., Department of State, The United Nations Conference on International Organization, pp* 525-6; and U.S.* Department of State* Report to the President ori"the Results of tho San Francisco Conference (Washington, D.CVt United States Govern ment Printing OfficT,_ 194577 PP* 247 or a Charter amendment of injurious impact to a member as bases for a voluntary withdrawal of a member* Tho United States took relatively the same position as Belgium, both of which found themselves on the winning team when the vote was taken* Thirty-eight approved the Belgian proposal, two objected and three refrained from voting.

Further discussion wa3 held on June 13 and 22 but no changes were made, in spite of the Soviet opposition to several clauses in the 7 Belgian proposal* The Belgian proposal was included in the rapporteur's final report, Thus the legal justification for a voluntary withdrawal was published outside the Charter, for the knowledge of a ll concerned, including Indonesia, withdrawal of which can now be discussed*

The Bandung Conference

The departure of the Dutch from Indonesia after the Second World

War and the resulting havoc caused by the lack of an experienced bureau cracy placed an excessive burdon upon the Government of Indonesia, The economy, never really stable even under Dutch guidance, gradually deter iorated and Indonesia found itself with a very unfavorable balance of trade that gradually grew worse* Conditions became so intolerable that the Indonesian Fresident, Ahmed Sukarno, was open to suggestions that might draw attention from the plight of the Indonesians* The suggestion

Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization* San Francisco", 1945, pp. 306-14, 444-iT,~and The United Nations Conference on International Organization, pp. 908-irT The Soviet Union opposed a clause which suggested th « "a withdrawal member consider in advance the burden it would impose upon remaining members through its withdrawal. The Soviet delegate considered this derogatory, before the fact, to a member considering withdrawal, The Soviet bid was acknowledged but no further action was taken on its suggestion. 24a

of the Prime Minister, Ali Sastroamidjojo, that a conference of dele

gates from Asian and African States meet in Indonesia to discuss cer tain problems that might be placed on an agenda met with the approval of Sukarno, Sukarno, sensing a potential increase in prestige for himself, and Favorable international attention for Indonesia, quickly accepted the idea and allowed his Prime Minister to host a preparatory Q meeting at Bogor Indonesia on December 2B and 29, 1954, The Prime

Qinisters of Burma, Ceylon, India and Pakistan met with Sastroamidjojo and an agenda was completed for the coming conference to be held at

Bandung, Indonesia,

Tho Bandung Conference was held during th e period A p r il IB -2 4 , 9 1955, No logical pattern of invitations was apparent, except that only

Asian and African States were represented, with a total of twenty-nine

States present,including the four that had mot with Indonesia at Bogor*

A noticeable point, on the other hand, was the fact that there was a great diversity of race, religion and opinion present at the Conference.

D Royal Institute of International Affaire. Documents on Inter national Affairs, 1954 (London: Oxford University Press, 1959), pp,169-72, The aims of the Conference were to promote good w ill and cooperation am ong the nations of Asia ans Africa, to consider social, economic, and cultural probloms and relatione, to consider problems of special interest to Asian and African peoples and to view the contributions that could be made by Asian and African nations in the promotion of peace,

9Ibid, , 1955, p. 397, States represented were Afghanistan, Cambodia, People's Republic of China, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gold Coast, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Nepal, Philippines, Saudi-Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, Democratic Republic of Vietnam, South Vietnam and Yemen and, of course, the hast states mentioned in the text* The Conference was composed of three working committeesi P olitical, Cultural Cooperation, and Economic Cooperation, with Indo nesians as chairmen of each committee, which indicates strongly a p olitically professional "Tammany Hall" approach by Sukarno, 249

The theme of the Conference became apparent at the opening of

the Confeence when Sukarno made the opening speech.

He are united, for instance, by a common detestation of colonialism In whatever form It appears, tfe are united by a carmen determination to preserve and stabilise peace in the world. , , , I freely admit—in these aims I am not disinterested or driven by purely impersonal matters,10

Thus, it can be seen that Sukarno had a double pronged objective in mind. On tho one hand, ho hoped to keep fresh In the minds of certain

delegates the memories of the old colonial era avan though it was of diminishing importance even during the days of the Bandung Conference, and, on the other hand, he, Sukarno, was subtly announcing his candi dacy as a possible leader of a group of States that might challenge the two superpowers. The Indonesian Prime Minister parroted the words of Sukarno during a later presentation to the fu ll committee on the same data,

A second look at the lists of States represented almost autom atically leads one to question the possibility of unhindered progress during the Conference, Both the People's Republic of China and India were represented by their respective Prime M inisters, Chou En-lai and

Jawarharlal Nehru, Both had been involved in a border dispute between

China and India and cooperation hardly could be expected. And yet,

Chou En-lai surprised the gathering by taking a very moderate stand, thereby winning the respects of many of tho Prime Ministers. Chou En- la i also diverted his charms toward Sukarno with whom China had certain

^Indonesia* Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Opening Speech by President Soekarno of Indonesia to the Full Conference, IB April 1955 (Djakarta! Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1955), pp, 20-27, 35-37^ 250 difficulties, especially in regards the treatment of Chinese in Indo nesia* So effective was Chou En-lai in his diplomacy that China and

Indonesia negotiated a treaty which would end dual nationality for millions of Chinese in Indonesia, a source of irritation for Indonesia and danger for the Chinese in Indonesia, many of whom had been subjected to harah treatment from Indonesians who despised the Chinese allegiance to their homeland to which they sent much of their earnings gained by employment in Indonesia

The Conference ended with a joint declaration of policy in which colonialism was condemned and declared contrary to the United Nations 12 Charter. A second resolution condemned racialism which was considered a method of cultural suppression* In effect, however, the Bandung Con ference was on exercise in frustrative sentimentalism reverting minds retrogressively to the days of colonialism, It also indicated that the

States represented were content to deal with and accept generalities and abstractions that did little to resolve inadequacies of their human populations* The absence of the majority of the developed countries, with the exception of Japan, represented a call to invisible benevolent keepers for assistance through a shrouded atmosphere devoid of direction*

The particularistic approach had been ignored,

^Royal Institute of International Affairs* Survey of Inter national Affairs, 1955-SG, p* 60* The treaty was ratified but only after a delay by both states, during which time the Chinese in Indonesia suf fered heavily from ill treatment accorded them by the Indonesians,

^Homer A, Jack, Bandung; Toward freedom (Chicago; Cooperative Publishing Association, 1955), pp, 22-23, 2ir. 251

But yet, the Conference could not be written off as a complete

failure* The Conference had an impact upon the United Nations which 13 had kept d o s e o b serv a tio n on developm ents a t Bandung* The a f t e r effects of the Conference were felt in the United Nations when Asian-

Africsn self-expression forced the Tenth General Assembly to faco now political and economic realities. The questions of remaining colonial

ism, race and the needs and desires of the underdeveloped countries took on a new and increased significance in the United Nations,

The Conference also had an Impact upon Indonesia, tho center of

study in this chapter, Sukarno had gained a friend in Chou En-lai and future assistance from China was enhanced by Sukarno's stand on colon

ialism and his Jack of condemnation of the Chinese on the mainland*

Friendly relations between Indonesia and China did not develop aa rapidly as might be expected, however, and Sukarno turned his attention inward toward domestic matters*

Guided Democracy

The year 1957 can be established aa a second important year in

Indonesia's contemporary history, It was during this year that President

Sukarno began his systematic conversion of Indonesia from a fairly demo cratic State to a dictatorship, under the facade of a guided democracy,

It was in 1957 that regional revolts occurred, causing chaotic con ditions in Indonesia, especially during the regional elections, during

^UtS*, Department of State* Department of State Bulletin, XXXIV, 862 (January 1956), pp, 111-2. 252

which the Communist Party of Indonesia won decisive victories and

proved itself the strongest political party. It wa3 the best organized

of all parties.

The strong showing of the Communist Party in the elections, and

the chao3 created by the regional revolts, paved the way for Sukarno to

increase his own stature. The ultimate outcomo was a position of

domination for Sukarno, with the army and Communist Party at odds with

each other, which made Sukarno's position more tenable. It also enabled

Sukarno to replace the normal elactlvo system In Indonesia, A careful

selection of personnel from the military, political parties and interest

groups, personnel sympathetic with Sukarno's views, meant that key posi tions could be filled with little danger of effective opposition within

the structure of government* Sukarno found, however, that he was not as safe as he would have preferred, when dealing with knowledgeable people outside the structure of government. This signified that tho key word was action, action to preempt opposition caused by inflation, an alarming birth rate, tho confusion associated with tho nationaliza tion of industries and the dangerous inefficiency of the governmental bureaucracy*

A national independence day normally has been a day when import ant speeches have been made, especially by those countries suffering from internal ills, The spark of loyalty can be re-ignitcd and

Sukarno was just the person to play on tho feelings of the people, which is precisely what occurred on August 17, 1959, Indonesian Inde pendence Day, It was on this day that Sukarno declared that 253

representation should be functional rather than elected or popular* He

also proposed that a ll political parties and interests groups enjoy

representation "nominated in family spirit" which, unllko "the disrup

tive practices of the liberal electoral system, could express the

national will as a concentration of national strengths.11^ This meant

that the new leadership concept would reflect a dictatorship from a

central authority--Sukarno,

Sukarno based his thoughts on a concept of unanimity and unity

which ware to replace the previous dualism. Decisions were to be made

by the representative body, in unison with the President, who would

make the decision if the representative body failed to agree. This

would replace the previous two levels of decision-making. This proce-

dure later became the law of the land. 15 Sukarno believed in politics

almost purely in moral terms. Ho sought "a just and prosperous society," and action toward this goal, whether "deliberative11 or "guided,"

Sukarnoi "The R ediscovery o f Our R ev o lu tio n ," Toward Freedom and the Dignity of Man {Djakarta i Department of Foreign Affairs ,_ 19517, pp, 37-76, This is a collection of five speeches made by Sukarno, See also Indonesia, Supreme Advisory Council, Decision Respecting Specifica tion of the Political Manifesto of the Republic of Indonesia of the 17th AugUB~t7~lli5 9~

^See "Rediscovery of Our Revolution," p, 9* Sec also Indonesia, Presidential Regulation 28/1950 (Djakarta: Department of Information, 1960)j and Indonesia, Gongress, Rules of Procedure of the Gotong-Rotong [Mutual assistance] Parliament (Djakarta! Department of Information^ I960), Articles 103 and 104 spelled out the provisions* 254

supposedly was democratic*^* Sukarno’s guided democracy, therefore, wa3

said to be based on a deep sense of morality which supposedly would pre

pare Indonesian society far revolutionary action*

The Political Manifesto was an important document, for it was

here that the future of Indonesia was blueprinted* The goals of guided 17 democracy were to be three* First, there was to be a continuation of

the anti-im perialist struggle to achieve a unitary republican State*

Secondly, Sukarno sought to create "a just and prosperous society11 to provide the basic needs cf the people* Finally, tho State would estab

lish a system of internal security* In analysing the Political Manifesto

It is obvious that it was nebulous* And yet, in spite of its lack of clarity, it could have been directed internally or externally, It also cou ld have boon in terp reted by th e Communist P a rty members a s fa v o rin g their views while simultaneously capable of being interpreted by anti communists as sympathetic to their cause. The Political Manifesto, in effect, should have been a warning to Indonesians that guided democracy

IB Indonesia, Congress, House of Representatives, Government Statement on the Implementation of Democracy with Leadership wiVhln~ the Frame of Returning to the 1945 Constitution (Washington, D.C.i Embassy of Indonesia, no date), pp, 2-3* This speech was made before a plenary meeting of the house of Representatives by the First Minister, Raden Djuanda, on March 2, 1959* Sukarno, in seeking a just and pros perous society, was applying his policy of Pantja Sila, the Indonesian moral approach to human relations, based on five distinct points of behavior* This Pantja Sila also was introduced to international law in the relations between certain nations. It was accepted by Chinn (Peopled Republic) and India in one specific treaty on relations be tween the two. In this case it bore tho general rubric of peaceful coexistence, 27 See Decision Respecting Specification of tho Political Mani festo of the Republic of Indonesia of the 17th of August 1959, p* 72, 255 could be a powerfully dangerous concept if Sukarno saw fit to take advan tage of its potentialities for selfish purposes* Selfish purposes were the motive and Sukarno had succeeded in his desire of neutralizing the opposition. So confused were the Indonesians that President Sukarno was able to rise to incredible political heights, chiefly because of his triangular relationship with the army and the Communist Party of

Indonesia, both of which were too busy trying to neutralize the other.

Sukarno clearly was primarily manipulative and secondarily organiza tional* This internal policy allowed Sukarno a virtually free hand in dealing with external affairs, Efforts now could be diverted toward improving Indonesian relations with the People’s Republic of China, a carry-over from the Bandung Conference,

Problems of Alignment

Sukarno's ease in replacing parliamentary democracy with his concoction of guided democracy in Indonesia buoyed him toward a repeat performance in the Afro-Asian sphere. Events during 1950, however, were not proceeding as hoped for by Sukarno, The favorable impression

Chou E n -la i had exuded a t th e Bandung C onference had n o t r e s u lt e d in th e cordial relations between Peking and Djakarta that Sukarno had expected*

Quito the contrary was true, and the cause of the growing friction res ted with the Indonesians who were expressing their domestic frustrations upon the Chinese residing in Indonesia, Bodily injuries and even loss o f l i f e to the C hinsse was e x te n s iv e ,

Sukarno also was being subjected to a re-evaluation of his per son al su c c e ss a t Bandung* The exp ected u n ity among the n e u t r a li s t s 256 and non-committed among the Afro-Asian States was not as cohesive as

Sukarno had expected. Concessions had been made by tho loading powers of the two main camps and several of the neutralists began leaning toward one or another of the leading powers. The various political romances thereby reduced the effectiveness of the views of the neutral i s t s .

Sukarno’s visions of future personal success also was subjected to divisive action from another source. An Afro-Asian People's Solid a r it y Conference was h eld in C airo, Egypt (now commonly known as th e

United Arab Republic) from December 26, 1957 to January 1, 1958. Gen eral international questions were discussed during this conference■

The Solidarity Conference was a partial rebuke to Sukarno in two res pects. On the one hand, it was a meeting of individuals rather than governmental leaders. As such it excluded Sukarno who, since Bandung, was promoting an international political personality campaign for his own benefit, On the other hand, the Conference terminated with a declaration of ten points, three of which conflicted with Indonesia's 18 practice of foreign policy. Point 6(b) called for each country to refrain from bringing pressure upon other countries, Point 7 suggested that each country avoid actions, making aggressive threats of resorting to force against any other country's territorial safety or political

^0Royal Institute of International Affairs, Documents on Inter national Affairs. 195Q, pp, 576-7, The solidarity of the Afro-Asian conglomeration could be questioned from the view that a small number of African States did not allow delegations to attend. One also might note that the Soviet Union, generally conceded as European, was represented at this conference. 257

Independence* Point 8 dealt with settlement of international disputes by peaceful means, Negotiations, conciliation, arbitration and judiciary settlement in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations were to be utilized In resolving disputes. The important point when discussing these points is the fact that Indonesia's relations with West Irian

(West New Guinea) we re being conducted under acute conditions, Sukarno was resorting to overt and covert action in an attempt to destroy the sovereignty of West Irian and the influence of the Netherlands in that 19 a r ea .

A second conference of itnportance to Sukarno was held at Accra,

Ghana during December 8-13, 1950, This All-African People's Conference clearly indicated a new turn of events and also produced evidence of now cleavages among the neutralists and non-aligned, It also should have been construed by Sukarno as a danger signal signifying the require ment fo r cau tion when try in g to analyze the in t e n s it y o f th e movement toward unity among the neutralists and non-aligned,

There is no doubt that nationalistic impulses were aroused at

Accra, The type of nationalism that was aroused, however, was Df a

^Commonwealth of Australia. Parliament, House of Representa tives* Agreement Concerning the Republic of Indonesia and the Kingdom of th e N etherlands Concerning West hew Guinea (West IrlanTI 2hth P a r i,, 1st sess,, August 21, 1952, pp, 510-22, Sukarno had attempted to gain control of West Irian since shortly after Indonesia had won its sover e ig n ty from th e N etherlands in December 19tt9, Indonesian methods usad frequently were covert (threats of guerrilla warfare) a3 well as conven tionally military oriented, The problem finally was solved when, on August 15, 1962 an agreement was reached at the United Nations head quarters, A U,W, Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) would replace the Netherlands colonial rule, effective October 1, 19S2. A final transfer, not later than May 1, 1953, would be made under which admin istration of West Irian would be turned over to Indonesia. 250

constitutional rathar than an extremist type. Whereas Sukarno had

eliminated constitutional democracy in Indonesia in 1957 when he dissolved

his parliament, in Accra the members were calling for a vigorous program

in Africa, but through a non-violent approach in accordance with demo

cratic principles.^

There also were two other danger signals for Sukarno at the

Accra conference* The cleavage between forces was evident throughout

the meetings* Gamal Abdul Nasser and Kwami Nkrumah became two mutual

antagonists, Nasser sought to control events and stimulate unity in

Africa, but under Nasser's guidance, while Nkrumah sought unity through

Pan Africanism and warned that Europe was not the only source of colon

ialism and imperialism and that Africa had no more room for the Asians 21 than the Europeans, This clearly was aimed at Nasser, but it also implied a warning for Sukarno* More explicit than im plicit in the

Conference proceedings, though, was the fact that African, rather than

Afro-Asian unity was stressed,

Sukarno then decided to revive the spirit of the Bandung Con ference of 1955 by appealing to the United Nations, he could not be classified as the sole instigator of this move, since he had the support of Ghana, Yugoslavia, India and the United Arab Republic in seeking an enlarged role for the non-aligned states in strengthening the possibili ties of peace* Mis speech to the General Assembly, on September 30,

J, E. Spence, "Recent Trends in South Africa," African Affairs, LlJi, 235 (1960), p* 136* 21 "People's Conference Plans Permanent Body," Africa Report, IV, 2 (February 195 9), pp* 3-7, 259

1960 was predicated on nationalist and anti-colonial1st foundations.

New nations, ho declared, were a blessing to the world community, but the continued presence of colonialism and imperialism were Increasing tensions and conflict, He then suggested the role of mediator between the two cold war blocs for the third force, the non-aligned grouping.

This, however, was only ona step that should be taken, according to

Sukarno. The other remedial action required was a transformation of the General Assembly as a duplicate, on a larger scale, of the Indones ian decision-making process through which consultation leads to consen sus. Resolutions, amendments and majority voting should not replace a belief in God and social justice, he asserted, because a belief in God and social justice are more proper bases for the United Nations than nationalism and internationalism.

From the foregoing it clearly can be seen that Sukarno was trying to create the proverbial mountain from a mole h ill, trying to superimpose the micro (Indonesia) upon the macro (United Nations) and equate the particular (Indonesia's social justice) with the general

(United Nations universality). The speech only clarified Sukarno’s growing b elief that Indonesia and Sukarno surely were destiny exampli fied, and served notice to the United Nations of Sukarno's candidacy as a world leader. It failed to cause any policy changes in the United

Nations and le ft Sukarno somewhat subdued.

22Sukarno* "To B uild th e tforld Anew," Toward th e Freedom and the Dignity of Han, pp. 121-49* 260

The Afro-Asian States met at Belgrade, Jugoslavia during

September 2-6, 1961. The Conference of Non-Aligned Countries included a more m ilitant Sukarno, even though he was more subdued, who now anal yzed world events in a modified perspective and the role of the third world grouping somewhat different from that of the previous year, especially during his United Nations speech, fie stated that:

Non-alignment is not neutrality * . . being non-aligned docs not mean becoming a buffer state between two giant blocs . . , There is a conflict that cuts deeper into the flesh of man, and that is the conflict between the emergent forces for freedom and justice and the old forces of domination^ , , * This is the era of emerging nations and the turbulence of nationalism, the building of nations and the breaking of empires*23

In other words, the two bloc and non-aligned world configuration now was modified and contained, for Sukarno, only two forces, tho old forces and the new forces*

The New and Old Forces

Sukarno's division of the world into new and old forces is conspicuous in the respect that it Is impossible to ascertain exactly which States ware classified as tho new forces and which comprised the

23Sukarno, Towards Friendship, Peace and Justice (Djakarta: Department of Information, 1963), I, p, 352. See also H, S, Handler, "Nehru Says Soviet Tests Increase Danger of War; Aska U.5,-Russian Parley," The New York Timas* September 3, 1961, 1:6; and Handler, "U.S, W ill Resume Nuclear Tests Underground With Mo Fall-Out; Reveals Third Soviet Explosion," The New York Times, September 6, 1961, l:*t. The excerpt is from the speech delivered by Sukarno at the Belgrade meeting* The Conference was marked by a split in the stand taken by leading delegates. Marshal Tito, with the support of Sukarno and several other chiefs of states, sought a strong stand against the two leading world powers, Nehru, enjoying the support of the majority, suggested a very moderate stand, Nehru won tho competition and tho fin al resolution was more acceptable in Moscow and Washington, 261

old forces as soon will bo discussed, What can be ascertained from

Information available Is that the Indonesian political lexicon contained

such terminology as New Emerging Forces, contracted to NEFO, and Old

Established Forces, shortened to OLDEFO, Gaines of the New Emerging

Forces {GAltEFG) also was added in the spring of 1963. This last could

lead to a question as to the propriety of including sports events in a

political category. Many would doubt the wisdom of such action until apprised of the fact that Sukarno classified certain sports events as political, which now w ill be discussed*

The Fourth Asian Games were sch ed uled fo r D jakarta during

August and September 1962* Even though Indonesia's internal events were becoming problematical, Sukarno continued with his program for the Games. Organizational and administrative procedures initially appeared to bo proceeding with little difficulty. Problems arose, however, when Sukarno refused visas to athletes from Nationalist China and Israel, The Indian Vice President of the Asian Games Federation, understandably upset by the Indonesians political action, either threat ened to seek an International Olympic Committee rejection of the Fourth

Asian Games, or irritated the Indonesians with his remarks* The Indo nesians became upset by the Indian official's attitude, demonstrated at the Indian Embassy (Djakarta) and forced an ultimate and hasty de- 24 parture of the official, persona non grata. The Olympic Committee

Ewa T, Pauker. "GANEFO Is Sports and Politics in Djakarta Aslan Survey* V, 4 (April 1965), pp* 172-3, See also "Sukarno Blames Foes for Anti-Chinese Rioting," The New York Times, May 20, 1963, 9i4t and "Indonesia^ Sukarno Agrees to Llfo RuleV The Hew York Times, May 21, 1963, 13 ;4, This was a period of problems for Sukarno, Indonesia 262

took follow-up action by demanding an apology to the Indian official,

Israel and Nationalist China and an Indonesian assurance that a similar

incident would never again occur. Indonesia was suspended, on February

7, 1963 by the Olympic Committee for allowing entry of politics into the non-political field of sports and made It an indefinite suspension, unless the apologies and assurance wore made by Sukarno.

Sukarno’s anger was evident, on February 13, when he announced

Indonesia's withdrawal from the International Olympic Committee and called for Games of the Hew Emerging Forces. The objective was repeated on A p ril 27, 1963 when Sukarno d eclared :

I propose to be frank* Now let's frankly say sports have something to do with politics, Indonesia now proposes to mix sports with politics, and let us now establish the Games of the Hew Emerging Forces. Pak Bandrio [Sukarno1s familiar form of address when refer ring to R. Subandrio, Minister of Foreign Affairs in Indonesia] has clearly said that sports cannot be separated from politics, He do not want to put on any masks; let us create a sports association on the basis of the new emerging forces, 25

More than sports was involved. Politics now was an integral part of the sports picture. wa3 plagued with revolts and thousands of troops were required to maintain order during the Games. The period also was one of inflated elation for Sukarno. The Indonesian Congress, a collection of members personally selected by Sukarno, had named him, only five weeks earlier, President of Indonesia for life, Sukarno very graciously accepted the honor, 25 Sukarno, Let Us Establish the GANEFQ (Djakarta: Department of Information, 1963), p, 36. " See also "Olympic Committee Drafts Charter th a t Would Bar Any N ation Showing B ias," The Hew York Times, February 9t 1963, 14:1; and Robert Trumbull, "Sukarno is Firm on Borneo Issue," The New York Times, May 21, 1963, 13:4. Sukarno delivered his speech to the Conference of National Front Committee on April 27, 1963, The quotation is extracted from Sukarno's speech as printed in the first source listed in this footnote. 263

The Games o f the New Emerging F o rces began on November 1 0 , 1963.

Fifty-one countries were represented and flexib ility of imagination was required If one wanted to confine this event as truly a contest among the new emerging forces. Several countries, such as Afghanistan, Argen tina, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Chile, Cuba, Finland, France,

Italy, Japan, Lebanon, Mexico, Netherlands, Thailand, Union of Soviet

Socialist Republics, Uruguay and Venezuela hardly could be considered as newly emerging* One also could challenge Sukarno's interpretation of neutralist and non-aligned when reading through the list just quoted, which is partial and not meant to be complete* One further could see that Sukarno's old concept of Afro-Asian was altered to fit his motives.

The s u c c e s s o f th e Games i s l e f t t o on e’ s im agination* I f ona measures success by the number of medals awarded, then the Games were a success. If one measures the Gamas by the number of countries repre sented then one would have to agree that Indonesia's venture was succes sful, especially for regional games* If one bases hia interpretation upon the number of athletes participating, especially in a qualitative sense, then one would have to reserve an opinion* It is hardly con ceivable that countries, especially those active in world Olympic games, would chance being prohibited from participation in world Olympic games by allowing their best athletes to participate in games such as GANEFO.

The participating countries, at least the majority, undoubtedly allowed their second or third rate athletea to participate* If one measures success by the same standards as did Sukarno, then one would have to

2SPauker, op. c it., pp, 171-2* Tho Games were terminated on November 22. 264

conclude that they were a success. So pleased was ha with the Gamas

that he decided upon creating a permanent Conference of tho Hew Emerg- 27 ing Forces (CQHEFO) and decided to make GAJIEFO permanent. If

success were to be measured by the amount of friendship gained from

Peking, then one would have to agree that the Games wore a success*

China reportedly contributed the greatest portion of the foreign ex change expenses of the Gamas, estimated at about one and one-half mil-

n P lion dollars, and provided over three-fourths of the sports equipment*

These contributions allowed China the opportunity of virtually elimin ating the influence the Soviet Union had enjoyed In Indonesia until

1962 when the West Irian problem supposedly had been resolved.

Sukarno remained Intoxicated with the memories of the 1955

Bandung Conference even after the Games of tho New Emerging Forces had been completed, lie therefore suggested such a meeting but in a differ ent country* Africa was to bo the regional setting and 1964 was tho target year, Planning was conducted with China and Indonesia coordin ated closely in seeking the exclusion of undesirable delegates or, If that were not possible, then to minimize the importance of certain delegates* The closeness of China and Indonesia meant that the Soviet

27 Ibid., pp. 176-00. See also Sukarno, A Year of Living Danger ously (Djakarta; Department of Information, 196*477 This last is a copy of a speech delivered by Sukarno on April 17, 1964,

2^Pauker* op. c it. , pp, 100-SI, A strange irony of the Games for the Soviet Union concerned the amount of credit it earned vis-a-vis China* Although the Soviet Union had contributed heavily toward con struction of the facilities used for the Games, credit reaped by China far outweighed that gained by tho Soviet Union, 2G5

Union, at odds with China, would be minimized and Malaysia, then en joying the dubious honor of being Indonesia's top enemy, would be eliminated from the Afro-Asian conference, which then would include

Latin American delegates* At any rate, the Fourth Afro-Asian Solidar ity Conference was held in the vicinity of Accra, Ghana, Hay 1Q-1S,

09 19G5* The Malaysian delegation was rejected, chiefly because Malay sia was causing Indonesia so many problems, which ultim ately would lead to a United Nations withdrawal,

"Crush Malaysia” and a Withdrawal

The Federation of Malaysia came into its formal existence on

September 16, 1963, It incorporated Malaya, Singapore (which later with drew), Sarawak and North Borneo (Sabah, as it later became known), Su karno had taken a cautious stand during the preliminary stages, which began In 1961, to formation of the Federation, His efforts were con centrated along with border with West Irian, where Indonesian troops wore concentrating in a peace through fear campaign which, hopefully for

Sukarno, would lead to a capitulation of the Netherlands colonial admin istration of West Irian, and eventual control of West Irian by Indonesia, 30 This eventually occurred in 1962,

^Guy J, Packer, "The Rise and Fall of Afro-Asian Solidarity," Asian Survey, V, 9 (September 1965), pp, !425-32. See also Franklin B, Weinstein, "The Second Asian-African Conference: Preliminary Bouts," Asian Survey, V, 7 (August 1965), pp, 359-73j and "Pan-African Affair," African Digest* XIII, 1 (August 1965), p, 20,

^Guy J, Pauker, op. c lt, , p, >426* The Organization of African Unity, during the preparatory stages, called the forthcoming meeting the "Second Bandung" Conference, See also supra, this chapter, foot note 19 and allied information, 266

Uprisings occurred in Sarawak and Borneo in August, 1962,

These ware the work o f d is s id e n ts seek in g t o u n ite th e two co u n tries

under a single head rather than the proposed federation, Sukarno, who

grew inertisingly m ilitant, especially after making D, N* Aidit Chairman

of the Communist Party of Indonesia, and M. H. Lukmann, the Party’s

Tirst Deputy Chairman, members of the Indonesian Cabinet in March, 31 1962, A iditrs presence in the Cabinet undoubtedly convinced Sukarno

of the wisdom of seeking Red China’s moral and spiritual, if not mater

ial backing. R. Subandrio, the Indonesian Foreign Minister, therefore

was dispatched to Peking where he conferred with Chou En-lai in January,

1963, Mis return to Indonesia was followed by a Subandrio declaration

of confrontation with Malaysia and a confirmation, in February, by in Sukarno of Konfrontasi—a policy of undeclared war, Although it was apparent th a t In d on esia had Red C hina’ s back in g, tho same could not

be said of Indonesia’s relations with the Soviet Union,

Tho Soviet Union had taken two different stands concerning Indo

nesia's relations with West Irian and Malaysia, It had fully supported

Indonesia in its dispute with the Netherlands over West Irian, It 33 actively supported Indonesia, through a military agreement withp and

31 John 0. Sutter, "Two Faces of Konfrontasi: Crush Malaysia and the Gestapu," Asian Survey, VI, 10 (October 1966), pp, 523-6.

32Ibid., p. 5 26.

33Madia Derkach. "The Soviet Policy Towards Indonesia in the West Irian and the Malaysian D isp u te sAsian Survey, V, 11 (November 1965), p, 560; and Guy J. Pauker, "Gsneral Nasution's Mission to Moscow," Aslan Survey. I, 1 (March 1961), pp. 13-22. 2G7 support of Sukarno in 1%1 and 1962, Tho dispute between West Irian and Indonesia was viewed as a dispute between a new State (Indonesia) and a colonial Power (The Netherlands), The Soviet position in the

Indonesian-Malaysian dispute indicated the flexib ility of the Soviets,

It no longer visualized tho presence of a colonial power but interpreted the situation as involving two new States, In thin case the Soviet Union no longer could support Sukarno. It treated Malaysia as an emergent

State and suggested a referendum In Malaysia (freedom of choice) and the ultimate withdrawal of the British from that area, This now ex plains the Indonesian switch in its foreign relations from the Soviot

Union to the People's Republic of China, which took a more m ilitant stand in favor of Indonesia and supported Indonesian desires vis-a-vis Malaysia,

The United States, long a benefactor to Indonesia in all types of aid, entered the picture during the two years, 1962 and 1963, with action net conducive to continued cordial relations with Indonesia*

President John F» Kennedy,

^Derkach, op. clt,, pp, 568-9* See also Sutter, op* c it., pp. 5 2 0 -9 , 260 continuous flow of United States aid of various typas to Indonesia, aid which, during the years since 1946 had amounted to billions of d o lla r s ,35

The action by President Kennedy, and the Indonesian failure to crush Malaysia, proved to be of such a frustrating impact to Sukarno that he now accepted a ll available aid from Peking and the Communist

Party of Indonesia, Great Britain and the United States became the targets of a joint campaign directed toward revealing both as n e o - colonialists and old established forces (the first outright revelation of who the old established forces were). This joint campaign also sought

Felix Be lair, Jr* "Aid to Indonesia and U.A»R, Curbed," Tho New York Times, November 8t 1963, 1;1* See also "Transcript of the President's Mews Conference on Foreign and Domestic Matters," The New York Times, November 15, 1963, 19 il in which President Kennedy expressed displeasure with Indonesian policy towards Malaysia; and Statements by President Sukarno of the Republic of Indonesia and Attorney General Robert F, Kennedy of the United States of Arnarlea "(Washington, D.C.: Embassy of Indonesia, TSBhJ; Sukarno, Safeguarding the Republic of Indonesia (Djakarta! Department of Foreign Affairs (1963), pT 272”[ and U,S,, Department of State, Department of State Bulletin (Washington, D.C.i United States Government Printing Office, February 17, 1964), pp* 239-43, The Kennedy mission was not a complete failure, Indonesia agreed to a cease fire, under Thailand supervision, and also agreed to a tripartite meeting of foreign ministers (Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines) to be held in Bangkok, Thailand the following February* Sukarno in sisted upon maintaining the status

The failure of tho tripartite summit conference in June* 1964 was followed by landings of Indonesian guerrilla troops in Malaysia in August and September, The Malaysian reaction was an appeal to the

United Hations Security Council* The appeal* dated September 3* by the Malaysian Permanent Representative to the United Hations requested that the Security Council be convened under Article 39 of the Charter

(Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace* Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression), Malaysia accused Indonesia of a parachute drop of about thirty heavily armed Indonesian troops on South Malaysia* ”a blatant and inexcusable aggression against a peaceful neighbor*11 which was a "threat to international peace and security in the area,"

The Council held five meetings during which it discussed the

Malaysian appeal (September 9-10, 14-15 and 17)* Indonesia did not deny that It had invaded Malaysia* It argued, instead* that Malaysia was the product of British diplomacy rather than the wishes of the people of da bah (nee North Borneo) and Sarawak (Indonesia now was reversing its previous rejection of the Soviet suggestion that a referendum be tho basis of choice in Malaysia and using the previously rejected Soviet suggestion as a point in its own defense)* This had caused Indonesia to take action against Malaysia, action Indonesia considered political

^Sutter* op. cit»* 531-3, North Korea later would be included in this multiple axis,

^United Nations, Yearbook of the United Nations, 1964 (Now York: Columbia University Press, 1966), pp* 135-9* 270 rather than legal, It argued that the "so-called international law of the world of colonial powers was incapable to daterring the struggle 30 for freedom," The Indonesian Delegate admitted that Indonesian volunteers and guerrillas had been fighting In Malaysia for an indef inite period of time and had trained militants of Sarawak and Sabah*

The discussions terminated, on September 17, with a resolution calling for a resumption of talks by the two Governments concerned,

The resolution, however, was defeated by a nino-to-two vote, with the

Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia voting against adopting the Council resolution* Indonesia gained a hollow victory through the lack of a condemnation of its aggressiveness for, in the voting, Morocco and the

Ivory Coast, both supposedly Afro-Asian, voted for adoption of the resolution* 39

The scene next shifted to Cairo, during the Second Conference of Non-Aligned Countries, October 4-10, 1964, It was at this confer ence that Sukarno once again lost ground In his attempt at gaining world support, Sukarno was successful in having Malaysia eliminated from the meeting, hut once again it was a hollow victory in two respects, The

Conference would not adopt the Indonesian resolution which would have

3®Ibid, Tho Indonesian Delegate also stated that, "the con flict between the new emerging revolutionary forces of freedom and the old dominating forces s till continued and took an acute form in South East Asia, Malaysia*s so-called complaint could thus be viewed only in the wider context of that conflict and with reference to the struggle that waa being waged between the new forces and the old es tablished ones in that area*

^United Nations* Security Council, Official Reports (New York; U nited N ation s, 19GM), 5 /5 973, September 15, 1964, 271 denounced Malaysia as'h neo-colonialist p lot.l,lt^ The second setback involved Ghana, Malaysia and Indonesia in which the Ghanian delegate inflated the Malaysian battle for international recognition by offer ing Ghanian good offices to help Indonesia and Malaysia resolve their differences. This placed Malaysia on an equal status with Indonesia and a l l o th er members o f th e A fro-A sian group.

The turning point for Indonesia, in the United Nations, came two months lator. The time had arrived in December, 1964, for the

General Assembly to not on the membership of the Security Council for th e coming tw o-year p e r io d , Two non-perm anent Members had to be s e l e c ted for the two-year term starting January 1, 1955 and ending December

31, 1966, One other vacancy would be created on December 31, 1965 and

Assembly action was required. The Netherlands and Uruguay were selec ted for the two-year terms, which meant little to Indonesia. The other nomination, and acceptance by the General Assembly, however, proved to be of an entirely different nature, Czechoslovakia's term was expiring on December 31, 1965 and the President of the General Assembly had nominated Malaysia to fill the seat for a one-year period, The Assembly accepted and approved the nom inations,^

40 Sukarno, The Era of Confrontation (Djakarta; Department of Foreign Affairs, 1965),pp, 15-21 and attachmenti Declaration Adopted by the Second Conference of Non-Aligned Countries, Cairo, 5th to 10th Octo ber, 1964, pp, 30-35, 45,

^United nations, Yearbook of the United Nations, 1964, p, 609* See also Yearbook of the United Nations, 1963, p. 7lXj Ati agreement had been reached In the General Assembly, November 1, 1963, to f ill the vacancy caused by completion of the Philippine two-year term by dividing tha following two-year term equally between Czechoslovakia and Malaysia, with Czechoslovakia occupying the seat for the first year, after which it would resign the seat in favor of Malaysia for the following year. 2 72

The General Assembly action Infuriated Sukarno, who unwittingly

had maneuvered himself, through a ten-year period, into a position

whereby drastic action would have to be taken* The day had arrived when Sukarno had a choice of accepting Malaysia as a superior In the

United Nations by virtue of Its seat on the Security Council, and the possible harm it could do Indonesia through its prestigious position in the Council, or take tho drastic action of leaving the United Na tions* Sukarno decided on the second course of action and notified the

Secretary-General of his action by a letter of January 20, 1965* The strange mentality of Sukarno, as expressed in the letter, is Interesting*

Malaysia had been forced into tho United Nations on 17 Sep tember 1963, by deliberate avoidance of any voting, in a success ful manoeuvre of neo-colonial powers* While Indonesia had voiced disapproval, it had remained patient until, by another colonial manoeuvre, Malaysia had been pushed into the Security Council* , » . What contribution for the maintenance of peace and security had been made by Malaysia, The very existence of Malaysia—a tool of British neo-colonialism in South Eaot Asia—was controversial and opposed by itsn eigh b or!, Indonesia could have challenged the legality cf Malaysia’s election in 1964 due to the non-voting procedure* * , , Indonesia did not intend to obstruct the work of the United Nations or wrack the Organization, , , • Indonesia's decision might become a catalyst to reform the United Nations in spirit and in deed. The present revolutionary Indonesian decision, taken in the be3t interest of the United Nations, might also have a beneficial effect for the speedy solution of the Malaysian problem* Indonesia still upholds the lofty principles of international co-operation as enshrined in the United Nations Charter, which can, however, be implemented outside, as well as inside, the United Hat io n s ,112

^Indonesia, Declaration of the Suprem e Advisory Council on the Withdrawal of Indonesia from the U.M. (New York: Consulate General, Republic~of Indonesia, 1965}* S ee also Subandrio, Formal Notification of Indonesia’s Withdrawal from the U.N* (Washington, D*C*: Embassy of Indonesia,” 1965), 273

There are several possible explanations for the text of the

letter* The first is that Sukarno* known to be afflicted with incur able diseases* in 1965 was suffering brain damage. The second involves

Sukarno's immediate surroundings, It is highly possible that cortain associates* members of the then powerful Communist Party of Indonesia, bad collectively dictated the letter and convinced Sukarno of the wis dom of taking the action, Tho third involved Sukarno's inflated itnage of his and Indonesia's position in world affairs. This may have caused him to think that the United Nations somehow might have made concessions

For Indonesia's rescission of the letter of withdrawal* The fourth involves a combination of all three, and appears to be the moat logical explanation. At any rate, Sukarno also announced that Indonesia was withdrawing from the specialized agencies of the United Nations, such as the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), (Jnitad Nations Child ren's Fund (UNICEF), and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and

Cultural Organization (UNESCO). A later decision by Sukarno concerned the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the Inter- 43 national Monetary Fund, from which Indonesia was withdrawing*

^ Yearbook of the United Nations, 1365, pp. 733, 760, 763* See also World health Organization, Basic Documents (17th ed, : Genevai World health Organization, I960), p. 142;""Official Records of tho World Health Organization, 1966* pp, 174-5; Part II, pp. 7* 250-1, 326* 344, 420-1* Indonesia, a regular member of the World Wealth Organisation since May 23* 1950, remained active in that organisation during the period of withdrawal from the United Nations. It had its two represen tatives in continuous attendance at the World Health Assembly, It alao allowed continuity of eleven WHO projects in Indonesia during the same p erio d . 274

Indonesia's action was dualistic In nature, It meant that

Indonesia had ceased all participation in the United Nations proper*

thereby leaving the United Nations without the balance of the assessment

levied against Indonesia about which nothing could bo done until the

next United Nations fiscal period was planned. On the other hand*

Indonesia now had cancelled nearly a ll beneficial aspects previously

associated with membership in the United Nations and the two inter

national funds, In trying to wiigh the effects It appears that the

Indonesian action did far more damage to Indonesia than the United Na

tions, The monetary damages were extensive to Indonesia while the with

drawal was only the first suffered by the United Nations in its twenty

years of existence* end this involved only a small power,

Indonesia's withdrawal mat with the approval of the leaders of

the People's Republic of China, as could be expected, Sukarno accepted

the congratulations of Chou En-lai as well as those of tho leaders in

Hanoi and Pyongyang* North Korea, This stimulated the Indonesian leaders

who continued their anti-Malaysia campaign* causing the Malaysian Rep resentative to the United Nations to appeal again and again to the

Secretary-General for assistance. The lack of action by tho United

Nations* plus the support received from Peking* therefore meant that the

Communist Party of Indonesia in 1955 was becoming extremely powerful and aggressive*

The withdrawal of Indonesia from the United Nations was not as complete as might have been suspected. The historical time lapse since the Indonesian exit was only three months when Sukarno lay the cornerstone 275

for a new complex of buildings in Djakarta on April 19, 1955, These

buildings wore to be duplicates of the United Nations In New York City,1**1

This was in addition to the tall building under construction in Djakarta,

which Sukarno fe lt was necessary to commemorate the Games of the New Em erging Forces, It was clearly evident that Sukarno hoped to replace the United Nations with his version of an international organisation composed of the Afro-Asian States with Indonesia enjoying the permanent honor of hosting the organization, The Afro-Asian States did not share

Sukarno1s enthusiastic dreams of fantasy, Reality dictated more pru dent and obtainable goals,

Reality also should have dictated more prudent action on the domestic scene where Sukarno's fiscal irreap onnihility was directing

Indonesia into a situation in which explosive action became a more

Immediate possibility, Combined with the popular restlvcness was an other element tending toward a dangerous situation, Tho army, having enjoyed a position of prominence In Sukarno's p olitics, gradually found itself lapsing into a position of secondary importance, Sukarno's swing to the loft threatened the privileged status of the army. Some of the generals resigned themselves to the facts of life, greed being the determinant. Others among the upper echelons of the military, how ever, viewed Sukarno's vlatrlcs with apprehensions,

October 1, 1965 was a critical day for Sukarno, This was the day o f th e coup p erp etrated by tho commander o f Sukarno1s p alace guard*

The series of events that followed throughout Indonesia resulted in a

^Guy J, Pauker, op, cit., pp. 425-6. 276

house arrest for Sukarno and control of Indonesia by Major General 45 T* H. J. Suharto, who restored order from the chaos* Then came the

series of actions that once again would make Indonesia a fu ll fledged

Member of the United nations,

’'Cessation of Co-operation11

It took Suharto, Sukarno's replacement, nearly a year to bring

a reasonable amount of stability in Indonesia* The tine had arrived

for Indonesia to resume its rightful place in the United [fations* The

date was September 19, 1966, tha date of which the Secretary-General

received a letter stating that Indonesia wished to resume its seat

commencing with the Assembly’s twenty-first session due to open an the

following day, The letter, and previous letters concerning the with

drawal, wore discussed on September 2B, 19G6, It immediately became

apparent how flexible the United Nations could be when the President of

the Assembly read the letter of intention of returning* Heading of the

Indonesian latter was followed by an interpretation of its contents.

The President states that it appeared that, ’’the Government of Indonesia

considered that Its recent absence from the Organization had been based

not upon a withdrawal from the United Nations but upon a cessation of co-operation,"i|& Immediate acceptance of Indonesia was unanimous,

45 Daniel S, Lev, 11 Indonesia 1965: The Year of tho Coup," Aslan Survey, VI, 2 (February 1966), pp. 103-10,

^United Nations, Yearbook of the United Nations, 19GG, pp,2Q7- 06, 210, This action was not exactly a precedent, Tho United Nations had used a somewhat similar method when Syria declared itself no longer a partner of the United Arab Republic and sought to occupy its former sovereign position in the United Nations, 277

The problem of financial arrangement then was discuscod, The

President suggested that Indonesia meet Its full budgetary obligations from tile time of its re-seating in the Assembly. The period of non participation was left to the Secretary-General, who, on December 6,

I960 stated that Indonesia had offered to pay ten percent of tho amount it would have been assessed had it remained in the United Nations 47 during the January, 1955-Scptember, 19G6 period, This included the regular budget and the Special Account for the United Nations Emergency

F o rce.

Indonesia then completed its resumption of membership by join ing the specialized agencies such as the International Labor Organiza tion (ILO), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the United

Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE),^8 Tho damage done the United Nations, and Indonesia, by the withdrawal, or "cessation o f co -o p era tio n " now had been as r e c t i f i e d a s was p o s s ib le ,

Jt7lbld., p. 950. ‘48Ibid., pp. 377,934,990,1116* IX

CONCLUSIONS

A statement was made, In the First chapter of this study, indicating that an assessment would be made of the political motiva tions of the various actors withdrawing from the League of Nations and the United Nat ions * A determination also would be made of the actual effect of the withdrawals upon each of the two universal organizations*

A further purpose of this study was to assess the value of membership in universal organizations as perceived by the members, particularly those departing*^

The above was accomplished but only to a limited degree, the chief reason being the vast magnitude of the study dealing with the many rather than single withdrawals, The mass volume of material associated with the many withdrawals studied required an acute select ivity and brevity in composition, which, in turn, meant that a mental construct, containing only brief mention of the motivations, value perceptions and effects upon the organizations was presented, thereby necessitating a search, through content analysis, by the reader for what was implied in each of Chapters II through VIII*

^-See supra, first paragraph of Nature and Purpose, Chapter I , p. H,

270 279

For these reasons the study requires a recapitulation of the

m in points Involved in the withdrawals, The purpose of this chapter,

therefore, is to present views on the political motivations of the with

drawing Members, the overall effect upon each organization and a review

of the value perceptions of departing members* Some thought also

w ill be presented on tho reasons for failure of the League of Nations and success of the United Nations in retention of membership* The

chapter and study w ill be terminated with a theoretical discussion of

the feasibility of establishing general rules associated with with d raw als o f Members from in t e r n a t io n a l organ ization *

A few words of explanation are in order before discussing the p olitical motivations of the withdrawing Members and their value perceptions of membership* A differentiation between the two must be established before proceeding with the discussion.

Political motivations are construed as those acts, by any in dividual, political or non-political, or group(s) of individuals, in and/or out of political office In a withdrawing Member State, which lad to a withdrawal or contributed to the withdrawal■ This differs from value perception in that value perception is considered to be the withdrawing Member's attitude, expressed or implied, toward membership in the international organization, during any span of membership*

One final point must be made. One must be aware of the fact that, unlike value perceptions of membership, which nearly always were expressed at the time of withdrawal, political motivations were not always clearly enunciated by the withdrawing Members prior to their 290

withdrawal* This necessitated an interpretation of certain acts in an effort to discover the implied intent and political motives under

lying the political events now being presented,

Political Motivations

There were many goals, desires and feelings which induced and

impelled the resort to withdrawal from the League of Nations and the

single withdrawal from the United Nations, with only a slight semblance

of uniformity involved, except for the fact that the majority decided

to cancel membership in a universal organization* This means that each, with the exception of several smaller Latin American countries, must be discussed on an individual basis, following the same general chronological order as in the main portion of the text*

a* Japan

Japan was politically motivated by a desire for territorial expansion, It had to withdraw because it could not, by choice, adhere to that portion of the Covenant requiring guarantees against aggres

sion (Article 10), The Japanese Government had established a goal in

China long before establishment of the League of Nations and succes sive Governments did not see fit to deviate from that course of action*

China, suffering from decades of foreign intervention and domestic political instability and turbulence, sought League assistance after bilateral arbitration with Japan had failed repeatedly* The

Japanese, however, were adverse to a resolution of Articles 12 and 13 which dealt with those two subjects respectively, The Chinese request 281 for the Invoking of Article 15 of the Covenant was accepted by the

League in February, 1932, with no resistance from Japan*

Japan had, only about three years earlier, interpreted the Kel- logg-Briand Pact for the renunciation of war in such a manner that the

Pact provided Japan with freedom of action in China, even to the ex tent of forcefully gaining additional territorial rights in China*

The Japanese acceptance of a League proposal to investigate conditions in the disputed areas of China apparently was made with the hopes that Japan could favorably influence the Lytton Committee or the

League, o r th e L eague's more pow erful Members would r u le in fa v o r o f

Japan*

Those portions of the Lytton Report which were not in harmony with the Japanese outlook toward its territorial and political expan sion in China were too poignant for the Japanese* The Lytton Report induced a political decision to forsake the League and proceed on a bilateral course of action, free of any interference by the League, which, according to the Japanese, did not understand and appreciate the political situation in the Far East*

b* Germany

In Germany, the territorial desires were of a slightly differ ent type prior to and during its League membership* It sought to re gain the territories lost, particularly that strip of land pejoratively referred to as the "Polish Corridor*11 It also sought thareturn of the port city of Danzig to German control. These points, however, are 282 elements of a larger desire, which was a revision or destruction of the dreaded Treaty of Versailles.

The Germans used a s many methods a s p o s s ib le to r e lie v e Ger many of the restrictions imposed by the Treaty. Failure to gain elim ination of reparations requirements was followed by the German success in gaining acceptance of the Treaty of Locarno by France,

Great Britain and Italy. This German success, however, did not bring the degree of relaxation by the A llies expected by the Germans.

Germany also did not gain any concessions in military matters and had to resort to continued assistance rendered Germany under seerat pacts with the Soviet Union and several European countries, most of which were Members o f th e League.

The lack of favorable results caused Germany to turn to Article

9 of the Covenant pertinent to the reduction of armaments. The Germans f e l t t h a t a c lo s e r sem blance t o e q u ity could be gained fo r Germany I f the other League Members could be convinced of the wisdom of disarming*

Failure to achieve this and the other subordinate goals that might eventually lead to the main target, elimination of the Treaty of

V ersailles, caused H itler, then in power In 1933, to decide that more progress could be made outside the League structure*

d* A u stria

Austria’s withdrawal revolved around a basic desire of the

Austrians, particularly those of completely Germanic origin, to u lti mately unite with Germany, The security provided during the days of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, regardless of how spurious it may have 233

been, no longer was available to the Austrian^, They had to look

e lse w h e r e, meaning Germany,

The desire for unity with Germany withstood the trials and

tribulations associated with a decade and a half of membership in the

League and the desire of Austrian Chancellor Engelbert Dollfus to

hold in abeyance the labors of those Austrians seeking the anschluss

with Germany,

The respect for the League by Dollfus, largely a result of the

League's assistance to Austria during its time of need in 1922, and

the attempt by the Chancellor to keep Austria actively engaged in the

League, disintegrated after the assassination of Dollfus, Pro-ffazi elements gradually gained control in Austria, while stirring up the frenzy of the people toward union with Germany, and the path was pre pared for the eventual alliance with Germany, In March, 1939, at a period of history when Germany already had been an ex-Momber of the

League for nearly five years. Acceptance by tho Austrians of Hitler as their leader was coupled with a desertion of the League by Austria in fulfillm ent of H itler's desire and his hatred of the League,

d , I t a ly

A low regard for the League and a desire to expand into East ern Africa were the basic motivations leading to the withdrawal of

I t a ly ,

The Italian nation, in general, had felt frustrated in not being able to collect the promises made to Italy in the Secret Treaty of

London, The Italian frustration was agitated by their new Premier, 28U

Benito Mussolini, who sought to consolidate his own political position by diverting Italian attention to tho international scene* The murder of General Tell ini occurred at a most opportune time for Mussolini and the actions of the League during the Corfu crisis were readily adaptable to his radical plans for Italy*

Resolution of the problem between Italy and Greece did not result in a change of attitude on the part of Mussolini toward the

League, He continued toward his goal of discrediting the League, while simultaneously seeking status in Europe for himself primarily and for Italy in a secondary sense. He realized less than desired results in these goals, which necessitated another goal which would placate an increasingly restive Italian nation* Ethiopia, of course, was ideal for his plans and the Italian imperial plan was set in mo tion in 1935 with the attack upon Ethiopia,

The Italian attack upon Ethiopia resulted in the imposition of sanctions upon Italy, but these were incomplete and eventually were eliminated as a failure, thereby increasing Mussolini's contempt for the League, which led to the Italian withdrawal in 1937,

e i Hungary

Hungary's primary desire to revise and obtain elimination of the Treaty of Trianon, it3 continued desire for return to Hungary of lands lost under that treaty, its close relationship with Italy and its ultimate desire to gain control over its former holdings in

Czechoslovakia may be listed as the motivating factors leading toward the Hungarian withdrawal. 285

The early attempt, in 1910 and 1919, to regain land lost to neighboring States, resulted in formation of the Little Entente, a political pincer which helped control Hungarian desires* The poli tical pincer, with Hungary situated between the points, forced Hungary to look to Italy for friendship and resulted in a close relationship between the two, It also resulted in an incident at Szent-Gottbard, which was clearly in violation of the Treaty of Trianon, both for

Hungary and Italy* This violation clearly indicated the Hungarian desire to disregard the Treaty of Trianon when the possibility arose.

Political events in Europe then took command of the situation for Hungary when the Hungarians found themselves situated directly at the midway point on the route from Berlin to the Balkans, a goal cherished by Hitler in 193B*

H itler's political plan of conquering the Balkans was adapted by the Hungarians to their dream of the past two decades, this being the recovery of lost lands, in this case the lost land being Slovakia.

The Hungarians sought to placate both Hitler and Mussolini and delu ded themselves into believing that their withdrawal from the League would entice Hitler into granting them concessions in Slovakia* The withdrawal occurred in 193 9, but without the expected action by Hitler in allowing Hungary to absorb Slovakia.

f . The L atin Group

Brazil's quest for status was the underlying motive for its withdrawal* It had served the League well for six consecutive years and had been reelected as a non-permanent Member of the Council throughout those years* It therefore felt that it should he given

preferential treatment over Germany, or at least be given a permanent

seat at the same time as Germany. The failure of tho League to con

sider Brazil either on a preferential, or even on an equal status with

Germany became the signal for its withdrawal in 1926*

Paraguay predicated its withdrawal on its interpretation of

the League's decision to lift sanctions against Bolivia and continue them against Paraguay as unjust and unequal treatment*

The problem had begun with an apparent attack upon Bolivia by

Paraguay in an effort to regain a section of territory between the two countries, territory which had been ceded to Bolivia by treaty provisions* The League had considered the dispute and took action, based on what the League considered to be a justified course* Para guay’s interpretation differed from that of the League and termina tion of membership of Paraguay was a result*

The p olitical motivations of Guatemala, Nicaragua, Honduras and £1 Salvador are identical and may be stated as a desire to stabil ize their national budgets* Membership In the League had been a luxury neither of the four apparently felt they could afford, even though the f in a n c ia l a ssessm en t a g a in s t each was th e minimum one u n i t , $ 4 ,6 7 5 * 9 0 ,

Although this amount appears to be extremely minimal under current standards, the fact remains that it was of a much greater monetary impact after the First World War, especially when considered from the view that returns enjoyed in balancing the expenditure of the annual sums is not comparable to the ratio associated with United Nations membership* 287

All four countries were forced to make a decision as to

whether they preferred a continued loss of monies sorely needed in

domestic economies or an infusion of those monies into domestic needs.

Each of the four selected the latter course of action and decided to

forfeit membership for possible domestic social, economic and poli

tical stability,

Much the same could be said of Costa Rica even though it ob

jected to inclusion of the Monroe Doctrine in the Covenant of tho

League, It apparently felt it simply could not afford membership in

the League and had to withdraw,

Chile's desire for non-intervention by the League in what Chile considered to be purely hemispheric affairs, its search for recognition in the League, failure to achieve that goal and its gradual but eventual los3 of confidence In the League were the chief political factors motivating it toward withdrawal from the League,

Chile and Peru had a territorial disagreement in 1922 and

Peru's appeal to the League for an alteration of an old treaty between the two led to Chile's assertion that the problem was one involving the Western Hemisphere, a problem in which the League had no ju ris diction, Any other interpretation by the League supposedly would result in a withdrawal from the League by Chile, The League declined any examination of the problem,

Chile later, during the 1930s, sought recognition in the

League by proposing changes in the League. Host of the proposals were considered of marginal value by the League and were disregarded. 203

This angered the Chilean Government and its delegates to the League

who decided, in May, 1938, that the League's refusal to consider a

reorganization of the League, under which a ll States rather than just

Member-States should be allowed to participate in the League, meant

that the League no longer was universal and representative of world

opinion* The Chilean delegates also provided the League with a

summary of the League's failures to resolve many of the problems in

troduced to the League for resolution, problems that were solved out

side the League structure* Chile felt that it could accomplish as

much outside the League as a non-Member as it cou'd as a Member,

The balance of the Latin exits are relatively unimportant for

this chapter, chiefly because no reasons were given for their with

drawals and the two memberships added so little to the League,

g* The S o v ie t Union

The search for security, but under terms exclusively advanta

geous to the Soviet Union, with an absolute minimum loss of its na

tional sovereignty, and the inability of the League to provide this

security led the Soviet Union toward unilateral action that resulted

in its expulsion from the League,

The in itial approach of the Soviet Union after joining the

League was that of repeated suggestions that the League be reorganized and composed of congresses, each of which would be utilized to re

solve problems within their territorial areas* These supposedly

would provide a ll members with an added amount of security but with a minimum loss of sovereignty. When this suggestion failed, the 289

Soviet Union then sought a reduction of armaments by the powerful

Members o f th e League. The m otive behind th e S o v ie t d e s ir e fo r th e reduction of armaments was an effort by the Soviet Union to bring o th er Members down to th e S o v ie t l e v e l o f m ilit a r y p rep a ra tio n .

Failure of the League to act upon the Soviet suggestions, and the worsening European political situation, caused the Soviets to take unilateral action at a point considered strategically important to the defense of Leningrad, Surrender of the port city of Hanko by

Finland was denied the Soviets and the m ilitary attack upon Finland by the Soviets resulted in the expulsion of the Soviet Union from the League*

h. Indonesia

The desire for recognition and leadership of the uncommitted and developing countries provided the basis for a series of events which ultimately led to the withdrawal of Indonesia from the United

N a tio n s,

Sukarno, after interpreting the results of the Bandung Con ference of 1955, visualized the prospects available to himself as the leader of the Afro-Asian group and Djakarta as a new power center of the world, thereby propelling the so-called uncommitted and developing countries into such a position of prominence that the leading powers would have little recourse but to accept this group of members as a force with which the leading powers would have to contend, consult and compromise, 290

Sukarno became so imbued with the position held by Indonesia

in the Afro-Asian group that he foresaw a change in the organization

of the United Nations, a change which hopefully eventually would make

the combined uncommitted and developing countries a group sufficiently

powerful to influence the judgments and decisions of the superpowers

in United Nations affairs,

Sukarno's hopes gradually were converted to despair. The

failure of the United Nations to pay the amount of attention he ex

pected from his 1965 General Assembly speech led to his decision to

withdraw from the United Nations,

Value Perceptions

This section will be devoted to a discussion of the value of

membership in universal international organizations as perceived by

the departing Members of the League and the United Nations, The

discussion is based nearly equally upon statements made by the dele

gates, included in the text of this study, of the withdrawing Members

or an interpretation of certain acts by the delegates or political

leaders or elements of those countries.

ai Japan

The value of membership in the League was a subject of exten

sive debate in Japan during the late 1918 and virtually a ll of 1919,

Japanese officials debated the value of joining the League even while they had representatives engaged in the Paris Peace Conference. The debate in Japan also included a sizable segment of the Japanese press 291

which doubted the wisdom of the League as an organization while equating the League with Woodrow Wilson whom they fe lt displayed a tendency to ward being anti-Japanese in matters concerning Japanese interests in

China.

The suspicion of Wilson never really was dissipated even though

Wilson ruled in favor of Japan rather than China during the Peace

Conference discussions of matters concerning the Far East. The sus picion of Wilson also was largely the result of past United States immigration laws which affected virtually a ll Japanese contacts with

Americans, especially those in governmental relations.

Membership in the League did not neutralize Japanese interests in China even though the Covenant called for open, just and honorable relations between nations with international law as the rule of con duct among tha Governments. The maintenance of justice and respect for treaty obligations associated with membership was not taken seriously by the Japanese who, in 1929, decided that the Kellogg-

Briand Pact could be interpreted to support Japanese intentions in

China and add legitimacy to the Japanese imperial desires, Ventures in China were considered defensive in nature by the Japanese, which hardly could be considered as supporting international law or open, just and honorable in relations with China.

Continued Japanese actions in China indicated as nearly a complete disregard for the League and the principles of the Covenant as was possible* All Chinese reque' ' s for treaty modification were ridiculed by the Japanese who also broke a ll promises made to China 292 and the League in matters concerning moderation of the Japanese approach toward China.

The Japanese attitude during League discussions of the Chinese complaints in late 1931 and early 1932, and its attack upon the Lytton

Report were f in a l in d ic a to r s o f the mediocre to low esteem o f member ship as perceived by the Japanese. Japanese delegates sought to deceive the League bodies at every opportunity during discussions and hoped to influence the Lytton Committee during its investigation. The approval of tho Lytton Report by the League brought on a verbal denun ciation of tho League as being, in essence, incompetent in judging the political situation in the Gar East,

b, Germany

The German view of the Treaty of Versailles as a dictated peace end the desire to negate the affects of, and ultimately destroy that Treaty provided the foundation for the Geman views of the value of membership in the League,

Gustav Etresemann, the German Foreign Minister, provided much of the stimulus leading to eventual Gorman membership in the League,

His b elief that more could be accomplished in the League toward a relaxation of tha restrictions imposed upon Germany under provisions of the Treaty of Versailles through membership rather than as an ex ternal observer overcame much of the opposition to the League by many

Germans, particularly the leading military figures of post-war Germany.

Stresemann's belief that membership also possibly could lead to ultimate collapse of the Treaty of Versailles did much to counter 293

the bitterness of many Germans toward the League, Stresemann pro

mised that German membership would lu ll France and Great Britain into

a false sense of security during which Germany could utilize membership as a device from destroying the Treaty of Versailles,

Stresemann became the opportunist prior to official entry o f Germany a s a Member o f th e League. The Treaty o f Locarno was con

sidered the instrument that could pave the way for an early and un contested entry Into the League for Germany, Stresemann felt that the Treaty of Locarno also would placate the French who were quite concerned with their security along virtually all of the western border of Germany. The eventual gain in security for France through the Treaty of Locarno hopefully also would have an effect upon

England, thereby providing a line of departure for Germany in its task of favorably modifying the Treaty of Versailles.

Stresemann was aware of a ll secret treaties entered into by

Germany under which th e m anufacture o f armaments and tr a in in g o f

German military forces were accomplished. In spite of this knowledge, he did nothing to help curtail the practice and even used Germany’s

League membership to warn French leaders against pursuing the matter, implying in his conversations that German membership in the

League could be involved if the French continued to challenge Germany' b international and domestic political policies.

Departure of Stresemann, in 1929, signalled the end of a period of German political outlook that could be considered revisionist but not to the point of being radical, Other European Powers were not 2 014

entirely pleased with Germany13 political behavior but they did not

despair. Tho depression gripping the world forced acceptance of much

that previously was not considered normal. League Members, however, were not prepared for the views of Hitler who gave notice to the

League that he was a maximalietic opportunist who valued League mem b ersh ip a t an a b so lu te minimum and planned to r e in s t a te Germany to a position equal in status to that previously held prior to the First

World War, whether within or outside the League structure. Hitler accurately interpreted the German discontent with the League and the r e s u lt in g low valu e th e Germans placed upon League membership and d ecid ed to lea d Germany to an independent course o u tsid e th e League, which ho actually did in late 1933,

c , A ustria

The Austriana faced reality and accepted their new position in world affairs as tho result of the war* They were rather indiffer ent toward the League until economic assistance was received from several of the League Members in late 1922, The assistance infused a new attitude toward League membership, which, during the following decade, gradually was dissipated by Austrian awareness of the growing str en g th o f Germany,

The changing A ustrian outlook toward Germany and r e s p e c t fo r

League membership were controlled by Chancellor Dollfus until hie assassination in July, 1934. This important event in Austrian his tory was followed by a growing strength among the Austrian Hazis who regarded League membership with the same low esteem as did H itler, d, I t a ly

Italy's attitude toward the League is the most outstanding

example of a feeling of nearly complete contempt for the League* It

is more glaring than that of Hitler because it was of a much longer duration, both in total time and duration of membership* Italy

had failed to gain the territory promised it by the Secret Treaty of

London and, though Wilson was out of the picture, leaders in London and Paris were doing nothing to compensate Italy for the broken prom

ises, Both the Italian leadership and the nation in general felt

frustrated and vented their fury upon the League.

Mussolini dared the League to act against Italy In the Corfu

incident and maintained this approach throughout tho period of Italian membership in the League, In fact, his disgust with the League be came so great that he openly challenged the League, both during the

Corfu deliberations and the early period of the Italian venture into

Ethiopia, to take any action, no matter how miner, that would be detrimental to Italy, He repeatedly threatened to leave the League and the final act of withdrawal can be construed as having come much later than should have been expected*

e , Hungary

Hungary’s in itia l attitude toward the League was quite similar to that of Italy and Germany, It hoped to revise the Treaty of frianon, the equivalent of the Treaty of Versailles in the case of

Germany and hoped to reg a in land l o s t and pop ulations freed of

Hungarian rule. 296

The Hungarian attitude was changed to a certain extent, in

1924, when s e v e r a l o f th e League Members provided f in a n c ia l a s s is ta n c e to Hungary in duplication of the 1922 assistance to Austria.

Hungary’s perception of the value of membership became some what identical to that of Italy during the ensuing decade and a half,

It allied itself closely with Italy and duplicated Italy's vote in nearly every League function calling for a vote.

The notice of withdrawal by Hungary in 1939 contained regrets that the action had to be taken* Previous actions, in and outside the League, when analyzed in conjunction with the political motiva tions for Hungary's withdrawal, signify that Hungary was less than sincere in its regrets and membership in the League had not been valued as highly as Hungary suggested in its notice of withdrawal*

f , The L atin Group

Brazil had been one of the more active members in the League and had enjoyed an excellent relationship with the League, It valued its membership until Germany received preferential treatment over

Brazil in the award of a permanent seat on the Council. This was a cruel blow to Brazil, and the Western Hemisphere, and Brazil then decided that membership was of questionable value. It did not, how ever, bear malice against the League and the Covenant, but did feel th a t th e le a d in g European Members in th e Laaguo had been too p a r t ia l toward Germany and had failed to follow a course that would have pro vided more hemispheric balance in the Council if Brazil rather than 297

Germany had received the permanent seat in the Council* These cir cumstances effectively neutralized Brazil’s high regard of its membership in the League, without affecting its high esteem for the

League and the Covenant.

Paraguay apparently did not place a high premium on member ship. This became especially apparent during League deliberations in the 1928-35 Bolivia-Paraguay dispute which led to the withdrawal of

Paraguay* Paraguayan delegates repeatedly acted contemptuously in the Assembly and Council of the League* Attempts by League Members to conduct productive hearings were countered by evasive and deceitful maneuvers by Paraguayan delegates throughout League attempts to find a solution to the Chaco fcTar between Bolivia and Paraguay.

Guatemala, £1 Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua were as faith fu l to th e League a s cou ld be exp ected o f such sm all Members, Though

Honduras had ch a llen g ed th e in c lu sio n o f th e Monroe D octrine a s an article in the Covenant, during discussions and drafting of that document, it (Honduras) and the other three here being considered did virtually nothing to inhibit League progress except resign their memberships which actually were too great a luxury for a ll four.

Costa Rica can be classified in the same general category as the four just previously mentioned. In spite of the fact that it challenged Article 21 (Honroo Doctrine) of the Covenant, this action appeared to ba a facade for the real reason for Costa Rica’s with drawal, which was of a monetary nature quite identical to that of

Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Honduras, 29a

The case involving Chile is of quite a different nature from that of the majority of the Latin American countries that withdrew from the League. Whereas other Latin American countries supported the League during its early years, Chile challenged the League's legality in acting on a treaty signed by Chile and Peru, in 1092, in volving territory at their common border, Chile considered the League unqualified to act in a matter exclusively Western hemispheric in content, It expressed its interpretation of value of membership by threatening to withdraw if the League ruled on the treaty involved in the dispute with Peru*

Chile contributed time and effort to the League and continued its financial support of the League during the decade following the

League's 1922 decision not to rule on the Chile-Peru dispute, The relationship gradually became strained at the turn of the decade,

Chile did not impose the sanctions against Bolivia and Paraguay to th e e x te n t o f o th e r League Members d u rin g th e Chaco War between those two countries. In fact, Chile allowed some of its male popu lation to fight on the side of Bolivia and also allowed transport

□f war material through its country for use in that war at a time when the League was trying quite desperately to bring about a solu tion to the dispute and at a time when virtually every other Member of the League had applied the sanctions. The relationship also be came more d ifficu lt later on, during the middle 1930s when the League failed to act on suggestions presented by Chile which recommended change in the League, Universality of representation in the League, 299 to inclu de non-Member S t a t e s , was su g g ested by C h ile on s e v e r a l o cca sio n s from 1935 until Hay, 1938 when suspicion that the League was not paying

Chile the courtesy of giving full consideration to its suggestion for more universal representation in the League led to a renunciation of the League by Chile as too ineffective and not worthy of continued support from Chile.

g, The Soviet Union

The Soviet attitude toward membership prior to its actual ac ceptance of membership outwardly presented a picture of complate con tempt for the League and a ll its functional It professed no desire for membership and criticized the League at every opportunity, con stantly comparing it with an association encouraging imperialism and protecting the members considered by Soviets as im perialistic and seeking to destroy the Soviet Union, Poland and Prance being the chief targetsi The Soviet derogatory pronouncements may have been a facade, however, a facade concealing a true desire of the Soviet Union of being accepted in the international political community, through league membership, especially during the late 1920s and early 1930s, It is highly probable that it actually hoped that the League rather than the Soviet Union would initiate formal proceedings leading to Soviet membership) The eventual rapidity with which the Soviets accepted the in v it a t io n s o f s e v e r a l League Members le n d s much credence to the belief that the Soviets were playing a waiting game in hopes that the

League would take the initiative in inviting the Soviet entry. History 300 has proven that the Soviets have become masters in the gam of allow ing the other party in a dispute or conference the opportunity of making the fir st commitment.

The Soviets valued membership in the League even though they had selfish motives in mind. They constantly sought a reduction in armaments and fought for equality In armaments when a reduction was out of the question. Participation in League functions was contin uous and suggestions by the Soviet delegates could be expected. It was regrettable for the League, however, that suspicion was a con stant element in all of the Soviet dealings with the League throughout the relationship, which also was suffused with the radical ideology of

Marxism, League membership was viewed as a transmission belt, when ever possible, for dissemination of Soviet political beliefs to any recipient willing to accept the Soviet teaching,

The Soviets began to lose interest in the League at the time of the German action in formally rearming the Rhineland in 1936, It suddenly dawned on them that Germany could become a menace to the

Soviet Union as well as to all of Europe, The Soviets viewed the

League's inability to take action against Germany in the Rhineland as a signal that the League could not provide the security desired of the League by the Soviet leaders* This reasoning actually had been instituted by the Soviets in 1935 when the League failed to provide security to Ethiopia against attack by Italy, It now, in

1936, was much closer to home and the leaders in Moscow were much more concerned. 301

The ultimate teat of the Soviet perception of the value of membership came with the attack upon Finland and the subsequent refusal of the Soviets to send delegates to Geneva during League discussion of the dispute between the Soviet Union and Finland, The Soviet actions indicated that they regarded the League as politically bankrupt and not worthy of the time and effort required in defense of the Soviet

Union's course of action just completed. The Soviets undoubtedly in terpreted the European political situation and felt that the League was on the verge of collapse and membership no longer was of any value whereas unilateral defensive action was warranted and justified*

h. Indonesia

The case involving Indonesia is unique, chiefly because it involved so many dichotomies and vacillations by the leader of that country* It is extremely difficult to make a concise statement con cerning the Indonesian approach to membership in the United Nations,

The course of action followed by Sukarno appeared to be that of a

Member seeking to aid the United Nations and yet there Is evidence of malcontent with the United Nations leading ultimately to the Ban dung Conference of 1355, during which Sukarno sought to create a politically strong Afro-Asian bloc, with a political headquarters in

Djakarta, which would make the Afro-Asian bloc of uncommitted and developing countries a third force sufficiently strong to force con cession by one or both superpowers.

The Afro-Asian grouping showed signs of a shift in omphasis in 195B when African members began to stress African nationalism rather 302

than Afro-Asian solidarity. Further cleavages were noted at Belgrade,

Yugoslavia, in 1961, when the uncommitted showed signs of two groups,

one taking a so-called hard line toward the superpowers while the

other, in a majority, stressed moderation*

Sukarno, in the minority group, then began to show an ever in

creasing tendency toward increased friendship with the leaders of

the People's Republic of China, while gradually drifting away from

the United Nations* Sukarno now pictured the world split into two

main forces, one composed of the old established forces and the

other embracing the new emerging forces, He had hopes that the new

forces would force a reorganization of the United Nations and perhaps

neutralize the power wielded by the old established forces, although

he hesitated in publicizing his interpretation of which countries

actually composed each of the two forces*

Sukarno decided that the time had come, in January, 19B5, for

a showdown w ith in the U nited N ations* The r e s u lt in g f a ilu r e o f th a t

organization to take action on his recommendations apparently con

vinced him that membership no longer was worth the effort and that a replica of the United Nations, located in Djakarta, eventually would

force the United Nations to reorganize in accordance with Sukarno1s

dream of an idpal universal international organization, i It became apparent after the downfall of Sukarno that the Indo

nesians in general did not share in his viows concerning Indonesian membership in the United Nations, and especially those entertained

by Sukarno during the decade prior to the Indonesian withdrawal* 303

Failure of the League

There were a s iz a b le number o f reasons why th e League fa ile d as an international organization. The discussion of these reasons w ill follow a general pattern of considering the most important initially and progressing to the least important of the group.

The first and most important reason for failure of the League was its inability to retain its membership. The large number of Mem bers withdrawing, based on the total membership, was too severe a loss for an effective continuity of the League as a universal inter national organization.

A second reason involves the retention of qualitative member sh ip , The League had l o s t too great a number o f the most pow erful

Members, Members th at i t needed badly fo r c o n tin u ity o f e f f e c t iv e op eration, The loss of Japan, Germany, Italy, Brazil and the Soviet

Union, each of which were of prestigious status, severely crippled the

League. This was compounded by the loss of others on a slightly lower level, such as Austria, Hungary and Paraguay, which, when combined, also constituted an excessively great loss*

The third reason, lack of universality, is closely associated with the second reason just presented. The presence of the United

States, recognized as the one power that could have provided unchal lenged normative guidance and stability for the League, unfortunately had been denied to the League, due chiefly to the shortsightedness o f sev e r a l pow erful members o f the U nited S ta te s S en a te, members who cherished defeat of a President over long-range International peace 304

and security. Compounding this gap was the absence of many other

countries which remained colonies throughout the inter-war period.

These colonies were inhibited from joining the League, thereby making

the League fairly exclusive in membership.

The fourth of the reasons involves political motivations and the value of membership as perceived by the withdrawing Members, Neither

Chile, in 1922, nor Italy, in 1923, relished membership to such an ex tent that compromise would have been the course of action to be fol lowed. The same may be said of Japan, throughout its membership, and

Germany after the departure of Stresemann and gradual rise of H itlera

The Soviet Union also proved that it lost much interest in the League after Italy attacked Ethiopia and Germany rearmed the Rhineland, Each of the withdrawing Members just mentioned viewed membership worthy but only if benefits outweighed by a great margin surrender of goals desired by the withdrawing Members, In some of the cases the ratio would have had to be almost completely one-sided in favor of the withdrawing Member, This occurred at various times in the ca30 of Chile, or constantly in the case of Italy, Japan and the Soviet Union, The more balanced ratio of benefit to bo received vis-a-vis compromise, a necessary element in all international affairs, was not always an integral part of the relationship between these Members and the

League,

Fifthly, resort to warfare to resolve international disputes still was an accepted procedure. Institutionalized pacific settle ment, an innovation introduced with formation of the League, did not 305

work as had been hoped, International law and morality, which suppos edly were to be imbued with higher normative standards through the

Covenant and by actions of the membership, individually and collec tively, received successive setbacks and withdrawals resulted, The resort to war supposedly was a part of history when the League was formed but Japan, Paraguay, Italy and the Soviet Union proved that this was not so and the League suffered the consequences of their acts.

Next, the League could not have a uniform and satisfactory application of sanctions against Members violating the Covenant, nor did It have the force required to enforce the sanction which meant that each sanction, or threat of a sanction, resulted in a withdrawal.

In the case of Japan, the League did not take any action beyond verbal suggestions and publication of the Lytton Report which was detrimental to Japan, but only if public opinion became aroused against Japan, which occurred but only to a lim ited extent. Japan repeatedly had violated Chinese sovereignty but the League selected a course of action noted for its leniency,

The League took action in the Chaco War between Paraguay and

Bolivia, but only after a long period of pondering and hopeful anti cipation that the dispute would be settled by the two disputants,

When sanction was applied it was applied in equal measure against the original violator (Paraguay) and the Member attacked (Bolivia).

The end result was a withdrawal after sanctions against Bolivia had been lifted, 306

The League, in 1935, selected the application of sanctions against Italy after it attacked Ethiopia but the sanctions did not

include an embargo against shipments of o il, the most critical Item required by Italy* The League then expelled the Soviet Union when it attacked Finland in 1939*

Each of the four cases were violations of the Covenant, all of identical and equal nature and severity, but the League had no uniformity of application of sanction, this last being a definite requirement to insure a re-evaluation by the offending Member*

Seventh, there was an inadequacy of sanction, short of com plete expulsion and use of military force, by the League, which might have influenced retention of membership* One might take the case of

Italy as an example for discussion, No sanction had been applied ag ainst Italy in spite of its military action at Corfu* One can wonder, in retrospect, if perhaps the exclusion of the Government of Italy from further League functions, without exclusion of the Italian State, an action similar to that taken by the Organization of American States against the Government but not the State of Cuba, might not have pre vented the loss of respect for the League by Italy at a time when loss of membership had not been suffered and retention of qualitative mem bership still was enjoyed by the League* This same trend of thought may be applied in the case of Japan during its many years of interven tion and military action in China* The actual use of sanction against

Italy already was discussed and need not be continued in this seventh rea so n . 307

An eighth reason can be listed as a lack of collective secu rity, especially to smaller and weaker Members, Concentration of a tte n tio n i s being p la ced upon the sm a ller and weaker Members ra th er than any large and more powerful Members, such as the Soviet Union, mainly because the Soviet Union was more adamant and demanding than actually required, considering the fact that Hitler appeared to be the only leader sufficiently audacious to attack such a large country as the S o v iet Union, A la r g e hut weak Member, such a s China, and a sm aller but weak Member, such as E th io p ia are th e c h ie f c en te rs o f concentration for this portion of the discussion* Both had much to fear, the first from Japan and the second from Italy, but neither could rely on the League for remedy of the fear. The attacking party in each case decided to leave the League when, in the case of China, the findings against Japan contained no sanctions, indicating a position of weakness of the part of the League, and when the application of sanctions against Italy failed and indicated once again a position of weakness on the part of the League* Both had lo3t respect for the

League but the League, on the other hand, had encouraged this loss of respect through inability of the collective membership to take the necessary action to protect the Innocent victims of the aggression*

Number nine of the list may be described as a lack of organi zational consultationi Organizational consultation, one of the inno vations introduced into international affairs with the formation of the

League, proved to be much less successful than hoped for by Wilson in hie approach to the League. International actors, such as Japan, 308

Germany, I t a ly , B ra zil and the S o v ie t Union e it h e r were w illin g to

consult if beneficial results could be derived for themselves or

were resigned to taking the drastic step of discarding membership if

no immediate or long-range gain were apparent.

A second approach to this subject In th is, the ninth reason,

may be taken from the view that a ll of the powerful Members of the

League could not be assembled in any one session for consultation on

any one subject of major importance. The question of Japan's inter

vention was discussed in the League but the Soviet Union was not pres

ent a s a member. I t i s p o s s ib le th a t the S o v ie t rep resen ta tiv e might

have been able to assist in a retention of Japan as a Member, through

a suggestion by the Soviet Delegate, with some satisfaction to China.

The key word is "possible" In this previous sentence, The same can

be said of Italy's recourse to contempt for the League, leading ul

timately to its withdrawal. The presence of the United States and

the Soviet Union in 1923 may have been sufficient in prestigious con

tent to have had an effect upon Italy13 course of action at Corfu and

the resulting lose of respect by Italy for the League, The presence

of the United States and Germany (preferably under a leader other than

Hitler) in the League in 1935 might have had an effect upon Italy's choice of action and might have influenced Italy to retain member

ship in the League, There is a certain amount of speculation involved

in this line of reasoning which must not be overlooked.

The lack of equity of return might be listed as the tenth reason for failure of the League to retain its membership* This would 309

involve the poorer Members of the League, the several Latin American

Members that withdrew because of the financial burden imposed by the

assessments. If the League had had duplicates of the Economic and

Social Council and other specialized agencies, such as the World

Health Organization, it is possible that the five Latin American

Members withdrawing for financial reasons might have remained In the

League, Once again, as in the previous reason just mentioned, thera

i s a certain amount of speculation in this tenth reason.

The eleventh and final reason being offered, also speculative

to a great extent, can be listed as a lack of stigma associated with

withdrawal from the League. It must be admitted that there really is

no concrete proof in substantiation, but even so, one can sense that

there was a lack of stigma that might normally be associated with

withdrawal from an international organization, especially one of the

type being discussed which was established for such a noble purpose.

Withdrawal did not seem to carry with the act any undue hardhipa for the departing Members, Nona of the withdrawing Members apparently suffered any serious repercussions as a result of their withdrawal from th e League. While none o f the withdrawing Members seemed t o

suffer any ill effects, the same could not be said of the League,

Each withdrawal had an impact upon the League, Each successive with

drawal demonstrated to a ll that the League had far too many weak points and that survival was in doubt. Only a major reorganization or re placement of the League appeared to be the answer if an international organization of that type wore to continue as a formal element of

international affairs. 310

Success of the United Nations

There are several very Important reasons for the success en joyed by the United Nations, It must be stated, prior to the discus sion, that the belief underlying this section is that the United

Nations has enjoyed much more success than failure, both of which are considered abstracts incapable of being quantified, since success and failure are as great as each individual elects to accept in accord ance with his own beliefs and interpretations of events and conditions.

The i Irst reason for success of the United Nations has bean its ability to retain its membership. In its twenty-five year3 it has lost only one Member to date, and that Member has returned after the replacement of the leader who led the Member to the withdrawal.

The withdrawal actually amounted to loss of leas than one percent of the membership.

Second on the list, very closely allied to the previous reason, is the fact that the one Member lost to the United Nations for a little over a year was one not considered essential to the life of the United

Nations, Indonesia, as a Member of the United Nations, did not enjoy the prestige and prominence normally associated with either of the superpowers or oven any of those in the next most important bracket.

I t was not a q u a lita tiv e withdrawal*

Thirdly, there is a general unanimity in the belief in the requirement for sanity in world affairs, The dangers posed by the technological advance of exotic weapons, including nuclear weapons and a global delivery capability for those weapons, which makes organize- 311 I tional consultation at the conference table a required element of

international affairs, suggests a very sober and realistic approach

toward continued membership in the United Nations, This approach is

extremely important to the most powerful Members who posse qb the

n u clea r c a p a b ilit y , but i t does not elim in ate th e weaker Members.

They collectively can wield sufficient influence to force upon the

strong Members their desires. This means that a ll Members have been

provided a reason for continued membership, thereby fostering success

for the United Nations in the retention of membership.

Security against attack might be listed as reason number four.

Even the very smallest and weakest Members of the United Nations gen

erally have greater security against attack by a larger member of

the United Nations, An admission must be made that there have been exceptions during the twenty-five years of existence enjoyed by the

United Nations. The exceptions, however, could have been greater

in number and danger and one must g iv e the U nited N ations same c r e d it

in encouraging rationality in each exception to this reason number

fo u r .

The United Nations enjoys a more truly universal status than

the League of Nations, reason number five in the list. In spite of

the fact that the People’s Republic of China and the two Germanies

are not members of the United Nations, one certainly must be enthused

by the fact that membership includes virtually every country in the

world, thereby enhancing the prestige of membership* 312

Reason number six concerns the provision for normative guid

ance in the Charter and utility of this provision by Secretaries-General,

especially Dag Hammarskjold, the second of the three. The Secretary-

General is authorized under the Charter to take initiative action and

each of the three have exercized that responsibility in a ll matters

including retention of members.

Members of the United Nations enjoy much more equity of return,

the seventh reason undor discussion, than previously afforded by the

League of Nations. Each member in some way enjoys this equity. The

superpowers and the secondary group, members such as France and

Great D r ita ln , to name on ly two, en joy more p r e s tig e than d id th e

leading Members of the League, At the lower levels of membership,

involving the smallest and weakest Members of the United Nations,

Members can ex p ect r etu r n s through th e U nited N ation s Economic and

Social Council, World Health Organization and several other specialized agencies from which they can benefit through the many functions in volving economic and social activities and projects*

Flexibility can be listed as next on the list, The flexibility contained in the Charter allows interpretations for various occasions and circumstances. This flexibility has been utilized in the past when loading Members have demonstrated a flexib ility in the interpretation of the so-called rules of the game as displayed during the discussions on United Nations peacekeeping activities in the Congo, Discussions on this subject continued from 1960 to 1965 when the United States con ceded that the majority of the then 114 Members, In August, 1965, were 313

opposed to application of Article 19 pertaining to sanction (loss of vote in the General Assembly) for any Member in arrears in payment of financial contributions to the United Nations. This meant that the

Soviet Union and France could look forward to continued, unhindered participation, including active voting, in the United Nations General

Assembly,

Flexibility may be discussed very briefly from a second view point, There is no penalty for those members who elect to absent their delegates from the General Assembly or the Security Council, even while discussion is in progress, whether or not that discussion involves the Member temporarily withdrawing its delegates* The Member thereby is allowed to express its displeasure without resort to a formal and complete withdrawal.

The ninth and final reason can be described as a lack of en couragement toward withdrawal. Members of Committee 1/2, concerned with the subject of withdrawal from the United Nations, during the

San Francisco Conference on the drafting of the Charter of the United

Nations, experienced some difficulty in deciding whether any mention of withdrawal should be included in the Charter, Several Members sought an inclusion of at least a phrase signifying the right of

Members to withdraw. The majority won the decision not to include any mention of withdrawal in the Charter, The general feeling among the majority was that withdrawal wa3 a facility, or right, enjoyed by a ll Members of an international organization. This makes sense when viewed from the fact that membership in international organizations 314 generally Is of a voluntary nature and freedom of withdrawal must bo included. Returning to the San Francisco Conference, there was a prevalence of b elief among the many Members of the Committee that Members should be aware of their right to withdraw under certain circumstances, chief of which were a pending collapse of the international organization and unusual circumstances making withdrawal a necessity. These rights, however, were to be made public to each Member at the time of entry of that Member into the United Nations, The feeling among the majority of that Committee was that inclusion of any mention of withdrawal in the Charter could serve as an enticement to exercise that faculty or right, while absence of any mention of that right would have the oppo s i t e e f f e c t . I t i s im p o ssib le to comment on th e e ffe c tiv e n e s s o f absence of any clause or article on withdrawal in the Charter, One can only speculate through conjecture, which is the main reason for listing this subject as least important on the list.

General Operative Rules

The previous discussions of the failure of the League and success of the United Nations in the retention of Membership quite obviously loads to a discussion of general operative rules that must be observed if an international organization, such as the United

Nations, of a permanent type, with a formal organizational structure, expects to remain operative.

Rule number one most certainly would come under the heading of retention of membership. The international organization must 315 enjoy the capability of retaining its membership. Loss of membership mu3t be prevented or curtailed at the very earliest opportunity. Any number of withdrawals, from one to a greater number, becomes a danger signal for the international organization, chiefly because onco the trend toward withdrawal begins the international organization grad ually experiences more difficulty in its retention requirement* The retention capability decreases with each successive withdrawal after the in itial withdrawal suffered by the organization*

The second rule involves the qualitative membership. The international organization may survive a certain number of withdrawals, but it cannot afford the loss of any of it3 qualitative membership.

Loss of any one or more of its qualitative Members, here construed as the larger, more powerful and more important of the total member ship, w ill Impose upon the organization a burden of such magnitude that recovery w ill be difficult and/or uncertain. Recovery almost certainly would not be complete, due chiefly to the fact that the loss has become a matter of record and the probability of further lo3H of

Important Members would e x i s t .

Third on the list offered is the requirement for provision of security for a ll Members, irrespective of status within the organi zation, The smaller, weaker and economically inadequate Members must be guaranteed a sufficient degree of protection which will insure thoir political existence in the international community. This protec tion must be secured from the organization of entirety, a group of

Members of the organization, or even one of the most powerful Members 316

holding the interest of the organization and individual Members in

high esteem. The third element of this last sentence is of major

importance in this rule number three.

There must be respect For international law and morality am

ong the timbers of the international organization* Organizational

consultation and peaceful settlement of disputes through bilateral

and multilateral coordination must be stimulated through the normative

guidance provided for in the constitutions of international organiza

tions, particularly those established on a permanent basis, with a

formal structure which includes a secretariat. This rule number four

will enhance retention of membership in the international organization

If the organization can foster respect for international law and morality among the membership.

One can lis t, as number five, the requirement for a balance between national Interests and the collective interests of the inter national organization. When taken collectively, the national inter ests of each Member become interest articulations within the inter national organization, These must be coordinated so that they will cohesively fit into the pattern of the aggregate interests of the international organization in such a manner as to contribute toward continuity in the operation and functioning of the organization. An important point to remember in this rule Is the fact that membership in the International organization normally is voluntary and the inter national organization has the task of respecting the national sover eignty of each Member to the maximum extent possible. The 317

Interpretation of national interests by the Member, or Members, however,

does n o t in clu d e a c t i v i t y d e tr im e n ta l to o th er Members or the organi

zation. This rule is of an extremely delicate nature because the

national interests of each individual Member w ill withstand only a

certain undefinable amount of external tampering from a universal

organization in which membership is voluntary rather than compulsory,

A sixth general rule would involve a bond of unity beyond that of having the name of the Member on the roster of membership. In its most extreme form wo note the bond of unity as a requirement imposed upon the membership of the United Nations from an external source,

The danger of annihilation from nuclear weapons, a technological advance associated with the activities of certain United Nations

Members, but outside the framework of the organization, has provided the United Nations with an element which encourages continued member ship, All [{embers can utilize daily contacts with those [{embers pos sessing the nuclear capability, contacts which hopefully w ill retard or preclude their use of the nuclear weapons. The case involving the People's Republic of China, and its expected global nuclear capability, is a peculiar case and contains too many Imponderables for any meaningful and relative discussion in this study,

A second hond is also very germane to this study, even though it may be of a much lesser Impact than the first just mentioned. It involves utility of the organization, in this case the United Nations, as a world forum for expression of Ideas, requests or complaints, and organized consideration and discussion of those remarks. This 318 outlet for expression and discussion must be available to the smallest and weakest Member as well as the most powerful in the organization if it is to be effective,

A third bond, of external origin, may bo one similar to that associated with the danger posed by the Cuban Government In its pro fessed goal of advancing subversive activity In Latin America. This has, to date, involved an international organization, but one of a regional nature rather than universal, which makes it ponderable and of limited use in this study, chiefly because the Organization of

American States took action to isolate the source (the Government of Cuba) and the success of this type of subversive activity in the

United Nations remains too highly speculative, Incidentally, this source Is generally conceded to be external by the Organization of

American States because, even though Cuba, both Government and State, was a Member of the Organization of American States, Marxism, the product being exported by the Government of Cuba, through subversion, was considered foreign and inim ical with democracy, the accepted basis for a ll Latin American Governments, except Cuba, and politics of those Governments.

There are two very important points to bear in mind in this sixth general rule, The importance of the bond in each case is the result of the evaluation by each Member of the danger, as perceived by the leader, or leaders facing that danger, which makes the bond of membership as great as the individual Member believes it to be in accordanca with his own evaluation of variables Involved in the 319 danger. Secondly, the danger may be fluid. It may gradually recede in intensity, as has been the case of nuclear weapons up to the current date. The diminished danger, caused by a rational approach by both superpowera, who realized the fu tility of employing their nuclear capability, when combined with the changed evaluation, by the non-Members of the so-called nuclear club, of the dangers involved, has caused the bond to recede in importance from a previously high level to one of much lesser importance, but not of such alow intensity as to allow complete disregard for, w illful forfeiture, or voluntary retraction of Membership in the United Nations.

A final rule, number seven, may be listed as the requirement for an equity of return for the coot of membership. Many of the smaller and weaker Members can retain membership in the United Nations and afford the financial obligation only because of the large amount of economic and social returns realized through membership, - Many of the projects conducted or supervised by the United Nations in the smaller and weaker Member countries certainly could not be initiated, performed and completed if it were not for the United Nations, which has the technological equipment and knowledge available to the United

Nations hut not possessed by those smaller and weaker Members, chiefly because of the prohibitive costs involved*

This completes the discussion of the operative rules that must be observed in the retention of membership in international organiza tion, The priority presented is not rigid. Circumstances could force a modification or different ordering of rules three through seven, 320

One or mors might even be rejected, with substitutions made, depending on one's opinion and evaluation of international organization and its success or failure. BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary

A llie s A u th o r itie s , Germany

Allied Control Authority for Germany, Tfrial of the Major War Criminals, Nuremberg: International Military Tribunal, 1947,

A u stra lia

Commonwealth of Australia, Parliament, House of Representatives, Agreement Concerning the Republic of Indonesia and the Kingdom pf the Netherlands' Concerning West Hew Guinea TWest Irian)Y 24th Pari,, 1st seas*, 1962,

Great Britain

Great Britain, Foreign Office, British and Foreign States Papers, London: H,M, Stationary Office, 1839, XXXII,

______. British Documents on the Origin of the War, 1B99“1914, London: H.M. Stationaiy Office, 1932,

, Collected Diplomatic Documents Relating to the Outbreak of the European War, London: H,M, Stationary O ffice, 1915^,

______, Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939, London: H.M. Stationary O ffic e , 1947-1960, 0 vols,

______, Documents on German Foreign Policy, 191B-1945, London: H,M, Stationary O ffice, 1959,” V, III,

______* Papers Respecting the Froposals for a Pact of Security Hade by the German Government on February 9, 193S. London: H,M, Stationary O ffice, 1925,

Indonesia

Indonesia. Decision on the Political Manifesto, Djakarta: Supreme Advisory Council, 1961,

321 322

______* Declaration of the Supreme Advisory Council on the Withdrawal from tho U.N, New York: Consulate General, Republic of Indonesia, 1965.

* "The Era o f C o n fro n ta tio n ,11 D eclaration Adopted by th e Second Conference of Non-Aligned Countries, Cairo, 5th to 10th October, 19G4, DjakartaV Department of Foreign Affairs. 1964, "

. Handbook on the Political Manifesto. Djakarta: Department of Information, 1961, ”

. Opening Speech by President Soekarno of Indonesia, to the full Conference. IB April, 1955, Djakarta; Ministry o f“Foreign Affaire, 1955,

______, Presidential Regulation 28/1960, Djakarta: Department of Information, I960.

. Statements by President Sukarno of the Repuhlio of Indonesia and Attorney Genoral' Robert F. Kennedy. Djakarta: Department of Foreign A ffairs, 1963*

______, Congress, House of Representatives. Government Statement on tho Implementation of Democracy with Leadership Within the Frame of Re- turning to the 1945 Constitution! Washington, D."C,i Embassy of Indo nesia, n.d,

______, Senate. Rules of Procedures of the Gotong^Rotong [Mutual assistance] Parliament, Djakarta: Department of Information, 1960,

, Supreme Advisory Council. Decision Respecting Specification of the Political Manifesto of the^Repubiic of Indonesia of the 17 B i of August, 1959^ Djakarta: Department of Information, 1950,

Subandrio, R. Formal Notification of Indonesia's Withdrawal from the U.H. Washington,lYc,Y Embassy Y>f Indonesia, 1965, _ —

. "Revolutionary Diplomacy," Indonesia on the March: A Collec- tlbn of Addresses by Dr. Subandrio^ Djakarta: Department of Foreign Affairs, 1963.

Sukarno, Ahmed, A Year of Living Dangerously, Djakarta: Department of Information, 1964,

______, Let us Establish the GANEFO. Djakarta: Department of Infor- mation, 1963,

, "The R ediscovery o f Our R ev o lu tio n ,11 Toward Freedom and th e Dignity of Han. Djakarta: Department of Foreign Affairs, 1961, 323

. Safeguarding the Republic of Indonesia. Djakarta: Depart ment of Information, 1964,

, Towards Friendship, Peace and Justice. Djakarta: Depart ment of Information, 1963,

League of Nations

League of Nations, Appeal by the Chinese Government. Geneva: League of Nations, 1932,

. Appeals of the Chinese Government. Geneva: League of Nations, 1933,

, Documents of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference, Geneva: League of Nations, Series IV, V,”Vl,

______* Greek Refugee Settlement. Geneva: League of Nations, 1926,

. The League of Nations from Year to Year, October 1, 1928- Septamber 30, 1930, Geneva: League of Nations, 1930,

. The League of Nations From Year to Year, 1931-1932, Geneva: League of Nations, 1932.

. The League of Nations From Year to Year. 1933, Geneva: League of Nations^ 1933, "

. League of Nations Political Activities. Geneva: League of Nations, 1923.

, The Monthly Summary of the League of Nations, Geneva: League of Nations, VII, 3* 4 (1926); XI, S, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12 (1931); XII, 1, 2 , 3, 5, 10 (1932); XIII, 3 (1933); XIV, 11 (1934); XV, 10, 11, 12 (1935); XVI, 5, 7 (1936); XVII, 0 (1937); XVIII, 3 (1930); XIX, 4, 12 (1939).

. Official Journal, Geneva: League of Nations, III (1922), I7T1923), V (1924), VI (1925), VII (1926), VIII (1927), IX (1934), XVI (1935), XVIII (1936), XVIII (1937), XIX (1938), XX (1939),

______, Official Journal, Geneva: League of Nations, Plenary Meetings! First Assembly (1920), Second Assembly (1922), Seventh Assembly, (1926), Ninth Assembly (1928), Nineteenth Assembly (1938)

______, Official Journal. Geneva: League of Nations, Resolutions and Recommendations Adapted by the Assembly, Special Supplement No. 123 (1934), 132 (1934), 133 (1935). 324

Official Journal, Geneva: League of Nations, Special Supple- aunt No7 16 (1324), 19 (1923), 23 (1924), 33 (1925), <+3 (1926), 130 (1934), 145 (1935), 146 (1935), 163 (1937), 169 (1937), 130 (1936).

t Protection of Linguistic, Racial or Religious Minorities by the League of Nations, Genevai League of Nations, 1929, 1931,

. Records of the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of1 Armaments, 1932-34, Geneva: League of N at ions, 19357

. Records of the First Assembly. Geneva; League of Nations, 1920, Plenary.

. The Saar Plebiscite. Geneva: League of Nations, 1935.

. Treaty Servies, Geneva: League of Nations, VI (1922), VII (19227,' IX ViOT)', XII (1922), XVIII (1922), XIX (1923), XXV (1924), XXVIII (1924), XCIV (1929).

. Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments* Conference Documents. Geneva: League of Nations, Series Z. I; V, I I ; C, I I .

Council. Minutes of the Council. Geneva: League of Nations, 1920.

. FrocaB-Verbal of the Third Session (1920), Froces-Verbal of the Fourth Session (1920), Froces-Verbal of the Fifth Session (1920), Froces-Verbal of the Sixth Session (1920), Procea-Verbal of the Tenth Session (1920), Proces-Verbal of the Eleventh Session (1920).

United Nations

United Nations. Documents of the United Nations Conference on Interna tional Organisation, San Francisco,"1945. Hew York: United Nations, 1945.

Yearbook of the United Nations. New York; United Nations, 1963 (1965), 1964 (1966), _1965" (1967), 1956 (1966).

______, Security Council. O fficial Reports. New York: United Nations, 1954.

United States

U.S., Congress, Congressional Record, 33d Cong., 2d sees., 1907. 325

______* Congressional Recordt 65th Cong., 2d aess., LIV, part 2, 1917.

______, House. Attltudo of the United States Toward Austria, 78th Congi, 2d seas., 1938,

, Senate. Japanese In the City of San Francisco, 5 9th Cong., 2d sess,, 1938.

______. Treaties, Conventions, International Acts, Protocols, and Agreements Between the United Stated of America and Other Powers, 1923-1937, 75th Cong,, 3d S a s s ., 1930, IV.

U.S., Department of State. Department of State Bulletin. Washington, D.C.i United States Government Printing O ffice, XXXIV, 862 (January 16, 1956)j IV, 103 (June 14, 1941); V, 112 (August 16, 1941); L, 1236 (February 17, 1964).

. Documents on German Foreign Policy. Washington, D.C,: United States Gove rh trient- Fr intihg Off ice, 1959, Series C, II.

. Foreign Relations of the United States. Washington, D.C.i Government Printing Office, 1895, 1; 1906, 1; 1913, 1919, Paris Peace Conference, I, II, III, V, VI, VII, IX, XI, XIII; 1920, I, II; 1921, II; 1925, I; 1927, IIj 1928, I, II; 1929, II, III; 1931, 1, III; 1932, I, II; 1933, I; 1934, II, V; 1935, I, IV; 1936, Vj 1937, V; 1938, II, Vj 1939, II.

■ Tho International Conference of American States on Conciliation and Arbitration! Washington, D.C.i United States Government Print ing Office, 1932.

. Manchuria, Report of the Commission of Enquiry Appointed by the League of Wations. Washington, D.cTi United States Government Printing Office^ 1932

. Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941. Wash "ington, D.C.j United States Government Printing O ffice, 1942.

. Report of the Delegation of the United States of America to the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace. Washington, D.C.i United States Government Printing O ffice, 1937,

. Report to the President on the Results of the Sati Francisco Conference, Washington, D.C.i United States Government Printing Office, 1945.

______. Statutes at Large of the United States. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing O ffice, 1925,” XLIII, part 2. 326

. The Treaty of Versailles and After. Washington, D.C.i United States Government Printing Office, 1947,

■ Treaty Series, Washington, D.C*; Government Printing Office, 1928,

—______, Trial of War Criminals, Washington, D.C,? United States Government Printing O ffice, "1945,

. The United Nations Conference on International Organisa- tion* Washington, D.C .t United States Government Printing-Office, 1946,

U.S., Immigration Commission, Annual Report of the United States Com mission of Immigration, 193sT Washington, D«C, t United States Government Printing O ffice, 1939,

U.S., National Archives* Federal Register, Washington, D.C.i The National Archives, 1940, V, 93,

, Records of the Department of State Relating to Political Relations lietween Greece and Other States, 1910-29* Washington, D.C, t The National Archives, 1963,

. Records of the Department of State Relating to Political Relations Between Italy and Other- States,- 1910-29. Washington, D.C.: The National Archives, 1963,

______, Records of tho Department of State Relating to World War I and Its Termination* Washington, D.C*; The National Archives, 1962,

U.S., Office of the United States Chief Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality, Nasi Conspiracy and Aggression, Washington, D,C.t United States~ Government "frinting Of fic e ,

World Health Organization

World Health Organization, Basic Documents, 17th ed.| Geneva j World Health Organization, 1966,

* O fficial Records of the World Health Organisation, Genevai World Health Organization, 1966*

_ , O fficial Records of the World Health Organization* Geneva: World Health- Organisation, 1966, P art'll, 327

Secondary

Encyclopedia

H utch ins, Robert Maynard, ed , Great Books o f th e Western World, P la to Chicagoi Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc,, 1952.

Langer, William L, ed, An Encyclopedia of World History* Boston) Houghton M ifflin, 1953.

Essay

Fuller, C. Dale, "Lenin's Attitude Toward an International Organization for the Maintenance of Peace, 1914-1919," Essay, Columbia Univer sity, 1948,

Research Institute

Royal Institute of International Affairs, Documents on International Affairs, 1954, 195B, London) Oxford University Press, 1957, 1962,

* Survey of International Affairs, 1955-195G, London) Oxford Un ivers ity Press, 19 BO,

Books

Albertini, Luigi, The Origins of the War of 1914, London) Oxford University Press, 1952.

Aron, Raymond, Peace and War, Hew York) Doubleday & Company, Inc,, 1960,

Baker, R* S, Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement, New York: Double- day, Page and Company, 1922,

Barker, A, J, The Civilizing Mission, New York: The Dial Press, 1968,

Barros, James. The Corfu Incident of 1923, Princeton) Princeton University Press, 1965.

Beloff, Hax. The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia, 1929-1941, Hew York) Oxford University Press, 1947-1349, 2 vols,

Berkeley, George F* The Campaign of Adowa and the Rise of Menelik, London: Constable £ Co, Ltd,, 1902, 320

Borgcso, G* A, Goliath: the Hatch of Fascism, Hew York: The Viking Press, 1937,

Buehring, Edward H, Wilgonts Foreign Policy In Perspective. Blooming ton) Indiana University Press, 1957,

Carr, E* H, The Bolshevik Revolution. Baltimorei Macmillan £ Co., 1953; Penguin Books, 3 vols,

C arnegie Endowment fo r In te r n a tio n a l P eace, The Proceedings of th e Hague Peace Conferences. Hew Yorks Oxford University Press, 1920, The Conference of 1B99; The Conference of 1907*

Cecil, Lord Robert* A Great Experiment, Hew Yorki Oxford University Press, 1941*

Claude, Inis L*, Jr, Power and International Relations. Hew York) Random House, 1962.

Craig, Gordon A. and Felix Gilbert, eds. The Diplomats; 1919-1939. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953*

Gumming, C. K* and H alter P e t i t , eds# R ussian-A m erican R e la tio n s , 1917- 1920. Hew York: Harcourt, Brace and Howe, 1920*

Darby, William E. International Arbitration, International Tribunals* London; J, M* Dent £ Co*, 1904,

Davis, K* The Soviets at Geneva. Geneva; Libririe Kundig, 1934,

Degras, Jane, ed* Thu Communist International, 1919-1943; Documents. Hew York; Oxford University Press, 1956-60, 3 vols^,

* Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, New York; Oxford University Press, 1951, 3 vols,

Eden, Anthony, The Edsn Memoirs; Facing the Dictators, London; Cassell 6 Co., 1962,

Eudin, Zenia and H, Fisher, Soviet Russia and the West, 1920-1927, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957, -

Fay, Sidney Bradshaw, The Origins of the World War, Hew York; The Macmillan Company, 1929, 2 vols,

Fischer, Louis, The Soviets in World Affairs, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951, 2 v o ls , 329

Gat home-Hardy, G. II, A Short History of International Affairs, 1920- 1939* New York) Oxford University Press, 1964.

Glaskow, George, The Janina Murders and the Occupation of Corfu, London: The Anglo-Hellenic League, 1923,

Grotius, Hugo, Commentary of the Law of Prize and Booty, Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1950^

Hertslet, Edward, The Hap of Europe by Treaty, London: Butterworths, 1075-1891, 4 vols,

Jack, Homer A, Bandung; Toward Freedom. Chicago: Cooperative Pub lishing Association, 1955.

Kimmich, Christoph M* The Free City. Hew Haven and Yale: Yale U n iv e r sity P res3 , 19GB,

Knight-Pat ter son, Vf * M, Germany From Defeat to Conquest. London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd,, 1945,

Kochan, Lionel, Russia and the Ueimar Republic, Cambridge: Bowes and Bowes, 1954,

Lenin, V* I, Imperialism* The Highest Stage of Capitalism. Hew York: International Publishers, 19347

. Left-Ming Communism, An Infantile Disorder, Hew York: International Publishers, 1934.

______. Selected Vorka. Haw York: International Publishers, 1935-3B, 12 v o ls .

______, at al, The Soviet Union and Peace, London; Lawrence £ Mishart, 1930*

Lovarmare, Charles H. Second Yearbook of the League of Nations. Hew York: Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 1922,

Lippmann, Valter. United States Foreign Policy, Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1943,

Mantoux, Etienne, The Carthaginian Peace, Haw York: Charles Scrib ner's Sons, 1952.

M iller, David. My Diary at the Parle Peace Conference, New York: privately published, 1924, 21 vols* 330

M iller, David Hunter, The Drafting of the Covenant. Hew York; □ , P, Putnam's Sons, 1928, II,

Mitrany, David, A Working Peace System, London: National Peace Council, 1946,

Nansen, Fridjof, Russia and Peace. Now York: Macmillan Company, 1924,

Nussbaum, Arthur, A Concise History of tho Law of Nations. Now York; The M acmillan Company, 1958.

Osgood, Robert E, Alliances and American Foreign Policy, Baltimorej Johns Hopkins Press, 1969,

Phillipson, Coleman, International Law and Custom of Ancient Greece and Rome, Londons The Macmillan Company, L td ,, 1911, 2 v o ls .

P in k , Ge^Jhard F* The Conferencp o f Ambassadors, Geneva: Geneva Research Centre, 1942,

P lu c k n e tt, Theodore F, T, A Concise H istory o f the Common Law. Boston: L i t t l e , Brown and Company, 1956,

Potter, Pitman B, Hal Hal Arbitration. Washington, D,C. i The Carnegie Endowment for I it terna t Iona 1 Peace7 1938,

Scott, James Brown, Classics of International Law. Washington, D,C, i Carnegie Institute of“Hashington, 1911, Exposition of Fecial Law and Procedure, or of Law Between Nations, and Questions Concerning th e Same,

. Classics of International Law. Oxford: At.the Clarendon Press, 1944, Law, Selections” from the Three Works of Francisco Suarez, II.

______* Classics of International Law. New York: Oceana Publishers, I n c ,, 1954. Suarez. S e le c tio n s from Three Works, I I ,

Sforza, Count Carlo, Contemporary Italy, New York: E, P, Dutton and C o ., 1 9 4 4 , tr a n s , Drake and D enise de Kay,

Shapiro, L, Soviet Treaty Series. Washington, D.C,: Goergetawn University Press, 1950,

Shot w ell, J, T, War as an Instrument of National Policy. New York: H arcou rt, Brace and Company, 1929, 331

Stalin, J, V. Works, [toscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1952-55, 13 vols.

Taracouzlo, T, A. The Soviet Union and International Law. Now York: The M acm illan Company, 1935,

Temper ley, H, W. V. A History of the Peace Conference of Paris. London: Henry Frowde and Hodder and Stoughton, 1920-1924, 6 vols,

Thayer, John A. Italy and the Great War: Politics and Culture. 1870- 1915, Madisoni University of Wisconsin Press, 1954,

Thompson, Geoffrey. Front-Line Diplomat. London: Hutchinson Publish ing Group, Ltd,, 1959*

Walsh, Edward A, The History and Nature of International Relatione. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1962.

Walters, F* P. A History of the League of Nations* London; Oxford University Press, 1960.

Wehberg, Hans* The Outlawry of War* Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment fo r I n te r n a tio n a l P eace, 1931,

Wolfers, Arnold* Britain and France Between Two Wars. Hew York: W* W, Horton £ Company, In c., 1966,

ZiL tern, Alfred, The League of Nations and the Rule of Law, 191G-1935. London: Macmillan and Company, Ltd*, 1945*

Periodicals

Boak, A* E, R* "Greek Interstate Associations and the League of Nations/' The American Journal of International Law, XV (1921), pp. 375-03,

Derkach, Nadia* "The Soviet Policy Towards Indonesia in the West Irian and the Malaysian Disputes," Asian Survey, V, 11 (November 1965), pp* 5 5 6 -7 1 ,

"Final Protocol of the Locarno Conference, 1925,and Treaties Between France and Poland and France and Czechoslovakia," International Conciliation, CCXVI (1925), pp. 4-93,*

Ginsburgs, George, "A Case Study in the Soviet Use of International Law: East Poland in 1939," The American Journal of International Law, L II, 1 (January 1 9 5 8 ), 69-84. 332

Graham, M, W* J r . "The S o v ie t S e c u r ity System ," In te r n a tio n a l C o n cil iation, CCLII (September 1929), pp. 345-76*

Hudson, Hanley 0, "How the League of Hations Met the Corfu Crisis," World Peace Foundation Pamphlets, VI, 3 (1923), pp. 169-210*

Horgenthau, Hans J, "The Mainsprings of American Foreign Policy," American Political Science Review, 44 (December 1950), pp. 833-54,

Lev, Daniel S, "Indonesia 1965: The Year of tho Coup,” Aslan Survey, VI, 2 (February 1966), pp. 103-10,

"Pan-African Affair," Africa Digest, XIII, 1 (August 1965), p. 20.

Pauker, Ewa T* "GANEFO I: Sports and P olitics in Djakarta," Asian Survey, V, 4 (April 1965), pp. 171-05.

Pauker, Guy J, "General Hasution's Mission to Moscow," Asian Survey. I, 1 (March 1961), ppa 13-22*

______* "The Rise and Fall of Afro-Asian Solidarity," Asian Survey, V, 9 (September 1965), pp. 425-32.

"People's Conference Plans Permanent Dody," Africa Report, IV, 2 (February 1959), pp, 3-7*

Prince, Charles* "The U.S.S.R, and International Organisations," The American Journal of International Law, XXXVI, 3 (July 1942), pp* 425-

Radek, Karl. "The Bases of Soviet Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs, XII, 2 (January 1934), 193-206*

Spence, J* E. "Recent Trends in South Africa," African Affairs, LIX, 235 (1960), pp. 136-43.

Sutter, John 0. "Two Faces of Konfrontasit 'Crush Malaysia and Gestapu1 Asian Survey, VI, 10 (October 1966), pp. 523-46.

Weinstein, Franklin B, "The Second Asian-African Conference: Prelimin ary Bouts," Asian Survey. V, 7 (August 1965), pp. 359-73,

Newspapers

Eelair, Felix Jr. "Aid to Indonesia and U.A.R, Curbed," Tho hew York Times, November B, 1963, 1:1 333

Handler| M, S, "Nehru Says Soviet Tests Increase Danger of Warj Asks U*S,-Russian Parley/' The New York Times, September 3, 1961, 1 :6.

"Indonesia's Sukarno Agrees to Life R ule/1 The New York Times, May 31, 1963, 13:4.

"Olympic Committee Drafts Charter That Would Bar Any Nation Showing B ias,11 The Hew York Times, February 9* 19G3, 14:1*

"Sukarno Blames Foes for Anti-Chinese Rioting," The New York Times, Hay 20, 1963, 3:4

"Transcript of the President's News Conference on Foreign and Domestic Matters," The New York Times, November 15, 1963, 18 tl*

Trumbull, Robert* "Sukarno is Firm on Borneo Issue," The New York Times, May 21, 1953, 13:4,