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Wesley Clark's EN. Wesley K. Clark, United Clark’s candid memoir gives a States Army, led NATO’s view of Allied Force very different G military forces to success in from all others to date. The narrative 1999 in Operation Allied Force. And is dominated not by details of air Gas recently as February, the former combat operations, as one might ex- US Army photo by Spc. Christina Ann Horne Supreme Allied Commander Europe pect, but rather by recapitulations of told a large USAF–sponsored con- lost political battles and fervent plan- ference, “The US Air Force saved ning for a ground operation that never me, and it saved NATO.” Clark, how- took place and was never really in ever, delivered these remarks before the cards. His tale provides a dis- the appearance of his book, Waging turbing inside look at a Supreme Modern War, in May. Allied Commander who was distrust- Since publication, he has been ful of airpower and out of step with singing a different tune. Clark has military colleagues and political su- been unwilling to describe Allied periors in Washington. Force as an airpower success. The now-retired SACEUR, appearing in Going to War May at National Defense University Waging Modern War takes note of in Washington, D.C., declared to all the fact that Allied Force began on assembled that airpower could not March 24, 1999, with Clark’s full be expected to do much in future backing. In early March of that year, armed conflict. “Boots on the ground,” Clark told Secretary of State Made- he said, would be needed for deci- leine Albright that NATO air strikes sive military action. had to go ahead if diplomatic talks Incredibly, Clark’s 479-page mem- between the Serbs and the Kosovar oir does not even mention the Air Albanians failed. This was true, he Force B-2 stealth bomber—one of said, because alliance credibility was the war’s most effective weapons— on the line. much less recognize the B-2’s key However, Clark had misgivings contribution to the success of the about airpower. He believed that the operation. In contrast, the Army’s limited NATO air strikes had been AH-64 Apache attack helicopter (the effective in Bosnia in 1995 (Opera- core of Clark’s boots-on-the-ground tion Deliberate Force), but his pro- fantasy) gets extended and favor- fessional view of airpower was able attention—despite the fact that shaped in the 1970s, a time in which, it did not ever engage in combat. as a student at the Army’s Command It was exactly this obsession with and General Staff College, he re- trying to put boots on the ground in searched and wrote a thesis about the form of an invasion in Kosovo the “ineffectiveness” of Operation that likely cost Clark his job as Rolling Thunder in Vietnam. Clark’s Reversal. Since publication SACEUR. Even in its rockiest peri- Clark’s skepticism about airpower The campaign of his book Waging Modern War in May, Wesley Clark has stopped ods, the US military Chiefs and White was only reinforced by what he was in the air, but calling attention to the role of House officials offered steady sup- thought he knew about Desert Storm. SACEUR’s mind airpower in the success of Operation port for the NATO air campaign. The general believed (incorrectly) Allied Force. Here, Clark talks with Clark, however, lobbied hard for a that the Gulf War coalition’s airpower Wesley was on the soldiers in Kosovo two months after NATO decision to gear up for land hit only about 10 percent of the Iraqi the end of hostilities. war. forces. He also felt that the long ground. As it turned out, Clark was com- Desert Storm air campaign preced- pletely at odds with Washington and ing a “short ground operation” had European leaders about the preferred wrongly convinced analysts that “pre- direction of the war. His penalty was cision strike” was sufficient to win Clark’s high. Just one month after the end of wars. By Rebecca Grant Allied Force, White House officials After reviewing early studies of leaked the embarrassing news that the situation in Kosovo, Clark felt no Clark would retire earlier than more sanguine about the use of air- planned and vacate the SACEUR post power. Strategic targets were few, for another officer, USAF Gen. Jo- and they did not constitute a firm seph W. Ralston, who was then the center of gravity, in Clark’s view. vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of However, Clark was encouraged when Staff. the threat of air strikes in October 44 War AIR FORCE Magazine / September 2001 AIR FORCE Magazine / September 2001 45 EN. Wesley K. Clark, United Clark’s candid memoir gives a States Army, led NATO’s view of Allied Force very different G military forces to success in from all others to date. The narrative 1999 in Operation Allied Force. And is dominated not by details of air Gas recently as February, the former combat operations, as one might ex- US Army photo by Spc. Christina Ann Horne Supreme Allied Commander Europe pect, but rather by recapitulations of told a large USAF–sponsored con- lost political battles and fervent plan- ference, “The US Air Force saved ning for a ground operation that never me, and it saved NATO.” Clark, how- took place and was never really in ever, delivered these remarks before the cards. His tale provides a dis- the appearance of his book, Waging turbing inside look at a Supreme Modern War, in May. Allied Commander who was distrust- Since publication, he has been ful of airpower and out of step with singing a different tune. Clark has military colleagues and political su- been unwilling to describe Allied periors in Washington. Force as an airpower success. The now-retired SACEUR, appearing in Going to War May at National Defense University Waging Modern War takes note of in Washington, D.C., declared to all the fact that Allied Force began on assembled that airpower could not March 24, 1999, with Clark’s full be expected to do much in future backing. In early March of that year, armed conflict. “Boots on the ground,” Clark told Secretary of State Made- he said, would be needed for deci- leine Albright that NATO air strikes sive military action. had to go ahead if diplomatic talks Incredibly, Clark’s 479-page mem- between the Serbs and the Kosovar oir does not even mention the Air Albanians failed. This was true, he Force B-2 stealth bomber—one of said, because alliance credibility was the war’s most effective weapons— on the line. much less recognize the B-2’s key However, Clark had misgivings contribution to the success of the about airpower. He believed that the operation. In contrast, the Army’s limited NATO air strikes had been AH-64 Apache attack helicopter (the effective in Bosnia in 1995 (Opera- core of Clark’s boots-on-the-ground tion Deliberate Force), but his pro- fantasy) gets extended and favor- fessional view of airpower was able attention—despite the fact that shaped in the 1970s, a time in which, it did not ever engage in combat. as a student at the Army’s Command It was exactly this obsession with and General Staff College, he re- trying to put boots on the ground in searched and wrote a thesis about the form of an invasion in Kosovo the “ineffectiveness” of Operation that likely cost Clark his job as Rolling Thunder in Vietnam. Clark’s Reversal. Since publication SACEUR. Even in its rockiest peri- Clark’s skepticism about airpower The campaign of his book Waging Modern War in May, Wesley Clark has stopped ods, the US military Chiefs and White was only reinforced by what he was in the air, but calling attention to the role of House officials offered steady sup- thought he knew about Desert Storm. SACEUR’s mind airpower in the success of Operation port for the NATO air campaign. The general believed (incorrectly) Allied Force. Here, Clark talks with Clark, however, lobbied hard for a that the Gulf War coalition’s airpower Wesley was on the soldiers in Kosovo two months after NATO decision to gear up for land hit only about 10 percent of the Iraqi the end of hostilities. war. forces. He also felt that the long ground. As it turned out, Clark was com- Desert Storm air campaign preced- pletely at odds with Washington and ing a “short ground operation” had European leaders about the preferred wrongly convinced analysts that “pre- direction of the war. His penalty was cision strike” was sufficient to win Clark’s high. Just one month after the end of wars. By Rebecca Grant Allied Force, White House officials After reviewing early studies of leaked the embarrassing news that the situation in Kosovo, Clark felt no Clark would retire earlier than more sanguine about the use of air- planned and vacate the SACEUR post power. Strategic targets were few, for another officer, USAF Gen. Jo- and they did not constitute a firm seph W. Ralston, who was then the center of gravity, in Clark’s view. vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of However, Clark was encouraged when Staff. the threat of air strikes in October 44 War AIR FORCE Magazine / September 2001 AIR FORCE Magazine / September 2001 45 1998 helped force a temporary cease- judged that the way to influence decision to submit a limited number fire between Serbs and Kosovars. In Milosevic was to target his army of targets at the outset doomed Allied early 1999, Clark began to acknowl- forces.
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