NATO's Secretary General Javier Solana and the Kosovo Crisis

Ryan C. Hendrickson NATO’s Secretary General Javier Solana and the Kosovo Crisis > Introduction Analysts have already devoted consid- erable attention to NATO’s post-Cold The evolution of North Atlantic War evolution, and the literature on Treaty Organization (NATO) since NATO’s military initiative in Kosovo, the Cold War and its mission in pro- Operation Allied Force, continues to viding European security has under- grow rapidly. Within both bodies of gone profound change following research, however, very little analysis is the Soviet Union’s collapse. NATO devoted to NATO’s political leader, its was created originally to protect Western Secretary General, and how this position Europe from a Soviet invasion. Now the has evolved with the Alliance’s new objec- Alliance plays a substantially different tives. During the Cold War, the Secretaries role in providing transatlantic and, in- General generally played a limited role in creasingly, global security. The founda- NATO, as their influence and powers tions for this evolution were set at were severely constrained by the biggest NATO’s Rome Summit in 1991, where powers in the Alliance. In the post-Cold the Alliance agreed to a new strategic War era and as NATO’s strategic mission concept. In Rome, the Allies agreed to go broadens, however, Secretary General Javier beyond NATO’s traditional and strictly Solana occupied a highly visible and instru- defined Article V’s purpose of collective mental position for the Alliance in Allied defence, and accepted a broader array of Force. Solana’s leadership and authority security objectives. The Rome Summit granted during the bombing campaign noted that security risks had become was considerably different from NATO’s multi-faceted and multi-directional, and Cold War Secretaries General. While many that NATO would be more willing to observers view Solana’s leadership as suc- engage in crisis management situations, cessful, no broad assessment exists on peacekeeping and democratic promotion Solana’s specific contributions to Allied in this new security environment (Rome Force, or on the broader question of how Declaration 1991). Arguably, the new the Secretary General as an institutional strategic concept culminated in NATO’s player factors into NATO’s evolution. seventy-eight day bombing campaign of The article begins with a brief litera- Kosovo and Yugoslavia in 1999 — an out- ture review of NATO’s post-Cold War of-area military mission conducted to pro- changes, including a discussion of the ori- tect ethnic Albanian Kosovars from fur- gins of NATO’s Secretary General and ther oppression by Yugoslavia’s President, the leadership limitations the office faced Slobodan MiloπeviÊ. during the Cold War. It then turns to a 240 JIRD (2002) 5(3), 240-257 Copyright 2002 by Faculty of Social Sciences, Centre of International Relations Journal of International Relations and Development 5(September 2002)3 case study of Javier Solana’s contributions since the Cold War in ways that were not to Allied Force, and how these findings anticipated in the early 1990s. relate to the issue of the Secretary General’s Examinations of NATO’s post-Cold new role in NATO after the Cold War. War evolution have been conducted While little debate exists over the United through a number of different perspec- States’ de facto leadership of the Alliance tives. Some analysts focus on NATO’s during Allied Force, the findings here sug- 1991 new strategic concept, and the Al- gest that expanded leadership possibili- liance’s interest in playing a broader role ties exist for the Secretary General as in European security. This new role NATO evolves, and that Solana con- included the commitment to intervene in tributed to Alliance cohesion on many Central and Eastern Europe to stabilise fronts. Aspects of Solana’s leadership to and assist in the democratisation process NATO’s be examined include the novel interna- (Kay 1998; Lepgold 1998; Yost 1998). Secretary tional legal foundation he crafted in North Other analysts focus on NATO’s strength General Atlantic Council (NAC) meetings to jus- as an institution, arguing that the organi- Javier Solana tify the bombing, the use of NATO’s rules sation itself was deeply integrated and and the to foster co-operation during the military flexible enough to allow for new and dif- Kosovo campaign, and his close working relation- ferent operational tasks (Duffield 1994; Crisis ship with NATO’s military commander, McCalla 1996; Wallander 2000). Additional the Supreme Allied Commander Europe research stresses another major change in (SACEUR). Solana’s connections to the NATO’s evolution; its growth in mem- Clinton Administration and his own ex- bership. General agreement exists that ceptional diplomatic skills also offer insight Germany and the United States played into the Secretary General’s ability to lead crucial roles in determining how the in this new security environment. Alliance would expand (Haglund 1996; Goldgeier 1999; Szayna 2000; Reiter 2001). None of these studies of NATO’s post- NATO’s Evolution and the Cold War evolution, however, address the Secretary General Secretary General’s role, which in some respects might be expected. With only a As the Cold War waned promi- few exceptions, little analytical assessment nent analysts in international rela- of NATO’s Secretary General occurred tions predicted that, without the during the Cold War. Among those who Soviet Union’s presence, NATO studied the Secretaries General, the con- would cease to exist (Mearsheimer sensus view suggested serious limitations 1990; Waltz 1993). Much of the previous on the power of this position (Fox and literature on alliances focuses on their Fox 1967; Jordan 1967; 1979). relationship to war and members’ nation- When NATO was initially formed, its al interests, arguing that, without an Charter said little about the Alliance’s external threat, alliances tend to dissolve bureaucratic structure, leaving NATO’s (Hellmann and Wolf 1993; Walt 1997). organisational framework somewhat am- Traditionally, alliances are not viewed as biguous. The most specific reference to organisations that undergo fundamental NATO’s structure was addressed in revolutions in purpose and mission, but Article IX of the North Atlantic Treaty: rather as institutions that remain focused on their external challenger. NATO, how- The Parties hereby establish a council, on ever, has adapted and reformed itself which each of them shall be represented, to 241 Journal of International Relations and Development 5(September 2002)3 consider matters concerning the implemen- from Canada, Italy and Norway, who tation of this Treaty. The Council shall be became known as the Three Wise Men so organized as to be able to meet promptly (Kay 1998:37). Their recommendations at any time. The Council shall set up such resulted in an agreement to give addition- subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; in al powers to the Secretary General, who particular it shall establish immediately a could now formally propose methods to defence committee which should recom- improve consultation within the Alliance, mend measures for the implementation of and in overseeing all NAC meetings, were Articles III and V. also encouraged to keep the Secretary General appraised of all concerns within As the Alliance began its day-to-day the Alliance (Jordan 1967:292-3). Ryan C. work, it soon became clear that NATO Despite NATO’s efforts to further Hendrickson needed greater structural and institution- integrate and encourage consultation, al leadership. In his memoirs, the United these measures were not enough as inter- States’ Secretary of State Dean Acheson nal problems within the Alliance generat- characterised NATO during its first years ed additional disunity, mostly due to as ‘a body — or more accurately twelve France’s opposition to strong leadership bodies — without a head’ (quoted in by the Secretary General. Although the Jordan 1979:8). Members quickly under- position of Secretary General was occu- stood the need for organisational leader- pied by talented diplomats, who occa- ship. Although some disagreement exist- sionally had some record in building con- ed between the United Kingdom and the sensus, for most of the Cold War NATO’s United States over the appropriate new Secretary General played a limited role in “head” of the Alliance, a compromise was the Alliance (Jordan 1979; Kay 1998). reached at NATO’s Lisbon Conference in Moreover, given that NATO had more February 1952, allowing for the creation narrowly defined objectives in transat- of a Secretary General and an interna- lantic security and never used force dur- tional staff to assist him. A tacit agree- ing the Cold War, major leadership ment also existed that the Secretary opportunities also did not exist within General would always be a European.1 In the Alliance for the Secretaries General his leadership capacity, the Secretary was like they potentially do today. authorised to assist the NAC in its respon- Since the Soviet Union’s fall, minimal sibilities and to implement the Alliance’s attention has been given to the Secretary decisions. The Secretary could also attend General, despite NATO’s increasing pres- Council meetings and initiate proposals ence in European security affairs. When (Jordan 1967:45-7). it comes to specific examinations of The first Secretary General, Lord NATO’s bombing campaign in Kosovo, Ismay, assumed office on 4 April 1952, analyses of Secretary General Javier Solana NATO’s third anniversary. Analysts view have only been

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