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Home , Javier Solana, Wesley Clark

Ryan C. Hendrickson NATO’s and the Crisis

> Introduction Analysts have already devoted consid- erable attention to NATO’s post-Cold The evolution of North Atlantic War evolution, and the literature on Treaty Organization (NATO) since NATO’s military initiative in Kosovo, the and its mission in pro- Operation Allied Force, continues to viding European security has under- grow rapidly. Within both bodies of gone profound change following research, however, very little analysis is the ’s collapse. NATO devoted to NATO’s political leader, its was created originally to protect Western Secretary General, and how this position from a Soviet invasion. Now the has evolved with the Alliance’s new objec- Alliance plays a substantially different tives. During the Cold War, the Secretaries role in providing transatlantic and, in- General generally played a limited role in creasingly, global security. The founda- NATO, as their influence and powers tions for this evolution were set at were severely constrained by the biggest NATO’s Rome Summit in 1991, where powers in the Alliance. In the post-Cold the Alliance agreed to a new strategic War era and as NATO’s strategic mission concept. In Rome, the Allies agreed to go broadens, however, Secretary General Javier beyond NATO’s traditional and strictly Solana occupied a highly visible and instru- defined Article V’s purpose of collective mental position for the Alliance in Allied defence, and accepted a broader array of Force. Solana’s leadership and authority security objectives. The Rome Summit granted during the bombing campaign noted that security risks had become was considerably different from NATO’s multi-faceted and multi-directional, and Cold War Secretaries General. While many that NATO would be more willing to observers view Solana’s leadership as suc- engage in crisis management situations, cessful, no broad assessment exists on peacekeeping and democratic promotion Solana’s specific contributions to Allied in this new security environment (Rome Force, or on the broader question of how Declaration 1991). Arguably, the new the Secretary General as an institutional strategic concept culminated in NATO’s player factors into NATO’s evolution. seventy-eight day bombing campaign of The article begins with a brief litera- Kosovo and in 1999 — an out- ture review of NATO’s post-Cold War of-area military mission conducted to pro- changes, including a discussion of the ori- tect ethnic Albanian Kosovars from fur- gins of NATO’s Secretary General and ther oppression by Yugoslavia’s President, the leadership limitations the office faced Slobodan MiloπeviÊ. during the Cold War. It then turns to a

240 JIRD (2002) 5(3), 240-257 Copyright  2002 by Faculty of Social Sciences, Centre of Journal of International Relations and Development 5(September 2002)3 case study of Javier Solana’s contributions since the Cold War in ways that were not to Allied Force, and how these findings anticipated in the early 1990s. relate to the issue of the Secretary General’s Examinations of NATO’s post-Cold new role in NATO after the Cold War. War evolution have been conducted While little exists over the United through a number of different perspec- States’ de facto leadership of the Alliance tives. Some analysts focus on NATO’s during Allied Force, the findings here sug- 1991 new strategic concept, and the Al- gest that expanded leadership possibili- liance’s interest in playing a broader role ties exist for the Secretary General as in European security. This new role NATO evolves, and that Solana con- included the commitment to intervene in tributed to Alliance cohesion on many Central and Eastern Europe to stabilise fronts. Aspects of Solana’s leadership to and assist in the democratisation process NATO’s be examined include the novel interna- (Kay 1998; Lepgold 1998; Yost 1998). Secretary tional legal foundation he crafted in North Other analysts focus on NATO’s strength General (NAC) meetings to jus- as an institution, arguing that the organi- Javier Solana tify the bombing, the use of NATO’s rules sation itself was deeply integrated and and the to foster co-operation during the military flexible enough to allow for new and dif- Kosovo campaign, and his close working relation- ferent operational tasks (Duffield 1994; Crisis ship with NATO’s military commander, McCalla 1996; Wallander 2000). Additional the Europe research stresses another change in (SACEUR). Solana’s connections to the NATO’s evolution; its growth in mem- Clinton Administration and his own ex- bership. General agreement exists that ceptional diplomatic skills also offer insight and the played into the Secretary General’s ability to lead crucial roles in determining how the in this new security environment. Alliance would expand (Haglund 1996; Goldgeier 1999; Szayna 2000; Reiter 2001). None of these studies of NATO’s post- NATO’s Evolution and the Cold War evolution, however, address the Secretary General Secretary General’s role, which in some respects might be expected. With only a As the Cold War waned promi- few exceptions, little analytical assessment nent analysts in international rela- of NATO’s Secretary General occurred tions predicted that, without the during the Cold War. Among those who Soviet Union’s presence, NATO studied the Secretaries General, the con- would cease to exist (Mearsheimer sensus view suggested serious limitations 1990; Waltz 1993). Much of the previous on the power of this position (Fox and literature on alliances focuses on their Fox 1967; Jordan 1967; 1979). relationship to war and members’ nation- When NATO was initially formed, its al interests, arguing that, without an Charter said little about the Alliance’s external threat, alliances tend to dissolve bureaucratic structure, leaving NATO’s (Hellmann and Wolf 1993; Walt 1997). organisational framework somewhat am- Traditionally, alliances are not viewed as biguous. The most specific reference to organisations that undergo fundamental NATO’s structure was addressed in revolutions in purpose and mission, but Article IX of the North Atlantic Treaty: rather as institutions that remain focused on their external challenger. NATO, how- The Parties hereby establish a council, on ever, has adapted and reformed itself which each of them shall be represented, to

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consider matters concerning the implemen- from Canada, Italy and Norway, who tation of this Treaty. The Council shall be became known as the Three Wise Men so organized as to be able to meet promptly (Kay 1998:37). Their recommendations at any time. The Council shall set up such resulted in an agreement to give addition- subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; in al powers to the Secretary General, who particular it shall establish immediately a could now formally propose methods to defence committee which should recom- improve consultation within the Alliance, mend measures for the implementation of and in overseeing all NAC meetings, were Articles III and V. also encouraged to keep the Secretary General appraised of all concerns within As the Alliance began its day-to-day the Alliance (Jordan 1967:292-3). Ryan C. work, it soon became clear that NATO Despite NATO’s efforts to further Hendrickson needed greater structural and institution- integrate and encourage consultation, al leadership. In his memoirs, the United these measures were not enough as inter- States’ Secretary of State Dean Acheson nal problems within the Alliance generat- characterised NATO during its first years ed additional disunity, mostly due to as ‘a body — or more accurately twelve France’s opposition to strong leadership bodies — without a head’ (quoted in by the Secretary General. Although the Jordan 1979:8). Members quickly under- position of Secretary General was occu- stood the need for organisational leader- pied by talented diplomats, who occa- ship. Although some disagreement exist- sionally had some record in building con- ed between the and the sensus, for most of the Cold War NATO’s United States over the appropriate new Secretary General played a limited role in “head” of the Alliance, a compromise was the Alliance (Jordan 1979; Kay 1998). reached at NATO’s Lisbon Conference in Moreover, given that NATO had more February 1952, allowing for the creation narrowly defined objectives in transat- of a Secretary General and an interna- lantic security and never used force dur- tional staff to assist him. A tacit agree- ing the Cold War, major leadership ment also existed that the Secretary opportunities also did not exist within General would always be a European.1 In the Alliance for the Secretaries General his leadership capacity, the Secretary was like they potentially do today. authorised to assist the NAC in its respon- Since the Soviet Union’s fall, minimal sibilities and to implement the Alliance’s attention has been given to the Secretary decisions. The Secretary could also attend General, despite NATO’s increasing pres- Council meetings and initiate proposals ence in European security affairs. When (Jordan 1967:45-7). it comes to specific examinations of The first Secretary General, Lord NATO’s bombing campaign in Kosovo, Ismay, assumed office on 4 April 1952, analyses of Secretary General Javier Solana NATO’s third anniversary. Analysts view have only been conducted in short, jour- Ismay as a professional and well-respect- nalistic accounts. Broad historical surveys ed diplomat, but the European Allies of NATO’s intervention in Kosovo give became frustrated with the absence of Solana limited treatment (Daalder and substantive consultation and real dialogue O’Hanlon 2000; Ignatieff 2000; Judah in the Alliance (Jordan 1967). To address 2000). Military and operational assess- this problem, in 1956 NATO created a ments of Allied Force focus mostly on Committee on Non-military Co-opera- NATO’s SACEUR and discuss Solana, if tion that was chaired by foreign ministers at all, in the most minimal way (Cordesman

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2001; Lambeth 2001; Lyon 2001; Peters et and . His place in NATO’s history, al. 2001). In perhaps the broadest assess- however, will likely centre around the role ment of the politics and differing view- he played in assisting the Alliance in its points within the Alliance during Allied war in Kosovo. His first major contribution Force, where it might be expected to see to Alliance cohesion entailed the orches- some discussion of Solana, virtually no tration of a legal basis for the bombing. attention is devoted to his role (Martin and Brawley 2000). Given the ostensibly Building an International weak historical role of the Secretaries Legal Consensus General during the Cold War and the lim- One of the first and most important ited recognition of Solana during Allied political hurdles to overcome before Force among recent research, it seems NATO’s bombing campaign could begin NATO’s reasonable to conclude that NATO’s was the need for an acceptable internation- Secretary Secretary General was only a tertiary al legal foundation to use force. When General political player in the Alliance during the NATO used force for the first time(s) in its Javier Solana bombing campaign. The findings in this history in 1994 and 1995 in Bosnia, the and the case, however, suggest that Solana played Security Council of the United Nations Kosovo a crucial role in building consensus and (UN) had given it formal authority to act Crisis brought a new level of leadership to the (Boulden 2001). Article 52 of the UN Secretary General’s office compared to Charter states that regional organisations Solana’s Cold War predecessors. At the may use force, as long as the regional or- same time, the conditions surrounding ganisations and ‘their activities are consis- Allied Force that allowed Solana to shape tent with the purposes and principles of policy entailed a complex interplay of the United Nations.’ International legal political factors, and thus do not neces- analysts note that when the UN Charter sarily imply an expansion of power for the was written its framers were clear in stating Secretary General in the post-Cold War that regional organisations could act inde- environment. pendently of the UN Security Council in self-defence (Greig 1991; Meyer 1993). At the same time, the “right” in international Solana’s Contributions to law for regional organisations to use force Allied Force without Security Council approval remains debated today, especially when some mem- On 2 December 1995, NATO chose bers of the Security Council disagree over Javier Solana, Spain’s Socialist For- the use of force. In 1998 such conditions eign Minister, as the Alliance’s new existed in the Security Council, and a few Secretary General (Simons 1995). members of NATO felt that formal UN Solana replaced the Belgian , Security Council authorisation was neces- who resigned amidst accusations of sary before NATO used force in Kosovo. bribery during his previous political posi- Moreover, what little precedent existed for tions in Belgium. Solana came at a crucial NATO with Bosnia suggested that UN time for the Alliance, as it was about to Security Council approval should precede begin its peacekeeping deployment to any NATO military operation. Bosnia in the aftermath of the Dayton In June 1998, NATO authorised mili- Peace Accords. He also served as Secretary tary “fly-overs” of Serbian borders in an General during NATO’s membership en- effort to deter MiloπeviÊ from additional largement to the , Hungary, military actions in Kosovo (Operation

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Determined Falcon 1998). The Clinton The process of getting NATO to agree Administration, led by Secretary of to use force was not easy. As the Serb’s Defense and Secretary of military actions continued and heightened State , however, went in the summer of 1998, Secretary General a step further and threatened direct mili- Solana became increasingly alarmed that tary action against the Serbs if they did MiloπeviÊ was damaging NATO’s credi- not cease their violence. Both Cohen and bility. Like Albright, Clinton’s most senior Albright maintained that international advisor who favoured military strikes, legal authority existed for the strikes, Solana appeared ready to use force and even though neither the UN nor NATO behind the scenes was calling for a mili- had authorised such actions (Albright 1998; tary response (Moskowitz and Lantis Ryan C. Cohen 1998). These statements caused 2001). In a September 1998 meeting with Hendrickson some consternation among NATO Allies NATO defence ministers, Solana tried to who responded with different degrees of place additional pressure on the Alliance concern that UN Security Council autho- by sharing with the Allies what a Serb risation was needed before NATO could General had told him: ‘A village a day use force. By the end of summer 1998, keeps NATO away’ (quoted in Gellman NATO had still not gained specific 1999). Solana also announced in September authorisation from the Security Council, that NATO had completed its plans for a and had not itself agreed to use force. military operation on MiloπeviÊ in the As the Serbian atrocities continued, event it became necessary in the future and in response to these international legal (Judah 2000:178). Solana began to seek concerns expressed within the Alliance, from the Allies an Activation Order the United States and the United King- (ACTORD) to allow NATO to begin dom went to the UN Security Council in preparations for a military strike. Such a September 1998 to seek its approval for vote from the NAC would be a signal of military action. The Western Allies were NATO’s strength and would set the pro- only able to gain the strong condemna- cess in motion to use force if necessary. tion of the Serbs’ actions through Security Strong reservations continued at NATO Council Resolution 1199, yet no formal on the use of force, and remained after authorisation for military strikes was the UN Security Council’s vote. In the acquired (UN Security Council 1998). end, however, Solana was credited with China and Russia included reservations in crafting a legal position for the Alliance their votes, noting that additional approval that allowed for the ACTORD. After was required before force could be used days of debate, on 10 October 1998 Solana with UN backing (Turner 1998). announced that all Allies had agreed that In the eyes of some NATO Allies, the a ‘sufficient legal basis’ existed for the use Security Council’s unwillingness to endorse of force (quoted in Daalder and O’Hanlon military action created additional legal 2000:45). Three days later, NATO ambas- challenges for NATO. Those Allies who sadors endorsed the ACTORD and gave remained most concerned were Belgium, the Secretary General authority to con- Germany, Greece, Italy, Spain and, to a duct limited air strikes in a phased aerial lesser extent, France (Guicherd 1999). assault if a diplomatic resolution was not Thus, it fell to diplomatic persuasion to achieved (Solana 1998a).2 convince these members to support a Solana’s achievement was due to his NATO military strike in the absence of ability to find a legal consensus using the formal Security Council approval. semantic ambiguity of ‘sufficient legal

244 Journal of International Relations and Development 5(September 2002)3 basis,’ which allowed each member of the Allied Force in March 1999, no legal Alliance to justify to their varied domes- debate ensued within the Alliance over tic constituencies that NATO had inter- the authority to conduct air strikes against national legal authority to act. Members MiloπeviÊ. While the debate on NATO’s could make different appeals to “UN authority to use force continues in legal norms”, the appropriate historical intent circles and within the NATO Allies and and role for the Security Council, or even elsewhere, Solana won the debate in the Security Council’s vote only days in October 1998.4 Solana’s work before to appeal to domestic audiences at this time set the legal foundations for that voiced concern. Solana himself relied NATO’s bombing campaign in March on UN Security Council Resolution 1199, 1999 when international legal questions the Serbs’ unwillingness to comply with were no longer on NATO’s agenda. NATO’s these demands, as well as the threat of a Solana’s ability to find a consensus was Secretary humanitarian catastrophe, the deteriorat- one of his most important achievements General ing conditions in Kosovo, and the as Secretary General, and reveals a Javier Solana Security Council Resolution’s unwilling- markedly different role for a Secretary and the ness to act to justify a military response General of NATO compared to the Cold Kosovo (Solana 1998b; Guicherd 1999:27-8). War era. His ability to shape policy, how- Crisis In his efforts to find a consensus, ever, does not necessarily imply changes Solana consulted widely with all members in the Secretary General’s institutional of the Alliance. Rather than stressing the power. Solana was allowed to go forward differences among the Allies, which were with this position by the Allies, with considerable in the immediate aftermath strong support from the United States of Security Council Resolution 1199, and the United Kingdom. His achieve- Solana stressed the areas of agreement, ment also came when NATO’s credibility which was enough to gain the NAC’s was being questioned as MiloπeviÊ con- approval to begin preparations for mili- tinued with his atrocities. Solana’s diplo- tary strikes (Guicherd 1999). Solana’s back- matic achievement in crafting this posi- ground as a Socialist Foreign Minister tion points mostly to his personal leader- from Spain and his activism against ship strengths. Thus, Solana’s ability to NATO earlier in his political career may lead was assisted largely by these very have also been useful in building support “case-specific” conditions. among some of the European Allies to use At the same time, it must be noted force (Peters et al. 2001:13). No doubt, that these events took place as NATO Solana benefited from the United States was considering a new role for itself in (see below) and the United Kingdom’s European security. In this environment, backing, but interviews with leading par- the Secretary General inserted himself ticipants, as well as journalistic coverage into the centre of action as NATO debat- of these events, viewed Solana as the prin- ed its proper role in providing security for cipal architect of NATO’s legal claims.3 Europe. These conditions allow for an Solana succeeded, then, in finding com- activist and skilled Secretary General, who mon legal grounds for NATO military had the backing of the Alliance’s major action without UN approval. When powers, to play a larger role in shaping NATO formally moved again to support Alliance decisions as compared to Cold military action if needed before the War Secretaries General. Similar conclu- Rambouillet meetings in January 1999 sions exist regarding NATO’s decision- and later in the days immediately before making procedures during Allied Force.

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Solana and NATO’s Decision- authorise air strikes against targets on FRY Making Procedures territory. The NATO Secretary General Allied Force was considerably different will take full account of the position and from NATO’s previous uses of force in actions of the Kosovar leadership and all Bosnia, when the UN Security Council Kosovar armed elements in and around played a key role in authorising its air Kosovo in reaching his decision on military strikes. The strikes were also considerably action (NATO 1999). more restrained. In contrast, Allied Force was NATO’s most sustained military mis- Moreover, when meeting with the sion to date. In the process, NATO entered press in the hours prior to initiating Al- new political and legal territory, with no real lied Force Solana noted: Ryan C. precedents that it could follow. The manner Hendrickson in which the decision-making procedures I have just directed SACEUR, General were shaped and later used provides some Clark, to initiate air operations in the Fe- insight into Solana’s leadership. deral Republic of Yugoslavia. I have taken Both before and during Allied Force, this decision after extensive consultations in the Secretary General was placed at the recent days with all the Allies, and after it centre of the decision to use force. Solana became clear that the final diplomatic effort announced formally on 13 October 1998 of Ambassador Holbrooke in Belgrade has that the NAC had granted the ACTORD, not met with success (Solana 1999). or the authorisation to begin prepara- tions for a military operation within 96 These press statements and the NAC’s hours if a diplomatic solution to the crisis decisions provide an additional insight was not achieved (Solana 1998a). Solana into Solana’s role in leading the Alliance. then travelled to Belgrade, along with SA- The NAC’s decisions clearly placed Solana CEUR General and Chair- at NATO’s epicentre, which made him a man of the Military Committee, General real player in the decision to use force. Klaus Nauman, to deliver the message to Admittedly, Solana would have been un- MiloπeviÊ that NATO was ready to use able to call for military strikes if support force if necessary (Solana 1998c). Through had not existed in the Alliance. At the the ACTORD, Solana formally became a same time, Solana’s “independent pow- key diplomat for the Alliance, and the ers” granted by the NAC should not be lead voice in Belgrade in discussing the underestimated. ACTORD with MiloπeviÊ (Clark 2001: As Allied Force progressed, and the Al- 145-7). lies moved into Phase III of the campaign, Similarly, prior to the meetings at which included strikes in and around Bel- Rambouillet, France on 30 January 1999 grade, Solana was given, and to some degree when the Kosovars and the Yugoslav gov- asserted, additional decision-making dis- ernment agreed to meet for diplomatic cretion over the types of targets that could talks, the NAC again provided the Sec- be hit (Daalder and O’Hanlon 2000:118). retary General with, ostensibly, some dis- For example, in describing these events cretion to determine if force would be General Klaus Nauman later recounted: used. In its official statement, the NAC statement noted: We realized that we would never get another formal decision of the NATO The Council has therefore agreed today Council to escalate to phase three, which that the NATO Secretary General may after all, had meant an all-out war against

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Yugoslavia. So the Chairman of the NATO the bombings began. By making Solana Council, Secretary General Solana, chose the “final” decision-maker for the use of the procedure to tell the council, “I, as sec- force, states in the Alliance would not retary general, interpret our discussion in have to answer directly for or justify the this and that way, and I hope that you can specific bombing targets. By giving Solana go along with that.” So it was stated (quot- the political responsibility for Allied Force, ed in Peters et al. 2001: 27). some member-states whose domestic crit- ics were louder than others could shift at- Solana then moved the Alliance into tention to Solana (and to the United States Phase III bombings without formal ap- as NATO’s primary military implementor) proval from the NAC and, in this sense, for any mistakes that might have taken exercised power through the NAC’s tacit place once the operation began.5 In some NATO’s support and trust. states, especially Germany, Greece and Secretary Solana’s role in initiating military force Italy, the domestic opposition to Allied General is considerably different from NATO’s Force and the concern for civilian casual- Javier Solana 1995 bombing campaign against the Bos- ties was considerable (Martin and Brawley and the nian Serbs. In 1995, the decision on whether 2000). Thus, the authority that Solana Kosovo or not to strike the Bosnian Serbs was a was given and then eventually used during Crisis “dual key” decision, which required ap- the military campaign served the inter- proval from the UN and NATO military ests of many within the Alliance. commanders, rather than the Secretary Additionally, Solana’s view of the prob- General at the time, Willy Claes (Owen lems in Kosovo was no secret. Solana be- 2000). Although Claes has been credited lieved that MiloπeviÊ provided a crucial with playing an important and under- test for the Alliance. Consequently, some appreciated role for NATO in 1995 (Hol- have argued that Solana sought for him- brooke 1998), the Secretary General’s level self a leadership role in the Alliance and of influence and decision-making authority worked to empower himself due, in part, compared to Claes and certainly Solana’s to his strong convictions regarding Milo- Cold War predecessors reached new heights πeviÊ’s conduct and what he perceived to in 1999. be NATO’s appropriate role after the The NAC’s decisions also made Solana Cold War.6 Whatever Solana’s personal a key diplomat for the Alliance. Solana be- motives were, it is clear that decisions came more than a mediator of conflict at made in the NAC elevated the Secretary NATO headquarters. He also was a diplo- General to the world stage and within the mat and arbiter for NATO in Belgrade Alliance. and during the Rambouillet talks. Through Once the bombings ensued, Solana used the NAC’s decision, Solana would evalu- additional “rules” that simultaneously ate and report back to the Alliance as empowered him while also protecting the authorised. Such a decision by the NAC NATO Allies. For example, approximate- contrasts sharply with that of NATO’s ly one month into Allied Force Solana an- Secretaries General during the Cold War. nounced that approximately 20,000 addi- A number of explanations provide an tional ground forces were being sent to insight into why NATO and Solana craft- the region, and that “All options remain ed the NAC’s “rules” in this way. open” regarding the use of these troops. One reason for empowering Solana was Upon this announcement, Solana invoked to insulate and protect member-states the “silent procedure” which allows for a from domestic criticism, especially once resolution to be passed by the NAC with-

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in twenty-four hours unless a member- Alliance was through his relationship with state objects to the announcement (Droz- the SACEUR. The SACEUR has always diak 1999a). In taking such a step, Solana been under American leadership, first by no doubt had the backing of NATO’s former United States’ President and Gen- major powers, but the silent procedure eral Dwight D. Eisenhower. In 1999, Gen- would force a less enthusiastic ally to go eral Wesley K. Clark occupied this posi- public if it opposed the action. Public dis- tion. When the Alliance authorised the agreement would place NATO member- use of force in October 1998 and again in states at odds with each other for the world March 1999, the Secretary General was press to consume, and would be news that permitted to strike the Yugoslav govern- MiloπeviÊ would welcome. At the same ment according to different bombing Ryan C. time, the silent procedure also allowed phases, beginning with Phase I, which Hendrickson states not to take positions publicly, which included Serbian air defence systems and would again serve to insulate some states any troops in Kosovo, followed by Phase from domestic critics. II, or what General Clark referred to as In sum, as NATO moved into new the “Limited Air Campaign”. This phase legal and political territory, the Alliance’s allowed for strikes on headquarters, ground rules evolved as well, which generally work- forces and other military outposts below ed to strengthen the Secretary General’s the 44th parallel in Yugoslavia (Clark 2001: position within the Alliance. This does 176). Phase III targets permitted strikes not mean that Solana could then unilater- in and around Belgrade, where the risk of ally neglect member-states’ desires. These civilian casualties was most controversial. powers were given to Solana in only these Solana gained authority from the NATO political circumstances, when the politi- ambassadors to implement Phase I targets cal pressures among the Allies varied when the bombing began on 24 March widely. Yet these events and roles played 1999 and, by Day 4, permitted strikes on by Solana also suggest something quite Phase II targets. By Day 9, the SACEUR different from the typical Cold War Sec- began to strike Phase III targets upon retary General, whose powers and leader- consultation with Solana (Lambeth 2001: ship opportunities were nothing like Sola- 28-9).7 The SACEUR, however, was the na’s. The Allies clearly trusted Solana’s chief implementor of the Secretary Gen- judgement, and wanted him to play a key eral’s orders. role in the Alliance. Solana personally ac- Although broad authority to oversee cepted these roles and was an indepen- the operation was given to the Secretary dent advocate in the Alliance for using General, the decision-making reality was force. As with crafting the international that the major powers (France, Germany, legal foundations, the decision-making Italy, the United Kingdom, and most im- procedures too have case-specific circum- portantly the United States) had a sub- stances. Nonetheless, Solana was a Sec- stantial input into determining which tar- retary General who was a primary imple- gets would be hit (Meyers 1999; Priest mentor, decision-maker, and diplomat as 1999a). General Clark writes that, besides NATO took on new roles in European working with NATO officials to deter- security. mine bombing targets, his selected tar- gets were cleared by the United States Working with the SACEUR . Senior officials at Another key element in Solana’s ef- the were also among those forts to build and keep consensus in the included in the decision-making process

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(Clark 2001:178). Solana’s job, like Clark’s, option in the first stages of the bombing was to ensure that NATO succeeded in effort, Alliance cohesion would be threat- its military efforts. Solana, however, had ened. Clark soon recognised that Solana’s the additional job of keeping diplomatic advice was the best route to follow politi- unity among the nineteen Allies during cally, and notes that Solana was a “master” the bombing. Thus, close dialogue between for NATO’s cause (Clark 1999:219; 2001:15). Solana, who was in Brussels, and Clark, On occasion, Solana also vetoed strike who was in Mons, Belgium, at NATO’s Sup- requests from Clark in response to heavy reme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe criticism from certain NATO Allies.9 Alt- (SHAPE), would also be key for the oper- hough this occurred infrequently, Solana ation’s success. consulted widely with the Allies in order Much evidence suggests that Solana to assess these views. One senior official NATO’s and Clark worked extremely well togeth- at NATO noted that on a number of oc- Secretary er in carrying out NATO’s military mis- casions Solana vetoed Clark’s request to General sion. When Solana sensed reservations or hit the Yugoslav television outlets, which Javier Solana outright opposition within the Alliance explains why NATO continued to repeat- and the to Clark’s proposed targets, he relayed edly strike oil refineries even though they Kosovo these sentiments back to the SACEUR had little strategic value to the Serbs.10 Crisis (Clark 2001:177). When internal opposi- Finally, all evidence suggests that Clark tion in the Alliance increased to threaten- and Solana both felt ideologically similar ing levels, Solana requested Clark’s pres- about MiloπeviÊ and NATO’s role in con- ence at NATO headquarters in Brussels fronting Serbian military aggression. As and encouraged him to meet privately evidenced by Solana’s calls for NATO to with the NATO ambassadors. In effect, confront MiloπeviÊ as early as September Solana became an advocate for Clark, who 1998, and from Clark’s own memoirs, faced strenuous if not unrealistic demands both viewed the conflict in Kosovo as one from some members of the Alliance. Those that threatened NATO’s credibility and members wanted to conduct a war but re- presented a moral outrage to Europe (Nic- fused to cause any casualties, make mis- holl and Barber 1999; Clark 2001:134). takes, or contribute in any way to the The Secretary General and the SACEUR deaths of civilians.8 Solana was particular- did not have to struggle over an appropri- ly useful to Clark in helping the SACEUR ate role for the Alliance in the or build support for more sensitive strikes in its wider role in European security that faced opposition in the Alliance (Ig- affairs, which facilitated co-operation be- natieff 2000:102). tween the military and political organisa- Solana was also attuned to the politi- tion in NATO. cal limits within the Alliance for the kind In summary, the ideological similari- of military force the Allies were ready to ties between the SACEUR and the Sec- use. From early on in the bombing effort, retary General, and the NAC’s decision behind the scenes Clark wanted a ground to allow Solana a crucial role in moving to troop option, which had been publicly different bombing phases, enhanced Sola- eliminated at the initiation of the bomb- na’s influence during Allied Force. While ings by the United States and others in the final bombing decisions remained with the Alliance (Moskowitz and Lantis 2001: the major powers in the Alliance (the Unit- 80-1). In an effort to contain Clark, Solana ed States, the United Kingdom, France, advised the SACEUR that, by pushing Germany and Italy), it is clear that the aggressively and openly for a ground troop SACEUR needed Solana (Priest 1999b).

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While this relationship was obviously NATO ambassadors in order to place contingent on personalities and specific pressure on more senior allied governmen- political conditions, the record does point tal officials to co-operate with NATO. to a potentially stronger Secretary Gen- When NATO ambassadors became too eral in the post-Cold War era, who in this aggressive in their opposition to Allied case was relied upon to convey messages Force, Solana phoned the prime ministers from the Allies to the SACEUR. or heads of state of these Allies to exert additional pressure on governments to Diplomatic Skills comply with NATO’s mission. In his pre- Solana was viewed by many within the vious role as Spain’s Foreign Minister, press and at NATO as an individual with a Solana had developed contacts and a deep Ryan C. tremendous political presence. To all Al- diplomatic “rolodex” covering many of Hendrickson lies, Solana was approachable, he never Europe’s foreign policy elite. Solana embarrassed diplomats from member de- would often not tell the ambassador that legations and possessed the empirically he was using such means, but it would intangible, but real personal and diplomat- soon become clear to the NATO ambas- ic quality of being a “consensus builder” sador in residence that Solana’s diplomat- when trying to maintain cohesion among ic contacts were deep, and resulted in strong political personalities (Whitney bringing NATO ambassadors “in line” 1999). Disagreements, in the vast majority when disagreements arose.12 Solana was of cases, were handled behind closed also able to put pressure on the Allies doors which helped preserve his ability to when they began to waiver in their sup- mediate differences and prevent contro- port for Allied Force, without alienating versies from becoming divisive. Numerous these states (Priest 1999a). These skills structured interviews conducted at NATO and contacts were inherent to Solana, and Headquarters from 29 May to 4 June 2001 had nothing to do with the formal posi- found that Solana was viewed as an “hon- tion of the Secretary General. Solana’s est broker” by senior officials among all skills were seen as exceptional by many, states in the Alliance. This view is sup- which likely contributed to his selection ported by Clark’s memoirs, who notes that to serve as the ’s High Solana shared with the SACEUR the con- Representative for Common Foreign and cerns of all Allies during the bombing Security Policy at the conclusion of Allied campaign, including the views of small Force. states such as and Belgium Although not widely reported, it was (Clark 2001:339). Other key decision-mak- also appreciated by some governments ers in Allied Force also openly commended that Solana had maintained close diplo- Solana for his consensus-building skills matic contact and sustained dialogue with (Nauman 1999: 458). In the aftermath of UN Secretary General Kofi Annan during Allied Force, it was widely felt at NATO the bombing campaign. This relationship headquarters that the campaign was a suggested Solana’s respect for those gov- NATO operation and not strictly an ernments whose feelings remained mixed American mission, which was partly due on the use of force without UN Security to Solana’s ability to listen to all NATO Council approval.13 Allies’ concerns and to communicate their Solana’s diplomatic skills were assisted positions to General Clark.11 through his untiring and widely recognised When opposition arose, another aspect work ethic. It was not rare during the of Solana’s diplomacy was to “go above” the bombing campaign for Solana to phone

250 Journal of International Relations and Development 5(September 2002)3 members of his staff at any hour of the month into the conflict. Near the end of day or night to share ideas or to initiate the meeting, President Clinton indicated new policy. While ambitious politicians to the press that he supported Solana’s of all nationalities often work long hours, interest in beginning an assessment of a Solana’s work ethic was viewed as a near ground troop option for the operation. compulsion by many at NATO, which left Clinton’s position was different for an no doubt as to his commitment to NATO’s American President, who is widely per- success and the Alliance’s unity.14 ceived as the de facto leader of the Alliance. Clinton’s deference suggested that Solana American Support would have an independent impact on Another facet of Solana’s ability to NATO’s operational approach and direc- foster consensus was his excellent rela- tion (Broder 1999; Clinton 1999). What- NATO’s tionship with the Clinton Administration. ever Clinton’s reason for granting some Secretary Without the United States’ backing, NATO leeway to the Secretary General, the General would have not initiated Allied Force. result is that Solana’s voice would carry Javier Solana Here, Solana’s role should not be over- additional weight in the Alliance. Such a and the exaggerated. The Clinton Administration move by Clinton suggested a degree of Kosovo led the Alliance in determining if and trust in Solana and American confidence Crisis when force was going to be used (Gellman in the leadership that Solana provided. 1999). Yet the delegation of power to During Allied Force, Solana was also someone outside of the Clinton Admin- frequently in contact with American Na- istration, as was done with Solana, sug- tional Security Advisor, Sandy Berger, gests a degree of trust from senior White perhaps to an even greater extent than House officials, which also contributed to General Clark.16 As Allied Force contin- Solana’s ability to lead the Alliance. ued, Solana became an important diplo- One noticeable move by the United matic conduit for Berger as the United States as Allied Force began was to point States began the process of quietly lobby- the media’s press coverage to NATO’s ing for a ground troop option (Priest political headquarters in Brussels, Belgium. 1999c). Solana’s close connection to senior In shifting attention to Europe, the Clin- Clinton officials was an especially impor- ton Administration made a clear choice to tant connection given that the SACEUR signal that this was a NATO operation, did not have the full backing of the with Europe’s backing. The Clinton Ad- Department of Defense and, at the time, ministration also wanted all attention to the White House. In contrast, Solana had focus on NATO’s political headquarters direct access to the White House and in Brussels rather than its military head- clearly worked in concert with the United quarters in Mons, Belgium (Clark 2001: States. He also used this contact to keep 186).15 Solana took this role quite serious- General Clark abreast of the “politics” ly and in one instance required General being played in Washington, which in- Clark to remove the principle spokesper- volved strong differences of opinion over son at SHAPE for what Solana viewed as the appropriate use of military force in inept relations with the press (Clark 2001: the region (Clark 2001:262). Solana’s close 249). contact implied a recognition of his own Another indication of the Clinton Ad- political limitations as Secretary General, ministration’s support for Solana occurred e.g. the political reality of NATO’s re- when NATO Allies met in Washington liance on the United States, but also sug- for its 50th anniversary in April 1999, one gest a relationship that the United States

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viewed as equally beneficial. Since the Conclusion United States wished to work through NATO in Allied Force, Solana became a NATO’s post-Cold War evolution very important player in the Alliance, has been examined from many per- whose level of influence as Secretary spectives, but not through a study General increased, in part, because of of its Secretary General. This study American backing. finds that Operation Allied Force was influenced in many stages by the efforts Solana’s Critics of Secretary General Javier Solana. The Although most discussions and evi- findings demonstrate the potential im- dence concerning Solana during Allied portance of NATO’s political leader in Ryan C. Force suggest that the Secretary General times of crisis as the Alliance addresses its Hendrickson played an instrumental role in enhancing post-Cold War missions, and illustrates consensus, some criticisms have surfaced. the very different role played by the Sec- It has been alleged that Solana was not a retary General compared to NATO’s novel thinker and that he occasionally leadership during the Cold War. The legacy presented “consensus” ideas as his own.17 of NATO’s Cold War Secretary General Solana also received some criticism re- is one of minimal influence, whereas garding the way in which NAC meetings Solana’s role in Allied Force had a consid- were conducted, which were often undis- erable impact. The conditions that allowed ciplined and free-flowing, sometimes Solana to have such an influence, howev- without a clear result emerging.18 Solana er, were mostly specific to Allied Force has also been criticised, along with all of and therefore do not necessarily portend NATO’s senior officials and allied deci- long-term changes in the “institutional sion-makers, for seriously underestimat- influence” of the Secretary General. ing MiloπeviÊ’s commitment to Kosovo, First, Solana benefited greatly from the and for the faulty belief that MiloπeviÊ United States’ support. The United States would succumb quickly to a minimal felt it necessary to work through NATO to show of force by NATO (Arkin 2001). It confront Slobodan MiloπeviÊ. By doing so, may also be alleged that Solana was the Clinton Administration allowed more unable to effectively deliver NATO’s European states to enter the political stage threat of military action to MiloπeviÊ to in NATO’s bombing campaign. During force his compliance with NATO’s de- Allied Force, 13 of NATO’s 19 Allies con- mands. tributed militarily to the Alliance, with Over time and as more analysis is done many voices being present in this multilat- these criticisms will receive additional eral policy-making process. Since the scrutiny. While this study does not suggest United States felt it needed NATO in order Solana should be immune from criticism, to achieve its strategic objectives, Solana’s its focus is rather on Solana’s contributions position was elevated as he became a key to the Alliance. Implicit in all of these crit- diplomatic broker for NATO, and an icisms is that Solana did play a major role important voice for the European Allies in NATO and, for better or worse, was a who wanted their concerns shared with the significant actor in Allied Force. Even by United States and the SACEUR. This fac- his critics, Solana is implicitly regarded as a tor may be the single most important key player in moving the Alliance towards aspect of Solana’s influence, in that it simul- the use of force, as a diplomat, and in oper- taneously elevated the Secretary General ational aspects of the conflict. vis-à-vis the United States and the -

252 Journal of International Relations and Development 5(September 2002)3 pean Allies. As the bombings continued and These factors were purely personal traits the operation moved into different phases, to Solana, and again do not represent an the Clinton Administration and European institutional change in the Alliance. At leaders continued to turn to Solana for as- the same time, Solana’s leadership record sistance in different forms. Yet without a in NATO may result in heightened ex- close working relationship with the United pectations for future Secretary Generals States, the Secretary General would have when NATO faces its next major crisis. found it difficult to exercise such a promi- Many Allies, especially small states, nent role in the Alliance. If the United turned to Solana for a voice in the bomb- States chooses to work with “coalitions of ing campaign. Solana also placed himself the willing” in future operations, or if it in decision-making positions, which the chooses to call the mission “multilateral” Allies at times welcomed. Given Solana’s NATO’s but really mean “unilateral” in practice, the record during Allied Force, Secretary Ge- Secretary Secretary General would find himself with neral Robertson or his eventual replace- General considerably less influence. ment may find it difficult to play a passive Javier Solana This study also demonstrates that the role when leading the Alliance. and the Secretary General’s ability was influenced In sum, the post-Cold War environ- Kosovo by the legal and strategic ambiguity that ment potentially allows for a very dif- Crisis existed before the operation. The differ- ferent leadership role for the Secretary ent feelings about the operation’s legal General. The political conditions sur- legitimacy, coupled with whether this rounding Operation Allied Force, cou- mission was appropriate for the Alliance pled with Solana’s diplomatic skills, al- in its post-Cold War evolution, gave Solana lowed NATO’s Secretary General to play an opportunity to enter the debate to a key role in leading the Alliance during lobby for the policies he thought best. the operation. Instrumental leadership With the 1991 changes in NATO’s strate- similar to Solana’s, however, cannot be gic concept, which allow for non-Article guaranteed or even expected from the V peacekeeping and peace-enforcement Secretary General in future missions. activities, the Alliance’s mission will con- Kosovo was unlike any other security tinue to be in flux. As the Alliance strug- matter previously faced by the Alliance, gled with whether or not to use force and thus presented new questions for the against MiloπeviÊ, Solana moved in to Alliance and new leadership opportuni- shape the agenda for the Alliance. Thus, ties. Such questions and internal debate the uncertain strategic environment in will continue as NATO determines its which NATO resides will continue to appropriate role in fighting , its potentially allow the Secretary General to role in the , the Former Yu- exercise leadership. goslav Republic of Macedonia, and else- Finally, the Secretary General’s per- where. As the Alliance moves towards sonality was well-suited for leadership of expanding its membership, the Secretary the Alliance. Solana harnessed great dip- General may also be turned into a catalyst lomatic tact in fostering consensus before for unity within the Alliance. and during the operation; he was trusted Yet the Secretary General still needs by the European Allies and the United the appropriate political conditions, es- States. Solana’s exceptional relationship pecially good relations with the United with Wesley Clark also assisted the Sec- States, in order to play a leading role in retary General in keeping unity between Brussels. With American President George the Alliance’s political and military wings. W. Bush in office, such conditions appear

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less, rather than more, probable. Although 1 This understanding was reached because of the the Bush Administration co-operated perceived need that the SACEUR would be an Amer- with NATO in its peace-promotion ef- ican (Rogers 1987). forts in the Former Yugoslav Republic of 2 For two comprehensive diplomatic histories of gov- Macedonia, it did so with some initial ernment documents related to the crisis in Kosovo, see resistance. Even with the general consen- We l ler (1999), and Auerswald and Auerswald (2000). sus surrounding terrorism as a threat to 3 Five interviews among senior NATO officials and the entire world, important differences senior officials at NATO from various delegations within the Alliance have surfaced as to support this argument, including one interview with how best address these heightened secu- Robert Kupiecki, Poland’s Permanent Deputy rity challenges. While the Bush Admin- Representative to NATO (May-June 2001). For Ryan C. istration moved towards the ostensible more on the American and British commitment to Hendrickson use of force against in spring 2002, use force, see Drozdiak (1998). Secretary General George Robertson 4 Among the many discussions over NATO’s alleged noted publicly that European approval international legal authority to use force against for military strikes was conditional on MiloπeviÊ, see Charney (1999), Chinkin (1999), and seeing additional intelligence linking Falk (1999). to acts of international 5 The author’s background interview, a Deputy Per- terrorism. Solana benefited greatly from manent Representative of NATO member-state the Clinton Administration’s backing where- (May 2001). as, more recently, Robertson has posi- 6 Background interview, a Senior Department of tioned himself against the United States, Defense official, NATO Headquarters (May 2001). which is a very different situation to 7 See also Clark (2001:219) for additional discussion Allied Force. Thus, although new leader- of his efforts to expand the list of acceptable targets. ship opportunities do exist for the 8 Background interview with a senior NATO offi- Secretary General after the Cold War cial (May 2001). meaningful organisational leadership dur- 9 Background interview, a senior NATO official (May ing Allied Force demanded an amalgam of 2001). the United States’ co-operation, personal 10 Background interview, a senior NATO official diplomatic skills and uncertain strategic (May 2001). goals for the Alliance. This complex inter- 11 For one notable exception of differing views be- play of political forces will be difficult to tween Solana and the Czech Republic’s Ambassador repeat in future operations. to NATO, Karel Kovanda, see Drozdiak (1999b). Otherwise, it is difficult to find additional examples First version received: March 2002. of disagreement reported by the press. Final version accepted: July 2002. 12 Interview with the Czech Republic’s Ambassador to NATO, Karel Kovanda (June 2001). 13 Background interview, deputy Permanent Repre- Notes: sentative of NATO member-state delegation (May 2001). Ryan C. Hendrickson is Assistant Professor 14 Background interviews with NATO International of political science at Eastern Illinois University, and Staff and representatives from member delegations author of The Clinton Wars (Vanderbilt University (May 2001). Press, 2002). 15 Background interview with a Senior Department Address: Ryan C. Hendrickson, Eastern Illinois of Defense officials and a senior NATO staff mem- University, Department of Political Science, Charleston, ber, NATO Headquarters (May-June 2001). Wesley IL 61920-3099, U.S.A. [E-mail: [email protected]]. Clark (2001:195) also recounts a story in his book, in

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which his staff personally phoned an American news 17 Background interview with a NATO International anchor, Tom Brokaw of NBC news, to correct their Staffer (May 2001). description of an “American-led” strike on Kosovo, 18 Background interview with a Senior United States’ but rather a “NATO” military action. Defense Department official (May 2001). 16 Background interview, a Senior NATO official (May 2001).

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