University of Nigeria

Research Publications ITANYI, Chukwuma Agu

Author Author PG/MSC/05/40184 International Diplomacy and Conflict Management in the Middle-East: A Case Title Study of Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 1970- 2006

Social Sciences Faculty Faculty

Political Science

Department Department December, 2007 Date

Signature

UNIVERSITY OF NIGERLA, NSUl

INTERNAr~IC3NALDIPLOMACY AND CONFLIC'I' MANAGEMENT IN TllE Mlldl>LE-KAS?': A CASE STUDY OF ISNAICLI -PALESTINIAN C'ONFLICT, 1970 - 2006.

ITANYI, CHUKWUMA AGU PG/M.Sc./05/40184

NIX. PROJECT PRESENTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAI, 'KIENCE,IN PARTIAL F'ULPILLMENT OF TIiE REQUTREMENrI'SFOR THE AWARD OF MASTER OF SCIENCE (M.Sc) DEGREE IN POLITICAL SCIICNCE (INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS)

DECEMBER, 2007. TITLE PAGE

INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMACY AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN THE MIDDLE-EAST: A CASE STUDY OF ISRAELI -PALESTINIAN CONFLICT, 1970 - 2006.

A PROJECT REPORT PRESENTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA, NSUKKA

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF MASTER OF SCIENCE (M.Sc) DEGREE IN POLITICAL SCIENCE (INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS)

ITANYI, CHUKWUMA AGU PG/M.Sc./05/40184

PROJECT SUPERVISOR: Dr. ALOYSUIS- MICHAELS OKOLIE

DECEMBER, 2007. APPROVAL PAGE

his research project has been approved by the Department o litical Science, University b ".4igeria, Nsuldca as 11ieelingthe requirements for the award of Master of Science (M.Sc) Degree

-,:1Political Science (Intcrnntional Relations).

Dr. ~lo~sius&licl~aels0kolie Dr. ~&aniOnyebuchi !- * \ Projccl Supervisor !'. . .H~ed@epartmcnlof Political Science

Prgf. Okechl11w11ibeanu I lean, Faculty of the Social Sciences DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to the memory of my late parents, Mr. and Mrs. M. T. Itanyi, and to my two lovely sisters, Pat and Ekwy, who became my 'mothers' at their very tender ages and who have now grown and become mothers to my sweet nephew and nieces, Chukwuemela and Chizaram Ogbulafos, and Tanya Tony. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

When I started my M.Sc programme, Dr. Ogban Iyarn, one of my lecturers told me that "there is no short cut to knowledge," which I took for granted, but with Dr. Okolie as my supervisor; I finally realized that there is indeed no short cut to knowledge. Dr.Aloysuis- Micheals Okolie not only guided me, but also gave me his time by painstakingly reading, pointing out and correcting the mistakes I made in the beginning. With the knowledge Dr. Okolie has impacted in me, I can now face the world. To him, I owe a debt of gratitude. To Prof. Miriam Ikejiani Clark, you are indeed a definition of a good mother. Nothing I will say or do can givc you adequate Idea of how I appreciate your kind heart and listening ear. I will continue to pray Lo GOD to continue to bless you. To Prof. Asissi Asobie, who gave me some of the materials I used for this project, I say thank you sir. To my lecturers, Dr. Onyebuchi Ezeani, Head of Department, Political Science, Dr. Edeh, Dr. Ken Ifesinachi, Dr. Jonah Onuoha, Prof. Elochukwu Amucheazi and Dr. Ogban Iyam, please accept my sincere appreciation. To my fellow P.G colleagues, especially Ken Ugwuanyi, who assisted me in arranging and printing this project, I say a very big thank you. To my family members, Mr. Godwin Itanyi, Mr. Emma Itanyi, Mr. Joseph Ogbonna Itanyi and Prince Okezie Obgulafor, I remain grateful. To my friends and well wishers, especially Pastor Uzor Iheukwumere and Mr. Tony Odoemenam, I say thank you so much for your benevolence. To ALMIGHTY GOD, Who has always been the Shining Star that Lights My Path, all I have to say is THANK YOU LORD.

Itanyi, Chukwuma PG/M.Sc./05/40184 UNN TABLE OF CONTENTS

Title page ...... i . . Approval page...... II ... Dedication ...... IH Acknowledgment ...... iv Table of Contents ...... v List of Abbreviations ...... vi . . Abstract ...... VII

CllAPTER ONE 1,O Background of the stildy ...... 1 I. 1 Statement of Problem ...... 3 1.2 Objectives of Study ...... 10 1.3 Significance of Study ...... lo 1.4 Literature Review ...... I 1 1.5 Theoretical Framework ...... 27 1.6 Hypotheses ...... 32 1.7 Research Methodology ...... -32 1.8 Method of Data Collection ...... 34

CHAPTER TWO PREVENTIVE DIPLOMATIC MEDIATION AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT .... 35 2.0 introduction ...... 35 2.1 Preventive Diplomatic Mediation in the Management of Israel-Palestinian Conflicts: 1918-1948 ...... 36 2.2 Self- Determination, International Law, and Morality in the'creation of Israel:1918-1948...... 38 2.3 Preventive Diplomatic Mediation and Politics of Self- Determination: 1948-2006 ..43 2.4 Types of Diplomacy and Peace Keeping Operations ...... 46

CHAPTER THREE US FOREIGN RELATIONS AND THE MIDDLE-EAST CRISES...... 47 '3.0 Introduction ...... -47 3.1 America's Foreign Policy in the Middle- East ...... 54 3.2 America's Foreign Policy Towards Israel ...... 56 3.3 America's Foreign Policy Towards Palestine ...... 63 3.4 The Role of US in Resolving the Israeli-Palestinian Conflicts ...... 67 3.5 The Role of the UN in Resolving the Israeli-Palestinian Conflicts ...... 88 CHAPTER FOUR THE STATUS OF JERUSALEM AND THE MIDDLE-EAST CRISES ...... 89 4.0 Introduction ...... -89 4.1 The Status of Jerusalem: Two Peoples. One Land ...... 93 4.2 The Modem Conflicts and their Consequences ...... 94 4.3 Chronology of Major Events in the Middle-East from 1948-2006 ...... 98 4.4 Collective and Individual Freedoms in the Occupied Territories ...... 102 4.5 The Relationship Between Religion and Political Ideology In the Arab- Israeli Conflicts ...... 109

CHAPTER FIVE 5.0 Summary. Conclusions and Recommendations ...... 122 5.1 Summary ...... 122 5.2 Iicconimendations ...... -131 5.3 Conclusion ...... 133

BTBLlOGRAPHY ...... 135 APPENDIX ...... 144 vii

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AASS Anglo-American Survey Supplement ArPAC American Israeli Public Affairs Committee AJC American Jewish Community AMJ American Muslims for Jerusalem CIA Central Intelligence Agency EU European Union FTA Free Trade Agreement GB Great Britain GDP Gross Domestic Product GNP Gross National Product TDF Israeli Dcfense Force JNF Jewish National Fund NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 0AS Organization of American States 0AU Organization of African Unity PKO Pcace Kceping Operation PLO Palestinian Liberation Organization PNA Palestinian National Authority SU Soviet Union UNCP United Nations Committee on Palestine UNRWA United Nations Relief and Works Agency USA United States of America UK United Kingdom UN United Nations UNSC United Nations Security Council UNSCOP United Nations Special Committee on Palestine USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republic wzo World Zionist Organization viii

ABSTRACT

The study set out to evaluate the potency of the realist approaclz to conflict resolzrtion and international secwrity, and the role of the 'democratic peace' approach to international conflict management with a vielv to bringing out the prevailing ~izethorlswlziclz stakeholders in internatioizal system have applied irr resolving the Isrrreli-Palestirzia11 conflicts. The airn of the research was to provide a framework that explains how the realist approach to conjlict resolution and international security led to politicisation qf international cot~flictsand n~ediation.It also specrJies how the dejective upprotrch to conflic'f mnncI,qmierrt hnv /lot only led to internatioi~ali,~atioriof nrrtiorrcrl corrflicts hut also ,spccifies Iiow politici~~tioiiOJ ir~/crntrtiontrlconflict niarragernent hus heen institutioncr/izc.d through the r~rc.~.hunisnryf yr.even/ive tiiplon~ncy. We poststnr~uralist approach to internufiorral rekrtions which reassess the character untl the philosoplzical aid episteinologrral prepositiorrs oJ' the realist approach to cor1ffic.t i*t~solrrtionwid ilrternational security was arloptecl as our tmalyticczl framework to providu a conceptual foirntlation that explai~zsconflict managernei~tas u puliticul-econonzic control in the ha11d.s of intcrntitiunczl intervenors. as ~vllas explaining thc security dilemma in the Middle East, as well as the intmctuble nature of the Israeli- AraA-Pale,strniarz cotrflict. Our riletlzod of data collection was secondary sources of data involving descriptive, historical unalysis, which involves strictly quantitative method of data coIIection sotrrced ji-om the Global Negotiation Pruject databank sponsored by Haward University and contemporary press sources: Keesing's Contemporary Archives and the New Yorlc Tinm Inda. 7'he.following Izypotheticalpropositions were tested:

1. Preventive diplomatic mediation s~rcceedsnzore if it was attempted at the very early stage oftke conflict;

11. The tencle~icyby the United States to use her peace initiatives primarily to project her economic agenda conflicts with the Palestinian determination to wrest the disputed territories from Israeli occupation; and . .. 111. TIE lingering crises between the Israelis and the Palestinians are presently intractable cllre to both parties' rejjrsal to agree on the status of Jertisalern. AJier e.rarrziriirig the power resources and the impact of international nzediatiorz, arzd the determinants of the slrccess of preventive diplornutic niediatiorr, certain inferences were made: I) the greater the factiorzalisrrz witllin a state, the higher the likelihood that preverztive mediation will fail; 2) preventive interventiorl by third parties is best zrndertaken between adversaries that have well-defined and legitimate identities; 3) rrrediation has LZ better chance of s~rccesswhen each party is accorded full legitimacy; 4 ) disunity or lack of c-ohesion within a state makes it diflcult for the adversaries (as well as a mediator) to eizgage in any rnea~~ir~gfirl,forrnufprevcntive cliplo~nacy. The.jindings irrnderscorecl some critical problenl areas in which concerted action is required against the Ixrckdrop of Ambs declaring their willingness to share Iiistorical and religious sites of irnportance to both sides. The sturiy recoin~nendsthat Israel should adhere to UN resolutions and end the occupation of the territories it conquered and annexed in 1967, and allow the Palestinians to establish a viable, independent state alongside Israel as a resolution to the Israeli-Palestirlian and Israeli-Arub colljlict. CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

Israel has a right to exist ...to exist in safety within internationally recognized borders. (Koffi Annan, former UN Secretary General in a speech to the Arab league 312810 1)

Our position is that even if the Zionist State (Israel) is the size of a postage stamp it has no right to exist. (Imam Achrnad Cassiem, National Chairperson of the South African Islamic Unity Convention 05/23/02)

1.0 Background of the Study Conflicts do not occur when right clashes with wrong. Instead, they occur when right clashes with right. This is clearly attested to by both Israel and Palestine, both claiming its right to the land, and consistently maintaining that this right to the land in question is self evident and firmly based on God's will, morality, reason, and law (Stoessinger,l982:140). Conflict is produced by a clash of cultures, a disharmony of interests and/or a disparity of perception which result from the inability of the parties to the conflict to accept separately and together the environment they live in. Thus, the immediate context of any conflict is created by the attributes and the interactions of the parties. In addition, the more ideological a conflict becomes the more perennial it is likely to be. Thus, conflicts including the Arab-Israeli conflicts are perennial features of social interaction. Conflict may be social or political in character. This means that it may be a struggle over values or claims for status. Such conflicts may be between individuals, collectives or group of nations. The Arab-Israeli conflict subscribes to this, thus it is a conflict between the Arabs of Palestine and the Jews of Palestine. The Middle East crisis is often synonymous with the Arab- 1sraeli conflict. There is a sense in which this is correct. This is the extent to which the near cultural homogeneity of the Arab Middle East confers on the Arab-Jewish conflict. This portrays the image of a conflict between one socio-cultural unit- the Arab against another diametrically opposed socio-cultural unit-the Jewish race. The centre-piece of this conflict remains the ultimate status of the territory comprising the following cities, Israel, the West Bank and the Gaza strip. However, the Middle East is a large and diverse area whose geographical delimitation remains a matter of controversy. The Middle East lies at the intersection of Europe, Asia and Africa, with land, sea and air routes connecting these continents. The political units encompassed in this region represent a broad spectrum of political systems (from virtual theocracy to parliamentary democracy with military and other forms of dictatorial regimes). The region includes a number of ethnic and linguistic groups with varying socio-economic achievements. There is also a varying degree of international alignments. The geo-strategic significance of the region has made it an international focal point, with external powers competing for dominance, influence and control, as well as access to its resources and markets (Yigal, 1978:6). A greater part of this century has witnessed the never-ending conflicts between the Arabs and the Israelis. Britain divided the Palestine Mandate along the Jordan River and created in the territory east of the river, new entity called Trans-Jordan. Subsequently, she also created the Hashemite kingdom of Jordan. Arabs and Jews in the Yishiuv (the Jewish community in Palestine) clashed over the future of the territory West of the river from the inception of the Palestine Mandate in 1922 (Childers, 1968: 69). For the Jews of Palestine and the Zionist movement that encouraged and supported them, the goal was the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine. For the Arabs of Palestine and the Arab world, the objective was to retain Palestine as an Arab state within the broader Arab world, as they believed they had been promised in the Hussein-McMahon exchange of correspondence during the First World War. Tensions, demonstrations, and armed clashes between the rival camps in Palestine were common throughout the British Mandate period (1922-1948). Although various concepts for the ultimate disposition of the territory was put forward during the period between the World War, it culminated in the United Nations Committee on Palestine calling for the partition of Palestine. It also called for the creation of a Jewish state and an Arab state with Jerusalem under an international regime. The Jews accepted the plan, while the Arabs vehemently rejected and opposed it. The partition plan instead of helping to resolve existing conflict served as a prelude to other conflicts that escalated into a full-scale war in 1948. Thus the Israelis and the Palestinians are destined to live in close mutual proximity in a land which they both consider to be exclusively theirs. Although the Jews are the majority in the Israeli State, the non-Jewish inhabitants who are Israeli citizens and who live in the occupied territories of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza form the greater majority of the entire inhabitants. Despite the fact that the international community, especially the United Nations and the United States of America have employed several diplomatic means to end the modem crises between Israel and Palestine, there seems to be no end in sight to it. This has made some international relations analysts conclude that there may not be an end to the crises. Their conclusion is understandable because the more attempts are made at brokering a new peace accord between the conflicting parties, the more complex aspects of the conflict resurface. The reason for these ever increasing conflicts is not farfetched-both parties have continued to claim their rights in the uncnding crises.

Therefore, in this study, effort shall be made at probing into these inherent factors which have made permanent resolution of the crises an illusion. In addition, the study shall analyze the various diplomatic measures used in the Israeli-Palestinian peace accords or initiatives, the processes of the initiatives, as well as to examine the position of the U. S. as a key player in the Middle East crises.

1.1 Statement of Problem The main characteristic of the new security landscape lies in the fact that the gravest and the most frequent conflicts today emerge not between, but within the states. New threats and dangers have necessitated for more flexible and subtle responses to the increasing number of regional and intra-state crises. For instance, more than 80 conflicts, involving at least 64 governments, took place in the immediate few years following the end of the Cold War. Of these conflicts, 35 resulted in large-scale fatalities of 1,000 deaths or more. In 1992-93 alone close to one million people died as a result of conflicts, and 20 million refugees had to flee from international or other kinds of conflict. The United Nations alone found itself involved in more than 13 peace-keeping operations during that year - the most in its 50 year history. Much of the conflicts since 1989 have typically occurred not between states, but within states. Out of 94 conflicts since 1989 only two conflicts were of the traditional inter-state kind; all others involved civil conflicts or state formation conflicts (Wallensteen and Sollenberg, 1995:104). The Arab-Israeli conflicts have, without doubt become. the most protracted conflicts the modern world has witnessed. The conflicts have its genesis in the establishment of the Jewish State of Israel (a tiny state nestled in a hostile Arab world dozens of times its size) in 1948 in a land the Palestinians insist is theirs and have vowed never to give up. According to Biblical perspective, the Israelis believe that the same land in question which they are living today was given to them by God. Therefore, they are ever determined to secure it, and this, they have been doing doggedly, not only with the help of Jews in Diaspora, but also with the help of nations like the United States whose support has partially guaranteed their continued existence. The Jews see Palestine as their 'Zion', and no other place in the world can give them the same psychological satis1;clction Palestine gives them. This has infom~edtheir determination to cling to and defend it from any infidel. For them, the land belongs to the Jews and they have come to stay. All these opposing views have made the Middle East a "time bomb" which could 'explode' if adequate and concise efforts are not channelled into preventing further crises. Thus Middle East has become a test for the international community's ability to prevent, mitigate and/or resolve conflicts in the post-Cold War period. Some argue that there is no such thing as "the Middle East Conflict." They claim that there are in fact two conflicts, with two different victims. The first conflict is between Israel and the Arabs; the second is between Israel and the Palestine. In the first conflict between Israel and the Arabs, Israelis see themselves as victims who face existential threat, not only from Palestinians, but also from other Arab enemies who wish Israel to disappear from the face of the earth and who have no interest in peace with what they call "the Zionist entity." These enemies include Iran, Syria, Lebanon etc. (Sinclair, 2006: 14). In the Israeli- Palestinian conflict, the Palestinians see themselves as the victims whose land was forcefully taken away and some of her citizens driven into exile. They are the ones who face genuine existential threat, and the only people in the Middle East who are currently denied their right to self-determination. As far as they are concerned, for all the talk of peace since the days of Oslo, Israel still controls their lives in innumerable ways, and continues to build neighbourhoods around Jerusalem. This, they view as a situation that seriously diminish any chance for a Palestinian state, while the international community, including the Arab states, in spite of all their claims to support the Palestinian course, have never come close to doing anything to make the state of Palestine a reality. The tragedy is that both the Israelis and the Palestinians are correct. Israel is under genuine existential threat from a variety of Arab sources. The Israelis are right to feel victimized by this threat, while the Palestinians who have not yet been granted self determination are also right to feel victimized by their status vis-a -vis Israel. Thus the international community (especially great powers like the United States and Great Britain) now face new challenges and responsibilities with regards to resolving the above conflict scenario. In an attempt to resolve the conflict, a system of collective security has been supplemented with new mechanisms like peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations. However, both traditional and non-traditional mechanisms for maintaining peace and security have shown to be insufficient and non-effective. To mediate in crises, powerful nations have often assumed a leadership role in international relations by becoming involvcd in ethnic conflict arising within small states. Recently however, their willingness to do so, at least unilaterally, has diminished. The threats to international peace and stability may have changed their nature and location, but they remain as menacing as ever. By any conceivable standard, the presence and intensity of conflict in the post Cold War era has been remarkably high; the geographical area involved has been considerable; and the number of people affected by it have been truly significant. This automatically reinforces a leadership role by powerful nations in international conflict management. Much of the empirical literatures suggest that outside interventions tend to lengthen the expected duration of civil wars. The authors argue that the divergence can be found in how models of intervention are specified in the literature. They propose a model with two novel contributions. First, they incorporate mediations as the key to resolving the strategic problems that the civil war parties face. Second, they account for the decaying effect of interventions over time. Their results suggest that diplomacy is critical for understanding the duration of civil conflicts. They find that mediation has a dramatic effect on the expected duration of a civil war and that when controlling for diplomatic efforts, economic interventions can also reduce the expected duration.

Outside actors are not likely to be a major driver of either violence or the prospects for stability because of the self-sustaining character of the political dynamics. For instance, external interveners, especially, the super powers, notably, the United States are often seen as having priorities other than regime change in mind. Even where dialogue has been employed, diplomatic dialogue is not often seen as a seal of approval as states often result to "self-help". Rather; it is a tool for engaging both friends and adversaries in finding areas where interests overlap. Beyond damage control and containment, a positive evolution of the situation in the Middle-East would require mutually reinforcing actions by both Israel and Palestine and other states in support of decisions.

Yet whether to use force or diplomacy in dealing with adversaries is usually a false dichotomy. Lessons from the cold war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact illustrate the usefulness of diplomacy instead of war. Both had the means to annihilate one another, yet they maintained full diplomatic relations and even had summit meetings. Thus, the use of diplomacy can lead to the prcvcntion of tcwible outcomes. However, in spite of the manifest publicity given to diplomacy, foreign policies of nations are overly dominated by use of military measures without the guidance of an adequate diplomatic framework. One such period was the U.S "witless use of force" in its involvement in Lebanon in 1983 and 1984, and in Iraq in 2003. However, experience has shown that such grcat military power will only be effective in the context of diplomacy that is both robust and flexible. In other words, there is no contradiction between the use of diplomacy and military force since the two work best in tandem. This is especially so because trying to use diplomacy when an adversary saw that it was not backed up by the potential use of force predisposes such an actor to danger. At such point, diplomacy not backed with the sword, that is 'toothless diplomacy' becomes an empty word. The fact that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is part of a wider Arab- Israeli dispute affecting Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria in particular is a problem in itself. Given the intractable and destructive nature of conflicts, new approaches are needed to reduce the likelihood of widespread violence and killing and the fragmentation of societies. It was in this light that in 1992, the U.N. Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, brought this concern into focus with the publication of 'An Agenda for Peace', which presented a vision of the international organization not only as a peacekeeper, but also as an agent more involved in the areas of early warnings of conflicts and devising preventive measures. From theoretical point of view, and of praxis in conflict management, there are series of political options ranging from non-coercive to coercive measures: diplomatic, political, economic and military instruments appropriate to the evolution of a dispute before it erupts into conflict. In the spirit of Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations, these measures taken as a whole correspond to a period of 'unstable peace' or a 'negative' period (characterized by tension and suspicion between the parties but in which violence is absent or sporadic). The instruments chosen and applied so far include fact-finding, observer missions, diplomatic and economic forms of pressure, and the preventive interposition of troops. These therefore, implied harder measures such as economic or diplomatic sanctions and the threat of the use of force, especially if there is any escalation of violence. This distinction between 'soft' and 'hard' measures also corresponds to a distinction between types of dispute to which they are applied. To put it another way, non-coercive strategies have better chances of success in the early stages of a dispute, whereas cocrcivc strategies arc more suited to a situation in which positions havc polarized. Despite many discussions on thc issue, thcre is still no common and crystallized approach advocated both by scholars in the field of intcmational security studies and those in the field of peace and conflict research. The former rely on so-called "hard" and "soft" measures in conflict prevention, while the later insist on exclusion of pressures and threat of use of force. Thus, the demarcation line dividing these two main approaches can be specified as a collision of preventive measures backed by force (if necessary) and non-violent conflict prevention. Moreover, peace researchers prefer discussion on conflict transformation rather than on conflict prevention. They also differ from the security researchers regarding the question of whether conflict is something normal. In other words, the main problem in these two approaches is a choice between power and non-violent conflict resolution. Three main categories of policies for conflict prevention measures for dealing with the range of conflicts we face today generally fall under early warning systems, confidence-building measures and mediation, and related diplomatic missions. Preventive diplomacy emphasizes prevention rather than cure. It combines all aspects of the peace process, and is designed to institute a process of early conflict resolution. Central to preventive diplomacy is the objective of reducing tensions before they result in a violent conflict. Other related objectives of preventive diplomacy include stopping existing conflicts fiom escalating further, and limiting the spread of any ongoing conflict. Nevertheless, there is a general agreement in the literature that "the success or failure of mediation is largely determined by the nature of the dispute" (Ott, 1972517). Naturally, the choice of any conflict management mode and the chances of successful intervention are affected by the importance each adversary attaches to the issues in the dispute. When vital interests are affected, for example, issues of sovereignty or territorial integrity, mediation may unlikely have much of an impact on the dispute. To begin with, the duration of a dispute and the timing of the mediation may determine, to a large extent, the likelihood of the mediation's success. To be effective, mediation must take place at the right moment. There is little agreement on when a conflict is "ripe" for mediation, or even on how to recognize such ripeness. Edmead (1971), claims that preventive mediation is more likely to succeed if it is attempted at a very early stage of the conflict, and certainly well before a threshold of violence has been crossed. Others, such as Northedge and Donelan (1971), Ott (1972), and Pruitt (1981) suggest that mediation is more likely to be effective if it is initiated after each side has experienced a sense of failure and shown a willingness to moderate its intransigence. There have been several initiatives and proposals since 1945 such as the first Camp David summit, the Madrid Conference, and the Oslo Accords initiated to find a peaceful resolution of conflicts between Israel and Palestine, yet there seems to be no hope for an end to the crises. Sequel to the series of attempts at fostering a lasting and enduring peace between the lsraelis and the Palestinians, on one hand, and the Israelis and the Arabs on the other, which have all failed, this intractable problem has continued to draw world wide concern. Massive global concern has turned to the Middle East in order to find a solution to the conflict. Since mediation is a key component of preventive diplomacy, the ever increasing number of international conflicts, their complexity, intractability, their wasteful costs, and the untold sorrows they have brought to mankind demand that the world focus more attention on preventive diplomacy. The major stumbling block for peace in the Middle East is the approach adopted by the U.S which has been futile and counter-productive because it has been based on a belief that Arabs will eventually come to terms with the fact that Israel has come to stay, and that Palestinians that have been displaced will eventually abandon the hope of returning to their occupied homeland and seek alternative resettlement elsewhere. Since true and long lasting security for the Israeli people would be better answered by the emergence of a West Bank State than by short term policy of granting autonomy to the region under Israeli or Palestinian rule, the major problem is not what the final peace settlement in the Middle East is going to look like, but how it is going to be achieved. Israel's claim to sovereignty over the West Bank and Gaza Strip has no validity in international law, yet the principles used in preventive diplomatic mediation grants Israel (recognized existing nation-state) to determine its form of government and destiny but deny the Palestine the right to justify its own self-determination. The inherent contradiction between in the current political instability in the Middle East between Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs is due to a lack of understanding of Israeli nationalism on the part of the Palestinians. Thus, without Arab recognition of Israel's right to exist as a Jewish state, any peace process is obviously doomed to fail. The inability to mainstream this fact in the prevailing preventive diplomatic mediation strategy is a major lacuna in the literature. Many different international security organizations, state representatives, and prominent iildividuslls have, for several years, been engaged in search of a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflicls. For that purpose, a variety of methods, techniques and inechanislns for conflict management were employed with minor success. The failure of the international community was a consequence of its inability to understand the complexity of Israel and Palestine legacies and the logic of external intervention in domestic affairs. The missing link in their actions has been the lack of awareness that all Israeli and Palestinian conflicts have always been deeply interrelated and interdependent. The other missing point is the inability to realize the fact that the greater the cultural differences between disputants, the less likelihood of successfbl mediation. Rather, the internal composition, cultural and ethnic differences, and degree of homogeneity are being politicized and elevated to the level of international terrorism by the West, without first addressing the question on why the Palestinians willingly carry out suicide attacks on Israelis even at the price of their own life. No amount of mediation by a third party is likely to prevent the outbreak of hostilities without addressing these facts. This present work therefore, sets out to fill these gaps by providing plausible and valid answers to the questions stated below: i. Is preventive diplomatic mediation more likely to succeed if it is attempted at a very early stage of,the conflict?

. . 11. Why has the Israeli - Palestinian conflict persisted despite the various peace proposals initiated over the years for the resolution of the conflict? ... 111. Are disagreements arising out of the inability of both parties to agree on the status of Jerusalem responsible for persistence of Israeli-Palestinian conflict?

1.2 Objectives of Study The economic and strategic importance of the Middle East has made the region very important to global peace and security. Turbulent times stimulate re-examination of orthodox theory and invigorate the search for reconstructed principles to guide thinking (Benard,1977:165- 169).The Middle East has been engulfed in these turbulent times for the greater part of the ccntury. The major purposes or objectives of this research shall be:

To examine whether preventive diplomatic mediation would have succeeded if the same right given to Israel was accorded Palestine at a very early stage of the conflict. To explain the consequences of the use of Peace initiative in pursuit of economic agenda in furtherance of national interest by the West in the Middle East on the Israeli- Palestinian conflict.

To explore if the lingering crises between Israelis and Palestinians are partly due to the refusal of both parties to reach a consensus over the status of Jerusalem

1.3 Significance of the Study

The seemingly intractable nature of the conflict in the Middle East since the beginning of this century has made the different several peace initiatives embarked upon by both the United Nations and other world leaders appear inappropriate. The field of international relations is awash with proposals for resolving the bitter struggle. Proposals for settlement range from direct compromises along Arab-Israeli frontiers to indirect scheming such as those of the United Nations' economic rehabilitation of the whole Middle East. Innumerable plans to bring peace to the Middle East have been conceived, ranging from a liquidation of the Jewish State on one hand, to Arab acceptance of Israel on the other hand. The question then is; why has peace continued to elude the Middle East? This has agitated the minds of scholars and statesmen, policy-makers and concerned individuals the world over, hence the significance of this study. This implies that new avenues and proposals should be sought that would transcend the failures and shortcomings of the previous efforts. The study draws its significance at two levels, namely theoretical and practical. At the theoretical level, this study is a timely contribution to ongoing international debates on the Middle East conflict. It is obvious that disunity or lack of cohesion within the Middle East makes it difficult for the adversaries as well as a mediators to engage in any meaningful form of preventive diplomacy; and that the greater the imbalance between one party's peaceful methods of conflict resolution as compared to the other (the 'balance of peace') the greater the likelihood of war. In predicting the prospects for peace, the study, therefore, complements the worlts of other scholars who have tasked the preventive engagement and the realist approach to conflict resolution and intcrnational security. In addition, part of the significance of thc study inheres from the fact that the study providcs a critique of the 'democraticpeace' approach to international conflict ~nanagementby evaluating whether the 'deinocratic perzce' approach, or the realist approach to conflict resolution and international security has enhanced international peace or led to politickation of international conflicts. It is in view of the above that this research became more imperative in the face of the global concern for peace and stability which has already become an emergent paradigm around which the international community is being mobilized in the fight against terrorism. Since mediation is not a panacea, nor can it solve or prevent all conflicts, the study provides at the practical level, an alternative to the realists' approach to international conflict resolution. This could be done by making the public become aware of the possibility of a perspective that strives for a conflict resolution that satisfies the legitimate needs of the parties and at the same time meeting the needs of the wider community. In this way the study will have proffered a strategy with which the polar power balance between the parties can be harmonized in such a way that the weaker ones are protected, and the strong not made weaker, hence a "triple win" situation.

1.4 Literature Review There exist an abundance of materials on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and also the roles of the United Nations and the United States in the conflict. This posed for the researcher the problem of selecting appropriate and most recent works on the subject. To avoid the problems, this review is grouped into basic frameworks and themes. First is a general review of works on the Arab-Israeli conflict. Second, is review of the works on organizational approaches of preventing and managing international conflicts comprising of preventive diplomacy; peace- making; peace-keeping; and peace-building. This includes a review on theoretical and empirical study of the mediation process in the real world, and on the nature of international mediation as well as the conditions for effective mediation.

Framework A: Overview of the Arab-Israeli conflict. According to Meir in the 'Psychologicul Dinzension of the Arab-Israeli Conflict' the inherent contradiction between the national aspirations of Arabs and Israelis is attributed to a lack of understanding of Israeli Natioi~alismon the part of the Arabs. He argues that the most important aspect of the Middle East dispute has been each side's failure to understand the other's emotional and psychological nccds. The political and territorial disputes that havc chslracterised the conflict since 1948 resulted in part from basic psychological differences. Each side's misapprehension of the other's motives and action has prolonged the hostility, impaired diplomatic efforts and made the dispute appear deadlocked.

The creation of the state of Israel in 1948 was based on several fundamental principles that Israel deemed non-negotiable. Palestine territory alone could provide the only site that would be historically, culturally and religiously meaningful. Palestine or Zion was the source, the birthplace of Jewish culture and faith, and the land where God first appeared to the Jews. It was here too that the first and second temples were erected. No other land, it was felt could offer then1 the same kind of haven from harassment and the recovery of lost heritage. He went further to argue that although the Arabs do not deny in principle the historical, cultural and religious relationship between the Jews and Palestine, they maintain nonetheless, that the creation of Israel was based on the Western feeling for the persecuted Jews especially after the Nazi experience. Also, the Western powers' drive to implant an imperialist tool in the midst of Arab nations for long-term political expediency accounts for this (Meir, 1977:432). Ho\Xlever, whether it was guilt feeling on the part of the Western countries or Jewish 'historical right', the existence of a growing and thriving Jewish community in Palestine has come to stay. The Arabs claimed that for 140 years, the Middle East had been pre-eminently the spiritual centre of Islam, the birth place of Muslim faith and the home of the Arabs. He is of the view that the clash in Palestine is not between nations and colonialists, but between two nationalist movements. He went further to state that both are in their own ways right and thus irreconcilable. Giving a proposal for possible peaceful resolution, Stroun and Finger in their work stated that true and long lasting security for the Israeli people would be better answered by the emergence of a West Bank State than by short term policy of granting autonomy to the region under Israeli or Palestinian rule. Such a state could be effectively established on a basis similar to that which led to the independence of Austria after the Second World War. Generally, the conclusions would entail three things: a state of permanent neutrality, prohibition of any union with any other country, and a guarantee of internal democracy, and forces. This they believe is a compromise which would attract realistic Arab leaders. The conflict developed other different dimcnsions and problem areas after the 1973 war, According to Michacl (1975) nearly two years after the 1973 war, the borders of Israel remained substantially the same with those attained in June 1967. The combined Egyptian and Syrian attacks in October 1973 caught the Third World by surprise. It was deemed successful as much for the degree of unity it elicited fi-om the Arab world as for the tactical surprise achieved against Israeli defense force. This unity, however, disintegrated under pressure of competing interests. He contends that while Egypt and Syria were struggling for Arab leadership at the Rabat Summit, Israeli forces were quietly re-arming. As Israeli military strength increased, Rabin took several political initiatives. The Israelis purchased land on the West Bank outside Israeli settlements; built highways connecting Tel Aviv and Jerusalem; constructed a new industrial centre situated on the West Bank, and finally, constructed settlements named Katzabeye in the centre of the Golan Heights. Everyone seems to agree that the key elements of an Arab-Israeli peace are: withdrawal, resettlement, and recognition of the state of Palestine. However, the steps towards the realization of these are dragging and faltering. Sholmo (1978) blamed the United States for the slow progress towards peace. According to him, the major stumbling block for peace in the Middle East is the methodology adopted by the United States in its quest to further an effective settlen~ent. According to him, the United States' approach is futile and counter-productive. For him, the major problem is not what the final peace settlement in the Middle East is going to look like, but how it is going to be achieved. He maintains that Kissinger's diplomacy was based on one assumption- that the conflict cannot be solved through a series or piecemeal agreement. Speaking on the future of the conflict, Childers posits that the Arab-Israeli conflict remains a fatal deadlock. The general belief is that Arabs will eventually come to terms with the fact that Israel has come to stay, and that Palestinians that have been displaced will eventually abandon the hope of returning to their occupied homeland and seek alternative resettlement elsewhere. Also Zionism has refused to be drawn into further conflict with Israel. These according to him appear to be the prevailing assumptions held by both the West and Israel. But he asks the questions: What if these assumptions turn out to be wrong? Speculating on the place of the Palestinians in the peace settlement, Micheal (1980) contends that Israel's claim to sovereignty over the West Bank and Gaza Strip has no validity in international law. The Camp David agreements provide for the possibility of a future compromise between Israel and other Arab states over the states of the West Bank and Gslzsl but does not go far in meeting Palestinians' demands that thc establishment of the state of Israel was a lcgal nullity because it violated the legal right of the Palestinians, and that this nullity can only be cured if Palestinians recognise the state of Israel. He concludes by saying that Palestinians therefore should not be a party to recognise Israel unless Israel recognises the Palestinian right to self-determination. Writing on the U.S involvement, Tucker (1978) stated that against the general background of the Middle East situation as it has developed since 1973, a more ambitious American policy is not rooted in assurance that comes from a stable position of power, but rather from the anxiety that has resulted from an awareness of growing vulnerability. This awareness forms the principal motivation that has prompted a deepened American involvement in the Middle East. Benard and Cancy (1977) contend that efforts at achieving an Arab-Israeli settlement havc shared two general characteristics in the period between 1947 and 1977. All have, according to them, tried to achieve an agreed solution which would result in peace for the region, and none has succeeded in producing a settlement between the parties on the central substantive issues. Their article reviews the more salient and significant official proposals put forward by the parties and by the major outside player (the U.N), in order to discern the factors that have determined the direction of the peace efforts. There has been a host of proposals designed to move the situation forward. They argued that in some cases, the lack of success in reaching an agreement may be attributed to the unwillingness or inability of the parties to accept the suggestions. While commenting on the chances of a peaceful settlement, (Yigal 1978) states that four factors will determine any eventual agreement between Israel and other Arab states: the nature of peace, boundary, security arrangements, and the Palestinian issue. According to him, the only Arab consensus concerning a Palestinian entity is that it should serve as a tool to undermine lsraeli existence. The main protagonist of this idea is the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO). The PLO constitution defined its raison d'etre in terms of the destruction of the state of Israel. Confrontation is therefore, at the heart of all the ambitions of the PLO. No compromise is permissible. Commenting on the deepening of the conflict following the 1967 war, Rodinson (1968) maintains that Israel won the June 1967 war while the Arabs lost. A decision was reached within six days that put an end to the conflict. For him, has everything been said on the subject? Has the curtain fallen on the Arab-Israeli drama? .By no mcans, he continued, the contest may be seen in n new light but the slates and the pledges remain unchanged and the issues unresolved. He posits that two main questions remain to be addressed; will Israeli be accepted by her neighbours? Will the anti-imperialist revolt of the Arabs go on? These two questions are inescapable, and the same war has not made them easier to answer. If Israel is to be accepted by her neighbours, within which boundaries, and to what extent? He concludes by saying that the situation has not changed in this respect. The same war has done nothing to compel the Arab states to grant recognition to Israel though it is not impossible that a new military campaign would force them to take this step. However, such an approach would be fought with many dangers. Commenting on the role of the US in this conflict, Rosen stated that the US can help in achieving peace in the Middle East but the very belief that the United States holds the key to the problem may be counter-productive. The Egyptians in particular and the Arabs in general will not accept a territorial compromise. With regard to Israel, the United States must realize that a necessary evolution of attitudes cannot be engineered from outside or achieved overnight. He concluded by saying that as the Israelis observe the implications of their own position during the discussion with the Arabs, a political maturation process will occur and then progress can take place naturally. Many proposals have been put forward for the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The proposals are varied on the road to peace. Placed in the context of Global Politics, Dietrich Jung in his work 'The Middle East and Pulestine: Global Politics and Regional Conflict', contested stereotypes of Palestine in particular, arguing that the regional patterns of conflict and violence have been deeply moulded by international and trans-national relations, rather than being the result of a peculiar Middle Eastern culture. This theoretically informed historical perspective examines the evolution of Palestine as a political territory and the institutional and ideological aspects of Palestinian nationalism. It discerns patterns of nationalist conflict not dissimilar to that found in European history and demonstrates that the war-prone emergence of the Middle Eastern state system fits tightly into the logic of international politics (Dietrich Jung, 2004: 3-35). Citing Morten Valbjom, the author posits that though two approaches to Middle Eastern politics have replaced the previous neglect of culture by International Relations scholars, this change has over-emphasised the focus on culture. According to the author who corroborated the view of Bernard Rougier, this overemphasis on culture has led to the process of forging a new religiously defined identity, which in turn has led Palestinian refugees to violently reject the traditional symbols of Palestinian nationalism while opting for a trans-national Islamist movcment engaged in a global stniggle.

Framework B: Diplomatic Approaches of Prevention and Management of International Conflicts Boutros-Ghali (1992) identifies four possible organizational approaches of preventing and managing international conflicts; preventive diplomacy; peace-making; peace-keeping; and peace- building. Peace making is an approach to conflict that seeks to bring hostile parties to an agreement by peaceful means. Peacemaking techniques include negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, adjudication or any other means the parties may choose. Peacemaking may be further enhanced by mobilizing resources and financial assistance and using these as leverage to achieve a cessation of hostilities and a peaceful resolution. If all peacemaking efforts fail, other policies of conflict management may have to be instituted. Peace-keeping is an approach designed to separate hostile parties, contain the severity of a conflict, reduce tensions and provide opportunities and incentives for resuming negotiations. Peace- keeping is an attempt to interpose between the parties and thus stop a conflict from hrther escalation. As a result of the 1956 Suez Crisis, the United Nations is frequently credited with inventi& modern peace-keeping. As an international response to conflict, peace-keeping has become so popular that it has stretched to their limits the U.N.'s organizational, financial, logistic and personnel resources. Peace-keeping by the United Nations has been particularly popular in the post Cold War era when as many peace-keeping operations were launched by the U.N. in three recent years, as was the case in the previous 45 years. Peace-building measures, on the other hand include efforts to identify and create structures which will support a sense of certainty, confidence, and security between previously hostile parties. Peace-building measures are designed to be applied at the post-conflict phase and to create structures that can ensure that a conflict will not be reignited. Such measures usually take the form of concrete cooperative projects from which all parties involved may benefit, or joint programmes and developments that reduce hostility and foster a commitment to peace and economic development. Once sustained, successful peace-building measures produce an environment that can avoid the breakdown of peaceful conditions. Although thc rnnge of possible responses to conflict seems quite broad, it has not been particularly adequate. A better understanding of the different measures that may prevent or halt conflicts and the possible complement of these approaches - might help us to strengthen mechanisms of conflict rcsolution, and face the challenge of conflict more effectively in the contemporary international system. According to Bercovitch (2004) in 'Under-standing Mediation S Role in Preventive Diplonzacy ', preventive diplomacy emphasizes prevention rather than cure, combines all aspects of the peace process, and is designed to institute a process of early conflict resolution. Central to preventive diplomacy is the objective of reducing tensions before they result in a violent conflict. The U.N., a regional agency, or other potential interveners, may be informed of potential trouble- spots, or critical crises, and asked to undertake whatever measures or circumstances are warranted to defuse the crisis. Other related objectives of preventive diplomacy include stopping existing conflicts from escalating further, and limiting the spread of any ongoing conflict. Confidence-building measures play a very different role in preventing conflict. Nothing poses a greater threat to peace and security than uncertainty, anxiety, reciprocal fears, and misperceptions. These factors drive, fuel, and escalate all manners of conflicts. Confidence- building measures are simply designed to lower uncertainty, reduce anxiety, eliminate misperceptions, and increase confidence. When parties have confidence in each other's intentions and future behaviour, peaceful relationships can be sustained. Confidence-building measures are designed to prevent conflicts by changing perceptions, and thus the overall climate within which a conflict'may occur. A number of confidence-building regimes in Europe and in parts of the Middle East, South Asia, and the South Pacific have operated quite success~llybilaterally or multilaterally. Such measures should be extended to other regions of the world, and applied to conflicts within, as well as between states. Four types of confidence-building measures can be adopted to prevent conflicts. They include: a) Joint and explicit declaration on an internationally-accepted code of conduct (e.g., respect for non-combatants, prohibiting the use of chemical and biological weapons, etc.) b) Agreement on information exchange and increased communication to assuage each party's fears about military intentions and activities; Observations and inspections, through the exchange of military delegations, or the use of low-orbiting satellites, to ensure genuine transparency of intentions. c) Mutual agreement on measures of constraints, (that is, each party in a potential conflict binds itself not to use force under some specified circumstances, to ban certain kinds or weapons, or establish buffer zones). All thesc mcasures havc the potential to prevent a tense situation fiom escalating into a full-blown conflict.

Framework C: The Nature of International Mediation

Mediation can be central in the development of effective policies for the prevention of conflict. The practice of settling disputes through intermediaries has had a rich history in all cultures, both Western and non-Western (Gulliver, 1979). In the present international environment, with the challenges of ethnic and internal conflicts, an anarchical society, and the absence of generally accepted "rules of the game", mediation is about as common as conflict itself. As a form of conflict management, mediation is most likely to take place when: * Conflicts are complex or drawn out and last for a long time; * The disputants' own efforts to deal with the conflict fail to yield positive results; * Neither side is prepared to countenance further escalation of the dispute; and * When the disputants are prepared to break their pattern of conflict by co-operating with each other and eniaging in some contact and communication (Bercovitch, 1984:64). Mediation is rarely implemented as a discrete activity, nor does the process exhibit the same form in every case. Rather, mediation spans a spectrum of behaviour ranging from the passive (e.g. go-between) to the highly active (e.g. putting pressure on parties). The form and character of mediation in a particular conflict are determined by many factors which include the phase of the conflict, the nature of the conflict, the nature of the mediator, and a number of other cultural and contextual variables. In general, mediation can be defined as a preventive form of conflict management where parties seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help fiom an individual, group, state, or organization to prevent or resolve a conflict without resorting to physical force and violence (Wall 1981 ; Dryzek and Hunter, 1987). Even a cursory survey of recent conflicts reveals the extent, and heterogeneity, of mediation in the context of preventive diplomacy. In recent years, we have seen the involvement of such actors as the United Nations (in the Vietnam-Cambodia dispute, in Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, the Afghanistan conflict, and the Iraq-Kuwait dispute); the Pope (in the Beagle Channel dispute); the Organization for African Unity (in the Tanzania-Uganda dispute and also in South-Wcst Africa); the Organization 01 American States (in the Nicaragua); the Arab League; thc Islamic Conference and Algeria (in the Iran-Iraq dispute); Algeria (in the US.-Iran hostage crisis); thc United Kingdom (in the Rhodesia-Zimbabwe dispute); President Carter in Haiti; Cynls Vance in Bosnia; and the United States (in numerous mediation attempts in Middle East conflicts). But how does mediation actually work to prevent conflicts? Under what conditions is it effective? And can it succeed as a preventive strategy? These are just some of the questions that require an answer if mediation is to prevent more human suffering and loss of life. Such questions can best be answered by undertaking and answered at the empirical level.

Framework D: Theoretical and empirical study of the mediation process in the real world. Studying the Conditions for Effective Mediation The idea that mediation can prevent disputes from arising, or limit their scope and intensity once they have arisen, is both appealing and simplistic. It is surely better to prevent than to cure. ' But mediation cannot be applied indiscriminately to all potentially explosive situations, nor is it likely to be successful in all cases. The relationship between mediation and successful conflict resolution outcomes is frequently mentioned, rarely defined, and widely misunderstood. Same scholars, such as Arthur Meyer, emphasize the unique aspects of mediation and the impossibility of generating any useful conclusions about mediation as a preventive conflict management strategy. To Meyer (1960:161) the "...task of the mediator is not an easy one. The sea that he sails is only roughly charted and its changing contours are not clearly discernible. He has no science of navigation, no fund inherited fiom the experience of others. He is a solitary artist recognizing at most a few guiding stars and depending on his personal powers of divination." This view is echoed by another experienced mediator, William Simkin (1971: 27) who notes that "the variables [in mediation] are so many that it would be an exercise in futility to attempt to describe typical mediator behaviour with respect to sequence, timing or the use or non-use of the various f~mctionstheoretically available." Others, much influenced by organizational development theories move from an anecdotal to a normative approach in their construct of mediation. These analysts suggest, in a generic fashion, that a particular form of mediation or consultation that involvcs behavioural scientists (and takes the form of non-evaluative consultation or facilitating communication) can initiate change, produce successfid outcomes and prevent conflicts from escalating at any level from the interpersonal to the international (Burton, 1984). Neither the anecdotal nor the narrativc approach is quite satisfactory. The former cmphasizes certain aspects of a conflict and assumes that all conflicts are different and that nothing meaninghl can be said about broad patterns of preventive mediation and conflict outcomes. The latter, concerning itself with the subjective elements of perception and communication, assumes that no conflict is too intractable or insoluble, and that experienced mediators can remove all the obstacles to a successful settlement. Neither approach has really stimulated much-needed einpirical research.

Framework E: The Contingency Approach A more promising method of analysis is what has been referred to as the "contingency approach" to understanding mediation. This approach treats the outcomes of mediation efforts (be they successful or not) as dependent or contingent upon the environment (or context) of a conflict and the manner of behaviour within it. This approach basically holds that there are conflict situations where mediation can be effective, and does in fact, succeed, and that there are also conflict situations where mediation simply cannot achieve anything either proactively or actively. A key task is to differentiate between the two kinds of conflict. To use the contingency approach (or, for that matter, the anecdotal or narrative), it is necessary to obtain information on the incidence of international conflicts and the practice of international mediation. A great many quantitative studies describe the occurrence and analyze the important patterns of international conflicts. These are well summarized by Bremer (1993). The political context of states can be divided into five regime types: monarchies; one-party states; military regimes; multiparty democratic states; and others. While democratic states accounted for 30 percent of all those states involved in mediation attempts in this study, they usually resort to mediation only when their adversaries are non-democratic states. Only 6.7 percent of all mediation attempts involved disputes where both parties were democratic states. Overall, the kind of political system does not greatly impact on the chances of mediation. Preventive mediation may be undertaken in any context, irrespective of the internal political arrangement of the states involved in conflict. One can also examine whether such factors as internal composition, cultural and ethic differences, and degree of homogeneity might affect the success or failure of mediation. Preventive intervenlion by third parties is besl undcrtaken between adversaries that have well-defined and legitimate idenlities. A mediator's job is hardly likely to prove easier if ~hcgovcmment of one of the states involved is alrcady experiencing an insurgency, rebellion, or any other serious internal threat. Mediation has a better chance of success when each party is accorded full legitimacy. Disunity or lack of cohesion withln a state makes it difficult for the adversaries (as well as a mediator) to engage in any meaningful form of preventive diplomacy. The successive failures of any mediation attempt in Lebanon, Cyprus and the former Yugoslavia illustrate this point only too well. The relationship between internal unity and successful conflict management has been alluded to by others. Modelski (1964), Raymond and Kegley (1985) state that "the greater the cultural differences between disputants, the less likelihood of successful mediation". Kressel and Pn~itt(1989) support this argument by suggesting that internal discord within a state has a negative impact on its interactions with other states. The greater the factionalism within a state, the higher the likelihood that preventive mediation will fail. Looking at this relationship empirically, it was found that mediations where one or both of the parties are culturally fragmented have a 54.4 percent chance of success. Where one or both of the parties have no significant cultural minority, the chances of successful mediation are as high as 64.4 percent. Where one or both parties have a significant cultural minority, the chances of mediation success drop to 38.4 percent. Preventive mediation works best with ~nfra~gnentedactors. Another contextual factor relates to the relative power of the parties in conflict. Is there a relationship between the power and capabilities of states, or their discrepancies, and the possible effectiveness of preventive mediation? Ott (1972) and Young (1967) suggest that the smaller the power differences between the adversaries, the greater the effectiveness of international mediation, which seems like a logical point to make. In cases of clear power disparity, the stronger adversary may not be prepared to make any concessions or compromises that are essential to mediation success. Yet others, such as Deutsch (1973) argue that conflicts in which there is "a mutual recognition of differential power and legitimacy" will be more easily resolved. The presence of a fairly unambiguous advantage by one of the parties may well create clearer incentive toward a settlement. The idea that mediation (of any kind) is more effective in disputes involving adversaries with equal power receives strong empirical support from a reinterpretation of Butterworth's data (1976). In a study examining power resources and the impact of international mediation, a clear pattern emerged showing high mediation impact, that is, settlement or resolution of a conflict whcn powcr capabilities were evenly matched and low iinpact when power disparity was high (Bcrcovitch, 1985).The parties' relative power was measured using the Cox-Jacobson scale, incorporating measures of states' gross national product (GNP), military spending, GNP per capita, territorial size, and population (Cox and Jacobson, 1973).It was found that where the power disparity between parties power is small (between 0-4 on the Cox-Jacobson scale), that is, little difference exists in the power resources possessed by each party, the chances of successful mediation is 5 1.4 percent, compared to only 33.3 percent where power disparity is great (I I+ on the same scale). The implication of this finding is quite clear for any preventive programme. An analysis of the mediation data set, as well as direct interviews with experienced intermediaries, lends support to the latter proposition (Bercovitch,l984).Preventive mediation is more effective when it is initiated early, but not before the parties' positions and interests have . crystallized. It is impossible to guide the parties toward a settlement, facilitate discussion of issues, or structure the interactions until the full implications of a conflict, and the options related to it are " well understood by those involved. Early intervention should never become premature intervention. To test these notions, how the number of fatalities relates to and affects mediation outcomes was looked at. A clear and significant relationship emerged between low fatalities and successful mediation. .Just over 39 percent mediation attempts had any degree of success in high-fatality disputes (with more than 10,000 fatalities) compared with 64 percent of successful outcomes in low- fatality disputes (100-500 fatalities).Thus, high fatality level further complicates the chances of any form of conflict management or intervention. Literatures on mediation abound with ideas linking preventive mediation to the nature of the issues in dispute. Clearly, mediation can work better in some disputes than in others. Ott (1972:61) sees the "absence of vital national security interests, particularly questions of territorial control" as a necessary precondition for success~lmediation. Randle (1973: 49) contends that "should a dispute affect vital security interests of the parties, no amount of mediation by a third party is likely to prevent the outbreak of hostilities". Also, La11 (1966:95), himself a practitioner as well as a student of international mediation, contends that "it is one of the principles of international negotiation that when territory is at stake, the party in possession tends to resist third-party involvement" What they all seem to say is that the parties' perception of the issues is a key factor in determining whether or not to accept early mediation initiatives. lssucs in conflict obviously cause a dispute either among nations on individuals. Oflen, marc than one issue may be involved, and the parties then~selvesmay not agree on what constitutes a dispirtcd issue or its relative importance to settling the dispute. In international relations five categories describe and reflect the tangible and intangible types of issues; sovereignty; ideology; security; independence; and all other issues (including ethnicity).Each of the disputes may be described in terms of a primary issue and secondary issues. According to the data set, sovereignty (36.3 percent) and security (23.6 percent) are the most prevalent issues in contention in international disputes. A more interesting feature is that ideology disputes (achieving a 50.4 percent chance of success) are more amenable to preventive mediation than security disputes (where only 40.7 percent of mediation attempts had some success) and sovereignty disputes (where mediation had some degree of success in 44.7 percent of attempts).International disputes over issues of resources and ethnicity showed an even higher rate of successful mediation (70 percent and 66.7 percent respectively).Whichever way one looks at it (the issues in conflict), the way they are perceived and defined makes a considerable difference to the likelihood of achieving a successful or unsuccessful outcome.

. - *'7., ., .I, Framework F: The Nature of Mediation s The identity and characteristics of a mediator have been cited by some including Brett, Dreighe, and Shapiro (1986), Carnevale (1986), and Young (1968) as predictors of success. Others, such as Harbottle (1979), Kochan & Jick (1978) and Ott (1972), do not view the personal traits of the mediator as a critical determinant, relegating hirnlher to a secondary position. It seems possible to argue either position. Mediation is a voluntary process. This means that mediators cannot mediate unless they are perceived as reasonable, acceptable, knowledgeable, and able to secure the trust and cooperation of the parties in conflict. Elrnore Jackson, himself an experienced international mediator, makes this quite clear: "It would be difficult, if not impossible, for a single mediator, who was distrusted by one of the parties, to carry out any useful function" (Jackson 1952: 129). Effective mediation depends not only on the mediator's knowledge of conflict and conflict management, but also on hisker prestige and authority, originality of ideas, access to resources, and ability to act unobtnlsively. Wehr (1979) lists the required attributes for successful mediation as knowlcdgc about conflict situations; an ability to understand the positions of the antagonists; active listening; a sense of timing; communication skills; procedural skills (for example, chairing incclings, ctc.); and crisis management. The list of desired personal altributes for a successful inlcinational mediator is very long. Among the attributes that experienced international mediators then~selvescite as particularly in~portantare intelligence, stamina, energy, patience, and a sense of hun~our(Bercovitch,l984) .Such personal qualities are associated with success in other areas of human endeavour; and they are, of course, no less important in international mediation. Trust, credibility, and a high degree of personal skill and competence in the mediator are also necessary preconditions for effective mediation (Landsberger, 1960, Karim and Pegnetter, 1983). Another characteristic that has traditionally been cited as being strongly associated with any form of mediation is even-handedness or impartiality. Young (1967) claims that, "a high score in such areas as impartiality would seem to be at the heart of successf~~linterventions in many situations." His views are echoed by both Jackson (1952) and Northedge and Donelan (1971) who claim that parties will have confidence in a mediator only if helshe is, and is perceived as, impartial. However, the emphasis on impartiality stems fi-om a failure to recognize mediation as a process of social interaction in which the mediator is a major participant. It is entirely sensible to see mediation as "assisted negotiation" (Susskind and Cruikshank, 1987:86). A mediator engages in behaviour that is designed to exercise influence and prevent f~u-therconflict. To regard the work of a mediator as an external input with no interest in the outcome is both erroneous and unrealistic. Mediators are accepted by the adversaries not because of their impartiality, but because of their ability to influence, protect or extend the interests of each party in conflict (Carnevale and Arad, 1995; Touval, 1975; and Zartman, 1985). Mediators can succeed if they can "move things about", not because they are perceived as impartial or neutral. Effective and successful mediators need "leverage," or resources to move the parties away from the conflict precipice. Such leverage enhances a mediator's ability to facilitate a successful outcome. The mediator's task is also essentially one of refi-aming and persuasion (Edmead, 1971, Frei, 1976, Touval and Zartman, 1985).These are best achieved, as Zartman and Touval (1985) observe, not when a mediator is unbiased or impartial, but when helshe possesses resources that either party values (e.g, political support, economic resources). Effective mediation in international relations is more a matter of resource utilization, leverage, and influence than it is of impartiality (Brookmire and Sistrunk, 1980). One 01Ihc most effcctive resources any intendona1 mcdiator can possess is legitimacy. Leaders of states and high-lcvcl officials, such as foreign or prime ministers have legitimacy and can bring it to bear together with their status and respect (Ott, 1972, Touval and Zartman, 1985).Under the proper auspices and sponsorship of high-ranking mediators, an environment of credibility and trust may be established. The presence of a powerful and legitimate mediator allows the parties to back down from fixed positions, make concessions, and save face (Pruitt and Johnson, 1970).Leaders and representatives of large governments with more resources at their disposal are more likely to be successful mediators than other actors who do not possess such resources. One of the central tasks of mediation is to accentuate joint interest and cooperative aspects. This is best achieved when the parties' conflict management efforts take place in a neutral environment, fi-ee from the external pressures and influences of constituents and media. Such an environment allows the mediator to have procedural control over the process, and the parties to concentrate on substantive issues. In a neutral environment, a mediator is able to create a level playing field by guaranteeing each party fi-ee and equal access to information and resources, maintaining the flow of communication between the parties, and, (where necessary) balance power differences between the parties. The data confirms the importance of such an environment. Mediation on neutral ground (including mediator territory) provides the conditions most conducive to successful mediation, achieving 49.5 percent and 54.4 percent chance of success respectively. This contrasts with mediations held on the parties' own territory (45 percent success) or mediations that have moved between a number of different sites (36.4 percent success). Evaluating the relationship between what mediators do when they actually intervene and the outcomes of their efforts can, on the whole, be based on ex-post facto reflections from mediators (and they may be quite reluctant either to claim success or to take responsibility for failure). While the task of conceptualizing or measuring mediator behaviour, roles, and strategies is difficult, from direct observations of their performance (rarely, if ever available in international relations), many agree with Kochan and Jick (1978), and Touval(1982) that mediation behaviour is the most crucial variable affecting mediation outcomes. There are many typologies for describing mediation strategy and behaviour (Kressel, 1972, Kochan and Jick, 1978, Kolb, 1983, Bercovitch, 1984). Here we follow Touval and Zartman (1985) who classify mediator behaviour along a continuum ranging from low to high intervention. Three main strategies that encompass the spectrum of mediator behaviour are identified (Bercovitch, 1989:68).At the low end of the spectrum are comniunication-facilitation stratcgies, in which a mediator acts in a lairly passive role, largely as a channel of communication or go-between for the parties, exhibiting little control over the process or substance of mediation. The second set of mediation strategies (procedural strategies) involves a mediator exercising morc formal control over situational aspects or the process of mediation. Here a mediator may determine such factors as the mediation environment, the number and type of meetings with the adversaries, the agenda covered in those meetings, the control of constituency influences, and the distribution of information and resources to the parties. The most active range of mediator behaviour, directive strategies, occurs when a mediator sets out to affect the content and substance as well as the process of mediation. A mediator may achieve this by using a conlbination of "carrots and sticks", providing incentives, offering rewards and punishments, issuing of ultimatum, and introducing new proposals. Kochan and Jick (1978) found that industrial mediators who used directive strategies were more successful than mediators who used communication strategies. Carnevale and Pegnetter (1 %S), on the other hand, while surveying organizational mediators, found the use of communication-facilitation strategies to be more effective than other kinds of strategies. In an earlier study, Bercovitch (1986) found that communication strategies were the most commonly used, but directive strategies were the most successful. An analysis of the data set shows that the Likelihood of achieving a successful mediation outcome is 52.3 percent when directive strategies are employed and only 32.2 percent when communication-facilitative strategies are employed. This relationship is particularly strong when disputes are intense (Hiltrop, 1989:104). Mediators who possess the ability, opportunity and resources to initiate and engage in active mediation are more likely to secure a successfd outcome than powerless mediators who put their faith in communication strategies only. A good number of works have been reviewed on this subject yet there is no consensus among the authors on a particular proposal. In this way, the knowledge gap so created becomes the thrust of this research whereby our inclination becomes the filling of the gaps in knowledge.

Summary of review

Many different international security organizations, state representatives, and prominent individuals have, for several years, been engaged in search of a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflicts. For that purpose, a variety of methods, techniques and mechanisms for conflict ~nailagcrncntwere employed with minor success. The failure of the international community was a collscquence of its inability to understand the complexity of Israel and Palestine legacies and the logic of cxternal intervention in domestic affairs. The missing link in their actions has been the lack of awareness that all Israeli and Palestinian conflicts have always been deeply interrelated and interdependent. The other missing point is the lack of conceptual thinking and practice, and certain knowledge of the principles of international negotiation that predisposes the party in possession of a contested value to resist third-party involvement.This present work tends to fill these gap by putting special accent on drawback of diplomacy, drawing from the diplomatic aspect of the Middle East-Israeli -Palestinian conflict.

1.5 Theoretical Framework A theory is an explanation device, either true or false in itself, which demonstrates its worth by generating a continuous chain of derivatives explanations of phenomena that are not in conflict with conventional wisdom or certain testable hypothesis. Theory follows reality; it also proceeds and shapes reality. It is made through reflections, upon what has happened. The separation of theory from historical happenings is however, only a way of thinking because theory feeds back into the making of history by virtue of the way those who make history think about whit they are doing. The conflict resolution theory is therefore chosen and shall provide the framework of analysis for the Arab-Israeli conflict. There are three phases of conflict resolution process that are frequently identified: i. The pre-conflict phase, - the sequence of events leading to the outbreak of hostilities. .. 11. The actual conflict phase, - the outbreak and subsequent events of the conflict itself ... 111. The post-conflict phase,-be those events beginning with an overt attempt to end hostilities and concluding with a resolution of the conflict.

In international relations research, there has been more emphasis on the first two phases - the causes of conflict and the behaviour of nations during conflict situations. Some of the major proponents of the conflict resolution theory include Burton and Rosen. Others are Kenneth Boulding and Festinger. They can be grouped into different schools of thought because while they all are conflict resolution theorists, their positions differ. Kenneth Boulding and Festinger, in their separate but interrelated works on conflict identified at least six theoretical pattcrns of conflict resolution in a conflict situation.

1. Thc first is avoidance. A situation whereby parties to the conflict simply remove themselves fiom one another, increasing the distance between them to thc point where the conflict ceases from lack of contact. . . 11. The second is the use of brute force, but this can only occur where a party is conditionally viable with respect to the other. ... 111. The third method of conflict resolution is the submission of one party to another. This is usually induced by the exercise of threats either in form of a symbolic show of weapon or threats of economic sanction. iv. The fourth method is by compromise, but this can only occur if both sides realize that the price of continued conflict is higher than the cost of compromise and place premium on flexibility and willingness to settle the dispute themselves without an external mediator. v. The fifth is the principle of award, and this to them is the most objective involving the participation of a third party. But the problem with this remains not just persuading states to allow parties to arbitrate, but their willingness to submit to the decision of the third party. vi. The sixth according to them is resolution of conflict through passive settlement. This occurs when a conflict situation between two parties persist for a long time. The antagonist may implicitly accept a new states quo as partially legitimate. But this is more like a litany of ways of resolving a conflict but never really picking on one particular model as the critical one. Burton developed a unique approach to the analysis of conflict processes: the problem solving workshop which was designed to serve two functions: i. To provide conflict researchers with an opportunity to investigate the dynamics of an on- going international conflict, and; ii. To provide a setting in which the parties to the conflict could meet and learn techniques that would enable them to resolve the conflict peacefully. The development of this approach arose from the belief that conventional methods of third party intervention based on legal diplomatic condition were not highly successful in resolving conflict. His approach, contrary to the traditional techniques which treated conflicts as contesls to be won was to examine conflict as problem to be solved, and to explore more integrative solutions where both sides might 'win'. He made an effort to apply concepts developed in social psychological analysis of group bel~aviourand insights gained from labour management disputes. His approach to conflict resolution is very academic and applies more to small group conflicts or in industrial dispute but cannot effectively explain or help to resolve the Arab-Israeli imbroglio.

Similarly, Rosen (1978) contends that conflicts exist when two or more groups make mutually exclusive claims to the same resources or positions, and war is a means of allocating values to resolve the conflict. War in this view is a rational instrument of decision, and war policies are decided by a logical computation of costs and benefits. For him, the claim of rationality is controversial as conflicts can be decided by arbitration, elections, courts and tribunals, administrative decisions, direct negotiations and compromise. How rational is it to spill blood when non-violent means are available? He is also of the view that every nation or movement has a few core values which cannot be compromised and many 'shell' values which it would also like to satisfy but which are not vital. Secondary interests can be compromised with an opponent but leadership is obligated to defend core values by all available means. This particular view of conflict resolution best explains the Arab-Israeli conflict and the consequent search for peaceful resolution. According to the author, conflicts exist when two people ot groups make mutually exclusive claims to the same position. In this case, the land of Palestine is involved, The Arabs and Israelis have been making so many compromises which are of secondary values to both groups, but the core positions and interests of parties are still without any attempt to waiver. The conflicts can only be resolved if these values and interests are loosely held or con~pron~ised. Owing to the counterintuitive posed by the Arab-Israeli conflict management scenario, this study shall adopt the poststructuralist approach to international relations which reassesses the nature of the political. Indeed, it calls for the repoliticization of practices of world politics that have been treated as if they were not political. For instance, limiting the ontological elements in one's inquiry to states or great powers is a political choice. As Jenny Edkins (1998) puts it, the analyst need to "bring the political back in". For most analysts of International Relations, the conception of the "political" is narrowly restricted to politics as practiced by politicians. Howcver, from a poststn~cturalistviewpoint, the "political" acquires a broader meaning, espcc~allysincc practice is not what most theorists are describing as practice. Post structuralism sees theoretical discourse not only as discourse, but also as political practice. Theory therefore becomes practice. The political space of post structuralism is not that of exclusion; it is the political space of post modernity, a dichotomous one, where one thing always signifies at least one thing and another (Finlayson and Valentine, 2002:14). Post structuralism thus gives primacy to the political. It is a critical attitude which encourages dissidence from traditional approaches (Ashley and Walker, 1990a and 1990b). It does not represent one single philosophical approach or perspective, nor is it an alternative paradigm (Tvathail, 1996:99). It is a non place, a border line falling between international and domestic politics (Ashley, 1989:102). The poststructuralist analyst questions the borderlines and dichotomies of modernist discourses, Peace Keeping, Conflict resolution, etc. Indeed, post structuralism offers no definitive answers, but leads to new questions and new unexplored grounds. This makes the commitment to the incomplete nature of the political and of political analysis so central to post structuralism (Finlayson and Valentine, 2002: 15). Part of the international practices that poststructuralist analysts question is the philosophical and epistemological prepositions of the realist approach to conflict resolution and international security which is based on a one-dimensional principle that the behaviour of state is constrained by the deterrent or coercive force of external power(s). Part of this realist assuniption is that Dyadic year theory which claims that regardless of regime type some states over time (as measured by time series analysis, etc.) tend to have more trouble and conflict with one another than with other regime types.Thus the democratic Peace hypothesis, in the study of international relations suggests that democratic states are less likely to initiate and engage in conflict than non- democratic states, while the greater ability of democratic states to channel and accommodate internal discontent makes them less likely to exhibit external aggression (Mack and Snyder, l957:98). Put differently, what the 'democratic Peace hypothesis' imply is that democratic states are unlikely to find themselves in a dispute with one another, and when they are in conflict, they are more likely to resolve it through dialogue than through war. Ostensibly, the democratic states assign to themselves the role of 'making-peace7 in non-democratic states through institutions they establish and assign such role using two main approaches: preventive cngagernent, and the realist approach to conflict resolution and international security. Post stn~cturalisnrposits that realists' approach to international conflict is based on a one- dimensional principle that the behaviour of state is constrained by the deterrent or coercive force of extcrnal power(s), which reinforces external intervention. This justified the call by realists to use forcc, rather than attempting to address the roots of the conflict in their proposed solutions to conflict zones. Thus, democracies, in and of themselves, are less likely to fight wars with each other, even as they are more likely to defeat an adversarial autocratic state. Part of the new questions and new unexplored grounds in its commitment to the incomplete nature of the political and of political analysis is that it helps the analyst to realize that what informed the above realists' approach to international conflict is that "democracies will devote greater absolute resources to security, enjoy greater social support for their policies, and tend to form overwhelming counter coalitions against expansionist autocracies" (Lake, 1992:96). Thus, Post structuralism as analytical tool helps to critically investigate how the subject of international relations is constituted in and through the discourses and texts of global politics and opens up the possibility of historicizing it. Post structuralism posits that the differences in regime types might have little or nothing to do with foreign policy processes and negotiations, as foreign policy processes are usually dominated by elites who drive the process in approximately the same manner around the globe regardless of regime type.

In other words, controlling the economic structure of societies is of greater importance than mere 'peace-making7. Hence democratic peace is actually the result of commonly perceived national interests (Gartzke, 1998:74). For this reason, conflict management is a political- economic control variable in the hands of international intervenors. It is from this poststructuralist prism that the analyst questions the conventional approach to international conflict management in the light of the focal point of the democratic Peace hypothesis: the perceived ability of federal states to handle diverse interests and conflicts. For the same reason, the intervention of the United States under George H. Bush's administration in the days leading up to and through the end of the 1991 Gulf War in dealing with Iraq and Saddam Hussein, particularly her Middle-East foreign policy concerning Israeli and Palestinian territorial divisions of power has been criticized for being 'business as usual'.

1.6 Hypotheses: This study poses the following hypothetical propositions for verification:

i. It appears that Preventive diplomatic mediation succeeds more if it was attempted at a very early stage of the conflict. ii. The tendency by the United States to use her peace initiatives primarily to project her economic agenda appears to conflict with the Palestinian determination to wrest the disputed territories from Israeli occupation. . . . 111. The lingering crises between the Israelis and the Palestinians appear intractable due to both parties' refusal to agree on the status of Jerusalem.

1.7 Research Methodology The Israeli government and Palestinian National Authority (PNA), in mid-2005 had three - common assumptions covering the military, economic and institutional dimensions of security. The analysis of these assumptions relies on 'the balance of peace', which is the relative weight each party gives to peaceful, rather than military techniques for resolving the conflict. The thesis here is that over the long term it is the balance of peace rather than the balance of power that will decide the direction of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Israel's approach to negotiations relating to difficult conflicts amongst nations which was first developed in 1995 is to differentiate between what the parties consider to be negotiable and what they regard as 'non-negotiable' under any condition. Some issues are more amenable to compromise than others. Negotiable items normally affect measurable objects, the giving up of which entails only a material or monetary loss (e.g. land), but if this can be compensated for by acquiring other assets or gaining something else in return then 'give' and 'take' is possible. That is a quantitative argument: measurable, negotiable, and capable of compromise. However, when parties put forward value laden arguments, then by definition, value is not quantifiable and may be of great importance to one side but insignificant to another. A contested value can be moral, cultural or religious and it becomes completely non-negotiable and unchangeable. This is a qualitative discourse (Raphael Isreal, 2003: xix-xx). Thus it is vital for parties to a conflict to be aware of the quantitative versus qualitative nature of the parameters of every problem on the agenda for negotiations. Such mutual awareness may lcad to conlpensatory mechanisms whereby qualitative issiies can be accepted provided there is a quantitative quid pro quo for the accepting party. Even in these situations where a party to a conflict seeks to denigrate others as an act of faith, a gradual proccss of quantitative concessions may offset a qualitative refusal to compromise by the other party. It might, though be a great mistake to try to resolve the quantitative issues first and leave the qualitative issues to the end of the process because then the pool of quantitative quid pro quos will be depleted by the time qualitative issues are addressed. Consequently, under this method, the qualitative issues must be dealt with first by mitigating them with quantitative concessions, and only when they are being resolved might the other quantitative issues be solved more easily (Raphael Isreal, 2003:290-1). This approach is applied to the Oslo Accords of 1993- 1 95 between Israel and Palestine, by comparison to the 1994 Israel-Jordan peace treaty. The analysis covers the following themes: i. International diplomatic mediation (post conflict resolution strategy) .. 11. United States foreign policy and peace initiatives as instrument of projecting her economic agenda through mediation in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. ... 111. Ideological and irredentist tendencies between both Israel and Palestine.

Criteria for Evaluating Outcomes If the quantum of evidence skews to 'b' ,'c' or, 'a', the conclusions will be validated, a) international diplomatic mediation(post conflict resolution strategy) is more likely to succeed if it is attempted at a very early stage of the conflict, or initiated after each side has experienced a sense of failure and shown a willingness to moderate its intransigence. b) The tendency by the United States to use her peace initiatives and proposals to project her economic agenda appears to worsen the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Palestinians to be suspicious of America's peace proposals, and c) when a territory at stake is perceived as a spiritual capital; the party in possession tends to resist third-party involvement.

1.8 Method of Data Collection and Analysis The descriptive, historical and explanatory orientation of this study and indeed, the very nature of it preclude a strictly quantitative method of data collection. However, the use of secondary source was considered because the subject matter has been documented in multifarious forms. In view of this fact, my method of generating data, testing, validating or nullifying my hypotheses shall depend essentially on content analysis of library materials.

Part of our secondary source of information was sourced from a web databank sponsored by the Global Negotiation Project (formerly the Project on Preventing War) at Harvard University. The project is committed to the development of negotiation theory and practice in a wide range of related areas such as international mediation, containment of violence and conflict resolution. Information was also sourced from two major contemporary press sources: Keesing's Conteinporqy Archives and the New York Times Index. CHAPTER TWO

PREVENTIVE DIPLOMATIC MEDIATION AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

Introduction Why should the Arabs make peace? If I was an Arab leader I would never make terms with Israel. That is natural: we have taken their country. Why should they accept that? (Ben Gurion, Israeli's first Prime Minister, quoted in Goldmann, 1978).

The chapter specifies the necessary preconditions and deterniinants for a successful preventive diplomatic mediation with special emphasis on the timing of intervention. Understanding mediation's role and timing in preventive diplotnacy which emphasizes prevention rather than cure, is to appreciate the failure of the international community to understand the complexity of Israel and Palestine legacies, and the logic of external intervention in domestic affairs. Part of this failure has been the wrong timing of intervention. What is implied is the "contingency approach to understanding mediation which stresses the need to treat outcomes of mediation efforts (be they successful or not) as dependent upon the environment (or context) of a conflict and the manner of behaviour within it. Thus, "the greater the cultural differences between disputants, the less likelihood of successful mediation7'(Modelski, 1964, Raymond and '1 985). Literatures on mediation abound with ideas linking preventive diplomatic mediation to the nature of the issues in dispute. Clearly, mediation can work better in some disputes than in others. For instance, the "absence of vital national security interests, particularly questions of territorial control" is a necessary precondition for successfid mediation (Ott, 1972:61). In other words, "should a dispute affect vital security interests of the parties, no amount of mediation by a third party is likely to prevent the outbreak of hostilities" (Randle71973:49). After examining the power resources and the impact of international mediation, and the determinants of the success of preventive diplomatic mediation, a clear pattern emerged showing high mediation impact: 1. The greater the factionalism within a state, the higher the likelihood that preventive mediation will fail; Preventive intervention by third parties is best undertaken between adversaries that have well-defined and legitimate identities; . . . 111. Mediation has a better chance of success when each party is accorded full legitimacy; iv. Disunity or lack of cohesion within a state makes it difficult for the adversaries (as well as a mediator) to engage in any meaninghl form of preventive diplomacy. This approach basically holds that there are conflict situations where mediation can be effective and successfi~l,and that there are also conflict situations where mediation cannot achieve anything either proactively or actively. Mediation is a preventive form of conflict management where parties seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help fi-om a group, state, or organization to prevent or resolve a conflict without resorting to physical force and violence (Wall, 1981; Dryzek and Hunter, 1987). Theoretically, ccntral to preventive diplomacy is the objective of rcducing tensions before they result in a violent conflict. However, mediation is rarely implemented as a discrete activity, nor does the process exhibit the same form in every case. Rather, mediation spans a spectrum of behaviour ranging from the passive (e.g. go-between) to the highly active (e.g. putting pressure on parties). The form and character of mediation in a particular conflict are determined by many factors which include the phase of the conflict, the nature of the conflict, the nature of the mediator, and a number of other cultural and contextual variables. Specifically, this chapter will examine whether preventive diplomatic mediation would have been effective if the same right given to Israel in determining their form of government and destiny was accorded Palestine at a very early stage of the conflict. In addition, the concept of diplomacy and its various types as it has been applied in the management of the current conflict will be evaluated.

2.1 Preventive Diplomatic Mediation in the Management of Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: 1918-1948. The first wave of Jewish immigration into Palestine following the pogroms in Russia between 1881 and1884 were mostly inspired by religious rather than nationalist motives. It was only after the formation of the World Zionist Organization in 1897 by Theodor Herzl who became its president, that the development of Zionism was able to exert a larger influence on the second wave of immigrants into Palestine between 1904 and 1914.The congress at Basle in 1897 declared the goal of Zionism to be "the creation of a home for the Jewish people in Palestine to be secured by public law." The World Zionist Organization created its own bank in 1899, and in 1901 a Jewish National Fund was established with the stated purpose of buying and developing land for Jewish settlements in Palestine-a land that became inalienably Jewish and could not be worked by non-Jews. Their vision of a new Jewish society; based on Jewish labour alone, involved a commitment to the land and establishing a socialist agricultural basis for a future Israel. By 1914 fourteen out of the forty-four existing Jewish agricultural settlements had been sponsored by the World Zionist Organization (Smith, 2004: 37). No realistic proposal for the resolution of the Arab-Israel conflict can ignore the above theoretically informed historical perspective in any examination of the Middle East conflict, nor ignore the institutional and ideological aspects of Palestinian nationalism. This is a view inConncd by Dietrich Jung's "The Middle East ant1 Pulestine: GIoAul Poldics crntl Kegiontrl Corrflict", when it was argued that issues of nationalism and self-determination in Middle East is not dissimilar to that found in European history, and that the war-prone emergence of the Middle Eastern state system fits tightly into the logic of international politics (Dietrich Jung, 2004:3). The harsh reality of the Middle East today must be seen against the background of more than a millennium of history and 200 years of political and military interference by the European powers, and more recently, the United States. It is necessary to take note of some basic facts and realities. Only when all these are clearly understood can practical and workable solutions be proposed and implemented. The nature of the Arab-Jewish conflict is not only confined to the existence of the State of Israel in the sense that it reaches deeper into the Muslims' perception of the Jewish people. For instance, Sayyid Muhammed Husayn Fadlallah, the spiritual head of Hezbollah in Lebanon noted: The struggle against the Jews in which Muslims are engaged is a continuation of the old struggle of the Muslims against the Jews' conspiracy against Islam. Israel is not merely a group that established a state at the expense of a people. It is a group which wants to establish Jewish culture at the expense of Arab culture.

Apart from assuming that a resolution of the conflict involves a Palestinian state alongside a Jewish one, the vast majority of the Arab world believes that the only real solution is for Israel to cease to exist. As a result, the whole of Palestinian nationalism according to Professor Edward Sa'id, Palestinians' most prominent academic champion, was based on driving all Israelis out. This is already evident from statements by Arab and Palestinian leaders. Various tactics have been employed toward this end, including the mendacious rewriting of the history of the immigration of Jewish refugees into Palestine, as well as the demographic history or tlic Arabs of Palestine. Other tactics have included the targeting of vulnerable Jewish civilians beginning in the 1920s, the Palestinian support for Hitler and Nazi genocide in the 1930s and 1940s, and the violent opposition to the two-state solution proposed by the Peel Commission in 1937, and also by the United Nations in 1948. The Jewish-Arab conflict is perceived by the international community as a conflict of two people over one land which can be resolved by the creation of a Palestinian state. From this viewpoint, some analysts suggest that since Israelis and Palestinians both lay claims to the same lcrritory, division of the territory betwecn the two will bring about a peaceful resolution. But the big problem is that without Arabs' recognition of Israel's right to exist as a Jewish state, any peace process is obviously doomed to fail.

2.2 Self-Determination, International Law, and Morality in the Creation of Israel: 1918-1948 The British government that was granted a mandate from the League of Nations to establish a Jewish homeland in Palestine was the first to delude itself into thinking that there was a territorial conflict between the Arabs and Jews. The British government misjudged not merely the depth but also the nature of Arab opposition. In the aftermath of World War I, the Middle East was partitioned according to the wishes of the victorious allies (primarily France and Great Britain). Churchill, the Colonial Secretary, and his colleagues who were responsible for the Mandate and for British policy in the Middle East, treated the land issue as if it were valid rather than the fraud that it was (David Fromkin, 1989). There was violent and bloody Arab opposition to Jewish settlement throughout the period of the Mandate (1 921 -1 948) before Israel was established in 1948, and before Judea, Samaria and Gaza fellgunder Israeli jurisdiction in 1967. While Jewish leaders accepted the UN plan to partition Palestine in 1947, Arab rulers rejected it. Dividing the Holy Land into two states, Israel and Palestine would be the perfect solution to a territorial problem. But unfortunately, the Arab opposition to Israel has no relation to territory. It has to do with the existence of Jewish sovereignty, something that the Arabs cannot accept under any circumstances. Eugene V. Rostow, in "The Legal Context of the Middle East Peace Talks" posits that the purpose of the Mandate was to secure the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine (Rostow, 1992). The Palestine Mandate was intended to fulfill a policy of self-determination for the Jewish people, while the Arabs of the Ottoman Empire were given many states for development of self- rule. Under the Palestine Mandate, "the Jewish people" have the right to make "close settlements" in those areas - a right later protected by Article 80 of the United Nations Charter, which provides that until trusteeship agreements are concluded for certain territories, nothing in the Charter shall be construed "to alter in any manner whatsoever the rights of any states or any peoples or the terms or international instruments to which members may be parties"(United Nations Charter Chapter XII, Article 76 and 77). What the Arab argument boils down to is the proposition that a claim to self-determination is universal and transcendent; whenever a group of people makes that claim with respect to any parcel of territory, they must immediately be granted sovereignty. The UN Charter makes no such assertion, nor does customary international law. In 19 17-1 8, combined British and Arab forces ended over 400 years of Turkish administration in various parts of the Arab world, including Palestine. The nationalities in these territories stated Wilson in his famous "Fourteen Points" speech of January 1917 "should be assured of an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development." Yet nothing of the sort took place immediately. In the aftermath of World War I, the newly-formed League of Nations placed much of the region under mandatory rule by the British and French. Given the general acceptance of Wilson's principle; that is, the principle of self- determination; it seemed that Palestine, either in itself or as part of a larger geographical unit, was a region to which regional democratic self-determination should have been applied. Despite Arab expectations, this never occurred. During World War I, Britain promised its Arab allies independence throughout the territory liberated from the Turks, but also signed two other agreements,which embodied contrary policies. In 1916, Great Britain and France concluded the Sykes-Picot agreement by which the Arab Middle East would be divided up into regions of British and French influence under the sovereignty of those powers, with Palestine placed undcr some fom~of international administration. This was soon superseded by a more momentous decision. In 1917, the wartime British government under David Lloyd George issued the BalJbur Declaration declaring British policy to establish a "national home" for the Jewish people in Palestine. The Declaration was thc first significant victory for the Zionist movement initiated in the late 19th Century. Under the persuasive and careful diplomacy of its chief spokesman, Chaim Weizmann, the British Foreign Secretary, Arthur Balfour, issued the declaration in a letter of November 2, 1917 to Lord Rothschild: His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use the best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of the existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any olhar country (Stoessinger, 198 1 : 14 1).

I11 one stroke, Palestine, a land which had been peopled by an Arab majority for centuries, was now promised by a European power to the Jewish people. Although the crucial phrases 'civil and religious rights' and 'political status' were left undefined by the Declaration, it is significant that the document contrasted civil rights with political status' while avoiding reference to the political status of Palestinian Arabs which comprised the substantial majority of inhabitants. Thc principle of self-determination was ignored here; the largest segment of Palestine's inhabitants did not participate in the making of a decision which was to have a monumental impact upon their future. They were not consulted; no referendum or plebiscite was ever held, nor approval from Palestinian representatives ever secured. To the contrary, they adamantly opposed it and repeatedly voiced their opposition as early as 1919 (Khalidi, 1971 :2 13).

The governments of the United States and Great Britain were apprised of the situation in Palestine and fully informed of Arab opposition to the Balfour Declaration. In 1919, President Wilson dispatched a commission to the Near East to report on the political situation there. In their report to the Paris Peace Conference on August 28, 1919, the commissioners, Dr. King and Mr. Crane expressed concern about the future of Palestine, claiming that if the principle of self- determinatjon is to rule, then it is to be remembered that the non-Jewish population of Palestine - nearly 9/10 of the whole are emphatically against the entire Zionist programme. There was no one thing upon which the populations of Palestine were more agreed than upon this. They further stated that to subject a people so minded to unlimited Jewish immigration and to steady financial and social pressure to surrender their land would be a gross violation of the principle of the people's rights. But the British Government had already ruled out settlement of the Palestine question by appeal to the principle of self-determination. Lord Balfour was particularly blunt:

In Palestine we do not propose even to go through the form of consulting the wishes of the present inhabitants of the country . . . The Four Great Powers are committed to Zionism. And Zionism, be it right or wrong, good or bad, is rooted in age long traditions, in present needs, in future hopes, of far profounder import than the desires and prejudices of the 700,000 Arabs who now inhabit that ancient land (Khalidi, 1971: 208).

An official memorandum of the British Foreign Office Department to the British Cabinet contained an equally explicit suspension of the principle:

The problem of Palestine cannot be exclusively solved on the principle of self-determination, because there is one element in the population -- the Jews -- which, for historical and religious reasons, is entitled to a greater influence than would be given to it if numbers were the sole test (Lloyd George, 1939:750).

These statements foreshadowed subsequent British policy. No mention of sell- determination was made in the terms of the Mandate for Palestine, and, against the wishes of the Arab majority, the "gates" of Palestine were opened to Jewish immigration. This is evident by the fact that in 1931 the Jews constituted 16% of the total population, but by 1936 their population had increased to 28%. Even at the height of World War I1 in 1942, Winston Churchill, echoing the sentiments of Balfour and Lloyd George, expressed concern about the self-determination clause of the Atlantic Charter since it might obstruct Zionist settlement in Palestine. By 1947, Jews constituted roughly one-third of the Palestine's population of approximately 1.9 million people, "by the might of England, against the will of the people" (Toynbee, 1954:306). It was only when Arabs resorted to armed insurrection against the British in 1936-1938 that the Government changed its policy. In the 1939 MacDonald White Paper, Britain renounced the Balfour Declaration and declared a new policy of advocating a singular secular state throughout ~alestde.This met with approval among many Arabs (though not all), but was angrily rejected by the Zionist movement (Hirst, 1984:96).

In the aftermath of World War 11, a weakened Great Britain thrust the issue of Palestine onto the 'lap' of the newly formed United Nations. Western opinion was now more favorably disposed towards Zionist aspirations as the facts of Nazi persecution and genocide of European Jews became clear. In the most significant political victory for Zionism since the Balfour Declaration, President Truman endorsed Zionist proposals in August 1946, setting in motion American diplomatic efforts to secure a partition of Palestine into a Jewish and an Arab state (Khalidi, 1971 : xiv). The then prevailing political opinion, particularly in the United States and USSR, pushed the General Assembly to recommend partition of Palestine into Jewish and Arab states with Jerusalem placed under an international trusteeship (Resolution 181 of November 29, 1947). But this was in spite of the fact that in September of 1947, the UN Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) had acknowledged that the League of Nations Mandate had violated the Palestinian Arabs right of self-determination and that the creation of a Jcwish National Home in Palcstinc "ran counter" to the principle of sclf-determination (Quigley, 1990:33).

While Great Britain abstained in the voting, the United States led the fight for approval, resorting to pressure diplomacy to secure the necessary votes. Officially, the Jewish Agency (the political arm of the Zionist movement in Palestine) accepted the recommendations of thc partition plan; Arabs overwhelmingly rejected its provisions as constituting a gross violation of the rights of the Arab majority in Palestine. It is, as some describe it, the "original sin" which "underlies the entire Palestine conflict" (Lilienthal, 1982:97). In the subsequent violence of 1948- 1949, Jewish military organizations outnumbered and outgunned the disorganized Palestinian forces and their Arab allies. Massacres, like those that took place at the Arab village of Deir Yassin in early April 1948 caused thousands of Arabs to flee from their homes in fear of a similar fate (Hirst, 1984: 123; Khalidi, 1971:61). Self-determination took on a new meaning, with the gun rather than the ballot box as its principal instrument. By the time a cease-fire was finalized in 1949, over 800,000 Arabs fled or were driven from their homes, villages, and towns, whilc Israel came into possession of 77% of mandated Palestine. The refugees were never permitted to return to their homes which, in many cases, no longer existed, since Israel has destroyed 385 Arab villages (Lilienthal, 1982: 159). a

Today, Palestinians and their descendents number over 3 million, and on a land that was once theirs; Jewish immigrants from Europe and other parts of the Middle East, are settled. Chaim Weizmann, who had earlier assured the Arabs of Jaffa that it had never been anybody's intention "to turn anyone out of his property" now proclaimed that the events of 1948 constituted "a miraculous clearing of the land: the miraculous simplification of Israel's task" (Hirst, 1984:143). It was then that the "seeds" of violence in the Middle East took root and "germinated". After World War 11, the Atlantic Charter and UN Charter made the principle of regional-democratic self-determination a clearly acknowledged norm of international diplomacy.

With UN Resolution 181, however, Palestinian Arabs were denied input into rhc decision-making process that would determine their fate despite the fact that in 1947 they still outnumbered Jews by a two to one ratio. Although Jews owned only about 6% of Palestine, nearly 56% of the territory was allotted to the proposed Jewish state, while the Arab state was to bc cstablished on 43.7%, the remainder being in Jerusalem. Some have tried to justify Resolution 181 by claiming that the Jewish inhabitants of Palcstine secured self-delerrninalion, and that the very existcnce of a democratic Israel represents a paradigmatic exercise of that right (Stone, 1981:14). Yet, however strong the case for a Jewish state was in 1947, it could not be anchored on the type of self-determination discussed above. The Jews lacked a majority in Palestine. In 1947, over half of the 650,000 Jews in Palestine had immigrated since 1920; at leas1 IO'Yh classified as "illegal" by the British authorities (Anglo-American Survey Supplement, 1947:17- 23). Considering the demographic, historic, and legal circumstances prevailing in 1947-48, Arab Palestinians cannot be faulted for failing at that time to recognize another people's claim for nationhood in a territory which they (the Palestinians) regarded as their own. Given standing international norms, Palestinians, and Arabs in general, were under no obligation to either accept Resolution 18 1 or to recognize the state of Israel. How could they, when the imposition of Israel was not only against their will, but also defied all standards of international behavior in directly assaulting their rights to land, homes, and heritage in their traditional domain? On this score, David Ben-Gurion, Israeli's first Prime Minister, was candid, as stated above.

2.3 Preventive Diplomatic Mediation and Politics of Self-determination: 1948-2006

In *the years since Israel's declaration of statehood, Israeli Jews have enjoyed a considerable measure of self-determination. They have constituted themselves as a nation-slalc, and have enjoyed democratic rights of political participation. At the same time, the vast majority of Palestinians have been denied the most elemental form of self-determination by being excluded from the negotiations that have taken place to resolve the Israeliffalestinian conflict. This denial has persisted despite numerous resolutions by the UN General Assembly that the right of self-determination be accorded the Palestinian people. There are many ways in which this has manifested. For instance, throughout Israel's occupation of the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Golan Heights (since June 1967), Arab residents have been denied any right of self-determination and any democratic rights, save for municipal elections in 1972 and 1976. Instead, they have been govemed by patchwork of Turkish, British, Jordanian ,law, as well as Israeli Military Orders. Israel has annexed East Jerusalem, taken direct control of over 55% of land in the Bank and 40% of land in the Gaza Strip. Currently, there are some 140,000 Israeli Jews in East Jen~saleinand its outer belt, and approximately 100,000 in the rest of the occupied territories, all governed by Isracli laws.

The Palestinian Zntrfadu (uprising) is a direct response to these facts, and several attempts to resolve the Palestinian problem in the international arena have failed to include Palestinian participation. Most notably are the deliberations leading up to the framing of the important Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and of the so-called "Framework for Peace in thc Middle East" contained in the celebrated Camp David accords. The latter document signed by Israel, Egypt, and the United States, goes a long way in providing Palestinians an opportunity to "participate in the determination of their own future", by entering into negotiations "on the resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects". Palestinians charged, however, that the accords violated their right to self-determination because they were excluded from the negotiations which led to the framework. In the celebrated peace negotiations which began in November 1991 in Madrid and have been carried on intermittently since that time, only Palestinians from the occupied territories (excluding Arab East Jerusalem) have been permitted representation.

Thus, the systematic violation of the principle of regional-democratic self-determination in Palestine is a failure to observe and apply a recognized moral norm as well as a continuing source of'the ongoing conflict between Israelis and Palestinian. Yet the principle remains relevant, for the struggle over Palestine continues to pose a severe threat to world peace. Given Palestinians' persistent attachment to their ancient homeland, their unresolved grievances, and repeated international recognition of their entitlement to self-determination, the status quo in Palestine cannot be sanctioned by appeal to regional-democratic self-determination, To do so would be a mockery of the principle. Yet the mere existence of a debate over self-determination does not diminish its normative or legal relevance, realizing that the concept has been prominent in efforts to secure lasting peace in the aftermaths of each of the world wars and in the subsequent break-up of European colonial empires. For instance, it is present in agreements having significance for international law, especially, in Article 1 of the United Nations Chartcr which calls upon member nations "to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace." Again, the language of "right" occurs in a number of General Assembly Resolutions, for example, in GA Res. 1514 of Dec. 14, 1960 and GA Res. 2625 of Oct. 24, 1970, and, again, in Article 1 of the Tnternational Covcnant on Civil and Political Rights passed by the General Assembly on Dec. 16, 1966 "All peoples have the right of sclf-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural development."

This is enough to establish its normative importance for international relations, if not its status as a jus cogens principle of international law. At least three different notions and correlated principles can be identified in international law which underlies the diplomatic management of territorially-based conflict in international systems. These are:

Regional SelfDetermination - a demand that inhabitants of well-established regions, territories, or states be allowed to settle for themselves all questions of sovereignty over that territory, even if they should choose to be politically autonomous. Democratic SelJlDetermination - the idea of self-government by popular consent, requiring that the inhabitants of a territory ought to be democratically self-governing or that the social and political institutions which regulate public life be established through broadly "democratic" procedures. National SeIJ1Determination - the conception that a nation or people has a right to cchstitute itself as an independent sovereign state, a view popularized under the 19th Century German socialists' call for the Selbstbestimmungsrecht (sovereign right) of peoples (Umozurike, 1972:3).

Historically, this view has been used not only to justify the right of existing nation-states to determine their own form of government and destiny, but to pave the way for subordinate national groups to claim rights of secession from larger political units. It also strengthened the call for cultural, ethnic, religious, and racial homogeneity within a state thus providing an atmosphere in which 20th Century nationalist movements could flourish.

2.4 Types of Diplomacy and Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs)

Diplomacy is crucial to the Peacemaking process. It is a method undertaken by actors engaged in Peacemaking efforts. Track I diplomacy involves the participation and interaction of state andlor official actors in areas of conflict. These diplomats are acting with the authority and on behalf of one's state or multinational organization. It is a process which utilizes the sltills, rcsoiirces and intentions of those official and/or state actors. Track I1 diplomacy is more subtle and personal, involving actors representing non-governmental organizations engaged in activity at the grassroots level and back channel measures. Track I1 diplomacy is important in maintaining support at the local level for negotiated agreements and terms to a peace settlement

In this context, diplomacy is the practice of conducting relations between actors with the intent to influence, transmit a position or negotiate on a given issue or situation for a mutually acceptable outcome. A theoretical analysis of Peacekeeping should go beyond a historical perspective. Peacekeeping is a military third-party intervention to assist the transition from violent conflict to stable peace. Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs) contribute to this goal by providing security, supporting and facilitating other non-military initiatives, and making available the tool of military force. PKOs evolved from neutral monitoring missions to complex multi-task endeavours. However, their effectiveness is heavily influenced by their institutional structure and by practices at the operational level.

Track I and Track I1 diplomacy are two mutually reinforcing processes in conflict management: two overlapping circles, sharing common characteristics and responsibilities within 8 conflicts. Each track possesses its own effectiveness, and despite similar methods used by both tracks, their roles cannot be filled by the other. There is continued debate of the particular roles played by Track I and Track I1 actors in conflict management. The division of the actors involved in conflict management into two tracks is only one method of distinguishing the different participants in conflict management. However there are definite classifications between official and unofficial actors in areas of conflict. While it is generally recognized that both actors fill useful functions, boundary issues and other role-related issues continue to create tensions between the two tracks. The role of the diplomat changes depending on the particular situation and context of conflict. The diplomat can try to gain support for hidher party's side with the international community, the mediator or the opposing party. This can be done through various lobbying efforts during the Peacemaking process when the diplomat views hisher role as gathering the necessary support to "win".

Fig 1 : Types and Feature of Preventive Diplomncy

.A

Track I ! Track 11 I -. - - - - ..+ -* . - Official. Unofficial.

Representatives, Representatives, Governments, Nongovernmental organizations, Multi-national Regional and Local Leaders, Actors Organizations, Grassroots Groups Elites, Adversarial Leaders

Positive or Negative Back-channel Discussions, Incentives, Education Programs Methods Mediation, Workshops, Political or Economic Grassroots Reconciliation Support

Present in all stages but of Present in all stages but of particular importance particular importance during during Conflict Prevention and Peace building when Stages Peacemaking and local and regional actors can detect early warning of Peacekeeping when official signs of violence and can help foster personal Conflict actors determine cease-fires, reconciliation techniques between adversarial parties. peace accords and terms to negotiated agreements.

Track I Diplomacy and Conflict Management

The role of the Track I diplomat can be one of participant, supporter or mediator. This can be demonstrated through first, second or third party participation in the conflict. Track I rncdiators are crucial during Peacemaking because they can have a strong effect on the outcome of the peace process. Track I supporters can help provide incentives during the Peacemaking and help provide or generate political and financial clout for a party to the conflict. Track I diplomacy is also important for the parties to the conflict themselves. Committing First Track diplonlats to communicate for each side is a sign of commitment in the negotiation process. Despite the historical depth of Track I diplomacy, it is an ever-changing process, evolving in order to meet the demands particular to the parties, the conflict, and the international environment.

Parties to the Conflict

In internal conflicts, the parties do not always recognize each other's legitimacy. In such cases where parties are in fact denied official representation, Track I diplomacy becomes dirlicult. Often, an internal conflict is comprised of one "legitimate" side and one "rebel" side. Governments have been known to demonstrate this distinction by sending lower level officcrs to the beginning stages of negotiation. The "rebel" side and its leaders do not warrant the same legitimacy and respect as higher level officials. Using a high versus low-level officer in negotiation is also a method of indicating the level of commitment in resolving the conflict. This can be either a useful or detrimental tool. By first using a low-level official and then changing to a higher-level official, the party indicates its growing trust and faith in the negotiation process. Many negotiations fail because the low-level official does not have authority to accept options in the Peacemaking process. The Track I diplomat can advance one's interests while seemingly being committed to a negotiation. This can be done by attending negotiation processes while secretly attempting to prolong the process in order for one's side to gain further political, economic and military means to win the conflict.

States and organizations will become involved in a conflict on behalf of one of the parties involved. Each offers influence and prestige, and in doing so, can help shift the power stl-ucti~reof the conflict in the negotiation process. This can be done by providing additional support to one of the two equally powerful sides, thereby creating asymmetry between the parties in the negotiations. States will unite or unilaterally act to provide international support for a group or party in the conflict in the form of political, military or financial support. During the Peacemaking process this additional support provides power to the opposing sides through: Offering additional military support to a party in the conflict thereby providing further inducements to the opposing sides and the mediator to reach a resolution. Providing political support to a party in the conflict thereby demonstrating an international backing of one of the warring parties. Offering financial support through positive or negative incentives thereby intending to sway one party in the negotiation process.

Track I diplon~atsoffer legitimacy to the contending parties without the parties themselves losing face or becoming involved in the negotiation process. They can also bring issues to light during negotiations and ensure they are considered and addressed during the Peacemaking process. This can be done in several ways such as through commissions which work in concert with the negotiation process.

Third Party Mediator

The Track I diplomat's role is to aid in the resolution of a stalemate and the attainment of a peace settlement. One can do so in the capacity of mediator or arbitrator in the Peacemaking process. Third party involvement in the form of mediation is generally welcomed by all parties involved and is seen as an alternative to the parties negotiating their own solutions. Their presence helps diffuse tensions and creates a common language through which the parties can negotiate and settle differences.

Third party Track I diplomats intervene when they:

i. Possess a clear mandate to intervene . . 11. Have interests and stakes in the conflict, such as political or military stability. iii. Are invited by both parties to intervene iv. ah to preserve a structure to which they belong.

' When a First Track diplomat acts as a mediator or arbitrator during Peacemaking, helshe can either be a strong controller or a weak controller in the negotiation process itself. The third party Track I mediators are "individuals of high regard in the international community. Usually these individuals are selected because both the actor they represent has some relevant power, authority or legitimacy in the eyes of the parties to the dispute and because of their own personal skills as go-betweens". A strong controller generally has some vested interest in the conflict and in its resolution. While this interest is usually related to some tangible good, be it land, resource or people, it can also be intangible such as a kinship tie to the parties involved. In conjunction with the vested interest, a strong controller is only effective if helshe has some power to wield within the negotiation settlement. This power can be a result of a past, present or future political relationship, a present economic tie, or some form of power which allows the mediator to offer conditions on hislher own during the negotiation process

Methods of the First Track Mediator

A Track I mediator has particular resources at hislher disposal to aid the negotiation process. Even a weak mediator can and will use incentives to promote Peacemaking. Positive incentives are promises by either a state or international organization to provide the sides with goods or services in exchange for the negotiated settlement. This is particular to Track I diplomacy because Track I has more power and resources at its disposal than Track I1 diplomacy. Governments can promise humanitarian aid, weapons sales, trade relations or other incentives as a reward for a negotiated settlement. Likewise, international organizations can offer membership, loans, or similar incentives. These are more likely if a representative from the state or organization is involved in the negotiation process. It facilitates not only the incentive program but also the negotiation process itself. Additionally, a Track I diplomat has strong negative incentives to offer with their involvement in Peacemaking. Negative incentives might be in the form of sanctions, military action, and expulsion fi-om international/regional organizations or other types of actions which would negatively affect one or both parties. These negative incentives not only are meant to encourage the continuance of the negotiation but also of the state's or organization's commitment to the conflict's resolution.

Criticisms of Track I Diplomacy

First Track diplomats are criticized due to their lack of influence on the ground of the conflict. This means that even after a negotiated settlement has been reached, the fightcss continue to wage war. This could be because the fighters do not view the "diplomat" as a true representative of their cause, or because they do not agree with the settlement. Therefore steps must be taken to ensure that the fighters and the signatories are in communication and agreement during the Peacemaking process.

Track I1 Diplomacy and Conflict Management

While Track I1 diplomacy is pervasive through all stages of the conflict, it is growing in importance in Conflict Prevention and Peace building when Track I1 diplomats can use their contacts to monitor the situation "on the ground." It is crucial in laying the foundation for higher level negotiations. Citizen initiatives and actions outside official government roles demonstrate different ways in which Track I1 diplomacy has benefited conflict resolution. Track I1 diplomacy has increased in importance in resolving international conflicts in the past fifty years due to the increased ability of organizations and individuals to visit and participate in other cultures as well as the increased interaction between states. Track I1 is less public and therefore open to a larger degree of movement. During the Peacemaking stage Track I1 diplomacy can help the official actors prepare for negotiated settlements by initiating discussions and finding common ground on which negotiations can be based. The efforts of the Track I1 actor help diagnose the real problems and issues underlying the conflict. When negotiations are not prepared to begin at the official level, Track I1 diplomacy can be used to act on behalf o'f the parties themselves. Using representatives from the opposing sides who are in direct connection to the leaders is one way to initiate a peace process. Track I1 aids Peacemaking through lower-level agents:

Convening and expressing the sentiments of the respective parties Deciding on the framework of the negotiations Preventing the official actors from losing face by sending lower level representatives on a request of a third party. Maintaining contact between adversarial parties until Track I negotiations can resume during a breakdown in negotiations.

During the initial Palestinian-Israeli talks, only back-chaxinel meetings were allowed. With arrangements by a Norwegian sociologist, Terje Rod Larsen, discussions began between Yair Hirschfeld, an Israeli Jewish academic and Abu Alaa, a PLO official and former director of finances for Arafat. They began to meet secretly, and due to continued commitment by both sides, the Norwegian government began to sponsor further meetings between the two men, and eventually their respective parties. As a result of these meetings, a Declaration of Principles was "initialed" between the officials of the two parties. Initial groundwork by Track I1 diplomats on all sides was used until the parties were comfortable enough to sponsor and publicly support the discussions and their content.

Third Party Mediation

Second Track diplomacy has been known to bring parties together and ensure they are on similar playing fields before starting the negotiation process. By keeping in touch with information of the advancements in the negotiation process, they not only feel a part of the developments but also provide their assurance that no further violence will occur. This is the role of the Track I1 diplomat because the violent factions of the different parties, if not under direct control of the political leaders, are easily able to violate any agreement, and will if they feel it does not address their concerns. The official actors, however, might not feel the violent factions are legitimate enough to warrant a voice. It is therefore up to the Track I1 diplomats to create a channel between the official actors of the negotiation, and the unofficial fighters of the conflict.

From the above analyses, hypothesis one has been validated in the sense that the chapter highlighted the consequences that led to the creation of Israel without due considerations to the feelings of Palestinians which led to several cries of injustice not only from Arab states, but also from sincere Israelis, with regards to Ben Gurion's statement above. The analyses also go a long way in proving that if preventive diplomatic mediation was adopted in the process that led to the creation of Israel, the present crises which have remained intractable might have been averted. CHAPTER THREE

US FOREIGN RELATIONS AND THE MIDDLE- EAST CRISES

Introduction

Other principles of US foreign policy are also applied selectively in the Middle East. Countries viewed as antagonistic toward the United Statcs are routinely criticized for human rights violations. Yet the US government makes virtually no protest about the second class status Israel imposes on Palestinian citizens or about the human rights violation of occupation. (www.pcusa.or~worldwide/israelpalestine/resources.htm)

The US has for a long time been a part of the Middle East peace process. It has initiated and sponsored several peace meetings between Israeli and Palestinian leaders in a bid to end or reduce the violence between the two parties. The fact that some ,analysts see US involvement in the peace process as favourable to only one of the parties (Israel) has not in anyway, according to other analysts downplayed US efforts in ending the crises. Available facts and statistics show that the US and Israel have tremendous relations which covers ideological, political, economic and religious spheres. Apart from being the first country to recognize Isreal as a sovereign state just within few hours of Israel's declaration of independence, the US has given Isreal more money (both in grants and Aid), as well as arms than she has given any other country in history. In fact, this cordial relationship with Isreal is viewed with suspicion not only by the Palestinians, but throughout the entire Arab world, and indeed the entire Middle East which is dominated by Arab countries. This suspicion, according to some analysts is one of the reasons for the intractability of the crises. In addition, the United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 largely drafted by the United States and considered the gold standard for any agreement does not mention Palestinians at all, seeking only an agreement between Israel, Egypt and Jordan. All these have made the United States loose credibility in the region. Some analysts believe that promoting Palestinian unity rather than confrontation is the first step. Whatever U.S. ambitions might be, they argue, the current armed conflict between Hamas and Fatah is not constructive, but rather destructive. Without a basic understanding between Fatah and Hamas, no Palestinian leadership will be strong enough to implement even the most basic agreement with Israel. Instead of tacitly supporting the efforts of Saudi Arabia to end Palestinian infighting, the U.S. worked against it, funding Fatah for its armed confrontation with Hamas. This fighting has the implication of weakening each side to the conflict and makes it hard to forge a consensus on Palestinian national ambitions. Palestinian unity no doubt, is essential for any progress. This is because the longer the conflict persists, the less impact any US. diplomacy will have on solving the conflict. But with an expanded and durable ceasefire which may come as a result of this internal unity in Palestine, the scene can be set for a coordinated Israeli withdrawal from significant portions of the West Bank which many Israelis still support. (Donald A. Sylvan, Jonathan W. Keller and Yoram Z. Haftel, 2004). This chapter shall attempt to explain why the Israeli-Palestinian conflicts have persisted despite the various peace proposals put forward over thc years for their resolution. Attempt will be made to review several peace processes that have been initiated; the manner the US pursued their final implementations, US role in the Middle East, its relations with both parties, and how the relations affect the peace process.

3.1 America's Foreign Policy in the Middle East

The foreign policy of any nation comprises the objectives it seeks in its international relations and the means or methods by which it pursues them. The fourth foreign policy objective of the United States is: To preserve neutrality and peace, to keep out of the wars of Europe and Asia as long as non-participation is compatible with preservation of American Security and vital interests, and to devise means of peaceful settlement of all international controversies (Julius, 1965).

In pracrice this is not what America does. According to Presbyterian Church, (U.S.A) website, rather, the United States, the church went on, has been using its position and influence at the United Nations, including its veto in the Security Council, to protect Israel from criticisms and actions that challenge Israel's human rights violations. However, there is no denying the fact that the success of a notion's foreign policy depends upon the efficiency and efficacy of the instruments with which that policy is pursued. The United States has sought to attain the objectives of her foreign policy through several means which include peaceful negotiation through the process of diplomacy as well as the use of force if necessary. The Middle East region before the Second World War was of slight practical importance to the United States, but after the war, the region supposedly acquired critical importance for the defence of the "free world". The region was seen as the "chief treasure house'' of the world's petroleum reserves. A critical portion of the area lies within easy striking distance of the Soviet Union. In the days before the Cold War by the US and the then Soviet Union, the Middle East was presumed to hold a key to victory if the cold war should become intense. The region had long attracted American students of religious history and archeology as well as Christian Missionaries, whose educational work had produced the Roberts College in Istanbul and the American University of Beirut in Lebanon. American traders also had found their way to the region, but the trade was never large; and well into the twentieth century, America's concern with the Middle East remained principally humanitarian and/or political, but essentially economic. It was after the Second World War and its devastating effect on American economy that America first became conscious of the oil in the Middle East. When the World Zionist Organization adopted a programme calling for a Jewish State in Palestine, and Jewish army to defend it, as well as an unlimited Jewish immigration to the area in 1942, it received its chief support from within the US which had a powerful and strong

Jewish Community - numbering about 3 million people then. Throughout the period of the Second World War to the eventual declaration of the state of Israel in 1948, the question of Jewish immigration into Palestine became an issue in America politics. After 1945, the United States claimed that the underlying purpose of its policy in the Middle East was not only to contain Communism in the region, but also: (1) To contain the dispute within the area, notably the dispute between Israel and its neighbours. (2) To liaise the standard of living through assistance in developing the region's neglected natural resources (3) To strengthening the area's military potential and its willingness to resist aggression or subversion originating from the Kremlin. On US policy in the Middle East, former US President, Ronald Reagan said: Our involvement in the search for Middle East Peace is not a matter of preference, it is a moral imperative. The strategic importance of the region is well known. But our policy is motivated by more than strategic interests. We also have an irreversible commitment to the survival and territorial integrity of friendly states. Nor can we ignore the fact that the well being of much of the world's economy is tied to the stability in the strife-tom Middle East Finally our traditional humanitarian concern dictates a continuing effort to peacefully resolved conflict (Julius, 1965).

America does not only protect the interest of its big business at home, but also does same abroad-the Middle East inclusive. The US government usually takes steps, including the use of force, as stated earlier, to ensure the security of oil supplies, trade routes and markets in the Middle East. This has been the main motivations of all American administrations since they realized that oil was important for US economic survival. This was the main reason President George W. Bush went to war with Iraq in 1991. Some analysts believe that America's intention is to control not only the six Gulf States, but also Iraq and Iran'. Most of these countries in the Middle East also harbor American armed forces and contain her bases. The US realizes the tremendous advantages corporate America in general, as well as her oil companies in particular will derive should pro American regimes be involved in all these Middle East countries. The Middle East region plays a very crucial part in American capital markets: they hold an estimated $1.3 trillion in overseas investments, including $400 billion worth of American shares (The Economist, London, March 23rd, 2002).

3.2 America's Foreign Policy Towards Israel

The US, no doubt, has been Israel's mot trusted and constant ally. US military, economic and political support to Israel since the latter's declaration of independence has, as stated earlier, been the highest compared to US support to any other country. Since the creation of Israel in 1948, the US has never hidden her desire and willingness in ensuring that Israel survives. This is evident in official statements by US government officials on the survival of Israel. From past US Presidents to the Present, and from past Secretary of States to the present, their official statements on Israel have always been unequivocal and the same- Israeli's survival. In January 2006, US President, Bush declared that "United States would not deal with a political party that articulates the destruction of Israel", and precisely on January 3 1, Bush called on Hamas led government in Palestine to "recognize Israel." Also, earlier on January 11, Secretary Rice stated that "It remains the view of the United States that there should be no place in the political process for groups or individuals who refuse to renounce terror and violence, recognize Israel's right to exist" (New York Tribune, February 1, 2006). Rubenberg (2003) presents Israel as one of the strongest states in the global system, backed unreservedly by the dominant superpower, the United States of America. Seyon Brown in his work "Issues in US Foreign Policy" also added that "helping Israel to secure its existence in the midst of hostile neighbours" was one of the foreign policy thrusts of the US in the Middle East. He went further to say that since the founding of the State of Israel in 1948, support provided by the United States' government to the Jewish nation has been motivated primarily by moral considerations, and that the deepest sources of that commitment are found in the consensus of concern among American Jews and their fellow Americans for the fate of the Jewish people in the Middle East - a concern that became a US national interest in reaction to the horrific treatment meted to the Jews by Hitler during World War I1 (Brown,1984). But the consensus supporting United States' help to Israel to secure its existence necessitates the following questions: What are the necessary and appropriate means by which the United States ought to provide such help? What are Israel's legitimate security requirements? Lastly, to what extent should the United States endorse and tangible back those requirements? There is a school of thought who argues that American policy has developed more into the competing interest groups of the pro-Israeli and pro-Arab factions within the United States, and that the US foreign policy has had to take into account the pro-Israeli stance of American Jews who wield enormous influence on US foreign policy. Their argument is based on the premise that AIPAC, the leading pro-Israeli lobby group in Washington is not only one of the most influential on Capitol Hill, but the most powerful lobby group in the United States with enough financial wherewithal. They also argue that this group donates large sums of money to candidates' campaign and has become powerful enough to make or mar political careers of American presidential candidates, stating that this is the more reason America has not been criticizing Israeli violations of humanitarian and international law and has, in fact, been helping it keep these issues off the Security Council agenda. Some loyal American supporters of Israel would have the United States defer to Israel's own judgment of her security needs. This is the dominant thrust of lobbying by organized groups of the American Jewish Community who contend that no one can know better than the Israelis the state of Israel's security situation at anytime. Their argument is that only the government of a nation living in the midst of the volatile and extremely complex Middle East is in a position to authoritatively assess that nation's survival needs. Controversy in the United State's policy community over the degree to which the US should support or distance itself from Israeli policies and actions usually revolves around three issues. These are: (9 The nature and location of the secure and defensible borders Israel claims to require. (i i) The political status of the Palestinians and the characteristics of a future Palestinian territorial entity. (i i i) The governance of Jerusalem and US arms supply to Israel and other countries in the region. Since the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, in which the Israelis tripled the size of their territory, there has been tension between the government of the Unites States and Israel over the conditions under which this conquered territory is to be relinquished by Israel. Opinions vary among US policy-makers with regards to the extent to which the United States should endorse the official Israeli position on the issue. The standard Israeli position has been that the location of its perimeter for self-defence depends on the willingness of Israel's neighbours to live in peace with her. If neighbours consider Israel to be illegitimate and regard Arab-Israeli relations as essentially those of enemies, then Israel's security must require a more extended defence perimeter. The Arabs on their own part have insisted on Israel's return of the acquired territories as a necessary precondition for peace negotiations between the two countries. The position of all United States administration since 1967 has been essentially one of even handed approach with respect to the seemingly incompatible basic demands by the Arabs and Israelis which rests largely on the UN Security Council Resolution 242. When it comes to the issue of Israeli withdrawal and Arab recognition of the Jewish state and the means of attaining both of these goals, the positions in the United States policy differ. The pro-Israeli faction which commands support of a majority in the congress and usually from the residents backs the standing Israeli position, while the faction more sympathetic to the Arabs thinks otherwise. Successive Israel governments have rejected the notion that the legitimate rights of the Palestinians extend to the creation of a new Palestinian State on the borders of Israel. They have also regarded as illegitimate the organization which is broadly representative of the Palestinians seeking statehood - the Palestinians Liberation Organization (PLO), pointing out that PLO program calls for the dismemberment and destruction of the state of Israel. Until the late 1970's, the United States administrators backed by congress had deferred to Israeli insistence on both the question of a future Palestine political entity and the question of relations with the PLO. But the Carter administration on assumption of office in 1977 came up with a comprehensive plan for peace in thc Middle East that departed considerably Erom the rigid Israeli stance on the Palestine issue. Subsequently in the Reagan administration, reactions to Israel's 1982 invasion oC Lebanon showed an increasing erosion of the solid consensus in the US policy community, which till then had essentially endorsed Israeli policies for dealing with Palestinians. The formal position of the United States remained that of rejecting the concept of an independent Palestine state as reiterated by President Reagan in his September 1, 1982 address on the Middle East. Rcagan stated that "the United States will not support the establishment of an independent Palestinian State in the West Bank and Gaza" (New York Times, November 8, 1982). But the formal position is not necessarily fixed, as the search for ways of moving towards a sovereign Palestinian entity is continually underway. This can be seen by the number of proposals and alternative suggestions to an independent Palestinian State which have continued to appear in the rhetoric of official formal documents of the US government. The standing United States Policy on dealing with the Palestinian Liberation Organization was crystallized in 1975 in a special accord singed by US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger and Israeli Foreign Minister, Yigal Allon. Kissinger, unarguably the most charismatic Secretary of States in US history,.and who "invented" shuttle diplomacy promised that the "United States would not negotiate with the PLO so long as the PLO does not recognize Israel's right to exist and does not accept Security Council Resolution 242 and 336" (Brown, 1984). How Jerusalem should be governed has been highly contentious in American politics, and a source of tension between the US and Israel, and was often deferred by the officials responsible for formulating United States policy towards the Middle East. The basic US principle has been that any arrangement for the city must safeguard the rights and holy places of the three principal religious groups that consider Jerusalem sacred- the Jews, the Christians, and the Muslims. Since the 1967 war in which the Israelis occupied all Jerusalem, the US government has avoided a denial or endorsement of Israeli claims of full sovereignty over the city. The closest the US government came to endorsing Israel's claim of full sovereignty over all the city of Jerusalem was President Reagan's statement in his September 1, 1982 policy speech in which he stated that "We remain convinced that Jerusalem must remain undivided but its final status should be decided through negotiations" (New York Times, November 8, 1982). Some Middle East analysts have noted US strategic alliance with Israel, and have cautioned that this alliance should not dictate a biased course, but rather, it should exercise its powers for just peacemaking and peacekeeping. They believe that the US can maintain the integrity of the process by: i. Ensuring compliance with the signed resolutions by both sides. .. 11. Reinforcement and maintenance of terms of reference such as the equation of "Land for Peace" and the UN resolution 242 and 338. . . . 111. Creating a system of accountability for any violations, and if need be, arbitration of disputes mediating. iv. Maintaining the International components (European, Arab and global) particularly the role of the community paying for peace-building especially the EU. v. Dealing with instability in ways which would diffuse volatile situations by providing peaceful ways to solving disagreements (US Taking More Active Role in Middle East Peace Talks: http:/www:foxnews.com).

US Political Support to Israel: The US was the first country to recognize Israel only minutes after it was officially created in 1948, consistent with a 1922 Congressional resolution backing the League of Nations Mandate for a Jewish Homeland in Palestine. Since then the two countries have developed a rock-solid friendship that does not depend 9n the parties in power either in Washington or Jerusalem. While there have certainly been ups and downs, the basic bond between the US and Israel, the only country in the Middle East that resembles the US in its values and democracy, is very strong. Both countries have long-recognized that their mutual interests of deterring war, promoting stability and eventually achieving peace are only possible if the United States continues to stand firmly behind Israel.

US Economic Support to Israel: According to Zunes (2003) the U.S. aid relationship with Israel is unlike any other in the world. The US, he stated, has, since 1949 given Israel a total of $83.205 billion. The interest costs borne by U.S. tax payers on behalf of Israel are $49.937 billion, thus making the total amount of aid given to Israel since 1949 $133.132 billion. The amount, according to him, is the most generous foreign aid program ever between any two countries. This may mean that U.S. government has given more federal aid to the average Israeli citizen in a given year than it has given to the average American citizen. He argues that although Israel is an advanced, industrialized, technologically sophisticated country, it "receives more U.S. aid per capita annually than the total annual [Gross Domestic Product] per capita of several Arab states. He further stated that approximately a third of the entire U.S. foreign aid budget goes to Israel, even though Israel comprises just one-thousandth of the world's total population and already has one of the world's higher per capita incomes. According to him, U.S. government officials argue that this money is necessary for "moral" reasons-some even say that Israel is a "democracy battling for its very survival." If that were the real reason, however, aid, he argued, should have been highest during Israel's early years, and would have declined as Israel grew stronger. Yet "the pattern.. .has been just the opposite. According to him 99 percent of all U.S. aid to Israel took place after the June 1967 war, when Israel found itself more powerful than any combination of Arab armies.

Between 1949 and 1973, the U.S. provided Israel with an average of about $122 million a year. From 1948 to 2003, US direct aid to Israel was $89.9 billion, and this does not include loan guarantees and cancelled debts. Israel received $1.2 billion in economic assistance yearly from 1987-200 from the US. Israel was the first country to sign a free trade agreement with the US which has resulted in a quintupling of trade between the two countries. The US-Israel Free Trade Agreement (FTA) has served as a model for other trade agreements including the October 2000 FTA between the US and Jordan. According to Presbyterian Church, (U.S.A), US aid to Israel has some unique aspects, such as waiving the repayment of loans. Israel receives all of its aid in the first thirty days of the fiscal year, unlike other countries that receive aid in three or four installments. US Military Support to Israel: US military involvement with Israel has been on the increase right from when Israel gained independence in 1948. Between 1949 and 1973, the U.S. provided Israel with an average of about $122 million a year, a total of $3.1 billion (and actually more than $1 billion of that was loans for military equipment in ,1971-73) Prior to 1971, Israel received a total of only $277 million in military aid, all in the form of loans as credit sales. Since 1974, Israel has received nearly $100 billion in assistance, including three special aid packages. The first followed the signing of the Israeli-Egypt peace treaty and Israeli's withdrawal from the Sinai. The redeployment of Israeli forces and rebuilding of air bases in the Negev cost $5 billion. To partially compensate for this sacrifice, Israel received $3 billion ($2.2 billion of which was in the form of high-interest loans) in U.S. aid in 1979. As a direct result of the Yom Kippur war, especially following an Egyptian refusal to accept a cease-fire and a Soviet military airlift to the Arab states, the Nixon Administration sent a United States airlift of weapons and supplies to Israel enabling her to recover from earlier setbacks. The US quadrupled its foreign aid to Israel, and replaced France as Israel's largest arms supplier. The doctrine of maintaining Israel's "qualitative edge" over its neighbors was born in the war's aftermath. This was based both on US appreciation of Israel's role as a defender of Western values in a generally hostile region, and also on the Cold War calculus of opposing the Arab client states of the Soviet Union. In the following decades, Israel and the US worked together to counter the greatest threats to American interests in the Middle East. These threats include the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by rogue regimes; state-sponsored terrorism; the potential disruption of access to Middle East oil; and the spread of Islamic radicalism (Stoessinger, 1982).

Ever since, cooperation has extended to programs for sharing cutting-edge technology and valuable intelligence; conducting joint military exercises; researching and developing new weapons; establishing joint anti-terrorism strategies; and pre-positioning materiel in Israel for use in She event the US ever needs to respond quickly to a future Middle East conflict. In the 1990s, Israel and the US collaborated on a theater ballistic missile defense system, the ARROW, vital to Israel to defend against missile from nearby hostile Arab countries. Israel's missile defenses were integrated with US capabilities, including enhanced interoperability and upgraded regional early warning systems (Mark, 2005). 3.3 America's Foreign Policy Towards Palestine

Cheryl Rubenberg begins her book, 'The Paleslirziuns: In Search of a Jusl Peuce ', by identifying what she sees as the core of the problem for most people in understanding the Palestinian-Israeli conflict: Westerners tend to identify with Israel and generally are unable to see, let alone understand or empathize with the condition of the Palestinians. Their perceptions are so

grounded in prejudices and unchanging ' mental impressions, often subconscious, that they frequently fail to grasp the basic issues (Cheryl Rubenberg, 2003).

In her book, she describes the Palestinians as a dispersed people, dispossessed from their land and disorganised - 'a party so pathetically weak in the power dynamics of this conflict that to equate it with Israel is absurd.' These power disparities are highlighted throughout her book to show the many ways in which Israeli power represses the Palestinians and threatens their security. According to her, the imbalance has been reflected at all levels - alliance patterns and support, social and political organization and cohesiveness, military strength, economic resources, even information. Palestinians have not been able to confront Israel from anything but a position of weakness, and nowhere has this been more apparent than in the agreements that constitute the Oslo process (Rubenberg, 2003: 32). From a Palestinian perspective, in order to provide insight into their positions in the peace process and to clarify why Palestinians insist on achieving a viable independent state in the remaining 22 percent of Mandatory Palestine (e.g., the West Bank and Gaza), the major themes and goals emerging from this overview, which inspire the Palestinian national movement to the present time are: i. Injustice, dispossession, statelessness and fear of fransfer or expulsion. Injustice has remained as real for Palestinians as in 1948, when the state of Israel was created. The experience of statelessness has been traumatic, not only for Palestinian refugees. Despite their pragmatic acceptance of Israel on 78 per cent of what was their homeland, and willingness to coexist in peace, Palestinians earnestly desire an admission by Israel of the wrong done to them. . . 11. Occupation, resistance, steadfastness and the signiJicance of land. UN Resolution 18 1, approved by the General Assembly on 29 November 1947, had called, albeit contrary to the wishes of the indigenous population, for the division of Palestine into a Jewish state (55 per cent of the land) and a Palestinian state (the remaining 45 per cent) with Jerusalem as a united city under permanent UN trusteeship. While now accepting the creation of a Palestinian state, in the territories occupied by Israel after the 1967 war, on much less land than Resolution 181 originally granted, this constitutes the national objective. An independent, sovereign Palestinian state is invested with vast symbolic and emotional importance for Palestinians, whether or not they would live there, while for those under Israeli occupation it is a matter of individual and collective survival. 'All Palestinians believe that those living under occupation have the right- and duty- to resist (Rubenberg, 2003: 3 1). . . . 111. The plight of refugees, the sacredness of Jerusalem. The fate of refugees who were forced from their homes when Israel was created also has great significance. UN Resolution 194, approved by the General Assembly on 11 December 1948, called for the repatriation of the Palestinians to their homes or compensation to be paid to those who decided not to return. A year later the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) was established for Palestinian refugees but it was not authorised to seek local integration or the resettlement of refugees in other countries. Except in Jordan, most such refugees have remained stateless, in great need, and restricted to densely populated UNRWA camps. 'Resolution 194 remains the fundamental, although not the only, legal basis for the refugees' right of return. The majority of Palestinians believe the right of return is sacred and inviolable. Likewise, Palestinians, whether Muslim or Christian, do not accept Jewish dominance of a unified Jewish Jerusalem. The US has been critical of Palestinian authority leadership right from the creation of the state of Israel. These criticisms have been approved by the UN which has over the years condemned terrorists' attacks which the Palestinian authority headed by the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) under its former leader, Yasser Arafat supported against Israel. Even the Hamas led government which came into power in Palestine in 2005 after the death of Arafat has come under sever criticisms from the US due to its support for terrorism against Israel. The US goirernment has, on several occasions, stated in clear terms that Hamas will not be recognized by the US if the latter continues to support terrorist attacks against Israel. In January 2005, President Bush stated that the United States would not deal with a political party "that articulates the destruction of Israel as part of its platform" and, on January 3 1, called on Hamas to "recognize Israel, disarm, reject terrorism, and work for a lasting peace. Bush further stated that future assistance to any new (Palestinian) government would be reviewed by donors against the government's commitment to the principles of non-violence, recognition of Israel, and acceptance of previous agreements and obligations, including the Road Map.

US Political Support to Palestine: More recently, the US government has expressed its desire in ensuring her willingness to ensure a just and viable solution to the lingering crises through the creation of Palestinian state, as well as provide aid and support to Palestinian citizens. This is evident in President Bush statement on October 2, 2002, in which he stated that "the idea of a Palestinian state has always been part of a vision." (Times Magazine, November, 2002). A month later, precisely on November 10, he further stated that the United States is "working toward the day when two states - Israel and Palestine - live peacefully together within secure and recognized borders." (New York Times, December, 2002).

US Economic Support to Palestine: Despite the fact, the US has been critical of PLO, the former has also expressed her willingness to ensure a just and viable solution to the lingering crises through the creation of Palestinian state, as well as provide aid and support to Palestinian citizens. United States economic assistance for the Palestinians has averaged about $85 million per year since Israel and the PLO signed the 1993 Declaration of Principles. The United States began providing assistance for the Palestinians in 1950 with contributions to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), the International body created to provide food, shelter, medical attention, and education for the Palestinian refugees from the 1948-1949 Arab-Israeli war. In 1975, with strong support from private voluntary organizations, the United States began to provide foreign assistance for Palestinian projects, primarily humanitarian (child care, medical clinics) or infrastructure (clean water, roads, schools).

At an October 1, 1993, Washington meeting, 46 donor nations pledged $2.4 billion for the Palestinian entity. The donors established the "Holst Fund" at the World Bank (named after ~ohkJorgen Holst, the Norwegian Foreign Minister central to the negotiations) to transfer funds from the international donors to the Palestinian entity. The U.S. Administration offered $500 million ($125 million in loans or loan guarantees and $375 million in grants) over 5 years for economic development of the Palestinian entity. Palestinians drew only about $3 million of the $125 million available in loan guarantees. In 1994, the United States provided $36 million through the Holst Fund for the PA, but did not give any additional direct aid to the PA because of suspicions that the funds could be siphoned off for terror activities (Zunes, 2003). The table below shows US aid to Palestine.

TABLE 1. U.S. Aid Obligations to the Palestinians, 1994-1998 (Millions of dollars)

Program Totals FY 1994- FY 1996 FY 1997 FY 1998 1995 Expand Economic 65.814 26.410 16.182 14.219 9.003 Oooortunitv / Scarce Water 1 193.269 1 69.832 / 32.764 1 50.969 1 39.704 1 Governance 35.160 3.073 9.364 1 1.500 1 1.223

Transition to Self 49.268 39.132 ,136 10.000 0 Rule Short Term Develop. 24.754 17.839 5.860 .300 .775 Needs Totals 368.265 156.286 64.306 86.988 60.685

SOURCE: USAID Statistical Annex-FY 1997

United Nations General Assembly Resolution 212 (111) of November 19, 1948, recognized the need to provide funding for the Palestinian refugees. Paragraph 7 of UNGA Resolution 302 (IV) of December 8, 1949, established the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) to administer the distribution of food, shelter, clothing, medical treatment, and education for the ref~~gees,and the US has been contributing to this agency. The table below shows US contribution to the agency. TABLE 2. U.S. Contributions to UNRWA, 1959-2002 (Millions of dollars)

Year Amount

Cumulative 1950-199 1 1,618

I Cumulative 1950-2002 2.873

Source:.Depai-tment of State.

3.4 The Role of US in Resolving the Israeli-Palestinians Conflicts

There is no doubt that the US has played the most active role in trying to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. From President Eisenhower to Johnson, Carter to Reagan; Clinton to Bush; and Secretary of States Kissinger to Christopher, and Powell to Rice, the US practiced diplomacy in manners never witnessed before in international scene, all in a bid to resolve the conflicts. It is important to note that President Eisenhower was the first US president to criticize Israel. In a televised speech on February 20, 1957, he called on Israel to withdraw from the territories it occupied (Sinai and Gaza strip). The Rogers Plan and Jarring Mission is a clear case in point to US role in the Middle East crises. On December 9, 1969, the US Secretary of states, William Rogers announced a two track settlement plan: an Israeli- Egyptian element involving Israeli withdrawal from Sinai and West Bank. Since the October war of 1973, US Secretary of States have visited every Arab capital. This tour began with Kissinger who committed his skill and energy, and brought his reputation to bear during what Stocssinger calls "diplomatic tour de force" (Stoessinger, 1982). A lot of criticisms have followed US role in the Middle East, but this does not in any way understate their role. 11 was Kissinger's 'shuttle diplomacy' which brought about the historic Sinai agreement between Israel and Egypt in 1975. The following are some of US peace initiative in the Middle East Conflict.

The Versailles Peace conference: Right from 1919, the US has been involved in Israeli- Palestinian issue when President Wilson asked the Allies at the Versailles peace conference to send the King-Crane fact finding mission to the area.

The Rogers Plan and Jarring Mission of 1969: The US Secretary of states, William Rogers announced on December 9, 1969, a two track settlement plan: an Israeli-Egyptian element which was to involve Israeli withdrawal from Sinai as well as the West Bank. This did not go down well with Israel hence it rejected the plan. On June 19, 1970, Rogers put forward yet another plan which proposed a three month cease-fire, the acceptance by all parties of UN resolution 242 and resumption of the Jarring mission. The Un Secretary General had earlier asked the Swedish Ambassador, Dr. Gunner Jarring to proceed to the Middle East as his mediator. On August 1, Israel accepted the second Rogers plan, but the Palestinians rejected it with the claim that it did not take into consideration the existence of the Palestinian people and rights of their national rights. As a result of both parties refusal to accept all the plans, the peace initiative failed The Geneva Conference of 1973: After the collapse of the Rogers plan and Jarring mission, the new US Secretary of states Henry Kissinger accepted the challenge of the Middle East problem and advocated a policy of stalemate. Many events ensued which led to the adoption of the Security Council Resolution 338 on October 22, 1973 which was originally a joint US-Soviet text. Following the Geneva conference, agreements were signed on January 18, 1974 by Egypt and Israel for the disengagement of their forces along the Suez Canal front. A second Egypt- Israeli disengagement agreement was signed on September 4, 1974 after Israel had received a set of American commitments which include military and economic assistance, as well as oil and diplomatic support. Other incentives include coordination on the issue of the Geneva conference to ensure that the negotiations were conducted on a bilateral basis, and a refusal to recognize thc PLO so long as it refuses to recognize Israel's right to exist. Carter thereafter took two initiatives to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict based on three vital issues namely peace, border, and the fate of Palestinians. At Carter's instance on October I, 1977, US and Soviet Union published a joint communique calling for a comprehensive settlement at the Geneva Conference. The text of the communique called for the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from the territories it occupied in 1967, and a solution to the Palestinian question which would include guarantees of the Palestinian people's legitimate rights.

The Camp David Accord of 1973: The October war of 1973 which Israel won, and which, according to Stoessinger, left a legacy of shame and bitterness on the Arab world brought US role in resolving the crises to the fore with series of visits to the Middle East by US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger. He successfully negotiated disengagement of agreements between Israel and Egypt on 17the January, 1974 and 41h September, 1975 and between Israel and Syria on 31" May, 1976, and supervised the reopening of the Suez Canal 5'" June, 1974 (Stoessinger, 1982). These agreements, especially the one between the Egyptians and the Israelis, provided for lsraeii withdrawal form the strategic Mitla and Giddi passes, and the return to Egypt of the Abu Rudeise oil fields, on which Israel had depended for some 50% of its supplies since capturing them in 1967. A UN buffer zone was established separating Egyptian and Israeli forces. This was in addition to the provision of five electronic listening posts of which one was manned by the Egyptians, another by the Israelis and three by a team of 200 American citizens, who would monitor troop's movements. This agreement was considered a triumph for US diplomacy and had very significant effects on the Egyptian relations with her Arab allies. However, this was criticized by the Syrians and the PLO as "a surrender to US Israeli interest" (David, 1979). The Middle East was soon besieged by more conflicts. This culminated in the Lebanon War of 1976 after which US once more used its influence in the region to reach a compromise solution. This particular attempt was credited to Jimmy Carter, the then US President, and culminated in the Camp David Meetings which lasted for close to two weeks. The meeting which appeared to be break down on several occasions finally ended on 17'~September, 1978.After the meeting, Carter announced on television that Israeli Prime Minister, Menachem Begin and Egyptian President, Anwar Sadat have signed two documents which together provided a framework for peace in the Middle East. Furthermore, the meeting negotiated by President Jimmy Carter at the Presidential retreat at Camp David was followed by a peace treaty signed in Washington on 26th March, 1979. The settlement arranged for a phased restoration on the pre-1967 Israeli-Egyptian frontiers, which was completed on 25'h of April. The Gaza Strip, however, remained under Israeli administration, Israel was guaranteed free passage of the Suez Canal and normal diplomatic relations between Egypt and Israel were established for the first time in February, 1980. Another part of the agreement was supposed to deal with the wider question of the future of the West Bank and Gaza, and provided for an election for a post-Palestinian self- governing authority to replace the existing Military government. Both leaders signed an agreement on a 'Framework for Peace' between their two countries that provided for the phased withdrawal of Isreali forces from the Sanai and the signing of a full-fledged peace treaty. They also agreed on a broader 'Framework for Peace in the Middle East' that was designed to enable the Palestinian issue and the West Bank problem to be resolved progressively over a five year period. The agreement aimed at resolving the status of another territories occupied by Israel since 1967. However, this was never implemented due to the failure of Jordan, Lebanon and Syria to enter negotiations. The, Camp David agreements were greeted with a mixed reaction by the participants. In Israel, the agreements were greeted with cautious approval. Thus Israelis believed that Menachem Begin has realized Israel's long-standing ambition to conclude a separate peace with Egypt. This would be without making any substantive concessions over Israel's 'Return of Palestinian Refugees' right to control the West Bank and Gaza. On the other hand, the Arab world thought the agreement was regarded as a proof that President Sadat has abandoned the Palestinians and his Arab allies in order to satisfy Egyptian interests-an agreement the PLO were seriously opposed to and which made them refer to Sadat as a traitor. The government of Saudi Arabia put out a statement saying that the Camp David Agreement constituted an unacceptable formula for a definite peace. However, the resignation of the Egyptian Foreign Minister who was at Camp David with Sadat showed that Egyptian officials and public opinion was not wholly in favour of the Camp David Formula (Stoessinger, 1982). The controversy over the Camp David Accord in the Arab World centered around

whether it gave any real promise of an eventual self-determination to the Palestinians or 1101. The Palestinians too rejected all the provisions in the accord pertaining to autonomy, and stressed that these accords did not bind them since they were not party to them. George Corm (1999) observed that: More seriously, the accords are an updated version of the Balfour Declaration. Egypt and Israel alone effectively dispose of the vestiges of Palestine, the West Bank and Gaza, while inviting a third government, also non Palestine - that of Jordan - to join hture negotiations on the legal status of these territories; a status which the agreement leaves undetermined for a period of five years, enabling the Israelis to maintain their claims of sovereignty over the West Bank and Gaza.

However, the immediate criticism which the Camp David Accord received centered on the - statement made by the Israel Prime Minister, Menachem Begin. As soon as he was back in Israel, he declared in the Knesset that Israel would not "allow under any circumstance or condition", the establishment of an independent state and that Israel would continue to create new settlements on the West Bank and Gaza. He further stated that Israel would maintain armed presence there even after the end of the five year transitional period. Finally, opposition to the Peace treaty on the part of even the most moderate Arab government emphasized the need for Egypt's isolation with the Arab World.

The Madrid Conference of 1991: The Madrid conference of 1991 marked a turning point in the Israeli -Palestinian crises. This is because the US and Soviet Union Presidents, George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev were present at the joint press conference where the choice of Madrid was announced as the venue, and it was based on the UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, which enshrined the Principle of "Land for Peace". Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon participated in the conference even though they withheld their recognition of Israel. Each party presented their case and criticized the other's case. For Shamir, the Israeli representative, peace was necessary for other items to follow, but for the Arabs, it was withdrawal from the occupied territories first, and then peace. US Secretary of states who was not happy with the outcome voiced US concept of a compromise thus: Land, peace and security are inseparable elements in the search for a comprehensive settlement. Peace by itself is unachievable without a territorial solution and security. A territorial solution by itself will not resolve the conflict without there also being peace and security. Security by itself is impossible to achieve without a territorial solution and peace (Le Monde, Nov.3-4, 1991)

Following the different views of the parties and their refusal to agree with one another, the, the US presented them with another chance by proposing Washington as the venue for a second conference. But the second conference also did not yield any meaningful result, though it succeeded in triggering the mutual recognition and establishment of direct negotiation between Israel and the PLO. This peace process gave birth to the opening of the channel and subsequently the Oslo Accords.

The Oslo Conference of 1993: The Oslo Accords are the foundation on which current Peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians are based. Officially called the Declaration of Principles, the accords were negotiated secretly by Israel and Palestinian delegations in 1993 in Oslo, Norway. This was under the auspices of the Norwegian Foreign Minister, Johan Jorgenttolst. They were signed at a Washington D.C. ceremony hosted by US President Bill Clinton on 13the September 1993. During this period, Palestinian Leader, Chairman Yasser Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister, Rabin shook hands in public for the first time ending decades as sworn enemies .The election of a new Labour government in Israel headed by Prime Minister Rabin following the 1992 elections paved the way for the opening of a secret channel with the PLO which produced the Declaration of Principles signed on 13Ih September, 1993. The Declaration established a framework for negotiations on a permanent self- government; first in Gaza and Jericho, then in the rest of the West Bank. The rationale was that negotiation on the most complex issues, that is Jerusalem, refugees, water, settlements and borders, would follow after three years of confidence building between Israel and a new Palestinian Authority to be established within the Oslo framework. On 2gth September, 1995, at another White House Ceremony, Israelis and Palestinians signed another agreement known as the "Interim Agreement or 'OSLO 11". The 400-Page pact allowed for a second stage of autonomy for the Palestinians giving them self rule in the cities of Bethlehem, Jeuin, Nablus, Qalgilya, Ramallah, Tulkann, parts of Hebron and 450 villages, while allowing Israeli guarded Jewish settlements to remain. Israeli redeployment from all main Palestinian West Bank cities paved the way for the first Palestinian Democratic Presidential and Gencral elections which took place on 20Ih January, 1996. The Oslo Process had enemies on both sides. Israel's right wingers led by Benjamin Netanyahu opposed the very principal of trading land for peace. They also vowed to resist the surrender of any territory over which the Israeli flag flew. On the other hand, Islamic f~~ndamentalistPalestinians rallied round the Hamas movement to denounce agreement Illat would involve Palestinian and Arab acceptance of Israel's right to exist on what is Palestinian land. In spite of a cease-fire that followed these Peace accords, violence was always on the increase. For instance, in February, 1994, Barnch Goldstein, and Israeli settler, massacred 29 Palestinians inside a religious site at Hebron. Also in November 1995, a young religious conservative, Yigal Amir assassinated Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. Similarly, in February and March of 1996, the Hamas launched its deadliest assault yet on the peace process. Israelis were killed in a series of suicide bombings that prompted acting Prime Minister Shimon Peres to break off peace talks. It was, though, only against the background of the ending of the Cold War, and the Gulf crisis and subsequent US-led war with Iraq over its occupation of Kuwait that direct diplomatic negotiations began. PLO support for Iraq had badly damaged its standing with Gulf States while Islamic groups, which were also initially affected by this, won support from Islamic countries, notably Iran, and groups associated with the Islamic resurgence. There were two aspects to the Accord: the Declaration'of Principles and the letters of Mutual Recognition. The Declaration, which was officially signed at the White House on 13 September 1993, was conditional on the exchange of letters of recognition by Yasir Arafat as chairman of the PLO, and Yitzhak Rabin as prime minister of Israel. This exchange duly occurred; the PLO recognized 'the right of the State of Israel to exist in peace and security7and accepted UN resolutions 242 and 338. In his letter, Arafat declared that the PLO renounced terrorism and would seek to control those that might engage in it. He also undertook that those clauses in the 1968 PLO Charter that denied Israel's existence and called for 'armed struggle' to overthrow her were 'now inoperative and no longer valid', and that he would propose their removal from the Charter to the PNC (this was carried out in December 1998). For his part, Rabin wrote in his letter to Arafat that 'the Government of Israel has decided to recognize the P.L.O. as the representative of the Palestinian people and commence negotiations with the P.L.O. within the Middle East peace process (Rubenberg, 2003). Israel had accepted the PLO as the organisation representing the Palestinian people but not their objective of a Palestinian state. Palestinian 'rejectionists' claimed Arafat had recognised Israel's existence without gaining mutual acceptance of the Palestinian right to self- determination. Meanwhile Israeli rejectionists regarded the recognition of a Palestinian people, not to mention the PLO, as anathema and a prelude to such a Palestinian state in areas they intended to retain for Israel. The Declaration envisaged within preset time-frames, a negotiated agreement on the withdrawal of Israeli military forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area which would be granted self-governing status except for Israeli settlements in Gaza. The intention was to create what became the future Palestinian Authority comprising an elected council that would govern Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza for a transitional period not exceeding five years. The transitional period would date from the election of this council, intended to be July 1994, which would be dependent on first concluding an Interim Agreement to define the structure and authority of the council. 'Permanent status' negotiations were due to begin no later than July 1997 covering issues excluded from the jurisdiction of the elected council as they were still subject to unilateral Israeli control. They included Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, border relations and cooperation with other neighbours, as well as other issues of common interest. Although, once the Palestinian Council had been installed, the Israeli military government was to be withdrawn the Declaration also stated that after this withdrawal Israel's military authority would continue to have responsibility for external security and to override Palestinian civil authority on internal security and public order relating to settlements and Israelis. The Interim Agreement, or Oslo 2, was not concluded until September 1995 with the council elected in January 1996 (Rubenberg, 2003). The Wye River Initiatives: In 1998, US President Bill Clinton hosted Palestinian Leader, Yasser Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamine Netanyahu at a nine-day Summit at Wye Mills, Maryland. After a yearlong stalemate and Marathon 21-hour session, mediated by President Clinton, Netanyahu and Arafat signed a land-for-peace deal on 23rd October, 1998. The key elements of "The Wye River Memorandum" on the Wye accords include:- (a) A security plan to crack down on violence by terrorist. (b) Israeli troop redeployment from an additional 13.1% West Bank over a 90-day period. (c) A 14.2% transfer of West Bank from Joint Israeli-Palestinian control to Palestinian controls. (d) The revocation of clauses in the Palestinian National Charter that is hostile to Israel. (e) The guarantee of two corridors of safe passage between Gaza and the West Bank. (f) Israeli commitment for third-phase troop redeployment from the West Bank. (g) The release of 750 Palestinian Prisoners in three phases (h) The opening of a Palestinian airport in Gaza. Two months after signing the Wye River Accord, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu froze the deal saying that the Palestinians failed to meet their security commitment. During this period, the Knesset called for early elections. Among the contenders was Ehud Barak; Israel's most highly decorated soldier and the leader of the left-wing Labour Platform. In a direct vote for Prime Minister in May 1999, Barak won a record majority of 56% to unseat Lilcud Party Leader Benjamin Netanyahu. His decisive victory in the election gave him a mandate for ending the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. He resumed peace talks with Palestinian Leader Yasser Arafat to implement a modified version of the Wye accord. The agreement set September 13,2000 as deadline for a final peace treaty.

The Road Map, 2003: President Bush, in an address to his nation in June 2002, had said that he wodld not intervene in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict until Yasser Arafat had been replaced as head of the Palestinian Authority as he (like Sharon) blamed him for continuing Palestinian violence. However, he did envision under a new leader the creation of a Palestinian state as being necessary for Israel's own security. This was a goal of his 'war on terror' following the attacks on the World Trade Centre and Pentagon on 11 September 2001. The 'Road Map' derived from Bush's call for Arafat's removal and the start of Palestinian reform. It was developed in mid-2002 by the 'Quartet' consisting of the United States, European Union, Russia and the United Nations but not released until 30 April 2003, following the removal of Saddam Hussein by Bush' administration. The Road Map envisaged four phases, (though the timetable was overtaken by events): i. From April 30 to May 31,2003, Ending Terror and Violence. ii. Normalizing Palestinian Life and Building Palestinian ~nstitutions. iii. Transition: June-December 2003. iv. Permanent Status Agreement and End of Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 2004-05. The Palestinian prime minister, Mahmud Abbas (who was elected President in 2005), accepted the Road Map, but the Israeli prime minister objected on the grounds that it was performance-based. The Prime Minister demanded proof of Palestinian sincerity before acting, since the plan called for immediate withdrawal of settlements built since March 2001. However, despite these objections and lobbying for changes, Sharon did accept publicly the idea of a Palestinian state thereby appearing to reject the official 1977 position of his Likud party, which demanded the full Israeli absorption of the West Bank (Smith, 2004). Palestinian historic compromise in the peace process led it, as some analysts claim, to take a defeatist poison when: i. It abandoned the idea of liberating Palestine and when its proposal for a secular, democratic state was rejected by Israel. ii. It accepted UN resolution 242 even though this resolution is silent on Palestinian political or national rights; iii. Arafat, the PLO leader at the time, renounced terrorism despite Israel's 'persistent state terrorism' against Palestinians in the Occupied Territories and against Palestinian communities in the Diaspora (e.g., Lebanon). iv. It recognized Israel's right to exist, rather than simply recognizing Israel, in effect granting legitimacy to the Zionist seizure of Palestinian land and dispossession of its rightfi.11 owners. In other words, after the PLO agreed to the 1993 Oslo Accord, there were no further concessions, short of self-extinction as a nation. On the contrary, Israel had rejected every Palestinian peace proposal and the failure of talks under the Madrid framework suggested it was not interested in a settlement that required recognizing the Palestinian right to self-determination in an independent state. It appeared that Israel valued the expansion of settlements in the occupied territories above an equitable solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict (Rubenberg, 2003). In June, 1993, U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher said that the United States might be willing to guarantee security arrangements in the context of a sound agreement on the Golan. On January 16, 1994, President Clinton reported that Asad had told him that Syria was ready to talk about "normal peaceful relations" with Israel. The sides inched toward each other on a withdrawal and normalization timetable. Asad again told President Clinton on October 27 that he was committed to normal peaceful relations in return for full withdrawal. On May 24, 1994, Israel and Syria announced terms of reference for military talks under U.S. auspices. Syria reportedly conceded that demilitarized and thinned-out zones may take topographical features into account and be unequal if security arrangements were equal. Israel offered Syria an early warning ground station in northern Israel in exchange for Israeli stations on the Golan Heights, but Syria insisted instead on aerial surveillance only and that each country monitors the other from its own territory and receives U.S. satellite photographs. It was proposed that Syria demilitarize 6 miles for every 3.6 miles Israel demilitarizes. Rabin insisted that Israeli troops stay on the Golan after its return to Syria. Syria said that this would infringe on its sovereignty. Talks resumed at the Wye Plantation in Maryland in December 1995, but were suspended when Israeli negotiators went home after terrorist attacks in FebruaryIMarch 1996 Barak resigned on December 10, triggering an early election for the post of Prime Minister in Israel. Further negotiations were held at Bolling Air Force Base, in Washington, D.C. from December 19-23. On December 23, President Clinton suggested that Israel cede sovereignty over the Temple MountIHaram al-Sharif and Arab neighbourhoods in Jerusalem, 96% of the West Bank, all of the Gaza Strip, and annexed settlement blocs in exchange for giving the Palestinians Israeli land near Gaza. Jerusalem would be the capital of two countries. On February 6, 2001, Ariel Sharon was elected Prime Minister of Israel and vowed to retain united Jerusalem as Israel's capital, the Jordan Valley, and other areas for security. Sharon's associates asserted that the results of negotiations at and after Camp David were "null and void." On assumption of office, the Bush Administration said that Clinton's proposals "were no longer United States proposals." Sharon sought an interim agreement, not dealing with Jerusalem, Palestinian refugees, or a Palestinian state and, in an interview published on April 13, said that he could accept a disarmed Palestinian state on 42% of the West Bank (Ari Shavit, Ha 'aretz, April 13, 2001).0n April 30, 2001, the Mitchell commission made recommendations for ending violence, rebuilding confidence, and resuming negotiations. On June 12, the two sides accepted CIA Director George Tenet's plan to cement a cease-fire. On June 28, they agreed to a seven-day period without violence followed by a six-week cooling off period. On September 24, 2001, Sharon declared that "Israel wants to give the Palestinians what no one else gave them before, the possibility of a state." On October 2, President Bush said, for the first time, "The idea of a Palestinian state has always been part of a vision, so long as the right of Israel to exist is respected," The PFLP assassinated Israel's Minister of Tourism on October 17. On November 10, President Bush declared that the United States is "working toward the day when two states - Israel and Palestine live pe.acefully together within secure and recognized borders." Secretary of States, Powell sent General Anthony Zinni, USMC (Ret.) to work on a cease-fire, but violence impeded his mission. Israel confined Arafat to his headquarters in Ramallah on December 3. On December 7, Sharon doubted that an accord could be reached with Arafat, "who is a real terrorist ...." On December 12, Hamas ambushed an Israeli bus in the West Bank and perpetrated two simultaneous suicide bombings in Gaza. The Israeli cabinet charged that Arafat was directly responsible for the attacks and therefore is no longer relevant. On January 3, 2002, Israeli forces seized the Karine A, a Palestinian commanded freighter, carrying 50 tons of Iranian-supplied arms. Secretary Powell stated that Arafat "cannot engage with us and others in the pursuit of peace, and at the same time permit or tolerate continued violence and terror." At the White House on February 7, Sharon said that he believed that pressure should be put on Arafat so that an alternative Palestinian leadership could emerge. , On February 17, 2002, Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah, in an unprecedented statement called for full withdrawal from all occupied territories, in accord with U.N. resolutions, including Jerusalem, in exchange for full normalization of relations. On March 28, the Arab League endorsed his proposal with some revisions; it has since become known as the "Arab Peace Initiative." Prime Minister Sharon said that he was willing to explore the idea but that it would be a "mistake" to replace U.N. resolutions affirming Israel's right to "secure and recognized borders" with total withdrawal to pre-1967 borders. Israel declared Arafat "an enemy" and the Israeli armed forces besieged his compound in Ramallah, and took control of all major Palestinian-ruled West Bank cities. On May 2, the Quartet (U.S., EU, U.N., and Russian officials), proposed a conference on reconstructing the PA and related issues. After another Hamas suicide bombing near Tel Aviv, Sharon called for "the complete cessation of terror" before negotiations. After meeting Sharon on June 9, President Bush said that conditions were not ripe for a conference because "no one has confidence" in the Palestinian government. On June 24, President Bush called on the Palestinians to elect new leaders "not compromised by terror" and to build a practicing democracy. He went further by stating that the United States will support the creation of a Palestinian state, whose borders and certain aspects of sovereignty will be provisional until a final settlement. He also added that "as we make progress toward security, Israeli forces need to withdraw fully to positions they held prior to September 28, 2000, and (Israeli) settlement activity must stop." The President foresaw a final peace accord within three years. On September 17, the Quartet outlined a preliminary "Roadmap" to peace. On March 7, 2003, in what was seen as a gesture to appeal to the Quartet, Arafat named Mahmud Abbas as Prime Minister. On April 14, Sharon acknowledged that Israel would have to part with some places bound up in the history of the Jewish people, but insisted that the Palestinians recognize the Jewish people's right to its homeland and abandon their claim of a right of refugees to return to Israel. On April 14, Israeli emissaries submitted 14 reservations on the Roadmap to U.S. officials. On April 30, the Quartet officially presented the Roadmap which Abbas accepted. On May 23, the Administration stated that Israel had explained its concerns and that the United States shares the view "that these are real concerns and will address them fully and seriously in the implementation of the Roadmap," leading Sharon and his cabinet to accept "steps defined" in the Roadmap "with reservations". On May 25, Sharon declared that "to keep 3.5 million people under occupation is bad for us and them," using the word occupation for the first time. On June 4, President Bush met Abbas and Sharon at a conference hosted by Jordan's King Abdullah in Aqaba, Jordan. Abbas vowed to achieve the Palestinians' goals by peaceful means, while Sharon expressed understanding of "the importance of territorial contiguity" for a viable Palestinian state and promised to "remove unauthorized outposts." Abbas said that he would use dialogue, not force, with Palestinian groups. On October 15, a bomb detonated under an official U.S. vehicle in Gaza, killing three U.S. security guards and wounding a fourth. Palestinian authorities arrested members of Popular Resistance Committees

- disaffected former members of the Palestinian Security Services, Fatah, and other groups. (They were freed in April 2004.) Sounds of discontent with government policy were heard in Israel, culminating in the signing of the Geneva Accord, a Draft Permanent Status Agreement by Israeli opposition politicians and prominent Palestinians on December 1. On December 18, Sharon declared that, "to ensure a Jewish and democratic Israel," he would unilaterally disengage from the Palestinians by redeploying Israeli forces and relocating settlements in the Gaza Strip and intensifying construction of the security fence in the West Bank. On February 13, 2004, the White House said that an Israeli pullback "could reduce friction," but that a final settlement "must be achieved through negotiations." After an upsurge in violence on March 22, Israeli missiles killed Hamas leader Shaykh Ahrned Yassin and others. On April 14, 2004, President Bush and Sharon met and exchanged letters, according to Israel's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The President welcomed Israel's plan to disengage from Gaza and restated the U.S. commitment to the Roadmap. He noted the need to take into account changed "realities on the ground, including already existing major Israeli population centers," (i.e., settlements); asserting that "it is unrealistic to expect that the outcome of final status negotiations will be full and complete return to the armistice lines of 1949." The Presid,ent stated that a solution to the refugee issue will be found by settling Palestinian refugees in a Palestinian state, "rather than in Israel," thereby rejecting a "right of return." He called for a Palestinian state that is "viable, contiguous, sovereign, and independent." Sharon presented his disengagement plan as independent of but "not inconsistent with the Roadmap." He said that the "temporary" security fence would not prejudice final status issues including borders. A day before, he had identified five large West Bank settlements and an area in Hebron that Israel will retain and strengthen. Palestinians denounced the President's "legitimization" of settlements and prejudgment of final status. On April 19, Sharon's chief of staff Dov Wcissglas gave National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice a written commitment to dismantle illegal settlement outposts As of July2006, very few of the outposts have been dismantled. On June 6, Israel's cabinet approved a compromise disengagement plan whereby Israel would evacuate all 21 settlements in the Gaza Strip and 4 settlements in the northern West Bank. On June 30, the Israeli High Court of Justice upheld the government's right to build a security fence in the West Bank, but struck down some land confiscation orders for violating Palestinian rights and ordered the route to be changed. The government said that it would abide by the ruling. The Israeli Court has repeatedly attempted to balance Israel's security needs and the humanitarian claims of Palestinians in subsequent rulings; in some of the cases, it has required that the barrier be rerouted. On July 9, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued a non-binding, advisory opinion that the wall violates international law (http://www.icj-cij.01-g). On October 6, 2005 Sharon's aide Dov Weissglas claimed that disengagement was aimed at fieezing the political process in order to "prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state and a debate regarding refugees, borders, and Jerusalem." Yasser Arafat died on November 11, and Mahmud Abbas became Chairman of the PLO and a candidate for president of the PA. On January 9, 2005, Abbas won election as President. He called for implementing the Roadmap while beginning discussion of final status issues and cautioned against interim solutions designed to delay reaching a comprehensive solution. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice visited Israel and the PA on February 7, 2005 and praised the Israelis' "historic" disengagement decision. She discussed the need to carry out obligations concerning settlements and outposts, and warned them not to undermine Abbas. She appointed Lt. Gen. William Ward as Middle East Security Coordinator and emphasized the importance of Israeli-Palestinian security cooperation for the disengagement. The Secretary did not attend a February 8 meeting of Sharon, Abbas, Egyptian President, Hosni Mubarak, and Jordanian King Abdullah I1 in Sham al-Shaykh, Egypt, where Sharon and Abbas declared the end of violence and military operations. On February 20, 2006, the Israeli cabinet adopted a revised route for the security fence closer to the pre-1967 border in some areas, taking about 7% to 8% of the West Bank to encompass major settlement blocs. On March 16, Israel handed Jericho over to PA control. On March 17, 13 Palestinian groups agreed to extend a "calm" or informal truce until the end of 'the year. On March 21, Israeli forces transferred Tulkarem to PA control. On March 20, it was reported that the Israeli defense minister had approved the building of 3,500 new housing units between the Ma'ale Adumim settlement and East Jerusalem, in the E-1 corridor. Critics charge that the construction would cut East Jerusalem off from Palestinian territory, impose a barrier between the northern and southern West Bank, and prevent a future contiguous Palestinian state. Secretary Rice asserted that the plan was "at odds with American policy." On April 1 1, President Bush conveyed to Sharon his "concern that Israel not undertake any activity that contravenes Roadmap obligations or prejudices final status negotiations.': Sharon stated that "It is the position of Israel that the major Israeli population centers will remain in Israel's hands under any final status agreement," and that Ma'ale Adumim is a major population center, and, therefore, Israel is interested in contiguity between it and Jerusalem. On May 26, President Bush met Abbas at the White House and said that "changes to the 1949 armistice lines must be mutually agreed to." The President reaffirmed that a viable two-state solution must ensure contiguity of the West Bank, and a state of scattered territories will not work. He further stated that there must also be meaningful linkages between the West Bank and Gaza, declaring that "this is the position of the United States today; it will be the position of the United States at the time of final status negotiations." He also said that the barrier being erected by Israel must be a security, rather than political, barrier. Abbas said that the boundaries of a future state should be those before the 1967 war and asserted that "there is no justification for the wall and it is illegitimate." He also stated that the PA was ready to coordinate the Gaza disengagement with Israel and called for moving immediately thereafter to final status negotiations. Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing in Netanya on July 12, which killed 5 and injuring more than 90. Israeli forces responded by launching operations against the PIJ, reoccupied Tulkarem, and closed the West Bank. On July 22, Secretary Rice met Sharon and encouraged him to coordinate the disengagement with the Palestinians. On August 4, an Israeli army deserter opposed to the disengagement killed four Israeli Arabs and injured 13 in a bus in northern Israel. On August 15, Israeli Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz said that Israel would keep the settlement blocs of Ma'ale Adumim, the Etzyon

Bloc, Efrat, Ari'el, Qedumim-Qarney Shomrom, and Rehan Shaqed - all are within or expected to be on Israel's side of the security barrier. Mofaz added that Israel would retain the Jordan Rift Valley to guarantee Israel's eastern border (Golan Yokhpaz, IDF Radio, August 15, 2005, FBIS Document GMP200508 15621002). On October 20, at the White House, President Bush pressed Abbas to "confront the threat armed gangs pose to a genuinely democratic Palestine," but did not urge him to prevent Hamas from participating in parliamentary elections or to request that candidates renounce violence. Abbas asserted that legislators should be asked to renounce violence after election. On October 26, a PIJ suicide bomber killed 6 and wounded more than 20 in Hadera, on the Israeli coast. Sharon announced a "broad and relentless offensive" against terrorism. He ruled out talks with Abbas until Abbas takes "serious action" against armed groups. On November 14-15, Secretary Rice visited Israel and the PA. Sharon told her that Israel would not interfere if Hamas participated in the January 2006 Palestinian elections, but it also would not coordinate preparations for the elections with the PA or allow Hamas people to move around more during the campaign. He said if an armed terrorist organization is a partner in the Palestinian administration it could lead to the end of the Roadmap. Only if Hamas disarms and annuls its Covenant which calls for the destruction of Israel would Israel provide assistance for the elections and accept Hamas' participation. Rice asserted that it would be easier to compel Hamas to disarm after the elections because the entire international community would then exert pressure. She added that Abbas would lose US. and international support if he does not disarm Hamas. Rice vowed that the United States would not hold contacts with an armed Hamas even if it were part of the Palestinian administration. On November 15, she announced that Israel and the PA had achieved an Agreement on Movement and Access from the Gaza Strip. On November 25, the Rafah border crossing between the Gaza Strip and Egypt reopened with European Union (EU) monitors. On December 6, Israel barred Palestinians from entering Israel for one week, arrested militants in the West Bank, and began air strikes in Gaza. Israeli officials suspended talks with the PA about West Bank-Gaza bus convoys that were to begin on December 15. After Hamas victories in December 2005 Palestinian municipal elections, speculation increased about possible gffects on the peace process if Hamas achieved similar successes in January 25, 2006, parliamentary elections. On December 28, the Quartet stated that a future Palestinian cabinet should include no member who has not committed to the principles of Israel's right to exist in peace and security and an unequivocal end to violence and terrorism. On January 11, 2006, Secretary Rice stated, "It remains the view of the United States that there should be no place in the political process for groups or individuals who refuse to renounce terror and violence, recognize Israel's right to exist, and disarm" Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon suffered an incapacitating stroke on January 4. Deputy Prime Minister Ehud Olmert became Acting Prime Minister and, on January 12, he told President Bush that

mffkftm oodB not presress if terr&st era~ni7r~tionalike HH~HRjoined the Palsatini an government. On January 19, PIJ perpetrated a suicide bombing in Tel Aviv, injuring 30. Hainas won the January 25 Palestinian parliamentary elections. Olmert declared that Israel would not negotiate with a Palestinian administration that included an armed terrorist organization calling for its destruction and demanded that Hamas disarm, annul its Covenant that calls for the destruction of Israel, and accept all prior agreements. President Bush supported by in a statement that the United States would not deal with a political party "that articulates the destruction of Israel as part of its platform", and on January 3 1, he called on Hamas to "recognize Israel, disarm, reject terrorism, and work for a lasting peace. Future assistance to any new (Palestinian) government, according to him, would be reviewed by donors against the government's commitment to the principles of non-violence, recognition of Israel, and acceptance of previous agreements and obligations, including the Road Map. Hamas countered that it will never recognize Israel, would consider negotiating a "long-term truce" if Israel withdrew to its 1967 borders, released all prisoners, destroy all settlements, and recognize the Palestinian refugees' right to return (to Israel). On February 8, 2006, Olmert said that Israel was moving toward a separation from the Palestinians and permanent borders that would include a united Jerusalem, major settlement blocs, and the Jordan Valley. On March 5, his security advisor, Avi Dichter, asserted that new borders would consolidate isolated settlements into settlement blocs. He added that the Israeli Defense Forces would retain control over territory to prevent terrorism. On March 8, Olmert stated that he would wait a "reasonable" amount of time to see whether Hamas met his conditions. He aimed to reach a national consensus on permanent borders by 2010 and stated that the security barrier would be moved to those borders. Olmert also declared that construction would begin in the E-1 corridor between the Ma'ale Adumim settlement and Jerusalem. No Hamas official accepted Olmert's plan, but Prime Minister-designate Ismail Haniyah declared, "Let them withdraw. We will make the Authority stronger on every inch of liberated land." Damascus-based Hamas Political Bureau chief Khalid Mish'al said that his group would make no concessions to Israel and would "practice resistance side by side with politics as long as the occupation continued." On March 15, Israeli forces besieged a Palestinian prison in Jericho to capture men wanted for the October 2001 killing of an Israeli minister, indicating a lack of trust in a Hamas led PA to keep a 2002 agreement to hold the prisoners. After his party placed first in the March 28 Israeli parliamentary elections, Olmert said that he aspired to demarcate permanent borders for a Jewish state with a permanent Jewish

miarity and R democracy. He called for negotiations based on mutual recognition, agreements already signed, the principles of the Road Map, a halt to violence, and the disarniing of terrorist organizations. He said he hoped to hear a similar announcement from the PA, but "Israel will take its fate into its own hands" if the Palestinians do not act. On March 30, Secretary Rice said, referring to Olmert's plan, "I wouldn't on the face of it just say absolutely we don't think there's any value in what the Israelis are talking about" (BBC Monitoring Middle East, April 3. 2006). Prime Minister Haniyah said that Hamas would not object to President Abbas negotiating with Israel and that Hamas could redefine its position if the result serves the people's interests. In an op-ed in the British newspaper, (The Guardian, March 31, 2006)' Haniyah described Olmert's unilateralism as "a recipe for conflict" and a "plan to impose a permanent situation in which the Palestinians end up with a homeland cut into pieces." He appealed for no more talk about recognizing Israel's "right to exist" or ending resistance until Israel commits to withdraw from the Palestinians' lands and recognizes their rights. On April 1, PA Foreign Minister Mahmud al-Zahhar stated that he dreamed of a map with an independent state on all of historic Palestine and "which does not show Israel on it." On March

, 30, the A1 Aqsa Martyrs Brigades claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing near the Israeli settlement of Kedumim, killing four. Reacting to the bombing, the Palestinian Deputy Prime Minister said that Hamas would never object to the Palestinians' "self-defense" as long as they were under occupation. a On April 9, the Israeli security cabinet recommended severing all ties with the Hanias- led PA, which it called a "hostile entity," declaring that there could be personal contacts, but not negotiations, with President Abbas. On April 17, PIJ carried out a suicide bombing in Tel Aviv, killing 11 and wounding 60, including an American teenager. Abbas condemned the attack as "despicable" and counter to Palestinian interests, while Hamas officials called it an act of "self-defense." Israel did not respond militarily, but revoked the Jerusalem residency of three Hamas officials among other steps. Some Israelis maintained that Hamas' repeated defense of bombings and its appointment of a leader of the terrorist Popular Resistance Committees to head securlty forces (despite Abbas's veto) would serve to justify Israel's unilateralism. On April 26, President Abbas called for an immediate international peace conference with himself as the Palestinian negotiator. He said that the Hamas-led government is not an obstacle to negotiations because the PLO, which he heads, has the mandate to negotiate as it had all previous agreements. He also noted that he is empowered as the democratically elected leader of the Palestinians. In response, an Israeli spokesman cited the Road Map, which does not call for an international conference until its final phase, as the best way to move forward. Meanwhile, Hamas officials said that, for negotiations to begin, Israel must accept withdrawal from territories occupied in 1967, including East Jerusalem, recognition of the refugees' right to return, the release of prisoners, and the dismantling of the (security) wall. On May 4, a new Israeli government took office, with guidelines vowing to strive to shape the permanent borders of the State of Israel as a democratic Jewish state, with a Jewish majority. Although preferring to achieve this goal through negotiations, the government said that it would act to determine borders in their absence. Prime Minister Olmert asserted that the security fence would be adapted to conform to the borders in both east and west. The PLO rejected the Olmert Plan as aimed at undermining the Palestinian people's right to a state in all territories occupied in 1967, with Jerusalem as its capital. On May 10, imprisoned Fatah, Hamas, and other political detainees drafted a "National Accord Document" calling for a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital, the right of the return of refugees, and the release of all prisoners. It called for renewing, perhaps recreating, the PLO and for Hamas and PIJ to join it. It supported the right to resist the occupation in the lands occrpied in 1967. It asserted that the PLO is responsible for negotiations and that any agreement should be put to a vote by the Palestinian National Council or a referendum. Abbas accepted the document, but Hamas officials rejected its implied recognition of pre-1967 Israel. On May 21, Prime Minister Olmert asserted that, since the Hamas-led government was elected, President Abbas is "powerless," and "unable to even stop the minimal terror activities amongst the Palestinians, so how can he seriously negotiate with Israel and assume responsibility for the most major, fundamental issues that are in controversy between us and them?" Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni met Abbas on the sidelines of the World Economic Forum meeting in Egypt, where Abbas asserted that "permanent" arrangements are impossible without resolving the main issues of conflict: security, borders, Jerusalem, and refugees. He wamed that Israeli "unilateralism will quickly put an end to the two-state solution and will increase violence. After the Popular Resistance Committees kidnapped a young West Bank settler and killed him as away of pressurizing Israel to stop the Gaza operation, Israeli forces arrested three alleged perpetrators of this attack from the Fatah movement on July 4 in Ramallah, and on June 29, 64 Palestinian (Hamas) cabinet ministers, parliamentarians, and other Hamas officials in the West Bank and Jerusalem were arrested by Israel forces. An Israeli spokeswoman stated that the arrests were not an effort to get bargaining chips to exchange for the Israeli soldier, and the Israeli Foreign Ministry described the action as a "nom~allegal procedure" targeting suspected terrorists. On July 1, the three groups that had perpetrated the kidnapping demanded that Israel release 1,000 prisoners in exchange for the soldier. Israeli officials again demanded his unconditional release. Meanwhile, the kidnapers reportedly again revised their demands, insisting that Israel release all women (said to number about 100) and 30 male prisoners. But Prime Minister Olmert said, "Trading prisoners with a terrorist bloody organization such as Hamas is a major mistake that will cause a lot of damage to the future of the State of Israel." He added that to negotiate with Hamas would signal that moderates such as President Abbas are not needed. Reacting to the kidnapping and subsequent developments, the White House spokesman said that Hamas had been "complicit in perpetrating violence", and that Israel had a right to defend itself. He urged Israel not to harm civilians and to avoid unnecessary destruction of property and infrastructure. On June 30, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations John Bolton told an emergency session of the Security Council, "The United States is of the firm view that a prerequisite for ending this conflict is that the governments of Syria and Iran end their role as state sponsors of terror and unequivocally condemn the actions of Hamas." In her remarks on July 5, Secretary of State Rice described the abduction as the "root cause" of the problem. Rice also asserted that the Syrians need to use all of their considerable leverage to help the soldier's release take place and also spoke of the need for pressure on Hamas to stop rocket attacks. In addition, she called on the Israelis to exercise restraint. A spokesman for the U.S. Embassy said, "We understand why Israel is taking the actions it does, it has a right to protect itself and its citizens. We put the blame on the group that caused the raid and the kidnapping, and secondly, on the Hamas government for not taking on its responsibility to prevent terrorism."

3.5 The Role of the UN in Resolving the Israeli-Palestinian Conflicts

The United Nations has, since inception played an important role in resolving the Israeli - Palestinian conflict. Two years after its formation, it adopted Resolution 181 calling for the partition of Palestine into two states, one Arab, and the other Jewish, as well as the creation of an economic union to tie the two states together. In the fall of 1948, the UN Security Council called on Israel and the Arab states to negotiate armistice agreements. This followed with the December 11 1948 resolution adopted by the General Assembly calling on the parties to negotiate peace and create a Palestine Conciliation Commission (PCC), which constituted the US, France, and Turkey. In 1958, the UN Secretary General, .Dag Hammarskjold visited the Middle East for talks on Israeli-Jordan tension. The UN Security Council thereafter adopted Resolution 242 which outlined the basis for a comprehensive peace in the Middle East.

The UN has made several resolutions ever since. These include: 1 General Assembly Resolution 2535 (XXIV) of December 10, 1969 which emphasized the inadmissibility of the acquisition of a territory by war, and requested the withdrawal of Israel from the territories it occupied. 2 General Assembly Resolution 2672 (XXV) of December 10, 1970 which recognized that the Palestinian people were entitled to self determination in accordance with the charter of the United Nations. 3 General Assembly Resolutions 2787 (XXVI) and 2963 (XXVII) which reasserted the right to self determination. 4 General Assembly resolution 3070 (XXVIII) which reaffirmed the right of peoples under colonial and foreign domination to self determination, freedom and independence, and also reaffirmed the legitimacy of the struggle for liberation by all the available means, including armed struggle, and condemned governments which did not recognize the right to self determination and independence of peoples. Right from the Gunner mission, the UN has empowered several envoys to engage in the quest for a lasting peace in the Middle East, and has passed several Resolutions for resolving the crises. The UN has passed more resolutions condemning Israel than it has all other nations combined. Twenty- six percent of all Security Council meetings between 1948 and the 1991 Madrid Conference deal with the Arab-Israeli conflict. The UN Security Council passed a total of 175 resolutions. Seventy- four were neutral; four were against the perceived interests of an Arab body, while Ninety seven were against Israel (Source: WorldNetDaily.com).

UN RESOLUTIONS 194 and 242 Many Palestinians and Palestinian supporters continuously quote the above two UN resolutions, and claim that these resolutions give Palestinians the right to return to the land where they "came from" (Israel proper). RESOULTION 194 This resolution deals with the right to return. It is a General Assembly resolution. Therefore, it is not binding, like every other General Assembly resolution.

RESOLUTION 242 This UN Security Council Resolution (a binding resolution) 242 has two main components: 1. Affirms that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles: a. Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;

b. Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace with secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force. 2. Affirms further the necessity: a. For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area; b. For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem; c. For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones.

RESOLUTION 338 This is a UN Security Council Resolution, following the Yom Kippur war of 1973, calling on both sides to begin implementation of Resolution 242. Commentary Resolution 242 and 338 were unanimously approved by the Security Council and are fully binding and can be enforced by sanctions or military action. Statements lb and 2c of Resolution 242 are clearly the responsibility of the Arab states that do not acknowledge Israel's existence to a large extent. These resolutions were not unilateral -Israel was to pull out on the condition that the Arab responsibilities were fulfilled. Further, resolution 194 is the document that Palestinians claim gives them the right to return. However, in the UN, resolutions can be superseded by newer resolutions, and it is obvious that claims of right to return in resolution 192 (1948) are superseded by section 2b of resolution 242 (1967) where the refugee problem is to be solved with a just settlement which is likely to include compensation, but unlikely the right of return. RESOLUTION 181 The United Nations General Assembly adopted resolution 181in 1947 which recommended the partition of land west of the Jordan River into a Jewish state and an Arab state. The US seeks to maintain the role of the sole or at the least, the primary arbitrator of issues affecting Israel. US prevent her allies from playing a significant role in the effort to seek peace in the Middle East. For example, the Oslo talks had to be formalized in Washington, while the Road Map to peace put forth by the US, Russia, the EU, and the UN was a creation of the US. However, the above analyses have established that the US, under the guise of mediator and guarantor of peace pursues her own agenda in the Middle East. This has attracted condemnation from several Arab countries which claim that this US attitude constitutes an impediment to the peace process. This has therefore validated hypothesis two which states that the tendency by the US to use her peace initiatives primarily to project her economic agenda appears to conflict with the Palestinian agenda to wrest the disputed territories from Israeli occupation. (See Appendixes for U.S. assistance to Israel table and the texts of some of the UN Resolutions) CHAPTER FOUR THE STATUS OF JERUSALEM AND MIDDLE EAST CRISES

Introduction

The issue now at hand is the rights of the Palestine people. It is the aggression which took place in Palestine in 1948 with the collaboration of Britain and the United States. It is the expulsion of the Arabs from Palestine, the usurpation of their rights, and the plunder of their property. It is the disavowal of all the UN resolutions in favor of the Palestinian people. (Carnal Abdel Nasser: Speech to Egyptian National Assembly Members May 29, 1967.)

The central issue affecting Israel and Palestine remains the land and the competing nationalisms struggling for control over it. In fact no issue in the conflict between these two parties is more emotional than the status of Jerusalem. Historically, land and religion emerge as the twin issues to be resolved in securing peace between these two nationalisms, but there is no doubt that Jerusalem is the most difficult problem that the peace makers have to deal with. This is because Palestine is not simply land, but contains the Holy Land with Jerusalem at its center. The centrality of the issue of Jerusalem derives from emotional and religious sensitivities. The complexity of the issue is the result of three factors: [I.] the city is holy for adherents of Christianity, Islam and Judaism, which means that it is sacred for many millions of people; 12.1 it is the subject of conflicting national claims of two peoples Israelis and Palestinian Arabs; and [3.] its population is very heterogeneous. Religious sentiment generates a connection to territory that transcends purely legal and political concerns, and the intense emotional attachments to Palestine and Jerusalem have given the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians significance far beyond that of usual regional disputes. However, this is a conflict between one socio-cultural unit- the Arab against another diametrically opposed socio-cultural unit-the Jewish race. Therefore,the intractability of this modem conflict owes much to the deeply and sincerely held, but conflicting religious beliefs of both protagonists. The conflict has its genesis in the establishment of the Jewish State of Israel in 1948.

To appreciate the intractable nature of this conflict, it is necessary to understand key historical experiences that forged the cultural and national identities of Israelis and Palestinians, as well as their strongly held views and beliefs on Jerusalem. This chapter will therefore discuss the historical perspective of Palestine, origin of this modem conflict which began in 1948 when the state of Israel was created, the status of Jerusalem and its significance to Israel and Palestine, as well as both parties' beliefs on Jerusalem.

4.1 THE STATUS OF JERUSALEM: TWO PEOPLES, ONE LAND

Despite the fact that a lot of factors account for the intractable nature of Israeli- Palestinian conflict, the status of Jerusalem, no doubt, remains the most contentious.

Israeli's view on Jerusalem: Israelis claims to the land of Israel/Palestine go back to the first millennium B.C. when the ancient Roman Empire established a kingdom in what is today Israel and the West Bank. The Israelis also lay claim to Biblical perspective in which they believe that the land which they are living today was given to them by God. According to Edward (2001):

While Christians and Muslim believers accept the historicity of the basic elements of the Jewish tradition relating to Jerusalem which are familiar to us from Biblical and other sources... Christians and Muslims also naturally privilege the elements in their respective religious traditions which place their own connection to the holy city on a special level.

Jerusalem is very important to Israel, and America which has supported Israel for a very long time has come to appreciate that fact. This is evident in the. fact that America's embassy is situated in Jerusalem, and not Tel Aviv, which is the capital of Israel- the only American embassy situated outside any state capital. Palestinian view on Jerusalem: Palestinian claims to the same land go back at least until the same land go back at least to the seventh century A.D. Although Palestine occupied a generally

minor role in Islamic history until the modem era - except during the Crusades from 1097 to

1291 - Jerusalem was the third holiest city in Islam, after Mecca and Medina. According to 0 Islamic tradition, Muhammad stopped there briefly during his night journey to heaven and set foot on the Temple Mount, site of the Jewish temples. A shrine over the stone, the Dome of the Rock commemorates this. According to Siddiqi, President of the Islamic Society of North America, in a speech entitled "The Isalamic Perspective of Jerusalem" presented at the first meeting of American Muslims for Jerusalem in Washington D.C. in 1999: The city of Jerusalem is veiy sacred to Muslims. It is one of the three most sacred cities in Islam. Jerusalem is called al- Quds al-Sharif (the Noble Sacred Place). The sacredness of the city of Jerusalem, according to Islam, is in its historical religious reality. This is the city that witnessed the life and works of the greatest Prophets and Messengers of Allah. Here the Divine Grace touched the earth repeatedly. Allah's great Prophets and Messengers lived and moved in its valleys and its streets (Siddiqi, 1999).

Consequently, Talhami (2000) wrote that:

Jerusalem became irrefitably holy to Muslims as the place from which it is believed Muhammad rose to heaven and received instructions regarding the Muslim prayers. Physical space associated with a divine revelation becomes a religious trust and the occupants its guardians. iMus1ims today regard Jerusalem as a waqf (a religious foundation), which cannot change ownership. And since Palestine is the final repose of Muslim Clerics, learned Sheikhs and those who devoted their lives to the service of the faith, then all of Palestine is a religious trust.

4.2 The Modern Conflicts and their Consequences

The modem conflict has roots which go back over three thousand years, but this modem armed conflict began in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, when Jews from around the world began flocking back to their ancient biblical homeland in Palestine, driven by a modern Jewish nationalist ideology known as Zionism. The Zionists called for the ingathering of

, the Jews from around the world in Palestine and the creation there of a modern Jewish nation- state that would put the Jews on a par with all the other nations of the world. Most of the early Zionists either ignored the presence of the Arabs already living in Palestine or assumed they could either be bought off or would eventually submit to Jewish domination. In the late 19th century, modem Jewish nationalism (Zionism) developed in order to establish a homeland wherein Jews would constitute a majority and have political independence. This was made possible when Theodore Herzl, founder of Zionism convened the first world Zionism Congress in Basle, Switzerland in 1897. At the same time, Arab-Nationalism developed in order to establish an Arab state with political independence from Ottoman control. Following WWI and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the League of Nations, under article four established the British Mandate over the newly defined territory of Palestine, mandating it to establish an appropriate Jewish Agency to advise and co-operate in matters affecting the Jewish national home, as well as to take part in developing the country. During this period, the Arabs owned and occupied 98 percent of the land, while their population was 92 percent. According to an Arab critique of Herzl's Zionism "When Theodore Herzl, the founder of Zionism, spoke of 'a people without a land' looking for 'a land without a people', he was not aware of the presence of an Arab population in Palestine or its future evolution." As the administrative and governing authority between 1920 and 1948, the British attempted to pacify the conflicting national aspirations of the Jewish and Palestinian Arab populations, but were unsuccessful; hence they left the matter to the newly created United Nations. In 1947, after the report of the special UN commission on Palestine, majority of members of UN voted to divide Palestine into two states (one Arab, one Jewish). The plan was vehemently rejected by the Arabs and this led to British withdrawal, and on May 14, 1948, Israel declared statehood. Over the next 50 years, five wars and two intifadas transpired. This led to decades of peace negotiations which started with the Rogers Plan and Jarring Mission, but which were unable to bring resolution to the intractable conflict which has remained a focus of international attention to this day (Onuoha, 2005).

The final declaration of the state of Israel on May 14, 1948 signaled the beginning of what has remained the longest wars or armed conflict in human history. While the Jews had suffered centuries of insecurity as a minority, coupled with the atrocities meted to them during the Second World War, the Arabs on the other hand had suffered centuries of misrule as a province of the Turks in the Ottoman Empire. This explains why both parties have refused to give up on the land which they both claim is theirs. As a result of this, several wars have taken place, leaving in their wake aftermaths which victims would not have wished for.

The 1948 War: This was the first war the Arab states comprising Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and b Lebanon waged against Israel just less than twenty four hours after Isreal declared independence. The war was in reaction to Tsrealis declaration of statehood, and it signaled the beginning of several wars thereafter. Israel did not possess enough weapons that could withstand the combined weapons of the Arabs, yet, it still went ahead to defeat them. This bold defeat was very significant be cause it left Isreal in possession of the whole of Galilee, a section of central Palestine connecting the coastal area with Jerusalem, and the whole of the Negev. As a result of this, Jerusalem became a divided city, hence by 1949, the entire area controlled by Isreal was larger than what was allotted to the Zionists in the partition resolution of 1947. Apart from emerging victorious in the war, Isrealis displace more than 1 million Arabs thereby making them refugees.

The 1956 war: This is popularly known as the Sinai and Suez Canal war. When Abdel Nasser came into power in Egypt in 1952, he instituted a blockade on Israeli shipping through the Suez Canal, and in 1953 extended this blockade to include all goods being shipped to Isreal. This left the Israelis with only the port of Elath, at the head of the Gulf of Aqaba in the Straits of Tiran. He also began to restrict Israeli commerce through the Straits by making its ships subject to inspection by Egyptian coastguards. In 1955, he broadened the blockade and imposed a ban on over flights by Israeli aircraft. Later in that same year, President Nasser announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal which was partially owned by Britain and France. Tn reaction to all these, US Secretary of states, Foster Dulles announced that "force was the last method to be tried, but the United States did not exclude the use of force if all other methods fail." (Stoessinger, 1982). On October 29, Israeli forces lunched its four pronged advance against Egypt. Two trusts were aimed at Canal, while the third and fourth were to seal off the Gaza Strip and seize Sharm-el-Sheik. Within six days, isreal overran the greater part of the Sinai peninsular hereby achieving its main military objective, the occupation of Sharm-el-Sheik. this takeover did not last long for isreal because the UN through the United states prevailed on isreal to evacuate most of the territories it had conquered from Egypt, with the assurance and guarantee that Israelis right to free and innocent passage in the Gulf of Aqaba would not be infringed upon.

The six day war of 1967: This war is popularly called the six day war. The Sinai campaign (1 956 War) brought Israel the longest known period of peace in its history - from 1956 to 1967, during which Israel grew militarily and econon~ically.A crisis situation between Egypt and Israel on one hand and Israel and other Arab states of Jordan and Syria on the other hand turned into a six-day war in early June of 1967. Israeli superiority was once again proved against Arab states miscalculation of Arab unity, military superiority and Israeli diplomatic isolation. Egypt had earlier in May of 1967 closed the Strait of Tiran to Israeli shipment against the spirit of the result of the 1956 war, which Israel interpreted to be a causes belli or action justifying war (Ziegler, 1997). By these wars, Israel acquired territories that it hoped to trade for a permanent peace settlement. War became a blessing for Israel in an environment of failing diplomacy.

The October 1973 War: Although the 1967 Arab-Israeli war seemed to have resulted in a resounding Israeli victory, its conclusion resulted in bitter antagonisms that were later to culminate in more violence. With the death of Nasser in 1970, Sadat became Egyptian President and gradually began preparing the ground for an Arab counter attack on Isreal, but became cautious and calculating with an eye for the restoration of the Sinai Peninsula with accompanying gains of oil resources and revenue form the closed Suez Canal which was closed to serve as a cease-fire line. Nasser's viewpoint incorporated the Palestinian question whereas Sadat's was essentially 'Egyptocentric' (Kriesberg 1992). On Yom Kippur, the Jewish Day of Atonement, Syria and Egypt launched a well coordinated surprise attack. In the north, Syria attacked the vital Golan Heights in an effort to regain the vantage point over Israeli settlements in the valley below. By the end of the first week of war, Isreal had stemmed the Arab onslaught, but the might of its invisibility had nevertheless been broken. Because the 1967 Victory by Israel had emboldened it and slowed the peace process, the United States hesitated to render assistance in the face of multi-frontal attacks against Israel. This proved right. The war produced no clear winner as both sides recorded heavy casualties. The somewhat ambiguous results of the 1973 war paved way for the Camp David Accord between Egypt and Israel in 1979. However, Israel still remained under attack from the other Arab states (Craig, A. and George, A. 1995).

The 1980 Israeli invasion of Lebanon: In June 1982, a suspected Arab gunman shot the Israeli ambassador to Britain. In a quick plan to contain what it considered evil amalgamation in Lebanon where the Palestine Liberation Organization and troops of Syria were stationed since 1976. Israel spent weeks of sporadic attacks and siege on Beirut. This invasion of Lebanon by Israel had a similar goal as President Sadat's war against Israel in 1973. This lends credence to the famous Clausewitz dictum of war as politics by other means. The PLO was uprooted from Beirut to Tunisia with operations scattered in some Arab states thereby loosing the quasi- sovereign status in enjoyed in parts of Lebanon. Israeli weakening of its enemy in Beirut however created a new one. Many of the people in southern Lebanon were Shiite Muslims who never played direct role in the clashes between Palestinians and Israelis along the border. But the prolonged Israeli occupation drew them into the conflict. Repeated attacks on Israeli occupation forces often in form of suicide car bombs forced Israel to withdraw in 1985.

4.3 CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR EVENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST FROM 1947-2006

1947: UN votes in favor of partitioning Palestine into two independent states, one Jewish and one Arab, with Jerusalem under international control. Zionists accept the partition, which grants them 56 percent of Palestine, including fertile coastal regions. Arab nationalists reject the authority of the UN to partition a country against the wishes of majority of its inhabitants. May 14,1948,4 P.M.: David Ben-Gurion announced the birth of Israel. Two hours after, the US recognize Israel. In less than twenty four hours after, on May 15 Israel was sin~ultaileously attacked by Arab states of Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon. 1949: Negotiations at the Greek island of Rhodes lead to an armistice between Israel and the Arab states. In the end, the new state of Israel controls 77 percent of the territory in the former British mandate of Palestine. Jordan controls the eastern part of Jerusalem and the West Bank, which it formally annexes. Egypt controls the area around Gaza now known as the Gaza Strip. 1953: Israel establishes a special commando unit, led by Ariel Sharon, to carry out retaliatory strikes in response to an Arab grenade attack in Yehud, east of Tel Aviv. Sharon's unit kills dozens of villagers in the West bank town Qibya. The incident triggers a wave of international condemnation, with the United States suspending economic aid. 1954: Britain agrees to withdraw from militant bases in Egypt by 1956. Israel strategists fear that once Britain withdraws, Egypt might turn its attention to war. Acting on those concerns, Israeli agents Conduct sabotage operations against British and American target in Egypt, hoping that Western governments will blame Arab extremists and delay withdrawal. Egypt discovers the agknts, executes two of the agents and imprisons the rest. Tension between Israel and Egypt increased with near-continuous border clashes and guerrilla attacks. 1956: Egyptian president Game1 Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal formerly controlled by Britain and France. Israel thereafter invaded Egypt to regain the Canal which they succeeded, but later relinquished due to pressures from both the US and UN. 1960: Israel strengthens its position in the area by controlling more settlements, while Iraq, Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela form OPEC. 1965: A Palestinian guerilla group led by Arafat begins attack on Israel. Syrian authority hangs an Israeli spy in front of a crowd in Damascus, broadcasting the execution live on state Television. 1966: A new regime in Syria encourages Palestinian guerilla attacks on Israel, calling for a "war of liberation." 1967: The six day war began with Israel launching a preemptive attack destroying nearly the entire Egyptian air force on the ground in a surprise air attack and capturing the West Bank, Golan Heights, Gaza Strip, Sinai peninsular, as well as eastern Jerusalem. UN Security Council passes Resolution 242 calling for Israeli withdrawal. 1968: The first major hijacking by Arab militants occurred on El-A1 flight from Rome to Tel- Aviv. 1969: PLO was formed with Yasser Arafat as chairman. Egypt began the "War of Attrition", bombarding Israelis positions in the Sinai with artillery fire. 1970: PLO radicals hijacked three Swissair, TWA and Pan Am en-rout New York, and forced them to fly to Jordan. 1972: Eight Arab commandos of Palestinian group, Black September kills eleven Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympic Games. 1973: Egypt and Syria lunch a surprise attack on Israel on Yom IQppur, the holiest day in the Jewish year. After weeks of fighting, and crucial arms shipment from the US, Israel survives the attack and reclaims nearly all previously held territories. Oil producing Arab states began oil embargo against Israel supporters, sparking an energy crises in the West. 1974: UN General Assembly recognizes Palestinians right to independence. 1975: UN votes on a resolution accusing Israel of war crimes in occupied Arab territories. US casts a lone "No vote". US Ambassador to Lebanon Francis Meloy and an adviser are shot and killed in Beirut. 1977: For the first time since Israeli independence, Israelis voted the Leftist Labour Party into power. Egyptian President, Sadat visited Jerusalem on a historic visit and addressed the Israeli I-esset Parliament. 1978: Israel and Egypt signed a peace deal at Camp David, with US President Jimmy Carter mediating. Eighteen Arab countries impose economic boycott on Egypt .Israeli Prime minister, Begin and Egyptian President, Sadat receive Noble Peace Price. 1979: Iranian students storm US embassy in Tehran taking 66 American hostages for 15 months. US imposed sanctions on Iran. Protesters attack US embassies in Libya and Pakistan. 1980: Israel invaded Lebanon, advanced all the way to Beirut and bombarded PL,O strongholds. 1981: Israeli war planes destroy a nuclear reactor in Iraq. Muslim militants oppose Egypt's peace treaty with Israel and assassinated President Sadat for signing the treaty. 1983: A truck bomb exploded in US marine barrack in Beirut, Lebanon killing 241 soldiers. US withdrew force from Lebanon. 1985: Israel withdrew from all Lebanon except a 10-mile "security zone". 1987: First Palestinian intifada or uprising began in the occupied territories of West Bank and Gaza Strip. 1991: US-led coalition forces launched attacks in Iraq for invading Kuwait. 1992: Israel conducted elections that ushered in Yitzhak Rabin as Prime Minister. 1993: Israel and PLO signed mutual agreement, with PLO recognizing Israel right to exist. Israel also recognized PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Israel promised to give Palestine autonomy over much of Gaza Strip and the West Bank city of Jericho. The two leaders, Rabin and Arafat shook hands in public for the first time. 1994: Jordan and Israel signed peace treaty. Rabin, Arafat and Perez receive Noble Peace Price. 1995: Israeli Prime Minister, Rabin was assassinated by an orthodox Jew, and Binyamin Netanyahu became Prime minister. 1996: Aaruck bomb explodes outside US military barrack in Khober, Saudi Arabia killing 19 US airmen. 1997: Israel withdrew from the West Bank city of Hebron. 1998: Netanyahu and Arafat met and agreed to further Israeli withdrawals from occupied territories. 1999: Labour party leader, Barak defeated Netanyahu in Israeli election to become Israeli Prime Minister. 2000: Final-status peace negotiations at Camp David end without agreement on both sides. Likud opposition leader in Israel, Ariel Sharon visited Muslim.Holy sites on the Temple Mount in Jerusalem. A second, more violent intifada erupted. 2001: Hardliner, Ariel Sharon defeated Barak and became Israeli Prime Minister, met with US President, Bush. Sharon declared that Israel wants to give the Palestinians what no one else gave them before, the possibility of a state. President Bush said, for the first time that the idea of a Palestinian state has always been part of a vision, as long as the right of Israel to exist is respected. The PFLP assassinated Israel's Minister of Tourism. President Bush declared that the United States was working toward the day when two states - Israel and Palestine live peacefully together within secure and recognized borders. Sharon ordered reprisal attacks on Palestinian-controlled territories. 2002: Successive suicide bombings began on Passover. In response Israel reoccupied most of the West Bank and began mass arrest of suspected militants. ~sraeliforces seized the Karine A, a Palestinian commanded freighter, carrying 50 tons of Iranian-supplied arms. 2003: Arafat named Mahrnud Abbas as Prime Minister. Sharon acknowledged that Israel would have to part with some places bound up in the history of the Jewish people, but insisted that the Palestinians recognize the Jewish people's right to its homeland and abandon their claim of a right of refugees to return.. President Bush met Abbas and Sharon at a conference hosted by Jordan's King Abdullah in Aqaba, Jordan. Abbas vowed to achieve the Palestinians' goals by peaceful means, while Sharon expressed understanding of "the importance of territorial contiguity" for a viable Palestinian state and promised to "remove unauthorized outposts." 2004: Israeli missiles killed Hamas leader Shaykh Ahmed Yassin and others. President Bush and Sharon met and exchanged letters. The President welcomed Israel's plan to disengage from Gaza and restated the U.S. commitment to the Roadmap. 2005: US Secretary of States Condoleezza Rice visited Israel and the PA and praised the Isi-aelis' "historic" disengagement decision. Sharon, Abbas, Egyptian President, Hosni Mubarak, and Jordanian King Abdullah I1 met in Sharrn al-Shaykh, Egypt, where Sharon and Abbas declared the end of violence and military operations. 2006: Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon suffered an incapacitating stroke. Deputy Prime Minister Ehud Olmert became Acting Prime Minister and told President Bush that peace efforts could not progress if terrorist organizations like Hamas joined the Palestinian government. PIJ perpetrated a suicide bombing in Tel Aviv, injuring 30. Hamas won the January 25 Palestinian parliamentary elections and declared that it will never recognize Israel, would consider negotiating a "long-term truce" if Israel withdrew to its 1967 borders, released all prisoners, destroy all settlements, and recognize the Palestinian refugees' right to return (to Israel). Israel handed Jericho over to PA control. Palestinian groups agreed to extend a "calm" or informal truce until the end of the year. Israeli forces transferred Tulkarem to PA control. President Bush met Abbas at the White House and declared that changes to the 1949 armistice lines must be mutually agreed to. The President reaffirmed that a viable two-state solution must ensure contiguity of the West Bank, and that a state of scattered territories will not work.

4.4 Collective and Individual Freedoms in the Occupied Territories In this section of the work, the Palestinians' quality of life following the 1993 Oslo Accords is examined with respect to collective freedoms, economic well-being, and individual freedoms so as to identify those areas in which this deteriorated or did not improve. Since 1947 Israel has pursued a programme of 'de-Arabization' in Jerusalem, to advance its objective of permanent Jewish sovereignty in the unified city, including policies aimed at a reduction in the Palestinian population. At the same time it has used processes of Judaization in order to transform Jerusalem into a predominately Jewish capital. Once the Oslo process had started in 1993 Israel reinforced these policies and made them more comprehensive and thorough. For example: i. several fundamentalist Jewish groups, backed by the government, made a determined attempt to seize Palestinian homes in Muslim and Christian enclaves of the Old City and to occupy Palestinian neighbourhoods around its boundaries; . . 11. new settlements were created and existing ones expanded, while new bypass roads linked settlements in East Jerusalem with others throughout the West Bank; Israel developed various plans to situate Jerusalem as the prop for integrating settlement blocs in the outreaches of the West Bank with this newly expanded Jewish metropolis and, thereby, to Israel itself.(Sylvan, 2004). Despite the growth of houses and settlements, with the supporting infrastructure, there are insufficient Jews to fill them. Consequently Israel is continuously seeking to recruit Jewish communities, or even some non-Jewish ones considered suitable for conversion around the globe to come and settle in the occupied territories. In early 2003 the government authorized the immigration of 17,000 Falasha Moras (and 3,000 Falashas) from Ethiopia. These are black Jews who were made to convert to Christianity in the nineteenth century. The Falasha Moras were previously considered insufficiently Jewish because, unlike the Falashas, they had remained Christians in identity and religious practice. However, the need for settlers overcame the issue of their Jewish orientalism. The most controversial decision concerned a community of impoverished Peruvian Indians, brought to Israel in early 2002, who had no discernible Jewish ancestry but were willing converts and are eager settlers. The Israeli occupation is itself regarded as a form of violence. The conquest of the occupied territories and the illegitimate imposition of a military regime over the Palestinians is not a consensual arrangement but the domination of a people by another. Israeli sociologist, Baruch Kimmerling, is cited to argue that Palestinians have '. . .by any measure, the right to resist that occupation with any means at their disposal and to rise up in violence against that occupation. This is a moral right inherent to natural law and international law.' The Israeli attempts to define, in their interests, the legitimate use of force are one of the great prerogatives of power. Power names things, and it defines their meaning. Power creates myths. Power writes history from the perspective of those who dominate events. This Israeli definition cannot be accepted by Palestinians but even within Israel there are over 500 military reservists who have refused to serve in the occupied territories. The most popular of Labour's settlements was established in April 1968 without government authorization. On 10 April, about eight religious Jews rented a hotel in Hebron to celebrate Passover. After the holiday ended, some of them remained and declared their intention to settle permanently in the Palestinian city of 40.000. The group, led by Rabbi Moshe Levinger. had an unambiguous agenda: the creation of a Jewish majority in Hebron and the restoration of Jewish rights at the Cave of the Machpela, the site of the Tomb of the Patriarchs, long used by Muslims as a mosque. They received support from an extra-parliamentary group calling itself the Whole Land of Israel Movement, composed of noted right-wing ideologues (such as Israel Eldad) and Labor figures (such as Nathan Alderman, Avrahm Yoffee, and Moshe Shamir) who supported incorporating into the state the areas comprising the historic Land of Israel, and the settlement of 40,000 Jews in Hebron. Deputy Prime Minister, Yigal Allon supplied the squatters with three Uzi machine guns. In response to protests from the Hebron Municipal Council, which warned that Jewish settlement in the city might exacerbate relations between the local population and the military government, Defense Minister, Moshe Dayan declared that the settlers had violated no laws. On I9 May 1968 the settlers moved from the hotel to the compound of the military government. By late July, separate housing was being built for them within the compound. In August, the government approved applications of additional settlers to move to Hebron, and by September, plans were ongoing for the construction of Kiryat Arba, an urban settlement on 1,200 confiscated dunams that had been owned and cultivated by Hebron residents. By 1975, Kiryat Arba had grown from its original population of fifteen, to over 1,200 Jewish residents, who represented 44 percent of Israel's West Bank settlement population (excluding annexed areas of Jerusalem). In June 1977, there were 10,000 Israeli settlers in the West Bank apart from East Jerusalem. almost one half of them residing in Kiryat Arba near Hebron. A new Likud government, the first in Israel's history, had recently assumed power. Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, the architect of Israel's intention to remain forever in the West Bank and Gaza strip, spoke at a Tel Aviv conference commemorating ten years of Israeli rule in what were then referred to as the administered territory. In late June, then Minister of Agriculture, Ariel Sharon visited Hebron to commend the squatters. "Because of their stubbornness and perseverance," he declared, "the Jewish comnlunity will be renewed in Hebron." A i-lu 'aretz editorial, noting the contradictory messages of Begin and Sharon, lamented: Those who were denounced a short while ago by the prime minister now are being praised publicly. tor their stubbornness-that is, for breaking the law and for provocation against the government-by a senior government minister who is justly thought of as the real ruler of the territories.

In the wake of Sharon's visit, all restrictions were lifted on those seeking to enter or leave Beit Hadassah, "an important step forward in establishing a renewed Jewish community in the heart of Hebron" (Aronson, 1990). From the social and economic dimensions, Israel's imposition of closures more directly and adversely affected the Palestinian economy than any other policy between 1993 and 2000. Generally, a 'closure' means that Palestinians and Palestinian goods may not enter Israel from the occupied territories without a permit. There are several types of closures, varying in extent and severity, which are enforced through a system of roadblocks and checkpoints and, in extreme cases; freedom of movement is curtailed by curfews in parts of the occupied territories. Implementation of the safe passage between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip for persons and goods was delayed until 1999, only partly completed, and then closed in October 2000 (Firer and Adwan, 2004). Land, Settlements and Water: In the period from 1967 to 1987 Israel confiscated more than 52 per cent of the West Bank land and 40 per cent of the Gaza Strip, and by the end, had established 104 settlements with 65,000 Jewish settlers in the former territory and 18 settlements and 2,150 settlers in the latter. Severe restrictions have continued on how remaining Palestinian lands could be utilized. .These settlements are typically built on hilltops in the West Bank, often surrounded by fertile agricultural land. 'Settlements' are really modem developed suburbs with recreational facilities, schools and even industrial parks but surrounded by security fences and military outposts, as well as landfills. The Oslo period has resulted in a rapid growth in settlements and numbers of settlers with their supporting infrastructure including new bypass roads. Statistics from the Israeli 'Peace Now' organization and its American partner reveal that between September 1993 and January 2000,45 new settlements were established bringing the total number of independent settlements to over 200. Housing in the settlements grew by 52 per cent and the settler population by 72 per

cent (Firer and Adwan, 2004). All governments - Labour and Likud - have participated in this expansion, which has continued in the post-Oslo period. Following the 1967 war, Israel had put the control of all the water sources in the West Bank and Gaza under its military authority and then, in 1982, its national water company. According to an estimate in the mid-1980s the West Bank had an underground water potentid of 600 million cubic meters per year of which 475 million was used to hydrate Israel itself while the Palestinian population was permitted only about 20 million cubic meters per year of this sub-total. The position in Gaza was even more severe. Although Palestinian water rights were recognised for the first time under Oslo 2 in 1995, control remains in Tsraeli hands so that Palestinians are left with restricted access to water supplies that are insufficient to meet their current, let alone future, domestic consumption and still less their agricultural and industrial requirements for economic development. B'Tselem, an Israeli human rights organisation, reported that the average Israeli consumes for domestic, urban and industrial use five times more than the Palestinian per capita consumption. Whereas the World Health Organisation recommends as the essential minimum 100 liters of water per person per day, the Palestinians consume an average of only 70 liters per day. Severe water shortages each summer have added to problems of access for thousands of Palestinians. Economic Development and Well-Being: Palestinians had hoped that the peace process would enable them to restore their agricultural sector, develop a higher technology and more efficient industrial base, and offer better employment prospects for Palestinian workers in Palestinian firms. 'Not one of these objectives was realized' (Sylvan, 20.04). The economic deterioration during the Oslo years was reflected in the growing number of people in poverty - defined as those with less than US$2 per capita income per day. Data from the World Bank and other official bodies reveal that the percentage of the West Bank and Gaza Strip population living in poverty increased from 14 per cent in 1995 to 35 per cent in 2000 before then rising to 64 per cent in 2002. The situation was more severe in Gaza where the poverty rate was 20 per cent in 1995 and 8 1 per cent by 2002. In assessing the development of the Palestinian economy under the Oslo Accords the New York-based Council for Economic and Social Rights wrote in June 2000 that it is '... poorer and more vulnerable today than it was at the start of the peace process, and is further, not closer, to the path of sustainable development.' The Israeli impediments to self-sustaining Palestinian economic development, which is necessary for the survival of an independent state, include Israel's continued control of land, water, trade and other matters under the economic protocol of 1994. The insecure political situation also discouraged private investment during the Oslo period. Capital investments by international donors in infrastructure projects were not enough to generate self-sustaining growth. While in 'Area A', individual freedoms improved with the withdrawal of the lsracli military forces, Israeli legal practices still affected 'Area B' (about 26 per cent of the West Bank), under joint control with the Palestinian Authority, and 'Area C' (about 70 per cent of the occupied territories), under sole Israeli control. Several such practices had detrimental effects for Palestinians, amongst which were, according to Donald Sylvan, Jonathan. Keller and Yoram Haftel, (2004): 1. Administrative detentions: This includes. arbitrary imprisonment of an individual for up to six months without charge, indefinitely renewable for further such periods by the occupation authorities. . . 11. Arbitrary arrests and forced confessions: This includes membership in a terrorist organisation and violent crimes but also non-violent political activities, which led to 1,550 individuals being held in custody as of July 2000. . . . 111. Torture used widely by Israel during interrogations against administrative iv. detainees and security prisoners from 1967 to the present day; v. Demolition ofresidential housing has been used during the Oslo period officially because Palestinian houses were constructed without permits. vi. Political assussinations - two documented cases between 1993 and 2000 - and shooting of unanned demonstrators. There is also the issue of Settler Violence. Since the occupation began Jewish settlers have used various types of violence against Palestinians. As a consequence of the Oslo Accords and the settlers' fear that they might have to give up some land to Palestinians settler s, violence increased. B'Tselem, the human rights group, concluded in 2001 that all arms of the Israeli law enforcement system, concerning violent offences against Palestinians, tended to treat Palestinian complaints with contempt and show leniency towards Jewish offenders (Sylvan, 2004). The newly elected Prime Minister, Menachem Begin, was not alone among Israel's leaders in remaining deaf to such concerns, especially when they were expressed by Palestinians. Begin proclaimed the centrality of settlement-anywhere and everywhere the IDF ruled. Foremost among Begin's settlement priorities was the "illegal" settlement of Sebastia/Elon ' Moreh (today renamed Keddumim) near Nablus. Settlers belonging to the newly formed Bloc of the Faithful-Gush Emmunim-had been rebuffed by the IDF .in numerous attempts to settle at the site permanently before they managed to win agreement to remain. Their effort enjoyed the support of then Defense Minister Shimon Peres. Despite the opposition of' I'rimc Minislcr Yitzhak Rabin, settlers continued to squat at the encampment. They were there when Rabin was defeated in May 1977, inaugurating a decade of intensive settlement and land confiscation. Within days of his startling election, Begin journeyed to Elon Moreh to give his blessing to the settlement. "Since May of this year." he thundered. "the name of these areas has been changed from occupied to liberated territories. This is liberated Israeli land, and we call on young volunteers in the country and the Diaspora to come and settle here." "The mission of Gush Emunim now," declared one of its leaders, "is to grab and settle." In 1996 Ariel Sharon, using these exact words, urged the children of Gush munim to emulate their parents. Since then, the heirs of Gush Emmunim, as always with official connivance, have established more than one hundred of these "unauthorized outposts." In March 2007, the IDF and police, after initially noting their opposition and invoking the law prohibiting Israeli civilian access to their area, took no action to prevent settlers from reaching the area. When settlers announced that they planned to re-occupy the site permancntlj. Minister of Defense Amir Peretz himself declared that, "...there will be no taking over any part of the Hoinesh area. This must be clear." Olmert, however, benignly described the event as a "visit," notwithstanding the fact that organizers made no secret of the existence of "a nucleus of 30 families who intend to live there." A "security understanding" between Peretz, the IDF. and the settlers established "rules of the game" that enabled 3,000 to march to the settlement with enough generators, tents, water, and food to enable hundreds to stay. On April 20, the IDF approved another march to the site, this time on the day of Israel's independence. "The Israeli public ltnows who is harming the state and who is trying to save it," declared Boaz Ha'etzni, son of Elyakin1 Haetzni and a principal organizer of the Homesh campaign. If the campaign to re-settle Homesh is meant to evoke the "golden era" of pioneering settlement, the battle over property in Hebron betrays a grimmer reality. Only 500 Israelis live in Hebron. Most of them are young children and teenagers, many the offspring of what even Prime Minister Begin described at the time as the "invaders." Yet this small vanguard has, during thc last 40 years, transformed the look and life of the city. Their intent has always been to make life in the city unbearable for its Arab residents. Recent video recordings have captured the complicity of the IDF in this ongoing campaign. One video, according to a March 3 report on YNET, reportedly showed girls from Hebronqelting eggs at Palestinians in the presence of an IDF soldier and Border Police oflicers who made no move to stop them. Another dramatic video, now posted on YouTube, shows a young woman, Ifat Elkobi, taunting a young member of the Abu Aisha family ("You are a whore,") who lives in what can only be called a cage built around her house to protect the family from settlers. On March 19, 2007, settlers, fearing that Palestinians would soon preempt them, moved into an unfinished multi-story building strategically located on a road linking Kiryat Arba to the scttleinent in the city center. Although it lacked windows, plumbing, interior walls, and electricity, 30 families and 14 individuals moved into the 3500 sq.km structure that settlers christined Bet HaShalom, originally constructed as a commercial mall. The IDF, which is tasked with insuring the "normal life" of settlers, reiused to oppose the operation on security grounds. The most controversial decision concerned a community of impoverished Peruvian Indians, brought to Israel in early 2002, who had no discernible Jewish ancestry but were willing converts and are eager settlers. Nevertheless, the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies announces that by 2020, lerusalcm will be 40 percent Palestinian and 60 percent Jewish, compared to 34 percent Palestinian and 00 percent Jewish today. The IDF continues to close the gate at the northern entrance of Kafr al- Dik, forcing Palestinians to make a detour of 30 minutes to reach the village and disconnecting the villages of al-Zawai, Rafat, and Deir Ballout from Salfit city. However, the IDF reportedly closed the agricultural gates of the separation barrier near Masha and al-Zawiya, preventing farmers from accessing their lands.

4.5 The Relationship Between Religion and Political Ideology in the Arab-Israeli Conflict Jihad and Jerusalem: Jihad is the underlying Islamic justification for starting a war against an enemy. In sharia law, it has one main meaning: a military action designed to expand the ourcr boundaries of the realm of Islam or to protect the boundaries of Dar al-Islam (the Abode of Islam or, literally, the House of Islam) from usurping unbelievers. This idea is based on the belief that Islam is the latest and most valid revelation, which has come to replace other monotheistic religions. Under Islam, jihad is the only valid war because the Faith, being universal, requires hostilities to be directed only against non-Muslims so Muslims should not wage war against each otKer. Most Muslim countries have refrained in practice (due to theological and practical considerations) from pursuing the notion of jihad which, in theory, could pit the Muslim community against the rest of the world until it is brought under Islamic rule. As a result wars against Israel including wars of terror by Hamas and others are described as jihad. This concept can apply to defensive wars and, in the case of Arab-Israeli wars, Muslims would claim that since Palestine is part of their heritage and the establishment of the state of Israel was an act of aggression it is the duty of Muslims to defend their land through jihad. Arafat's repeated calls for jihad were usually concentrated on Jerusalem. In that respect jihad was described as a 'qital' (battle), a 'struggle until victory', that required 'sacrifices and martyrdom' - words that do not have a peaceful connotation (Israeli, 2003). Education in Palestinian Schools: The Oslo Accords and agreements placed obligations on both parties to eliminate aspects of incitement, including hostile propaganda, from their respective public school systems. The revising of Israeli textbooks had started before Oslo, and independently of it, under the influence of young Israeli historians who demonstrated that many 'facts' and 'events' in Israeli history were one-sided, partial and misleading. For example, these 'new historians' found that many Palestinian refugees were expelled from battle field zones and had not left voluntarily as previously claimed. An investigation of Palestinian text books commissioned or adopted by the Palestinian Authority highlighted: The conviction which the Authority wishes to instill into the minds of its children, from an early age until adolescence, as to the necessity and inevitability of a prolonged jihad to liberate all Palestine from the Jewish-Israeli grip. The insistent demand that children should be prepared to fight and die in the service of this dream, is unequivocal inasmuch as the textbooks do not offer any glimmer of hope for a peaceful settlement (Israeli, 2003).

The approach appears surprisingly similar to that of Hamas on the basis that the school textbooks reflect the thinking and policy of the Palestinian Authority. There is a question as to whether they are in accord with its domestic and international obligations. While it is obvious that a state in the making must lay claim to its history and its own unique cultural and national identity to build social cohesion and a political consciousness and rally its people in that cause, it is unclear why this should involve delegitimising other people, denial of their future and nurturing a confrontational attitude in children against the counterparts of Palestinian nationalism (Israeli, 2003). While anti-Israeli-Jewish-Zionist feelings in Egypt and other parts of the Arab world is not the result of the Arab-Israeli dispute, for the last one hundred years they have worsened as a result of the fears and suspicions generated by their Israeli rivals. Thus the peace process between Israel and its Arab neighbours which began with the first Camp David Accord in September 1978 on the assumption that Israel would exchange land for peace and normalization, did not work out as Israel had hoped. Countries, like Egypt, which received their territories in full, did not soften their fixed attitudes to Jews and Israel, and so it proved with Palestinians several years after the Oslo Accords. An investigation of the Egyptian press, linked to the establishment or opposition, during the months covering the turn of the millennium regrettably did not show that their articles or editorials had become more mature than in previous decades:

These writings have remained grossly anti-Semitic, geared to diminishing Israel and denigrating it, to accusing it of all the ills suffered by the Arabs, and to showing that no reconciliation is possible with it; even to leaving open the ominous prospect of the resumption of hostilities. A caveat is later added that, despite the overwhelming evidence against the Egyptian press, particularly in denial of the Holocaust, a few courageous individuals have publicly gone against this consensus, even though sometimes from questionable motives (Israeli, 2003).

Islamic Terrorism: Whether human-bomb assaults amount to 'suicide attacks', as described in the Western media, or to 'martyrdom', as their perpetrators and promoters laud them, or just nationalistic 'heroism' on the part of those eager for self-sacrifice in order to cause cold-blooded destruction of the enemy, is hardly a quibble about words but vital to discerning varied ideas and mind-sets behind the deeds. Suicide normally relates to a disturbance of the mind leading an individual to flee from his feelings about an overwhelming problem by taking his own life. It may be motivated by a strong sense of protest against an existing order that cannot be withstood or altered, or by revenge upon an individual or group. .Muslim fundamentalists of this kind are dubbed 'Islamikaze'. They gather around charismatic leaders, whom they regard as role models, not unlike the Jewish Hassidim with respect to their rabbi. Separating themselves from the evil environment around them they follow their leaders' word as the ultimate interpretation of will. propelled by a relentless drive, nourished by a supportive atmosphere, and guided by the sanction of the leadership-inspired 'fatwas' to give authority to the deed, a Muslim radical can transcend the ordinary into the rarefied world of the Islamikaze. Turning to an Islamic frame of reference appears essential if this unique mode of self- sacrifice is to be understood. A leader of the fundamentalist Islamic Jihad in Gaza Abdallah Shami claimed that it was only the lack of weapons which had caused his organisation to use human beings instead. Their method based on 'martyrdom' is not idealized or justified as a goal in itself but as an 'economic' means of fighting injustice, that is, by reducing the perpetrators' losses while assuring them of entry into Paradise. The build-up of the Islamikaze's ideological commitment comes about incrementally through three elements: identifying the enemy; increasing the importance of jihad as the religious duty of every Muslim against that enemy; and then inciting the Islamikaze to courage and self-sacrifice for the achievement of the stated goal. The significance of 'martyrdom operations' is brought home by a quotation from Fat'hi Shqaqi, Secretary General of Islamic Jihad, who was assassinated in 1995: It is true that the material balance of power is not in our favor. But this should not prevent us fiom seiking a balance of terror with the enenly. Here lies the significance of the mal-tyrdom operations, which prove that the unjust balances of power are not eternal.. . and that we possess the option of fighting rather than surrendering (Israeli, 2003).

What is missing from this Islamic rationale for their acts is a 'fatwa' (a religiously binding verdict) to lend a stamp of approval. This is necessitated because Sunni Islam normally forbids suicide since the soul given by God must not be taken away by a believer's self-destruction. Several scholars, while acknowledging this point, make use of the consensus amongst Muslim jurists that near-suicidal attacks by one man against many of the enemy are permitted when the perpetrator either believes he has a good prospect of remaining alive or thinks he can inflict great loss on the enemy, even though he will die. Muslim scholars believe that suicide is prohibited in any circumstances, according to Dr Hamza Mustafa, the Head of the Shari'a College at al-Quds University and a member of the Jerusalem-based Supreme Islamic Council, as cited in (Israeli newspaper Ha'aretz, 23 January, 1995). However, even the Islamic Jihad's earnest desire for martyrdom is restricted by the ban on killing innocent people. Consequently the core issue becomes who is innocent and who is guilty? Yet, of course, such acts of martyrdom, which are meant to spare women and children often make them the victims instead. In the context of universal Muslim combat for survival, which the author describes as the context in which Islamikaze acts are imperative, one is led to believe that without the supreme act of martyrdom, there is no other way to rescue Islam from its demise. Paradoxically, it is precisely the perceived impending danger to Islam which forces the martyrs to commit their fanatic act of self-immolation; and it is their desperate act of self- sacrifice which signals that they have failed to transmit their message in some more acceptable and less horrific way. On this doctrine of martyrdom the duty of jihad, unlike state-led jihad, falls on every individual Muslim. All this went on as Israelis and Palestinians sustained contradictory goals amongst their own people. The qualitative issues still to be addressed include Jerusalem, on which compromise is hard to envisage, the Palestinian 'right of return' for refugees; the granting of Palestinian nationhood, still resisted by Israel; withdrawal from Israeli settlements in the territories and the relocation of Israeli settlers; and other matters. Overall, the Arab-Israeli conflict has two aspects: quality and quantity. Since its establishment, the state of Israel has demanded to be recognised and legitimated by its Arab neighbours while Arabs have accused Israel of taking over their lands and urged it to vacate all of them. Even some post-Oslo Palestinians have repeated this demand because they regard those Accords as just one step on the road to the elimination of Israel. Israeli occupation of more Arab lands through war was necessary to convince them to negotiate as the only means to win them back. This new formula of 'land for peace' was precisely calculated to pay Arabs in terms of quantity as a balanced quidpro quo for their qualitative approval of Israel. Jihad as Political ideology: Religion and politics can be related in ways that are charitable in law, that is, not controversial, albeit one linking education, rather than religion, to politics in a charitable manner. M. J. Akbar has written what is described as 'the very first cohesive history of jihad'. His introduction to the subject with his explanation of the concept is given but not the full history that covers the Israeli-Palestinian conflict tangentially. An opening question is how Pakistan became the breeding ground for 'the first Islamic international brigade in modem times'? The President of that country, Pervez Musharraf, acknowledged it was swamped by the Kalashnikov and jihad culture, which he is trying to change. How, too, did Osama bin Laden find a hideout and opportunity in this culture? The answers lie in the sources of anger, for this is a war being fought in the mind as much as anywhere else. Whereas conventional war tends to be defined in terms of national interests and uniformed armies this jihad is also a war fought through surrogates by irregular armies. Jihad is only one Islamic response to the apparent world domination of the United States of America bul it has the ability to change the course of history as on 11 September 2001. This work tries to explain the origin and nature of both the battle and the battlefield. Jihad is moulded by the history of Islam and the history of the Middle East and South Asia. Pakistan, for example, was created by a moderate liberal leader but soon became 'a homeland of fundamentalists who constitute as great a threat to their haven as they are to the people and nations they seek to subdue.' THE SHADE OF SWORDS: The 'shade of swords' is an invitation to die, not a request to kill: When Muslims take the name of their Prophet, Muhammad, they always add a prayer: Peace be upon Him. Peace is the avowed aim of Islam, a word that means surrender; as-Salam, or the Peaceful, is one of the names of Allah. But the Islamic faith also demands from time to time, in a holy war defined by specific circumstances, the blood of the faithful in the defence of their faith. This is jihad. The profession of faith is called the 'shahada': There is but one Allah and Muhammad is His Prophet. Those who become martyrs for Allah are the 'shaheed'. Believers surrender only to Allah. Now and again they may have to submit but such defeat is just a pause before renewal. They wait, keep the faith and renew their jihad until victory is achieved as Allah promised in His bargain with the believer, clearly set out in the Holy Quran. Islam has always recognized the reality of war in human affairs, and set its moral and political compass. A definition like this is open to abuse in that there is a temptation to reinterpret both text and history to suit contemporary needs. For example, some Muslims today will convert a holy war into a mere injunction to inner purification. It is true that the Prophet insisted that a greater jihad was the struggle to cleanse impurity within, but that does not take away from the fact that the lesser jihad inspired the spirit that once made Muslim armies all-conquering, enabled Muslims to protect their holy places, and ensured that most of the community lived within the protection of Muslim power despite formidable challenge from Christian alliances in a world war that was virtually coterminous with the birth of Islam. If today's Muslim rulers are reluctant to sound the call to jihad it is because they fear the consequaces of failure. Defeat becomes an indictment of the ruler, which is risky because Muslims have long held rulers to account as they are commanded to do. Most Muslim governments are perceived as unrepresentative and undemocratic so with the disappearance of the traditional Islamic polity to meet the needs of the community, the 'urnma', the arena for struggle is taken by radical Islamic movements outside the boundaries of official authority. Unconfident rulers use the promotion of religious fundamentalism as a prop in relation to an external threat: Pakistan, for instance, created to protect Islam rapidly politicized jihad as an instrument to protect elites who had usurped power in the face of 'infidel' India. Fundamentalist elements prospered in Pakistan while the simultaneous collapse of aspects of secularism in India nurtured the rise of Hindu fundamentalism. The West needs to come to grips with the historical context of Islamic fundamentalism. There is still a strong urge to secularism, sense and democracy in Pakistan and India immanent in South Asian culture and traditions, which may prove a saving grace if that finds its political balance in both countries. For many, the case for a Palestine state is so obvious that it barely needs reiteration. Indifference and procrastination have allowed the conflict to turn cancerous. However, Palestine is also being used by many non-democratic Arab states as the cause they can focus public opinion on, deflecting criticism from their own regimes. The West may have underestimated the Muslim will to martyrdom. It did not recognize the child who would walk serenely under the shade of swords.

EDUCATION AND POLITICS: Akbar (2003) in The Shade of Swords: Jihad and the Conflict between Islam and Christianity has given a seminal illustration of the potential role of education in evaluating and influencing the direction of the ~sraeli-Palestinianconflict. This is intended to address the need for human and personal security. The sources used to achieve this purpose are as follows: Ruth Firer, the Israeli project coordinator and her Palestinian counterpart, Sami Adwan, have conducted school textbook analysis to provide 'a comprehensive overview of how the difficult Israeli-Palestinian relationship in the 20Ih century has been presented in history and civics textbooks from the end of the eighties to today.' This initiative has some similarities to the PP concept of 'peace games'. Donald A. Sylvan, Jonathan W. Keller and Yoram Z. Haftel report on an exercise aimed at testing international relations theories and a group of Middle East experts to see how they fare in forecasting Israeli-Palestinian relations.2 This is a closer match to the peace games idea, in which there is also a dual concern with conflict outcomes and methods of analysis. The Journal of Social Issues published an issue devoted to 'Arab-Jewish Coexistence Progammes' which examines in more depth education for coexistence (Akbar, 2003). The above efforts are based on the belief that national ideologies are implanted through educational (and other) processes in general and textbooks in particular that influence learning in school classrooms. Through over a hundred years of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict each side's identity has been forged in a culture of war. This study examines the narratives of this conflict as currently presented in contemporary history and civics textbooks and in the curriculum statements of middle and high schools of both nations. A culture of war relates to all aspects of human life rather than just to war itself and other acts of aggression. Such cultures are founded

on regarding one's own race as the most important and denial of others ill all types of socialisation influencing self-development. Nations involved in wars and conflicts resort to all forms of power games in defending themselves and defying the others. It is a 'win-lose' formula that controls their relationship where each side tries hard to defeat or destroy the others and describe them in a negative character. Dehumanization of the enemy is a means to justify the use of violence and to rationalize the human as well as the material losses. Alternatively, a culture of peace is founded on human rights, the values of civil society and justice so that negotiation and dialogue are considered the proper methods of mediating conflicts and disagreement. Such cultures also relate to all aspects of life. Peace-oriented individuals cite examples from history ... proving that wars have never solved any conflicts, because the losing party, by rule, seeks revenge. Often, the winner's prosperity as a result of . victory breeds new problems and conflicts, like corruption and internal social tensions. The cost of war in human life, energy and resources is immense; instead such precious resources can and ' should be used for human benefit. While, in theory, both cultures are self-contained, in practice people maintain a mix of both cultures; war and peace intermingled in varying proportions. The authors' belief is that the various elements of any particular culture have to be analysed in relation to their religious, national and social background and carefully balanced so as to enhance the elements of peace and reduce the likelihood of conflict and aggression. Although conflicts are unavoidable thcy need to be addressed through non-violent mediation. Peace education is not value-free but based on the belief well expressed in one UN body: 'Since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that defenses of peace must be constructed. While peace educators generally agree upon human values they disagree on the most effective means to realise the goals and on the importance of these morals because of their varying cultures and contexts. Education in the Middle East has usually been used as a means of advancing a particular combination of ideological, religious or nationalistic viewpoints. Consequently Israeli and Palestinian curricula and textbooks frequently tend to perpetuate negative attitudes and stereotypes of the other side and a positive self-image. In comparing the same narrative in both textbooks and curricula statements the researchers acknowledge the widely differing positions of both nations, e.g. in terms of their experience in developing textbooks, standards of school and teacher training and the fact that building state institutions by the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) has only begun. The findings of this study have the ultimate goal of empowering childrcn of both sides with the capacity to maintain one another's identity in an environment of tolerance and acceptance instead of hatred and animosity The same point can be demonstrated using textual analysis of curriculum statements (i.e. goals of education) and syllabi (i.e. topics for teaching) together with the contents and teaching methods within those parts of the textbooks that address the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Each side's textbooks and curriculum statements have been evaluated chronologically against the following objectives and criteria of analysis for dealing with controversies: I@ormatiorz. A minimum of information about each nation and the relations between them has to be included, defined according to age level. Content selection is dependent on subject discipline. Historical research, for instance, has to include such principles as accuracy, reference to reasons and results, etc. A variety of historical narratives and points of view are required. Attitudes arzd Values. History and civics textbooks aim to raise national self identity, based on human rights and irenical values, and leading learners to a sense of behavioural obligation and responsibility. Texts should convince pupils that they can improve their lives even if some problems can only be solved in the long term. Stereotypes and ,prejudice must be removed from such materials. Itztellectual, Emotional arzd Behavioural Skills. A student and 'process-centred' approach is required aimed at developing problem-solving abilities and methods of conflict management as well as skills in communication and related disciplines like negotiation and mediation. The texts need to give attention to the emotional aspect of national identity and try to teach students to acknowledge and control their feelings. Pupils need to be able to participate in their environment for self-improvement in their own communities and to co-operate with other nations. The textbook systems differ in the two nations: Palestinian schools use only textbooks that are authorised by the PNA but a part of these are still Jordanian and Egyptian ones passed by Israeli military censorship; Israeli schools can choose textbooks from an open market including those not on a list recommended by the Ministry of Education. The first and only authentic Palestinian textbooks were published from September 2000. As a result of these differing educational systems a different research sample had to be chosen. Two versions of the historical narrative are told. Differences include the following:

1. Zionism in Palestinian texts is a Western plan to colonise the Arab world and, in particular, Palestine. The Israelis view Zionism as a genuine national movement for repatriation and acknowledge the national Palestinian movement. . . 11. All clashes between Israelis and Palestinians are described differently, e.g. the 1948 war is called 'the War of Independence' in Israel but 'Al-Nakba' (the disaster or catastrophe) by Palestinians. .. . 111. The Nazis and the Holocaust are an essential part of the Israeli narrative but not mentioned at all in Palestinian textbooks. According to Adwan's interpretation; the focus on the Holocaust may prevent Israeli pupils from r&ognising Palestinian suffering arising from the 1948 War and the Israeli occupation since 1967. On the other hand, in Palestinian textbooks, the Jews and the Israelis are portrayed only in relation to the local conflict and the Western Zionist scheme. In Firer's view, this may prevent Palestinian pupils from gaining an insight into the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the prospects of resolution. iv. Each side emphasizes the international decisions which suit its interests, e.g. the Palestinians cite UN Resolution 194 on the right of return of refugees while the Israelis kmphasize the UN Partition Resolution of 1947. Each side stresses the fact that the other rejected the decision it favoured and both sides interpret differently those resolutions they do accept, e.g. Resolution 242 in 1967. v. Although in describing the wars the other side is always to blame, being the first to attack or cause a pre-emptive strike; the Israeli texts heighten Israel's victories while Palestinian texts recognise Arab defeats but stress victorious battles. The Oslo Accord in 1993 is viewed as a start for peace by Israeli textbook authors while Palestinian texts regarded it as an interim period that would lead to a full Palestinian state which would have peaceful relations with its neighbour, the state of Israel. New Palestinian schoolbooks avoid using the term 'State of Israel' in text or maps and Israeli texts do not use the terms 'Palestinian National Territories'. Each side uses its own religious and political terms when referring to the land without regard to the other side's terminology thereby contributing to each side's ignorance of the other's sensitivities. New Palestinian textbooks are less loaded than previous Jordanian textbooks in their portrayal of Israelis, mainly in their role as occupiers; obviously disparaging terminology and stereotypes are avoided. Nevertheless colored illustrations depict the Israeli occupiers in roles harmful to the Palestinians that reinforce negative attitudes and feelings. It cannot be said, however, that these illustrations would not reflect everyday experience of the majority of the Palestinians since 1967.0nly in new Israeli textbooks are Palestinians called by that name instead of 'Arabs' or 'Israeli-Arabs'. Until the mid-1980s negative stereotypes were frequent in Israeli texts but from then on became much less so. Negative descriptions still recur mainly when the text is addressing conflict including ArabIPalestinian massacres of Israelis. The latest textbooks of both sides since 1993 show the different expectations and suspicions of the other side, reflecting the burden of history. Unfortunately, this mixed attitude of hope, fear and anxiety was unbalanced towards the negative side, as the Al-Aqsa intifada of 2000 has proven. Aware of the difficulties posed by the Second Intifada, the authors make detailed recommendations for revising existing textbooks, curricula and syllabi so as to remove animosity reflected in narratives and stereotypes; to integrate stories of the 'other' [side]; and to emphasi;.e the common inheritance of both nations. Islam's principles clearly state that: there shall be no compulsion in religion; your religionsfor you and mine for me. Following Medina, though, Muslims declined to offer the other cheek to those who would persecute them. In those circumstances death was a little thing on the road to martyrdom. When viewed from a wider strategic point of view, the Muslim factor is adding contours to Europe's domestic and foreign policy landscape in more than just demographic and geographical terms. The European-Islamic nexus is spinning off a variety of new phenomena, including the rise of terrorism; the emergence of a new anti-Semitism; the shift of established European political parties to the right; the recalibration of European national political calculations; additional complications for achieving an ever closer EU; and a refocusing, if not a reformulation, of European foreign policy. Following the fall of the Berlin Wall, an older, revived version of the Muslim threat at home and abroad seems to have replaced the Communist threat in Europe. Indeed, during his brief tenure as NATO Secretary Seneral in the mid-1990s, Belgian Willy Claes claimed that the new threat to the alliance was Islam (Sami Zemni and Christopher Parker, 2002: 233). Hence, it is not surprising that Samuel P. Huntington's The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order had and continues to have far greater resonance in Europe than it does in the United States. Whether owing to a self-fulfilling prophecy, the transcendence of contemporary dynamics over political acumen and resources, or truly intractable differences between Europe and Islam, many inside and outside Europe will consider the failure to address and avert the looming crisis arising from the clash of cultures within European borders as confirmation of Huntington's thesis. The nature of the Muslim presence in Europe is also changing. They are no longer "temporary guest workers," Muslims are now a permanent part of western European national landscapes, as they have been for centuries in southeastern Europe. The institutionalization of Islam in Europe has begun, as has a "re-Islamization" of Muslims in Europe. Over time, the political salience of the Muslim factor in Europe is most evident now. First, as a group, Europe's Muslims are energized more quickly and forcefully by developments in the international arena, notably those in which the urnma (universal Muslim community) is viewed as endangered and the dar ul-Islam (abode of peace, or Islamic territory) is involved, such as the Israeli- Palestinian conflict and the crises in Iraq and Bosnia, than by domestic issues, such as employment and education. For example, the Muslim Association of Britain and the Stop the War Coalition jointly sponsored the mid-February 2003 demonstration in London involving an estimated one million persons- the largest protest in British history-under the dual banners "Don't Attack Iraq" and "Freedom for Palestine." ' Attempts to nationalize and secularize Islam, moreover, hinder the development of a modern Euro-Islamic identity that amalgamates Western culture with Islamic orthopraxy, parallel to the distinct Arab Islamic, South Asian-Islamic, and East Asian-Islamic cultures and identities that have emerged elsewhere in the world. The Arab Islamic culture has most profoundly shaped the practices of Muslims in continental Europe, but much of this influence derives from Arab customs and traditions. The fact that European governments and publics tend to view and respond to all Muslims as an undifferentiated whole further reinforces the tendency among Europeans to see the Muslim presence not as a potential boon but as a real threat, which, in some respects, becomes a self- fulfilling prophecy. The threat is framed in terms of security (terrorism) and economics (jobs); yet, the core issue is identity and the perceived cultural threat Islam poses to the European way of life. Europeans have even coined a name for it- Islamophobia. The Economist has warned that this "could be a huge long-term threat to Europe. Conversely, this tendency to see Muslims as a monolith has its reverse image in Muslim allegiance to the umma, which transcends other loyalties; tends to reinforce the "wehhem" perspective; and is part of the reason why Muslims resist assimilation- the total loss of identity-related indicators of existing differences from European societies-and insist on integration. In view of the foregoing observations, the centuries-old question of whether Europe and Islam can coexist will have to be confronted. The above analyses emphasized the significance of Jerusalem to both Israelis and Palestinians. This has validated hypothesis three which states that both parties' refusal to agree on Jerusalem's status has led to the intractable crises. Chapter Five

Summary, Conclusion and Recommendation

5.1 The study set out to investigate the application of intemational conflict preventive

diplomatic mediation in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It establishes a causal relationship that

explains how the realist approach to conflict resolution and intemational security led to

politicization of international conflicts and mediation and predisposes stakeholders of

international preventive mediation to adopt defective variety of methods, techniques and

mechanisms for conflict management strategies which assumes that conflict can only be

contained not resolved.

To foreground the above causal linkage, the work set out:

1. To show that preventive diplomatic mediation would not have been defective if the same right given to existing nation-states in determining their form of government and destiny was accorded to Palestine at a very early stage of the conflict to justify its own existence. . . 11. To explain the consequences of the use of Peace initiative in pursuit of economic agenda in furtherance of national interest by the West in the Middle East on the Israeli- Palestinian conflict. ... 111. To explore if the lingering crises between Israelis and Palestinians are partly due to the refusal of both party to reach a consensus over the status of Jerusalem The study was motivated by the need to investigate and provide valid and plausible answers to

the following research questions:

1. Is preventive diplomatic mediation more likely to succeed if it is attempted at a very early stage of the conflict? . . 11. Why has the Israeli - Palestinian conflict persisted despite the various peace proposals initiated over the years for the resolution of the conflict? .. . 111. Are disagreements arising out of the inability of both parties to agree on the status of Jerusalem responsible for persistence of Israeli-Palestinian conflict? In other to understudy and analyse the intractable nature of the conflict in the Middle

East, especially, the Israeli - Palestinian conflict and address the above questions, we relied on the poststructuralist approach to international relations which reassess the character, philosophical and epistemological prepositions of the realist approach to conflict resolution and international security.

In the end, it enabled us to present an analytical and conceptual framework that enabled us see international conflict management as a political cum economic control in the hands of international intervenors. In other words, the theory also provides a radical critique of the potency of the realist approach to conflict resolution and international security and the role of the

'democratic Peace' approach to international conflict management as applied in the Middle East

- the Israeli-Palestinian.

Guided by this theoretical framework, the following hypothetical propositions were posited and verified:

i. Preventive diplomatic mediation succeeds more if it was attempted at the very early stage of the conflict. .. 11. The tendency by the United States to use her peace initiatives primarily to project her economic agenda conflicts with the Palestinian determination to wrest the disputed territories from Israeli occupation. iii. The lingering crises between the Israelis and the Palestinians are presently intractable due to both parties' refusal to agree on the status of Jerusalem. These hypotheses were investigated in chapters two, three, and four respectively. The * study was divided into five chapters. Chapter one dealt with the conventional research

prdcedures such as the introduction, statement of the problem, objective of the study,

significance of the study, literature review, theoretical framework, hypothesis, and method of

generating data for research, all of which justified the study. Chapter two began by analyzing the necessary precondition and determinants for a successful preventive diplomatic mediation with special emphasis on the timing of intervention.

Though the central premise of preventive diplomacy is reducing tensions before they result in a violent conflict, it was observed that international preventive diplomatic conflict management emphasizes prevention rather than cure due to adoption of defective variety of methods; techniques and mechanisms for conflict management strategies that assumes that conflict can

only be contained not resolved. The chapter also noted that though there is international

recognition of entitlement to self-determination as stipulated in Article 1 of the United Nations

General Assembly Resolutions 1514 of Dec. 14, 1960, General Assembly Resolutions 2625 of

Oct. 24, 1970, and, Article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights passed

by the General Assembly of Dec. 16, 1966, the way the principle has been applied has led to a

denial of self-determination to the Palestinian.

Chapter three evaluated America's relations, foreign policy and diplomacy towards the

Middle East, her relations with Israel and Palestine, all with a view to conceptualize how

national interest has impinged on rights, hence the intractable nature of the Israeli-Jews and

Palestinian-Arabs conflict. Generally, it was found that the Westerners identify with Israel but fail

to empathize with the condition of the Palestinians because their perceptions are so grounded in

prejudices and unchanging mental impressions that they frequently fail to grasp the basic issues.

It was found that America's foreign policy and diplomacy towards the Middle- East covers

ideolo~ical,political, economic and religious spheres, and that America's connivance with Israel,

ip the pursuit of her interests in the Middle East, portrays it with some suspicious from the view

point of the Palestinians. In addition, it was observed that the US relations, foreign policy and

diplomacy towards the Middle-East and towards Palestine is guided by deeply rooted

perceptions, arising from beliefs and misconceptions dating back to the nineteenth century, that depict Jews as victims and Israel as a democracy, on the one hand, and Arabs and Muslims as outsiders, and the Palestinians as anti-Semitic or violent religious fanatics, on the other hand.

Similarly, successive Israeli governments rejected the notion that the legitimate rights of the Palestinians extend to the creation of a new Palestinian State on the borders of Israel. They also regarded as illegitimate the Palestinians Liberation Organization (PLO) which is broadly representative of the Palestinians seeking statehood because the PLO programme calls for the dismemberment and destruction of the state of Israel. On the other hand, since 1967, Israel has pursued a programme of 'de-Arabization' in Jerusalem, to advance the objective of permanent

Jewish sovereignty including policies aimed at reducing Palestinian population, as well as using the processes of 'Judaization' in order to transform Jerusalem into a predominately Jewish capital. In view of these observations, the chapter therefore concluded that it was due to the character of America's foreign policy and diplomacy towards the Middle East that has made the

Israeli-Palestinian conflict to persist in spite of the various peace proposals that were initiated over the years for their resolution.

Chapter four evaluated the status of Jerusalem and its significant to both Israel and

Palestine. The chapter also discussed the historical perspective of the modem conflict, the different wars that were fought between Israel and some Arab states since 1948, as well as a chronology of significant events that took place from 1947. It was found that part of the reason for the intractability of the modem day Israeli-Palestinian conflict owes much to the deeply and * sincerely held, but conflicting religious beliefs of both protagonists which has been recurrent since the establishment of the Jewish State of Israel in 1948. Thus, land and religion emerged as the twin issues in the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. However, there is no doubt that Jerusalem is the most difficult problem that the peace makers have to deal with because Palestine is not simply a portion of land, but contains the Holy Land with Jerusalem at its center.

Hence the centrality of the issue of Jerusalem derives from emotional and religious sensitivities.

Despite the support the state of Israel gets from the US and other Western allies, it was found that Israel faces an existential threat due to the continuation of the century-old Arab unwillingness of the Arabs to grant the Jewish people self-determination in a portion of their historical homeland.

From the foregoing evidence and the facts embodied in our analysis, we accept the hypotheses posited at the beginning of this study as valid, and restated them as follows: i. Preventive diplomatic mediation succeeds more if it was attempted at the very early stage of the conflict; .. 11. The tendency by the United States to use her peace initiatives primarily to project her economic agenda conflicts with the Palestinian determination to wrest the disputed territories from Israeli occupation; and iii. The lingering crises between the Israelis and the Palestinians are presently intractable due to both parties' refusal to agree on the status of Jerusalem. In the course of our analyses the following observations were made:

i. The internal composition, cultural and ethnic differences, and degree of homogeneity are being politicized and elevated to the level of international terrorism by the West, without first addressing the question and the reason why the Palestinians are willingly carrying out suicide attacks on Israelis even,at the price of their own life. . . 11. Despite the pragmatic acceptance of Israel by Palestinians on 78 per cent of what was their homeland, and willingness to coexist in peace; injustice, dispossession, statelessness and *fear still exist. . . . 111. The International community has called, albeit contrary to the wishes of the indigenous population, for the division of Palestine into two states, a Jewish state which will comprise 55 per cent of the land, and a Palestinian state which will comprise of the remaining 45 per cent with Jerusalem as a united city under permanent UN trusteeship. iv. An independent, sovereign Palestinian state is invested with vast symbolic and emotional importance for Palestinians, whether or not they would live there, while for those under Israeli occupation it is a matter of individual and collective survival. Despite the differences between them, the Israeli government and Palestinian National

Authority (PNA) and most of their respective publics in mid-2005 have three common

assumptions on what may lead to a peaceful resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: a) Political and/or military strength leading to a negotiated solution (Palestinian preference) or unilaterally imposed solution (Israeli preference) rather than relying mainly on rational persuasion; b) Greater economic independence rather than economic integration; c) A two-state solution rather than one-state solution. Resolution 194 approved by the General Assembly on 1 1 December 1948 remains the fimdamental, although not the only legal basis for the refugees' right of return because it called for the repatriation of the Palestinians to their homes, and for compensation to be paid to those who decided not to return. However, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) established

for Palestinian refugees was not authorized to seek local integration or the resettlement of refugees in

other countries Though the majority of Palestinians believe the right of return is sacred and

inviolable, whether Muslim or Christian, they do not, however, accept Jewish dominance of a unified

Jewish Jerusalem.

Each side stresses the fact that the other rejected the decision it favoured and both sides

interpret differently those resolutions they do accept, e.g. Resolution 242 in 1967.

Two versions of the historical narrative are told: a a) Zionism in Palestinian texts is a Western plan to colonize the Arab world and in particular, Palestine. The Israelis view Zionism as a genuine national movement for repatriation and acknowledge the national Palestinian movement; b) All clashes between Israelis and Palestinians are described differently, e.g. the 1948 war is called 'the War of Independence' in Israel but 'Al-Nakba' (the disaster or catastrophe) by Palestinians, and each party always blame the other as being the first to attack or cause a pre-emptive strike. The Israeli texts heighten Israel's victories while Palestinian texts recognize Arab defeats but stress victorious battles. The failure of the Oslo process, from a Palestinian perspective, arose from the vast power imbalance between Israel and the PLO. Whereas the PLO entered the process in a very weak position Israel was at the pinnacle of its political and military achievements with its full strategic partnership with the USA.As a result, the PLO was unable to influence even the most vital aspects of the Declaration of Principles, and with every new agreement Israel could extract more concessions even when Israel failed to implement agreements it had signed with the Palestinians. Beyond this fundamental problem with the Oslo agreements as a whole, there were other factors inherent in the failure of the Oslo process:

1. Israeli legal expertise ensured that the Declaration protected Israeli interests and prevented a sovereign, independent Palestinian state from emerging. .. 11. The separation of the interim from final status talks put the Palestinians at a huge disadvantage because they did not know what Israel meant, in legal terms, by 'status'. This separation allowed Israel to unilaterally decide the final outcome and indefinitely prolong even the commencement of final-status talks while buying time to construct many new settlements in the occupied territories. .. . 111. The most important defect was that the Declaration of Principles was not based on either international law or UN resolutions on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. iv. Lack of an impartial mediator, in the event of Israel failing to fulfill its obligations under the Declaration of Principles was another important defect. While the USA assumed he role of 'honest broker', it unreservedly supported Israel during the whole period. v. Israel kept demanding that the Palestinians guarantee Israeli security. This was something Israel could not do itself even in areas under its own control, and it used every act of violence from the territories to claim that the Palestinian Authority had failed to fulfill its obligations under the Oslo agreements. This resulted in suspension of negotiations, security crackdowns and economic closures in the occupied temtories while new Jewish settlements were constructed (Rubenberg, 2003). Leaving out relevant provisions of international law and UN Resolutions 1 8 1 and 194,

with other supporting Resolutions, greatly weakened the Palestinian positions. As the Declaration is not founded on law, rights or precedent but a political agreement between two parties presented as equals, the Palestinians had no recourse to international legal provisions that should have assisted them. The reference to UN Security Council Resolution 242 in the

Declaration was not clarified and allowed Israel to bargain over how much and from which areas

Israel would withdraw rather than their having to leave all the occupied territories.

Findings:

Generations of Israeli leaders have either supported or acquiesced in and later authorized, new settlements, even those illegal under lsraeli laws (all are illegal under international law). The two-state solution (divorce) is a short-term goal-an interim vision of a united country with divided sovereignties. The two states could not coexist without a tremendous amount of interaction. There is a disconnection between those who talk about what really happened historically, and those who wanted to talk about the perception of reality. Both views are important in resolving the conflict, however, both myth and narrative will generally prove to be more fruitful than talking about the minutiae of what occurred. There are major differences in the interpretation of events that are crucial in the history of the conflict: i. Israelis seeking refuge in their ancestral homeland because after World War I1 there was nowhere else to go. ii. Palestinians lose a homeland due to European-inspired colonization. ... 111. Palestinians want the entire state (as proved by suicide bombings). iv. Israelis want the entire state (as proved by 1967 war, continuing settlements). While suicide bombings are acknowledged as the most controversial aspect of Palestinian resistance, deserving equal condemnation with Israel's killing of civilians, the explanation for these acts and the promotion of their use by some groups is said to lie in overwhelming despair about the future and consequent willingness for self-sacrifice. The United States has fully backed Israeli policies and marginalized Europe, Russia and the United Nations in Middle East diplomacy thereby leaving the Palestinians isolated. It is, therefore, as responsible as Israel for the failure of the Oslo peace process and the outbreak of a second uprising; Despite the reservations of the then Israeli prime minister, Yitzhak Rabin about anything intellectual or run by academics it was Track-11' diplomacy which draws a distinction between the ultimate failure of the Oslo process to deliver a final, secure resolution of the conflict and the effectiveness of these talks as a breakthrough mechanism in 1993 process rather than the formal Track-I Madrid talks that achieved the breakthrough, albeit with the assistance of trained Israeli negotiators in the later stages. Both Palestinian and Israeli visions of separation are unrealistic, due to the close proximity of the two populations resulting from Israeli settlement policies since 1967.

International systemic and state-level variables have more weight than the decision- making variables, and this is in line with international relations theories dealing with two-level games and mixed support for public opinion and realist theories. Convinced that Arabs understood only force, and confident in their invincible might, the leaders of Israel were unconcerned about conditions in the occupied territories. It is most likely that Israel will favour and back its political, diplomatic approach with unchallengeable military actions despite sanctions many of its traditional European allies may impose on it From the above findings, we make the following deductions: i. The greater the imbalance between one party's peaceful methods of conflict resolution as compared to others (the 'balance of peace') the greater the likelihood of war (because lack of reciprocity tends to undermine peaceful methods of conflict resolution in favour of military methods). . .. 11. Preventive intervention by third parties is best undertaken between adversaries that have well-defined and legitimate identities . . . 111. Disunity or lack of cohesion within a state makes it difficult for the adversaries (as well as a mediator) to engage in any meaningful form of preventive diplomacy. iv. Preventive mediation is more effective when it is initiated ,early, but not before the parties' positi&s and interests have crystallized. v. When territory is at stake, the party in possession tends to resist third-party involvement. vi. The parties' perception of the issues at stake is a key factor in determining whether or not to accept early mediation initiatives and whether they will have much success. vii. It would be difficult, if not impossible, for a single mediator, who is distrusted by one of the parties, to carry out any useful fbnction Implications of the Study/Discussion of Findings Throughout Israeli-Palestinian conflict, each side's identity has been forged in a culture of war as currently presented in contemporary history of both nations. This culture of war relates to all aspects of human life rather than just to war itself and other acts of aggression. Such cultures are founded on regarding one's own race as the most important. Nations involved in wars and conflicts resort to all forms of power games in defending themselves and defying others. It is a 'win-lose' formula that controls their relationship while each side tries hard to defeat or destroy the other and describe them in a negative character. Dehumanization of the enemy is a means to justify the use of violence and to rationalize the human as well as the material losses. Alternatively, a culture of peace is founded on human rights, the values of civil society and justice so that negotiation and dialogue are considered the proper methods of mediating conflicts and disagreement. Peace-oriented approach and individuals cite examples from history to prove that wars have never solved any conflicts, because the losing party, by rule, seeks revenge. Often, the winner's prosperity as a result of victory breeds new problems and conflicts, like corruption and internal social tensions. The cost of war in human life, energy and resources is immense; instead such precious resources can and should be used for human benefit. While, in theory, both cultures are self-contained, in practice people maintain a mix of both cultures; war and peace intermingled in varying proportions. Although conflicts are unavoidable they need to be addressed through non-violent mediation.

5.2 Recommendations

The following recommendations are suggested based on the observations made in the study:

From a cognitive approach, 'since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of' men that defenses of peace must be constructed.' Therefore, Peace education and peace educators alike should generally agree upon human values to protect despite their disagreement on the.most effective means to realizing the goals of peace and justice. It is the wider Arab-Israeli conflict or the emerging. Muslim-Jewish (and Christian) conflict that has to be tackled, the focus so far on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, is very restrictive and misleading. Going by the very disparate experiences of 1948, it will be difficult to find a bridge between symbolic gestures, practical arrangements, and reconciliation. Israel must deal with the refugee problem for which it bears much responsibility. To achieving a resolution of the conflict through direct negotiations leading to the goal of two states - a safe and secure Israel and a sovereign, independent, viable, democratic and territorially contiguous Palestine, living side by side in peace and security, the Arabs must give evidence for their political will to make peace, which Israel continuously demand. This is in view of the fact that no negotiation is possible while violence (whatever the pretext, or incitement to hatred) is pursued. Secondly, Arabs must declare their willingness to share historical and religious sites of importance to both sides. It is hoped that with Israel as a strong partner for peace, in full equality, the Arabs will learn that without a revolutionary change in their traditional views about Jews and Israel they can only harm themselves. An effective early warning system requires cooperation amongst a host of relevant sources - including academics, nongovernmental organizations, national governments, regional organizations and the United Nations, to collect the necessary information, which should then be categorized, coded and interpreted by experts. Early-warning findings should then be presented in a fairly simple and direct way to decision makers, and the U.N. Office of Political Affairs, so as to enable it analyze and provide the basis of a model of risk assessment of communal, civil, and other conflicts, as well as develop policy options and recommendations for effective preventive action. However, the early warning requires three types of information; the conflict history and its context; each party's status, traits and objectives; and information on ethno-communal groups and their grievances. If the international community is to move beyond the current, ad hoc and reactive approach to conflict, it must articulate a framework for preventive diplomacy and gain significant political support for such activity. There is a clear need to strengthen the international community's handling and management of conflict. This need can best be met by having a range of effective policies for the prewntion of conflict so as to avoid human sufferings, save many lives, and stop large-scale violence from breaking out. If this were the case, many tragic events of the last few years could have been avoided had the international community paid more attention to conflict prevention instead of reactive approach to conflict. Therefore, a systematic expansion of policies of conflict prevention measures or preventive diplomacy should be high on the agenda of international intervenors. The intemational community should create a bold multilateral peace initiative, backed by a serious Marshall-Plan -like rebuilding package, in which the Israeli-Palestinian and Israeli- Arab conflicts are resolved simultaneously. Israel has to accept the Geneva Accords which majority of its population has favoured in the past, but with a cast-iron intemational guarantee that its withdrawal from the West Bank will coincide with peace, and start diplomatic relations with Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Iran. However, the entire Arab world must be pressurized to make peace and establish diplomatic relations with Israel, with an International guarantee that the proposed peace will coincide with the establishment of a Palestinian State. With a creative and sensitive timetable, with appropriate international diplomacy, and with a global understanding of the justified feeling of victimhood on both sides, a viable conflict resolution might be possible, only if it the world commits to solving the Israeli-Palestinian and the Israeli-Arab conflicts together. Finally, perhaps the researcher run the risk of some oversimplification, the solution to the conflict is for Israel to end the occupation of the territories it conquered in 1967 and to allow the Palestinians to establish a viable, independent state alongside Israel.

5.3 Conclusion

The essential issue, in the last analysis of their quest for a just peace, is 'power versus powerlessness'. The Palestinians are devoid of power and without allies in their struggle against a powerful state, Israel, which is fully supported by the USA, the most powerful state in the international system. The concept of 'power' is central to overcoming the resistance to achieving national objectives. Yet a distinction must be drawn between those types of power which rely on the use or threat of coercion and those that depend on cooperation between peoples. Here the former is called the 'power of coercion' and the latter the 'power of cooperation'. Generally, when people speak of 'power' they are referring to this power of coercion. Examples include military force but also 'peaceful techniques' like legal agreements and public opinion. So it is important to keep in mind that even peaceful methods can be highly coercive - the Oslo agreements constituted a peace settlement but not only did they carry binding obligations on each party (whether or not these were respected) but the consequences of implementing the agreements were at times anything but peaceful. Thus a legally binding agreement intended to inaugurate peaceful relations between former enemies can instead lead back to violent confrontation. The clear lesson is that settlers and their right-wing supporters in Israel have always controlled the settlement agenda and do so today, notwithstanding that most Israelis and the entire international community oppose settlements as incompatible with a two-state peace and Israel's Sounding framework as a liberal, Jewish, democratic state. The reasons for this anomaly lie in Israel's dysfunctional political system, which exaggerates the power of extremist minorities, and in the careless indulgence of the United States and the international community. Settlements can be evacuated, and peace advanced, but not without strong and wise diplomatic intervention, especially from Washington. It is not hard to see that if reasonable people from both sides sit down in a relaxed environment to discuss, in good faith, possible solutions to a seemingly intractable conflict, then a major advance may be possible. However, it is one thing to agree the terms of such a settlement in that kind of climate and quite another to implement it in the outside world where some people on both sides are neither reasonable nor disposed to peaceful means of conflict resolution. If education (and educators) could, though, undeniably contribute to a breakthrough mechanism then why not to the process itself? Without attributing specific blame to Islam as a faith, or to Muslim countries as political entities, it is nonetheless a fact that Muslims, in the name of Islam, lead many current domestic and international conflicts from Muslim countries, or under their wings, or by Muslim minorities under non-Islamic rule. This must signify something in terms of Muslim ideological involvement in terror, and especially the grass-root support it seems to have among large portions of the Muslim populace, notwithstanding Muslim governments' attempts at concealment. Finally, it is not the terms of any 'final' political settlement, but the means used to implement it that will be decisive as to whether a two or one-state solution leads to peace or war in the management of the Israeli-Palestinian, and Israeli-Arab conflicts. If the above recommendgtions are implemented, they will go a long way in reducing the conflict. Bibliography

TEXTBOOKS

Bercovitch, J. (1984), Social Conflicts and Third Parties: Strategies of Conflict Resolution. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press.

Boulding, K. (1 962), Conflict and Defense: A General Theory. New York: Harper and Row.

Brown, S. (1984), On the Front Burner: Issues in US Foreign Policy. Toronto: Little Brown and Company.

Burton, J. W. (1969), Conflict aid Communication. London: Macmillan Press.

Burton, J. W. (1984), Global Conflict. Brighton, Sussex: Wheatsheaf Books.

Butteworth, R. (1976), Managing Interstate Disputes, 1945-1974. Pittsburgh, Pa: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Carnevale, P. and S. Arad (1 999, Bias and Impartiality in International Mediation. Boulder Co. London: Lynne Press.

Charles, D. (2004), Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History with Documents (5th Edition) Bedford: St Martin's, Boston.

Cox, R. and H. Jacobson (1993), The Anatomy oflnfluence. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Craig, Gordon. A. and George, Alexander (1 995), Force and StatecraJ: Diplomatic Problem of our Time (3rded.). New York: Oxford University Press.

Deutsch, M. (1973), The Resolution of Conflict. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Dietrich, J. (2004), The Middle East and Palestine: Global Politics and Regional Conflict. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Edkins, J. (1999), Post Structuralism and International Relations: Bringing the Politics Back. Boulder CO. London: Lynne Press.

Edmead, F. (1 971), Analysis and Prediction in International Mediation. New York: UNITAR Study.

Elazar, Daniel. J. (1994), Federalism and the Way to Peace. Kingston, Ontario: Queen's University Institute of Intergoxernmental Relations. Festinger, L. (1 964), Conflict, Decision and Dissonance. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Fromkin, David (1989), Great Powers in Middle East Crises. New York: Harper and Row.

Gulliver, P. H. (1979), Disputes and Negotiations: Cross-Cultural Perspectives. New York: Academic Press.

Jackson, E. (1952), Meeting of Minds. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Jacob, Bercovitch. (2004), Understanding Mediation 's Role in Preventive Diplomacy. New Zealand, Canterbury: University of Canterbury Press.

Julius, W.P. (1965), History of United States Foreign Policy. Prentice-Hall: Englewood Cliffs, N. J.

Kressel, K. and D.G. Pruitt (1989), Conclusion: A Research Perspective on the Mediation of Social Conflicts. San Francisco: Jossey Bass.

Kressel, K. (1972), Labour Mediation: An exploratory Survey. New York: Association of Labour Mediation Agencies.

Kriesberg, L. (1992), International Conflict Resolution: The US-USSR and Middle East Cases. New Heaven: Yale University Press.

Lall, A. (1 966), Modern International Negotiation. New York: Columbia University Press.

Merritt, Richard. L.and Zinnes, A. (1991), "Democracies and War". New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.

Mitchell, C. (1 98 I), Peacemaking and the Consultant's Role. Hampshire: Gower Press.

Modelski, G. (1 964), International Settlement of Internal Wars. .Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Northedge, F. S. and M. Donelan (1971), International Disputes: The Political Aspects. ori id on: Europa Publications.

Ovendale, R. (1 992), The Origin of the Arab-Israeli Wars. New York: Longman, Press.

Pruitt, D. (1981), Negotiation Behavior. New York: Academic Press.

Randle, R. F. (1973), The Origins of Peace. New York: The Free Press. Raphael, Israeli (2003), Islamikaze: Manifestations of Islamic Martyrology. Frank Cass: London Press.

Rodinson, M. (1968), 'Israeli: The Options' in George Kenton and George Schwar Zenberger (eds.), The Year Book of World Affairs. London: Stevens and Sons.

Rosen,S. J. (1980), The Logic of International Relations. Cambridge: Massachusetts, Wintrop Publications Inc.

Rubenberg, Cheryl (2003), The Palestinians: In Search of a Just Peace. Lynne: Rienner Publishers, Boulder, Colorado.

Simltin, William (1971), Mediation and the Dynamics of Collective Bargaining. Washington: Bureau of National Affairs.

Spiegal, S. and K. Waltz. (1 971), Conflict in World Politics. Cambridge: Massachusetts Wintrop Publishers.

Stoessinger, J. (1982), Why Nations go to War (3rd ed.). New York: St Martins Press Inc.

Susskind, L. and J. Cruikshank (1987), Breaking the Impasse. New York: Basic Books.

Touval, S. (1992), Peace Brokers: Mediators in the Arab-Israeli Conflict. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press.

Toynbee, R. (1 956), Palestine: A Group Oppressed. New York: Academic Press.

Tvathail, Gearoido (1 996), Critical Geopolitics: The Politics of Writing Global Space. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.

Waterrnan, S. (1984), 'Involuntary Incorporation: The Case of Israel' in Michael Chilsholm and David Smith (eds). Shared Space, Divided Space: Essays on Conflict and Territorial Organisation. London: Unwin Hyman Press.

Wehr, P. (1979), Conflict Regulation. Boulder, Colo: Westview.

Youn8, Y. (1968), The Politics of Force. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Young, 0. R. (1 967), The Intermediaries: Third Parties in International Crises. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Ziegler, D. (1997), War, Peace and International Politics, (7Ih ed.), New York: Longrnan Press. Journal Articles

Akehurst, M. (1980), 'The Place of the Palestine in an Arab-Israeli Peace Settlement.' The Round Table. Vol. 2. No.3.

Ashley, Richard K. and Walker R. B. (1990), "Conclusion: Crisis and the Question of Sovereignty in International Studies." International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 34, No.3.

Benard R. and E. Cancy (1977), "Peace Plans and Proposals for the Arab-Israeli Conflict" Middle East Review, vol. 10. No. 2. pp7-17.

Bercovitch, J. (1985), "Third Parties in Conflict Management". International Journal of Conflict Management, vol. 4. No.2.

Bercovitch, J. (1986), "International Mediation: A study of the Conditions and Strategies of Successful Mediations", Cooperation and Conflict, 2 1: 155- 168.

Bremer, S. (1993), "Advancing the Scientific Study of War", Journal of Internationul Mediations, vol. 2. No. 2.

Brett, J., R. Driege, and D. Shapiro. (1 986), "Mediator Style and Mediation Effectiveness". Journal of International Relations, vol. 2. No. 4.

Brockner, J. (1982), "Factors Affecting Entrapment in Escalating Conflicts", Jotrr~trlof Research in Personality, vol. 2. No.4.

Brookmire, D. and F. Sistrunk. (1980), "The Effects of Perceived Ability and Impartiality of Mediator and Time Pressure on Negotiation", Journal of Conflict Resolution 24: 3 1 1-327.

Burton, J. W. (1972), "The resolution of Conflict", International Studies Quarterly, 16: 5-29.

Carnevale, P. (1986), "Strategic Choice in Mediation". Negotiation Journal, 2: 41-56.

Childers, E.B. (1968), 'Palestine: The Broken Triangle' Journal of International Affnirs, vol. 19,No. 1.

David, H. (1979), "Israeli- Palestinian Issues: What Next?'Jozwnal of Internationul Relutions, vo1.2 No. 4.

Donald A. Sylvan, Jonathan W. Keller and Yoram 2. Haftel (2004), 'Forecasting Israeli- Palestinian Relations'. Journal of Peace Research, vol. 41, No. 4. Dryzek, J. and S. Hunter. (1987), "Environmental Mediation for International Problems" International Studies Quarterly, 3 1: 87- 102.

Ebban, E. (1979), 'Camp David-The Unfinished Business'. Foreign AfSairs Journal, Vol. 52, No. 2.

Fisher, R. (1 983), "Third Party Consultation as a Method of Inter-Group Conflict Resolution." Journal of Conflict Resolution, 27: 301-344.

Fisher, R. (1994), "Generic Principles for Resolving Inter-Group Conflict." Journal of Social Issues, 50: 47-65.

Freid, D. (1976), "Conditions Affecting the Effectiveness of International Mediation." Peace Science Society (International) Papers 26: 67-84.

Gartzke, Erik (1998),"Can't We All Just Get Along? Opportunity, Willingness, and the Origins of the Democratic Peace." The American Journal of Political Science, 42: 1-27.

Ghada Hashem Talhami, (2000), The Modern History of Islamic Jerusalem: Academic Myths and Propaganda, Volume VII: No. 2.

George, Corm (1999), "Palestine: When Will the Injustice End?" Journal of International Relations, 44: 12-25.

Harbottle, M. (1 979), "The Strategy of Third Party Intervention in Conflict Situations." Iir~ernationulJournal of Peace, 35: 118-1 3 1.

Hiltrop, J. M. (1952), "Mediator Behavior and the Settlement of Collective Disputes." Journal of Social Issues, 41 : 83-1 00.

John, P. (1988), 'The Economics of Israeli Occupation', Christian Science Monitor

Johnson, M. (1975), 'Middle East: Is Time Running Out?' The World Today, RIIA, Vol. 3 1. No. 6.

Karim, A. and R. Pegnetter (1983), "Mediator Strategies, Qualities and Mediation Effectiveness." Journal of Industrial Relations, 22: 105-1 14.

Kochan, an and T. Jick (1978), "A theory of Public Sector Mediation Process." Journd of Conflict Resolution, vol. 22. N0.2.

Kolb, D. (1983), "Strategy and Tactics of Mediation." Human Relations, 36: 247-268.

Lake, A. (1992), "Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War." The American Political Science Review, 86: 24-37. Landsberger, H. (1 960),"The Behaviour and Personality of the Labour Mediator." Journal of Personnel Psychology, 13: 329-48.

Lilienthal, S. (1982), "The Palestinian Question: Issues Unresolved." Journcrl of Peace, vol. 1. No. 2.

Mack, R. and R. Snyder (1957), 'The Analysis of Social Conflict." Journal of Conflict Resolution. Vol. 1. No. 2. : 212-215.

Maoz, Z. and Abdulali, N. (1989), "Regime Types and Intemational Conflict, 1816-1976." International Studies Quarterly, 33:3-35.

Mark, Clyde (2005), "Israel: US Foreign Assistance" DC Congressional Research Service.

Meir, A. B. (1977), 'Psychological Dimension of the Arab-Israeli Conflict.' A World AB r ir s Monthly, vol. 72. No. 4.

Meyer, A. (1960), "Functions of the Mediator in Collective Bargaining." I~i~lu~triulurid Labour. Relations Review, 13: 156- 165.

Onuoha, J. (2005), "United States and the Road to Peace in the Middle East." University of Nigeria Jozrrrzal of Political Economy, vol. 1 .No. 1.p.189.

Ott, M. C. (1 972), "Mediation as a Method of Conflict Resolution." Internationcrl Organizcrlion 26: 595-618.

Pruitt, D. and D. Johnson (1970), "Mediation as an. Aid to Face Saving in Negotiation." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, vol. 2. No.4: 239-246.

Raymond, G.A. and C.W. Kegley (1985), "Third Party Intervention and Intemational Norms." Conflict Management and Peace Sciences, 9: 33-5 1.

Rosen, S. J. (1978), 'A Skeptical View.' Commentary, Vol. 66. No. 1. p. 46-52.

Rostow, V. (1992), "The Legal Context of the Middle East Peace Talks." Journal of Peace Research, 32: 34-36.

S11olm0, #. (1978), 'Peace Making: The Arab-Israeli Conflict.' Foreign Affairs, vol. 57. No. 1.

Stebbing, J. (1979), 'The Creation of a Palestinian Arab State as Part of Middle East Settlement.' Journal ofInternationa1 Relations, vol. 6. No. 3. pp. 507-517.

Strom, M. (1979), "For A Permanently Neutral Democratic Arab State Bound By An Austria- Like Treaty." New Outlook, vol. 21, No. 3 P 43-48. Touval, S. (1 979, "Biased Intermediaries: Theoretical and Historical Considerations." Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, vol. 1. No. 4.

Tucker, R. M. (1978), 'The Middle East: For A Separate Peace.' Commentary, Vol. 65. No. 3. pp. 25-3 1.

Wall, J. (1981), "Mediation: An Analysis, Review and Proposed Research." Journal of Conflict Resolution, 3: 157-158.

Wallensteen, P. and M. Sollenberg (1995), "After the Cold War: Emerging Patterns of Armed Conflict 1989-1994," Journal of Peace Research, 32: 345-360.

Yigal, A. (1978), 'Israel and the Palestinians.' Jerusalem, Quarterly Vol. 6.

Zartman, I. W. and S.Touva1(1985), "International Mediation: Conflict Resolution and Power Politics." Journal of Social Issues, 41 : 27-45.

Zunes, Steven (2003), "U.S Aid to Israel: Interpreting the Strategic Relationship" American Journal of Political Science, vol. 2. No. 2.

Official Document

Ghali, Boutros, B. (1992), Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacernaking, and Pence Keeping. New York: United Nations.

Newspapers and Magazines

Ashley Dunn, "Bush Gives Palestinians Hope." Times Magazine, November, 2002.

David Carl, "Haniya 'Attacks' Olmert." The Guardian, London, March 3 1,2006,

George Jill, "Reagan Seals Palestine Hope." New York Times, November 8, 1982.

0 Susan Givens, "Israel/Palestine: Will This Initiative Work?" Le Monde, Nov.3-4, 1991.

Sydney Starr, "Rice Warns Terrorists." New York Tribune, February 1,2006.

Walter Higgins, "U.S.: The World Is Watching" New York Times, March 2001 William Young, "The Middle East ~ndAmerica." The Economist, London, March 23rd,2002.

Internet Materials

American Israeli Public Affairs Committee, internet, http//www.aipac.org

'A Peace Process' Oslo Accords', internet, http://www.cnn.Com/interactive/Specials/OO07/undeast.documents/os/o.htm/accened 27/6/03

Arab-American Anti Discrimination Committee, internet, http//www.adc.org

Bard, Mitchell (2006), "U.S. Aid To Israel," internet, http:// www.unitedstates assistance to Israel

Clyde, Mark (2005), "U.S. Aid to the Palestinians," internet, http://usaid.gov/wbg/budget.htm].

'Israeli Settlements', internet, http://www.cnn.Com/interactive/specials/007/mideast.Issue/refugeeshtm/accessed 29/7/03

'Middle East International: The Role of the EU in the Peace Process and its Future Assistance to the Middle East', Internet, http://www.medea.be/enlindex259.htm accessed 11/7/03

"Nasser Speech To The Egyptian National Assembly" http://www.israelpalestinian.procon.org/violence/ 1967nasserspeech.htm

'Our Position,' Zionist Organisation of America, http//ww.zoa.org accessed 15/03/03

'Return of Palestinian Refugees', internet, http://ww.cnn.Com/interactive/specials/0007/mideastissue/refugees.htm/accessed 29/7/03

'The W'ye River Accord', internet, http://www.cnn.Com/interactive/specials/OOO7mideast. Documents/Why.htm/accessed 27/7/03 http://ww.cnn.Com/interactive/specials/007mideast.Time/24.Htdaccessed 30/07/03 'United States Relations With Israel And Palestine,' internet, http://www.pcusa.org/worldwide/israelpalestine/resources.htm

'US Taking More Active Role In Middle East Peace Talks', internet, http:/www:foxnews.com.fn.99.World/Israelroder 041900.Sm/accessed 12/03/03.

'What should be the Role of US in the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict?' Internet, http://www.Ear/ham.edu/Po/s/Ps/797l /ashram/index.htm/accessed 15/03/03. APPENDIX1

US. Assistance to Israel

(millions of dollars)

------. - - . -. -- - - - I I lAmerican !Export- Jewish Schools

Import Refugee Housing I & Cooperative

Food for I

Economic Peace 1Bank tesettlement Loan Hospitals Other Development* Other - "------* ------.- - .. - .- - .- . ------. . - Year Total Loan Grant Loan Grant Loan Grant[Loan Grant ,Guarantee Grant Loan Grant Grant ------., -- - 1949 100.0

2005 2,630.0 2006 proposed 2,630.0 TOTAL 96,765.60 1 1,2 * = Less than $1 00,000 ' ** = CCC Loan

*** = Desalt Plant

+Israel received an additional $28 million in counter terror hdsin 2002.

# = Includes $1.92 billion in regular military assistance and $1.2 billion for implementation of the Wye Agreement.

@ = ESF was earmarked for $960 millon for FY2000 but was reduced to meet the 0.38% recision.

## = Money for counterterrorism that must be spent in U.S.

A = Congress voted to cut foreign aid across the board by 0.65%.

TQ = Transition Quarter, when U.S. fiscal year changed from June to September.

Sources: Clyde R.Mark, "Israel: U.S. Foreign Assistance," Congressional Research Service, (July 12,2004); U.S. State Department; USAID, Congressional Budget Justification for FY06 Foreign Operations, March 2005 Appendix I1

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1435

*-United Nations Security Council United Nations Security Council Resohtion , Resolutions 1435 by the United N(1fio1rs

Adopted by the Security Council at its 4614th meeting, by a vote of 14 to 0, with 1 :~hstention(United States), on 23 September 2002

'The Security Council,

Ketrffirniing its resolutions 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973, 13972002) of 12 March 2002,1402 (2002) of 30 March 2002 and 1403 (2002) of 4 April 2002, ;is well as the statements of its President, of 10 April 2002 and 18 July 2002,

?eiteratirzg its grave concern at the tragic and violent events that have taken place since September 2000 and the continuous deterioration of the situation,

ibrrclemr~ingall terrorist attacks against any civilians, including the terrorist bombings in lsracl on 18 and 19 September 2002 and in a Palestinian school in Hebron on 17 September 2002,

(3rcively concerned at the reoccupation of the headquarters of the President of thc Paleslinian Authority in the City of Ramallah that took place on 19 September 2002 and demanding its immediate end,

4larrned at the reoccupation of Palestinian cities as well as the severe restrictions imposed on the freedom of moven~entof persons and goods, and gravely concerned at the hun~anilariancrisis bcing faced by the Palestinian people,

Reiterating the need for respect in all circumstances of international humanikirian law, including the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949,

1. Reiternres its demand for the complete cessation of all acts of violence, including all acts of lerror, provocation, incitement and destruction;

2. Dcmnncls that Israel immediately cease measures in and around Ramallah including the destruction of Palestinian civilian and security infrastructure; 3. Dernunds ulso the expeditious withdrawal of the Israeli occupying forces from Palestinian cities towards the return to the positions held prior to September 2000,;

4. Cdls on the Palestinian Authority to meet its expressed commitment to ensure that those responsible for terrorist acts are brought to justice by it;

5. Expresses its fhll support for the efforts of the Quartet and calls upon the Government of Israel, the Palestinian Authority and all States in the region to cooperate with these efforts and recognizes in this context the continuing importance of the initiative endorsed at the Arab League Beirut Summit;

6.Decides to remain seized of the matter.

,_I---- .,- -.------*p-.----.-*4-*-.*------.,-... -- I This work is excerpted from an official document of the United Nations. The policy of 1I this organisation is to kecp most of its documents in the public domain in ordcs to , disseminate "as widely as possible the ideas (contained) in the United Nations I I! I Publications". I

I Pursuant to UN Administrative Instruction ST/AI/l89/Add.9/Rev.2 available in English 1 only, these documents are in the public domain worldwide: ;I I I i@ 1. Official records (proceedings of conferences, verbatim and summary records. ...) i ; i 2. United Nations documents issued with a UN symbol iI I I 3. Public information material designed primarily to inform the public about lJnited 1 I Nations activities (not includingpublic information material tho! is oflredfir [ ; sale, which, if in the public clomnin in the Utiited Stntes due to no copyright 1 i renewul or notice as required, should be instead tagged J{PD-US-~~-I.~~C'II~LII~)or i 1 i f {PD-US-no-noticell). I 1 I ! -I--- p-w-7 . -.-.-I Retrieved from "http://en.wikisource.ordwiki/lJnited Nations Security Council Resolution 1435"