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Superpower Relations and the Cold War, 1941-1991

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SUPERPOWER RELATIONS AND THE COLD WAR, 1941-1991 1 CONTENTS Quizzes & Completed Flowchart exam qu. quizzes 1: The origins of the Cold War, 1941-58 1.1a The Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam conferences 4 21 65 1.1b The creation of the Soviet sphere of influence 5 24 67 1.2a The Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan 6 26 68 1.2b The Berlin Crisis, 1948-49 7 29 70 1.3a The development of the nuclear arms race 8 32 72 1.3b Peaceful coexistence in the 1950s 9 34 73 1.3c The Hungarian Uprising, 1956 10 36 74 2: Cold War crises, 1958-70 2.1 The Berlin Crisis, 1958-63 11 39 76 2.2a The Bay of Pigs invasion, 1961 13 42 78 2.2b The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962 14 45 80 2.3 The Prague Spring, 1968 15 48 82 3: The end of the Cold War, 1970-91 3.1 Détente 16 51 84 3.2a The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 17 54 86 3.2b Ronald Reagan and the ‘second’ Cold War 18 57 88 3.3a Gorbachev’s ‘New Thinking’ 19 59 89 3.3b The end of Soviet control over Eastern Europe 20 62 91 Practice 8-mark exam questions 93 2 Every week, you need to complete your History homework: MUST Test yourself on the week’s quiz questions by: • Writing the answers from memory in the ‘Attempt 1’ column • Checking the correct answer, and marking/correcting your answer in red pen SHOULD Answer the practice exam question for the week’s topics. COULD 1. Revise previous week’s quiz questions. 2. Practice answering one of the exam questions at the back of this booklet. 3. Ask for additional reading from your teacher on a recent topic. 3 THE CONFERENCES DECISIONS MADE 1.1a: THE GRAND 1. The USA and Britain agreed to open a ‘second front’ by launching an ALLIANCE, 1941- The Tehran Conference attack against Nazi Germany in Western Europe. This forced the 45 (November 1943) Germans to move troops from Eastern Europe, which helped the USSR. The Grand Alliance met in Tehran to plan a strategy 2. Stalin agreed to help the USA fight Japan by supplying Soviet soldiers, to win the Second World War and defeat Nazi but only once Nazi Germany was defeated and the war in Europe over. Germany and its allies. Stalin was concerned that CAUSES Britain and America were delaying opening a 3. Agreed their aim was to ensure that Nazi Germany was defeated, and ‘second front’ against Nazi Germany in Western the country should remain weak after the war. The Second World Europe. He was currently suffering heavy losses War (1939-41) fighting the Nazis in Eastern Europe and wanted to 4. Agreed that an international organisation should be set up to use relieve the pressure on his army (4 million German negotiations and discussions to settle disputes, instead of war. The war broke out in soldiers had invaded the USSR in June 1941). September 1939. In 1941, 5. Agreed Poland would receive land from Germany after the war, and America and the USSR the USSR could keep land it had seized from Poland. entered the war on the side of Britain. They The Yalta Conference 1. Germany’s division into four zones of occupation after the war, each run formed the Grand (February 1945) by either the USA, USSR, Britain or France, was discussed Alliance against Nazi The ‘Big Three’ held a second conference in Yalta. Germany and its allies 2. Germany would pay reparations totalling £20 billion – half of this would By this time, it was clear that Germany was losing the (e.g. Japan). Franklin D. go to the USSR. The Nazi Party would be abolished. Roosevelt (USA), Winston war. The aim of the meeting was to decide how Churchill (GB) and Josef Europe would be governed after the war. While 3. Stalin agreed that the future governments of countries in Eastern Stalin (USSR) came to be many agreements were made, some Europe would be decided in free, democratic elections. known as the “Big disagreements arose: Three”. A series of • Poland: Stalin expected elections to a pro-communist 4. The borders of Poland would be returned to their 1921 position in 1921, Polish government, but Churchill supported the non- conferences took place giving the Soviet Union more territory. communist London Poles politicians (exiled in London between the allies. from 1939). • UN: Not all 16 Soviet republics could join the UN, only 5. The United Nations would be set up as a peace-making organisation. The PotsdamRussia, Belarus Conference and Ukraine. 6. Stalin would support the US against Japan 3 months after Germany’s defeat. (July-August 1945) The situation had changed dramatically by the time the Potsdam Conference was held: Agreement (Germany): Germany and Berlin were divided into four • Roosevelt died in April 1945 and was replaced by President Harry S. Truman. zones of occupation (even though Berlin was in the Soviet zone). The • Churchill had lost the general election in 1945 and was replaced by Prime Minister Clement Attlee. economy was run as a whole. • Germany had completely surrendered in May 1945. • The USA had developed, and tested, an atomic bomb. Disagreement (Poland): Truman did not agree with the changes to • Soviet soldiers were occupying large areas of Eastern Europe, which they had freed Poland’sDisagreement border (Reparations) and giving the: Truman USSR didmore not territory want to (agreed weaken at Germany, Yalta). from Nazi rule. whereas Stalin wanted to place heavy reparations on the country. It While agreements were made, further disagreements arose between the Grand Alliance, was agreed that each occupier would take reparations from its own increasing tensions between them. Truman was suspicious of Stalin’s aims for Eastern zone. As the USSR was in charge of the poorest zone, they could take a Europe, and he thought the atom bomb could be used as leverage. quarter of the industrial equipment from the other zones. 4 1.1b: THE SOVIET ‘SPHERE OFEVENTS INFLUENCE’ (1945-48) CONSEQUENCES The Novikov Telegram (September 1946) CAUSES THE CREATION OF THE Nikolai Novikov was a Soviet SOVIET ‘SPHERE OF politician working in Washington. America as a nuclear In September 1946, he sent a power (1945) INFLUENCE’ Kennan’s ‘long telegram’ telegram to Stalin saying that: (1945-48) (February 1946) • The USA wanted to use their On 6th and 9th August 1945, the military power to control the USA exploded atom bombs over Stalin’s main aim after the Second World War George Kennan was America’s world. the Japanese cities of Hiroshima was to ensure the USSR was secure ambassador in Moscow. As Stalin • Americans no longer wanted and Nagasaki, which killed (protected). He was determined to create a was setting up communist to cooperate with the Soviet 120,000 Japanese civilians. “buffer zone” of communist countries governments in Eastern Europe, Union. America was the only country between Germany and the Soviet Union. As Kennan sent a telegram to with nuclear weapons and they a result, the Eastern European counties freed President Truman in February had shown how powerful these from the Nazis by the Soviets were turned into 1946 giving his views about Soviet Increased tensions were. This made Stalin feel satellite states which had communist actions. He reported that: threatened and more governments and were controlled by Stalin • Stalin wanted to destroy Stalin and Truman became more determined to ensure the security and the USSR. The methods used to do so capitalism. suspicious of one another. It was (protection) of the USSR. were undemocratic. By 1948 all countries in • The Soviet Union would back clear that both the USA and the Eastern Europe, except Greece, were down if America put up strong USSR had different aims for communist and in the Soviet ‘sphere of resistance. Europe after the war. Neither side trusted what the other was influence’. aiming to do. The impact of the Second • Czechoslovakia: In February 1948, non- Churchill’s ‘Iron Curtain’ World War communists were removed from power speech and a communist government was set up The Truman Doctrine • The USSR suffered severe losses (March 1946) that was loyal to the USSR. Other political during the Second World War (March 1947) parties were banned. Churchill visited the USA and (27 million deaths). The war was Truman eventually committed • Poland: After rigged elections in 1947, non- gave a speech in Fulton, Missouri. the second time Russia had the US to ‘containment’ – communist politicians were forced to flee He was no longer prime minister, been invaded by Germany in preventing the spread of Poland or face imprisonment. Poland too but was still a respected the early-20th century. communism (see next page). became a communist country. politician. In response to the • In 1944 and 1945, the Soviet • Bulgaria: Communists won the 1945 expansion of communism in The USSR was more Red Army freed many countries elections. They then executed leaders of Eastern Europe, he accused determined in Eastern Europe from the the other parties, turning Bulgaria into a Stalin of threatening world peace Nazis, as it advanced towards The Soviet Union became even completely communist state. and freedom and causing Germany. Stalin was therefore more determined to establish a Europe to be divided. in a position to keep control of ‘sphere of influence’, following these countries after the war. the increased tensions with the West. Stalin felt even more that he needed security from the West. 5 CAUSES 1.2a: THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE AND MARSHALL PLAN CONSEQUENCES The Soviet takeover of Stalin’s reaction to the Eastern Europe Why did President Truman begin a policy of containment in 1947? Marshall Plan By 1947, the USSR had • Truman was suspicious of Stain’s aims.
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