THE BIOLOGY OF MARIO CANELLA: SCIENCE, POLITICS, AND RACISM IN THE

AGE OF ITALIAN FASCISM

Giovanni Bisi

Submitted to the faculty of the University Graduate School in partial fulfillment to the

requirements

For the degree

Master of Arts

in the Department of History and Philosophy of Science and Medicine

Indiana University

July 2021

ii

Accepted by the Graduate Faculty, Indiana University, in partial fulfillment of the requirements

for the degree of Master of Arts.

Master's Thesis Committee

______

Sander Gliboff, Ph.D.

______

Domenico Bertoloni Meli, Ph.D.

______

Elisabeth Lloyd, Ph.D.

iii Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my advisor, Dr. Sander Gliboff, for his aid and advice; the staff of the

Biblioteca di Santa Maria Delle Grazie (University of Ferrara, Italy), for their invaluable aid in

helping retrieve original sources despite the limitations of the pandemic; and my family for

always being there for me.

iv Giovanni Bisi

The Biology of Mario Francesco Canella: Science, Politics and Racism in the Age of Italian

Fascism

Mario Francesco Canella was an Italian scientist active primarily before and during the Italian fascist period and the second world war. His writing is notable for an early period dedicated to a firm defense of Lamarckism and opposition to Darwinism, followed by an abrupt shift beginning in the 1940s to an almost exclusive focus on racial science and eugenics. Following the end of the war, his writing shifts again to a much narrower focus on microzoology, and does not revisit either of his earlier themes. At first, these shifts appear driven purely by political considerations, hinting that Canella repeatedly modified and abandoned his views to fit changing political climates. However, while his second shift away from racial science shows evidence of this being the case, the two other periods demonstrate much stronger theoretical links, and the original shift into racial science is much more firmly rooted in beliefs expressed within Canella’s earlier writing.

v Table of Contents

Acceptange Page ...... ii

Acknowledgements ...... iv

Abstract ...... iv

Introduction ...... 1

Mario Canella’s Early Biology ...... 5

Mario Canella’s Racial Theory ...... 29

Mario Canella’s Late Biology ...... 40

Responses ...... 42

Analysis and Conclusions ...... 44

Bibliography ...... 57

Curriculum Vitae

vi Introduction

Mario Francesco Canella was an Italian biologist active during the early and middle twentieth century, beginning published activity early in the 1930s and continuing until his retirement in the 1970s. Canella followed a very unusual career path, establishing himself as a late supporter of Lamarckian theory and a critic of Darwinism, and later of the genetic theory of natural selection. This holdout of Lamarckism as far as the mid-twentieth century is in itself worthy of analysis, but becomes particularly interesting in light of how, with the rise of fascism,

Canella involved himself into the racial theory and racism that came to dominate Italian academic thought until the end of World War Two. This shift is made most notable by the fact that the scientific racism of the early and middle twentieth century was deeply rooted in social

Darwinism – Darwinism of the very same kind that Canella originally rejected.

Canella was, at the time of his most active writing, a figure of not inconsiderable reputation in the field of Italian racial science. His writings were some of the most extensive studies of racial science performed by a single author and were widely read and cited, ultimately leading to an invitation to join the General Directory for Demography and Race as an advisor in anthropological matters. Despite this, secondary literature on Canella and his work is severely lacking, leading to a very limited overview of an influential figure in the development of Italian racial psychology. In addition, Canella’s academic history serves as an illustrative case study of the interaction between independent research and political influence, both in terms of how shifting political climates can facilitate the growth of preexisting research along specific and potentially dangerous lines and in terms of how researchers can come to consciously alter their stances and beliefs to reflect the political order of the day.

1 This paper’s purpose will thus be twofold. Firstly, it will explore the chronological development of Canella’s writings, in order to provide a clear picture of the various stages and applications of his beliefs at different times. This will serve to both prepare for the second aim and to create a cohesive summary of Canella’s life and beliefs. Secondly, it will analyze this development and attempt to determine how, or if, these different stages, as well as the contradiction between his effective social Darwinism and his vocal anti-Darwinism, can be reconciled to one another. The picture that emerges from this analysis is a complex one, showing the development of an academic who, over the course of his career, became highly compromised by political pressures, but whose transition into racial science was most probably greatly eased by the establishment of psychologically-driven racial theory in Italian academia.

Mario Francesco Canella was born in Venice in 1898. He was part of a family of limited wealth and entered the working force early in his life, enlisting as a cabin boy on merchant ships which traded throughout the Mediterranean. In this period of employment he expanded the boundaries of his world, heading to India on three occasions. In his retrospective on Canella’s life, Luigi Boscolo attributes a lifelong sense of curiosity and observation to these early exposures to the wider world.1

Canella moved with his family to Bologna during World War I, where he continued to work while pursuing his studies. He graduated from Liceo Scientifico “Augusto Righi” in 1926 and afterwards enrolled in the University of Bologna’s Natural Science program, where he studied under Ercole Giacomini, a professor of vertebrate anatomy whom he greatly admired. In addition to the program’s courses, he also followed classes in the school’s departments of Medicine,

1 Luigi Boscolo, “Ricordo di Mario Francesco Canella (1898-1982)”, Annali del Museo Civico di Storia Naturale di Ferrara vol. 9/10 (2006-2007), 5-27

2 Letters and Philosophy. Canella graduated magna cum laude in Natural Sciences in 1931 and, in

1933, earned a degree in Medicine with the same honors.2

An interim period followed where Canella turned down a number of university and medical positions, and during 1936 and 1937 spent time journeying through Europe to visit zoos, botanical gardens and museums in Switzerland, France, Belgium, Holland, and England. In

1937, he accepted a position as lecturer of comparative anatomy at the University of Bologna, where he served as a secondary lecturer to the primary titular of the department, Prof. Pasquale

Pasquini. Canella remained attached to the University of Bologna until the closing stages of

World War II, after which he moved to Ferrara and obtained a post as a professor of zoology in the city’s university. He eventually became director of Ferrara’s Civic Museum of Natural

History, which he reorganized, expanded and modernized. Simultaneously, he joined the faculty of the University of Ferrara, and received the Italian Medal of Merit for Culture and Art in 1972 for his contributions to the field of biology.3 He remained active within the University until

1973, whereafter he retired from teaching duties but remained the director of the university’s museum. He retired from this duty in 1978, and died in 1982 at the age of eighty-four.4

Mario Canella’s literature can be broadly divided into three periods: an early one, preceding the second world war; a middle, taking place during the conflict; and a late, covering the remainder of his career. The early period is marked by a combination of anatomical studies of animals and by theoretical writings on anatomy, biology, Darwinism, and Lamarckism. Racial theory and human biology instead dominate the middle period. Finally, the late period focuses on studies and descriptions of microorganisms, particularly ciliates, and on commentaries on Italy’s

2 Ibid. 3 Benevelli, di Luigi. “PSICHIATRIA E RAZZISMI Storie e Documenti Di Luigi Benevelli.” Mario Canella: Non Solo i Neri Ma Anche i Gialli, www.psychiatryonline.it/node/5364 4 Boscolo, “Ricordo di Mario Francesco Canella”.

3 museums and schooling system. Each of these stages will be given specific analysis in the following sections.

4

Mario Canella’s Early Biology

Over his early career, Mario Canella was deeply involved in discussions concerning the biological sciences. He taught courses of microzoology, herpetology, and comparative anatomy, and wrote extensively on these matters. In addition to descriptive tracts on these subjects,

Canella authored a number of works discussing the theoretical underpinnings and methodological issues of the life sciences, chiefly anatomy, genetics, and evolution, such as

L’Anatomia Comparata nel Quadro della Biologia Moderna and Orientamenti della moderna

Biologia. Notable here are his attempts to redefine and reevaluate comparative anatomy in an attempt to modernize it, his defense of Neolamarckism, and his critiques of contemporary genetic and Darwinist theories. Some of these subjects are, in context, seemingly incongruous, while others are much more readily identifiable with the discussions of their times.

During the 1930s and 1940s, comparative anatomy had fallen into sharp decline in

Italian, and more generally European, scholarship. The discipline enjoyed an early establishment in Italian universities, with the first Italian teaching position on the subject being established in

Naples in 1907 to Giosuè Sangiovanni. It afterwards saw active pursuit in Italian institutions;

Giovanni Battista Grassi, professor of comparative anatomy at the University of Rome, became a particularly active voice in the field through publications such as an extensive monograph on fish vertebrae and his identification of the leptocephalus as the larval form of the eel.5

Following the publication of Darwin’s theories in the late 1800s, Canella describes evolutionism and comparative anatomy as having merged to form an “evolutionary morphology”

5 Caputo, Vincenzo, “Il ruolo dell’Anatomia comparata nella ricerca e nella didattica universitaria fra ieri e oggi”, Le Scienzi Nautrali Nella Scuola 26 (July 2004): 56-71.

5 where comparative anatomy was used to infer or support evolutionary classifications. Ernst

Haeckel became one of the first to argue that phylogenies needed to be closely derived from evolutionary theory and embryology, and that classifications of and interrelationships between organisms must be rooted in their ancestral relationships. Comparative anatomy thereafter entered a sharp, sudden period of decline. Writing in 1937, Mario Canella identified as causes of this decline the rise of experimentalism and its incompatibility with descriptive anatomy, as well as the crisis of Darwinism that would later be resolved in modern synthesis.6

In 1937, Canella published L’Anatomia Comparata nel Quadro della Biologia Moderna, a work dedicated to determining the causes of comparative anatomy’s seeming decline in prestige and whether it was still a vital branch of the life sciences or if its time was past. The book opens with a description of the state of comparative anatomy as a discipline, noting that, despite having been one of the “fundamental pillars of Biology” as recently as the turn of the century, had fallen from the esteem of academics and was entirely unknown to the “so-called learned” public.7

Canella also notes the removal of comparative anatomy courses from all programs of medicine, surgery and veterinary medicine in the nation, stating this development to have been due to the discipline having come to be considered “needlessly onerous for the cultural and scientific preparation of the doctor”.8 It remained present for degrees of natural sciences and biological sciences, but the latter of these two appeared only “on paper” and was not formally offered to students.9

6 Ibid. 7 Canella, Mario. L’Anatomia Comparata nel Quadro della Biologia Moderna. Casa Editrice Zanichelli, Bologna, 1937. 1. “L’Anatomia comparate, che alle fine del secolo scorso era ancora considerata come uno dei pilastri fondamentali della Biologia, via via è caduta assai in basso nell’estimazione, non diciamo del pubblico cosidetto colto che ne ingora perfino l’esistenza, ma degli stessi biologi, medici e naturalisti.” This and all future translations by author. 8 Ibid, 2. “E così, giudicando l’Anatomia comparate inutilmente gravosa per la preparazione culturale e scientifica del medico, essa è state senz’altro cassata dai programmi dell’insegnamento superiore.” 9 Ibid, 2.

6 One cause of this problem, Canella stated, was a confusion in the meaning of “comparative anatomy” itself, one likely caused by “that unhappy, and grammatically incorrect, label of

‘compared’”, instead of the more grammatically correct “comparative”, which he felt generated confusion about the purpose of the discipline by creating the impression that it was a simple comparison of organs and .10 Canella drew a sharp distinction, here, between descriptive anatomy and comparative anatomy, defining the former as limited to describing organs, systems and tissues, individually and in their connections to one another,11 while the latter “gathers, completes, orders, faces” the materials gathered by descriptive anatomy.12 Provided with these observations, its purpose is to determine the laws of organic life and the processes by which the diversity of modern forms arose, so that “every fact, every observation, every comparison, should gain value insofar as it is referable to a problem of general order”.13

Canella then states that, in order to reestablish itself as a valid scientific discipline, comparative anatomy needed to be distanced from its current descriptive nature. Specifically, he held that its goals needed to be redefined to focus on determining the function of the organs and systems studied and to determine the relationships between the structures found in different organisms. In this manner, comparative anatomy could go from being a simple list of descriptions and observations to a true science dedicated to creating original knowledge.14

10 Ibid, 3. “Vi si contribuisce forse quell’infelice qualifica, gramaticalmente scorretta, di ‘comparata’, quando invece dovrebbe propriamente dirsi ‘comparativa’”. The Italian term for “comparative anatomy”, “anatomia comparata”, translates into English as “compared anatomy”. 11 Ibid, 3-4. “L’Anatomia descrittiva… non si propone che di notomizzare, osservare, descrivere organi, apparecchi, tessuti, sia singolarmente considerati, sia nelle lore reciproche connessioni.” 12 Ibid, 4. “L’Anatomia comparate, per contro, à finalità del tutto diverse: essa raccoglie, completa, ordina, raffronta, con criteri sui propri, i materiali descrittivi relativi al maggior numero di forme.” 13 Ibid, 5. “Per essa ogni fatto, ogni osservazione, ogni comparazione, dovrebbe acquistare un valore in quanto riferibile ad un problema di ordine generale.” 14 Ibid

7 Following this analysis, the book shifts to discussing classifications for the anatomical sciences themselves. Canella here made a distinction between descriptive and comparative anatomy. He defined descriptive anatomy as a basic observation organs or systems, and to be a fundamentally observational discipline. Comparative anatomy was instead envisioned as an investigative field concerned with comparing structures between distinct species, and using this process to determines the origin and purpose of differences between them. In Canella’s proposal, comparative anatomy should be joined with comparative morphology to form a single field he termed biological morphology.15

Canella then discusses and critiques models proposed by other writers, reviewing several in rapid succession. He first covers the Italian translation of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe’s 1795

Erster Entwurf einer allgemeinen Einleitung in die vergleichende Anatomie (Introduzione generale all’Anatomia Comparata), in the 1885 Principi di filosofia zoologica e anatomia comparata. Canella credits Goethe with coining the term “morphology”, but notes that no real distinction is made between morphology and comparative anatomy. The Goethian view of this science is based on the concept of an ideal animal type and the use of observation and comparation to determine the laws governing the organization of animal biology. The purpose of this morphology is the production of a deep and integral understanding of living organisms by means of analysis of their systems.16

Canella then moves to the views expressed by Ernst Haeckel in Generelle Morphologie der

Organismen. Here, Haeckel presented morphology as the general study of external and internal structures of animals and plants, whose purpose is to identify common patterns among organisms

15 Ibid, 5-6 16 Ibid, 8-9

8 and determine the evolutionary relationships by which they arose.17 Louis Vialleton, in the 1911

Morphologie des Vertébrés, used the strict definition of morphology given by Haeckel. He also distinguished various branches with the discipline, such as descriptive anatomy, comparative anatomy, embryology, and histology, but noted a lack of clear distinction between them and that this lack engenders confusion in scientific discussion.18

Lorenzo Camerano (1856-1917), an Italian herpetologist who held the chair of comparative anatomy at the University of Torino and directorship of the university’s museum,19 placed morphology within comparative anatomy in his 1875 Anatomia comparata, a choice that Canella noted as strange, and gave morphology the specific purpose of establishing homologies between organs. The medical anatomist and parasitologist Giovanni Battista Grassi, in the 1920 Alcuni cenni sulla Morfologia animale, reversed this decision. Instead, Grassi argued that comparative anatomy cannot be detached from embryology, paleozoology and similar studies, which he grouped under animal morphology.20

Canella then moves to the1925 Historie de l’Anatomie comparative, authored by the French zoologist and anatomist Joseph Chaine. In this text, Chaine insisted on the synthetic and speculative value of comparative anatomy and on the necessity of revised language. However, he only changed the adjective from “compared” to “comparative” and dissolved it into multiple sub- fields, which Canella noted made for a rather vague picture of Chaine’s morphology.21

17 Ibid, 9 18 Ibid, 10 19 Bacetti, Baccio. “CAMERANO, Lorenzo”, Dizionoario biografico degli italiani, vol. 17, Roma, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana, 1974. https://web.archive.org/web/20071011090629/http://www.torinoscienza.it/accademia/personaggi/apri?obj_id=414. accessed April 12, 2021. 20 Canella, L’Anatomia Comparata nel Quadro della Biologia Moderna. 11 21 Ibid

9 A distinct section is afterwards given to a more in-depth analysis of Gegenbaur, “certainly the most brilliant of the comparative anatomists of the second half of the past century.”22 In

Gegenbaur’s 1859 Grundzüge der vergleichenden Anatomie, morphology is tasked with the study of physical forms, of their microscopic structures and of their development. Canella interprets this to mean that Gegenbaur identified morphology and comparative anatomy with one another as a study of the forms and development of animal bodies and of general theories on these subjects. This field, Gegenbaur held, can be divided into anatomy and embryology, but these are purely descriptive sciences that simply provide raw material for the “higher” one, and

Gegenbaur strongly denies that these two are true sciences.23 These views are reiterated in the

1876 Die Stellung und Bedeutung der Morphologie, where Gegenbaur again holds that anatomy is a true science only when in its comparative form, where it synthetic and not descriptive.24

Another author extensively analyzed in this section is Wilhelm Lubosch, specifically in light of the Handbuch der vergleichenden Anatomie der Wirbeltiere he coauthored in 1931 with Louis

Bolk, Ernst Göppert, and Erich Kallius. Lubosch took a strongly anti-Darwinist stance and blamed Darwinism for comparative anatomy’s troubles. In his view, comparative anatomy had become confused with phylogenesis and the mechanisms of transformation between organisms, and consequently lost credit as a science when Darwinism declined.25

Lubosch separated comparative anatomy and morphology, and further divided morphology from etiology. He relied on Gegenbaur for the first distinction, and based the second on Goethe through work by Schopenhauer influenced by the latter. In so doing, Lubosch attempted to

22 “Conviene ora soffermarci un pò estesamente sul pensiero di GEGENBAUR, certamente il più geniale degli anatomici comparati della seconda metà del secolo scorso.” Ibid 23 Ibid, 11-14 24 Ibid, 14 25 Ibid, 14

10 completely decouple comparative anatomy from causal processes, and to have it instead focus strictly on structural comparisons between organs.26

Etiology is, instead, the study of causes, and would be the realm of genetics and of the mechanisms of organic development. This would serve to isolate the study of evolution from the other fields. Morphology is then presented as the study of the interrelated systems of the organism, their functions and how they relate to one another. “Pure” morphology would encapsulate the entire organism at once, but limitations in human cognition force researchers to focus on isolated organ systems.27

Canella strongly criticized Lubosch’s model. Specifically, he disapproved of its reducing comparative anatomy to a descriptive, rather than analytic, field, arguing that this prevents it from formulating any form of theory or model or doing anything beyond making comparisons of form – Canella, in fact, argued that taken literally, this would even prevent it from claiming that there is a meaning in shared form at all. Thus, Lubosch’s model would reduce comparative anatomy to a strictly descriptive, non-scientific exercise.28 Canella also resisted separating morphology and comparative anatomy, arguing that “Comparative anatomy and morphology must identify with each other, and that the separation of assignments and methods proposed by

Lubosch, instead of aiding, would harm science and thought.”29

Canella then passes to a direct critique of the relationship between comparative anatomy and

Darwinism, and specifically of the use of the former to interpret the evolutionary history and relationship between living organisms. Here, his view is clear and unambiguous. Physical

26 Ibid, 15 27 Ibid, 18-19 28 Ibid, 16-17 29 “Per conto nostro, e ci si perdoni se osiamo tanto, restiamo piu che mai convinti che Anatomia comparata e morfologia devono identificarsi, e che la separazione di compiti e di metodi proposta dal LUBOSCH, nonchè giovare, nuocerebbe alla scienza e al pensiero.” Ibid, 20

11 homologies between different creatures cannot and do not, in any form, imply shared descent, as

“the series of homologous organs established by comparative anatomy do not correspond at all to real genealogical series”.30 Morphology may seem to show a series of gradations between different physical states but, Canella argued, this is only so in the manner in which any range of natural phenomena can be arranged from a least complex state to a most complex one. This, however, he deemed to be purely an artificial form of organization and not something that reflected “the real order of things”, a proposition that he stated to be inadmissible.31 Similarly, paleontology is rejected as potential evidence for a common ancestry of all living beings, and is argued to “say nothing about origin of classes and of orders”. It can provide evidence for short phylogenetic chains, but Canella considered the fossil record to be too fragmentary and incomplete to confirm more extensive relationships or the ultimate origin of any group above the species or genus level.32

At the same time, however, Canella rejected a return to a purely abstract anatomy, where relationships between different organs and organisms are defined only in terms of idealized forms and types. In his view, this system was anachronistic and undesirable. As a strictly formal study of organic archetypes, he felt that comparative anatomy would “contrast so much with the mentality and general direction of the work of contemporary science” that it would simply hold no interest or attraction to the scientists of his day.33 Consequently, he felt that comparative

30 “Le series di organi omologi stabilite dall’Anatomia comparate non corrispondono affato a serie genealogiche reali.” Ibid, 23 31 “di qualsiasi categoria di fenomeni, di stati, di cose, si può fare un ordinamento seriale, partendo da un «minimo» ed arrivando ad un «massimo» … attraverso più o meno numerosi passaggi graduali: ma che in una seriazione siffatta sia rispecchiato l’ordine reale delle cose, che essa ci riveli un sistema «naturale», assolutamente nulla ci autorizza ad ammettere.” Ibid, 23-24 32 Ibid, 24 33 “Una Anatomia comparate così concettualmente e sostanzialmente «formale», constrasterebbe talmente con la mentalità e l’indirizzo generale di lavoro della scienza contemporanea, che essa sarebbe giudicata senza remissione come una disciplina che davvero à fatto il suo tempo.” Ibid, 28

12 anatomy needed to fundamentally reinvent itself and its goals if it was to survive. He proposed potential avenues for it to pursue, such as the possibility that homologies may imply similarities in organogenesis and in the composition and properties of the “germinal protoplasms” from which tissues form. He also noted that, despite the fall in prestige of Darwinism, it would be hasty to entirely reject the concept of transformism. In this regard, he advised simply waiting and suspending judgement until such a time as enough evidence may have been gathered to properly evaluate it.34

The first point of interest in this text is Canella’s positioning of himself within the contemporary literature and debates. This was Canella’s first major published foray in the discussion of comparative anatomy, and the extensive page space dedicated to analyzing and critiquing the views and theories of other writers likely served to establish him as well-read and well-versed in the matter. The specific details of his critiques also help to delineate his own views, in particular his desire to synthetize comparative anatomy and morphology and his resistance to models, such as Lubusch’s, that would further separate them. His conclusions are however noticeably vague in what direction he proposes comparative anatomy to follow in the future. He raises a number of possibilities but does not particularly commit to any of them, and further shies away for even a true rejection of transformism. This marks the beginning of a trend that remained evident in later writings, as Canella tended to believe both that contemporary science was unlikely to fully or even mostly understand the nature of living organisms and that understanding the mechanisms and workings of a process was of secondary importance to acknowledging its existence. Thus, Anatomia Comparata ends on a note that many later texts will share, sharply criticizing existing models and proposing processes by which biology and

34 Ibid, 29

13 evolution could work while hesitating from providing more than tentative guesses for how these theorized processes actually operate.

In 1939, Canella published Orientamenti della moderna Biologia: micromerismo od organicismo? Mutazionismo o lamarckismo? This was another work intended to tackle theoretical concerns about the direction taken by the biological sciences, and is particularly interesting in light of what it shows about Canella’s beliefs regarding genetics and evolutionary science. The book’s first chapter, “Crisi della biologia e sue cause”, reiterates Canella’s concerns regarding a crisis in the biological sciences. A central point in Canella argument is a perceived overemphasis on single causes in modern research, embodied in the search for a single ruling mechanism or process that would govern biological evolution and in a tendency for researchers to assume that their specific field of research, such as genetics, was the lens through which all biology could be understood. Canella argued against unitary theorizing of this sort, seeing it as unfounded, and held that organisms needed to be looked at in their totality, as complexes of interconnected systems and processes, to be understood.35

In the second chapter, “Genetica ed embriologia”, Canella discusses the developing genetic theories of his days and shows considerable skepticism towards the explanatory power of genetic theory. In particular, he was doubtful of the importance assigned to chromosomes, of the distinction between the roles of somatic and germ cells, and of the idea that the genome must be the only ruling factor in heredity and that all transmission of traits must happen through it and through it alone. Canella here favors a model where the cytoplasm and other extranuclear factors

35 Canella, Mario Francesco, Orientamenti della moderna Biologia: micromerismo od organicismo? Mutazionismo o lamarckismo? Casa Editrice Zanichelli, Bologna, 1939, 9-15

14 play a larger role in heredity, and where the needs and developments of the cell and organisms shape the genome rather than the other way around.36

Chapter three, “Genetica e transformismo”, is chiefly an argument against mutationist evolutionary theory. Canella’s chief argument is that the model of natural selection is logically unsound and inherently creationist. The first issue he raises is teleological in nature: essentially, under natural selection, traits arise independently and by chance, before and unrelated to any interaction with the environment. Environmental pressures then simply weed out “monsters”.

Thus, Canella argues, Darwinian evolution assumes that organisms arise by chance with a set of traits that so happens to be suited for their environment instead of these traits being developed in response to experienced conditions. In Canella’s view, this is view is inherently preadaptive in outlook.37

Canella also holds, citing the arguments put forward to this effect by Émile Guyénot in the

1930 publication La Variation et l’Evolution, that Darwinist natural selection can cause changes within a species, but cannot cause a species to change into another one. As natural selection can only mold and shape preexisting traits and weed out “monsters”, it cannot generate entirely new traits (as an example, Canella argues that it is impossible to conceive of “the acquisition of insect wings from a flightless ancestor”38) and thus cannot alter a living being by more than a limited amount. As such, Canella reasoned, that a “casual play of mutations” arising by chance cannot turn a fish into an amphibian, an amphibian into a reptile and so on.39 Thus, he held that strict mutationism must by necessity require the belief that species are fundamentally static things that always existed in largely their present form, eventually leading to no possible origin for life but

36 Ibid. 17-43 37 Ibid, 45-50 38 “È impossible, ad esempio, concepire l’acquisto delle ali degli Insetti da parte di un antenato attero”, Ibidi, 53 39 Ibid, 54

15 “either creation by part of a Demiurge, or self-creation by part of an immanent, omnipotent and intelligent ‘vital force’”.40 Consequently, Darwinism was a highly limited model that inherently led to creationism.41

Having debunked Darwinism to his satisfaction, Canella dedicates the following two chapters, both titled “Visione di un Lamarckismo eclettico”, to developing a model of

Lamarckism suitable for a more modern biology. The chapters’ shared title refers to Canella’s intention of creating an eclectic Lamarckism, abandoning certain concepts he considered dated or unscientific – specifically, he rejects the Lamarckian idea of evolution directed towards increasing perfection and complexity, under the argument that this view leads to seeing evolution as something driven by causes largely decoupled from an organism’s experiences in the environment. The key point that he retains, however, is that alterations in traits and form are driven by the organism’s internal needs and activities. Canella also reiterates his unitarian view of biology, stating that all modes of studying an organism – ecology, taxonomy, embryology, anatomy – must be taken as a synthetic whole in order to study an organism, as using only one by itself would only provide disjointed snapshots of knowledge. However, Canella emphasizes, the organism is not a transcendent system existing as more than the sum of its parts. Instead, his view is simply that all parts must be looked at together to properly picture the whole.42

Canella then turns his attention to the nature of adaptation. He rejects both the creationist view of organisms as perfectly adapted for their conditions and his perceived Darwinism’s view of mutations and adaptation as something entirely unrelated to the environment. Instead, he directs his Lamarckism towards a middle road where traits arise in response to the environment

40 “non rimane altra via, per rendersi conto dell’esistenza di tali organismi ... che la creazione: o creazione da parte di un Demiurgo, o autocreazione da parte di un immanente onnipotente e intelligente «forza vitale»” Ibid, 57 41 Ibid, 57-60 42 Ibid. 63-80

16 but do not necessarily do so successfully; in particular, he argues against Lamarck’s original concept of a constant progression of life’s complexity. While all new traits come into being as a direct product of life’s need to survive, he argues, it is possible for any given trait to emerge in an imperfect manner, or in response to a misdirected need or mistaken drive. Such mistakes in trait-formation are the result of unfit organisms and poorly-adapted traits, which may lead to permanent maladaptation in cases where an organism or species becomes too locked into its current path to adapt back into a fitter and potentially to extinction of the entire lineage. Canella also speculates that life is probably polyphyletic in origin.43

Canella ultimately roots his theories in an inherent “need to survive”, a drive which motivates all living organisms’ attempts to endure and reproduce. He assigns psychological activity a central role in this process, rejecting a purely chemical or mechanistic view of life. He concludes that some form of awareness and desire to endure and spread must be an inherent trait of life, as it seems illogical that living things could have arisen without these traits and only developed them later. He admits that he does not understand how these drives originate or work, but does not consider this an inherent problem; instead, he argues that it is illogical to dismiss as nonexistent everything that cannot readily be analyzed with available methods, and that observing something’s existence should be enough to assure the scientific community that it manifestly exists even if it cannot yet be analyzed and understood.44

In the final chapter before a brief conclusion and summation, “Ereditarietà dei caratteri acquisiti”, Canella discusses the methods by which acquired traits might be passed on from parent to offspring. He argues that a trait cannot be passed down as a self-standing monad, but that an entire complex of reactions must exist to create the visible trait and that this system must

43 Ibid. 81-104 44 Ibid. 81-104

17 be what is transmitted to pass on the trait. He also addresses criticisms leveled against

Lamarckism. To address accusations that Lamarckian emphasis on teleology requires the assumption of some kind of supernal order, he reiterates his stance that this teleology is rooted in the psychology of the organisms themselves and that traits are not always transmitted ideally, logically or well. He also replies to Thomas Hunt Morgan’s claim that, if Lamarckism were true, some evidence of its proposed processes’ workings should be evident by again stating his view that understanding the mechanical whys and wherefores of a process is of secondary importance to discussing its existence of that processes can be seen to exist.45

In many ways, Orientamenti codifies theoretical approaches first seen in Anatomia

Comparata. In particular, the previous tendency towards sweeping theories and little structure becomes acknowledged in the text, where Canella defends this position on the basis that if a process is observed to exist, it is not necessary to also know how it operates to acknowledge its presence. This work also marks the published beginning of Canella’s defense of Lamarckism, alongside explicit criticism of Darwinism. The decline of Darwinist theory was simply taken as a given in Anatomia Comparata, but here Canella attacks it more vigorously and explicitly.

Particularly notable are his beliefs, which would be touched on in later texts as well, that

Darwinist evolution cannot lead to the emergence of new species, and that it inherently leads to creationism. The work also sees a formal delineation of Canella’s rejection of unitary theorizing and of the reduction of natural processes to a single cause or origin; this is spelled out early in the text, and remains evident in successive chapters as he argues against views such as the monophyletic origin of life or of traits being caused by single genes. This book is also Canella’s

45 Ibid. 105-131

18 first formal interaction with the developing field of genetics, which would receive a more thorough analysis in his next major publication.

In 1941, Canella published Genetica, Mutazionismo e Neolamarckismo as a defense of

Lamarckism and a critique of genetic models of evolution. In this text, Canella argues against the growing prevalence of genetic models of mutation and evolution. In his view, such models would only be admissible if the nature of genes and the nature and mechanisms by which mutations happened were fully known and understood. He also held that there was a need to establish for certain that there was true distinction between germ and somatic cells, and that mutations were the only method of creating new species. In Canella’s view, none of this was known with sufficient certainty.46

In the late thirties, there was still much room for theorization on the nature of the mechanisms of inheritance, and Canella here noted the state of the primary theories of the time.

He believed that the possibility of chromatin serving as the carrier of inheritance had been discredited by the time of his writing, but recognized a number of models as still potentially valid. These included a “pearl string” model, where genes would be as-yet unidentified components supported by a chromatin chain; the possibility of chromosomes being very large molecules, with genes being side chains branching from the central chromosome-molecule; and

Goldschmidt’s outright rejection of genes in favor of chromosomes in themselves serving as the hereditary units. Canella also noted speculations on the nature of mutations, including alterations in chemical equilibrium of an organism, qualitative changes of the genes, shifts in the position or nature of the chains of the molecule-chromosome, and mutated genes being stereoisomers of nonmutated ones.47

46 Mario Canella, Genetica, Mutazionismo e Neolamarckismo, 1941 47 Canella, Genetica, Mutazionismo e Neolamarckismo

19 Having established himself within the broader discussions of the period, Canella presents a critique against extensive system-building in fields where the theoretical underpinnings are not well understood, as well as against Darwinism in general. The primary weakness of mutationism, in his view, is that it focuses upon changes to existing traits and thus cannot explain how they first originate. As an example, he argued, mutations can alter an insect wing but cannot create wings from a flightless form. He also noted that when observed in nature, mutations are always negative and harmful and impair the functioning of the creatures and organs they affect.

Consequently, they cannot lead to ordered, adapted systems. Thus, mutation cannot factor into the origin of living beings, and original creatures already provided with various traits must come into existence in some other manner before it can even occur. Due to this, he argued that strict mutationism was inherently creationist in its assumptions.48

Due to the paradox arising from natural selection being, in his judgment, unable to create new forms of organism but of multiple forms of organism demonstrably existing, Canella criticized Darwinian selection as implicitly requiring the existence of two historical periods – one in which “strictly biological, and thus adaptive, factors”49 create primitive forms provided with limbs, organs and other adaptations necessary for life, and a second where these previous factors somehow vanish and ones “without any biological significance, completely incidental”50 replace them.51 In this manner, Canella attempts to display the baselessness of Darwinism by portraying it as so incompatible with biological principles that the only way for it to exist is if some other, more realistic process existed before it and created the modern forms life for it, as natural selection would be unable to do so itself – a ridiculous paradox.

48 Ibid 49 “Fattori stretttamente biologici a quindi adattivi” 50 “Senza alcun significato biologico, del tutto incidentali” 51 Canella, Genetica, Mutazionismo e Neolamarckismo, 1941

20 Genetica can be seen as a mature form of Canella’s early biology, and reiterates many of the rhetorical and theoretical points made in in Orientamenti. In particular, Canella focuses on restating the earlier work’s argument that Darwinism is incompatible with a purely adaptive view of biology and that it leads inherently to creationism. The other major point of the book, his criticism of modern genetic theory, elaborates arguments also seen in Orientamenti. In addition to specific lines of argument, Genetica also continues a strong trend of criticism of and detachment from prevalent scientific trends of the day, as well as a general suspicion of new sciences. The shift in focus from Orientamenti’s more comprehensive overview of the life sciences to Genetica’s narrower focus on genetics and associated evolutionary theories in particular shows a growing preoccupation with, and suspicion of, the then-rapidly developing field of science.

A particularly notable pattern in the bibliography of Canella’s early biological texts is the contrast between Gegenbaur and Lubosch. The two authors are cited extensively throughout

L’Anatomia Comparata, often in direct comparison to one another. Gegenbaur’s proposals for comparative anatomy are presented in a favorable light, despite his Darwinist position otherwise contrasting with Canella’s own views. Indeed, Canella actively argues against a Luboschian argument that Gegenbaur was a more tepid Darwinist than he actually was, holding that

Gegenbaur’s texts show him as a clear and convinced supporter of Darwinist and Haeckelian theory.52 However, Canella also held that Gegenbaur would likely have recanted his views on

Darwinism had he been alive in Canella’s time.53 Lubosch, by contrast, is criticized much more extensively.

52 Canella, L’Anatomia Comparata. “nella parte generale della seconda edizione dei Grundzüge (1870), lo si trova già convinto darwinista e haeckeliano.” 22 53 Ibid, 28

21 Central to this contrast is the classification and subdivision of comparative anatomy.

Gegenbaur’s model equates morphology and comparative anatomy into a single field of synthetic study. This mirrors Canella’s own aims to develop the discipline past a purely descriptive state and, in view of the important place given to Gegenbaur elsewhere, may have informed them as well. Indeed, Canella cites Gegenbaur as having been the first to make a clear distinction between synthetic and descriptive anatomy in the Grundzüge der vergleichenden Anatomie.54

Lubosch’s separation of morphology into multiple distinct fields is presented much more negatively, and is particularly criticized for extracting all synthetic elements form comparative anatomy and assigning them to other fields. Lubosch’s model, as presented here, would reduce comparative anatomy to precisely what Canella has devoted himself to distancing it from, a static collection of measurements and illustrations.

In addition to this contrast with Lubosch’s views, Gegenbaur is cited extensively. This is chiefly in support of and to provide evidence for various claims made by Canella, and his writing is represented in the bibliography of L’Anatomia Comparata more extensively than any other author’s. Among his works, the 1859 Grundzüge der vergleichenden Anatomie, 1870 Manuel d’Anatomie comparée, 1876 Die Stellung und Bedeutung der Morphologie and 1898

Vergleichende Anatomie der Wirbeltiere are all cited. It is also notable that earlier writers are often described and looked at through Gegenbaur’s own observations on them. In particular,

Canella notes Gegenbaur’s comment that Goethe understood comparative anatomy better than his contemporaries,55 and his “most authoritative judgement” that “Morphology and

Comparative anatomy come to identify with each other and their goal is the profound and

54 Ibid, 3 55 “GEGENBAUR osserva che GOETHE aveva meglio dei suoi contemporanei compreso l’Anatomia comparata.” Canella, L’Anatomia Comparata, 9

22 integral comprehension of the living under all their aspects and rapports” is used to give authority to Canella’s analysis of Goethian morphology.56

Chaine also sees extensive citation, although only two of his works, the 1922 Anatomie comparée and 1925 Historie de l’Anatomie comparative, are used. Chaine is chiefly used in a similar role to Gegenbaur, and most of his citations are used to support and provide background for Canella’s own conclusions. In particular, he is used to provide support for shifting the adjective in “anatomia comparata” from “comparata” to “comparativa”, as Chaine had attempted to promote the same change in French.57

The most prominent rhetorical trend in Canella’s writings on general biology is one of steadfast skepticism. Rather than strictly advocating for specific biological theories, Canella tended to instead advise against drawing hasty conclusions from limited data. This can be seen in

L’Anatomia Comparata when arguing against the claims that gradients of homology imply gradual descent and that paleontological research can be used to trace phylogenetic lineages. In the first case he stated that there was not sufficient basis to claim that this was not simply a case of the human mind impressing artificial order on diffuse data. In the second, he instead argued that the spottiness and incompleteness of the fossil record made it unreliable for tracing large- scale sequences. In Genetica, he similarly attacked the growing tendency to base evolutionary models on genetic research on the basis that the actual nature and mechanics of genes were still not understood with sufficient clarity to do so.

This shows a very deliberately cautious approach to theorizing. New scientific models,

Canella consistently argued, should only be built on the solid foundations provided by fields of

56 “Per questo stesso autorevolissimo guidizio del GEGENBAUR, possiamo dire quindi che in GOETHE Morfologia e Anatomia comparata pressochè si identificano e loro oggetto è la comprensione profonda e integrale dei viventi sotto tutti i loro aspetti e rapporti.” L’Anatomia Comparata, 9 57 Canella, L’Anatomia Comparata, pp 3

23 knowledge that are completely and thoroughly understood. By the same token, he also held against rejecting these models out of hand on largely the same basis, and advised instead to suspend judgement, work on surer fields, and leave off full evaluation until such a time as sufficient knowledge had been gathered for this to be done properly.58

This cautiousness, however, often grew into outright skepticism. This is particularly notable in his critique of the validity of evolutionary theory. In L’Anatomia Comparata, he strongly denies that either comparative anatomy or paleontology can provide evidence for or against evolution by common descent; in Genetica, he argues against the appropriateness of genetic research for this same purpose. While he allows the possibility that the base theory might be correct, he shuts off most avenues of thought necessary to prove or disprove it, and does not give a particularly clear idea of what would be acceptable proof for or against it. He also tended to view new and growing fields of science, most notably genetics, as faddish, perceiving their proponents as too eager to latch on to a new and promising field of inquiry and of acting as if the adoption of that field alone would be sufficient to explain and answer all mysteries of life.

A noticeable trend in Canella’s early period is a recurring criticism of highly unitary science. Generally, Canella was consistently skeptical of the idea that biology, in whole or in any one part, could be reduced to or explained through only one cause. In his debates against genetic theory, this often led him to argue against the conviction that a single structure and a single process – i.e., chromosomes and mutations of the genes – must be the only things driving evolution and inheritance, preferring instead to consider that many causes might be responsible for these processes. He similarly also argued against using a single field of study, such as taxonomy or anatomy, to attempt to study the complexity of organisms. This trend is also visible

58 “Occorre sempre guardarsi dalla precipitazione. È sempre bene applicare la tanto utile epoché pirroniana, cioè sospendere il giudizio e attendere, senza cessare di pensare e di lavorare.” Anatomia, 29

24 in his belief that life likely was likely polyphyletic in origin, instead of all organisms tracing back to a single ancestor.

Canella’s early biology also shows a notably teleological view of the nature of evolution.

However, a distinction is present, although never explicitly worded as such, between different forms of teleology, some of which Canella rejected and some of which he embraced. On one hand, Canella firmly rejected the presence of “cosmic” teleology as a factor in the history of life.

The concept that some external force might direct the development of life, whether this be God, a demiurge, or a personified nature, is mentioned and rejected at multiple turns. When outlining his eclectic Lamarckism, Canella is likewise careful to exclude Lamarck’s own view that life’s development builds up towards increasing perfection and complexity. No external, guiding force is allowed a role in the evolution of living beings.

However, an “internal” teleology derived from the organisms themselves is not simply allowed, but made central and indispensable to Canella’s theories. A core aspect of his views is that, when a new trait arises, it must do so for a purpose; it cannot arise casually or without a final reason. This purpose, however, must be derived strictly from desires and drives of the organism it emerges in. This is often held in strict contrast to Darwinist, Neodarwinist and mutationist theories, where the origin and appearance of new traits is random and only their later selection for or against is not. This random origin of traits is the central reason for which Canella rejected these views; under these theories, changes in an organism’s form and function are driven by entirely random occurrences with no relationship to its experiences and environment (as specific causes for change in a being’s genome were not known at the time). Thus, they are acausal and purposeless in nature, producing a random selection of sports and variants whose natures hold no relationship to their environment outside of simple luck of the draw.

25 Instead, Canella held that new traits must necessarily arise due to an organism’s active attempts to adapt and respond to its lived conditions. If, for instance, a being gradually becomes faster over time, it cannot be because some greater being wishes for it to be so, because of some universal law pushing for the increase of running speed, or because a random process happened to make it faster than its conspecifics. Rather, it must be because the creature has a specific, perceived need for greater speed, and its body is reacting to and changing in response to this need. This view also allows for imperfect or deleterious evolution, since Canella recognized that living things are not inherently given to be right about what they need and can conceivably pursue a wrong response to a stimulus or misunderstand the nature of their conditions, but a causal link between the environment, the creature’s survival drive and its changing traits must always exist.

This view is particularly evident in Canella’s discussions in Genetica, which strongly hinge on the assumption that when a new trait arises it does so for the specific purpose of increasing the organism’s fitness. Random mutation would not thus be biologically significant, since it is undirected and typically harmful in nature. Canella’s dismissal of the concept makes clear that he did not consider it something that belonged in ordered natural processes.

A particularly notable result of this form of teleology is Canella’s view, repeated throughout Orientamenti della moderna biologia, that mutationist evolutionary theory is intrinsically reliant on preadaptation. In Canella’s argument, the chief problem with mutationism is that it requires that new traits in living beings arise by chance, instead of originating as a response to their environment. Thus, in any generation, there are multitudes of organisms with many traits with no particular relation to their environmental needs, and the ones that thrive in the environment are simply the ones that by chance so happen to have a set of traits capable

26 suitable for life within it. Canella holds that natural selection does not thus adapt living species to their conditions but simply winnows out “monsters”, but he also states that even when a given organism is suited for its conditions, the fact that its traits arose as a random event before entrance into the environment makes this process inherently nonadaptive because the traits are not originally caused by a response to experienced conditions. This is used to reject the validity of natural selection, as he argued that it is based on strictly nonadaptive and thus inadmissible precepts. In essence, Darwinism and mutationism lacked the “right” kind of teleology, because they describe traits as originating randomly and without a causal link to their bearers’ experiences, lives and environments, but also had the “wrong” kind of teleology, as Canella interpreted them to require the ultimate creation of life by a divine force or a form of self- manifestation. Due to this combination of factors, Canella found these theories entirely inadmissible and unacceptable.

The primary point of interest regarding the biological discussions on evolution that

Canella took part in is that they happening when they were. There is relatively little room in modern historiography for placing serious doubt of evolution as a concept and likewise serious defense of neo-Lamarckism at any point much after the 1920s. The fact that Canella was doing precisely this does not thus seem easily compatible with modern views of the course the life sciences took in the early twentieth century. It is possible that Canella was only operating on the fringes of established science, and that his views did not thus closely reflect the scientific orthodoxy of his time.

Also notable is Canella’s use of the specific term “mutationism” (mutazionismo). While it had been a strong contender among evolutionary theories in the beginning of the twentieth century, it had declined alongside most other theories due to its incompatibility with recent

27 genetic discoveries. T.H. Morgan’s experiments, for instance, had presented strong proof against the directionality of evolution required by mutationism; this had been enough to sway Morgan, a mutationist himself, away from that field.59 Canella’s choice to engage with this field well into the thirties is thus especially anachronistic since, unlike Lamarckism, he was arguing against it.

However, Canella does not always seem to draw a clear line between mutationism and

Darwinism, something especially notable in his claim that mutationism can only modify, and not create, traits, and that it is unable to create new species and can instead only lightly modify them and create internal breeds. This is in explicit contrast to mutationist claim that it could explain the origin of major and entirely novel characteristics in living creatures. However, later works by

Canella, such as Razze umane estinte e viventi, do show a clearer distinction made between mutationism and Darwinism that is far more consistent with their common definitions. This may suggest that, while the specific meaning remained in use within specific contexts, the meaning of the term “mutationism” may have begun to drift by Canella’s time or have become equated with post-Mendelian theories of genetic alteration.

59 Bowler, Evolution: The History of an Idea, 268-273

28

Mario Canella’s Racial Theory

The second period of Canella’s scholarship is marked by an increasing interest in the concept of racial science, and especially of racial hierarchies and relationships and of eugenics.

This stands in noticeable contrast to his earlier views, and especially with his commitment to opposing Darwinism and selectionism in general. This forms a seeming paradox of contrasting views – how can you commit to the permanence of racial traits and the need to remove undesirable elements while also subscribing to a view of internally malleable organisms? – which closer analysis can provide some help in illuminating.

Canella’s earliest forays into racial theory are a pair of 1939 articles, “Il concetto di razza umana”, where he defended the necessity of studying human diversity through the establishment of a clear field of racial psychology,60 and “Australiani: fossili viventi”. However, his most notable publications on this subject came later, in the form of the 1940 Razze umane estinte e viventi and the 1941 Principi di psicologia razziale. During this period, Canella becomes greatly invested in eugenics and in the necessity of removing what he perceives as defective elements – which he refers to as “tarati” – from humanity to prevent them from negatively affecting future generations.

The first chapter of Razze umane estinte e viventi, “Antropogenesi”, discusses potential origins of the human species. Canella resists the possibility of a plurality of human species, citing observed levels of variability among breeds of other species as evidence against human diversity requiring the presence of multiple species and universal interfertility among human populations as evidence of their close relationship. He however admits that a polygenic origin is

60 Maiocchi, Roberto, Scienza Italiana e Razzismo Fascista. La Nuova Italia Editrice, Firenze, 1999. 271

29 still a possibility, noting that “we cannot yet have absolute certainty, on scientific ground, of a single origin for all the human races, while the polygenetic theories certainly don’t lack serious arguments.”61

Canella here notes the ambiguity and often variable use of the term “race”, which he attempts to define as “a group of humans characterized by a collection, peculiar to itself, of morphological, physiological and psychical traits, individually variable within certain limits, which are transmitted hereditarily from generation to generation”.62 However, Canella also believed that, since humans are highly migratory and often mix and interbreed, no “pure” races exist anymore.63 Modern ethnicities are instead defined as being cultural-linguistic groups made of mixtures of different racial elements, although a single ethnicity can only include members

“of the same color”.64

The chapter closes with brief descriptions of various models of evolution, divided between

“Fissismo” (where species do not change over time, but which is noted not to be inherently synonymous with creationism) and “Transformismo” (where species do change).65

Transformismo is further divided into a number of specific models, which Canella provides with descriptions of their own:

61 Canella, Mario. Razze umane estinte e viventi, Seconda Edizione Riveduta ed Ampliata. Sansoni Edizioni Scientifiche, Firenze, 1940. “Resta inteso, però, che la certezza assoluta, sul terreno scientifico, di una origine unica di tutte le razze umane non possiamo ancora averla, mentre le teorie poligenistiche non mancano certo di seri argomenti.” 4-5 62 Canella, Razze umane estinte e viventi. “un gruppo di uomini caratterizzato da un insieme, proprio ad esso, di tratti morfologici, fisiologichi e psichici, individualmente variabile entro cenrti limiti, che si trasmettono ereditariamente di generazione in generazione” 63 Ibid. 6-14 64 Ibid. “Il concetto di etnia coinciderebbe quindi con quello di popolo, cioè di un unità sociologica che può essere costituita di più tipi razziali (sempre però, insistiamo, dello stesso gruppo, sempre, potemmo dire, dello stesso colore!)” 65 Ibid. 28-29

30 Lamarckism is defined as a model where species change due to a need for survival, “to which is connected a capacity of the organism for new morphologic and functional adaptations”.66 It is characterized by inheritance of acquired characters, and Canella argues that “many facts and observations of the living world would demonstrate that, at least in the past, organisms must realistically have enjoyed such capabilities”.67

Darwinism is defined as a model where natural selection acts on populations of non-identical organisms, where those possessing traits less suited to helping them secure limited resources don’t thrive. Canella claims that Darwin however allowed for other factors, such as sexual selection and inheritance of acquired characters, to affect the gradual change of living species.68

Neodarwinism is presented as a distinct theory whose creation Canella attributes to August

Weismann, and is defined as rejecting the inheritance of acquired characters. This belief is defined as being due to Neodarwinism making a strict distinction between soma and germ cells, and holding that the derivation of new characters is rooted purely in the germ and unrelated to environmental factors, so that “even without totally excluding the influence of the environment on the determinism of genovariations, all relations of adaptation are always excluded”.69

Mutationism is described as a distinct model where changes between generations occur brusquely and dramatically from mutations within germinal cells. These changes occur entirely due to internal causes and are thus “without any biological finality”. In the mutationist model,

Canella argues, all organisms are thus casually “preadapted” instead of changing in response to their environment, as the environment merely weeds out the unfit after forms come into being.70

66 Ibid. “al quale è connessa una capacità dell’organismo di nuovi adattamenti morfologici e funzionali.” 29 67 Ibid. “moltissimi fatti e osservazioni del mondo vivente dimostrebbero che, per lo meno in passato, gli organismi debbono verosimilmente aver goduto di tale capacità.” 30 68 Ibid.30 69 Ibid. “Anche se non si escludono totalmente le influenze ambientali nel determinismo delle genovariazioni, si esclude in ongi caso ogni relazione di adattamento”.31 70 Ibid.32

31 Ologenism is described as a theory of limited acceptance created by the Italian zoologist

Daniele Rosa. Under this view, a species’ germ “matures” over time, eventually splitting into two new germs more or less distinct from it, generating two “daughter-species” while the

“mother-species” goes extinct. One branch will be “precocious”, divide early and more often and produce more primitive species; the second will divide later and produce more developed forms.

Under this model, all modern species are fully resolved and mature, and no longer produce these splits; essentially, evolution is over. Ologenism, like Neodarwinism and mutationism, is also dismissed by Canella as internal and non-adaptive.71

The final model described is Neolamarckism, the system to which Canella himself subscribed. This view places the greatest importance on the inheritance of acquired characters and the concept that organisms “react actively to the environment in which they live, acquiring new characters that can, to various degrees, be transmitted to their descendants”72 and that, without this, “the uncountable adaptive specializations that vegetal and animal forms present cannot be explained”.73 However, this system also accepts that other mechanisms, such as natural selection, sexual selection and hybridization, can and do act to cause gradual change in living species, although they are understood to have lesser importance than the active acquisition and inheritance of new traits.74

Canella then notes that the origin of the human species isn’t clear, but that humanity is assumed by both neodarwinists and neolamarckists to have developed from pre-human primates forced into savannahs due to shrinking forests. However, the precise mechanisms by which this

71 Ibid.32-34 72 Ibid. “reagiscono attivamente all’ambiente in cui vivono, acquistando nuovi caratteri che possono, in grado vario, essere trasmessi all discendenza.”34 73 Ibid. “non si possono spiegare le innumerevoli specializzazioni adattive che presentano le forme vegetali e animali” 34 74 Ibid. 34-35

32 is assumed to have happened vary greatly between one theory and another.75Any more specific details about the origin of humanity are, however, highly speculative and subject of conjecture.

Most views of the time posited a single origin from which all humanity comes from, but others assumed as many as nine distinct branches of descent.76

In concluding this section, Canella states that the abundance and diversity of the theories proposed to explain the origin of the human species is enough to attest that “none of these puts forward arguments and proof of sufficient evidence to be able to impose itself as the most founded and reliable”.77 In Canella’s view, the origin of humanity is too remote in time and the physical remnants available for study too few, and on the origin of humanity “nothing certain, precise, exhaustive and irrefutable we know, and maybe will ever know”.78

Chapter 2, “Ominidi Fossili”, consists of descriptions of known hominid fossils from the

Pleistocene, ending with Neolithic humans. This chapter is purely descriptive and only lists the physical traits and provenance of each specimen.79 Canella also notes that current ideas on prehistoric humanoids are not and cannot be considered “very clear and unambiguous” until a greater proportion of fossils is recovered and described than was available at the time.80

Chapter 3, “Caratteri Cromatici e Morfologici Razziali”, describes traits used in defining human races. These include skin color, hair color and form, height, form and dimensions of the skull, facial traits (such as orbit size, projection of the jaws, shape and size of the nose, shape of the lips, shape of the cheekbones, shape of the forehead and shape of the chin, shape and color of

75 Ibid. 36-37 76 Ibid. 48-51 77 Ibid, “Il fatto stesso della loro molteplicità attesta eloquentemente che nessuna di esse adduce argomentazioni e prove di un'evidenza tale da poter imporsi come la più fondata e attendibile.” 51 78 Ibid. “in realtà, circa l'origine dell'Uomo, nulla di sicuro, preciso, esauriente ed irrefutabile sappiamo, e forse mai sapremo; troppe decine o centinaia di migliaia di anni sono passate da allora e troppo poche e incerte sono le prove rimaste.” 51 79 Ibid. 55-79 80 Ibid. 62

33 the eyes, shape of the earlobes), and the shape of the breasts and genitals.81 This is also a purely descriptive chapter, presenting a simple list of traits and their potential variability.

Chapter 4, “Classificazioni Antropologiche”, is a simple review and description of various attempts to classify the human races and construct phylogenies for them.82 The following chapters, which comprise the majority of the text, consist of an extensive review of the various human races, which are provided with descriptions pertaining to their appearances and physiological and psychological traits. Emphasis is placed on psychic elements, something especially notable in the case of the Hebrew race. Canella did not consider Jews to be sufficiently uniform in physical form and traits to be a true biological race, arising instead from crossings between other Levantine groups, but believed them to share a common mindset and collection of psychologic and behavioral traits, chiefly negative ones, that allowed them to be considered a race by virtue of shared psychology.83 This particular shared psychology is given a considerable emphasis in the section dedicated to discussing the Hebrew race, where Canella stresses that “even if speaking of a Hebrew race in an anthropologic sense doesn’t seem scientifically correct”, it would still be acceptable to speak of it “in a psychological sense”.84

Razze umane is notable first and chiefly for being Canella’s first major foray into racial science. In many regards, as race was given very limited and sporadic focus in his previous publications, the change feels abrupt, something accentuated by this being by far his longest work up to this point. Indeed, while the text gives space to a discussion of evolutionary and biological matters more typical of his early period, these do not harmonize greatly with the rest

81 Ibid.81-99 82 Ibid.101-108 83 Volpato, Chiara. “Mario Canella e la psicologia razziale. Un caso di conformismo al potere universitario.” In Il Giorno della Memoria all’Università di Ferrara. Iniziative realizzate dal 2002 al 2014, edited by M. Ravenna, & G. Brunelli, 59-73. 2014, Firenze. 84 Canella, Razze umane estinte e viventi. “Ma se parlare di una razza ebrea in senso antropologico non sembra scientificamente corretto, non sarebbe forse improrprio parlare di una razza ebrea in senso psicologico” 234

34 of the work. In particular, despite the description of evolutionary theories in the first few chapters, this matter isn’t given a great deal of attention in sections after the summation of potential origins for humanity in the first two chapters; when the origins of races are discussed, hybridization also tends to play a greater role than Lamarckian or Neolamarckian theory.

However, a common thread remains to his previous body of work in the form of the emphasis given to psychology and mentality, such as his use of shared psychological traits to define the

Jewish race despite physiological heterogeneity.

Principi di psicologia razziale focuses on identifying the nature of psychological differences between races, and whether they originate from hereditary or environmental factors.

Canella opens the text with a strongly worded rejection of the concept of racial equality, pushing back against the concept that the human races are meaningfully equal to one another in emotional, moral or intellectual traits. He makes particular criticism of writers such as Labriola, who took the stance that race is fundamentally a modern and artificial invention created to justify colonialism and that there are no innate psychological differences between human races nor any kind of truly inferior or superior cultures. He also rejected the view of the “great English ethnological school”, cited as including Lubbock, Tylor, Frazer and Lang, which argued that the cultural and developmental differences between human races are due to their simply being on different points of a universal upwards progression. Canella fundamentally disagreed with the idea of a global evolution shared by all humanity, instead viewing its development as “many distinct evolutionary lines that have led to the psychological and somatic differentiation of the various racial types”.85

85 Canella, Mario Francesco. Principi di psicologia razziale. G.C. Sansoni, Firenze, 1941. “Non esiste, infatti, un’evoluzione globale dell’Umanità, ma tante line evolutive distinte che ànno condotto al differenziamento somatico e psichico dei vari tipi razziali.” 9-20

35 The book’s third chapter, “Fondamenti biologici del differenziamento psichico razziale”, is of particular interest to the question of the reconciliation of Canella’s biological and racial views. This chapter attempts to provide biological explanations for the perceived differences in mentality between various races, and presents the relationship between physical and behavioral traits as a two-way street. That is, while developments in some physical traits determine behavior and psychic traits (for instance the development of the brain, seen as indicative of and cause of mental complexity), behavior and psychology are also treated as controlling the development of physical traits in other cases. Particularly illustrative of this is the section devoted to facial muscles: here, the degree and kind of emotive activity in the individual’s life plays a large part in shaping the development of the facial muscles used in forming expressions, with different familiar, social and scholastic influences and different lived experiences resulting in individuals with distinct facial physiologies.86 Similarly, the activity of the endocrine glands, also linked to intelligence and lack thereof, is defined as strongly linked to “environmental, cosmic, climatic, nutritional influences”, such as the hypophysis becoming more or less active under different degrees of solar illumination.87 These alterations would, “over the generations, being constant if the same influences remained, have become inherited, that is truly racial”.88 The specifics of a race’s physical and behavioral traits, in other words, are at least in part directly shaped by its native environment, which produces biological changes within its members that can be passed on to new generations and become a permanent part of its nature.

In the following chapters, the book’s description of racial psychological traits establishes a clear hierarchy of the races, placing Whites at the top, Asians (termed “Gialli”, or “Yellows”)

86 Ibid. 36-38 87 Ibidi, 45-46 88 Ibid. “tali variazioni di attività funzionale sarebbero poi, attraverso le generazioni, costanti permanendo le stesse influenze, diventate permanenti, cioè razziali vere e proprie.” 45

36 further down, Blacks beneath them, and “Primitives” at the bottom. This last group is a collection of distinct and far-flung groups, gathered together based on shared psychological traits and contrasts with civilization-building races. Canella cites the concept of “mental” or “psychic races”, proposed by other anthropologists and racial scientists such as Giovanni Marro, Georges

Pouchet, and others, intended to justify the terming as races groups that have little somatic or physical homogeneity, such as Jews and Primitives, on the grounds of their sharing a common mental profile.89 Primitives, as an example, are defined as including a wide and disparate collection of populations originating from multiple other “racial” stocks, including blacks (such as a variety of African tribal peoples, Australians and Melanesians), certain far-eastern oriental peoples, and even offshoots of the “white race” (such as the Ainu). However, they share “psychic characters common to all or almost all of these ethnic and racial groups”, and on this basis are classified as part of a single category.90

Among the four major groups, Primitives are defined as completely absorbed in the present, overly sexual, gifted with little self-control, and overly absorbed in physical needs.

Blacks possess a few admirable traits, such as dexterity, sharp senses and a sense of rhythm, but are otherwise overly emotive and sexual, largely incapable of reflection, logic or abstraction, and overly interdependent and imitative. This renders them strictly inferior to Whites and Yellows, and they are portrayed as fully aware of this and as oscillating between hatred and servility towards Whites as a result. Yellows are portrayed with a mixture of positive and negative traits.

On the one hand they are static and uncreative, limited in their understanding of transcendental

89 Volpato, Chiara. “Un caso di rimozione scientifica: la psicologia razziale di Mario Canella.” Giornale Italiano di Psicologia, Vol. 27, n. 4 (2000): 807-828 90 Canella, Mario Francesco. Principi di psicologia razziale. “Ora, un cumulo di testimonianze dimostrerebbe l’esistenza di caratteri psichici comuni a tutti o a quasi tutti di questi gruppi razziali ed etnici.” 150

37 ideas or outside influences, and highly conservative. On the other, they are realistic, hardworking, tenacious, frugal, serious, calm, and self-controlled.91

Whites are given a much more glowing review, where Canella praises them for intelligence, creativity, culture-building, sociability, and a bellicosity explicitly painted as a much more positive and admirable desire to spread their culture and order the world than the brute aggressiveness of other groups. Whites are also given a much more detailed overview than the other races, which are presented as monolithic blocks, and are subdivided into eight subcategories – Nordics, Alpines, Mediterraneans, Falicians, Dinarics, Baltics, Anatolians and

Jews, this last group defined as a cross of Arabs and Anatolians. Here, Canella argues that the

Jewish people were fundamentally shaped by their past a desert-dwelling population, a process that left with a great faith in themselves and distrust of others.92

Principi holds a greatly important role in Canella’s literature. On the one hand, it is a further step into and elaboration of his racial theory – while the earlier Razze umane largely limited itself to physiological descriptions, Principi marks a full commitment to racist theory and an elaborate defense of racial inequality, of the fundamental differences between the intellectual and emotional capabilities of the human races, and of the superiority of the white race over the others. However, it also features a greater integration of racial theory with the biological and evolutionary views characteristic of the early period. Rather than being segregated into different and loosely related sections as in the earlier text, Canella’s Neolamarckism and racism become more fully integrated as the former is used to support the latter. Especially notable in this context is the return to the importance of psychology on biology, but also important is the integration of inherited acquired traits in the development of human traits. The discussion of the development

91 Ibid 92 Ibid

38 facial muscles and endocrine systems is particularly illustrative of this, demonstrating the development of a truly Lamarckist form of racial theory.

Through his writings on race, Canella gained a considerable degree of prestige in Italy’s academia. His articles were published on some of the period’s most prestigious journals, such as the Rivista di Psicologia and the Archivio di Psicologia Neurologia Psichiatria e Psicoterapia.

La Giustizia Penale reviewed both Razze umane, estinte e viventi and Principi di psicologia razziale, alongside all of his articles dealing with race, all of which were given glowing commendations.93 Within the University of Bologna, and later that of Ferrara, he was also entrusted with a course of human racial biology, a program that involved sections racial psychology, the “Aryan question”, and “aspects of Italian racism”.94

In the postwar period, following the fall of the fascist regime, Canella’s academic trends saw him targeted by accusations of racism and antisemitism. In response, he published Epurandi in veste di epuratori: strascichi di un’epurazione mancata, in which he attempts to defend himself and to claim to have always been opposed to fascist ideology. However, in his protestations against accusations of racism, he attempts to retain the validity of his racial theory and race psychology by arguing that his studies of the human races had been rooted in purely scientific methods, rather than recognizing the concept of racial theory as being inherently rooted in racist thought.95

93 Ibid 94 Ibid 95 Volpato. “Mario Canella e la psicologia razziale”

39

Mario Canella’s Late Biology

The early years following the publication of Epurandi see a brief return to Canella’s early speculatory forays into the philosophy of science. In 1947, he published Variabilità ed ereditarietà dei caratteri psichici alongside a handful of short philosophical pieces; 1950 sees the release of Problemi ed enigma dell’evoluzione; 1951 sees Origine e destino del mondo vivente (Fatti, ipotesi e speculazioni). Afterwards, however, Canella’s work shifts to a focus on microzoology; his publications from the 1950s on consist chiefly of articles on the anatomy of aquatic microorganisms. Articles written during the 1950s cover a relatively broad range within this field, including essays on ciliates, rotifers and general overviews of aquatic microfauna; after this decade, Canella’s writing narrows further to an exclusive focus on descriptions of ciliates.

The majority of these articles were published through the Annali dell’Università di Ferrara, although others appeared on the Italian Journal of Zoology. Canella performed some forays into other branches of anatomy as well, such as a 1959 paper on bird embryology and a 1963 paper on chameleon melanophores. However, these mark some of the few exceptions to the focus on ciliate biology that would dominate the rest of his scientific career.

In addition to this emphasis on microzoology, a secondary trend visible in Canella’s late period is a series of tracts on the subject of schooling and museums. These do not match the number and recurrence of his microzoological work, but occur sporadically throughout the late period, beginning with “Occupiamoci della Scuola” and “Moralizzare la Scuola: la piaga delle raccomandazioni”, both in 1946. 1952 later sees “Funzione culturale e educativa dei Musei di

Storia Naturale”, “Passato e presente del Museo di Storia Naturale di Ferrara”, and “Notizie sull’attività didattica, organizzativa e scientifica durante il quinquennio”. A long lull in these

40 works follows, ending with the 1978 publication of “Presente e futuro del Museo di Storia

Naturale and the 1982 “Disamene vicende museologiche et de quibusdam aliis”, which would be

Canella’s last formal publications.

This period also sees a slowing of the rate at which Canella wrote and published articles.

The 1950s see a high publishing rate similar to that of the two earlier stages, with a total of fifteen articles released at a rate of one to three per year, peaking at five articles in 1952, with occasional gaps of one to two years. Only seven articles over the next decade; 1960 and 1961 each see one article published, 1663 sees two, 1964 three, and 1965 one. No more material is released until the 1970s, where 1971, 1972, 1976, 1977 and 1978 see one publication apiece, before “Disamene vicende” in 1982 closes Canella’s active career before his death on the same year.

Also notable is that the late period also sees the end of Canella’s involvement in reviewing and publishing reviews of scientific and philosophical works. Between 1927 and 1945, covering the majority of his early and middle periods, Canella wrote a total of 198 review articles of works on a variety of topics, including biology, physiology, anthropology, chemistry, physics, psychology, philosophy, history, and religion, which where published through the

Rivista di Psicologia. He appears to have abandoned this practice early in his late period, and did not publish further reviews afterwards.

41 Responses

Early responses to Canella’s anatomical work can be seen in contemporary reception of his books, such as Prof. Raffaele Gurrieri’s 1938 review of L’Anatomia comparata nel quadro della biologia moderna. Gurrieri restates the loss of comparative anatomy from university curriculums, including Medicine, Surgery and Veterinary Medicine, and specifically times this removal to the Royal Decrees of 28 November 1935 and 7 May 1936, which standardized the courses assigned to university degrees. The review afterwards focuses on affirming Canelli’s arguments against the division of morphology into multiple overly specialized sub-fields. The end of the review is then composed of selected quotations on this theme taken from the text, and ends with an exhortation for the readers to take heed of them.96

In 1940, the scientific magazine Genus published a review credited to E. Casanova of

Razze umane estinte e viventi. The review, while short, is generally positive in tone and praises the “great clarity” with which Canella lists and describes the most recent scientific theories on race and the traits of living races. Casanova, however, criticizes the limited amount of time spent on describing extinct and vanishing races, a subject that the author felt was hinted at in the title of the work but skimped over in the text itself in favor of extant and widespread groups.97

In 1941, the review Angelicum published another review of Razze umane, credited to E.

Moran. This review describes canella as being “amongst the most notable cultivators” of racial biology, a field noted as very active at the time of its writing. Moran notes that, in the section of the text where different transformist models are described, Canella is highly skeptical of

96 Raffaele Gurrieri, " L’Anatomia Comparata nel Quadro della Biologia Moderna," L’Università Italiana, V XXXIV, N. 1 (10th January 1938), 2-4 97 Casanova, M. Review of Razze umane estinte e viventi, by Mario Francesco Canella. Genus Vol. 4 (November 1940): 175-176

42 mutationist and Darwinist models, and considers them in character with the neolamarckist position professed in the earlier Orientamenti della moderna biologia. Moran also praises the cautiousness present in Canella’s admittance of the lack of certainty in any ultimate origin for mankind. However, the review considers Canella’s hard claim in the impossibility of

“redeeming” lower races, due to their traits being “crystallized” by millennia of evolution, to be excessively pessimistic.98

In 1951, the zoologist Nello Beccari, in his Anatomia comparata dei vertebrati, acknowledged the removal of comparative anatomy from university courses and a divide between vertebrate anatomy studied by medics and invertebrate anatomy studied by zoologists, but rejected a true decline in the practice in and of itself. Much like Canella, he defined comparative anatomy as a science that, in addition to describing the appearance and function of organs, should aim provide explanations for their nature and origins. He however believed in the necessity of separating zoological and human anatomy from one another, and rejected Canella’s proposed biological morphology.99

Canella also received more direct attention from Italy’s fascist regime during its active years. In October 1940, he was invited by Sabato Visco, a human physiologist heavily involved in the academic enterprises of the fascist party, to replace the recently sacked Guido Landra as an expert on anthropological matters at the General Directory for Demography and Race, an institution of the fascist party intended to oversee matters pertaining to race, citizenship and demographics. Canella, notably, declined the invitation.100

98 Moran, E. Review of Razze umane estinte e viventi, by Mario Francesco Canella. Angelicum Vol. 18 (April 1941): 270-272 99 Beccari, Nello. Anatomia Comparata dei Vertebrati. Sansoni, 1951. Preface. 100 Maiocchi, Scienza Italiana e Razzismo Fascista. 272

43 Analysis and Conclusions

The first notable aspect of Canella’s philosophy is his continued defense of

Lamarckism and opposition to Mendelian genetics and Neodarwinism until well into the mid- twentieth century, a trend visible as late as his recapitulation of theories of inheritance and evolution in Razze umane. Canella’s views are for the most part very similar to the dominant form of 19th-century approaches to evolution; in that period, natural selection was assumed to only weed out monsters but not to be able to produce new traits and adapted forms, a lacuna caused by the lack of any mechanism within the theory that could explain how traits could be formed. As such, some other process must have been present to create variation and push species into increasing adaptation, and Lamarckism was the favored theory used to explain how this occurred.101

By Canella’s period, however, Lamarckism had almost completely been rejected in academic study. The introduction of genetic variation into the modern synthesis during the 1920s and 1930s provided a means for new adaptive traits to be created, filling the primary theoretical gap present within the older Darwinist model. Neodarwinism could thus provide a theoretically complete picture for how species developed and became actively adapted to their environments, and Lamarckian models started to quickly fade from prominence.102 By the 1930s, the study of inheritance had become increasingly focused on Mendelian genetics, and all other methods of

101 Laurent Loison, “The Notions of Plasticity and Heredity among French Neo-Lamarckians (1880-1940): From Complementarity to Incompatibility”, in Transformations of Lamarckism from subtle fluids to molecular biology, edited by Snait B. Gissis and Eva Jablonka, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2011), 67-76 102 Snait B. Gissis and Eva Jablonka, “Introduction: The Exclusion of Soft (“Lamarckian”) Inheritance from the Modern Synthesis”, in Transformations of Lamarckism from subtle fluids to molecular biology, edited by Snait B. Gissis and Eva Jablonka, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2011), 103-107

44 tracing the passage of traits between generations were increasingly losing ground and scientific acceptance.103

Lamarckism, in particular, came into conflict with a number of core tenets of the modern synthesis and of the models of inheritance and biology that became dominant over the 1920s and

1930s. Firstly, the concept of a strict separation between the germ line, which is responsible for inheritance, and the soma, which makes up the bulk of the living body and does not pass on traits, became increasingly important. Lamarckian acquired traits were by necessity modifications of the soma, and the soma/germ line distinction did not allow for these being passed between generations. Secondly, experiments intended to test the nature of inheritance had consistently failed to show evidence for the inheritance of acquired traits or, for that matter, of non-Mendelian inheritance outside of some microorganisms. Thirdly and finally, analysis of seemingly non-Mendelian inheritance of certain traits had revealed that most visible traits arise due to the interactions of multiple independent genes, and that most genes do not control an entire trait in their own right – indeed, many genes impact the formation of multiple traits at once. This evident lack on one-to-one gene/trait relationships caused a shift in biological thinking, shifting the focus of genetic research from the inheritance of traits to the inheritance of genes. Lamarckian theory, which focused strictly on the inheritance of visible traits, thus became incompatible with the new zeitgeist and, in essence, unnecessary as well.104

In light of these developments, Canella appears as something of an anachronism. His defense of Lamarckian theory and particular approach to studying inheritance and criticizing

103 Scott Gilbert, “The Decline of Soft Inheritance”, in Transformations of Lamarckism from subtle fluids to molecular biology, edited by Snait B. Gissis and Eva Jablonka, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2011), 121-125 104 Adam Wilkins, “Why did the Modern Synthesis Give Short Shrift to ‘Soft Inheritance’?”, in Transformations of Lamarckism from subtle fluids to molecular biology, edited by Snait B. Gissis and Eva Jablonka, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2011), 127-132

45 Darwinism would have been highly typical of the dominant literature two to three decades before he began writing, but the Lamarckist camp had already entered its decline when he began writing and had been almost completely superseded by the end of his early biological period. The likeliest explanation for this situation is that Canella simply happened to adopt a Lamarckist view shortly before the system truly began to decline. Lamarckism would have remained a defensible position during the early formation of Neodarwinism, and once the latter camp began to fully dominate evolutionary science it is likely that the few remaining Lamarckists, such as

Canella himself, had become too invested in their views to abandon their ship.

The most notable developments in Canella’s academic history are his abrupt shifts between theoretical biology, racial theory, and descriptive biology. Most notable is the seemingly extremely drastic shift between his original anti-Darwinist position and his joining into a tradition of racism and eugenics heavily rooted in social Darwinism. In particular,

Canella’s own writings place a heavy emphasis on the damage done by permitting the continuation of “defective” lines within a population and on the absolutism of racial traits. These beliefs seem to be in irreconcilable contrast with the Lamarckist view of the inherent mutability of all living organisms and of the ability for any creature to modify itself into new states in response to its needs.

In Canella’s early period, attention is given to the subject of human race in the 1939 articles “Il concetto di razza umana” and “Australiani: fossili viventi”. These, however, remain the only two departures from a literature focused almost wholly upon animal biology and evolution. This stage ends with the release of Razze umane estinte e viventi, in 1940; after this point, publications on racial theory become very common and largely subordinate general biology. “«Superiorità» e «inferiorità» di razze e di popoli”, “Psicologia dei «primitivi»” and

46 Principi di psicologia razziale” are released in 1941; 1942 sees a second edition of Razze umane; and 1943 has “Psicopatologia razziale”, “Suicidio e criminalità nelle varie razze” and Lineamenti di Antropobiologia. The only purely anatomical studies released during this period are the 1941 publications “Del metodo, dello sperimentalismo eccessivo e della sintesi in biologia” and

Genetica, mutazionismo e nelamarckismo and the 1942 “Considerazioni sull’avvenire dell’Anatomia comparata: Tipologia predarwinistica o Morfologia biologica?”

The shift between the middle and late periods is even more abrupt. Lineamenti di

Antropobiologia is Canella’s last racial or anthropological publication. Notably, while its full title identifies it as “volume I” and thus implies the planned release of at least a second volume, no follow-up works are present in Canella’s publications or unpublished works. A lull in publication follows this release; 1944 sees no fresh releases, 1945 a defense of psychology and

1946 a study on the origin of sex, marking a much lower rate of publications than the two to four releases per year that mark the earlier two periods. 1946 then sees the publication of Epurandi in veste di epuratori: strascichi di un’epurazione mancata, a defense by Canella of his earlier views against accusations of racism following the end of the fascist regime. This is Canella’s last publication on race; his writing does not revisit this subject again.

Chiara Volpato notes an additional contrast between Canella’s later antisemitism and sometimes outright philosemitic tendencies in his earlier writings and reviews. As an example,

Canella speculated in a recension of a 1933 essay on the historic role of German Jews that

German antisemitism was the byproduct of an inferiority complex directed towards a group one does not wish to recognize a debt to. In light of this, Volpato argues that Canella’s drastic shift into racist science was a case of academic conformism in the wake of the passing of Italy’s racial laws. The beginning of Canella’s shift into racial theory conforms to the beginning of Italy’s

47 occupation of Ethiopia and of the fascist regime’s attempts to align itself with Nazi-led

Germany. At this time, it would have become expedient for academics to align their views with those of the state in order to make themselves visible. Volpato thus argues that Canella, in order to bring himself further into light, sacrificed his older views in favor of adapting his writing to the changing political climate.105

However, several complications are present with this analysis.

Firstly, despite the abruptness of the shift between them, a clear sense of theoretical continuity exists between Canella’s earlier biology and his racial theory. In particular, his model of neo-Lamarcksim places considerable importance on the effects of psychology on physiology, giving mental impulses and desires a central role in directing the course of evolution and shaping the physical nature of an organism – see, as an example, the role that he gives education and social and emotional life in shaping the development of the facial musculature. This emphasis on the primacy of psychology over physiology is continued in his later racial writings, most notably in his use of “psychological race” to group physically distinct populations on the basis of shared cultural and mental profiles.

In addition, elements of Lamarckism continue to be present and notable within Canella’s later racial writings. Razze umane estinte e viventi, while mostly dedicated to a systematic description of human groups, still includes a review of transformist models fully congruent with the views present in earlier works, and which was noted in contemporary responses, such as the

Moran review, as consistent with Canella’s earlier work. Principi di psicologia razziale also shows a clear continuity with Canella’s Neolamarckism in the manner in which the inheritance

105 Volpato. “Mario Canella e la psicologia razziale”, 65-66

48 of acquired traits and the role of the environment in directly molding the beings living within it are given a central role in Canella’s theory of racial genesis.

Moreover, neo-Lamarckism and psychology of race were important parts of Italian scientific racism, providing a clear bridge through which Canella could have organically crossed into racist theory from his earlier positions. Italian racial scientists had long acknowledged that Italians show a great deal of physiological variation, enough so as to appear to belong or be composed of multiple independent “races” – a single morphologically consistent “Italian race” was not visible in the nation. Admitting a strictly genetic definition of races where physiology and ancestral inheritance were the dominant factors of race would thus have been tantamount to admitting that there was no such thing as an Italian people.106

Italian racial scientists thus turned to a model where culture and environment played a greater role and inheritance a lesser, although still present, one. As early as the 1927 Italiani. Genti e favelle, authors argued that cultural and geographical factors played an important role in shaping mentality and intellectual outlook. This allowed the sidestepping of Italy’s heterogenous ethnic profile and became a foundation of Italian racial science. The Italian race thus became understood as a historic or spiritual entity more so than a biologic or ancestral one.107 Similarly, the difficulty in admitting the use of cultural behaviors and other learned traits for defining biological races had been resolved through the assumption that psychological and cultural characters are heritable, a position that had by Canella’s period become firmly established in the work of racist writers such as Lido Cipriani, Ludwig Clauss and Eugen Fischer. By 1940 racial psychology had become a central part of Italian racial science, and Canella had established himself as a prolific contributor to this. By the early forties, his work established him as a

106 Maiocchi, Scienza Italiana e Razzismo Fascista. 144-147 107 Ibid

49 respected authority in racial psychology, and became an important reference point for spiritualistic racist science.108

The importance of this factor is specifically the weight that Canella’s writings in both his early and middle stages place on the importance of psychology within biology and of its impact and control over physical forms. The Italian tradition of psychological rather than genetic racism thus provided a ground where he could insert his ideas without significantly altering his earlier theories, and indeed one that was likely receptive to him specifically because of his preexisting views. The neo-Lamarckian and psychological nature of Italian racist science would have provided a means for him to adapt into it, as the intellectual environment used within closely matched his own views. To a scientist already invested in neo-Lamarckism and the primacy of psychology over biology, a scientific tradition that made heavy use of these themes would have seemed sound and legitimate, and easy to insert himself into.

More difficult to reconcile, however, are Canella’s commitment to both Neolamarckism and the fixity of human races. Canella’s writings do not allow for a very plastic nature of humanity’s subdivisions. His descriptions tend to be very definite in describing them as firm and cleanly defined groups, and in Razze umane he is highly critical of the belief that other races can be in any way “redeemed”. This seems to run counter to the Lamarckist notion that any species is in time capable of radical self-alteration in response to its needs and desires, and Canella’s own writings are not very forthright in addressing this issue. The question also arises of how “unfit” or “lesser” races could have arisen in the first place. However, a potential solution to these problems can be seen outlined in his description of Neolamarckian inheritance as far back as

Orientamenti della moderna Biologia.

108 Ibid, 260-273

50 Canella’s Neolamarckism, as outlined in the text in question, is notable for specifically allowing for the possibility of maladaptation. Its teleological bases originate from the organisms’ personal drives and desires, and changes take place through the mechanisms of the living body.

This leaves a considerable window for error to occur, as animal minds are neither all-knowing nor highly logical and organic processes have a well-documented tendency towards fallibility and imperfection. Thus, Canella held it as entirely possible for a species or breed to be objectively maladapted or degenerate due “mistakes” made in its history. While not stated outright, it is possible here to speculate that this would have been a vicious cycle of sorts. If mental and psychological traits are both the cause of new traits arising and inherited traits themselves, then an initial case of maladaptation could well leave future generations less suited for evaluating their needs and responding to the environment, leading to further disadvantageous traits, leading to further poor responses, and so on. Canella, however, also firmly opposed the possibility of “lower races” being artificially elevated through education or assimilation. This can also be traced to his earlier views on adaptation, and specifically to a comment at the end of his tract on maladaptation stating that a highly maladapted species could become permanently locked into its sate and eventually die out; it is not inconceivable that this is how he viewed the situation of non-white human races.

This view, strictly speaking, still appears at odds with orthodox Lamarckism. The key point at hand, however, is that it is visible very early on in Canella’s career, well before his racial period, and can thus be viewed as an endemic aspect of his Neolamarckism – and thus an element that would have found itself highly suited to the field of antebellum race science and specifically to the rigid classification of human races. It is also possible that Canella might have held that a sufficiently advanced degradation of psychological traits might have left its subjects

51 too maladapted to desire or absorb external instructions, thus leaving them unable to direct themselves down “higher” paths with or without external prompting.

A final note on the nature of Canella’s racial writing concerns the presence of antisemitism within it. Before the establishment of the Fascist government, Italian antisemitism was comparatively subdued by European standards, despite the presence of enforced segregation such as the ghetti and of currents of antisemitic thought in Italian academia. The Italian Jewish population was otherwise fairly integrated into the Italian one, and experienced higher acceptance and greater safety than the ones native to other European countries. The Fascist party was itself originally ambivalent towards Jews; no enforced segregation or discriminatory rhetoric occurred from it at its start, and several Italian Jews obtained prominent positions within it.109

Several members of the original March on Rome were Jewish themselves and others later achieved considerable status, most notably in the form of Renzo Ravenna and Enrico Paolo

Salem, who became the podestà – municipality leaders under the Fascist government – of

Ferrara and Trieste.110 In the early 1930s, the party line tended to be hostile to the introduction of

German-style hierarchies of European races, most notably through Mussolini’s description of antisemitism as “the German vice” and of “the Jewish question” as something nonexistent in

Italy and which should be absent in any country “with a healthy system of government”.111

This status changed in 1938 with the sudden implementation of the racial laws. These firmly committed Italian law and society to open and enforced antisemitism, and banned Jews from holding any type of teaching position or membership in the Fascist Party, prohibited

109Michael A. Livingston, The Fascists and the Jews of Italy: Mussolini’s Race Laws, 1938-1943 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013). 13-16 110 “Storia Di Paolo Salem L'ebreo Fascista Che Fu Podestà a Trieste - Il Piccolo.” Archivio - Il Piccolo, ricerca.gelocal.it/ilpiccolo/archivio/ilpiccolo/2009/06/12/NZ_24_SPAL.html. Accessed May 21, 2021 111 Christopher Hibbert, Il Duce; the Life of Benito Mussolini (Little, Brown, and Company, Boston, 1962). 76-77

52 intermarriage with “Aryans”, and restricted Jewish citizens’ rights to own property and businesses.112

Unlike more general racism, antisemitism is not readily present in Canella’s earlier writing, and comments regarding Jews are rare in general. The ones present do not show particular condemnation; notably, a recension published 1933 instead has him attribute German antisemitism to a sense of cultural ungratefulness on the part of the Germans towards a segment of their population they did not wish to admit a debt to. Among his later writings, however, antisemitic descriptions become prevalent, but take sometimes peculiar tones in comparison to the description of other races.

Razze Umane, strictly focused on physical appearance and descent, has little to say about culture and behavior, but Canella still notes a difference in behavior between Sephardic and

Ashkenazi Jews. Canella here holds a more positive opinion of the Sephardim and a more negative one of the Ashkenazim, holding the former to be more agreeable and acceptable than the latter – although, it should be noted, the primary positive trait Canella assigns to the

Sephardim is the greater ease with which they are assimilated into host cultures.113 Principi, the primary discussion of racial psychology and culture, is most notable here for its omission, in its section on the white peoples, of a number of races, including the Hebrew one. Canella only briefly mentions it by stating that it is arguably a subsection of, and shares most traits with, the

Anatolian race. The Anatolians, however, are themselves assigned a number of traditionally antisemitic stereotypes, most prominently a characterization as a commerce-minded, mercantile race prone to argumentative behavior.114

112 Michael. The Fascists and the Jews of Italy: Mussolini’s Race Laws. 16-17 113 Canella, Razze Umane Estinte e Viventi, 230 114 Canella, Principi di Psicologia Razziale, 206

53 Unlike the broader thread of racial prejudice, this shift in his later racial writings – all of which were published after the passing of the racial laws in 1938 – can be interpreted as a deliberate adaptation to political developments. No clear link exists between these statements and earlier writings, and the awkward mode with which his description of Jewish is inserted is at noticeable odds with the otherwise extremely forthright manner in which he lists out the various cultural, psychological and evolutionary failings of the non-white races. It is likeliest here that

Canella probably was or began as, like other Italian academics, broadly ambivalent towards the

Jewish people, but took deliberate steps to adopt a more openly antisemitic viewpoint once it became politically advantageous to do so.

Canella also collaborated with the Comitato di Liberazione Nazionale, an internal resistance movement formed in 1943, after the Kingdom of Italy’s formal capitulation but before the fall of either the fascist party itself or of the Republic of Salò, which at the time controlled

Bologna and the broader Emilia region. During this period, Canella is reported to have helped identify academics compromised with fascist activities so that they could be removed from their positions.115 The particular timing of this activity further complicates the idea that he simply bent to changing cultural pressures, as he would still have been operating within areas actively ruled by the Fascist Party at this time. Notable here is also his self-defense in Epurandi, where he emphatically disavows entanglements with the fascist movement while still attempting to defend his previous racial theory. Canella was also defended from accusations of being himself involved with Fascist Party by other academics who were themselves uncompromised.116, 117

115 Boscolo, “Ricordo di Mario Francesco Canella”, 8 116 Ibid. 117 Maiocchi, Scienza Italiana e Razzismo Fascista. 270-273

54 Despite this seeming distance from fascist involvement, however, Canella’s writing is undeniably highly racist in tone and certainly fit well within pre-war Italy’s political climate. The likely cause of this was simply that racism was extremely pervasive in Italian science and culture, to the point that supporting qualitative differences between human races and the superiority of the white race was not in fact considered to be “racist” or anything more than a statement of fact – only biologically-defined antisemitism was considered rigidly indicative of fascist-aligned racism,118 and the afterthought-like manner in which antisemitic matters were inserted into his racial theory likely played in his favor here. Following the war, Canella’s shedding of his beliefs and views was slow and incomplete even after they fell out of favor. This does not match a model where he adopted them purely to fit into the new paradigm, and appears more consistent with the gradual suppression of genuinely-held beliefs.

Taken as a whole, this suggests that Canella likely did consider himself opposed to the fascist regime and actively opposed political influence in academic works. His racial views were most likely the product of the prevalent Italian racial culture of the decades before the war, and his adoption of racial science a product of both that and of its preexisting leanings into Lamarckism and the dominance of psychology.

However, the shift between Canella’s middle and later periods does show the impact of political pressure on Canella’s research. In the postwar period, fascist ideology rapidly fell out favor and having one’s views align with it suddenly became highly unfavorable. This would have left Canella in a very precarious position, and an attempt at restoring himself can be seen in the publication of Epurandi. Nonetheless, despite his attempts to justify his racial theory, Canella quickly set aside his racial psychology in response to a political climate that no longer allowed it.

118 Ibid

55 Canella’s writings in the late forties show a distinct lack of focus and for the most part orient around organizational issues and abstract philosophy rather than science and scientific philosophy. This can be interpreted as a side-effect of the sudden halting of his earlier line of research leaving him without a clear direction to his studies. A new focus appears at the end of the decade in the form of the start of his microzoological research, but after this period Canella limited himself to research papers with very specific focuses and no longer published books or the ambitious philosophical tracts that characterize his earlier two periods. This change may also have been due to the aftershocks of his racial theory’s fall from grace, after which Canella may have found it more prudent to limit his involvement in major debates or a return to academia’s public eye. Moreover, his original battleground – the defense of Lamarckism against the growing dominance of Darwinism and genetic theory – already a declining camp before the second world war, was not likely to be a viable one to return to after the 1950s. Thus, even once Canella might have felt able to return to discussing philosophy of science, a reprise of his pre-racial focus of studies would most likely no longer have been possible.

In full analysis, Canella’s transition between his early and middle stages did not consist of him simply selling out for political favor nor directly abandoning his earlier beliefs. Rather, it appears to have occurred as a more organic transition rooted in the nature of both Italian culture and Italian racial science. Instead, it is his later abandonment of racial science that appears directly attributable to cultural-political pressure, as the rapid change in cultural and ideological standards after the fall of fascism forced him to rapidly abandon his previous lines of research.

56 Bibliography

Allen, Garland Edward, Life Science in the Twentieth Century. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1975 Badino, Guido. torinoscienza.it. “Lorenzo Camerano”, accessed April 12 2021, https://web.archive.org/web/20071011090629/http://www.torinoscienza.it/accademia/person aggi/apri?obj_id=414 Beccari, Nello, Anatomia Comparata dei Vertebrati. Sansoni, 1951. Benevelli, di Luigi. “PSICHIATRIA E RAZZISMI Storie e Documenti Di Luigi Benevelli.” Mario Canella: Non Solo i Neri Ma Anche i Gialli, www.psychiatryonline.it/node/5364. Boscolo, Luigi, “Ricordo di Mario Francesco Canella (1898-1982)”, Annali del Museo Civico di Storia Naturale di Ferrara vol. 9/10 (2006-2007), 5-27 Bowler, Peter J., Evolution: The History of an Idea. University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, California, 1983. Canella, Mario Francesco, L’Anatomia Comparata nel Quadro della Biologia Moderna. Casa Editrice Zanichelli, Bologna, 1937. Canella, Mario Francesco, Genetica, Mutazionismo e Neolamarckismo. 1941. Canella, Mario Francesco, Orientamenti della moderna Biologia: micromerismo od organicismo? Mutazionismo o lamarckismo? Casa Editrice Zanichelli, Bologna, 1939. Canella, Mario Francesco. Principi di psicologia razziale. G.C. Sansoni, Firenze, 1941. Canella, Mario Francesco. Razze Umane Estinte e Viventi, Seconda Edizione Riveduta ed Ampliata. Sansoni Edizioni Scientifiche, Firenze, 1940. Caputo, Vincenzo, “Il ruolo dell’Anatomia comparata nella ricerca e nella didattica universitaria fra ieri e oggi”, Le Scienzi Nautrali Nella Scuola 26 (July 2004): 56-71 Casanova, M. Review of Razze umane estinte e viventi, by Mario Francesco Canella. Genus Vol. 4 (November 1940): 175-176 Coccia, Paulo, “150 Anni di Storia dell’Evoluzione in Italia (1859-2009), Vol. 1”. Partner-Graf, 2018. Gissis, Snait B., and Jablonka, Eva, ed. Transformations of Lamarckism from subtle fluids to molecular biology. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2011

57 Gurrieri, Raffaele, review of L’Anatomia Comparata nel Quadro della Biologia Moderna, by Mario Francesco Canella, L’Università Italiana XXXIV, N. 1 (10th January 1938); pp 2-4 Hibbert, Christopher. Il Duce; the Life of Benito Mussolini. Little, Brown, and Company, Boston, 1962. Livingston, Michael A., The Fascists and the Jews of Italy: Mussolini’s Race Laws, 1938-1943. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013 Maiocchi, Roberto, Scienza Italiana e Razzismo Fascista. La Nuova Italia Editrice, Firenze, 1999 Moran, E. Review of Razze umane estinte e viventi, by Mario Francesco Canella. Angelicum Vol. 18 (April 1941): 270-272 “Storia Di Paolo Salem L'ebreo Fascista Che Fu Podestà a Trieste - Il Piccolo.” Archivio - Il Piccolo, ricerca.gelocal.it/ilpiccolo/archivio/ilpiccolo/2009/06/12/NZ_24_SPAL.html. Accessed May 21, 2021 Volpato, Chiara. “Mario Canella e la psicologia razziale. Un caso di conformismo al potere universitario.” In Il Giorno della Memoria all’Università di Ferrara. Iniziative realizzate dal 2002 al 2014, edited by M. Ravenna, & G. Brunelli, 59-73. 2014, Firenze. Volpato, Chiara. “Un caso di rimozione scientifica: la psicologia razziale di Mario Canella.” Giornale Italiano di Psicologia, Vol. 27, n. 4 (2000): 807-828

58 Curriculum Vitae

Giovanni Bisi

[email protected]

EDUCATION MSc 2021 History and Philosophy of Science and Medicine, The College of Arts and Sciences, University of Indiana Bloomington Thesis: “The Biology of Mario Canella: Science, Politics, and Racism in the Age of Italian Fascism” Advisor: Dr. Sander Gliboff 2018-19 Additional courses taken through University of Wisconsin-Madison B.A. 2018 St. Norbert College Major: Geology Minor: Biology 2012-13 Youth Options Program, University of Wisconsin-Platteville, taken through Platteville High School

HONORS AND AWARDS 2014-18 Trustee Distinguished Scholarship, St. Norbert College 2014-18 Rev. Ken DeGroot Ruth Multicultural Leadership Award, St. Norbert College

PRESENTATIONS 2018 Classification of Early Eocene (53 MY) Rodents from the southern Bighorn Basin, Willwood Formation, Wyoming (Undergraduate Research Forum, St. Norbert College)

LANGUAGE SKILLS Italian Native language English Fluent in reading, speaking, and writing Spanish Reading, speaking and writing ability