Oil, Empire and Islam

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Oil, Empire and Islam August 14, 2015 23 Culture Memories of Mossaddegh: Oil, empire and Islam Gareth Smyth Roots of Middle East Terror, have ing his proposal for a referendum found a causal link between the and eventually to a call for Mossad- coup and not just the 1979 Islamic degh to be executed for treason. London Revolution, but even the attacks on Aside from the Shia establish- New York and the Pentagon on Sep- ment, Fadayan-e Islam, a mili- he US-British coup that tember 11, 2001, because it empow- tant group inspired by the Muslim toppled Mohammad Mos- ered radical Islam. Brotherhood and committed to sha- saddegh as Iran’s prime But August 19, 1953, is not among ria rule, opposed Mossaddegh, as minister on August 19, the dates commemorated in the Is- did Khomeini, then a mid-ranking 1953, is still pored over lamic Republic. Mossaddegh’s ghost cleric among the group’s sympa- Tnot just as a turning point for Iran may have haunted all subsequent thizers. but for the wider Middle East. rulers of Iran but those claiming to While Fadayan-e Islam differed In an influential biography pub- be his successors — including Mehdi from moderate clerics in assassinat- lished in 1990, Musaddiq and the Bazargan, interim prime minister ing figures it opposed — including Struggle for Power in Iran, histo- during the 1979 revolution — have in 1951 prime minister Ali Razmara rian Homa Katouzian argued Mos- been sidelined and sometimes im- — it agreed with establishment cler- saddegh, although defeated in prisoned. ics that the main threats to Islam attempting to assert national Among his innova- came from Communists, secularists control over Iran’s oil, carried tions, Ayatollah and atheists, many of whom sup- forward a democratic flame Ruhollah Khomeini ported the partly French-educated from the aborted Constitu- identified the Shia Mossaddegh. Just as there are those tional Revolution of 1905- clergy with an asser- who lambast Mossaddegh for al- 09. tive nationalism fused leged weakness in the face of West- This, for Katouzian, with suspicion of the ern imperialism, so there are those means today that “Irani- United States and its who argue that an undue emphasis ans espousing democratic allies. National owner- on the CIA and British Secret Intel- principles can with some ship of upstream oil and ligence Service (SIS) role in the 1953 Mohammad Mossaddegh plausibility point to a gas is required under coup obscures its domestic roots. democratic tradition in the constitution of the In an intriguing study published their country, a tradition Islamic Republic but this in 2010, Iran and the CIA, Darioush portrayed “helpless, ignorant Irani- and the wider Middle East. that however weak and tat- has not made a hero of the Bayandor argued that the coup “had ans … (as) victimised by nefarious, Perhaps he would recall a speech tered nevertheless provides foun- prime minister who first at- essentially an indigenous character all-knowing Westerners”, suited he gave in 1944 in which he said, “A dations on which to build”. tempted oil nationalisation. and resulted from Iran’s internal dy- today’s authorities in Tehran “who dictator is just like a father who pre- The removal of Mossaddegh For the revolutionaries of 1979, namics”. exploit the image of a rapacious vents his child’s normal develop- and the restoration of Mohammad “liberals” such as Mossaddegh had Such cudgels were taken up by Great Satan to justify their tyranni- ment and, when he dies, leaves an Reza Pahlavi as shah in 1953 cer- let Iran down: Islam would not. But Ray Takeyh, a US State Department cal rule”. What would Mossaddegh inexperienced and underdeveloped tainly paved the way for the shah’s this necessitated some revision of official subsequently at the Council make of it all? After the coup, he child behind.” increasingly dictatorial rule. And, the tumultuous events of 1953. on Foreign Relations think-tank in spent 14 quiet years under house ar- Musaddiq and the Struggle for argues Katouzian, the role of the While some clerics supported New York, who argued in Foreign rest at his modest country estate in Power in Iran; Homa Katouzian; IB United States and Britain in the Mossaddegh, most senior ones did Affairs in 2014 that Mossaddegh’s Ahmadabad, west of Tehran, before Tauris; revised edition 1999. Iran coup undermined the relationship not. The leading religious figure “dictatorial tendencies and his un- his death in 1967, when he was de- and the CIA: The Fall of Mosaddeq — personified in Mossaddegh — of the day, Ayatollah Mohammad- willingness to resolve the oil dis- nied a public funeral and buried be- Revisited; Darioush Bayandor; Pal- between constitutionalism, if not Hossein Borujerdi, welcomed the pute with the British steadily erod- neath the dining room of his house. grave Macmillan; 2010. full-blown democracy, and national shah back to Iran after the coup. ed his support” and led to his ouster Possibly he would be amused and self-determination. The most politically visible cleric, by a coalition of “Iranian army offic- quietly pleased by the way his name Gareth Smyth has covered Middle Others, including Stephen Kinz- Ayatollah Abdolqassem Kashani, ers, merchants and mullahs”. and the events of 1953 reverberate. Eastern affairs for 20 years and er, in his best-selling All the Shah’s moved from supporting Mossad- Takeyh suggested that accounts Mossaddegh would be less amused was chief correspondent for the Men: An American Coup and the degh to a fatwa in July 1953 outlaw- exaggerating the foreign role, which by much of politics today in Iran Financial Times in Iran in 2003-07. The chaos of Egypt’s religious discourse Viewpoint he attention paid to allowed to preserve the gains they Even the black list the Ministry of state is closer to a media circus renewing the nature of have made in the social space. for Religious Endowments has than an actual movement for religious discourse in One of the clearest manifesta- drawn up of extremist preachers The misuse change. Egypt in the months tions of the present crisis is the does not appear to have been of religion The wrong-headed way in after President Abdel way in which al-Azhar has implemented properly. During the for political which the task of renewing Fattah al-Sisi called for abrogated its traditional role. For prayers of Eid al-Fitr, mosques ends has Egypt’s religious discourse is Ta “religious revolution” has been example, al-Azhar has not nationwide were split into two being handled betrays a sense of a cause for optimism among troubled itself with the views of camps, those following the allowed chaos and a lack of focus that many. The misuse of religion for its scholars and has not formu- Ministry for Religious Endow- extremists to ignores the root of the problem political ends has allowed extrem- lated a useful prescription for ments and those following the find a place and sticks to the margins. ists to find a place in Egyptian extremism. Instead, al-Azhar has political current of the Salafists This approach provides an Mohamed society, creating a problem that preferred to avoid confronting and Muslim Brotherhood. In in Egyptian environment in which extremist Abulfadl needs addressing. extremists both within its own effect, mosques became the scene society groups can continue operating So far, however, the results of ranks and within other institu- of a political competition to see and killing to prevent any renewal this effort to renew and correct tions. which side would attract the most of religious discourse. It will allow religious discourse in Egypt has Instead of confronting extrem- people. extremists to continue to employ not inspired confidence or ism, al-Azhar has looked the other The politicised spectacle of the obvious failure of official indicated that fundamental way, something that has encour- prayers in Egypt throughout religious institutions as a means change has taken place. aged those who stood to lose out Ramadan and the Eid should ring of increasing their own popular- A major problem is that those from a religious renewal and a alarm bells. It is now clear that the ity, something that could provide who have been tasked by the state closer monitoring of mosque task of renewing religious them with ammunition in any with undertaking a religious preachers. Extremist preachers discourse that future confrontation. renewal, namely al-Azhar and the have been able to preserve their has been So long as the approach of Ministry for Religious Endow- role in many places, some going announced by officialdom towards extremism ments, are busy absolving so far as to blatantly challenge the Sisi and remains unchanged it will themselves of responsibility for authority of the state. adopted by continue to lose ground to the present state of affairs. No The Ministry for Religious numerous extremists, who have been left to effort has been made to diagnose Endowments, which initially institutions create a popular base of support in the present crisis correctly and appeared in the vanguard of the Egyptian society despite the begin addressing its social, fight against extremism, has blows levelled against them in the religious and cultural roots. instead limited its role to that of sphere of politics and security. Instead of coordinating their preventing Salafists and Muslim The task of religious renewal is efforts to institute a strategy for Brotherhood sympathisers from of the upmost importance and any dealing with religious extremism, preaching in mosques. Those who solution must deal with its al-Azhar and the Ministry for have not graduated from theological, social and cultural Religious Endowments have al-Azhar now need a permit aspects more broadly, attending to engaged in an exercise of mutual in order to preach but not every detail so as to deal with the recrimination.
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