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Fair Trade Milk Initiative in Belgium: Bricolage as an Empowering Strategy for Change: Fair trade milk initiative in Belgium
Article in Sociologia Ruralis · July 2017 DOI: 10.1111/soru.12174
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Fair trade milk initiative in Belgium: bricolage as an empowering strategy for change
Journal:For Sociologia Review Ruralis Only Manuscript ID SORU-16-063.R2
Manuscript Type: Special Issue Paper
dairy system, bricolage, ambiguity, lock-in, multi-level perspective, fair Keywords: trade
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1 2 3 4 1 “Fair trade milk initiative in Belgium: bricolage as an empowering strategy for 5 2 change” 6 7 3 8 9 4 Abstract: 10 11 12 5 In a context of multiple crises, dairy farmers struggle to receive a fair remuneration for their 13 14 6 work. This situation led to the creation of fair milk projects in Europe. But fair trade projects 15 16 7 often suffer from ambiguous interpretations that place them simultaneously in and against the 17 18 8 market. This studyFor focuses onReview a Belgian milk label inOnly order to analyse how dairy farmers 19 20 9 developed a particular strategy to create their own fair milk. Based on semi-structured 21 22 10 interviews and using the multi-level perspective, we propose that articulating the concepts of 23 24 11 lock-ins, bricolage and ambiguity enables us to analyse the potential of this innovation for the 25 26 12 transition of the Belgian dairy system. The study shows that fairness is often a matter of 27 28 13 divergent interpretations, and its final actualiszation is the product of emergent and negotiated 29 30 14 relations. By using bricolage practices, the stakeholders reinforced their capacity to gain market 31 32 15 power and act within the system they want to change. 33 34 35 16 Keywords: lock-in, dairy system, bricolage, ambiguity, multi-level perspective, fair trade. 36 37 38 17 39 40 41 18 42 43 44 19 45 46 47 20 48 49
50 21 51 52 22 53 54 55 23 56 57 58 59 60 1
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1 2 3 4 24 1. Introduction 5 6 7 25 After decades of protectionist regulation, European dairy policy took a step further towards 8 9 26 liberalisation with the opening up of milk quotas in 2015. In European countries, the number of 10 11 27 dairy farms is constantly decreasing while, at the same time, they are becoming more intensive. 12 13 28 Moreover, dairy farmers have had to cope with a series of crises occurring in 2009, 2012 and 14 15 29 2015. All these crises were linked to the opening up of the European dairy sector to the global 16 17 30 market. This context of crisis opened a window of opportunity for fair trade projects in 18 For Review Only 19 31 European countries. These projects aim to support traditional farmers who barely earn a fair 20 21 32 remuneration for their work. 22 23 24 33 The analysis of fair trade products reveals a contrast between ideal fair trade projects and their 25 26 34 practical implementation (fairness in-the-making). In particular, many scholars have highlighted 27 28 35 a tension in fair trade projects, which are simultaneously “in” and “against” the market (e.g. 29 30 36 Huybrecht 2012, Fridell 2003, Le Velly 2004, Haynes 2006, Raynolds and Long 2007; 31 32 37 Özçağlar-Toulouse et al. 2010). As Huybrechts explains (2012, p. 17), stakeholders within the 33 34 38 fair trade movement “wish to use market mechanisms as a tool to increase their social impact, 35 36 39 but at the same time promote a political project that questions the functioning of the market”. It 37 38 40 thus appears that fairness is not a norm that can be realised in a self-evident manner: it is 39 40 41 necessary to make a series of adjustments (“bricolage”) to give it concrete effect, but this 41 42 42 generates a tension between the divergent interpretations of the project. These adjustments are 43 44 43 always specific: they vary according to the socio-historical context and the socio-technical 45 46 44 network in which the project takes place. 47 48 49 45 This article aims to contribute to the reflection around this tension, which frequently appears in 50 51 46 fair trade. The article will juxtapose this reflection with the question of the transition to 52 53 47 sustainable agri-food systems. Using the tools of the multi-level perspective (MLP), we will 54 55 48 analyse how Belgian farmers have developed a distinctive strategy in order to create their own 56 57 58 59 60 2
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1 2 3 4 49 brand of fair trade milk (Fairebel) as a response to the milk crisis of 2009. The analysis 5 6 50 demonstrates how the tension was created in the particular context of the dairy sector, which is 7 8 51 characterised by a high degree of “lock-in”, which forced the farmers to use bricolage to realise 9 10 52 their project. This bricolage is the source of the tension in which the project finds itself: at once 11 12 53 “in” and “against” the market; at once in conflict and continuity with the system. We 13 14 54 demonstrate how this tension generates an ambiguity, in the sense that the interpretation 15 16 55 depends on the perspective taken. 17 18 For Review Only 19 56 The case is interesting because of the manner in which the stakeholders of the fair milk project 20 21 57 responded to the ambiguity by showing their commitment to letting one interpretation of the 22 23 58 project (political commitment) prevail over another (market expedience). In doing so, they were 24 25 59 able to maintain their project despite the tension. This article contributes to the reflection about 26 27 60 the transition of the agri-food system; it does so by taking into account the fact that in the case 28 29 61 of a strongly “locked-in” system like the dairy sector, the realisation of a “radical” project is 30 31 62 difficult. Even so, the construction of an ambiguous but very concrete project could itself serve 32 33 63 to put the system into tension. As a researcher, it is interesting to grasp this ambiguity and the 34 35 64 manner in which it is produced. The process of bricolage that produced the ambiguity permits us 36 37 65 to summarise and identify precisely where the lock-ins with which the actors experimented are 38 39 66 situated. 40 41 42 67 To analyse and further explore this case study, we will first present our method and conceptual 43 44 68 framework and define our understanding of the key concepts: lock-in, bricolage and ambiguity. 45 46 69 Secondly, we will describe our case study: a fair milk label created in reaction to the dairy crisis 47 48 70 that occurred in 2009. Thirdly, we will describe the Belgian dairy sector and show how farmers 49 50 71 had to use bricolage to overcome lock-ins. Fourthly, we describe a controversy around the 51 52 72 fairmilk project and show how it revealed the existence of a tension between a “political 53 54 73 commitment” and a “market expedience” dimension. This tension is a source of ambiguity in 55 56 57 74 different interpretations of the project. We will describe the sociotechnical transformations 58 59 60 3
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1 2 3 4 75 realised by the stakeholders in order to contain this ambiguity and avoid the collapse of the 5 6 76 project. Fifthly, we will discuss how bricolage is a useful concept for overcoming common 7 8 77 dichotomies linked with innovation, transition and fair trade. Lastly, we will conclude with a 9 10 78 synthesis of the arguments as to why this case study contributes to the reflections on transitions 11 12 79 to a sustainable agri-food system. 13 14 15 80 16 17 18 81 2. Conceptual frameworkFor and Review methods Only 19 20 21 82 Theoretically we build on transition theories, and more particularly on MLP, which provides a 22 23 83 useful heuristic tool (Smith 2007) for understanding innovation and change. Transition theories 24 25 84 aim to understand how major sociotechnical change occurs, and more specifically, how a 26 27 85 sociotechnical innovation can disrupt an existing system and induce deep change. The MLP 28 29 86 interprets transitional processes as the dynamics of interaction between three analytical levels 30 31 87 (Geels 2005, 2011, Geels and Schot 2007, Smith and Raven 2012): the socio-technical 32 33 88 landscape (macro), the socio-technical regime (meso) and the niche innovations (micro). In this 34 35 89 paper, we consider the Belgian dairy system as being the socio-technical regime, the fair trade 36 37 90 milk label as the niche innovation, and the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and the market 38 39 91 rules as the socio-technical landscape. 40 41 42 92 Even though MLP gives the impression that it portrays regimes as homogenous or monolithic, 43 44 93 many actors underline the contrary: the permeability of the boundaries between the levels of the 45 46 94 regime, its niches, and its overall landscape (Smith 2007, Elzen et al. 2012b, Diaz et al. 2013). 47 48 95 The aim is thus not to strictly define the actors, organisations or initiatives as belonging to one 49 50 96 particular level or another; rather, the aim is to analyse the processes by which niches and 51 52 97 regimes interact and are interdependent (Darnhofer 2015, Smith 2007). Recent analyses have, 53 54 98 incidentally, focused on these aspects of niche-regime interaction, and have demonstrated that 55 56 99 the existence of relations or links with a regime are is important for the development of niches 57 58 59 60 4
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1 2 3 4 100 (Grin and Van Staveren 2007, Smith 2007, Elzen et al. 2012b, Diaz et al. 2013, Darnhofer 5 6 101 2015, Vankeerberghen and Stassart 2016). Transition is thus not the business of radical or 7 8 102 alternative niches that operate beneath the system in order to suddenly replace it. Instead, 9 10 103 transition is a two-dimensional process through which the trajectories of niches and regimes 11 12 104 evolve and reciprocally influence one another. 13 14 15 105 Within the regime, innovations are mainly incremental; change occurs along predictable lines 16 17 106 due to the lock-in mechanism (Verbong and Geels 2010) where multiple socio-technical 18 For Review Only 19 107 dimensions are aligned and mutually interdependent (Smith and Raven 2012). Scholars have 20 21 108 identified agri-food system lock-ins in various sectors (Cowan and Gunby 1996, Vanloqueren 22 23 109 and Baret 2009, Stassart and Jamar 2008, Lamine et al. 2010, Magrini et al. 2016, Roep and 24 25 110 Wiskerke 2012). Lock-in is an evolutionary process that systemically excludes competing 26 27 111 technologies, views and practices and as such creates internal resistance from within the regime 28 29 112 that may lead to inefficiency and blindness to environmental change (Foray 1997) that paves the 30 31 113 way toward unsustainability. In the case study examined in this paper, the lock-ins of the dairy 32 33 114 sector (the regime) forced the farmers to use bricolage to implement their fair milk project. 34 35 36 115 Bricolage is the name for unexpected practices – that is, practices excluded from conventional 37 38 116 procedures (or established modes of action). In such situations, bricolage may be defined as an 39 40 117 assemblage work that goes beyond pre-established planning and leads to the production of new 41 42 118 situated knowledges, objects and associations. It is a creative process, using “whatever is at 43 44 119 hand” (Levi-Strauss 1967, p. 17) according to which the redefinition of the project is aligned 45 46 120 with the simultaneous redefinition of its environment. What is key in these adjustments is that 47 48 121 bricolage practices “preserve emergent properties”. As Garud and Karnøe (2003, p. 296) 49 50 122 accurately point out: 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 5
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1 2 3 4 123 “It is a process of moving ahead on the basis of inputs of actors who possess local knowledge, 5 6 124 but through their interactions, are able to gradually transform emerging paths to higher 7 8 125 degrees of functionality ». 9 10 11 126 The faithfulness and authenticity of bricolage is always difficult to characterise scientifically 12 13 127 because it is rooted in local situations and practices and because “discursive justifications 14 15 128 always betray the specificities of tinkering” (Law and Mol 2002, p. 101). Nevertheless, several 16 17 129 authors who work on understanding the dynamics through which a niche influences a regime are 18 For Review Only 19 130 aware of the potential of bricolage for transition (Garud and Karnoe 2003, Diaz et al., 2013, 20 21 131 Elzen et al. 2012a.). 22 23 24 132 Garud and Karnoe (2003) go one step further and propose that bricolage is a type of strategy 25 26 133 that can adopt niches in order to bring about transitions. These authors develop an active (and 27 28 134 non-contingent) vision of bricolage: they allow for the integration of heterogeneous elements 29 30 135 and actors that wish to facilitate the transformation of an innovation path towards a transition. 31 32 136 Diaz et al. (2013) propose a similar vision of the emergence of an innovation that is also a social 33 34 137 process. This process requires both the enrolment of heterogeneous actors (notably hybrid 35 36 138 regime actors) and grasping the opportunities when they present themselves. In line with these 37 38 139 authors, this case study proposes that bricolage is a process of development of a niche that 39 40 140 permits the reinforcement of its potential to put the Belgian dairy system into tension. 41 42 43 141 The problem with the bricolage process – which is especially salient in our case study – is that it 44 45 142 may lead to ambiguous interpretations of the innovation. Leach et al. (2010, p. xiii) define 46 47 143 ambiguity as “a state of knowledge in which there are acknowledged to exist divergent, equally 48 49 144 valid ways to frame different possible outcomes”. Simmel (1908) uses the concept of ambiguity 50 51 145 to describe situations where interpretation is uncertain. In this regard, ambiguity can be the 52 53 146 subject of concurrent and conflicting interpretations which lead to different actions. 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 6
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1 2 3 4 147 The concept of ambiguity is rarely called upon in sociology. Ambiguity is subject to two 5 6 148 different interpretations in social sciences: for political sciences it is more of an obstacle 7 8 149 (Benzerafa 2011), but for management sciences, it is a valuable resource (Dannevoye and 9 10 150 Mormont 2014, March 1978, Goffman 1974, Journe and Raulet-Croizet 2008, Barley et al. 11 12 151 2012). For the latter, ambiguity is regarded as a strategy that leaves open the possibility of 13 14 152 mutual options and adaptations (Barley et al. 2012). 15 16 17 153 In this paper, ambiguity is a tension between two competing interpretations of the fair milk 18 For Review Only 19 154 project: between market expedience and political commitment (between “in” and “against” the 20 21 155 market). This paper does not aim to judge the different interpretations; rather, it aims to 22 23 156 understand how the elements that are at the foundations of the interpretations were constructed. 24 25 157 To do this, understanding the processes of development of an innovation as processes of a type 26 27 158 of bricolage is a useful heuristic tool. Analysing the Fairebel case permits us to illustrate the 28 29 159 three concepts of lock in, bricolage and ambiguity. 30 31 32 160 This case study is based on ten semi-structured interviews conducted in 2013. Interviews were 33 34 161 held with six actors from the niche level (dairy farmers, farmers’ unions) and four actors from 35 36 162 the regime level (dairy sector representatives, farmers’ unions). These interviews were 37 38 163 complemented with readings on the dairy system and Internet articles about the case study. The 39 40 164 multi-level perspective (MLP) was used to analyse the potential of such initiatives to transform 41 42 165 the dairy system and its lock-ins. 43 44 45 166 46 47 48 167 3. The case study: Fairebel 49 50 168 3.1. A 10 euro cent coin as kernel 51 52 During the 2009 crisis, the European Milk Board (EMB), supported by the Milcherzeuger 53 169 54 55 170 Interessengemeinschaft (MIG) and other national dairy farmers’ organisations, called for a 56 57 171 production freeze and organised a European milk strike that was followed by more than 40,000 58 59 60 7
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1 2 3 4 172 dairy farmers across Europe. The EMB is a European organisation of dairy farmers that argues 5 6 173 in favour of regulation and monitoring of production and demand and in particular, a guarantee 7 8 174 of a minimum price of 40 cents per litre of milk to dairy farmers. The MIG is a Belgian 9 10 175 organisation of dairy farmers, and a member of the EMB. They have both been particularly 11 12 176 active in demonstrations seeking to change the dairy system and obtain better prices for dairy 13 14 177 farmers. At the peak of these events in Belgium, farmers sprayed three million litres of milk on 15 16 178 fields. The pictures of tearful dairy farmers throwing out their production had a strong 17 18 179 emotional impactFor on Belgian consumers.Review This action received Only widespread media coverage and 19 20 180 opened a window of opportunity for the creation of Fairebel. 21 22 23 181 During this 2009 strike, several dairy farmers began to unite to create a Belgian fair-trade milk 24 25 182 value chain: the Fairebel project. The project was led by E. Schöpges – a dairy farmer living in 26 27 183 the German-speaking part of Belgium, to the East of Wallonia. Supported by the current 28 29 184 Walloon Minister of Agriculture, B. Lutgen, the group of dairy farmers created the Fairebel 30 31 185 cooperative in autumn 2009. The idea of developing a Belgian fair milk label was inspired by 32 33 186 the Fair Milk programme set up by the EMB and aimed at creating fair trade milk labels in 34 35 187 different European countries, supported by national dairy farmers’ organisations. E. Schöpges is 36 37 188 one of the co-founders of MIG and is a representative at the EMB. Before the crisis, he had 38 39 189 already tried to create a fair-milk label through the Fair Milk programme, without success. 40 41 190 However, the shock created by the dairy crisis created a new “window of opportunity” for 42 43 191 innovation within the regime and garnered the interest of heterogeneous actors around the 44 45 46 192 Fairebel project (dairy farmers, consumers, and the Walloon government). 47 48 193 E. Schöpges has been the director of the Fairebel co-operative since its founding. He had the 49 50 194 idea for this project and actively worked on building its network and connecting heterogeneous 51 52 195 actors with different interests. He therefore generated involvement and support for Fairebel. He 53 54 196 is the “bricoleur” who breathed life into Fairebel and enabled it to surmount the obstacles it 55 56 57 197 faced. 58 59 60 8
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1 2 3 4 198 The main idea of this fair milk label is to guarantee an extra payment of 10 euro cents to farmers 5 6 199 for each litre of milk sold under the Fairebel brand. This economic focus at the heart of Fairebel 7 8 200 originates from the fact that the Fairebel project was a direct response to the 2009 dairy crisis; 9 10 201 and the core of this crisis was economic: the extra 10 cents is an economic solution to an 11 12 202 economic problem. It has remained the non-negotiable part of the project throughout its 13 14 203 evolution; it constitutes the kernel which gave rise to the Fairebel initiative. 15 16 17 204 3.2. Fairebel network building 18 For Review Only 19 20 205 From this kernel of an extra 10 cents return, the Fairebel stakeholders enlisted the help of a 21 22 206 series of actors in order to achieve their project. As explained above, during the milk strike in 23 24 207 September 2009, they involved the Minister of Agriculture, the media and consumers. At the 25 26 208 time, E. Schöpges actively participated in bringing these actors together and had a large 27 28 209 influence on the structure adopted by Fairebel. However, his influence on the project was only 29 30 210 possible because he was supported by various actors whom he managed to involve: he gained 31 32 211 influence because of the alliances he created. He also joined forces with another person who had 33 34 212 a major influence on the project; P. Massoz, was the director of the Fairebel cooperative during 35 36 213 the first three years of the project. P. Massoz played an important role in the project’s 37 38 214 development. 39 40 41 215 Until autumn 2009 (when Fairebel was created), P. Massoz worked for the LDA-Solarec, which 42 43 216 is one of the two main dairy processors in Wallonia. When the Fairebel farmers’ stakeholders 44 45 217 learned that he had just resigned from his position at LDA-Solarec, they invited him to become 46 47 218 the director of their project. P. Massoz accepted the invitation; for him – as a person who 48 49 219 defines himself as a creator – it was a great opportunity to develop an original milk brand based 50 51 220 on a principle of fairness. And for the farmers of the Fairebel project, he was the ideal candidate 52 53 221 to become director: because of his experience, P. Massoz has acquired a great knowledge of the 54 55 222 dairy industry. 56 57 58 59 60 9
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1 2 3 4 223 Led by E. Schöpges and P. Massoz, and helped by the Walloon Minister of Agriculture who 5 6 224 granted a subsidy to Fairebel involving a payment of 1,000 euros to any new co-operator, 7 8 225 Fairebel quickly persuaded between 150 and 200 dairy farmers to become co-operators (winter 9 10 226 2009-2010). This subsidy was granted during the 2009 crisis, at a moment when the Minister 11 12 227 was seeking solutions; the Fairebel initiative was a great project to support and, by so doing, 13 14 228 provided a political response to a crisis that received extensive media attention. However, this 15 16 229 political support, later followed by another show of public support from the Minister, did not 17 18 230 free Fairebel fromFor regime-level Review pressures. Simultane ouslyOnly with its political activities the 19 20 231 Fairebel cooperative began negotiations with large retailers and dairy processors. An agreement 21 22 232 was quickly finalised with large retailers in Belgium, who agreed to sell milk under the Fairebel 23 24 233 brand. However, negotiations with the Belgian dairy processors were more hostile and 25 26 234 eventually they all refused to process Fairebel milk. 27 28 29 235 The reasons behind this decision are multiple and highly controversial. For some actors, the 30 31 236 explanation lies in an agreement among the dairy processors to prevent the creation of a new 32 33 237 brand of milk, for commercial and trade-union reasons; for others, it was the fault of Fairebel 34 35 238 stakeholders who refused to trade with the Belgian dairy processors; or it was the fault of the 36 37 239 Belgian dairy processors who wanted to reduce the extra 10 cent margin; others found an 38 39 240 additional explanation, suggesting it was impossible for technical reasons to produce a new 40 41 241 brand within the Belgian dairy processing sector. 42 43 44 242 Whatever the reason, the refusal to participate of the Belgian dairy processors shows how the 45 46 243 dairy sector is locked-in in terms of milk supply contracts and how the dairy farmers who own 47 48 244 the Fairebel brand have little market power. When they made contact with the dairy processors, 49 50 245 the Fairebel stakeholders were convinced that they would process their brand of milk because it 51 52 246 was a new opportunity to sell milk; however, they encountered social, political and, especially, 53 54 technical problems. 55 247 56 57 58 59 60 10
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1 2 3 4 248 5 6 7 249 4. Lock-ins of the Belgian dairy sector 8 9 10 250 4.1. The Belgian dairy sector 11 12 This case study raises the problem of transforming a food system that is faced with a double 13 251 14 15 252 inertia. Firstly, development of the dairy sector over the last 40 years has taken place within a 16 17 253 context of standardisation, normalisation, intensification, centralisation and globalisation. These 18 For Review Only 19 254 systemically interdependent factors have reached a high level of irreversibility. Secondly, the 20 21 255 pace of intensification of dairy farming has led to a reversal of the power relationship between 22 23 256 producers and the processing industries. The latter currently form a dominant oligopoly which 24 25 257 leaves producers very little room for manœuvre. 26 27 28 258 This power relationship is called market power. Market power is a concept originating in 29 30 259 industrial economics that evaluates the power of an actor in the market, particularly price fixing, 31 32 260 based on several criteria (e.g. the size of the organisation, the horizontal and vertical 33 34 261 concentration of the sector, links existing with the politics, finance capital…) (Hahn, 1984). We 35 36 262 apply and extend this concept to dairy farmers who lost market power as their economic 37 38 263 dependence on dairy processors increased. 39 40 41 264 From the 1960s onwards, the supply of milk began to exceed demand and farmers had to find a 42 43 265 dairy processor to accept their milk (Vatin 1990). Simultaneously, thanks to refrigerated trucks 44 45 266 and tanks, dairy processors were able to collect the milk over a broader area while maintaining 46 47 267 the quality of the milk (Van Mol 2005). This led to a drastic reduction in the number of dairy 48 49 268 processors and created a situation where farmers were confronted by fewer but bigger and 50 51 269 stronger dairy companies (Vatin 1990). The centralisation of the dairy industry in the 1960- 52 53 270 1980s was accompanied by a process similar to that of the petroleum industry where the 54 55 271 function of farmers is limited to that of “milk supplier” and then, influenced their investments 56 57 272 and agricultural practices in order to fulfil this function (e.g. the dominance of the highly 58 59 60 11
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1 2 3 4 273 productive Holstein breed) (Lebacq 2015). It was within this context that dairy farmers 5 6 274 experienced a loss of market power. 7 8 9 275 Furthermore, this overproduction of milk influenced the outlets in which the dairy processors 10 11 276 invested. Liquid milk is not well-suited to conservation, storage and transport, so they invested 12 13 277 in the processing of butter and milk powder in order to create new outlets for liquid milk (Van 14 15 278 Mol 2005). Today, the dairy sector in Belgium (especially in Wallonia) is still suffering from 16 17 279 those choices which provide scant opportunity for the production of high added value (HAV) 18 For Review Only 19 280 products like cheeses or yogurts that better enable dairy farmers to receive a good price from 20 21 281 dairy processors (Lebacq 2015). Indeed, global milk pricing is mainly determined by butter and 22 23 282 milk powder and Europe is under-competitive on the global market for dairy products – except 24 25 283 for HAV products (European Court of Auditors 2009). Therefore, if dairy processors are 26 27 284 producing a lot of butter and milk powder, they will be more vulnerable to global price 28 29 285 fluctuations and will struggle to ensure fair remuneration for farmers when the price is low. 30 31 32 286 Luxembourg milk - Belgian label 33 34 35 287 Within a few months, the farmers of the Fairebel initiative, with support from the Minister and 36 37 288 citizens, had set up the cooperative, registered a substantial number of members, and negotiated 38 39 289 an agreement with retailers. However, the cooperative had no dairy processor to process the 40 41 290 milk into the end product: i.e. cartons of milk. The refusal of Belgian dairy processors to 42 43 291 process the Fairebel milk was a significant obstacle to the project. The farmers from Fairebel 44 45 292 discovered the extent to which the dairy system is socio-technically locked-in. To overcome this 46 47 293 blockage they started to look for alternative solutions. 48 49 50 294 The solution they found came from a five-step “bricolage” process (the last stage only came 51 52 295 later – see below). Following the definition of bricolage given above, what did Fairebel 53 54 296 stakeholders have at hand to overcome the dairy processors’ refusal? 55 56 57 58 59 60 12
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1 2 3 4 297 Firstly, as already mentioned, Fairebel stakeholders took great care to combine all the skills of 5 6 298 the dairy industry. While it is certainly true that Fairebel stakeholders failed to get the Belgian 7 8 299 dairy processors on board, they did manage to enrol their integrated competencies through P. 9 10 300 Massoz and his experience of the dairy industry. 11 12 13 301 Secondly, as a handy alternative, together with P. Massoz, the stakeholders identified the dairy 14 15 302 processor Luxlait, based in Luxembourg and close to the Belgian border, as a potential partner. 16 17 303 Given that most Belgian dairy farms are located within a radius of 50 to 100 km of their dairy 18 For Review Only 19 304 processor, this did not have much of an effect on the technical organisation of the project. In 20 21 305 addition, Luxlait had – unlike the two Walloon dairy processors – a tradition of diversification 22 23 306 that demonstrated its ability to produce differentiated own branded milk products (Siweck 24 25 307 2000): a large range of drinking milks, butters, creams, yoghurts, cheeses, desserts, ice creams, 26 27 308 butters and even biscuits (Nelissen 2013). 28 29 30 309 Thirdly, the providential solution offered by Luxlait was double-edged. Luxlait was interested in 31 32 310 cooperating with the Fairebel project but had no agreement to collect milk in Belgium. Fairebel 33 34 311 had no other choice than to take what they had to hand: the milk from Luxembourgish farmers 35 36 312 processed under the Fairebel label. This third bricolage causes confusion for the consumer. 37 38 313 Indeed, even if the packaging suggests that the carton contains Belgian milk (colours and words 39 40 314 referring to Belgium); it in fact contains milk produced by Luxembourgish dairy farmers, while 41 42 315 the extra 10 cents per litre returns to Belgian dairy farmers’ Fairebel co-operators. The Fairebel 43 44 316 co-operators are farmers who bought shares of the Fairebel co-operative and, by doing so, are 45 46 317 part of it. 47 48 49 318 And fourthly, the milk produced by the Belgian dairy farmers’ Fairebel co-operators continues 50 51 319 to be collected and sold by traditional Belgian dairy processors, the same ones who refused to 52 53 320 produce the milk under the new Fairebel label. In other words, the Belgian dairy farmers who 54 55 321 are part of the Fairebel co-operative earn the extra 10 cents per litre of milk which is, in fact, 56 57 58 59 60 13
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1 2 3 4 322 produced by Luxembourgish dairy farmers and packaged by Luxlait, while they continue to sell 5 6 323 their milk to the Belgian dairy processors at the market price. To do so, they receive a share of 7 8 324 the extra money generated by the Fairebel label: they collect this money within the cooperative, 9 10 325 and share it annually amongst members, according to shareholdings. This economic 11 12 326 construction reveals the economic dependence of the farmers on the dairy processors, also 13 14 327 underlined by the EMB and linked to two aspects (EMB 2012, cited by Lebacq 2015, p. 192): 15 16 328 (1), the general obligation for farmers to deliver the whole production to the same dairy 17 18 329 processor and (2),For the low numberReview of dairy processo rsOnly collecting milk, as is the case in 19 20 330 Wallonia. 21 22 23 331 [Place Figure 1. Around here] 24 25 26 332 As soon as these four bricolages (Figure 1) were completed and the arrangement with Luxlait 27 28 333 finalised, everything moved quickly and cartons of Fairebel semi-skimmed milk were on 29 30 334 Belgian supermarket shelves in May 2010. 31 32 33 335 This alliance with Luxlait outside the Belgian borders gave rise to the question “what is fair?” Is 34 35 336 it the milk seen as a technical object that has to be fair, or the project – seen as a sociotechnical 36 37 337 object – that helps farmers to get an extra 10 cents return on each litre of milk sold? This is an 38 39 338 important issue and there is no simple answer. Bricolage relates here not only to new relational 40 41 339 assemblages: to shift from an anticipated actor to an unanticipated alliance. The Luxembourgish 42 43 340 association was a solution to an urgent problem in a highly locked-in system. 44 45 46 341 47 48 49 342 5. A controversy unveiling ambiguity 50 51 343 5.1. Between political commitment and market opportunity 52 53 54 344 In May 2010, this bricolage was pointed out by the Belgian federation of consumer 55 56 345 organisations, the Research and Information Center of Consumer Organisations (RICCO) that 57 58 59 60 14
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1 2 3 4 346 filed a complaint for ‘deceptive marketing practices’. This complaint opened up a controversy 5 6 347 around the Fairebel initiative and its fairness. 7 8 9 348 This controversy revealed the tension within Fairebel between being in or against the market. 10 11 349 This tension creates an inherent ambiguity in Fairebel and shows that it maintains close links 12 13 350 with the regime (the Belgian dairy sector), as well as pressuring it. On some dimensions, the 14 15 351 Fairebel project appears to act like a niche-innovation that puts the regime under pressure and 16 17 352 inspires a systemic transformation. But on other dimensions, Fairebel maintains close links with 18 For Review Only 19 353 the regime by using its technical devices and seems to be more a “fairwashing” than a radical 20 21 354 innovation. In this respect, we assume that Fairebel was developed within the regime by actors 22 23 355 from the regime, using its devices and following its rules. But little by little, Fairebel has tended 24 25 356 to distance itself from the regime and has come closer to the niche-innovation level, while 26 27 357 remaining between those two levels. This double-stretch between breaks and continuities with 28 29 358 the regime reveals the issues and problems that are addressed and questioned by the Fairebel 30 31 359 stakeholders (the breaks), and the other issues that could be questioned but not addressed by 32 33 360 them or over which they have no influence (the continuities). The specificity of the five-step 34 35 361 bricolage rests on the way in which Fairebel navigates between questioning or leaving 36 37 362 unquestioned the different aspects of the regime. 38 39 40 363 On the one hand, Fairebel breaks with the Belgian dairy sector by creating several innovations. 41 42 364 The most important innovation created by Fairebel relates to the involvement and the role of the 43 44 365 dairy farmers. With traditional milk labels, dairy farmers have no market power in their hands: 45 46 366 the brands are owned by private companies (mainly multinational dairy companies), and the 47 48 367 price is negotiated by dairy processors. By owning their own brand and organising themselves 49 50 368 through a cooperative, the dairy farmers recover a part of the market power they lost; they take 51 52 369 part in the negotiations between the different actors of the value chain. From this viewpoint, 53 54 370 Fairebel empowers farmers by enabling them to get a better price for the milk they produce and 55 56 57 371 could thus be considered as being fair. 58 59 60 15
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1 2 3 4 372 This action to recover some market power is reinforced by a second innovation. Fairebel is 5 6 373 innovative because of its action on two levels: Belgian and European. As detailed by Feyereisen 7 8 374 and Melard (2014), these two levels of action strengthen each other and inspire a more radical 9 10 375 change in the system than the Belgian scale taken alone. The core of the extra 10 cents return is 11 12 376 supported by the Fair Milk programme led by the EMB; and is a part of a broader political 13 14 377 programme. The link between Fairebel and the European level is embodied through E. 15 16 378 Schöpges: leader of the Fairebel project, he is also the Belgian representative at the EMB. 17 18 For Review Only 19 379 On the other hand, Fairebel maintains continuity with the Belgian dairy sector they criticise. 20 21 380 Firstly, they do not question the material qualification of their product: in line with milk 22 23 381 standardisation, the Fairebel semi-skimmed milk is technically similar to any other drinking 24 25 382 milk. This reveals that the Fairebel stakeholders do not question the agricultural practices 26 27 383 around milk production. 28 29 30 384 Secondly, they play in the global market, mobilising a dairy processor outside national 31 32 385 boundaries, selling through large retailers. They could build their own dairy processing plant, 33 34 386 and thus be more independent, but the investment needed is so significant that the Fairebel 35 36 387 stakeholders considered it to be too risky and they preferred – as a first step – to gain market 37 38 388 power through their strategy of volume, and then, possibly build their own dairy processing 39 40 389 plants in the future. By selling a volume of milk under the Fairebel label, they believe they will 41 42 390 have more ability to win back the market power they lost. And they translate this goal of volume 43 44 391 into selling through large retailers that are able to reach a large number of consumers. 45 46 47 392 Third continuity with the regime: the Fairebel stakeholders subcontract many services. The 48 49 393 transport, the processing and the storage are subcontracted to specialised companies; and, in a 50 51 394 way, even the production is subcontracted to Luxembourgish dairy farmers. This strategy of 52 53 395 subcontracting helps to reduce investment, allows staffing levels to be kept to a minimum, and 54 55 396 to permits flexibility to re-shape the project when needed. Indeed, the dairy sector is 56 57 58 59 60 16
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1 2 3 4 397 characterised by strong uncertainty (e.g. on prices), and subcontracting gives great freedom and 5 6 398 flexibility that helps it to easily bounce back and re-shape. 7 8 9 399 Fourthly, regarding complaints entered by the RICCO that Fairebel contains Luxembourgish 10 11 400 milk, Fairebel takes market shares of drinking milk and then reduces the outlets for the milk 12 13 401 produced in Belgium. Fairebel reacted by sending a volume of milk equal to the volume of milk 14 15 402 processed under the Fairebel label to the Luxlait dairy processor: regularly, a truck full of milk 16 17 403 leaves a Belgian dairy processor and goes to Luxlait. But they buy this volume of milk on the 18 For Review Only 19 404 spot market, that is to say the surplus market that circulates between the dairy processors, 20 21 405 characterised by its fast trading and delivery (two working days) and negotiated with a trader. 22 23 406 This milk is then integrated into the Luxlait infrastructure and blended with its own production 24 25 407 with no guarantee that this milk will be inside the Fairebel carton. This response convinced the 26 27 408 RICCO to withdraw its complaint. We propose this response as being a fifth step in the 28 29 409 bricolage constructed by the Fairebel stakeholders, following the four previous steps detailed 30 31 410 above (see Figure 1). 32 33 34 411 Fifthly and lastly, the Fairebel stakeholders continue to sell their milk production to the Belgian 35 36 412 global dairy processors although the functioning of these super dairy processors is denounced 37 38 413 by the EMB (European Milk Board 2012). As explained above, this action is the result of the 39 40 414 strong economic dependence of the farmers on the dairy processors. 41 42 43 415 [Place Figure 2. around here] 44 45 46 416 Figure 2 shows how these breaks and continuities with the regime create a tension within the 47 48 417 Fairebel project. This tension prevents Fairebel from fully belonging to the regime or to the 49 50 418 niche-innovation level. In fact, the continuities were made to concretise the project on technical 51 52 419 aspects, by adapting themselves to the market opportunities. And subsequently, because they 53 54 420 technically managed to concretise their project, they were able to put under pressure the dairy 55 56 57 58 59 60 17
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1 2 3 4 421 sector from the point of view of socio-political aspects (the breaks) related to the power of dairy 5 6 422 farmers. 7 8 9 423 The continuities with the regime underline the point that the Fairebel stakeholders follow a 10 11 424 much more commercial plan than before; this is linked to their strategy of gaining market 12 13 425 power, expressed as a volume target. But this time, the commercial actor is headed by farmers. 14 15 426 This strategy of posing as a commercial actor was denounced by its detractors who said Fairebel 16 17 427 is a hollow shell to make profit and not a fair trade project. Amongst the detractors, there are 18 For Review Only 19 428 actors from the main trade-union of farmers in Wallonia, other conventional farmers and 20 21 429 persons working in the value-chain. By pointing out this tension, they tend to classify Fairebel 22 23 430 as “market expedience” and they revealed that Fairebel is, according to them, ambiguous. 24 25 26 431 In their version of the narrative of the project, the Fairebel stakeholders insist on the breaks with 27 28 432 the regime; for them, these breaks are the soul of the project and they define the project by these 29 30 433 breaks. The tension they impose on the regime rests on socio-political arguments. 31 32 33 434 5.2. From ambiguity to commitment 34 35 36 435 The five-step bricolage that creates this tension can be interpreted in two different ways: either 37 38 436 Fairebel is seen as market expedience, or as a politically engaged project. This duality is 39 40 437 empirical and not only theoretical; it is how people interpret the value of Fairebel all along the 41 42 438 chain and how it is judged by public opinion. Some consider it as market expedience while 43 44 439 others think it is a political commitment. Fairebel leads to ambiguous interpretations. To 45 46 440 overcome this ambiguity and bring more people to consider Fairebel as being a political 47 48 441 commitment, the Fairebel stakeholders engage in a whole range of activities that demonstrate 49 50 442 their competence and commitment to their fairness project, that is to say, a socio-political 51 52 443 project. Those activities are also constructed through bricolage. The building of trust in the face 53 54 444 of public questions that aim to reduce those tensions depends precisely on their competencies 55 56 445 and commitment to respect some common principles that give direction to their actions (Karpik 57 58 59 60 18
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1 2 3 4 446 1996). This is the mechanism that we call commitment. This commitment also permits Fairebel 5 6 447 to depart further from the regime. In this respect, their response to the controversy opened by 7 8 448 RICCO and their attempt to reduce the ambiguity of Fairebel is threefold. 9 10 11 449 First, the narrative used by the Fairebel stakeholders evolved to empower the project. After the 12 13 450 complaint from the RICCO, the Fairebel stakeholders understood how difficult it was to say that 14 15 451 Fairebel is a “Belgian fair milk” when it contains Luxembourgish milk. They therefore changed 16 17 452 their narrative from “fair milk” to “fair project” outlining the concrete benefit to the farmer of 18 For Review Only 19 453 10 cents per litre of milk. This emphasis on the positive gain for the dairy farmers, victim of the 20 21 454 global agribusiness, becomes a stronger translation of their political commitment and a more 22 23 455 credible alternative to the existing regime. This can then benefit the powerful critical narrative 24 25 456 on the part of the EMB about the unfairness of the existing regime. By placing the emphasis on 26 27 457 a “fair project”, they redefined the project itself to better reflect the pressure they placed on the 28 29 458 dairy sector. For example, the Fairebel advertisements present how the cooperative, the farmers 30 31 459 and the sector work. An example of this is an advertisement presenting C. Dumont, a dairy 32 33 460 farmer who explains that “Fairebel helped us to find our real place and the true values of our 34 35 461 work”; or other advertisements that explain the qualities of the milk, how to produce cheese or 36 37 462 how the cow produces milk.… This marketing strategy is very different from the narrative used 38 39 463 by the market leader’s advertisement in which Shakira is dancing to sell yogurt. In summary, 40 41 464 the power of their narrative is built on a positive and credible expectation about the future, 42 43 465 justifying the Fairebel project to a wider audience and challenging the prevailing regime in ways 44 45 46 466 that emphasise future opportunities for the sociotechnical innovation of Fairebel (Smith and 47 48 467 Raven 2012). 49 50 468 Secondly, Fairebel created an original link between farmers and consumers. When a farmer 51 52 469 wants to join the Fairebel cooperative, he or she has to consent to complete one half-day of 53 54 470 promotion for every five cooperative shares. This promotion is primarily directed at large 55 56 57 471 retailers. Later, Fairebel started the “COW funding” that opened the cooperative to citizen 58 59 60 19
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1 2 3 4 472 shareholders (autumn 2015). It aims “to show society that farmers and citizens are now bound 5 6 473 together”, explained E. Schöpges explains that it aims to show society that farmers and citizens 7 8 474 are now bound together (Leherte 2015). The strategy of dialogue with the consumer was 9 10 475 implemented little by little, until the Fairebel stakeholders fully understood the added value 11 12 476 brought by this link and transformed it into a strong strategy. By doing so, they aimed to 13 14 477 overstep another lock-in: most consumers seek low-cost food products as their first criterion 15 16 478 (RICCO 2012, cited by Lebacq 2015, pp. 193-4), so it was necessary to convince them to accept 17 18 479 paying a higher priceFor for one litreReview of milk. Only 19 20 21 480 Thirdly, since being set up in 2010, the Fairebel label extended its product range. At the 22 23 481 beginning of the project, Fairebel focused on a regular carton of one litre of semi-skimmed milk 24 25 482 to get into the market, which is the most basic and widely sold dairy commodity in Belgium. 26 27 483 When the Fairebel cooperative began to diversify its products, it tried to incorporate a technical 28 29 484 qualification to its new products: the fat content of the whole milk varies according to the 30 31 485 season; the chocolate milk is produced with whole milk (while others are made with skimmed 32 33 486 or semi-skimmed milk); the ice creams are made with organic milk and produced by a Walloon 34 35 487 SME; one of the ice cream flavours is “natural milk” in accordance with the idea of producing 36 37 488 authentic products; and the cheeses comply with the “marguerite happy cow” label. This label 38 39 489 focuses on the fact that GMOs are not fed to the cows and their diet consists of at least 60% 40 41 490 grass. By means of this label and the organic ice creams, agricultural practices are questioned 42 43 491 (but still in a disparate manner, because this is not the main goal of Fairebel), even though the 44 45 46 492 Fairebel cooperative is still open to every farmer with no preconditions about agricultural 47 48 493 practices. These sociotechnical transformations meet the expectations of the consumers who, in 49 50 494 the first instance, buy a commodity – a technical object – even if they are sensitive to its socio- 51 52 495 political dimension, especially its fairness. 53 54 496 Today, the Fairebel cooperative unites more than 500 farmers. In 2015, around 7 million litres 55 56 57 497 of milk were sold under the Fairebel brand. It represents a little bit less than 1% of all drinking 58 59 60 20
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1 2 3 4 498 milk market shares. So, Fairebel is still a marginal brand but its market share significantly 5 6 499 increases each year and it is beginning to be well-known by Belgian consumers. One carton of 7 8 500 Fairebel semi-skimmed milk is sold for around 0.90€ in stores. The 10 cents per litre are 9 10 501 collected by the cooperative and shared annually amongst cooperative farmers according to 11 12 502 shareholdings. Since this controversy in 2010, Fairebel underwent a development in terms of 13 14 503 both the social and technical aspects that overlap one another. 15 16 17 504 18 For Review Only 19 20 505 6. Discussion: bricolage as an empowering strategy for transition 21 22 23 506 The Fairebel case study challenges some classical assumptions about transition theories in 24 25 507 which the niche level and the regime level are clearly separated. Fairebel gets round this 26 27 508 separation and leads us to conceptualise bricolage as being a way of challenging the regime 28 29 509 itself. But this bricolage is not the result of “pure chance”; it “preserves the emergent 30 31 510 properties” of Fairebel in line with its political commitment (Garud and Karnøe 2003, p. 296). It 32 33 511 is this bricolage that permits Fairebel to develop and intensify its political commitment during 34 35 512 its trajectory, and then to put pressure on the dairy system. 36 37 38 513 If bricolage practices can inform specific modes of tensions between niches and regimes it is 39 40 514 because these practices relate to situated learning process and commitment based on a situation 41 42 515 of entanglement. This entanglement may lead to a situation of empowerment for those who had, 43 44 516 in some cases, felt long-term dissatisfaction with the actual/conventional mode of power 45 46 517 relations. What may be methodologically and fruitfully pointed out here, according to the 47 48 518 Fairebel case study, is that power relations should themselves be characterised as emergent 49 50 519 properties. There is an acknowledgment of the existence of adverse power relations by Fairebel 51 52 520 stakeholders (due to their initial problematisation of the situation). However, the experience of 53 54 521 facing unexpected recalcitrance (from the dairy processors, from the milk producers, from the 55 56 522 customers, from the customers association…) leads to the emergent adjustments that are 57 58 59 60 21
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1 2 3 4 523 produced in order to cope with those power relations (by shifting to a Luxembourg dairy 5 6 524 processor, by creating new modes of relations between producers and customers by organising 7 8 525 new contact points: at the supermarket or as new co-operators…). Emergence means that those 9 10 526 new and sometimes fragile modes of relations produce new agencies and possible new identities 11 12 527 at the same time. What represents a power relation (and its extent) is itself indeterminate until a 13 14 528 contingent fact is perceived and whether or not it reconfigures action. 15 16 17 529 The case study of Fairebel provides some elements to complement the reflections around the 18 For Review Only 19 530 existence of a common tension between divergent interpretations appearing within fair trade 20 21 531 projects which are both simultaneously “in” and “against” the market. 22 23 24 532 On the one hand, the entire strategy of the Fairebel project is articulated via the market: it is 25 26 533 about selling the maximum number of litres of milk in order to recover the market power 27 28 534 necessary to obtain the best possible payment for the milk sold. Here, the balance of power 29 30 535 manifests itself around the parts of the market taken over by the dairy farmers and their Fairebel 31 32 536 milk. However, as Le Velly (2004, p. 250) emphasises “the larger the size of the participation 33 34 537 in the market, the less the exchanges realised can be disconnected from the habitual practices of 35 36 538 the market”. In effect, the high-volume strategy adopted by the Fairebel stakeholders implies the 37 38 539 use of the features of the system: large retailers; major dairy processors; sub-contractors, etc. 39 40 41 540 On the other hand, this heavily market-dependent strategy of volume is articulated with another 42 43 541 strategy that is aimed at modifying the rules by which the market functions. In addition to the 44 45 542 purely commercial project of selling cartons of milk, the project proposes a series of innovations 46 47 543 that have nothing to do with the market. First, Fairebel encourages solidarity among farmers in a 48 49 544 Belgian context that portrays them as individualists and competitors. Secondly, Fairebel 50 51 545 finances a project that aims to significantly modify the rules of the market. For every carton of 52 53 546 milk sold, Fairebel collects 10 cents for the farmers, but also two cents that are donated to the 54 55 547 farming organisations EMB (1 cent) and MIG (1 cent). 56 57 58 59 60 22
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1 2 3 4 548 By doing this, the project combines economic pressure (through sales of Fairebel) with 5 6 549 institutional and political pressure (EMB and MIG) on the dairy sector (Feyereisen and Mélard 7 8 550 2014). Finally, opening the Fairebel co-operative to citizens makes it possible to surpass the 9 10 551 conception of consumer engagement that is limited to their act of making a purchase. In this 11 12 552 way, consumers are invited to actively participate in challenging the norms and rules of the 13 14 553 system, rather than delegating this work to the organisations they support by buying their 15 16 554 products (Dubuisson-Quellier 2006). As a result, Fairebel “is not just a market niche operating 17 18 555 within the global Formarket; it is alsoReview an attempt to construct Only an international moral economy that 19 20 556 challenges the market and the individualistic, competitive culture of capitalism” (Fridell 2003, 21 22 557 pp. 5-6). 23 24 25 558 This hybridisation between positions in and against the market is made possible by Fairebel’s 26 27 559 strategy of division between the commercial project and the socio-political project (Huybrechts 28 29 560 2010). On the one hand, the co-operative adopts a commercial project via the sale of cartons of 30 31 561 Fairebel milk, and on the other hand, the producers’ organisations EMB and MIG invest in the 32 33 562 socio-political project. The cohesion between these two projects is guaranteed by maintaining 34 35 563 economic links (the cooperative partially finances the producers’ organisations) and above all 36 37 564 by the human links (certain people are both representatives of the co-operatives and the 38 39 565 organisations – this is notably the case for E. Schopges) between the two entities. As 40 41 566 Huybrechts has underlined (2010), this strategy of division into two specific entities 42 43 567 demonstrates the difficulty of managing the different missions of fair trade within one 44 45 46 568 organisation. 47 48 569 49 50 51 570 7. Conclusion 52 53 54 571 The analysis of a fair milk brand existing in Belgium has enabled us to understand how the 55 56 572 dairy sector is organised in Belgium. Because they are directly influenced by market rules, dairy 57 58 59 60 23
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1 2 3 4 573 farmers have struggled to receive a fair remuneration for milk and have faced multiple dairy 5 6 574 crises. In response to this situation, some Belgian farmers tried to organise and empower 7 8 575 themselves: they created a fair-trade milk label that aims at receiving an extra 10 cents per litre 9 10 576 of milk sold. But as soon as we look more closely at these milk cartons, we observe an 11 12 577 ambiguity: is Fairebel a « political commitment » or « market expedience » project ? Is it 13 14 578 inspiring change within the dairy system? or is it « fairwashing » ? Many scholars have 15 16 579 highlighted an ambiguity in fair trade projects, which are simultaneously “in” and “against” the 17 18 580 market, but few studiesFor link this Review ambiguity with the system Only the fair trade projects try to change. 19 20 21 581 This Belgian fair milk label containing Luxembourg milk challenges the definition of fairness. 22 23 582 There is no legal definition of this common concept, but many detractors consider that this milk 24 25 583 label is not fair. In fact, the analysis shows that the stakeholders are creating fairness “in-the- 26 27 584 making” when they have little market power in their hands, as well as a lack of competencies 28 29 585 and the capacity to act. From this point of view, this milk label participates in fairness. With this 30 31 586 project, the dairy farmers build the capacity of the collective to act from within the system they 32 33 587 want to change. 34 35 36 588 By analysing this case study through the lens of the three concepts of lock-ins, bricolage and 37 38 589 ambiguity, this article aimed to contribute to the reflection around transition of the agri-food 39 40 590 system. The first main contribution is the use of the concept of bricolage to understand how this 41 42 591 ambiguity around the fair trade labelling was created, to better grasp which elements of the 43 44 592 innovation inspires change in the regime (the dairy system). By doing so, we understood that 45 46 593 even if the ambiguity weakened the fair milk project as radical innovation, it also allowed it to 47 48 594 pursue and achieve its project, as well as empowering its stakeholders. Ambiguity is connected 49 50 595 to the capacity of the Fairebel stakeholders to act. It takes time to challenge the regime. It gives 51 52 596 an existence to a fair milk label in the dairy system and helps farmers to become empowered; 53 54 597 they will then be better able to adopt a more radical position vis-à-vis the regime. The second 55 56 57 598 contribution is a proposal of a heuristic tool articulated around the three concepts of lock-ins, 58 59 60 24
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1 2 3 4 599 bricolage and ambiguity to identify pragmatically (from the action of the actors of the case 5 6 600 study) how lock-ins appear and how they become part of strategies to overcome them. The 7 8 601 successive detours and reconfigurations that have been realised by the stakeholders of the case 9 10 602 study permit us to identify: (1) the centralisation and oligopoly of the Belgian dairy sector and 11 12 603 (2) the low market power in between the hands of dairy farmers. The identification of lock-ins 13 14 604 within transition studies is a key point for understanding what prevents the transition of a 15 16 605 system, and how it could be possible to unlock the possibility of such a transition. 17 18 For Review Only 19 606 20 21 22 607 Acknowledgements 23 24 25 608 Support for this research has been provided by the Walloon Region through the funding of the 26 27 609 Food4gut project. We gratefully acknowledge the guest editors Jessica Duncan and Damian 28 29 610 Maye, the two anonymous reviewers and the editor Bettina Bock for their advice and useful 30 31 611 comments on previous versions of this article. We also thank the interviewees for the 32 33 612 information they provided. 34 35 36 613 37 38 614 39 40 615 41 42 616 43 44 617 45 46 618 47 48 619 49 50 620 51 52 621 53
54 622 55
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1 2 3 4 658 Feyereisen, M., and Mélard, F. (2014) From fair milk to fair enterprise: the consequences of an 5 659 unexpected "bricolage". Outlook on Agriculture 43(3) pp. 207–211 6 7 660 Foray, D. (1997) The dynamic implications of increasing returns: Technological change and 8 661 path dependent inefficiency. International Journal of Industrial Organization 15 pp. 733-752 9 10 662 Fridell, G. (2003), Fair trade and the international moral economy: within and against the 11 663 market. CERLAC Working Paper Series, January 2003 12 13 664 Garud, R., and Karnøe, P. (2003) Bricolage versus breakthrough: distributed and embedded 14 15 665 agency in technology entrepreneurship. Research Policy 32(2) pp. 277-300 16 17 666 Geels, F. W. (2005) Processes and patterns in transitions and system innovations: refining the 18 667 co-evolutionary multi-levelFor perspective. Review Technological ForecastingOnly and Social Change 72 pp. 19 668 681-696. 20 21 669 Geels, F. W., and Schot, J. (2007) Typology of sociotechnical transition pathways. Research 22 670 Policy 36(3) pp. 399-417 23 24 671 Geels, F. W. (2011) The multi-level perspective on sustainability transitions: Responses to 25 672 seven criticism. Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions 1(1) pp. 24–40 26 27 673 Goffman, E. (1974) Frame Analysis an Essay on the Organization of Experience (Cambridge: 28 674 Harvard University Press) 29 30 675 Grin, J., and van Staveren, A. (2007) Werken aan systeeminnovaties. Lessen uit de ervaringen 31 van InnovatieNetwerk en andere praktijkorganisaties. Assen: Van Gorcum, 238 pp. 32 676 33 677 Hahn, R. (1984) Market Power and Transferable Property Rights. The Quarterly Journal of 34 35 678 Economics 99(4) pp. 753-765. 36 37 679 Haynes, I. (2006) Défis et tensions dans le commerce équitable : une approche bibliographique. 38 680 In C. Auroi and I. Yepez del Castillo eds., Economie solidaire et commerce équitable : acteurs 39 681 et actrices d’Europe et d’Amérique Latine (Louvain-la-Neuve: Presses Universitaires de 40 682 Louvain) 41 42 683 Huybrechts (2010) Les organisations de commerce équitable face aux tensions entre solidarité et 43 684 marché. In M.-F. Turcotte and C. Hervieux eds., Mettre en marché pour une cause : Enjeux 44 685 commerciaux et impacts du commerce équitable (Montréal : Presses de l’Université du Québec) 45 46 686 Huybrechts, B. (2012) Fair trade organizations and social enterprise (New York: Routledge) 47 48 687 Journe, B., and Raulet-Croset, N. (2008) Le concept de situation : contribution à l'analyse de 49 50 688 l'activité managériale dans un contexte d'ambiguïté et d'incertitude. M@n@gement 11(1) pp. 51 689 27-55 52 53 690 Karpik, L. (1996) Dispositifs de confiance et engagements crédibles. Sociologie Du Travail 54 691 38(4) pp. 527–550 55 56 57 58 59 60 27
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1 2 3 4 692 Lamine, C, Barbier, M., Blanc, J., Buurma, J., Haynes, I., Lehota, J., and Wierzbicka, A. (2010) 5 693 Reducing the dependence on pesticides: a matter of transitions within the whole agri-food 6 694 system. In Reducing the dependence on pesticides: a matter of transitions within the whole agri- 7 695 food system, ed. IFSA, 9th European IFSA Symposium 8 9 696 Law, J. and Mol, A. (2002) Local entanglements or utopian moves: an inquiry into train 10 11 697 accidents. The Sociological Review 50 pp. 82–105 12 13 698 Le Velly, R. (2004) Sociologie du marché. Le commerce équitable : des échanges marchands 14 699 contre le marché et dans le marché. Thesis (Université de Nantes) 15 16 700 Leach, M., Scoones, I., and Stirling, A. (2010) Dynamic sustainabilities: technology, 17 701 environment, social justice (London: Earthscan) 18 For Review Only 19 702 Lebacq, T. (2015) La durabilité des exploitations laitières en Wallonie : analyse de la diversité 20 703 et voies de transition. Thesis (Université de Louvain-la-Neuve) 21 22 704 Leherte, O. (2015) Fairebel: devenir actionnaire d'une coopérative agricole belge? RTBF 23 705 https://www.rtbf.be/info/societe/detail_devenir-actionnaire-d-une-cooperative-agricole- 24 706 belge?id=9115687 (4th April 2016) 25 26 707 Levi-Strauss, C. (1967) The savage mind (Chicago : University of Chicago Press) 27 28 708 Magrini, M. B., Anton, M., Cholez, C., Corre-Hellou, G., Duc, G., Jeuffroy, M. H., Meynard, J. 29 30 709 M., Pelzer, E., Voisin, A. S., and Walrand, S. (2016) Why are grain-legumes rarely present in 31 710 cropping systems despite their environmental and nutritional benefits? Analyzing lock-in in the 32 711 French agrifood system. Ecological Economics 126 pp. 152-162 33 34 712 March, J.G. (1978) Bounded Rationality, Ambiguity, and the Engineering of Choice. The Bell 35 713 Journal of Economics 9(2) 36 37 714 Nelissen, T. (2013) CAP sur 2015. Le Jeudi http://jeudi.lu/cap-sur-2015-2/ (2nd April 2016) 38 39 715 Özçağlar-Toulouse, N., Béji-Bécheur, A., and Robert-Demontrond, P. (2010) Demystifying Fair 40 716 Trade in France: The History of an Ambiguous Project. Journal of Business Ethics 92 pp. 205- 41 717 216. 42 43 718 Raynolds, L., and Long, M. (2007) Fair/Alternative Trade: Historical and Empirical 44 719 Dimensions. In L. Raynolds, D. Murray and J. Wilkinson eds., Fair Trade: The Challenges of 45 46 720 Transforming Globalization (London: Taylor & Francis) pp. 15-32. 47 48 721 RICCO – Research and Information Center of Consumer Organisations (2012), Consumer 49 722 Behavior Monitor: le baromètre des consommateurs. http://www.crioc.be/files/fr/6742fr.pdf 50 723 (5th December 2013). 51 52 724 Roep, D., and Wiskerke, J.S.C. (2012) Reshaping the foodscape. In Food Practices in 53 725 Transition: Changing Food Consumption, Retail and Production in the Age of Reflexive 54 726 Modernity. eds. G. Spaargaren, P. Oosterveer and A. Loeber, pp. 207–228 (New York : 55 727 Routledge) 56 57 58 59 60 28
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1 2 3 4 728 Simmel (1908), Digressions sur l’étranger. In Y. Grafmeyer and I. Joseph eds., L’école de 5 729 Chicago. Naissance de l’écologie urbaine, 1984 (Paris: Flammarion) pp. 53-59 6 7 730 Siweck, J.-L. (2000) Le beurre et l'argent du beurre. d'Land 8 731 http://www.land.lu/2000/2006/2008/le-beurre-et-largent-du-beurre/ (2nd April 2016) 9 10 732 Smith, A. (2007) Translating sustainabilities between green niches and socio-technical regimes. 11 733 Technology Analysis & Strategic Management 19(4) pp. 427-450 12 13 734 Smith, A. and Raven, R. (2012) What is protective space? Reconsidering niches in transitions to 14 15 735 sustainability. Research Policy 41(6) pp. 1025–1036 16 17 736 Stassart, P., and Jamar, D. (2008) Steak up to the horns ! The conventionalization of organic 18 737 stock farming: knowledgeFor lock-in Review in the agrifood chain. GeoJournalOnly 73 pp. 31-44 19 20 738 Vatin, F. (1990) L’industrie du Lait. Essai d’histoire économique (Paris : L’Harmattan) 21 22 739 Van Mol, J.-J. (2005) Le lait et ses dérivés. Origine et essor d’une industrie (Bruxelles, 23 740 Université Libre de Bruxelles press) 24 25 741 Vanloqueren, G., and Baret, P. (2009) How agricultural research systems shape a technological 26 742 regime that develops genetic engineering but locks out agroecological innovations. Research 27 743 Policy 38 pp. 971-983 28 29 744 Vankeerberghen, A., and Stassart, P. M. (2016) The transition to conservation agriculture: an 30 745 insularization process towards sustainability. International Journal of Agricultural 31 Sustainability 14(4) 32 746 33 747 Verbong, G., and Geels, F. (2010) Exploring sustainability transitions in the electricity sector 34 35 748 with socio-technical pathways. Technological Forecasting and Social Change 77 pp. 1214-1221 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 29
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1 2 3 LOCK-INS OBSTACLES Corresponding BRICOLAGES 4 (1) Incorporated competencies of the 5 Refusal of the Belgian dairy Belgian dairy industry through P. 6 Massoz processors to process the Fairebel 7 milk label Centralisation and (2) Technical infrastructures of the 8 Luxembourg dairy processor Luxlait 9 oligopoly of the Belgian dairy sector 10 Luxlait does not collect milk in (3) Milk from Luxembourg in the Fairebel 11 Belgium cartons 12 Dairy farmers possess Economic dependence of the (4) Receipt of extra 10 cents through the 13 low market power farmers on traditional dairy shareholdings of the cooperative (and 14 processors not by selling the milk) 15 Common tension The complaint about “deceptive (5) Sending a volume of milk (cream) to 16 existing in Fair Trade marketing practices” lodged by the Luxlait equal to the volume of milk 17 project’ interpretations RICCO unveiled the ambiguity of processed under the Fairebel label 18 (in and against the Fairebel For Reviewtime Only 19 market) 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 BREAKS 11 12 -Project by and for farmers 13 -Label owned by a farmers’ cooperative 14 -Multi-level transition strategy 15 ! The project (sociotechnical) is fair 16 17 TENSION 18 Market expedienceFor Review Only Political commitment 19 CONTINUITIES 20 -No qualification on the product 21 22 -Use of internal features of the system (global market, large retailers, processing outside of Belgium) 23 24 -Subcontracting (transport, process, communication…) 25 -Supply on the spot market 26 -Selling of Fairebel co-operators’ milk on the traditional market 27 ! The semi-skimmed milk (technical) is not fair 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60
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