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The PLA Navy's ''New Historic Missions'': Expanding Capabilities for a Re-Emergent Maritime Power

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The PLA Navy's ''New Historic Missions'': Expanding Capabilities for a Re-Emergent Maritime Power TESTIMONY THE ARTS This PDF document was made available from www.rand.org as a public CHILD POLICY service of the RAND Corporation. CIVIL JUSTICE EDUCATION ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT Jump down to document6 HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS NATIONAL SECURITY The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research POPULATION AND AGING organization providing objective analysis and effective PUBLIC SAFETY solutions that address the challenges facing the public SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY and private sectors around the world. SUBSTANCE ABUSE TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE Support RAND WORKFORCE AND WORKPLACE Browse Books & Publications Make a charitable contribution For More Information Visit RAND at www.rand.org Explore RAND Testimony View document details Limited Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law as indicated in a notice appearing later in this work. This electronic representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for non-commercial use only. Unauthorized posting of RAND PDFs to a non-RAND Web site is prohibited. RAND PDFs are protected under copyright law. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of our research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please see RAND Permissions. TESTIMONY The PLA Navy’s “New Historic Missions” Expanding Capabilities for a Re-emergent Maritime Power CORTEZ A. COOPER CT-332 June 2009 Testimony presented before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission on June 11, 2009 This product is part of the RAND Corporation testimony series. RAND testimonies record testimony presented by RAND associates to federal, state, or local legislative committees; government-appointed commissions and panels; and private review and oversight bodies. The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. is a registered trademark. Published 2009 by the RAND Corporation 1776 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138 1200 South Hayes Street, Arlington, VA 22202-5050 4570 Fifth Avenue, Suite 600, Pittsburgh, PA 15213-2665 RAND URL: http://www.rand.org To order RAND documents or to obtain additional information, contact Distribution Services: Telephone: (310) 451-7002; Fax: (310) 451-6915; Email: [email protected] Cortez A. Cooper1 The RAND Corporation The PLA Navy’s “New Historic Missions” Expanding Capabilities for a Re-emergent Maritime Power2 Before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission June 11, 2009 Let me begin by expressing my appreciation to the Chairman and the other distinguished members of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. It is an honor to have the opportunity to testify here today. My testimony will briefly examine three areas of pressing concern: People’s Republic of China naval modernization strategy, in the context of Chinese Communist Party directives and military guidelines Recent expansion of the missions and deployment of China’s naval forces, and trends regarding this expansion out to 2020 Implications of Chinese naval modernization and force deployment strategies The Commission poses a key question regarding China’s re-emergence as a maritime power: do recent People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) activities reflect a China that will act as a responsible stakeholder, or a China that will seek to only pursue its own national interests? My testimony hopefully will provide insight into the PLAN as a rapidly modernizing maritime force, whose fleet over the next decade will be structured, equipped and trained for a diversified mission portfolio supporting China’s expanding economic interests. Whether or not this will equate beyond 2020 to the construction of a force capable of global sea power projection will largely depend upon the perception of China’s leaders regarding the viability of economic lifelines under existing maritime security conditions. In the next three to five years, Chinese Communist Party elites probably will make the decisions determining the direction of naval power projection for the next two to three decades. 3 1 The opinions and conclusions expressed in this testimony are the author’s alone and should not be interpreted as representing those of RAND or any of the sponsors of its research. This product is part of the RAND Corporation testimony series. RAND testimonies record testimony presented by RAND associates to federal, state, or local legislative committees; government-appointed commissions and panels; and private review and oversight bodies. The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. 2 This testimony is available for free download at http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CT332/. 3 In this testimony, I differentiate between “power projection” and “force projection.” The former refers to an ability to project and sustain major combat operations far from secure, fixed basing; the latter to an ability to deploy force packages away from fixed basing for limited times and more permissive, or low-intensity, operations. The distinction is that of the author alone. 1 Even if China’s leaders assess that energy and market access is basically secure, and deem naval power projection beyond China’s peripheral seas unnecessary, the PLA will continue to modernize for a number of diverse tasks—some of which are of great concern to U.S. policy makers. The PLAN is modernizing to support joint warfare in the littoral, conduct sea control operations in near peripheral waters and sea denial operations at extended ranges in regional seas, and deploy and sustain naval formations in support of non-combat or low-intensity operations in distant seas. This latter capability can support mutually desirable stakeholder objectives, such as international law enforcement, peace-keeping and humanitarian relief operations. Communist Party Guidelines for PRC Naval Modernization and Operations The PLAN has operated for decades under an “offshore active defense” strategy, but only since former President Jiang Zimen’s promulgation of active defense guidelines in 1993 did this have real meaning for naval modernization. Under Jiang’s “Military Guidelines for the New Period,” prioritization of capabilities to conduct sea denial operations beyond Taiwan accompanied the need to protect coastal economic centers of gravity and deter or delay U.S. intervention in a Taiwan conflict. As part of the requirement to win a “local war under high-technology conditions,” Jiang’s “strategic guidelines of the active defense” also led the PLAN to develop offensive capabilities to conduct limited sea control operations to enforce sovereignty and territorial claims in the East and South China Seas.4 This requirement has changed slightly over the intervening years, to fighting and winning a “local war under informatized conditions”—recognizing the criticality in modern warfare of command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) and network electronic warfare. More recently, China’s leadership has openly stated that the PRC is a central player in the world economy, and that global stability and prosperity are intertwined with Chinese national development. The overarching approach to this national development is expressed in President Hu Jintao’s “Scientific Outlook on Development,” which encompasses an evaluation of China’s internal and external security environment and highlights the centrality of global economic factors. The corresponding military guidance clearly establishes the desire for PLA capabilities beyond those required for defense of the homeland and a potential Taiwan conflict.5 These guidelines were formally delineated by Hu in December of 2004, in a speech on the “historical missions of 4 For a comprehensive reading of Jiang’s guidelines, see Jiang Zemin, The International Situation and Military Strategic Guidelines, 13 January 1993 (Republished in August 2006, Three Volumes: Selected Works of Jiang Zemin.) 5 For an overview of Hu’s Scientific Development and associated military missions, see James Mulvenon, “Chairman Hu and the PLA’s ‘New Historic Missions,’” China Leadership Monitor, no. 27, Winter, 2009. 2 the armed forces for the new stage in the new century.” These “historic missions” delineate four tasks for the PLA: Consolidate the ruling status of the Communist Party Help ensure China’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and domestic security in order to continue national development Safeguard China’s expanding national interests Help maintain world peace6 China’s most recent Defense White Paper, China’s National Defense in 2008, further highlights the inextricable link between China’s global economic reach and its burgeoning military power. It is also the first White Paper, of six thus far, that specifies containment by outside powers as a threat to China—and the U.S. is the only nation mentioned by name as exerting a negative influence on Asia-Pacific security. The paper indicates that China is hampered by the economic, military and technical
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