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1 Friday, 5 July, 1946 2 - - - 3 INT ERNAT IONAL IHLITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST 4 Court House of the Tribunal War Ministry Building 5 Tokyo, Japan 6 I ! 7 The Tribunal met , pursuant to adjournment, I I I~ 8 at 0930. 9 - - - 10 I I i I 11 Appearances: I 12 For the Tribunal, same a s before with the I 13 exception of HON. DELFIN JARANILLA, Justice, Member I 14 from the Commonwealth of the Philippines, who is not 15 sitting. 16 F:}r the Prosecution Section, same as befor e . 17 •• For the t Defense Section, same as before. 11 18 19 - - - I 20 I (English to Japanese and Japanese 21 to English interprat ation was made by I !I 22 SHIUhl10UCHI , To shiro and SHIMi~DA , Masakazu, 23 ' Sho Onodera acting as Monitor.) 24 I
I 25
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1:- ... 1,912
D u MARSHl.L OF THE COURT: The Intcrn & ~ nd is r eedy t o hee. r e.ny me.ttcr brouf ht be f or e it. w THE PRES I DENT: All the e ccusec ~re pr esent h a except OKAr:.1. l' nd , I under s t <:' nd , HI Rf,NliLh . I hri ve 1 6 e been info rned by the Mc- r sh~ 1 that HIRJd\TtH~. i s too n 111 t o ettend. But we hPvc nc doctor' s cer t ificete; ~e should heve one. I t shoul C he the cer t ificete 1 of t he: Sugamo Prison ' s doctor . JO MR . OHT.h : I ~~ OHTA , counsel f or the I I de f e nd~n t DO~iI ~ ihHJ, . I shoul d l ike t o r.ut t \''O or ' -~ 1 thre0 questi<' ns on subj cc t s r.1hich we r e ovcrlo0ked I')' . ~ t our pr evious se ssi0n. ! I I I : . ~ :7 ,., ,, ., ' -··.. .! l ) ) -"·.· I __ ,' 1, 913 OKADA CROSS ------·------K E I S U K E 0 K A L A, callee as a wi tness 2 on behal f of the prosecution, resumed the stand an~ testified as follous : ·1 CROSS- t;XAMIIrATION (C :)ntinued) ', BY h2. OH'i.'A ; 6 ~. :r . "fitness, in your affidavit you ref er t o 7 t he incident of Lieutenant Colonel /... TZA' IA , and you , ' s s tate that despite your status as Pri ~e ~ i ni ste r you 9 ner e powerless to conauct the investigat i on of said 10 incident. The fact is , honever, that in l es s than a 11 year af ter the hear ing on t he c ~ s e, sentence wa s pr o !~ nounced on the third of July, 1936. THZ [O~ I T OR: Slight corr ection : You stated I 1 in your affidavit t ha t aespite t he f~ct that you wer e 15 frime ~iniste r at the time , you we r e powerless to i nves- ... 16 tigate the crime committed by a me r e offi cer i n the 17 army. Ho~ever , to you not confirm the fact that 1:) Lieutenant C olon e 1 4~ I Zi~··14·~ ·::a s inoicteG in l ess than a I 19 year, nnl on Jul y 3, 1936 , he was executed? 20 13. L ~ 3SE ? : Mr . Fresi dent , I ~ou ld l ike to 21 C:ir ect the Court ' s utt ent i on to the f net that this )} counsel has cond ucted cross- cxarnin3tion on one occa- 2) s ion previ ously. .? ·I I Tn£: P.rt::'.;3 I LEiiT ; I s t his not a cont i nu:.i t i on? You say this i s his second nttempt to cr oss- examine? I -- _,I j 1,914 OKADA CROSS II iiR . DArtS~Y: He concluded his pr evi ous cross- 1 2 examination. TM P?lESILENT; I ·;ms not aware of that. You 3 4 cannot cross- examine further . 1 ~. . KR . HOZWI : I am HOZUNiI , counsel for the 5 I 6 I defendant TOGO . I CROSS- EXAl.iINAT ION (C ontinued) 7 I 8 I B1 t.~ . HOZUl..I; 9 I ~r . ~it ness , may I ~sk vou whe ther you r ecall 10 the f act that a pre limin~ r y conference on naval disar 11 mament ~as held in London in 1934 when you wer e Prime 12 l:inister? ' 13 A Yes , I recall that f act. 14 Ther e i s no mi stake in my statement then 15 I that at that confer ence the Japnnese navy proposed l6 1 as its count e r- p l ~ n the principle of the common upper 17 l imit in nav~l tonnage? I 18 1 A Yes, you ar e correct. Q Do you also r emember the fact th3t TOGO at I 19 I 20 I that time ~a s dir ector of the European-Asiatic Affair s 21 Bureau of the Foreign Office? 22 I A Yes , I r emember . 23 I Q Do you ~ l s o know of the f ~ct that TOGO , direc 24 I tor of this buren u, h~d 3n opposing opinion to the I 25 principle of the cornmo~ upper limit in na v~ l tonnage --- 1,915 OKADA CR OSS I I on the gr ound that such a pl an would obstruct t he sue- ... '' cess of the conference? A No, I am not aware of that f act. Q il h~ t i s your r ecollection of the fact that ) TOGO at tha t time h~d expr essed his opposing opinion 6 to the Pr i me ~ inist e r on the s ubject? 7 A I don ' t r ecnll thnt . 8 I ~· ·· ~ o vou r ecall the f 1ct th~t in the same year 9 the '!!ashington N~ vR l Tr eaty w1s r enounced? JO A Yes , i r ec 3ll th~ t . 11 Then, ~ hat about th ~ f 1ct that TOGO ~~s a l so 12 opposed to the abrog1tion of this ..! nshington Treaty? A I don 't r ecall thct . l ·l Then, 1:1 11.at ·'.1 .~s the opinion of the Prime Min- 15 1 i ster hir.iself? 16 A I w ~ s under the impres sion that the idea of ,,. 17 " fixing the common upper limit woul d be approved at .,.,. I l east by the United Stntes of America . TP..E t:Ofi ITOR: If ex!)l ained r1ell to them. 20 Q ~hnt ~ as the r e sult of th ~ t ? .! I A The r esult ~1 s not sotis f 1ctor y . .,., Q Could you , ~.~r . ··:itncss, expla in in concrete _1) ' I t erms the cont ents of your knoCT l cdge of the plot for 2·1 the Manchuri an Incident ~ hen you nere N ~ vy Minister ) C in t he SAITO C ~ bi ne t? -- _I 1, 916 OKADA CROSS ,------A I knev th ~ t it ~~ s carried out by s e ve r ~ l of 2 the younger off icer s of the Knantung Army. i,!y ') quest i on, Vi r . ··at ness , i s not the plot ti itself but th ~ pr ocess by •:1hich .you :lcqui r ed knowledge 5 of this plot . A I c"me to unGcr s t J nd f ull y ~bo ut t hnt mat t er 7 on t he str engt h of ~n investign t i on , ~s t he result of an i rl').e ztig,tion c ~ r ri e d out b~ the gover nment in 9 the pr evi ous yc~ r . IO n.l -. _·:;'I_, NiornToa ~ Correcti on : The gover nment cnr- 11 r i ed out the invest igat i on t he f c ll o~ ing year about the 12 inci dent tha t occurred t he pr evious ye~ r. Ther ef or e , I ', I l e3r ned 3bout t hi s . I I ~IB . DArtSE1: Ther e i s no r edi r ect , Mr . Pr esi- I I) I dent. 16 (' lher eupon , the ··: i tnes s i:;:l s excused.) A .. 17 l1:n. DARSEY: flny r:.r .. Sacket t pr oceed ''l i t h t he 18 I f ur ther production of a vic~n c e? 19 I i3. SACKETT : I:ny it ple~ s e the Court, the pr os ecution uou l~ l i ke to h ~ vo its document 490 marked 21 for i 00nt ifi c3t i on . I t is ~ l r e~d y in the hnnds of 22 t he Cler k, h~ v ing been de?ositad ther e pu r s u~ n t t o 2) nn order of thi s Court • .., . _1 CLZRK OF T!1£!: C O~T : It ·;1i ll be 1-;:>. r !ccd exhi bi t No. 177. '-· 1,917 1 (Wher eupon, the document nbove 2 r ef erred to ~n s mar ked prosecut ion ' s exhibit 3 No. 177 for id e ntific ~ ti~n.) 4 L~ . S ~ CKE T T: I mi ght sey th~ t this is ~ ~ book w:- itten by Hh SH II~OTO in 1940 , the ~ ccus e d 6 HASHI MO TO . The prosecuti on C: oes not cesire t o offer 7 in evi~ e nc e ths ent ire book ~ but me r el y an excerpt 8 from pages t wo, t hree enc f our. 9 I h~V 3 spoken to the Clerk, nnrl in view of 10 the f act t hP. t t her a mny be oth.: r excer pts introduced 11 in the future .o.rrl.I h-i vc bef or e mo ~ n I:) x ~ ct copy in 12 J apanese ant English of th ~ excer pt De desir e to i ntro- 1 13 I duce . I sugg0st th ~ t i t ~ l s o ba mnr ked ~n exhibit for ' 14 id e ntific~tion so t hn t the r ecord may be cl e ~ r ns to 15 what we ~r e off er ing. I will m~ ke on offer next. 16 I 7;;-~ Frt~ S I~ :t:i:T : It .-1 111 have to be form::i lly 17 t ender ed. 18 i.::R . 3J. CK3TT : I '! m going t o m ~ ke the off er 19 now , if i t pl Get se your Honor. 20 The pr osecution no~ offer s i n evi dence the 21 excerpt from prosccut\on' s document 490 , which is 22 m!lrked 490E . 'ifo of f .::r to y.' r ove by this excer pt, if 23 the Court pl cns e , t h~ t the ~ ccu se d HJ..SE I1.10TO in 1930 24 actively pl anned t he ~~ n c huri n n Incitient, the J apanese 25 secessi on from the Leng ue of ~a tions , the Jnp ~ nese - 1,918 1 r enunci at i on of the dis ~ rmame nt treat y, toget her wi t h 2 v ~ rio us inci dents t hnt occur r ed in J ~p~ n pr oper. 3 MR . Mc MANUS : If the Tri bun~ l pl e2ses, I 4 would like to h-:i ve my obj ect ion noted to any further ~ explanntion by the prosecutor. After nll ther e has 6 been an opening st ~ t eme nt ~e r e, nnl the document s nre 7 being of f er ed . I do not see that t he ~rose c utor should 8 t est ify hinsel f ~ith an ad6itional opening stat ement l 9 and nn ad~itionn l expl an3tion. I 10 T::E FJ3SIL~~T: He mer ely 6escr i bed the con- 11 t ent s of the excerpt. Th~ t is nl l it amounted to; in 12 ver y few ~orcis , too. 13 The document is 'lcmitted subject t o t he usual 14 t er ms . 15 ( Jher aupon , p r os e cutio~ ' s exhibit No. 16 177 wc s r 0ceived in evidence . ) e 17 fu:t. SACKETT: The prosecution ·noul d l ike to •• 18 r eaa the excer pt , if the Court pl e~ s ~ . 19 ' Book by HP. SHD~OTO , "Tho :to-:; d to t he Re con- 20 struction of thl: ~'/ or ld . 11 21 C:tption: ''Advice t o Young Pe ool e . Pul sati on 22 of thG N.J tions ." 23 11 Since gr nduc.ting f r om the t:ili t~ r y Stoff I 24 Coll ege , I h~ ve bc ~ n i mmer sed in ny study of r evolu 25 tionar y Russ i ~ in the R u s si~n Sect ion of the Gener al ' - 1,919 Staff Office. In 1927, I unexpectedly was appointed 2 attnche to the Turkish Embassy by official order and 3 frequently had intima t e t alks with the dictntor '1 Kemal, he.ving had dinner with him in Angora , Capital 5 of Turkey. After my three years' stay in Europe , I 6 returned to my native country in 1930. 7 "During my st ay i n Europe, when I observed 8 the politics of Stalin of Sovi et Russia , Mussolini 9 of Italy, Hitl er of Germa ny, and Riza Khen of Persia, • 10 which were the ria in ohjects of my study, and to say 11 no t hing of Kernal in my ap ry ointed country, I keenly 12 f elt t hat these countries wer e moving strongly 13 toward government control v1i th unanimous consent, I I al though i t wo s not clear whe. t they would deme.nd I ) I or although the source was not t he same . " !6 Caption: "I entertain fears for my native 17 country. " '• 18 ''When I observed J apan through the Japanese 19 ' papers, studying the tendency end actual conditions 10 of these countries and being i cpr cssed by the above 21 mentioned e ~ otion, during my three ye ars' stey in 22 Europe, I was clearl y conscious that Japan was the I . 23 only country v1i thin the whirlpool of world movement that stood uithin the bounds of liberalism end re gar ded l iberalism ~s the one Rnd best idea l. I con- -- 1,920 sidered thet if Japnn ~oes on under the present con- 2 ditions, she woul d drop f rom the r Rnks in the com munity of nations end cause the downfall of J apan. I thought it was not t hen time for me to stay non ch~lrntly overseas but to return as soon as possible 6 and to do something ebout it. "At this t i me , fortun[>tely , I was ordered ... to f!O beck c> nd v: i th ?n irresi stible long ing for home , C) s ~ iled across the Indian Cl cean tov:ard my f atherland Io in an easterly direction . During ~Y thirty days' 11 voyage, I ponder ed on hov1 to refor m Japan r- nd e,s 12 I the result, I succeeded i n drening ~ definite plan I' I ') to e. certl'.in degree . And on ret urning to the General l I .. Staff Office, r.iy former haunt, I devised s!ever al I "I schemes in order to· put my ideas into execution. Although I d ~ re not s ~ y it wes the only cause of tf.. 1 17 - such r esults , ho ·•ev.er, the MC1 nchurie.n Incident, I I S I secessi on from the League of Nn tions , 2nd renun I<) ' ciation of the dis a r m~ nc nt treaty took plece suc 20 cessively r>nd \': ithin the country, Me y 15' Incident·; : ~I SRINPEI TAI Incident , ?nd the Febru?.ry 26 Incident 22 took plnce in succession. 11 ·-- _I II 1 , 921 The prosecution .'.1 t t his time \'1 ould l i ke t o-·- t hey had copies , I und er s tood , your Honor. ~c checked ~ tho other c~ y . ! I LANGUAGi.!: 0ECTION CHIEF; Our copies do not contnin the f i rst pa r t of your st~t ome n t ~ t all. :.: ~ . S/lCKETT: !e l l , I checked ··1 ith you on your exhibits and you s:?io you hnd them. LAi\GUAGE 3~CT ro-- CH I ~F; ..J c hqvc document 4 90. It is not cont~in ~ d in those pages , th ~ t mat t er. La . SACKETT : If the Cour t ple~se , the prose cution at this time \Joule. l ike to offer t he d i~ ry of Ma r quis KIDO , th ~ accused Mar quis KIDO , f or i ~a n t i f i - c ~ ti on . CLZRK OF TH::: COURT: How ~v o u ld you l i ke to have thi s mn r ked? I.8 . SACK~TT: I ··1ou l d like to hnv0 i t mar ked as an 0xhibit. C L~RK OF TH~ COURT; Do you ·a'1nt separ a t e 10tter s for each of the vol umes? The next number ITill be 178 . to you ~~n t i t A, B, c, D, ~ nd so forth? L:rt . SA CK~TT : I think thG di ~ r y should be m3rked for identif icnt ion ~ith one exhibit number at the moment. (Wher eupon, the document above r eferred t o ~as mar ked prosecut ion' s exhibit 1,922 - - ·------ No . 178 f or identific ~ ti o n.) I 2 1:3 . FURNES S: If the Court pleqse, the defense l I objects to the offer of the entire diary. The entire I 4 ainry has not been served on us for translation for ~ i all defense counsel. 1.r/e unC: erst:'lnd thnt; under the 6 rule as ~mended, only excerpts cnn be offered ~nd 7 · only excerpts go into evidence. 8 ~ . SACKZTT: If the Court ple3se, there ha s 9 been no offer m1de as yet . JO T2-lli ? iIB S I ~Ei '. 1' : Kr . Snckett, we expect you 11 to exercise n l ittle more f o rm~ lity. You should have 12 told ~.~ r. Furness you hnd not finished ·::hnt you hnd to say. 14 i~ . SACKETT : If the Court please, the prose ! 5 cution nt t his time does not des ire to offer the 16 entire diar y in evidence . I t h ~s been me r ely marked Ji for identific ~ tion. ~ e de s ire to offer in evidence l8 ei ghteen s ep n r ~ t e excerpt s during the months of July, I h3 ve been circ u l ~te~ to the d ef end ~ nt s . I h~ ve copies of the J~p~ n ese 1nd English her e . For the s nke of ' ' keeping the recor d s tra i ght, nnd in vie ~ of the fact t here may be other offer s in the future from other sections, I think thnt these s e p ~ r~ t e excerpts should be marked f or 1dentifi cnt i on ~s s ep~ r ~ t e exhibit c I _____I 1,923 1 numbers . 2 The prosecution a t this time would like to 3 offer in evidence -- 4 r.m . FUR NESS : Do I understand thot the entire diary is later to be offered in evidence? If not, 6' I see no r eason for heving it merked f or identifica 7 tion or gi ven an exhibit number . If it is to be 8 .. offer ed i n its ent irety, the defense is ver~,. I!!Uch 9 inter est ed and \'!OUld like t o know . 10 MR. SACKETT: The pr osecution, if the Court 11 please, reserves the right to off er such evidence as 12 it sees fit, and the def ense may do accordingl y. It 13 will be all excer pts. 14 THE PRES IDENT : At present you ar e offering 15 excer pts. 16 1.m. SACKET T: We ar e offering excerpts only. 17 That is t he off er . 18 THE PRES IDEI\T: They are c:d mi tted on the 19 usual t er ms . 20 MR . FURJl!ESS : May I a sk c.gainst \'!horn these 21 exc er pts ar e being offer ed? Only ~ ga inst KIDO or 22 against all defendonts? 23 MR . SACKETT : If the Court pl ee.se, the ex 24 cerpts e. r e being offered all def endant s under 25 ~g~ inst the ter ms of the Charter that says n di~ry is . """ 1,924 admiss ible in evidence . 2 t8. FlfilNESS : Then , ns to the d 0 f c nd ~nt SHIGE~ ITSU , nnd 3s to the dc f e nd~ nt UMEZU,I am author , '• ized to obj ect on the grounds thnt conspir ncy hns not -• been proved, on the r el evancy and competency nnd 6 material ity of these excer pt s as cvi6ence . I\@. . SACKZTT: If t he Court pl ense , we charge • 8 conspirncy amonb ~ 11 d e f c nd ~n ts . ',"le offer to connect 9 all the ~a f e nd~nt s with the conspiracy in the course JO of this trial. And \'le off er those st:?.t t} rn cnts in the 11 dinr y of Ifa rquis KIDO i n evidence as a s t ntemc:nt of 12 co-conspir titor mcide in the course of conspirncy. 1'!0 r ' I') offer them with the unaer s t nnd ing that t he other I I defend ant s will be connected up with the conspiracy. 15 The Court \'1 111 consider the i 6 objections. ! ) .! O 21 I I I I - _I 1,92 5 G r 1 MR. FUR NESS: Will the Court make a ruling e 2 I e on that, if your Honor pl ease? n b THE PRESIDENT: I v1 111 have to ask the Court e r to adjourn to consider this if you want a ruling now. f I don't think that we should be r equired to do that, & 6 actually. These documents are submitted subject to B 7 n the usual t er ms. That is the expression. The t erms • r 8 t will be subject to nll just exceptions that ar~ 0 9 n t aken. Exception is no ~·, t aken on specified grounds. 10 Those exceptions will be consider ed. 11 lffi . SACKETT: In order that the Court may 12 k11ow the relevancy of this offer, I would like to state I that we offer to prove by these excerpts the great increase in tho powe r of the Japanese Army between 15 July and October 1931 which is the period of time 16 prior to and subsequent to the Ma nchurian Incident, . ~ t 17 September 18. 18 THE UONITOR: ·Nill tho;- r eportt: r please r ead 19 t ha t last stat eme nt? (,,'./her eupon, the l ast stat 0mcnt 21 was r oad by the off icial court reporter. ) l.:R . SACKETT: First excerpt i ~ tha t of 23 July 11, 1931 and is pr osecution's document 1632-A 2'1 "On the wa y home about 10 o'clock, I visit0d Hr. 25 HARADA at his home. H0ard the informa tion that the - £Wi 7lS'F 1,926 ------··------·------·--- Army during the pa st \'teek had stiffe ned its attitude 1 '\ in r egar d t o the r eduction of t he armaments and 1· especia lly in r egar ds t o economizing "Thich is the latest plan of the Fina nce Department. we ar e vrorried that the Ar my as a l a s t r esort might t ake '6 further steps to appea l t o the thr one." 7 The next excer pt • 8 TP.E PRESI Df HI' : I understand that a ll these 9 excer pt s vrill have one exhibit number but t hat each 10 I excer pt ,·w ul d have a l etter in adcH ti on. Is that 11 \7 hat you ha ve in mind? 12 CLERK OF THE COURT: The first excerpt is 13 from exhibit 179-A, and the r est ar e numbered B 14 . dovm t o R • 15 I (Whereupon , the documents ::ibove ,, • I 16 r ef erred t o wer e marked pr osecution's exhi bit 17 I • No . 179-A t o 179-R for i dentif ica ti on. ) 18 ~IB. SACKETT: rtay I hand t here a ll in and 19 then r ead without inter r uption? 20 THE PRES IDENT : Yes. They nr e admitted 21 sub ject t o t he usua l t er ms . 11 22 { W he r ~ upon , pr osecut i on ' s exhibit 23 No . 179-i\ t o 179-R \'!er e r ccci v ec1 in evidence . ) 24 MR. s .~c rET T : 1632-B: "July 13, Monday I 25 I At noon, had l unch \'t i t h nessr s . H.AR,\DA, T~'\ GAKI, -·------II -- - --. 1,927 1 SAKA I and OKABE at Tokyo Club. Mr. HARADA r eported I I 2 to us that the Army was more unyielding than ever I 3 and that tho ·.;1ar ?Unistcr is going to see tho . I 4 Emperor on the 14th or 15th. I thought that I should r ~p ort this ma tter to the Lord Keeper of the ' Privy Seal, and l eft Shinbashi a t 2: 25 for Kamakura 7 I to rel ay this messag0 . Order ed to r r-l ay this message • 8 to the Grand Chamberla in in Hayana , I imm ediately 9 l eft by automobile and called on the Grand Chamber 10 l a in SUZUKI a t Chojaen. I r el ayed to him the message 11 and thP. Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal's view in r e 12 gard to it and c a~e home at 6: 30." 13 At:tgust ? , Friday -- "Came to Tokyo by 14 el ectric car starting at 8:19 and went to see Mr. 15 BARADA . I l earned about the l a t est political condi It 16 I 1,,: tions nnd especially of the plot to be carried out in • 17 Ar rny circles during the middle of Ma rch. It i s 18 r ~ gr c t t a bl e froM the standpoint or control of our [ 19 country that it is bec om ing very obvious that the 20 Aroy will carry out a certain type of plot. 21 "During the middl0 of I ~ a rch \"hen th{} 22 Parliamenta ry session was being held a pl an wa s 23 draftod at tho official r esidcnc0 of Viar Minister to 24 disrupt the P a rli a~ 0 nt a r y sessi on and bring about 25 the polit1c ~ l change by Ma jor G c n ~ r ~ ls KOISO, . ------' 1,928 1 TATEKAWA and NI NOMIYA as l eader s with Lieutenant 2 Colonels HASHII:OTO ~ nd SHIGEFUJI who would net~ 3 their beck and call. OKA;'JA, Shu rn ci, stood bct wef.'n 4 j them collabora tine •1th Social ~~s s Party. They ' I planned to s end Lieutenant Colonel SUZUKI to IWRI 6 I of the SEIYUKAI party, conveying their plot con- 7 fident1ally. This vtas given up, however, by the • 8 advice of SUZUKI , who (cnterta1 ncd f ears) f tJr the 9 sake of t he Ar my. It could be gues sed th ~ t UGAKI ,, 10 wa s at the back of the plot. 11 11 An ~ ssoci n tion of r esearch group of 12 M~ nchuri a n and I.Iongolian questions was formnd among 13 a group of ca pta tns gr ~d un t e d r ecently from the Army 14 Staff College , and the above-mentioned Li eut cn~ nt I 5 I Colonels HASHE~ O TO :ind SHI GEFUJI wer e its backers. 16 I "The br ~dns of the Army cnnnot ch€ck these I 17 kind of a s s uc i~ ti o ns b ~ c a u s c they thcnsolves planned 18 such plots as ~ e ntio n ed nbovo. 19 ' "Rc e;cntly t he Arny group has been getting 20 very strong. Ther e is a danger of s trong antagonism 21 bet ween the civilians and the Ar my r egarding drnft 22 ing of the budget. 23 THE FRESIDENT: We have not been given the 24 right excerpts. This is getting out of hand, Mr. 25 I I Sackett. I I• ,. ~I 1,929 1 MR. SACKETT: I beg your par don? 2 THE PRES IDENT: You hnd better hand each 3 of the judges the whol e thirty excerpts nt the s ame 4 · tiYT".e ~ You are s aying one thing, nnd we are r ending 5 I another. 6 ~:R . SACKETT: My infor ma tion i s , if the 7 Court pl ease , these copi es wer e hnnded in in the 8 order in which I run r eading. There a. r e fifteen 9 copi es of ei ght een excer pts. 10 THE PRESI DENT: The f nct is that we ar e 11 r end ing one thing, and you ~r e stating another. 12 MR . SACKETT : I mi ght soy this t o help 13 clarify the situation: that the al phabetical l e tter I If ing on t he nrosecution's docu~e nts is not being f ol- 15 1 l owed . That was n ma tter rrer oly of pr ocessing. I 16 nm following them chronol ogically nnd sta ting the ... 17 dat e -- in other wor ds , A, then B, then G, and then 18 I. But I an r end ing them chr onol ogically, giving the I 19 dat es first, and they ar e handed in in the order in 20 which I am r e~di ng then, which i s a chr onologico.l 21 or der. ')) THE PRES I DENT: I r epeat, you or e saying one 23 thing, and we ar e r e:nd ing another. V!ha t the explan- 24 , ati on is, I an not concerned t o di scover just now . 25 1 But I want these thinr,s in proper or der. t 1 ,930 .---.... ---·- --'"-··------ 1 t.rn . Sf CKETT: ?.~~Y I pr oceed , your Honor ? 2 THE PRESI DENT: Yes, if you nr e r endy. 3 MR. LOG i\N: Iv:ay I hove a ruling nt this 4 tirr.e by the Tribunal so I will be guided in the ~ future wi th r e spect t o the r ending of excer pts frorn 6 this di ary? I don't wnnt t o i nterrupt and t ry t o 7 I neke corrections e v ~ r y t i ~c en excer pt is r ead 8 because of the differ ence in the trnuslation. And ' 9 I would like t o have a~ rulin g fror. the Tribunal as 10 t o whe ther I should r.lak e thos e objections at the 11 tirr.e the excer pt s are r end or wait until the entire 12 di ary i s cor.tpleted and t hen snbr.ii t our trnnsl ntion. 13 Now , f or examp l e , this excer pt that was J .f just r ead a minute ago - August 7, docur.te nt 1632-G - 15 that's the ono wher e i t r of ers to a pl ot i n the 16 futur e during the next ~nrc h , when the actual trans 17 I lation of th ~ docur.ent r ef er s t o un inci dent t hnt 18 hupponed t he pr e:vious !•. arch; ~nd it changes the 19 entire sense of the bu l~ nc e of the excer pt. 20 THE PRES IDEFT: Your positi on will not be :! I pr e judiced if you defer your object1nn t o the extent 22 thnt you pr opose . 23 r.~R . S;\CKETT : The next 0ntry, i f tho Court pl ease , is ~nrk ed 1632- H. It is dat ed l u ~ us t 12, 25 1931. I_ -- -·- - 1,931 ·------· --· -----·--- - 1 "6 o'clock in the nftornoon, I went to 2 Baron HtJlADA 's house. H ~ d dinner with Prince KONOYE 3 nnd Mar quis INOUYE. '''(. hear d and studied the de- 4 . tnils of what Mr. HARADA had tol d me the other d~y 5 ebout the under-hand ed activities of a s ection of I 6 the Arr.y. The af fair thn t mode Mr. UG/1KI the 7 leader, was that of I~ arch 20. Certain . SHI MIZU of 8 Taikosha was supplied with thirty bombs (Thos e were ' 9 onl y for use in meneuvers and we r e a lm o ~ t har mless). 10 How0ver , it wns tol d thDt t h~ b0mbs wer e t aken back 11 t o the Ar my a month ogo. It i s a f act thnt b ~ caus e 12 the plot wa s called of r r·nd to n<'.. y off the- men tl.at had been assembled , they coll&ct&d ¥ 100,000 from i 1( among the Tokugawa nobles . " 15 There is a footnot e which I shall r ead : l6 "The nbove- wentioncd fact centering around Ugaki as • 17 the l eader, is in n:.:gar d t o the occurr0ncc of about 18 Ma rch 20, when a certai n --" doesn't finish. 19 CilPTi;.IN KLEU.~AN: May I addrC;s s the :!O TJ:ibunal ? 21 TttE PRESI DENT: Yes . 22 Ci\PTJ'.. IN KLEI MilN: Si nce five v1eeks ago, 23 I have asked the pr osecution to allo\·.1 me to ins".le c t 24 ' thG d i ~ry e1th0r in J n p ~ne se or English t r ansl at i on 25 s o that t ·e could hccome: acquainted wi t r. t he s ame . 1,932 ,----- ·------·------, 1 I rn ak~ the r eque st through the Secret ariat's office, 2 The Secret ariat has been trying to cooper a t e ~ ith me. 3 I r eeeived notes fr om them on t wo occasions to go up 4 to the nr osecution's office. As ye t, I have not s een 5 the diary. 6 I now r equest, on b eha lf of th0 de f endant 7 HIRANUM,l , f or myself to be a llowed t o t ake those 8 ' books in Japanese so tha t rny J apanese ass(')ciate ~ay 9 look over those books. I will r eturn them in the 10 same ccmdi tio n by Monday morning. 11 THE PRE SIDENT: No, you cannot ha ve those 12 books. You know you cannot have th e ~. 13 (T o the interpret er) Inter pr et v: ha t he 11 said. 15 (To Captain Kleirr.an) You must know, 16 Captai~ Kl & i~an, the originals mus t r err.a1n in the 17 possession of the Court, but you must be given every lS r fncility to inspect the ~ in your turn. Cthers may I 19 ' I be entitled to nrecede you . 20 I The order ~ade by the Court c overs this 21 I matter.· 22 CAPTAI N KLEHt./,N: Thank you, your Honor. 23 I don 1 t know what is contained in the diary • .At 24 this time , on behalf of t he def endant HIRANUMA , I 25 I offer in e vidence the entire cont ents of the diary ------·------·---· ,r I ~ ,I - ~ ------1,933 1 and ask for transla tion t o be made in behalf of the 2 defendant HIR;\NUMA by the prosecution who hns t he 3 only 'translati on st ~ ff. Vie have no one to make any 4 transl ati ons . THE PRESIDENT: You have no right to ~nde r 6' that evidence in this star.e unless th~ prosecution 7 i nvites you , or the Court. Neither have done so. 8 • DR . KIYOSE: This evidence was originally 9 written in Jap~ne s e , and the Japanese version should 10 be the origi nal of it. 11 THE MONITOR: Or , shoul d be the standard 12 by which this trial should proceed . 13 ' DR . KIYOSE (C ontinuing): Tho ~apanese 14 counsel arc so~ewhc~t confused in that, nlthough this 15 document is c3lled a diary, many rya ss ~ge s therein 16 I ar e undated . That boing the ens&, we should like 17 • to have this ~a tt e r submitted to the L~nguage 18 Section of th ~ Tribunal f or necessary corrections. 19 L~ R . S/.CKETT; If the Court plecse, at the 20 present tir.ie 21 THE PRES IDENT: You arc ~lways permitted to 22 r ef er n~ tt e rs to the Lnngucr,e Section. Th0r e i s no 23 need to i nterrupt these ~roce ed in g s to ask for some 24 thing you nr& alr eady entitled to. 25 Go ahend . ------· 1,934 1 DR . KIYOSE: I aM not impeding this t?ial ; 2 I am trying to he l p it out • . 3 THE PRESIDENT : You a r e i mped ing it when 4 you ~nke unne cess~ry r eque sts . LR . S f, CKETT: The next docume nt is 6 number ed 1632-D, da t ed Sept embe r 9, 1931, V!edne s day. 7 11 :,t 6:30 P.r.1 ., he l d n confer ence in r e 8 I I spect of th~ pr e s ent ~spc ct of affairs , a t the r usi 9 dence of Prin~c KONOYE , including the prince , A?. Il!.A , 10 OK!J3E and r.;yse lf. I.ios tly, tJU~!J\ explained in de 11 ' tails about tho s ecret plot v· hich had been pl anned 12 by a c ertnin gr oup of rr. 111 t ~ ris ts nnd the OKi~ 1 ' 'A ' ;, 13 faction in thL' midd le uart of l a st Enrch, by such l ·1 connection as he had been r &que stcd to ryarticipnte 15 in execut i V <: thE.: pl ot by OKA'.''A , S huMe i through 16 SHU '. I ZU. 17 " AR I I.:A . 'This plot hns b0en suspended 18 once. However, c. th ou~h t of this kind will not 19 di sappear nl t o~e th e r, but VJ ill r eapnear \'lhenevcr an 20 op..,ortuni ty '1r e s cnts i tsclf, mc ause the motives of 21 pl anning this pl ot wer e 22 "(1) thn t thE:: per meati <'n of Cornr.:unism ha s 23 b e~ n so noticcabl o r ecently tha t this country mi ght 24 f all into Corirunists 1 h'!nds if the ngi tation vm s 25 l e:ft unchecked . 1,935 "(2) No movement will attain its ohj C; ct, ~ unless it is carried out under the I o, cria l rul e ~ "(3) \'!hor efore , the OKi',WA ' s f action advo cates Socia listic Nn tionelism under the Impcricl i rule and th~ e st ob lis hm~ nt of nn Autocra tic govern 6 me nt in pl ace of the nr esent noli t i cal narty system. 7 11 (4) A c crtni n militnris t s ' group has • r esponded to this nnd shook r.ands with the OKAV:b ' s 9 f action for the ourpos c of cr e~ tin ~ such n Fascists ' Ill government ~ s existing in Ita ly.' 11 "In view of th(;' Rbovc r easons, we sha ll 12 have to think up an adequa t e counte r- me a s ur e ~ I ~ Especially, the Ii. •pe rial Househol d shoul d have full I 1 und er stnncing of the situnt i on and t ak E: necessary :5 steps about 1 t. Vie found the point of a greement in our opinions, and we arranged t hat w0 meE: t nnd di s • cuss this n ~ tt c; r as freque ntl y a s possi bl e.•" The next entry is number 1632-F , 1931, .' Sept ember 10 , Thursdoy -- "Hnd l unch with Mr. OKABE, 2l' Mr. ODtl and li~ r . TANI, the head of the :ls1ntic Bureau, 21 a t Prince KONOYE' s house . Mr .• TANI told us about 11 the Chinr. J'l ffuir s and gave his opinion.. His opinion ')' I -., wa s that s e lf def ensive acti on rei ght be unnv~ 1 cab l e 2 j a ccor di ng t o develC)!) rr.e: nts in the future.. I :igr ec wi th it, in ge; ne r ~ l .• " ____...; ___ ._ I 1,936 • 1632-E, Sept ember 12, '31, So turday -- "At noon I met Mr. HARADA at Ginza Dining Hall and t alked ind etail about the. latest und er-hunded rr.ove- n:ent of tht: t.rmy." ' 1632-I, September 19, 1931 -- "At 1:30 the Prime llanis t er ,:'. ent to see th0 Emperor. I wns told that our Army would not t,ry to enlar ge the situa tion but woul d stop any furtht:. r action when it found it self in an advantageous position. "A tel ephone call c ame from ?:tr. HARADA telling ~c to rr.eet at the official r esidence of the Minister of the I;-:ipcrinl Hous ehold at 8 :30. "The ~P. inj. st e r of the Iu:p crial Household, I tho Grand Chamberlnin and Mr. HARt..DA wer e ther e . Mr. HARADA r eported t hat he ~ a s called by the Prime Mini:;ter ~ t about 6:30 ~nd that he wa s asked about J the stat e of aff~ irs. He s~ i d t hat th0 Army's atti- ' tude v1t:-.s very s trong. He ndded thct in r egard to the policies decided upon by the cnbinc· t, the Prc;mier seemed t o be worrying because the .Army was not dri v ing it ho~ e t horoughly. The Pr 0mi er , t her efore , ,11 wanted to find the be:s t way for controlling the Army. Sorr.e said t hnt it mi ght be best to ask for Prince K/,N -IN' s help, ~ nd the others s nid tha t they should ask the 'GENRO ' to stay in Tokyo . But I told t hem ------ J I 1,937 ,------·--- .. ·--·····---- 1 t hat t he Premier should not depGnd on others in the I~ 2 s olution of this s itu ~ ti on at this critical time . ~ I emphasized t ha t t he r e was no nther clternativc ~ but for the cabi net t o hol d mee tings r epeat edly and i for days, even if futile , and to indica t e a firm 6 opinion of i t s ov·n f or the uni f ie a t i on of nat i onal ., , opinion." .. 1632-V, SE:pternbc. r 21, flionday --"At 9:30 I 9 \'Jent t o tht office . The Lord Keep I ~. Seal came t o Tokyo l ast nigh t. The Lord Keeper of 11 the Privy Seal, the Grand Chamberlain ~ nd Vice-Grand L. Ch amb e rl ~ in, t he head of the Army Aide-de-camp and 13 I gather ed in the r oom of the Lord Keeper of the 1.-: Privy Seal and conferred about the China and 15 Manchukuo conflict. .' ., "Baron h f.RAD/, t el ephoned rne from Kyoto asking Ii if t h ~r e we r e any further developments in the situa ,, II tion, and s u g~ e s t ed t hat i f the Enperor wer e t o c all I 'I. I Prince lCi~N- I N , we \'lou l d di s cuss thoroughly the '.'(; Prince ' s answer t o t he Emper or. HhRADA phoned me again that cv0ning . He trcnsmittcd Prince SAI ON JI's 2: wor ds to be cautious ri 'bout his (KllNf,YA ) answer when KANhYA, the Chief of t he Gener a l St aff would go to I . 'I I see the EP.!pe r or to expl ain why t he Korean i~ r rn y had ' advanc ed i nt o Manchukuo v: i t hout t he Empe ror's sanction. ------_ _ _ __ i r' ,. ' h 1,938 ·- - - - ·------. 1 "At 7 :30 p. m., after dinner, I vis ited t he 2 Lord K e ~pe r of the Privy Sc~ l at his ~f f ici a l r esi 3 dence and t r ansmitted HARADl 's t el ephonic me ss a ~ ~ . 4 On my way home , I s topncd ut TiLKEUCHI's house . But ~ I could not sec him, ~ s he wos cm a busi ne: ss t rip ." 6 1632-J, 1931, S~p t cmbo r 22, Tue s d~y 7 "At 1:30 I visited Mr. Hf',RADA 's hous e ngnin, KONOYE , 8 SAKAI, OKABE , and TAKAGI came ther e . Discussed nnd 9 s tudi ed various t hings c om inP, from various direc 10 tions. 11 "The Army is s o strongly det er mined in its 12 posi t ivc policy t ovmr d r.1nnchur1a thnt orders given 13 . by the Central Authorities may not be carried out. 14 "The Emperor hes expr essed s a tis f action 15 and appr oval to the Prirr:e llinis t ar nnd the Uinis t er 16 I of 1.'!ar f or t he gover nmental j)olicy t o s tr1ve not to 17 ext end further the J,:nnchurinn Incicent. HowE:ver, the t 18 Ar my is r eported t o hnve cons trued and t o be j nd i r, 19 nnnt, t hnt th8 Emp~ r or's op inion had been s o i nduced 20 I t o fo r~ by his pcrconal att endants. 21 "In view of such circurnstcnces, 1 t was 22 decided emong us t hn t t he Er.~pe r or had better not s ay 23 anything further nbout t he Monchurinn policy, unles s 24 he is ne c ess it ~ t ed t o co so, ~ n d t hat the GENRO 25 (meaning Prinoe SAI ONJI) agains t whom t he Ar my ·------··---- -.: -- - - 1,939 , -- --.: ------··------ 1 har bors anti pathy, had better not make a trip to 2 Tokyo unless t her e is an i mpor t ant c h~ n ge in th ~ ' s ituation, because it would i nt ensify the mili- 4 t arist' s antipathy." ~ 1632-K, September 23, 1::edncsday, 1931 -- 6 "At 2 :00 p.n., attended t c:l'. o:irty t hrown for Gcntle- 7 ~e n of the- Pr ess a t Ki.SU!.iIY/.t.!A Cl ub. Hear d the 8 course of events in t he l!.anchurian Incident from 9 ' HAY;\SHI, the head of t~ nintc nn nc o Bureau of the 10 Department of ... nr. Hov1evcr , ns tho cause of the I I r ailway expl osi on, the mos t important point of t he 12 whole nffnir was not oxpl nined clear l y , I asked him 13 t he question. To thi5,he r cpli0d t hat ho had not !4 as yEt r eceived the- r ~n ort. I t seems very strnnge t o mo. It i s r cgr cttacl o also , not to be posted 16 and infor~ ed on this ryoint , ospc-cielly when people 17 • er e t alking ~ it h skepticism about the cause of this i 18 ~ cci c". e nt. 11 19 1632-L, Scpt cnbor 29 , Tuesday -- " At 20 9 o'clock, I 'visited the Lord Keeper of th<:: Privy 21 Seal at his official r esidence and r eported what I ii f had hear d frore H AR~DA l ast niqht; name ly, wha t tho 23 Chief of t he Ar my Gener al St aff had t old to the I 24 Pre~i e r, ' Chances ar e the hrmy is compelled t o send Ii 25 l troops t o the Yangtze River ar ea. If this happens, ·' -~ 1,940 he does not want the troubl e r egarding the r ever s ion 2 of Sup r e~e Commnnd -- that i s to say, the Government 5 shall not interfer e with the pr erogative of the ti Supreme Comrrand of the Army.'" 'l 1632-M, 1931, October 1, Thursday ,, 11 1't 4 o'clock, I vis ited t.~ r. HARt,DA. Also orcsent 7 wer e Prince KONOYE and Mr. SHIR,',TOR I. 1!'e discussed ~ and consulted upon the militarist's secre t plot • • 'J The combinction of the niddl e class el ements of the (: hr my is likely t o be pr etty t ight, and the pl an to ; I . br eak down the ~ r esent pol iticnl party ·;st 8m by L means of effecting coun- d' et nt enc to administer 1 • • ,'I national nff3irs un~e r d ict a t o rshi ~ has been made "' secretly ev~ r s ince thG 2nd yoor of Shown er a (1927). ''! ' This is ~ s erious p r obl ~m ind0cd t It will be i mpos •'' s i bl e for our st ~te s ~c n und ~o l it icic ~ to r ealize the dnnger of such a p r~b l c~ . It i s very c iff icult to devise c. counter rien sure . l1nyway, i t will be necessary t o guide those militarists so th~ t they } •.t won't c ~u s e the no tion a s e ri ~us da~ og e ~nd ·lilllnec- -· essar y sacrificE. . I t i s n nn tional cnlaI!li ty." ' . . j - -- • ! - 1,941 ,.. l Document No . 1632-N, dated Oc tober 5, 1931 - 0" .... 1 4 "At 4:30 I visited ?f.inister of the Imp0rinl Hous ehold r 3 • ICHIKI, a t his offi ci al r esidence with Prince KONOYE • •s \"e discussed th(: Army's stubbornness and its in- p ~ trigues. ··· e gave him al l inf or r.lati on available c. nd r a 6 asked him t o think up the best solution t o this t!'a tter." t t 7 Document No. 1632-0, dated October 6, 1931 8 • "The Pri~e Minister seemed t o hav& t alked about the 9 . s erious situati on to th0 Lord Ke eper. The thing JO worrying t hE Pri me Minister is that tt0r e is a r i sk 11 of head-on col lisi on vd th t he Ar my ~bou t the question 12 of the other ~arty with V!hom t o negotiate the Man 13 churian problerr.." Document No . 1632-P, da t ed Oc t ob~r 7, 1931 -- D " At 7 p. u . HARADA came t o my house and we we nt to 16 s ee: Ma rquis I NOUE at Uchidayama . '.'e he nrd the opin- 17 I ' i ons of t he current problom of the Ar my Department 18 from Lt . Col onel SUZUKI. ,\ctiv i ties in which Lt. 19 Colonel SUZUKI takes part do not intend to c ~r ry out 20 th~ nat i onal r ef ormation i mmcdi at 0ly, but it is to 21 save t ~ ~ si tuation if something docs happen in the 22 future , such cs t he outbr eak of r ebellion among the 23 young of fice rs. On the, wa.y hom e: , I r cportE: d t o 24 Prince KONOYE about tht'.; ~ bov e ma t t er . " 25 I Do ~u~~ nt No. 1632-Q, dnted October 14, ~~: 1_ =---' 1,942 1 11 At noon I wc: nt t o Count Tadama sa SJJ 2 had n confer ence with Mtisatoku YASOUKA, Chokci OKABE, 3 ffi nnnbu r,:hTSUMOTO, Shigeru YOSHIDA ., and Fumio GOTO 4 r egarding the curr0nt problems. Ac r or ding to Mr. ' YASUOKA, th~ plo ts of th ~ Army ar e progr es s ing r apidly I 6 and students and Ronins nr c participating in it. 7 • 'Sor.iething r.:us t be done: r egarding t his rrc tter,' he ., 8 s aid. Our opinion wa s t hn t S ha shokuka1 /TN. an 9 a ssocintion/ ·:ihich had bec. n pr c. viously pl nnncd by 10 YASUOKA end ot hers, should be matoria lized as a per 11 manent counter ~en sure~" 12 Document No . 1632-R , da t ed October 15, 1931 - 13 "At 1:30 I attended a t Ge pt-. rty of the::: mana ging staffs 14 of the newspap ers. The Ch L.: f of the Informa tion, 15 I SHIRATORI, Chi e f of t he l•. :a intenance Burc:: au, HAYAS HI, 16 and I had ~ co nfer e: nce on the s itua t i on. 17 H.i\YASHI, upon n pr emise th<; t it wr.s his own <.! ssump I 18 tion, gave t h0 f ol lowi ng s t ~ t e ment: 19 "'It will be unwi s e t o t '1 ke t i rr.e 1• solving 20 t h ... I::;.nchurinn que: s tion, f r or. t he: I~ rmy' s poi nt of 21 view i n g0vcrning di scipline s. It r equires prompt 22 s olution. In or der t o r ccch pr o~p t s oluti on, it will 23 b G ne cessary t o crr:nt <.: :-. ncv· r q~ iT.'le in 1,:.'.lnchur i n . I:f 24 the C e ntr ~ l ~ uth oriti o s shoul d gi ve t he ngitnt ors of i I 25 t h e: movement n t ~ ci t n. p p r ov~ l to do so , it \':111 I _ ___ _.I - - ·- 1,943 ------·-·------ 1 I r ~ c1litat e t r.e solution of the r r otlem .' 2 "He ind icn. t ed by his s t r! t c~ t: nt the f ~ ct th ~ t thf: ~ ~ ilit n rists still stuck t~ its nl ~ n t o e st ~ blish a 4 new r c ~ i rn e in Manchuria . On the other hand , it is 5 s~ i d th ~ t th0 attitude of the ~il it ~ rist s suddenly 6 stiffened , taking advantage of t h0 runor thot Count 7 UCHIDA , the Presi dent of South r.~~ nchuri ~ R:'. ilway 8 ' Comp::my, had tte intention to settl e tte pendi ng 9 question by one ef fort - - the est.nbl ishr:.ent of a 10 new r egi me in r!i::mchur1n." 11 If the Court nl E:: ase, we would like to c o.11 12 Gene: r al T:.NAKA to the witness stcnd o.t this time for 13 1nter rognt1on. 14 THE PRES IDENT: I11r. Levin. 15 11ffi . LEV I N: r.:r. President, I woul c like to 16 ctill the att8ntion of the Tribunal t~ the f ~ ct thnt 17 nlrecdy in the di ary ther o has appear ed thE n~~~ of l 18 ~ · Chamberlain SUZUKI ~ nd Lieutcncnt Colonel SUZUKI . 19 Throughoct thes e pr oceedings ther e will appear the 20 ncme of SUZUKI, :'.Ild I sir.ip:\,y •:mnt to direct the at 21 t ention of t he T ri b un~ l that t he defendant is Lieu 22 t enant Col onel SUZUKI, Te11chi, subsequently Lieu 23 t ~ nnnt Gene: ral; so thnt no confusi on n~ y be had with 24 ' r (:: spe:ct t o the µcr snn Y:ho is l"."e: nti0ne:d in :my of 25 these pr oceedings . I • ------·-----. ------· I 1, 94'1,. ,------~ ------··-·---, ' 1 THE fRESIDEitl' : Ycf.. 2 ttu\RSnitL OF THE CC'U~. T ; r.: r . President , the ~ ~ itn e s s i s i n court and uiJ1 n~ ~ be suorn. The ~i t n ~r~ Ti ll nrr7 s i ~n t he oath of ' ~ itnes s a nd a f f ix his seal. I 6 r.~ r . Presi-:"l 8 I fifteen rr.~nu t~s . 9 1 ( "herc..ur0n , a t 1045 a r ece s s 10 ..rns t aken until 1100 , after ·:1hich the pr o- 11 cecdinr; s ·;:e-:c r e ~:w< -1 as f o l lo-:.rs : ) 12 13 I 14 15 16 • 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 I 25 !:IrtECT ,----· ·-· ·------·------·· G 1 '."A~ SS..L CF ~!E c c~~-:'. :hr iribun~l is TIO\"! 0 1 2 I d I I b ~ ~y 1 KIC1iI c I r 4· l on beha l f of th· ~ r os~ c ~ t ion , b ,... in ~ first ~ u ly g ~ sworn, t r stifird ~s folJo~s : ".A· 6 ~3. S ~ CKET?! I ~irh t st~t~ t o t h e Ccurt '{ ('> 7 thn t ·.-: c. ;-r opes .:: to in tcrrog"'. t c· U: is ·:·i tnnss or:il l y 1 ,, 8 ~ n d not us e a~ ~ ffi 10 3Y '.lL S ~C KETT: 11 ~ ~ ill you sta t e ycur na ~ c , rl~a s c, sir? 12 n ?;.;·:AK.~, rt yukichi. 13 Q r-:or· ol d arc yc u? 14 rt Fifty- f our. 15 '< ~~at is your r r cs~ n t husi n r ss e r occu r~ ti o n? 16 , rt ::c i: r:. r l o ~r.:-:er. t . 17 ~ 18 ;..r-:: y"': 19 n 1 · s . 20 ( ··:il l :rcu s t 'l t r:. t h :"\ r •.., r iods of tir:e? 21 r . 1914 t C' 1942. 22 I ~ ".'Jill yci.l st:'tt• in ('!C t 'lil t h e v~ :- 1.o us l.OSi- 23 tions you h el d ·;·i th t h e J....r:-.y during t:-: cs c- y -:! rs? 24 25 1914; g r ~d u...,t -::d : :~ v'll - - :·ilit'1 ry St ". ff Colle ge , I I i - ' 1,946 DIRECT ,------·-- ' 1 ' October, 1921 ; a ttached to tho ArMy General Staff, 2 Dccc~b e r 1, 1922: att ached to the First Division on naneuvcrs of the Ar1'1y Ge neral Staff up to De c eMbcr, t 1925; attached to the Se cond Division, Army General ~ St aff Inves t igation, J&combcr, 1925, to hUgust, 1927; 6 r esident Peiping, Chin~ , ,:.u;:-ust, 1927 s ~ ssis t cd in the 7 busini:? ss of th e: J :l rancs -:: Lia g0 t i on on sor ~e occasions; 8 Ch i ef of the I nv c stig ~ti on Dopa rtr.~ nt ~ Arny Gener al 9 Staff , ~u g us t 1, 1929: a t th& s~n c tine pronot ed to I 10 ::ajor; i.ssistant rili tnry h. tt ~ <' h C o f the Attache ' s 11 Office , Jaranos o EP- ba ssy, Changha i, 1 October 1930; 12 Comna nder, Ba ttnlion , Fourth ~eg im e nt of Fi eld 13 .. rtillcry in Osaka, .;ugus t 1, 1932 ; befor e becoming 14 Batt alion C omr.~ ~ndc r, t r -- vel cd f or two months in 1~ I China , ranchuria and Kcroa ; a ttachcd t o the First 16 Artillery nf t h0 Fiel d hrtillcry Regi r. ent, Tokyo, 17 • J.:a rch 1, 1934 ; :~ ssis t11n t or Dcruty Cor~n\ nde r, l 18 according t o the A r. c r ic~n t ercinol ogy; Staff Officer , 19 Kr:nn tung ..:. .rr·.y, 1 l. :irch 1935; at the sar.! c t i ne pr o 20 r.ot cd to Li e: utenant Col onel; CoMn3nder, 25th Reg iment, 21 :. t Ra n:m, Yorea , Aug ust 1, 1937· 22 TI:E i:or:ITOR : Corr ection: "25th !:ountn. in 23 krtill 0r y -- fqck ~r till 0 ry Rcg i nent. 24 I n.' (Continuing) Attnched t o t he To jo Arny 25 Corps in Inn e:r -- o n go li~ for t wo nonths bef ore ------· I' , L 1,947 '!'ANA KA DIRECT ------... -·- - --·-·-----i 1 becoming RegimentRl Command er 1n Koren; Ch i ef of the II 2 Llilitary Service Se ction, ~3 r Offi ce Tokyo, 1 Decem- ~ be r 1938 -- I f nil cd t o sny th ~ t on 1 Au gust 1937 4 was r rornot ed to full Co lonel -- Cbi ef st ~ ff Officer, ' First Army i n Taifen China , 1 r ~ rch 1940-- 6 THE ? .:ON ITO R~ "T ~i yu o n, China." 7 ~ (Continuing ) In Shansi Province; Chief of 8 • the !: ilit ~ ry Service Bureau, ::Ja r Office , Tokyo , 9 1 December 1940; dismi s s ~ a , 5Pp t € mb~ r, 1942. Th~ t's 10 al l. 11 ,.. .. -.1hat wa s vour r ;mk .'.'\ t the t i..rne of your dts- 12 missal, sir? 13 A Y. ~n,j or Gener a l. 14 \ In the course of your offi cial dut i es, did 15 I you ever h~ ve occa sion to ~a k c nny investiga tion of 16 I Army personne: l ? 17 I I h As t o r ersonn0l, no; but 1 s to criminal 18 ~ ction on the p~ rt of Army pe rsonnel, yes. 19 ,..... In the course of your official duties , did 20 you ever have occ9s i on to ~nk e ~ ny inves tigntion of 21 events or i ncidents thnt occurred ~ ithin the Army? 22 A Yes . 23 ~ ~1 S th~t on enc or more than one occasion? 24 A In nccordnncc with my dut i es , I conducted 25 such inv c stig~t ~ on when necessary, wh ethr r in the ------.... 1,948 TANAKA DIRECT ------"---- past or present. 2 In the course of such lnvestigations, did you 3 1 have access to or custody of any official Army records? A Yes, various offic1al documents as well as 5 reports of the Japanese military police. 6 Q You stated that in 1940 vou became Ch ief of 7 the ~- ili ta ry Ser vice and Dlsctpline Bu reau of the • ·:iar J~ inistr y . 11'hat , if anything, did tha t 3ureau have t o do ~ 1th investigat ions? One of the nr t ncipal duties of the t:ilitary ! I Service Bureau i s to contr ol and supervi se morale L' and morals of the entir e Army . 1.; Q As Chief of that Bureau did you have cust ody l ·I and contr ol of the prjor records, investi€ations made ! 5 and f i led ~t th t hat Bu r eau? ! () ,- A Yes . • Evi dence has been i ntr oduced in t his t rial of the killing of ·~r s hal C ~ a n g Tso-lt n on June 4, !') 1928. '../ho was i~a rshal Chang 'I'so- lin'? , r. Chang Tso-li n was a marshal, Chinese marshal, '• ., who died ~ n llukden in 1928 • •. • I Do vou ~ no w whether any official investiga- . ) t 1on of t~is ~ i lli ng wa s ever made b7 t he Japanese .' I Arm:· or Government? A Yes. official i nvestigat i on ~a s conducted. 1,949 DI:iECT ,------·------·- . --- 1 1 I Q How do you know this? 2 In 1942 when the ~ar Off ice was ~o ved from 3 a r- lace called Piyakezaka to Ichigaya . I had occasion 4 1•1hen cl eaning up of various documents was conducted ~ at the tine to r ead various documents tn the Urgent 6 ?i le cf the C~i e f of the :;ureau "Ji th reference to 7 he t~y 15 Incident, the February 26 Incident, among 8 which these documents wP re f ound. 9 ~ 7hat ~a s vour position at that tine? 10 I A Ct:ief of the Ki li tary Service Bureau , 11/ar 11 Office. 12 Q ··1as this document tn y ~ur official custody 13 as Chief of that Bureau at that time? 14 A Yes. 15 Q ~a s it one of the off icial recor ds of that 16 I Bu reau? 17 A Yes . 18 I Q ~ha t year ~as it that you found this record? I 19 h January 1942. 20 r De you know approximately ~he n the report was 21 I -. made? 22 A Au1ust 1928, if my ~ecollections a re not 23 I 24 mistaken. 25 St ate, i.f you ~no w, who personally prepared this reoort. 1 , 950 DI~ ECT ,------·------·- i " ·:a.ior Gener alMI NE of the Tokyo r.:ilitary 1 2 Police at the or cte r of be ~e n ~a r Mi nister. !:'HE 1\.0 ~ ITOR: Co rrPc tion: " Ma~or Ge ne ral 4 1.UNE , •:1!-:c ·::as the Ch ief of t hE> Tokyo l\':P unit . ~ Did you r~ad t his rerort? 6 "es . 7 Do ~:ou >r:o··! \'/here ~ t i.s no·;:? 8 h If it has not been lost it should be in ~ 9 .. hP Ur gent ?ilo - r the ~hi pf o f' the ::ili t a!'y Service 10 9urPau, ~ar 0ffice . 11 t~ . SACKETT : If the Court please . the 12 prosecu t 'on at t his t '.. r.e ··Jould 11 ke to offer in 13 evidence prosecution' s document No . 2 214. I ·.·1 ould 14 like t o stat e that t his i s comor tsed of the corres- 15 ' pond ence bet~ e en the prosrcution and t he Japanese 16 Go ve rnme nt "'ii th ref erence' to the producing of this 17 7'eport. 18 r::c: F~ESID~~!T : .. Jr.at do0s the correspondence 19 disclose'? 20 ~~ . SACKETT : I t di.scl osPs a rPquPst t ~ at 21 ~~e ~ e Po r t be r roduced and an ans~e r from the Japan- 22 cs0 Go v e rn ~en t that tt c~n n o t be l ocated and is not 23 avai l able . 24 CLE~K C'? TP.Z CCTJRT : It ·::ill be marY.ed ' 25 exhibit ·:o . 180. I ------==--- 1,951 TANAKA DIRECT 1- ·------. -----·--···-· --- 1 TP.E F~ES I D E~lT ~ Admitted subject to t.he 2 usual terms . 3 ( ···h~ r eupon , pr osecut ion' s exhibit 4 !Jo . 180 1.'1as recei. ved in evidence . ) ' r ·:.rhat did tr.i.s official repor t that ~rou 6 read have to say .., ;. th refer ence to the death of 7 tarshal C~a ng Tsc- l i n? Tell us in detail. 8 , n T~e killing cf c 1~ ang Tso- 1 ir. ··;as olanned 9 by ~ ~ nior Staff Cfficer: Kwantung Ar rnv, Colonel 10 KA.\'/AI:CTO . Ttis i ncident had no connecti on •:Jha tso- 11 ever ·::i th t he Co:nmand er-i n-Chief of the K1•:.antung 12 Army at t he t i~e . Tte K~~n tun g Arm y, in accordance 13 ·:11. th the policy of the I'A i~ AK.A Cabinet to secure an 14 early settlement of ~an churian problems, endeavor ed 15 to cH sarm Cb.in"'se troops r etreating f r om !.Iukd en in 16 the dir ect!on of ?e i pin~ and Tsients i n, i n the dir e ctio~ •J 17 I of Kins~u, o r Chincho~ . Tr.e purpose wa s t o get rid of 18 • t~rshal Chanr Tso-lin and t o se t ~P a new state 19 I 11 seoarated f r om the ~ nk ing Government ~ith Chang 20 gsueh-liang as leader; in other ~ ords, t o create a Ii 21 n e ~ stat e und er Japanes e contr ol, a state of peace 22 and order ~~i ch later became ~~ nchukuo . 23 'i'P.E I'.:OI\ITOR : Corr ecti.o n: W;Jhich ·,·ms some- 24 25 thing like I!anchukuo t hat came ~ n to cxi stcnce later. " A (Cont i nuing ) ~owe v c r, this plan ~as banned ·------1,9 52 TAi?AKA DIRECT 1------·-- ' ' I by t he TA1lAKA Cabinet l a tr.> r. However, Co lonel I : 1 : 2 t:A ..' /A?l~O TO , still true t o hi s o•:m pur pose of s etting . ~ up an a r ea of peace and orde r i n Ifanchuria, endeavor ed 4 to get r id of Chang Tso-lin and s et up Chang ~ Hs ueh-liang i n ~is pl ace . As a r esult, on June 3, 6 ' 1927 , the t r a in ·:1~ ich deoart ed from Po i pi ng ·::a s blown 7 up a t the crossing cf a South :·anchu rian Railway 8 and the Peiping- I 9 Chang Ts o- l i n c~E'd. T!':is dyr.anit i ng ..,as car ried 10 I ou t bv o ffi cer~ -- b y .art of t he officers and non- 11 commissioned c :f :Lce,·s of th~ 20th Engineer ?.egiment 12 wbich had c o ::: ~· to ~ : uk d e n frcm Yo r ea . At t ~ 1.s ti.me 13 Captain t;z:~r ~ I, s.:.:aff Offica r of Colonel KA".//AMOTO 14 tried t o r e t urn the f i re ~bi c h ~a s opened b y the ' 15 pe r s onal bod yguards of Chong Tso- lin. At that time 16 the ulan Tas an immed iat e nustoring of the f orce s 17 •·' but t~is mustPr ing of the f orce s -- Kwantung Army 18 II forces -- ·:1as stonpcd by Chief of Staff of the K•van 19 Ii tung Arrr.y, Lieutenant Gene r al ShITO. The com posi t i on 20 of t he t r ain ~a s made clear -- the composition of the Ii 21 pass enger s or. the t r ain ··;as made quit e cl oar by the 22 II off i ce r s ~ n t b'' Col one l J:'XJA!10TC -- ·:1as made quite 23 cl!'ar by an officer di s patched b.' Co lonel KA".l/At:O TO 24 ,, to Pe i ping and Sh anhaiY.uun. Tha t's all. 25 ------·--- - - · l 1,952 TA i'?AKA DIRECT ,------___, ______1 by the TA JAKA Cabinet l a t P. r. However, Co lonel J:A.:'/All~OTO , still true to ht s o·:m pur pose of s etting up an a r ea of peace and order in Ifanchuria, andeavored to ge t rid of Cha ng Tso-lin and s e t up Chang Hsueh-liang in ~is pl ace . As a r e sult, on June 3, 6 I 1927, the t r ain ·:1rich deoar t ed from Pc i p1 ng ·:1as blown 7 I up at the crossing cf a South :~nchurian Railway 8 and the Peiping-~ukd~n ~ailv~ y, and as a r Psult 9 ' Chang Tso- lin d!ed . T~is dynanit ing ~as carried 10 I out bv o ffi cer~ -- by pa rt of the officers and non- 11 commiss ioni;d c :f tce,·s of th(? 20th Engineer ?.egiment 12 wbich had c o= ~ to ~~kden ~r e m ¥or ea . At t ~ is time 13 Captain uz;j:I, S'.:aff Officer of Colonel KAVIAMO TO 14 tried t o r eturn the fire which ~ as opened by the 1~ personal bod yg uards of Chnng Tso- lin. At that time 16 I the olan .,.. as an immcd ia t e r.ms t cring of the f orces 17 but t~is rnustPr ing of the forces -- Kwantung Army I 18 forces -- \'Jas stoupcd b~r Chief of Staf f of the Kwan 19 tung Arrr.y , Lieutenant Gener al SAITO. The com positi on 20 of the t r ain ~ as made clear -- the compos ition of t he ' 21 passeng er s or. t he train ··;as made quit e clear by the 22 officer s ~nt bv Colonel I<'J~·i/A! !OTO -- ·:1a s made quite 23 cl ~ nr by an officer dispatched b.' Col onel KA'.l/Al.~ OTO 24 to Pei ping and Shanhaikuan. That ' s all. 25 ------. 1, 953 Q ~'lha t did he say this repor t 1 ii. pur pose f or t he b 2 r a ~ m 4 Ti1e pur pose & separating ~ peace , t r anquility ,,, also by 6 that ar l}a tr.e Kanking 0 r 7 i:1ar lords s ·· 1 e 8 vail ed s enarate from 9 ' Slight 10 ent, ;·1r.ich · as c or~duct in g a 11 punit i ve expe d j tion 12 the nur.iber of 13 people ir.volved ,. 14 i. J. € s . 15 Q r.ow ~any odd. others . 16 A Colo:1. e l 17 personally? . , 18 i e s , r :· i n ~ i:-:a tely • 19 you :'irst meet 20 21 ever t a l k t o :·.ii:-. killing 22 of 'i's o - l~ n? 23 24 ·.. r.er. a r.:l ·;:tcrc'i' 25 In ::c.?:c!':ukuo, 1~ 3 5 · I ------· ·~------.---· ~------1,954 ...... TANAKA DIRECT ,------1 Q What was your r ank or positi on at that 2 time? ; A Staff Officer, Kwantung Army; Lieuenant I, Gener".l -- Lieutenant Colonel, J e. p ~t.'3Se Army . <. Q ¥! her e is Colonel KAWA; lOTO , if you kno·.v? (1 A Yes. 7 Q Wher e? ".., A In Taiyuan, Shansi Province, China. • 9 Q In your conversation with him did he say lO anything with reference tc c.ny plP..n or progr am in 11 June, 1928 , on the pe.rt of the Kwr: ntung Ar my , or any 12 elements thereof, concerning r.~e nc huria ? 13 A Yes, he told me what I hv.ve c> l reedy ste.ted, l 11 Q '!!hat did he y>ersonally t ell you with r efer I .. "' ence to the killing of lfo.rshal ChRnr, Tso- lin when 16 you talked to him? 1 17 MR . l'c~ !AimS : I f your Honor pl e~. se , I 13 object. It i s strictly he 2rsay . 19 THE PRES I DENT: It i s hearsay, but heersay 20 is adrnis s~ble . !1 MR. McHbNUS : No question but what it i s 22 hearse.y . 1 ?"_, 'I Tiffi PRES I DENT: I t is admi t ted f or what- l 1'1 evar pr obr t ive v~ lue it has. The objection i s over - 25 :u:~a . ------·--- _____ .______! - .. 1,955 j TANAKA LihECT ~J 1------··------ A Col onel KA111Al.. OTO t old me thusly: that i f 1 2 the ur gent mus tering up of the Kwa ntung Ar my had ~ been carr ied out , then the J.ianchur ian Incident vrou l d 4 have been car r i ed out then and the State of ~ !~anchukU(l . vrou ld have been created then. The ex- 6 pl osive used a t t hat tine belonged to the Engi neer's 7 Regiment ~ o . 200, square dynamite 200 . 8 i,'.R . WAH.REN : ~. : a y we have t hat a nsv1er agai n , 9 si r ? 10 I TEE Ph E5 1DE.i:T ~ Yes. It is not t oo clear, 11 is it? 12 '1HT!IESS : The explosives used a t that t i ;ne 13 were squar e shaped axplosives numb ering approximat ely 14 ' two hundred , belonging to the Engineer Cor ps. 15 :.m:ITOR ! Co rr e ction ~ ar tiller y unit . -. 16 Q ·Iha t, if anyt hing 1 did he say he had to do 17 with the killi ng? 18 He t ol d ne that it was a plan of his oun 19 alone . 20 uid he descr i be the part played, if any, 21 by Captain OZAKI? 22 A Yes . 23 Q ":/hat did he say? 24 ...\ Captain CL.AKI' s pur pose '."fas t o fol loYr the 25 order s given b y Colonel ~ ·:1AiiOTO to muster the forces ------1,956 TA NAKA DIRC:CT ;- ·------~--- - .. ------ 1 l then in Eukden to open fire ar.ains t the train 2 carrying Chang Tso- lin. 3 Q What, if f nything, did he say as to the 4 purpose or r eason for killing the l.iarshal? ~ A He said t hat the purpose was to get rid of 6 the ';'tar lords then prev 7 creat e n ne\'/ r eeime seoar nted fror.: the Nanking 8 Government, a regime of peace and order un6er the • 9 leadership of Chang hsueh-liang. 10 (/_ In your conver sation with hi m about the 11 killing of the Marshal ·:!hat, if anything, vro s said 12 about Jn.napcse control of ;.:anchuria? 13 Jt Na turally, inasmuch as Colonel KA·~~ A.I.:01'0 was 14 a strong advocate of a new state, an independent l~ I State of l!cnchuria -- 16 Q ~ie ll, what did he say'? 17 A Ee said that e new state must be set up 18 in the ar ea of ~an chu ri a and separa ted from the 19 :anking Government to pl ~ C b that r egime under 20 JapanesG control and leadership, and to develop 21 the ar ea ~i thin, and also to strengthen this new 22 r egime for purposes of Japanese n ~ tional defense . 23 q ~id ho disclose how meny people were in- 24 volved in the Incidentr 2 ~ A :'ot in de tail . ------1,957 .'AtlAKA LinECT r Lo you know Ca ptain OZAK I that you huve 2 mentioned as being i nvolved i n th0 Incident? A Col onel KAWAl~o·ro def initel y said t hat 4 Cnptain 02..AKI had nothi ng to do with the explosion. Q l.~ y question was: Do you know Ca ptain <· OZAKI ? 7 Ye s, I know him well. h I r 'Jhe n did you fir st meet hin? <) I A 5e uas a colleague of mine when I was a t- 1() tached to the t r my GGnar a l Staff in 1922 . I I Q Did you ever talk to hirn about t he kill ing of ~a rshal Chang Ts o-lin? 13 A Yes. YJhe n a nd Hhor e? A I net h i m in Tokyo in 1929 wh en he wa s being t r ansfer red f r om ;~ anchuri a a s bnttalion 17 colTll':landcr i n Eokka ido . I\ Q ·,iha t di d he tell you on that occ a sion ·:fi th r cf er &nce to the killing of l~c.r shal Chang Ts o- lin? .~ll I Ee said that he had issued a mus t ering u p L ! ' order u t the comr.ie.nd of Colonel KA':1Ai :OTO, but that I' he vas r epr imanded by the Chief of St~ff of the .~ ) Kvmnt ung Ar my, Si\I TO, who s ~id •:1hl'\ t \·:~s the nE:c- c ssity of u sing tho K··E'. ntung : r my against such c weak &r r.iy as thnt of the Chi ne s e . -~- 1,958 TANAKA Dif.ECT ----·--- Did he say anything with r eference t o t he 1 Q 2 purpose f or the killing of the iia r~ hal '? No. In t he ycnr 1930 ?. nd the spring of 1931, ,. ' what was the nttitude gener ally of the ar my toward 6 Uanchuria? 7 A Folloning the Tsinnn Incident and the Chang • Tso- l in Incident , Sino-Japanes e r elations became ') extr€mely aggr avated, both in Chi na end Ilanchuria, ! (j as a r esult of which the army took a very strong and 11 stiffened a t t itude . l.' LlONITOR: The China -J epenose situation u became very agr.r ava t ed and it vrc.. s pr a ctically ba t t lo I If conditions , without t he declarnt i on of ~a r. 15 ~!iI TNESS: (Continuing) Si nce the fall of 1928 a fter Chang Esueh - li ~ n g hnd succeeded Chang • 17 Tso-lin t>. S l eader of Ilnnchuria, sa id Chang Heueh-liang ... I .. enter ed the Kuomintang and brought tho ~~uom int a ng 'I I . flag i nto Llanchuria . As 2 r esult, J ep2nese-Chinese r el ::>. t ions in i :nnchuria became extreme l y aggr ava t ~ d, .. and it wa s tho s t rong attitude esp0cielly of the ar my th ~ t in v i e~ of t he great sacrifice J ap3n had made in th~ t ~ r ~ a since the huss o -J ~pa nese 'ibr this •A - I pending question in 1:anchurin must be s t opped de- finitely . \ 1,959 TANAIV\ DIHECT 1-- Q Wer e ther e any el&mcnts in the ar my ed 1 I I voca ting Jape. neso occupation of I.lanchuria in those 2 I dc:ys? ?> 4 A Yes . Q ·-:1 er e there cny e l cm~ nts in t he ar my ad 'l I 6 I vocating the creation of an independent ~a nchuri a 7 i n those daysc n No , thEre w~s no advocacy of an independent • 8 9 I sta te in :,;anchuria , but vrh en the si t un t ion had l(l r eached such ~ s tat e th~ t diplomatic n~ goti~tions I 1 wer e of no avnil, it v1 I t1 to set up a new r egime under J apanese cont rol, a r egime 0 f peace end ord ~ r. I' " . Then your ~ns we: r is that t her e wer e • i i &l cment s in 1930 end 1931 th~ t a dvoc ~ t e d the cr ~ a t io n of ~ n i ndependent 1:0.nchuri a? l I L:R . ·,1ARF\EN : If the Court pl ccse , we wish . \. to object to that question. THE ?RESIDENT: Yes, it is objecti onabl e. Objection susta ined • .~ .. r Ho~ do you know thcsa ~ l o n cn ts in tho army ' I n dv oc~tcd t he things you h ~ v e t~stif i c d to? )o At the. t time I \lnS ir. the Gener al St a ff ---- -· ------1,960 TANAKA DIRECT office and was ca rrying on inve stigations on ffu n 1 2 chur ian problems , ther efor e I know. I P.rn we ll ~ c 3 I qur. inted with the m~ tt e r . 4 Q To your knowl edge, were t here ~ny civili~ ns 5 nt th~ t time who advoc ~ t ed the s ane thing? 6 A This W:>.S my friend OKA''!A , Shurne i. 7 Q State, if you know, who nnong the m ilit ~ry • 8 gr oup in Jap ~n in the Spring of 1931 ~nd in 1930 9 v1er e the l et:'.d i ng advocf' t e s '"> f wh ~ t you h ~. ve t estified ' 10 t o . 11 A One of the ve ry strong ~ dv0 c ~ t c s ~e s ny 12 s en i or officer, the t hen r·!P. j or Gene r al T,'\TEK/.''.'A, who 13 WAS chief of the Second Division , Gener al Stnff. 1·f f_rno ng civili<:>.ns it vms a gr 0up wr ich m:.s cente r ed 15 ~ ro und OKJ-'.''11., Shune i. Othe rs :>dv0c :- ting this strongly 16 fr on the Spring of 1931 wr. s my friend Ht.SHI!·:OTO , 17 Kingor e , and C;:;ptain Ch0 , Ismnu, •nh'J \'ms n rienber of 1}i the Snkurr:- Kai. IY rio. TITOR : C0rrecti-:> n : In pl a ce of fron 20 the Spring 0f 1931, in 1930 and the Spring 0 f 1931. 21 q '''h') , if e.ny, v1er e the l e~d e rs nf this policy 22 in the K·m:mtunt: J.r my ? 2?> !. I r ecall that it wci.s Col 0ne l I T,".G;J 2 1) Chief of Str: ff , Kvmntun ~ f.r:"".'', end Str: ff Office r, 25 Lieutennnt C0l onel 1SHI Hf.R h, K~nji . 1,961 uIRECT ------ ~ Is t he HASHII.:OTQ you r.ient i on one of the 1 accus ed in this ca se? 2 ' 3 J \ Yes . '1 Q I s that likewise t r ue of :;Joctor OK.i ...1.J A? I A Ye s . " I 6 I Q Is I TbG~K I one of the accused in this c a s e~ 7 Ye s . s ()... Did you 0ver hear of a n or ga n iz~tion call ed 9 Sakur a- kai? IO Yes . 11 Q State possibly 'lhen i t was f ounded , i f I.. you. know? 13 h. The or gnni za tion of Sakur a - lrn i its elf we. s I 11 for ma lly or ganized in the spring of 1931 , if I r e 15 call, but ths firs t r.i ~ e~ing : or the pur po se of or I (J ganizing t nis soci _ty ·:ms held on October 1 , 1930 . 17 I don ' t r -:.: c :>.l l ·· 1 h ic ~ , ':~ c K~iko - sh~ or the Fuji m- tei J :.. in Kud~n, :c~yo. I ,c~scn~lly a tt ~ nde d t his mee ting. I ) Q ·.. no or f:~ niz0d the S::kur:-. - k:-. i, if you know? '.l O A Si;.co I h~d l ef t Tokyo on the ni ght of 21 October ls t for S h~ ngh a i, I don ' t know r1ho or gani zed 2.' t hG societ y , or who wcrL l ead0r s of the society, 2~ but I r ~ ce. 1 1 t hc. t th:: 1:1ec ting of first i.J0 ccrnb cr vm s I 2 tj I 2) I I ~ Do you know ~h~ t type or class of people I__ ------·' - - - ~ •' 1,962 DIRECT ,- --·· -·- --- - . i made up the memb ership of this organization? I I A 2 Yes . I Q Wi ll you stato ~ I to the Tribunal who they lj wore? '\ .h ht tha meeting on first Octobor the (1 officers Y1er e f r om the Inspoctor jcm..:r al of liili tary 7 Educetion, the ~er Office , arid the G e ne r ~ l Staff. ! ~ I Their rank, li e ut c n~n t colon ~ ls and ma jors. Ther e • I •) wer e also five or six officers from the navy. i.nd 10 I think this socict ::· continu ~ d to c xp~nd with these II m0n as its nccl eus. I . Q Do you know th0 e.pproximnte size of the l j I orgnnization'? l '1 h If my memory serves me correctly, about Vi fifty or sixty offic0rs at thG meeting held on J, , first October. From wh~ t I l e:e.r ncd from Ce.ptein I-; CHO l a t t:r , the momb 0rship increas ed follov1ing its I~.. organization in t he spring of 1931 v1ith students from : , J t he Army Staff Collogc and the nrtillcry Engineer . ., I School • } . - 1 ~ ~ fua t WLr o t ho objectives of this organiza- 2· tion, if you knovr,· •'•I h The mocting on f i rst October did not touch .'11 nt all on Manchurinn problems . "t tha t t ime dome: stic 1· questions within Japan wer e cxtr 0rn oly acute. I I. - 1,963 LIF\ECT Ther e was continuous controversy in political ') circles, the state of political affairs was pnr ' Licular ly low, and even in the ideological field ,f J~po:l n ':1as in o v0r y bad condition. It wa s our be- ') lief then that i f things wer e l ef t ~lone Jcpan would 6 shortly decline ns a nation and a s a peopl o, and it { w~ s our desir e to do our utmost to clc;anse politics 8 i n J e. pan and to r enova t e the country. /.ccording to ') v1hnt C ~ pta in Cho told me in Shanghai , the purpose JO of the S~kur a -k ::t i wa s tv10-fold; one , to carry out I I an i ntorncl r ovolution , or r enovation, and, second, I ') ·- ' to se ttle tho J-.:anchur i ~ n probl em. 13 iiOfl!I ? OR: This was aft e: r the I:anchurinn In- l I cid0nt. iS TJ:E Ph ESi u ;~E T : '.k wi ll adjourn until half '6 past one . ·7 • ( -..her eupon , at 1200 , n r occss wa s I!' t cken . ) ; ') ' 20 21 . 22 _)1 ' 2·1 ,, -- ...... iiiiiiiiiiiiir! .. 1,964 DIRECT AFTERNOON SESSION The Tribunal met , pursuAnt t o recess, nt 1330. 2 I (Engl i sh t o Jepanese end J npcnese 3 4 t n English interpret eti on was nade by 5 SHHU.NOUCHI, Toshiro, and SHI!:ADA, frc-.saknzu, 6 Hidekazu Hayashi acting a s !~oni t or. ) 7 M/JlSHJ,L OF THE COtmT: The Int e rn~ tion n l 8 Hilitnry Tribunal f or t he Fnr Enst is noVI r esumed . 9 THE PRESIDENT: I heve here a certificnt e I 0 fron the prison ned ic ~ l officer at SugnMo, r e~ding : 11 "This is to certify that Kiichiro HIR/.NUUf.. 12 is under treatnent for nn upper r cs pir~tory infection. I I 3 It is expected th ~ t ho will cfain be able t ~ ettend I ' the tri~ ls on 8 July 1946." 15 Let th~ t ccrtificc. t e be r ecorded. j() .; 17 R Y U K I C H I T h. N !. K ,., celled .:lS a \•ti tncss 18 on b eh ~ lf of the prosecution, r esuncd the JI) stP..nd end t estified ns f ollows : 20 BY rm . SI.CKETT (Continued) : 21 Q General T/.N J'JG, , evidenc e h~s been introduced 22 in t his cnse in r ef erence t o t~ e J~nnchuri cn Incident -'.'I? ~ which t ook pl ace on SGpt cnber 18 , 1931. Ar e you :;• t f nn ilinr with the f acts and circun st ~nc e s of this 2) Incident'? ------' --- -·- ~ ... 1,965 TA NAKA DIRECT A Yes . Q 2 Do you knoVJ v1hether or not the Manc hurion Incident came about as a r esult of a pl an, as dis ·1 tinguished f rom being sp en~ nn eou s? A Yes . J I () Q Do you kn ow the l ee'.' ding Japanese individuals 7 who wer e involved i n t he plnn? •· 8 LIB . ·;/ARREN: If the Tribun::i l please , we 9 1 want to object. The fir st quest i on wns l eading and 10 no objection w3s made . This witness has not testi- 1 J 1 fied there ·,7::is nny plan. He just simpl y st3ted that 12 he knew whn t it was . Counsel keeps insisting on 11 assumi ng f ccts thnt ar 0 not in evidence nno on 1·1 putting words i n the .,.,i tness ' mouth. 15 ~e object t o it . 16 Tn.s PR~S IIJ.C:iIT: I do not s ee any grounds 17 for objection. He wa s nske( whether this was the '~' ' result of n plQn or 1ahether it vm s something spontn- 19 neous . Ther e is nothing lending ther e . 20 Objecti on overruled. 21 Q Ganer 3l T;.NAKA, t o .vour knowl edge , wa s the ) ., Manchurinn Incident n pl~n ned incident? 2) A Yes . Q Do you kno~ the l e~{ ing Japnnese people or indi viduals t h~ t ~e r e involved in this p l ~n; and if ..-. ·------~ ..._ 1,966 TANAKA Di nECT .. , J so, state who they we re . l A Spea king from t he subjective point of view, 2 one of the lende rs nt th~ t time in J~p nn was the 3 Chief of the Second Division of the Army Gene r a l '1 s Staff, the then Maj or Gener a l TATEKA''/A; nmong other s , l eader of the S~kurn-K a i, the then Lie utennnt Colonel 6 7 HASHI MOTO; and 3mong civili ~ns , a group under the ; .. 8 l eader s hip of OKA~A , Shume i . 9 THE EONITOn; :iASHir!.OTO as 'ilell as Cho , Iso.Illl. 10 Q ~ha t ~3 s th~t l ast ansner? 11 A Eajor General TATEKA;tA; of the Sakura- Kai 12 members, Lieutena nt Colone l H/1. 5HD.:OTO , a nd Capt ~ in 13 Isamu Cho . 11 Q ·1ere the r e nny i n6ividu::ls '.'.l mong the Knnn- I S tung Army th~ t you •.•1ould c l ~ ssif y as l ender s in the i6 pl an? 17 A According to ·:1 h:i t Capt~ i n Cho a nd Lie utenant IS Colone l HASHH:OTO told me , the l eader s in t he Kn~ n 19 tung Ar my wer e t he Chief of Staff, t he t hen Colone l 10 I ThGAKI, and Deputy Chief of s t ~ ff, Lieuten~ ~t 21 Colone l I SHI HhRA , Ka n ji. 22 Q V/e r e HASHI MOT O, OKt:.!A, ".nd I TAGAKI mentioned , 23 each accused i n this c ~se ? 2·1 A Yes . 25 Q ;!ill you state, if '.'OU k1:ov1 , ~·;h~t the pla n ____.. - ' 1,967 TA NAKA DIRECT r--. ------·-·------v1a s and its objectives? l I A The stories t old on this subject, on this 2 ; 1 problem, by ITAGAKI, HASHI MOTO, ~nd Cho nr e al l differ ent. But the plan and objactive, a s I view it subjectivel y, i s thnt the interna l situation in , J apnn m1s extremely s arious o.nd aggr avnted :'I t the (1 time , and , furthermora , the r el ati onship bctneen China ' and J ~pn n was al s o seriousl y a.ggrnve? t ed . The plan , ~ ~ 9 and objective was to fi~d ~ solution to this 1(1 situntion. ! I To c~rry out this purpose , it w~s t he intent I.' of t hose ~ ho ~e r a concer ned t o destroy the Chinese I~ war l ords then in ~n nc h uria, to sot up n new country l ·l based on the kingl y •;r:1y ~ncl r.: country ma int ~ ining I) peace, tranquility, m16 or dar, n country inse parnbly I(• bound i n their r el ationshi ps betgeen J apan and Unn- 17 1 churi ~ , a country uncer the control of Jnpan, so th3t .~ close coopcr ction 3n6 coor dination moy be made in the I '1 • economic exploitati on of this ~ r e~ ~nd th9r eby to .. !l stabi lize t he J apanese conditions nt home , as we l l as to m~ke of Jap~n n stnbilizing f nctor i n Enst Asia. Did you ever t~ lk to ~n y of the se people ) ' -') you have mentioned concerning t he ~cnchuri a n -"' Incident? A Yes. .. 1,968 DIRECT i- -- ... ·----.. ·---- 1 You menti oned the nccused HASHIMOTO. Do you 1 I Q 2 know him? A Yes. He is my friend. 3 Q ··.'hen him? 4 did you first me e t A In 1929, v1 hen Liautcnant Col one l HASHIMOTO ~ 6 r e turn~ d from Turkey :inc Russ ia, ~ s Chio£ of that 7 s ection , end bef or e th1t in t he Army S t ~ ff College • 8 when we were together. 9 Q Is he in the courtroom t od ~ y? 10 A Ye s. 11 Q V/ill you point him out to the Court by 12 i nd ic~ting ~he re he is s e~ t od in the courtroom? 13 A (Pointing) To the extr eme l eft, second row . 14 Q Did ~rou ever s orv-3 1::1 th or under hi m in the 15 nrmy? 16 A Not under him. 3 ut I s erved ·:1i th him ~s a 17 colleague in t he t.rmy Gene r ~ l St:iff off ice. 18 Q Did you t n l~ to him on any occnsion ~b o ut 19 the Lb nchuri:..n Incident? 20 A Ye s . 21 Q .. /hen anci r1hcr c "''" s th:1 t? 22 A At t he Akabono- so aos tnur ~ nt in Kojim:lchi 23 ii!n r d in Tokyo in the Fnll of 1934. 24 CJ ·i1hro t if anythi ng did ho t ell you on tha.t 25 occa sion ns to ~ h a th J r or not tho ev2nts t h~ t took ------·-- 1,969 TANAKA DIR:t;CT - -- -· ------·---- place i n Mnnchuria on the night of September 18, 1931, wer e planned in ndvancc ? A Yes. Q · ih::t t c id he s::y with r ef <: r ence to whet her or not i t was planned? A Ho told me th'l t the I1!nnchuri'ln Incident vms pl anned by tho Ku~ntung Army and th,t he, i n cccor d nncc nith this pl.:in, ·muld nssist nnd support the I ncident ana by th ~ t mc~ n s ~ n6e~vor to bring nbout ~ r enovation of i nt e rnal pol itics in J~pn n , Dh ich nt that time ·:ri s 0xtrc:ne ly corrupt-3 d. He 'l l so sa id that he 1na Capt ~ in Cho h~d pl~nncG the October Inci dent thnt haa f;ilcd. But he 'll s o s~id that in s pite of t ha t f J i l ure t hey h~d succccaed in cr enting n n e~ st2te, ~anc hukuo . He nl so sni a th ~ t ~t f i r s t i t ~as t he pl an of the K1:1:-tntung Army to exploit I.innchuria ·:1 hil c under the J .2.pancse Kv1:mtung /.rmy occupa tion, but t h::i. t be had ur ged th; t u ne~ ~ nd independ ent state be erect ed in or 6e r to avoid intcrn'ltionnl comp lic ~ tions . lnd this p rop os~ l of his u~s t ~ k c n up . Q 1i6 h: t ell you ~ho D~s involved in the plan, by ::nr.:c ? A In Jap~ n it D~s . ~ jor Go ncra l TATEKA~t , Chief of tho Fir st Livision, Ar my G e nc r ~ l St,ff , ~ho l ed ------..--- ...- ... L-----~C'- ...... 1,970 TANAKA DIRECT - --· ··------ l ~ nd supervi sed HASHihlOTO nnd 9ho , And among civilians, 2 it wn s a gr oup c ~ nt e rin g 8round OK.AWA. In Manchuria 3 it was Colonel ITt.GAKI and Lieutenant Col onel ., Hf.SHIMOTO, both of 1.Yhom cnrriod out t he plnn. 'i' hn t ~ is nll. 6 Q Did he t e ll you nh~ t th ~ u lt im~ t ~ objectives 7 of t he pl an wer e? 8 1~ Y~s . 9 CJ ·. :hut di 6 he s c. y? 10 t~ To m'lkc of i::.nchuri-:i it b"l s o.3 from which to 11 bring nbout t he r cvivGl of As i a . 12 Q Did he sny wh0t h0r or not t he Kw"lntung Ar my 13 was involved in t he plnn? 14 A He just point ed out t he n~me , Kv1 ~ ntung Ar my. · ~ Q ~ ha t did he soy ~ h e n he point ed out t he nRme , 16 if ~ ny t hing? 17 THE MONITOR: Correc t i on : He just pointed 18 out t he n ~mc , Kw:ntung I~ r my, and d i o not mention any 19 indi vi d u~ l's name . 20 Q ~ 0 11, whn t Gid he soy if nnything Tihen he 21 menti oned t he Kv1~ ntung Army'? 22 1. He sa id t h:t t he centra l figures in t he 23 Kvmntung t.rmy vrc r c Colonel !Tl.G I.KI "nd L.lcut ennnt 24 Colonel I SH IH.~RA . 2~ Q Did he s ~ y ~nyt hi n g ~ i th r ~ f c r c nc c t o ~ ha t -----4------,I -- - - 1,971 DIRECT 1 1---::e Kwnntung /\rmy •dvocatcd concerning Me.nchurb ~ t 2 the ti~e of the Incidont? A He s~i d t h'lt it ~~s tho Kw1n tung Army's 4 intention to occupy Mn nchuri~, to destroy t he in- ~ fluancc of t ha unr lords in th ~ t or e, , nnd to bring 6 1 about the economic devel opment of t h" t t erritor y 7 under army occupntion. 8 '/h2 t pos i t ion d id the nc cusea HI-. SHI MOTO hold 9 at the tit:~o of tho I ncident, if you knO\:v? 10 A Yes. H0 ·:1".s ChJcf of th.3 .rt u ss i ::~n S0ction, 11 Second 1ivision, Gcner:l st~ff office i~ Tokyo . 12 Q Did HASH IMOTO t ~ ].l ~.r o u ·;1h:t p'1r ticul,r 13 pnrt he pl~yed i n t he p l~n? 14 A 'Jh:it co you m0:n by ;,pee i '1 l p:irt he pl !lyed 15 in this pl nn? 16 Q Lid HJ.SaII.iOTO t c 11 IfOU \"J h'l t i f ::t nything he 17 did with r ef er ence to the pl:n he doscribed to you? 18 a' Ho s: i~ t h". t tog ~ t ho r ~ ith Che , the desir e 19 ~~s , b0for e the out br c:k of th0 Incident, t o bring 20 1 about .:l pos itive s ettl ement of l<~nc huri :m problems , 21 ~ nd ~ith t his end in vieu to ~or k ~ i t hin t he nr my . 22 Af t er t h~ Incident, how0vc r, h0 p l~n n 0 d the October 23 I nc i dent in order to bring t he do-.mf :ll of t he '.'/e:lk 24 nnci corrupted govar nrnont in J ~p~n ~ n d to con c c ntr~t e 25 J~p~n cs0 publ ic opinion on ~~nchu r i:n '1ff:ir s . --- ...... ~------~cm•_ ...__ -... 1,972 TANAKA DIRECT ,-----·------· You hnve r ef erred on sever al occasions to 1 ' Q What year ar e you r ef erring 2 the October Inci dent. 11 3 to? •$ A October, 1931. ~ I 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 1~ 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 l______-. - - - 1,973 TANAKA DIRECT ,- ---·- ·-- ---· -----·- w Q Ar e you f amiliar •1! i th the f:lcts nnd ciroum 0 1 1 s t ances of the October Incident? f 2 } A I was not acquainted with the det ails, since & s 4 I was at thnt time in Shanghai, but I l earned of those p ~ det ails from Captain Cho when he visited Shmi~hai in r a 6 June, 1932 . t t 7 Q V' ha t did he t ell you? 8 ..• A He s ~ id th ~ t the purpos e of the October In 9 cident w ~ s t o clennse the i deologiccl and political 10 atmospher e of thet time , which was extreme ly corrupted; 11 to r e rnv~ t e internal Jap~ ne se politics by cssnssinating 12 the l eaders of the g ov e rn~e nt at thnt time; to s et up 13 a new renovnted government, and the: r eby s nve the nation; j 14 and then t o bring about un~y nrnong the people in order l~ to secure their unnnirnous supnort of t he s 0ttlement of 16 the .1anchurian situati on. 17 Q "hat, if anything , did HASHIMOTO s ay to you 18 wi th r ef er ence t o the Octob~ r Incident? 19 A He told ne exactly wha t Captnin Cho had told me,. 20 -. a Q "'hat position di d T ATEKJ~'.'/A hol d a t the time of • 21 t he Incident? 22 A Chief of the First Division, Gener al Staff 23 Office . 24 Q Did HASHII.10TO, in his convers:l tion with you, 25 t ell you tiha t p 1- ·----. ------ 1 A Ye s. 1 2 Q '.' ha t di d he so.y? 3 A Tf.TEI 4 , Colonel HASHIMOTO ~ nd Capt~ in Cho wer e mos t cmthusi ~ astic a.bout the Incident, nnd he was ~ lso -- Ti~TEKA' "JA 6 was a lso most enthustiastic ndvocate of the ?.1anchur1an 7 independence . 8 THE ~. iONI T OR : Correction: Not l eader, but " 9 supporter. 10 Q V' ha t positi on did Cho hold c t tho time of 11 the Manchurian Incid ~ nt? I 12 A Attache d t o th~ Cllinn Section, Second Division, 13 Gener nl S t aff Office . 14 Q Did HASHI~ O TO t el l you what p ~ rt he played in l~ the pl nn? 16 A Yes . 17 Q i''ha t di d he s ny? 18 I A Cho wns Hi~S H I MOTO' s most trusted colleague. 19 Q ".''hat position did Dr • OKi\'.'.'!. hol d at the t irne 20 of the Incident? 21 ~ Ch~ ir m nn of the Boar d of Directors of the 22 Eo.st /~sia Econ om ic Re s earch Bur c::tu of the S0uth Me n- 23 I c hurinn Rr..i l way, Lir.ii t ed . 24 Q 1.''hn t, if nnythint; , di d H/.SHU~O TO t f.: 11 you a s 25 t o tba part Dr. OKri1f!A pl nye d in the plan? 1,975 DIRECT 1 A He s ::i id thnt with r ef or e:: ncc to the Manchurian 2 Incident.--' th8 decisive set t l eme nt of the Manchurian 3 Incident nnd pr obl em , as we ll as tho internal r enova 4 tion in J npan , he most ent husias tically cooper nt ed in ~ the: plnn. 6 1 Q ~'·ha t posi t10n di d ITilGhKI hold nt the time of 7 t he I ncident? · ' ~ 8 A Senior S tnff Officer, Kwantung t.rmy. 9 Q '. .. r:nt part did H.;.sHir.10TO t ell you he pl ayed in 10 ' the pl nn, if nny? 11 A Yes. 12 Q I sn~. d , v1ha t ~ntrt you wer e t ol d he pl nyed in . 13 the pl cn, i f ~r;y? 14 A Tog other '.;·ith ISHi lL'tRA, ITltGAKI w ~ s a key 15 fi gure in the: Kv1 ~ntur..g f....rr.y. I 16 Q Di d lL\SHn.:oT o t oll you whether or not the ,, 17 1 event s tha t happ ened on Sept enber 18 wer e the r esult 18 I of the pl an he described t o you? 19 A 11!111 you r epe:it thnt agc1n? 20 Q Did ~SHH.iOTO t ell you -.·1hether or not the I 21 events tha t hcppened on the night of September 18, 1931, 22 wer e t he r esult of the p l ~ n he described to you? 23 A Yes. 24 Q 1.'!ha t di d he so.y? 25 A He sai d t his Incident had pr ovided an - 1,976 TANAKA DIRECT ,-··------~ --- .. ·------I' 1 i opportunity and a chance to create Hanchukuo. 2 Q Did he tell you whether or not the occupation ~ of I.fo nchuria, which f ollowed the night of September 18, 4 wa s the r esult ~~ the ~l a n he disclos ed t o you? A Yes. 6' Q 1"ha t 1.:id he say? 7 A He sa id that at f i rst t he pur po se wa s t o 8 utilize this Incident t o seek the e c ono~i c exploita- 9 tion and deve l ~ pment of the ~r ea under Japanese ar my 10 · occupation. However, he suggested t hat if such ar- 11 r angerient VJ er e tnken, it ·11o uld produce undesirable 12 effects i nt ernationally, Pnd, ther ef or e , the political I 13 i and -- therefore , an indepandent ?fanchuria should be 14 creat ed 1n order t o devel op t his ar ea, and ther eby 15 t o solve the e co no~ic and political crisis in Japan, 16 and by so d0 ing ~ o save Japan fr0rn her pr edicament at r • 17 that tine. 18 THE ! NT~PRETER: Correct i on : He s ai d that 19 this 'Incident at first -- had been t ~ ·"" ~. ~ ·t ~n tio n ~ t 20 first -- was t c utilize t his Inc t rl - ·· · ., ':!?.nchuria . 21 The i nt ention of the K·.· .:.·' J • • i-.1·-:w wa s t 0 22 bring about t he econ0rn i c c:xpl r. 1 .. ~:--~.: i. -:: the a.r ea under 23 ar rny nccupnt i on nnd t o pl ace t his ~ r ~a ~ nd Jap~ n nn ~ 24 basis 0f i nseper abl e r el ctionship , end by s0 do ing t 0 25 seek the soluti0n to the economic ~n d p~ li ti c ~ l crisis ·------·--- I>• - 1,977 1 TANAKA DIRECT ,-·------·------ 11 1 which then was s eriously cgg r ~ vn t ed in J apnn, nnd by ' 2 s ee kin ~ such solutions t o save Japan from her diffi- 3 cult pr ed icament. How ever, he sni d t hat he believed 4 he r eg~rd ed occupati on as b ~ in g undesirnbl e fr om the ) intern...; t i onal point of view, ~ na pr oposed tha t an in- 6 · dependent stat e be crent &d und0r Japanes e control, and 7 suggest ed accordingly t o the Kwantung Ar my . I ' 8 Q Did H.i.SHI MOTO say anything ns t o what this !\ 9 :l gr oup of people that he named pl n ~ned t o do , if nny ' 10 I thing, if t he J apanes e goverunent did not support the 11 occupation of ~.i n nchuri a? 12 A Yes. 13 j 14 A He sci d the t the V,'A(J~TSUKI Cabinet was ex- I 15 ' trerne ly weak. 16 Q I would l ike t o ask you t hat question a ~ a in. 17 A He s~. id that the at t itude of the V.'AKJ~T SUK I ' 18 Cabinet was extreme ly weak ; nd exceedingly pas sive 19 w1 t h r cspec t t o the r.~ u nchur i an Incident. 20 II Q Did HJ.SHH~OT (t s ny nnythinr, to you in your i 21 u conve rs ~ tion with him on th'1t occasion as t o wha t, if I 22 anything, this group of peo~ le th~t he nnned pl anned 23 to do if the eovcrnment i n Jnp nn di d n0t support the 24 II occupati on of Knnchuriu? 2~ Yes .. : __,______1,978 TANAKA DIRECT Q What did he so.y? 1 k I s ~ id s ~ id 2 As bef or e , he that it wa s the 3 plan of the SJJCTJRA-K/'1! a nd its members, end am on ~ 4 civilinns in collabor a tion v1 ith OKA'.'!A 's gr oup , t o I 5 brinr? about a cbup d'eta t in Tokyo ,·:i th wh ich t o de- 6 • stroy the governme nt then in power, t o s et up a new I· 7 government, and with t he power of t oc nevi government 8 t o rally the support of t he entir e populnt i on t oward 9 the s e t t l ement of the Manchuric.r. Incidcmt. This wns 10 the October Incident of 1931. 11 Q You have mentione d the n. ccused , Dr. OKAWA. 12 Do you know him? 13 A Ye s. He is a frie nd of mine. 14 Q ,,1hen did you first meet him? 15 A In 1925. 16 Q Di d y ou ever work with or under hi m? 17 A No . 18 Q Is he runong th0 a ccused i n t he courtroom 19 todc.y? A No , he is not. 21 Q Di d you ever t nlk t o Dr. OK J_,,.\'.'A prior t o 22 September 18 , 1931, wit h r ef e: r enc e t o Manchuria? 23 A Ye s·. 24 Q 1/'hen and r1her e di d you t c-. lk t o him? I 25 A I hnd s poken of Manchurian pr obl ems with him ------· 1,979 TANAKA DIRECT .------ 1 quite frequently, but I think tha t since he had con 2 s i der ed a separationist movement between Nanking and 3 , Manchuria in 1930 - - it wns in the summer of 1931 thnt 4 • I met Mm . ~ I Q \'!hat did he sny to you at that time with r ef 6 erence to Manchuria? 7 A l''ith r ef er ence to Manchuria , he snid that 8 by all me ~ ns Manchuria must be separated from the 9 Nanking government, nnd place the new ar ea under 10 Japanese control;to create a l and f ounded on the 11 pri nciple or the kingly wny -- n l nnd of peace, l aw 12 o.nd order. He s ai d that since the f 1.rst part of the 13 17th Century Asia hns been under const ant western ag 14 gr es s i on by the white r ace , end that Asin is either 15 colonial -- ha s beco ~ e a col onial ar ea or Asia's 16 t erritories ho.s become either col oni al or se~i-colonial . 17 • He s~ id outside of the people of Japan all the people 18 of Asia ar e now suppressed ~nd oppr essed people. He 19 sai d, furthermore, tha t after setting up nn inde 20 pendent Mnnchurin n r el ntions hip -- an insepar able 21 r el ationship should be est nblished be t we~n Japan 22 nnd M::m. churia , and th:\t v:ith t r.e g::·owth of Jnpon•s 23 n~ ti onn l str ength,Japnn ns l eader or t he peopl es or 24 Asia endccvored t o driv0 out the whit e r ace from thi s 25 ar ea, to bri ng about t he emanci pat i on of Asiatic 1,980 TANAKA DIRECT 1------ 1 peo,les, and also to bring about the r eviva l of As ia. 1 He furthermor e sa id that he had gone to Manchuria in 2 3 the first part of 1930 to t alk with Chan g Hsueh-.lia ng 4 . and had pr op;sed this i dea of his to the young Mar- shal~ But Cha ng Hsueh-.lio.~g showed no desire what- i 6 ' soever nor any ngr eE;ment to OK.AWA ' s pl an. Thnt being I I 7 the cas e, in the light of t he f act that Sino-Japanese I 8 r elations had been so aggr avated at tiat time, OKA'i!A said I I • 9 that the only wn.y to bring about t m fulfillment of tha t I 10 i denl was by force of nr~ s. 11 Q Y!as your talk with Dr . OKAV!A, about the Man- 12 churian Incident,nfter it occurred? 13 A Yes. 14 Q Whe n ~nd whe r e was t hn t? 15 A In November, 1934, nfter OKh\'.'A had been r e 16 l eased fr o~ prison a s a r esult of his involvement in • 17 tho May 15 Incident; when he was r e l eased from prison 18 I pni d hio n visit. 19 Q ,,.,here did you visit hi m? 20 A At his home in Me~u~ o , Tokyo. 21 Q On tha t occcsion whn t, if ~nything , di d he 22 have t o s ay I 1,981 TANAKA DI RECT .·--- ... . · -- . ------. - - - . ------·, A He s c. id th ~: t with respect t o the Manchurian 1 Incident, ITAGAKI nnd I SHI HARA ar c the centrc.l figures 2 3 in the Kwantung hrr.iy . In Jnpan he sai d t ha t the l ead 4 ers wGr e Colonel HASHI MOTO, Ma j or Cho, and hi ms c; lf, ~ and their purpose was t o carry out t he October Inci 6 dent in or der t o cl ean Ot\.t party politics and to 7 r enovat e t he J apanes e goverlll'!lent. Hm·1ever, he sai d 8 that t he October IncidGnt f ailed on account of the 9 tetrayal of Lieutenant Colonel NEMOTO. 10 Q Did he say wha t the pl nn involved , insofar 11 as M~nchur i a was concerned? 12 A He s ai d that the independence of Manchuri a , 13 which he had as an i deal s ince his youth, wa s the 14 fir st step in the emancipation of ~ sia . 15 Q ··:hat pnrt, if any , did he say he pl ayed in 16 the pl an? • 17 I A Yes. 1~ I 19 :w 21 22 23 24 25 ' ------·------i,9e2 DI ~ECT ------, G Q ·1.'ha t di d he say? r 1 (' A. he 2 i3i:;fore the ··:nnchuri an Inci dent sai d fl n h n s:;iirl that bef or e> th e J "anchurian Ir.cident he had ~ I b f 4 trnvel ed all over Japan pr opagandizing to th0 effnct r g ~ th~ t 1:anchuri a r.u st be r l a ced under J:lpanese control. & 6 ~h il e on this l ectur e tour he a lso stressed at tte B 7 sare ti~e the i nportance of a gener a l r enova tion i n a r 8 Japan both in t he fi ~ l d of thought and econor.ics. t 0 9 Ee said tha t the r esult of this l ecture t our \':;i.s n 10 ver y effective. 11 At th:; ti!'ie of t he outbr eak of th t:: i ·anchur - 12 i an I nci dent, Japanese pol iticians and financiers , 13 he sn. i d -- financiers and other s i n high circl es , 14 h e sai d , ~e r e e xtr c~e l y wea k an~ r ~ f l e ct ed that 15 \'Jeakness i n th~ i r a t t i tude to~·:ard v~:-iou s rrobl eri s; 16 and t hat he sought to orpose then to ~r i ~g about their • 17 do~n f a ll in order to real ize th ~ r enovgti0n of J~pR n . 18 T'r.i s r enova t i on v:a s to be c ~rr i ea out on the ~-a rt 19 of the ~~ r r::y by H..;.sHr: ·crc, Cho and their grour; on 20 the civilian side b? OK:~' 1;.. n.nd h is gr our; and that 21 they r;ere to coo 1:1er a t o anci col labo r ate \.. i th each 22 1 ot her in a ~ ra nd coup d ' ctnt ~ ith th0 obj ~ ctiv e of 23 over thro·1:ing the govnr nr f: nt and th".' n , by setting up 24 a n r·\'i Rn-i renova t ed bovc:rnr..ant , t o cleanse r oli tics 25 and roli t ica l ad~ inis t r a t i on , -t n~ r A ll y public orinion DIRECT ,-·-----I ·-·------, I I 1 and a ll the effor ts of the peopl e towar d the s ~ ttl e - I I I 2 r: ent of the i ·anchurian pr cbler.: . ' ~ Tha t is a ll. 4 Q In thi s conv ~ rs a tion you had nitt: l)r . 0Kh''.1A , ~ di d he sny nnythini; flS t o i'.'h 5t h er or no t t!:::; ev en ts 6 I t hat took pl ac e on the niFht of Sep t ~nbc r 18 wer e 7 t he r esult of the r l an he di 3clos 0d t o you? 8 h. Yes . 9 Q ··Iha t di d h e say? 10 I A He sa i d tha t in T~ nchur i a, as I sa i d b efor e , 11 t he l eaders \'1ere I7AGAKI a nd P.ASH il:OrO; tr.a t in 12 I J a pa n i tself the l cador ~a s hi~ s e lf -- tha t is, 13 who would devot e hin s elf t o th ~ ob j ect Rnd 14 t h E t g sk of r allying rublic o p ini o ~ ~round the pl a n; 15 and '."i thin thi:: arr:y a t h or. -; , Col on• l E~SHI~ :o ?O and 16 C ap t ~ i n Cho \·:i t h •::h or.~ h 0 ·;:'1 n t ~d t o C'.l~~Y out the f 17 October push. 18 Q 9i d he SPY a nyth i ng t o you ns to ~h c the r or 19 no t the occu pation of , ·:\nchur i a , \.. hi ch f ollor:ed the> 20 night of Scptcr.:b t:: r 18 , ,.. ;s t r. 0 r t"?sul t of the r l an h e 21 d i s cl os0d t o you ? 22 A Yes. 23 ·-,he.. t di d h ~ s~y? 24 Ee sq i d t h.., t h e hod l onG thour.;h t :l bout it 25 hir.: s i: lf a ri:i t r: ~ t h 0 h·t1.i b ncn c oll cc tin;: d~ b. i':h ilc in 1,984 / TANAKA DIF.ECT ,- ·-·------· --·------·-··----·---. ! 1 the Research Bur9a11, and tha t h e f elt extremel y 2 gratified and fortuna t e tha t a similar pl an was I .a 3 being pr e oa r ed and l a t er carried out by the Kr·antung I 4 Army. I l 5 Q Di d he say wh ether or not the c stabli shr.ient I I 6 of the so- ca l l ed gov ernncn t of ?~an chukuo was the I I 7 r esult of the plan he de scribed to you? i I 8 A Ye s . I 9 Q I ··,hat did h e say? ! i 10 ~ He sa i d that tho e stnbl i shmen t in i ~ anchukuo I 11 progress ed s r.1 oothly, VJithout a hitch, because of the 12 f act that it had been v: ell pl anr:ed and Pr e pared 13 beforehand. 14 Q Do you know the a ccused I TP G ~ KI? 15 I A Yes. I ar.1 very r.:uch incle ".. .. ·:·::d to h i ri . 16 Q ·:w'hcn did you fir s t r1eet hii:t ? • 17 A He •:1as ny s ection l ead er in thG same 18 conpany wh en I enter ed the Military a cadeny. 19 Q Is h e in the courtr oo~ today? 20 d. Ye s. 21 Q '.'!ill you indica t e to th8 Court VJher e h e is 22 s eated? 23 A ( I nd ica ting ) Ext r e~e r i ght, s econd row. 24 Q Di d you evr: r serve v.i i th h i m in 1.:anchuria? 25 :1 n Yes . I____ ------. ------· 1,985 TANAKA DIRECT 1 Q When? 2 A March, 1935 to March, 1937. 3 Q Did you ever talk to him prior to Septemb er 4 18, 1931 about !~a nchuria? ~ A Yes. 6 Q '/!hen and where was this? 7 A In Port Arthur, when I made a tour of 8 ?f.anchuria in June, 1930. 9 Q At tha t tir·e , wha t, if anything, in his 10 conv9r~ati on with you did he advocate with refer ence 11 to I:anchuria? 12 A Vlith r ef er ence to the ~ ·; a nchurian Incident, 13 no, but he did sa y tha t J.~a nchuri a should be placed 14 under Ja panese control by a ll mca~s ~ 15 Q Did h e say anything on t•·1:: : ~ ·J.b j e ct matter 16 of the use of force to a cc or:·pli s ~ t11is r esult? 17 A Yes. 18 Q Hhat did he s ay? 19 A Th e situa tion b et ween Chin~ and Japan in 20 l~anchuria a t tha t tine v1as extror.ely a ggravated in 21 view of the f act tha t m;iny pending issues be tween 22 the two countries, treaty problems and others, had 23 been unsolved. How ever, after the death of Chang 24 Tso-lin, the r el a tionship bet r:een China and J npan 2~ became even ~or e seriously aggr avated. Furthernorc , 1,986 TANAKA MRECT 1 he said that the pending questions in Manchuria 2 between the t wo countries were so serious that their ~ settlement could not be arrived a t by diplomatic 4 ~eans and that ther e was no alternative in solving ' thes e problems except the use of ar med f orce ; tha t 6 ar med force should be r esorted t o in Ea11churin in 7 order to drive out Chang Hsueh-liang and his r egi me 8 and, after driving thes e war l or ds out, to est ab • 9 lish in t:Rnchuria Chinese-Japani:= s e cooper ation by 10 liter ally joining the hands of the t \·10 peopl es and 11 ther eby endeavor to creat e a model state under the 12 rule of l aw and order in a ccordance with the prin 13 ciples of the kingly wa y; and, on such a basis, to 14 bring about the h e~ lthy econoMic devc lo p~en t of 15 that ar ea. 16 In the first sta~e, in thr: pol itical fiel d, • 17 Nanchuria should be gui ded under J Rpanese control. 18 As a r esult of this rr ogr o.n , it was f elt that a 19 ~ode l a r en concretely de~onst~ a tin g the possibility 20 of v~ rious r aces to live together in pence and 21 cooper ati on will be set up in ~s i n . 22 If ~ harnony of r aces and t rue cooper ation 23 could be r ealized under Japnnese l endcrship in 24 Ifo nchuria , then th(; peopl es of Asin :i.nd other ar eas 25 woul d c o~e t o trust Japan as a l eader of the -- -- - 1,987 TA NA KA DitECT 1- ·- ·------·------·--- - r-~· I , ~~· I As i atic r a ces and respect Japan as their l eader. I; 1 :'.'A 2 Furthermore, ho was of the opini on that with 3 Japnn as a l eader of Asia, it would be possi bl e i n ,;' ... 4 the not too distant future to free al l As i a from ~; ~ wh i te dominati on and bring about the liber ati on of IJ. 6 As i atic peoples, and br ing about the fulf i l lment of ( Ii 1 I•· 7 the ideal of Asia for the Asiati cs. I>> ~· 8 Q Did you t al k to him on any other occasion ·. ~ • 9 prior to the Incident with r ef er ence to ?.!anchuria? I 10 I A Wi th r cspect to the present subject? 11 Q With r espect to M~nchur ia, pr i or to the 12 Incident, di d you t al k to hi n on any other occasi on? 13 A No . 14 Q Af t er the Incid&nt occurr ed on Sept ember 15 18, did you have occasion to t al k to Gene r al 16 I TAGAKI with r ef er ence to what h1.ppened on tho night 17 of Sept ember 18? ! • 18 A ~"Jith r ef er ence t o t :ie C: l/cnts of the night 19 1 of Scpt en~ c :- J 3 or \'.'i th r c:'c::- c.::i ce to any plan ther e- 20 t o, I heard nothing fron hin .. Hor1ev0r , at the time 21 of the Inci dont I hear d th~ t heavy guns set up i n 22 Mukden had a very powerful effect. 23 i Q Did you t al k t o General I Th GAKI after t he ( 24 1 Incident with r ef er ence to these guns you ncntioned? 25 I A Yes . I heard from Gener al I TAGAKI . I_ ____ ------·- I I 1,988 J TANAKA DIRECT ":± ;· ------·------I~ '.; ·~, Q When and \'there was it you t a lked to him :1,~ l ~ with r ef er enco to the guns? :'{ 2 A If cy memory s erves mo right, in thD f a ll l 3 ' 4 of 1935. 5 Q Wer e you a ttached to the Kwantung Army at ~ that time? ~ 6 ,,. 7 A Yes. I was Staff Officer, Kwantung Army. ,· i' 8 Q Was Gener a l ITAGAKI attached to the .~ k~: • 9 Kwantung Army at that time? ~- I;,; 10 A Yes. He was Deputy Chief of Staff, Kwantung ",. t· tJ Army a t th~ t time. ~; l 2 Q How often did you see hi~ in those days? 13 A When his Excellency, ITAGAKI, was stntioned 14 in Hsinking, I had occasion to s ec him on official 15 duty daily. ~~ 1•• 16 Q Will you sta t e wha t he told you in detail 17 on that occasion with r ef er ence t" tho gun? 13 A Yes. 19 Q Wha t did he say? 20 A In speaking of this gu~1; the conversa tion 21 arose to the effect thn t in a W.''.:..' it wa s necessary 22 to strike agninst the enemy 's v1eukncss and to over- 23 whel m the enemy. Befor e the outbreak of the Ine1dent 24 on Sept ember 18, 1931 the Chief of the Military I 25 Affa irs Section in the Viar Office , NAGATA, Tetsuzan, . -=~= -- - _ _!!!!II______,_ __ ....._._ __ .... ~~ - .....--p TANAKA. DIRECT 1,989 ·---- ·------sent two heavy guns to Manchuria to set up in Mukden; nnd one of these guns was used in the bombardment of 2 the Mukden airfield when the Incident occurred. The 3 I. one set up in the north docks wa s concentra t ed on 4 '·' the Mukden airfield when the Incident broke out. 5 'I' 6 And the Chinese troops, when they hear d the big 7 noise of the guns as well a s the rain of shells tha t .. 8 came showering down upon them, i rrur.ed i at ely a bandoned 9 ~uk den, and t he quick Chinese r etreat enabled the 10 Japanese t o carry out their first opera tions 11 aga in~t Mukden very smoot hly. 12 'IHE ! ~ ON I TOR: And ,ther efore ,. he said · J3 tha t cl ement of surprise is very essential in wa r. 1·1 Furthermor e, t wo guns of 24 cm. caliber wer e in 15 stalled in l!ukden. When the Incident occurred one 16 of them shot a t the north barracks -- Chinese bar 17 r acks, tha t is -- and one shot at llukden a irfiel d. 18 THE PRESI DEHT: We will r ecess now for 19 fifteen minutes. 20 (Wher eupon, nt 1445, ~ :i... ecess was 21 t aken unt il 1505, after which r.hc pr oceed 22 ings we r e r esumed as f ol lows:) 23 2'1 25 1,990 DI~ECT G ~:A ~S HA L CF TH~ CC'URT: The Tribunal ; s now 0 l 1 r esumi:-d . d 2 b TH.B p::ESIDENT: Hr . S ~ ck 0 tt . e ~ r DIRECT EX~ INA"ION (Continued) g 4 BY VR . SACKETT : & 5 y 6 r: General; ;rou •.1: Pr f' t n ~ tif:dng wi. t h r eference e 1 t c ycur convnrsatton ~~~h I ~AG AY I ccncerning t he l n- 1 d 8 stallation c f ce rtain gunn . Did I TAGAKI ~e ll vou who ... e n 9 sue~ ~ st e d ~he ~ n sta lla t io n of th~ s e guns? 10 d I t was Colonel NAGATA , Tetsuznn.. Chief of 11 t hf'.' lf.ll.; t ar=r /l ff a i ,..s Soc t i on: War Cff ice, accord i.ng 12 t o what h1s Excelloncv I TAGAYI told me . 13 When did he Sa!r the euns Vm"'e installed 14 1 at Mukl'k n? 15 A The installation was c o ~rl e t ?. d on er about 16 10 Septnmber . 17 · · 111 a ~ i f an~rth i ng, did lie say as to t h n 18 i n ~tal l ation bcine kept a s ~ c r e t? 19 A Yes. He said tha ~ the tnstn l l ~ tio n cf the 20 guns should be kept a very, kept a t~ ~ secret; and that 21 to the outside ~ or ld it should b0 said tha t a ~e ll ~a s 22 bP.ing dug . 23 .". ~ fu e n vou stat ed the instnll ation of the funs 24 .... as co!"'pl c t ~ d Sf>p t ern ba r 10, ~11 hat v ea r r1cr e you r ef errine 25 t o? _ ...... _ ----~ __ _ l,991 TANAKA DifiECT A 1931. 1 ('I '!Tha t type of earrison wqs t his where the 2 .. 3 ~uns w0r c install ed? 4 A Tha £arrison of t he .; nfantry in i.!ukden. ~ ftre you fami liar with t h~ terr ain around ~ 6 !!ukden i:1here the Incident t ook r. l ace on the night of 7 Sept€'l"!ber 18? 8 A Yr:. s . 9 ~ Yo ~1 have al readv t~st if-t ed that you have 10 been esrecially trained i n r rt~ll e r ~ ma+-ters , is 11 that right? 12 A I wa s an office r 1n t he artill ery. 13 ~ Do ybu know the r ange of t he guns t hat we r e 14 install ed a t ru1'den a ccor di.ng to the accused I'!'AGAKI? 15 A Ye s . 16 ("\ .. ,ill you s tat0 •11hn+- that 1 • 1 ~ s in m-ile s'? c,, 17 •• r:aximum rang0 fifteen Il'li l e s. 18 ~ Frcm vour knc•:1 l C> dfC c f the location wher e 19 the guns 1!.ic r e ~nstall 0 d, a r c you ablP to state ·1he ther 20 the ~ un s had suff icient r ang ~ thnt th ?i r fir e might 21 r each the parti cular spot on th ·~ S0u l. ~ I ~a n churia n Rail 22 road "'her e the ol l e~t1 d cxp l os~on occur r ed on t ho ni ght 23 of Se ptember J8? 24 A Ye s . 25 C By that you ~ n an they ~0 r c of sufficient 1,992 TANAKA DIRECT range? 1 2 A Yes . ~ ··~en you ware on the General Staf f of the ~ 4 Kwantung Army, did you ever have occasion ~o t a l~ to t:he accused I T.~GAKI about current l ~ anchurian af fairs? 6' A ".Vhai: do vou mean by "current affairs?"; 7 .. · .:Q · hffairs current at th~ time you talked to 8 him. • 9 A De vou mean at the time I was attached to 10 t h·:? Kviantune ,~ rmv or at t:h~ ti.me of the Imident? 11 ~ I am r~f~r ri ng to th0 t1me you were attached I 12 to the Kwant ung Army . 13 A Yes; I VJa s aJ.v•ays speaking r f ..:urr3nt 14 ma t t ~ rs with hi~ be c~us e of my official duties Rt the l~ time. 16 ~ And what were the approximntc dates that 17 vou served toeether with the accused ITAGAY. I in t he 18 Kv·antung Ar1:1y? 19 A Approxi matPlV ~wo vears. 20 ~ Will you s t ~ te those v0a~3 ? 21 A tia rch 1935' to 1'nrch 1 93~· . 22 ~ In your convArsations with ITAGAKI during 23' those years, ~ha t, if any th~ng , did he advocat e ~ith 24 reference to Japan' s ~ontrol of ranchuria? 25 A With r es pect t o do~in3tion , no; but he --...:=~= ------~ 1,993 - TANAKA DIRECT rv1' K t: ,- - -···------·-·------I·: 1 I' advoePted ccn trcl . ~· 2 V!i l l you explain wha t you mean bv "control" r;. K· 3 when you say he advocated control ? ~·· 4 A To r eal ize pol 1. tical conditions 1n r.~c- n- } churia in c m~ nne r de sired by J ~pa n , to d0velop Man ... 6 churia econom1. cally in a ~ ~ nn c r de sired by Japan; and ,. . t 7 t o cstqblish clos ~ ano intiwa t 0 r c l a ti onsh~ps be tween I\ i"< . "' 8 J apen and t".anchuria wi~h r ~sp~ ct to defense; at the 9 SP.me ti ~c to oromote th ~ ha~pin e ss and pros ~e r i tv of ,. 10 the people inhabiting Mflnchuria. 11 (\ .... To your 9wn per sonal knowledge: whi l € vou ll. .. 12 were i n Manchuri a , did I'I'AGAY.I os Cl"ief of StAff of the Kwantung Ar rnv 0xe rcise any con trol over Manchur i a? 14 A As Senior Stoff Officer, no; but through the 1~ Chief of Staff ns well P. S th ~ Ass ~ st 1 nt Chief of Staff 16 I • of the K~a ntung Ar~y tt mev be s ~ 1a t hat he wns one of 17 ' t ~e foremost and l eadj ng figur es 1n tha construction 18 of Me. nchi.~l 1- -- -- 1 t I Staff of the K,·1antung ftrrrrr himself? A His Excellency, General I~AGAYI, went to 2 I ~ I Manchuri-3 as Deputy Crief of Staff of the Kwantung Army at the end cf 1935; became Cbi~f of Staff in M~ rch 1936 and held tha t nest unti l 1fu rch 1937. : I i 6 I '. ''ill vou describe in your ovm words how the 7 accused ITAGAYI, whi l e he ~ as Chief of Staff of the 8 Kwantung Armv, exercised control over Manchukuo as • 9 vou h3ve t estified? 10 A ht the ti ~e r f thn e st o blis~re c nt of the 11 State of !.!a nchukuo, his Exc elloncv I ':'AGAKI r nturned 12 for .':\ visit to J ::1 pan ::i nd ret urned to mmchu1'uo qgain 13 4 n th ~ end of 1 9~5 as Denutv ChtPf of St aff of thP 14 Kw antung Ar rey. At th ~ t time hP s aid tha t the develop- l~ ment of !~nnchukuo wr s 'O rogr ~ ssing as i ntend ed f.l nd 16 desired. Bet ween J apan ~ nd ;~ nchuri A th~ r c w ~s c on- • 17 eluded a t r •"' " tv for mutual def ense un der .., hi ch the 18 Kwantung A r~y hRd aut hority t c co~trol nnd guide l9 the internal aff' airs of r~ nchukuo . BY thi s means 20 An insepqr nblc r e l ~ ti o nsh ip W? S a st ~ blishc d ba t ~cen 21 J a p ~ n end l~ n c huri a ; and the "Ur pose of this a uthority 22 t o control t he i n t ernal a r f airs of ! ~ nchuri a w~ s cal- 23 c ul ~ t c d to promote t h~ h ~ p p in e ss of the pAc pl e s of 24 bo t h countries. Thls control over t hn inte rna l a ffnirs 25 of Manchuria wns c ~ rri ed out through th0 General ----- ~- 1,995 TANAKA DIRECT ------·------·----· I' ,---- 1 Affairs Departmen t of Manchukuo. The a ll-important 1 I l' per sonnel shj fts end a ppointments wnr e ~ R d e by the k-,..,. 2 ~'. 3 D:l. rectcr of thi.s Gene ra l Affairs Depnr tment. As to 1 ~t 4 the shifts in o~ rsonn e l, no ~ ction Dctunlly could be ' 1. '· 5 done by th~ Cfl i C' f cf StAff "1i thout the a pt1roval of ii. 6 the Co~me nd c r-in -Chi e f of t~e Kv~ntung Ar my . ~· " 7 t.IB . SACKETT: I ·.•:ould like t o have tha t 8 r ~ tr a n s l a t e d, if the Court pl er se . ~h~t c ~ nnc t be I.· • 9 t he correct ::\ nswe r . ' i~ 10 I A ( Re in~~~ p r ~ t e d) Corr ~ ct 1on: Shifts i n 11 personne l coul d not b ~ c ~ rri ed out by the C om~3ndc r- 12 · in- Chief of the K··1on t ung Ar my v1i thout nc t ue lly h ~ v - 13 1.np the approvnl of the Chtcf of St ~ ff. 14 ' (Further r e intc r pret~ ti on) Shifts in 15 p e rsonn~ l we r e cRrrind out -- could be c ~ rri c d out 16 by the Co:rm r.ndcr - in- Chief of thC' K·.n:mtung !~r !r. y; bu t , 17 n c tu ~ lly, it could not be c ~ rri e d out by ~h ~ above • 18 n ~ ~ e d G 1 n c r ~ l ~ffai r s D npR rt m~ n~ wi thout thP apnr ovnl 19 or the Chief of ~ t ~ f f . 20 •. 11 im portant inf ustrios, such !ls t h·..., s t i:c.> l 21 ~ nd coa l indu s•rics, ~n r r cnt ~r ~ lv pl Rced und er the 22 control of th ~ govcrnm0nt. Also plP. ccd un 23 contr cl ~ ~ r e r~ilways , rc~M untc ~ ti cns ~ nd f i s cal 24 ma•t crs . No politici l r ~r t i e s wore rc r ~ itt o d wlth 25 th ~ c xc cn t~ o n of th ~ Concordi a Soci0ty. ~hAt i s a ll. '~--~~~~~~----~---~--~------~~-~-~~~~ · ~----...... 1,996 ':'ANAKA DIRECT 1 To vcur personal knowledge, did General 2 ITAGAKI, as Ccrmrander-in-Chie f of t he Kwan tung Ar mv 3 Pxr- rcisc anv economic ccntrol ovr> r r··anchukuo? 4 A Gener al ITAGAKI was not Comm1 nd er-in-Chj ef ' of the y ... ,m t ung A.r m~' . 6 Q W~l. l; what I mean i s ns Cl~ :t e f of Sta ff I 7 I of the Kwa ntun~ Ar my . 8 I A I unde r stand. In 1 9 ~ 6 , in order t o r ealize 9 I ~he ~ pical devc lo;ment of l· ~ a n chut 11 HOS H I ~O~ Naoki 1 be came Director G nn r r ~ l of the Gener al 12 1Aff Rirs DepartmGnt be1np. on 0xpe rt on fiscal and econom- ' I 13 1c nroblems . Because of HC SHI NO ' s eYne rt knowl edge , l4 the economic aspects of M~ nchuri ~ n d0v0lc ~ e nt pro- 1 ~ l ercssr> d und er J nr. ~ n 0en control ~s desired ~ nd ~ c a liz e d l6 : very f avorable -- f ~ vor n bl 0 r esults. I 17 I 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 2~ ------nf ----==~--- - 1,997 TANAKA DIRECT ,------· Q My question was to your knowledge did u 1 0 General ITAGAKI personally exercise any economic r 2 s control over Man1d'lukuo? e ' A I am confident in saying t hat I TAGAKI had & 4 no direct relationship whatsoever with the economic A b ' control of Manchukuo. r 6 O What connection did ITAGAKI have with the a 7 m 8 Manchukuo government while he was Chief of Staf f? 9 A As Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army he 10 very closely guided t he General Aff a:irs Department of 11 hianchukuo. 12 r Is that the department you stated was headed 13 by HOSHINO? 14 A Yes, before HOSHINO became Director General 15 and even after he was appointed to t hat office. 16 C Did ITAGAKI have anything to do with the •• 17 appointment of officials in l ~ammukuo? 18 A Yes. HOS h I N ~ 's appointments and dismissals 19 of officials in t he 11anchukuo government could not 20 be carried out without the approval of ITAGAKI . 21 To your knowledge did ITAGAKI exercise 22 any political control over 1Ianchukuo? 23 Lili. UchlANUS: If the Tribunal please, many 24 of these questions are leading. Cannot the prosecutor 25 here ask the witness wha t control I TAGAKI had over - ==,,,.-- 1,998 TANPY. 11 DIRECT 1 Menchukuo. Now he is going into each separate phase. 2 They are all leading questions. I think it is tine 3 we should note our objecti on. 4 THE PRF.SIDENT: '?ell, I uphold tha t objec 5 tion. I noticed they were l eading an hour ngo . I 6 think sone atte~pt should be made t o observe the 7 rules. 1'.'e ar e not bound by theri but in the case of 8 a witness like this, who doesn't need any l ead ing, I 9 think it would be just ns well t o observe the rules. 10 Q ·~a s Manchukuo, during the days you wer e 11 ther e with the Kwantung /1r ny, a compl et ely inde 12 pendent country? 13 A No . 14 Q Describe what you mean by that answer it IS was not conpletely independent. 16 .A By the Japan-Manchukuo ~!u tua l Def ense Peet 17 •• concluded in December, 1932, it is cleer that Manchuku -::> wa s placed under J apanese control. By I 19 virtue of this pact the Kw~ntun e Arny ha s auth'>rity 20 t o control the internal nffc. irs of 1!2nchukuo. By 2 1 virtue of this authority the Kwentunf /.rrny through 2.? the General riffairs Departrtent nf the !~anchukuo 2j Government exercised political and econonic control 2) as Jepan desired f or the purpose of prono ting the prosperity and happiness of the people of that ar ea. 1,999 TANAKA DIRECT ,- -- ··------·------} I The important positions in this Department of 2 I General Affairs was filled by -- almost entirely 3 by Japanese officials. Hence, it was possible to 4 control ldanchukuo as Japan desired. The fundamental 5 factor in the economic and polical affairs:1s 6 personnel. Personnel shifts in Manchukuo were 7 carried out in the name of the Emp er or, Kang Te, but this could not be possible without the approval 9 of the Kwantung A~my -- most of the important IO personnel shifts. Inasmuch as the political, 11 economic, and financial affairs of the L!anchukuo l }. Government were operated in accordance with Japanese 13 desire vii th a view to promoting the welfar e of tho 14 people of Manchuria through the control exercised 15 by the General Affairs Department, which in turn was t6 under the control of the Kwan tung i~ rmy, which 17 ... exerciseq,as I have said before, internal control 1.~ over its affairs, it can be concluded that the I '/ Knantung 1.rmy exercised control over the government of hlanchukuo. With respect to national defense, the ~ I Military Affairs Lepartmcnt of the I.ianchukuo Govern ment had Japanese officers as advisers thereof and 2-) I through them this dcpartmunt Vl!!.s directly and closely linked up with tho Kwan tung rlrmy, e.nd by virtuo of I that relationship the Kwe.ntung Army exercised military LI _ -- · ------. -- ··------~ I J 2,000 2"'""""' TJJUJU. DIRECT control over that government also. Hence, the 1 Manchukuoan /;rmy moved as de sired by the Kwantunr 2 l:Xmy. That is all. 3 Q You have mentioned a HOSHINO as being 4 president of the Gener al l~fa ir s Bureau of ~ Manchukuo. Is he one of the accused in this case? 6 ll Yes. 7 C) 8 Is he her e in the courtroom t oday? 9 A Yes. 10 Q '7ill you po int him 0ut please, sir? 11 A (Pointing) Fourth from the right, first 12 r ow. 13 THE PRESIDENTa Somewhat f ormal and even 14 dramatic, but, nevertheless, quite unnecessar y. 1, ~ "!ill you stat e t o the Tribunal whnt the • 16 duties wer e , if you know, of the Gener al hffairs 17 Bureau of Hanchukuo? 18 A To direct and gui de t he political and 19 ecrmomic affairs in Manchuria in the inter est of 20 J apan as well as the inter est of Manchukuo i n 21 accor dance with the treaties enter ed into betwe0n 22 the t wo countries. 23 Q You 'mentioned General TJ. TEK/, 1 ~'A as one 24 of the planners of the Manchurian Incident. Is 2~ he living or dead? A No. 2,001 DIRECT Q Is he living or is he dead? Will you stote 1 ono or the other, please, sir? 2 A I recall that he died in September l ast 3 year. 4 ~ What was his r ank at the time of his death? 6' h Lieutenant General. 7 " Did you lmow him? 8 Yes, very well. 9 0 When did you first me &t hirl? 10 J~ In 1925 when Tr.TEKhWs., then colonel, was 11 transferred from Commander of th0 Hiroshima Regiment· 12 to the General Staff Office ns Chief of the Eur opean 13 Section. 14 Q Did you evor serve with him in the J apanese 1~ h:rmy on other occasions than that~ 16 J... h.t that time I was also in the Ar my General. • 17 Staff Offie;.e: but we wer e attached to different 18 sections. 19 ~ Did you serve with him le.tar? 20 h Yes. 21 r Will you st ~ te when and where? 22 k I was serving under him in Pei ping from 23 Il'icrch,. 1928, to .t4Ugus t, 1929. 24 Q Did you ever t nlk to him about Manchuria 2) prior to tho Incident? I - 2,002 DIRECT ,------. n. Yes. 1 ti '; 2 Q Whe. t did ho say to you with refe r encc to ' ' . 3 Manchuria? ~ 4 J..IR. McllihNUS: If your Honor please, I :~ ' ' ' ~ realize that he2rsay testimony is admissible her e . .J 1 6 H01.·ever, it appGe.r s to me that conver sa tion 111i th n ~ 7 dead man , to be r ecorded here, is highl y irregular. I 8 TEE PttESIDENr: Oh, that do6sn't make any ~,, , • 9 j difference . It is going to be difficult to check ' lO conversations VJ ith n mnn who is dcnd. r;evertheless, i I l1 the evidence is admissible for our purposes. The ., ; 12 objection is overruled . 13 In 1929, when I vre. s Section C'.iicf -- v1hen I was Chief of the Investigntion s ~ ction in the 15 General Staff Office, Gener al T.-.TEfu-..'h.n was Chief ' 16 of t he Second Division of the 4r my General Steff • 17 • Gener al T.. TE K.h.1;.. at t hc-.t timC:! told ne th~ t under all . circumstance iianchukuo -- Manchuria should be placed tY under J cpanese control and tha t it shouldbo nadc into· 20 a self-susta ining state or self-sufficient state, 2 1 with the exception of petroleum. ~ccordingly,G e nc r n l 2.2 T•. TEK.. W '" instructed me to go t o i.I ~ nchukuo for the 23 purpose of invcstig:'.ting this mntter . ...s a r osult 24 of rny inv.:; stig?. tion, I found t he.t l:~ nchuri a could 25 I not become in itself a self-sufficient sta t e , and --- -- T/.NAKA DmECT I -·-· ------, I reported accordingly. However, ho said that 1 I 1· efforts should be made to !!lake Manchuria a self 2 3 contained country with the exception of petroleur.i, 4 and that every effort should be nnde to develop resources in order t o produce that product. In 6' August, 1929, a conference of chiefs nf staff was 7 held and the plan f or establishing self-sufficiency 8 in Manchuria was distributed among those who attended 9 the conference. By utilizing this naterial, effort 10 was made t,, impress upon them the f e.ct that Manchuria 11 was the life line of Japan. 12 UONITOR: Corrections To inpress upon the 13 entire Japenese 1.rmy. 14 ;;ss: (Continuing) Major General 1, TJ.TFXA':J1 hl!d a strong c0nviction that unless 16 Hanchuria were seized by Je.pan it would be impossible 17 • tor Japan t o become one of the p0wers of the w~ rld 18 as a highly devel oped nationcl def ense state. That 19 is all. 20 Q Did y~ u ever have occasion t o t alk to him 21 after the events 0f Septenber l ff, 1931? 22 A Yes . 23 q 17111 you stat e when end where thnt we. s? 24 l In 1934 when I wns lieutenant c0l onel in 25 the First Mountain t.rtillery Reginent. 2,004 Tl a.NaKi a. DIRECT 1 MONITOR: Correction ~ Heavy field artillery. 2 WITNESS: (Continuing) When I was en route 3 to my native place to pay r espects to my ancestors, I 4 met Gener al Ti~TEKi~WJ. in H1mej1, where hE:: was division 5 commander, and t alked to him a t that t ime about 6 Manchurian problems. 7 '1 Will you stat e in detail just what he told s you on that occasion with r ef er ence to the events t hat • 9 took plece on the ni ght of September 18? 10 k. His Excel l ency Ti1.TE~ ;:1, " bot h expected and 11 supported t he Manchurian Incident. 12 l.IR. W~N : If t he Tribunal please , we want 13 to object to the enswer as not being r esponsive to the 14 question and, incidentally, sir, we would like to 15 "bject to the question as assum:i.ng a f act not in 16 eivdence. The 1.:1 t j S ha s never test ified t o any 17 • conversat ion ~ o nc ~rning th~ September 18th Incident. 18 Counsel has consi st ently, t hroughout his quest ioning, 19 assumed fact s r!ot i n C; Vidence and we ask that t he 20 Tribunal ask hi m not to do th ~ t. 21 THE PEgSIDENT: I do not quite understand what 22 you mean by assuming fact s not in evidence. This man 23 is giving evidence . Thar e is no affidavit. 24 Mh . W44RhEN: Yes, thr. t is right, sir. It 25 is very common in 4•mericc.n pr actice to ob ject on tho • I I I - \ - - =---,.,,.,.._- =-- - - - 2,00; TANAKA DIRECT 1 ground that counsel is assuming a fact not in evidence, 2 The witness is here and he asked him about a conversa 3 tion and immediately asked the witness about a portion 4 of a conversation that the witness has never related ' occurred. 6 THE PRESIDENTs Oh, I see what you mean, 7 MR. SACKETTs May I explain? I asked a " . 8 question if he had a conversation with respect to the 9 Manchurian Incident and the next question I esked him 10 to describe events on the night of September 18, which 11 is the same thing. 12 THE PRESIDENT: That is an example of the 13 compound question which we ~ant to avoid, 14 I MR. SACKETT: I Will stre.ighten it out with 1, another question, it your Honor please. 16 Q General TANAKA, will you state whether or 17 • not you talked with TATEKAWA with reference to the 18 events that took place on the night or September 18, 19 1931? 20 A Yes. 21 Q Will you state in detail what that conver 22 sation was? . 23 A General TATEKAWA at that time told me that he 24 was expecting the outbreak the Manchurian Incident 2, or and that the time at lest was approaching when Japan l ! I - i I -=--~-- =--- I 2,006 • DIRECT can do what she desires to do •1th Manchuria. However, 1 on the 12th of September a cable was received from 2 Foreign Minis tar SHID.1.HiJU~ from the Japanese Co:lsul - 3 General in Mukden reporting the fact that a company 4 commander of a petrol unit in Fushin had said that 6' within a week a big Incident would break out. Foreign 7 Minister SHID:JLJU. brought this matter to the atten 8 tion of the War M i~ister 11IN1.MI and strongly protested \J, 9 against the report that he had on hand. As a rasult, 10 Viar Minister 1iINiJJI ordered General Ti.'1EKhVli~ to go 11 to Mukden as a special emissary post haste to put a 12 stop to the contemplated action of the Kwantung hrmy 13 and, in accordance with thr.t order, made a hasty trip 14 1 1 to Mukden. 15 llONITOR: Correction: September 12 should I 16 be September 15 or 16. 17 WITi~ ESS: ( Continuing) He told me, that is, I 18 General T•• TEK..w,. told me tha t General MIN;JwtI, Viar 19 Minister, had told him to stop the Incident ~t all 20 costs but that it was his own desire, that is, General II . 22 further told me that he had arrived in Hukden in the 23 evening of September 18; that tho Kwentung ;~rmy, 24 thinking that he had come to stop the Incident . had 25 brought.him to a r ostaraunt in ~ukdcn to isolate him. I ' I I .. DIRECT .------·------. 1 He further said that he was taken to this restaraunt 2 in Mukden by Ma jor IL~NkYk , assistant in the Special ~ Service Section of the ~. rmy stationed in Mukden, end 4 accompanied this major because he, himself, had no 5 desire to see other people in Mukden. kt midnight 6 the roar of heavy artillery so frightened the e~1aha 7 girls that they began to tremble . Gener al T;~TEKJ~Vih 8 further said that he had told the Geisha and others 9 employed in the r estaraunt not to tremble so much in- 10 a.s much as he was here in Mukden and that the Kwan tung 11 ~ rmy also knew t hat he was there. The Gener al further 12 said t hat he had slept soundly until the morning until 13 Major Hi~ ru·.. y.t·"' came to call for him, but at that time 14 I the Incident had already occurred and that he was 15 unable to carry out his mission. Tha t is all. 16 THE PliESIDENT: 1fo will adjourn to half past 17 nine tomorrow morning. • 18 (Whereupon, at 1600, an adjournment 19 ~ was t aken until Sr. turdey, ? July 1946, at I 20 0930.) 21 22 23 24 25