Page D-4.6

B. THE CONSPIRACY

2. THE CONSPIRACY TO OBTAIN DOMINATION OF THE ASIATIC AND iACIF1C AREAS.

D-l. The conspiracy with which the accused 'are charged in

Count I is at the same time both very simple and very complex.

From the point of view of the unity of its aggressive object and

purpose in both time and space, from the point of view of the

clarity of its enunciation; at first semi-secretly, and then more and more openly until ultimately it was blatantly announced to the

world under a euphonious title which concealed nothing; and from the point of view of the singleness and constancy of the drive

toward its effectuation, at an ever-increasing tempo, upon an ever- expanding scale, until it had made every Japanese an unwitting tool of the conspiracy ana had embroiled almost the entire world in its greatest war, the conspiracy is quite simple although of tremendous

scope and design. Broadly speaking, the conspiracy, which the prosecution submits has been fully established by the evidence, may be described as follows: During the period from January 1, 1928 to

September 2, 1945, the conspirators, including these accused and others, some of whom have been named in the course of these proceed-

ings, entered into, and attempted to and did, in large measure, carry out a common plan whereby under the pretext of an incident to be created Japan would invade, conquer, enslave and exploit that part of China known as Manchuria, with the object and purpose of using

Manchuria and its great natural resources and wealth as a spring- board and base for securing military, naval, economic, political and Page D-2

CD-I) social possession, domination, control and exploitation of Ikst Asia and th" Pacific and Indian Oceans and the islands therein, including the rest of china, French Indo-China, the Eetherlands J&st Indies,

Malaya, the Philippines, India, Burma and Australia, it was part of the plan, in order to bring it to successful fruition, that the con- spirators should accomplish their aim and purpose internally within

Japan by seizing and obtaining control of the government of Japan

either through coup d'etat or through the gradual infiltration of the members of the conspiratorial body throughout all the high posts in

Japan's political structure; and externally by wars of aggression, in violation of international law, treaties, agreements and assurances, to be carried out by Japan alone or in conjunction with other powers against any and all nations which stood in the way of accomplishment of the criminal objects and purposes of the conspirators.

D-2. However, from the point of view that in time the conspiracy covered a long period of history and that it involved thousands of events of all degrees of importance; from the point of view that the number of conspirators were large and that some entered the conspiracy at its inception and remained with it till the end, while others, with- out repudiating the conspiracy, dropped into an inactive status, while others joined actively into the conspiracy at some midpoint in its course, while still others played active roles at one time, dropped out for a while and then reappeared as active participants; and from the point of view, as might be expected in any conspiracy so huge in point Page D-4-2

(D-38) of time and of scope, of the internal conflicts betv/een the conspirators, not over any part of the conspiracy itself, but over the question of proper timing of particular facets of the conspiracy, the story is quite complex, in order to summarize in the simplest form possible the facts of the conspiracy

established by the thousands of documents and the testimony of

hundred of witnesses which, perforce, had to be introduced in

this proceeding, the prosecution, preserving in the main the

fundamental chronological continuity of the story, except

where the exigency of the situation dictates a topical

analysis for purposes of clarity, will analyze the conspiracy

in four successive steps. (1) The first step in the conspiracy-

obtaining control of Manchuria; (2) The expansion of control

and domination from Manchuria to all the rest of China; (3)

The preparation of Japan for aggressive war internally and by

alliances with the Axis Powers; (4) The further expansion of

the conspiracy into the rest of East Asia and the Pacific and

Indian Oceans by further aggressive wars.

FART I OF THE CONSPIRACY

OBTAINING CONTROL OF MANCHURIA.

A. THE SITUATION PRIOR TO THE MUKDEN INCIDENT - 13 Jeptember,

1931.

D-3. To fully understand the true nature of the conspiracy and the aggressive acts of the conspirators, they must be seen Page D-4-2

(D-38) clearly against the background in which they began and out of which they grew. We must, therefore, first examine the obliga- tions which Japan had assumed towards China and others, the rights which she had acquired in Manchuria and the actual

situation as it existed in Manchuria, China, and Japan at the time the Mukden incident started the processes of aggression into movement.

1° JAPAN'S OBLIGATIONS TOWARDS CHINA AMD OTHER NATIONS

D-4o Japan's obligations towrards China and other nations were defined by the treaties which she had signed and ratified.

The treaties, which stood in the way of an easy and early achievement of the main objective of the conspirators, fall roughly

into three categories; (1) Agreements dealing especially with

China; (2) Agreements defining Japan's duties and obligations with other countries; and (3) Agreements designed to prevent the use of war as a legitimate instrument of effectuating changes in

international affairs.

D-5. With respect to treaties relating to China, Japan and

Russia, by the 'Treaty of Portsmouth of September 5, 1905, both agreed that they would evacuate Manchuria completely and simul-

taneously, excepting the territory affected by the lease of the

Liaotung (Kwantung) Peninsula, would restore Manchuria, excepting

the leased territory, completely to the exclusive administration

of China, and engaged not to obstruct any general measures common Page D-4-2

(D-38) to all countries which China might take for the development of a. the commerce and industry of Manchuria. In this category Japai also had treaties with other powers. However, while there were many which provided for the respecting of China* s territorial integrity and the "open door" policy, the essential duties and obligations of Japan and the other contracting powers with respect to China had all been codified and were contained in the Nine

Power Treaty to which the United States, Great Britain, Belgium,

China, France, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands and Portugal were b. parties. These duties and obligations were set forth in plain and simple language easily comprehended and requiring no high degree of skill to ascertain its meaning, in the following provisions of the Treaty;

' "Article la

The Contrasting Powers, other than China agree:

(1) To respect the sovereignty, the independence,

and the territorial administrative integrity of China;

(hj to p-.ovule, the fullest and most unembarrassed

opportunity to China t© develop and maintain for herself an

©ffeetive and stable government|

(§) To uee their iaflueaee for the purpose ef

effectually establishing and maintaining the principle ef

enual eppertunity for the eeismeree and industry ef all

nations throughout the territory of China;

(4) To refrain from taking advantage ef

D-5. a. Sx. 81, T. 013, b. Ex, iO, T. 013, Page D-4-2

(D-38) conditions in China in order to seek special rights or

privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects or

citizens of friendly States, and from countenancing action

inimical to the security of such States."

"Article II.

"The contracting Powers agree not to enter into

any treaty, agreement, arrangement or understanding, either

with one another, or, individually or collectively, with

any Power or Powers which would infringe or impair the

principles stated in Article 1."

"Article III.

"With a view to applying more effectually the

principles of the Open Door or equality of opportunity in

China for the trade ana industry of all nations, the

Contracting Powers, other than China, agree that they will

not seek, nor support their respective nationals in seeking:

(a) Any arrangement which might purport to establish

in favor of their interests any general superiority of

rights with respect to commercial or economic development in

any designated region of China;

(b) Any such monopoly or preference as would deprive

the nationals of any other Power of the right of undertaking

any legitimate trade or industry in China, or of participat-

ing with the Chinese Government, or with any local authority,

in any category or public enterprise, or which by reason of Page D-4-2

(D-38) its scope, duration, or geographical extent is calculated

to frustrate the practical application of the principle of

equal opportunity.

"It is understood that the foregoing stipulations of

this Article are not to be so construed as to prohibit the

acquisition of such properties or rights as may be necessary

to the conduct of a particular commercial, industrial, or

financial undertaking, or to the encouragement of inventicn

and research.

"China undertakes to be guided by the principles stated

in the foregoing stipulations of this Article in dealing

with applications for economic rights and privileges from

the Governments and nationals of all foreign countries,

whether parties to the present Treaty or not."

"Article IV.

"The Contracting Powers agree not to support any

agreements by their respective nationals with each other

designed to create Spheres of Influence or to provide for

the enjoyment of mutually exclusive opportunities in

designated parts of Chinese territory."

D~6. In addition to these specific obligations with respect to China, Japan had other obligations with respect to Page D-4-2

(D-38) the Far East and the Pacific under the provisions of the second a. class of treaties. In the Treaty of November 30, 1908, with the United States, Japan and the United States had declared that

their policy was directed to the maintenance of the existing

status quo in the Far East and the defense of the principles of

equal opportunity for commerce and industry in China, and had

undertaken to respect each other's territorial possessions in

the Far East. On-December 13, 1921, Great Britain, France,

Japan and the United States (later joined by The Netherlands

and Portugal) had entered into a treaty wherein they agreed

to respect each other's rights in relation to their insular

possessions and dominions in the region of the Pacific Ocean,

and in the event that a controversy arose out of any Pacific

question involving those rights, which could not be settled

satisfactorily by diplomacy, to invite the other parties to

join a conference to which the entire matter would he submitted b. for consideration and adjustment. In the mandate of the League

of Nations, Japan had agreed that the islands covered by her c. mandate should not be fortified; and thereafter by the Treaty

of February 11, 1922, had extended the benefits of this under- d. taking to the United States and its nationals.

D-7. Over and above the obligations just mentioned,

Japan had also firmly committed herself in a series of treaties

» to the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy.

In the Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of Inter-

D-6. a. Ex. 22, T. 513. b. Ex. 24, T. 513. e. Ex. 23, T. 513. d. Ex. 29, T. 513. Page D-4.6

(D-7) a. national Disputes of July 29, 1899, Japan had agreed to use her best efforts to insure pacific settlement of international differences, and in case of conflict, before appealing to arms, to have recourse, so far as circumstances would allow, to the good offices or mediation of a friendly power. By signing the

Covenant of the League of Nations, Japan undertook to respect and preserve against external aggression the territorial integrity and political independence of the members of the

League, and agreed that if any dispute arose with a member of this League, to submit the matter to arbitration or enquiry by the Council, and in no case to resort to war until three months b. after the award or report. In the Kellogg-Briand Pact of C .

August 27, 1928, Japan and the other signatories had condemned recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, renounced it as an instrument of national policy, and agreed that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of all kinds should never be sought except by pacific means.

2. JAPAN'S RIGHTS IN MaNCHURIA.

D-8. ffhile Japan had certain well defined obligations toward China, she also had acquired certain rights in that part of China known as Manchuria. By the Treaty of Portsmouth of 1905 a. Japan had succeeded to certain rights of Russia in Manchuria.

In 1896, as part of a secret defensive alliance with China,

Russia had been granted the right to carry the Trans-Siberian

D-7. D-8. "a. Ex. 12, T. 513. ~ a. Ex. 21, T. 513. b„ Ex. 23, T. 513. c. Ex. 32, T. 513. Page D-4-2

(D-38) Railway from Vladivostok to China through Manchuria, to be used b. to transport Russian troops in case Japan should attack China.

In 1898 Russia secured a twenty-five year lease for the southern part of the Liaotung Peninsula and the right to connect the

Chinese Eastern Railway with Port Arthur and authority to build c. a naval port there. By the Treaty of Peking of December 1905

China consented to the transfer from Russia to Japan of the

Kwantung leased territory and of the southern half of the Russian controlled Chinese Eastern Railway north to Changchun, and granted to Japan the right to improve the railway between Antung d. and Mukden and to operate it for fifteen years. The Lytton Commission found that with respect to the leased territory, e. Japan had practically full sovereign rights. In August 1906

Japan organized the South Janchurian Railway Company, a govern- ment controlled corporation, which was given administrative functions, and was allowed to levy taxes and engage in other f. branches of business. In 1910, through annexation of Korea, g» Japan succeeded to Korea's jurisdiction over Korean settlers.

By the Treaty and Note of Peking of May 25, 1915, a result of japan's "Twenty-One Demands", the terms of the leases for the

leased territory, including Port Arthur and Dairen, and of the

South Manchurian (formerly Chinese Eastern) and Antung-Mukden h. Railways were extended to ninety-nine years. By this treaty,

the Japanese also acquired in oouth Manchuria the right to lease

land needed to erect buildings for trade and manufacture or to

D-8. b. Ex. 57, T. 18728. f. Ex. 57, T. 1758. Co Ex. 57, T. 18279. g. Ex. 57, T. 1758. d. Ex. 57, T. 1757-8. h. Ex. 57, T. 1759; Ex. 2383, e. Ex. 57, T. 1760-1. T. 19133. Page D-4-2

(D-38) carry on agriculture, and the right of freedom of travel, i. residence and occupation. The Japanese, however, were required not only to register their passports but also to submit to the j. police, laws and ordinances, and taxation of China.

3. IHE SITUATION IN CHINA.

D-9„ However, the rights acquired by Japan in Manchuria

were not unopposed. This was not something to be unexpected in

view of the conditions under which these rights had been

acquired by Japan. It is one of the well known facts of modern

world history, requiring no citation to support it, that China,

following the collapse of the Ching Dynasty in 1908, went through

the trying transition to a modern national state. Due to the

inadequate communication system in the vast territory of China, a. a serious handicap for maintaining law and order, an ancient

social system in which the unit of allegiance was the family and

not the nation, and an antiquated, wholly inadequate decentralized

system of finance, it was only natural, that China should go

through, in its emergence from a feudal civilization to a modern

nation, a period of internal conflict. It was precisely during

this period of the disintegration of the Ching dynasty and the

period of internal conflict that Japan obtained its rights in

Manchuria. In 19.15, taking advantage of the fact that the nations which had opposed Japan's expansionist ideas in Manchuria b.

in 1895 were then either at war with Japan or allied with Japan

in florid war I and were therefore in no position to object, Japan

D-8. i. Ex. 57, T. 1760; Ex. 2303, T. 19133. j. Ex. 2383, T. 19133.

D-9. a. Ex. 57, T. 18689. b. Ex. 2380, T. 18779; Ex. 2381, T. 18781; Ex. 2302, T. 18707. Page D-4-2

(D-38) obtained an extension of its former leases and a grant of new rights in oouth Manchuria.

D-lOo It was a natural concomitant of China's emergence as a modern state that China should develop an intense feeling of nationalism which, as has occurred in every other nation in its transition to a modern state, was reflected in intense anti- a. foreignism. The anti-foreignism was expressed in economic b. boycotts and anti-foreign propaganda in the schools. This new feeling of nationalism was particularly directed toward

Manchuria. The area known as Manchuria had in the course of

History since the Manchu conquest of China become unalterably c. Chinese territory. A peaceful and inconspicuous occupation by

Chinese had taken place so that by 1931 out of the total

Manchurian population of 30,000,000, 28,000,000 were Chinese, 800,000 Koreans, 150,000 Russians, 230,000 Japanese, and a few d. Mongols. After 1917 China began to take a more active e. interest and part in the government and development of Manchuria.

In 1918 Chang Tso-Lin, who had in 1916 as military governor of

Fengtien Province declared his province .independent of the central government in Peking, had withdrawn his declaration and f. had become Inspector-General of all Manchuria. While he again

withdrew his allegiance in 1922 and continued the withdrawal g. until his death, he did not alter Manchuria's actual relation

to China. The lytton Commission found that through all its h. wars and periods, Manchuria remained an integral part of China.

D-10. "a. Ex. 57, T. 18683. e. Ex. 57, T. 1740. b. Ex. 57, T. 18688. f. Ex. 57, T. 1744. c. Ex. 57, T. 1739. g. Ex. 57, T. 1745-53. d. Ex. 57, T. 1739-40. h. Ex. 57, T. 1749. Page D-4-2

(D-38) After the death of Chang Tso-Lin, his son Chang Hsueh-Liang became the ruler of Manchuria, and in December 1928, desiring to stop the internal conflict' and help unify China, he declared allegiance to the central government and became commander-in- chief of the Northeastern Frontier Army and chief of the adminis- i. tration of Manchuria and Jehol. After this union both the political and economic ties between China and Manchuria were j. strengthened, with China playing a larger role in developing the economic resources of Manchuria and in the commerce and k. finance of Manchuria.

D-ll. While China's emergent nationalism was being expressed in closer and closer ties with Manchuria, Japan was developing a new concept with respect to Manchuria. She began to claim a special position in Manchuria, a claim which later grew into Japan's averment that Manchuria was the lifeline of Japan.

This claim was not based solely on the rights legally defined in

Japan's extraordinary treaties with China, but a real part of it was based on intangibles such as feelings, historical associations a. and pride in Japan's achievements. The Lytton Commission pointed out that it was natural that Japan's use of the language

"special position" should be obscure and that other states had b. found it difficult to recognize this special position. It is respectfully submitted that while the language was obscure, there was nothing obscure about the purposes for which Japan claimed her special position, and the only obscurity lay in the

D-10. D-ll. i.. Ex. 57, T. 18718-9. a. Ex. 57, T. 18735. j. Ex. 57, T. 18727. b. Ex. 57, T. 18735. k. Ex. 57, T. 18725-7. Page D-14

(D-ll) choice of language deliberately designed to hide those purposes.

Japan's special position was based on two factors - strategic and economic. Strategically, Manchuria was of tremendous importance to Japan. It lay as a bulwark between Korea, a Japanese possession, c. and the Soviet Union, and it formed an excellent entry and starting point for a movement either south into the rest of China or north into the Soviet Far East. Economically, Manchuria is tremendously rich with vast areas of fertile soil for the growth of agricultural products, heavy timbered areas and huge deposits of coal and other minerals including iron, gold, oil shale, d. dolomite, magnesite, limestone, and fireclay—rich in the materials needed for war and conquest.

D-1S. Based on thi3 claim of special position, Japan later claimed, as do the accused in this trial, that China was menacing

Japan's national defense. Without pointing out, or being able to point out, any specific treaty provision or any long period of conduct by which China accorded to Japan any right to use Manchuria as i point of defense against the Soviet Union, Japan assumed she had that eight and accused China of menacing it. She accused China of menacing Japan's national defense by supporting communism and failing to keep law and order. With respect to communism, it is true that for a short period prior to 192? the communists were a. permitted to participate in the government, but in 192? the national leaders decided that communism was a menace and began to fight against it, with the result that by July 1931 the

D-ll. D-13. C« Ex.; 57, T, 18734. "a. Ex. 57, T. 18694-9. a. Ex. 57, T. 18710-11. D-15

(D-12) communist strongholds had been taken and the communists were in retreat, having been driven by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek into b. the mountains. However, with the outbreak of September 18,

China was compelled to suspend the offensive against- the' communists and withdraw a large part of her troops, and the c. cojnmunists thereupon resumed the offensive. Thus, at the time

Japan was complaining of the communist menace in China, China had the communists well in hand, only to lose her dominance over them because of Japanese action. The charge of failure to enforce law and order was based on the existence of banditry in China. However, the Lytton Commission, after studying the situation, found that while banditry might disturb the internal peace, it was no longer a menace to the Central Government of d.

China. It would, therefore, be expected that banditry would have progressively disappeared.

D-13. with nationalism in China becoming stronger daily, with China's ties with Manchuria becoming closer, and with Japan maintaining her right to a special position in Manchuria, one might well expect the appearance of points of friction. On the one hand, China consistently denied the validity of the 1915

Treaty, charging it had been obtained by duress, and demanded its a. abrogation. On the other hand, the Japanese complained bitterly that the Chinese were violating the treaties, particularly in agitating for the return of the leased territory and the South

Manchurian Railway, and in failing to accord to the Japanese

D-12. D-13. b. lLx. 57, T. 18699-701. a. Ex. 57, T. 18738-9. c. Ex. 57, T. 18702, d. Ex. 57, T. 18693-4. Page D-4-2

(D-38) the rights of residence, travel, occupation and leasing of b. land in Mouth Manchuria. One pressing question was the treat- ment of the Koreans resident in Manchuria based on differences of interpretation of the various treaties between China, Korea, c. and Japan, as a result of which the Chinese police came into d. conflict with the Japanese in enforcing Chinese law. As to many of the points of conflict, Baron SHIDEHARA, Foreign Minister before and at the time of the Manchurian Incident, testified on cross-examination that they involved economic matters and policy which he believed could have been solved, while others were e. police matters.

4. THE SITUATION IN JAPAN PRECEDING THE MANCHURIAN INCIDENT.

D-14. To meet the conditions existing in Manchuria, Japan prior to the Mukden Incident had two different policies. During the period from the Washington Conference until April 1927, she followed the "Friendship Policy" based on good will and neighbor- a. liness. During the period from April 1927 to July 1929, under the ministry of rrime Minister TANAKA, Japan followed the

"Positive Policy" which rested upon military force with respect b, to Manchuria. This "Positive Policy" placed great emphasis on the necessity for regarding Manchuria as distinct from the rest

of China and contained a declaration that if disturbances spread to Manchuria and . ongolia, thus menacing Japan's special position, Japan would defend them. The TANAKA policy asserted that Japan herself would undertake to preserve peace and order

D-13. D-14. b. Ex. 57, T. 18740-44. a. Ex. 57, T. 1764. c. Ex. 57, T. 18745-61. b. Ex. 57, T. 1764. d. Ex. 57, T. 18753. e. T,. 1350-1. Page D-4-2

(D-38) in Manchuria in contrast with the friendship policy which limited c. .the objective to the protection of Japanese interests.

D-15. The TANAKA Cabinet went further in its policy than merely making declarations. It intervened in the affairs of

Manchuria. According to Baron QKADA, the Navy Minister in the

TANAKA Cabinet, it was the policy of TANAKA to advance peacefully a. into Manchuria and then by degrees into China. It was the policy of the TANAKA Cabinet to expand and develop Japanese rights in

Manchuria to the fullest extent by collaborating with, aiding, b. and using Chang Tso-Lin. In 1928, after Chang Tso-Lin had been defeated by the luomintang Army, he was advised by TANAKA to withdraw his armies with the declared object of saving Manchuria c. from civil war. This advice was resented but followed. Enroute from Peking to Mukden on June 3, 1928, Chang Tso-Lin was killed d. in a train wreck caused by an explosion. The Lytton Commission reported that the responsibility for this murder had never been established but that there was a suspicion -of Japanese complic- e. ity. The uncontradicted evidence before this Tribunal, however, shows that the Japanese Government had established the respons- ibility and shown it to be with the Japanese. Baron OKADA, Navy

Minister in the TANAKA Cabinet, testified that by 1928 the Kwan- tung nrmy in Manchuria had become dissatisfied with the TANAKA policy of collaboration and desired to use force to occupy

Manchuria,.and that a clique of its officers had planned and f. plotted the murder. TANAKA,• Ryukichi, former Chief of the

D-14. D-15. ,c. Ex. 57, T. 1764-5; a. T. 1835. nx. 169, T. 1765; b. Ex. 175, T. 1816-7. Ex. 170, T. 1768; c. Ex. 57, T. 1752. Ex. 171, T. 1768-9 d. Ex. 57, T. 1752. e. Ex. 57, T. 1753. f. Ex. 175, T. 1817-8. Page D-4-2

(D-38) Military Service Bureau, found in 1942 in the files of his office a report made in August 1928 by General MINE of the Tokyo

Military Police Unit, which showed that the murder was planned by Col. KAWAMOTO, senior staff officer of the Kwantung Army.

The report revealed that the Kwantung Array wanted to rid itself of Ghang Tso-Lin and to set up a new state separated from the

Nanking Government under Japanese control. When this plan was banned, KAWAMOTO endeavored to get rid of Ghang Tso-Lin and succeeded. The report showed that the purpose of the plan was to create a new regime by separating the area from the Nanking g-

Government ana getting rid of the war lords. This report confirmed to TANAKA what he had already heard about the killing h. in 1929 from Captain OZAKI, who had issued the mustering order, and what he had heard in 1935 about the killing and its purpose i. from KAWAMOTO. This,testimony was also confirmed by MORISHIMA j. of the consulate at Mukden. The planning and execution of the murder of Chang Tso-Lin is of the utmost importance in this case.

In the first place, it is the first overt act in the conspiracy to carry out the objective of the conspiracy. . While it may be contended that these particular accused have not been shown to have participated in this particular incident, it must be borne in mind that the killing of Ghang Tso-Lin grew out of the program of the Kwantung Array; and when one considers the role played subsequently by the Kwantung Array, pursuant to this same program and policy, in carrying forward the conspiracy, the only inference,

D-15. g. T. 1949-1953. h. T. 1957-8. i. T. 1954. j. T. 3014-6. Page D-4-2

(D-38) it is submitted, that can be drawn is that the killing of Chang

Tso-Lin was the first, though abortive, act in effectuating the conspiracy. Furthermore, the incident is important because, as

GKADA pointed out, it was the first overt act by the Army to R. project itself into the formulation of government policy, and because it shows that the array was already strongly enough entrenched so as to be able to defy the government. OXADA testified that upon hearing of the incident, the Premier, the

Emperor and Minister of war SHIRAKAAA all agreed that strong disciplinary action should be taken to maintain discipline in the army. However, there was strong opposition in the General

Staff towards punishing those responsible. The result rras that the issue became controversial and the TANAKA Cabinet was forced 1. to resign.

D-16. With the resignation of the TANAKA Cabinet in July

1929, and the accession of the HAMAGUCHI, and the WAKATSUKI

Cabinets, the "Friendship Policy" was again adopted by Foreign a. Minister SHIDEHARA and was continued until September 1931.

This policy met with marked success, so that by the end of his term SHIDEHARA founc that the Chinese boycott movement advocating no trade with japan had begun to decrease steadily until the b. boycott policy was almost discontinued, as he had hoped.

B. THE MUKDEN INCIDENT .-vND ITS ^FTEDMaTH.

EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE INCIDENT

D-17. Despite the failure of their first precipitate attempt

D-15. D-16. k. Ex. 175, T. 1818. a. Ex. 57, T. 1764. 1. Ex. 175, T. 1819-20. b. T. 1350. Page D-4-2

(D-38) to obtain forcible possession of Manchuria, and despite the further fact that their action brought about the downfall of the

TANAKA Cabinet and the abandonment of the TANAKA policy of obtaining Japan's desires in Manchuria by peaceful means, the conspirators did not abandon their project. On the contrary, they used the next two years to plot, plan and agitate for the next step in their conspiracy. The plotting and planning followed so closely upon the murder of Chang Tso-Lin, and involved so many of the same people who were later involved in the Mukden Incident, that we cannot escape the conclusion that all the activity during the period from the murder of Chang Tso-

Lin until the Mukden Incident was all part of one conspiracy.

However, even if by some odd coincidence in the series of odd coincidences urged as a defense in this case, the Chang-Tso-Lin murder was not the first overt act in the conspiracy, th.e activity from 1929 on, involving many of the same persons as were involved in the Mukden Affair, including some of the present accused, was definitely part of the conspiracy charged and had as its purpose the furtherance of that conspiracy. The activity was carried on by the Army in Japan, the Kwantung Army and civilians.

D-18. In the General Staff, the leader was General TATEKAWA.

In 1929, while serving in Peiping, TATEKAWA, after telling TANAKA,

Ryukichi, that Manchuria should be placed under Japanese control and made into a state self-sustaining except for oil, sent TANAKA Page D-4-2

(D-38) to Manchuria to investigate. When TANAKA reported that this plan was not feasible, TATEKAWA stated that efforts should be made to a. make Manchuria self-contained. TATEKAWA felt strongly that unless Manchuria was seized by Japan, Japan could not become one b. of the powers of the world. In April 1929 there was distributed to the Chiefs of otaff, at a conference, a plan for establishing self-sufficiency in i.anchuria to impress upon them the fact c. that Manchuria was Japan's lifeline. In 1929, it was found

that the Investigation Section of the Kwantung Array was insuffic-

ient to probe into the resources of Manchuria and the sentiments of the people and to obtain other information, and the witness

TANAKA, was asked to make every effort to enlarge the China and Manchuria Investigation Section of the War Ministry. On

April 1, 1930, he succeeded in having created the General d. Investigation Section.

D-19. In October 1930, the SAKURAKAI was organized by

lieutenant-colonels and majors from the War Office, the General

Staff and the Office of the Inspector-General of Military a. Education under the leadership of the accused HASHIMOTO. According to the report of the rolice Affairs Bureau of the Home Ministry, the purpose of the society was national reorgan- ization for the attainment of which the Society was ready to use b. armed force. In January 1931, work had begun on the drafting of a concrete plan by Lt.Cols. SAKATA, NEM0T0, HASHIMOTO, TANAKA c. and Captains CHO and TANAKA. According to TANAKA, Ryukichi,

D-18. ' D-19. a. T. 2002-3. a. T. 1961-2; Ex. 183, T.2189 b. T. 2003. b. Ex. 183, T. 2189. c. T. 2003, T. 2067. c. Ex. 183, T. 219U. d. T. 2094-5. Page D-4-2

(D-38) CHO told him that one purpose of the organization was to d. settle the Lianchurian problem; and according to the Home

Ministry report, by 1930 this group had come to the conclusion that in order to settle the Ivlanchurian and Mongolian problems positively, the Japanese nation would first have to be recon- e. structed.

D-20. On July 1, 1931, the War Ministry discussed

Manchurian-Mongolian problems with officials of the South

Manchuria Railway. At the meeting which was attended by the accused MINAMI and XOISO and by other high ranking generals including TATEKAWA, MINAMI, then War Minister, stated that the army had long recognized the need for increasing its divisions in Korea and he hoped the day would come when more divisions a. would be sent. In view of the character of his audience and the nature of the problem under discussion, the statement is sub- ject to only one inference or interpretation: that MINAMI and the War Ministry favored military action in Manchuria. On August

4, 1931, MilNAMI made a speech to the division commanders in which he stated that Manchuria and Mongolia were closely related to

Japan's national defense as well as to her politics and economics, and that it was to be regretted that the situation .in China was following a trend unfavorable to Japan. He then stated he hoped that in view of this the commanders would carry out their duty of educating and training troops so that they could serve His b. Majesty's cause to perfection. The meaning of MINAMI's state-

D-19. D-20. d. T. 1963. a. Ex. 2202-A, T. 15752-3. e. Ex. 183, T. 2191, b. Ex. 186, part 1, T. 2209-10. Page D-4.6

(D-20) ' ... merit was clear and was readily understood, Cn August 6, 1931,

CZAKI, Yukio, and six other members of the Citizens' Disarmament league, wrote to MINAMI of the danger of spreading this propaganda and stated that it seemed to be MINAMI's intention to pit the divisional commanders against the politicians in a political disrute.

P-21. In the Kwantung Army a similar phenomenon was taking place, MORISHIMA, Consul at Mukden, testified that from the fall of the TANAKA Cabinet until the late summer of 1931 the influence of the group desiring to take over Manchuria increased. ITAGAKI,

ISFIEARA and HANAYA, all staff officers of the Kwantung Army, became definitely identified with the leadership of this group.

They felt that the use of armed force was necessary to preserve

Japan's interests and they wanted to occupy Manchuria and establish a. a government separate from China. The witness had personally heard ITAGAKI state that a very positive policy must be taken.

This determination to use force became progressively stronger through out the summer of 1931, and it was evident by the end of the summer that it was only a matter of days until the army would move in c „ Manchuria,

P."22. While the army was busily preparing for its move into

Manchuria, Dr. OKAWA, Shumei, who had previously written two hooks in which he had preached the doctrine that it was unavoidable to have a "deathly" fight between the powers of the East and of the West, and that Providence was trying to elect Japan as the champion a, of Asia, was plotting and carrying on propaganda for purposes of

D-20. D-22, c. Ex. 184, T. 2192-4.0 a. Ex. 2179-A, T.'15605-9? D-21. Ex. 2180-A, a. Ex. 245, T. 3016-7. T. 15610-11. b. To 3027. c. Ex. 24.5, T. 3017. Page D-4-2

(D-38) realizing the object of the conspiracy. In his testimony before the Tokyo Court of Appeals, OKAWA stated that, as an employee of the

East Asia Research Institute of the South Manchurian Railway, he had concluded that for Japan to be independent she would need both Korea and Manchuria to he self-sufficient in territory. While thus DO I KARA engaged, he became intimately acquainted with KGISO, ITAGAKI,/TADA and others who were subseouently involved in the events being b. considered. In 1929 he started a people's movement hecausehe felt that the Manchurian and Mongolian problems could not be left in the hands of the capitalists and politicians. From April or

May 1929 until the Manchurian Incident he gave a series of lectures in every prefecture in Japan advocating that Japan must attempt must economic developments in Manchuria and that Japan/build her life e. on an economic system uniting Japan and Manchuria. In a sub" sequent statement to the Tokyo Court of Appeals, OKAWA admitted that he gathered the authorities versed on the situation in

Manchuria, Mongolia and China and sent them out as propagandists for the purpose of leading the armed forces, the local leading d. class, and the general populace on the situation in Manchuria. By August of 1931 these propagandists had made the round of the e. whole land. Their propaganda stressed Japan's particular f. position in Manchuria. OKAWA admitted that through cooperation with the Kwantung Army he had done his best to further background operations, going so far as to risk the lives of his followers, and on occasion going himself into the actual field to plan

bs Ex. 2177-A, T, 15,565-6, e. Ex. 2177-A, T. 15573. d. Ex. 2178=1, T. 15595-6. e. Ex. 2178-1, T, 1559^. f. Ex. 2178-B, T« 15598. Page D-4.6

(D-22) g. matters. This cooperation between OKAWA and the Japanese army shows c3early that their aim was not limited to obtaining Manchuria

As early as 1924 CKAWA had openly espoused the ideas of SATO,

Shinen, who had advocated that Japan should first absorb China, then obtain the whole South Seas area so as to prepare for the northward advance of England, and then obtain control of India h. and the Indian Ocean,

This continual plotting-, planning, agitation and propaganda'had a most serious influence throughout Japan. Baron

CKADA, who was a member of the Supreme War Council during the entire two year period, testified that in his discussions with

Cabinet, Members and other statesmen much concern was expressed over the Army philosophy, which held that the Manchurian problem could not he solved short of using force to.establish a puppet government,, and that it was felt that it was only a question of 8 , time until the army would undertake the occupation of Manchuria,

JfafilhA Internallyi there wan still one serious obstacle to the easy accomplishment of the e©nspi»ey®»the duly established government of Japan, The HAMAGUOHI Cabinet was in power, and even more important, due to the attempted assassination of the premier,

Foreign Minister SHI I.)®AM, the hated exponent of the "Friendship a, feliey", was anting Premier-, if the conspirators could ale© take over the government, they would he free t© move without any restraint. Accordingly, the conspirators eeneaived of and proceeded to execute a plan for seising the government, This Brarsm&tswsr-s? a* sexewm trr are- «k e^m:ararae8P:SBWts--Bt w?98i:eMes:«s« = »»» wrecst » sr item p. Fx. 2378"P, T. a. Ex, 175, T, 1820-1. h, Fx. 2181-A, T. 1§632-3. itu* a. Ex. 156, T, 1323, Page D-4-2

(D-38) effort became known as the March Incident. In his testimony before the Tokyo Court of Appeals, CKAWA testified that, having learned from KOISO that UGAKI was to become president of the Seiyukai, upon

the request of Col0SHIGETC and the accused HASHIMOTO, he held an interview with UGAKI to learn his views and discovered that UGAKI felt that Japan could never develop her fate and overseas development with her present Diet and parties. OKAWA's report of the conference was reported in turn by HASHIMOTO and SFIGETO to Deputy Chief of

Staff NINOMIXA and TATEKAWA. All these parties and others, including

K01S0, held discussions and it was planned to have a mass demonstration on March 20, to be followed by the imposition of martial law. This had appeared to be UGAKI's intention. However, UGAKI felt that this should not be done? and KCISC told OKAWA that there was danger of discovery as too many persons were involved, and that they should b. therefore pretend on the surface to have suspended the plot, SHIMI2U, a henchman of OKAWA, testified that he was present at the meeting between OKAWA and KOISO and heard the latter say it was the direct o, order of the army to abandon the plot, UGAKI testified that whan he was informed by KOISO and SUOIXAMA that there was a plot to seise the government and put him at the head of it, and that OKAWA was involved and wanted Army aid, he immediately ordered both of them to stop all plans for carrying out the revolutionary coup by use ef d, the Army and to §o advise the conspirators 9 MUHIIIBTC in his testimony n&mad himself, TATEKAWA, KOIIO, NINOMI XA, IU0IXAMA and

OKAWA as conspirators. HASHIMOTO, in his interrogation, also

D»24t b, Ex. 2177=A, T. 15580-83, co Ex. 157, T. 1404. d. Ex, 163, T. s. T, 28820. Page D-4.6

(D-24) f. named as conspirators NAGATA, IKEDA, SFIGETO and CHO. This incident went further than the mere plotting stage and active preparations were made to carry it out. The witness SHIMIZU was to throw some bombs outside the Diet during a demonstration of

CKAWA's followers, and OKAWA was to lead the mob into the Diet and take over the government. Some 300 bombs which HASHIMOTO obtained g. from the army were delivered to SHIMIZU. Much has been made of the fact that SHIMIZU testified that he was told that the bombs h. were not real hut were mock bombs or firecrackers. Whether true or not, this fact is totally unimportant. The purpose of the bombs was to start a mass demonstration which would lead to martial law, and for that purpose mock bombs could he just as efficacious as the real thing. Moreover, the validity of the story told to SHIMIZU was belied by TCKUGAWA's testimony of the strenuous efforts of

K0IS0, who had procured the bombs, to have them returned beesuse i, he was in a had situation at the general Staff. At KCISO's j. instance, TOKUGAWA persuaded SHIMIZU to return them and SHIMIZU k. finally returned them to CoX NEMOTC. The plot, though abortive, did not remain a secret. Both the fact that there had been a plot and that it had been led by KCISO, TATEKAWA and NINOMIYA with

HASHIMOTO, SFIGEFUJI and OKAWA as collaborators was well known to 1. KIDO and the court circle.

]>2jL In his testimony in the Tokyo Court, OKAWA stated that a. the Manchurian Incident was the motive for the March Incident.

This statement needs no further corroboration than the fact that

f. Ex. 2188, T. 15677. a. Ex, 2177-A, T. 15578 g. Ex. 157, T. 1402-3. h. T, 1418. i. Ex. 158, T. 1442. j. Ex. 158, T„ 1442. k. Ex. 157, T. 14.04. 1. Ex. 179-F,T.1927-8; EX. 179-G, T. 1931. Page D-4-2

(D-38) among the leaders and participants in the March Incident were some who from 1929 to 1931 were openly and boldly demanding drastic action in Manchuria and were to play leading roles in the incident itself,

D-26. Following the debacle of the plot to take over the government, the movement to take over MANCHURIA continued with increasing vigor. On June 23, 1931, the accused KIDC admittedly already had information of a plot on the part of the military a, officers in Manchuria, and thereafter reported to the Lord Keeper information about a conspiracy in China contrived by the military b. in conjunction with some adventurers. In the summer of 1931, there occurred an incident which increased the tension between Japan and China and which clearly indicated the extent of the planning.

Captain NAKAMURA was killed by Chinese soldiers in Manchuria and the Japanese regarded this as the culminating incident in a series of events which they claimed showed disregard of Japanese rights by

Chinese. The Lytton Commission found that NAKAMURA admittedly was an army officer on active duty on a mission for the army and had represented himself as an agricultural expert. He had been warned that the area was bandit-ridden. He was armed and carried medicines c. which, according to the Chinese, included narcotics. MORISHIMA, the assistant consul at Mukden, who devoted much of his time in

August and September 1931 to the handling of this affair, testified that NAKAMURA was on an investigation tour of Inner Mongolia for the Kwantung Army and had obtained a passport from the Chinese

D-26. ""a. Ex. 3340, T. 30728. b. Ex. 3340, T. 30728-9, c. Ex. 57, T. 1781-2. Page D-4.6

(D-26) d. under false representation. In view of the nature of his mission and the covert and illegal manner in which it was being carried out, it is difficult to understand the tremendous outcry made by the Japanese unless their purpose in so doing was further agitation to build up the situation for the Mukden Incident. This is further borne out by the fact that, although the NAKAMURA incident took place in June, its announcement was delayed until e. August.

D-27.. Shortly prior to the outbreak of the Mukden Incident, the tension increased and there were reports of imminent action in Manchuria. SHIDEHARA testified that he had received confidential reports that the Kwantung Army had been massing troops and bringing up ammunition and material for military purposes, and concluded that some action of some kind was contemplated by the military a. bo clique. He spoke to MINAMI, the War Minister, about them,

MINAMI himself confirmed that SHIDEHARA had kept him informed and stated that shortly hefote September 18, SHIDEHARA reported that O G something seemed to be going on. As TATEKAWA was being sent by the General Staff to Manchuria, MINAMI talked the matter over with do him. On September 15 or 16, 1931, SHIDEHARA received a cable reporting that the commander of a patrol unit had stated that within a week a big incident would break out and SHIDEHARA protested to MINAMI. MINAMI, in turn, immediately sent TATEKAWA e. as a special emissary to Mukden to stop the action at all costs. The sending of the consular report was confirmed by defense witness f. KATAKURA.

D-27. d. Ex, 245, T. 3017-8. a. Ex. 156, T. 1324. e. T. 18886. h. T. 1334. c. T. 19821, d. T. 19821. e. T. 2006. f. T. 19106-7. Page D-4.6

2. THE MUKDEN INCIDENT - September 18, 194-1.

D-2g_. As a climax to the mounting tension, there occurred about 10 p. si. on September 18, 1931, an alleged light explosion on the South Manchurian Railroad, as a result of which the Kwantung

Army went into immediate action and did not stop until it was

completely in control of all Manchuria. According to the Lytton

Commission, the Japanese version of the incident was that a patrol,

on hearing of the explosion, discovered that a portion of one rail was blown up leaving a gap. Plhen they arrived, they were fired on from the east side of the railroad line, but when fire was returned, the other side stopped and retreated. The Japanese pursued and were attacked by 300 to 4-00 men, and reinforcements were then sent from Captain gAWASHIMA and Col. SHIMAMOTO. In the meantime, the southbound train from Changchun passed over the damaged spot without stopping and arrived at its destination on

time. SHIMAWT0 ordered an attack on the Chinese barracks, which the Chinese contested, but the barracks were captured. In the meantime, Col. HIRATA decided to attack the walled city and by

6 a. m. the eastern wall was occupied, and by 7.30 a. m. the a. arsenal and airdrome were captured. This same version has been bo repeated before this Tribunal by defense witnesses HIRATA, and c. SHIMAMOTO, Masaichi, together with the additional fact that d.

ITAGAKI approved their plans. The Chinese version, as reported by the Commission, was that the attack on the barracks was un- provoked and a surprise. All soldiers were in the barracks, and

D-28. a. Ex. 57. T. 1787-92. b. Ex. 24-04, T. 19284-95. c. Ex. 2410, T. 19479-85. d. T. 19307-13; T. 30265. Page D-4-2

(D-38) since on September 6 orders had been received to take special care to avoid any clash with the Japanese, the sentries had only dummy rifles. The Japanese had been carrying on maneuvers around the barracks since the 14th, and on the 18th they were maneuvering at a village where a train with three or four coaches had stopped at

9 p. m. At 10 p. m., a light explosion and rifle fire were heard.

The Japanese began to attack the barracks, and thereafter started to attack with artillery. There was no resistance except for one e. regim-nt which was cut off and had to fight its way through.

The Commission after hearing both sides concluded that the Japanese had a carefully prepared plan to meet the possibility of hostilities and the plan was put into operation with swiftness and precision.

The Chinese had no plan to attack the Japanese, made no concerted or authorized attack on them, and were surprised by the Japanese

'attack. There was an explosion hut the damage was insufficient in itself to justify military action. The Japanese military operations could not he regarded as measures of self-defense, although the Commission did not exclude the hypothesis that the f. officers might have thought they were 30 acting.

D-29. This Tribunal has had presented to it testimony in addition to what the Lytton Commission heard, and there is suf- ficient evidence to exclude any hypothesis of self-defense, and to find that the incident, including the explosion of the railroad tracks, was planned and put into effect by the conspirators.

John R. Powell examined the scene four or five days later and

D-28. e. Ex. 57, T. 1792-6. f. Ex. 57, T. 1797-8. Page D-32

(D-29) a. found no visible damage to the roadbed. He also testified that the Japanese went to unusual trouble to attempt to build up evidence that the Chinese were to blame, and that the purpose of the exhibit and the placing of dead Chinese soldiers with no blood stains under them in the vicinity of the explosion was so b. obvious that it aroused the suspicion of neutral observers.

Defense witness OYAMA, who made an investigation but did not concern himself with attempting to ascertain the responsible party, testified that the dead Chinese were on the east side of the railroad line, a fact wholly inconsistent with the Japanese c. contention. These suspicions were not confined to neutral observers since the accused KIDO himself was suspicious when on

September 23 the Head of the Maintenance Bureau of the War Depart- d. ment could not yet explain the cause of the explosion, and even e. a year later the Emperor was still suspicious. As early as

September 19, Consul General HAYASHI reported that the Kwantung

Army would not permit the railway authorities to approach the spot to repair the road, and concluded that the incident was f. wholly an action planned by the army.

D-30. Moreover, a week before the incident one of the

cogs in the conspiracy, in an outburst of zeal, disclosed that something was scheduled to happen on the 18th of September.

According to defense witness KATAKURA, Lt. KAWAKAMI at Fushun had assembled officials of the Railway and stated that some acute situation might arise after the 17th and that arrangements ought

D-29. a. T. 3213-4. b. T. 3212-6. c. T. 19624-5. d. Ex . 179-J, T. 1939. e. T. 19029. f. Ex . 181, T. 2178-9. Page D-4.6

(D-30) a. to be made about trains at Fushun. According to defense witness

ISHIHARA, KAWAKAMI, after receiving HONJO's new orders as to the work of his command, became worried about the defense of Fushun, since under the orders he had to leave the area, and had posited a hypothesis to those who would defend Fushun as to what they would do if on September 18 an event would occur in Mukden requiring

KAWAKAMI to leave; and that after the meeting he had notified all b. concerned that it was only a hypothesis. The care taken to let the listeners know that the problem was only a hypothesis is clear evidence in light of all the circumstances that the incident was planned. The contention that the date of the 18th was named purely as a coincidence is utterly unworthy of belief. To show that it was only a coincidence, ISHIHARA pointed out that on the c. 18th KAWAKAMI forgot to perform his task. It is not at all unusual in any conspiracy that one of the conspirators should get excited and lose his head at a decisive moment.

D-31. Moreover, if the Chinese had blown up the railroad, which was Japanese owned, operated and controlled, common sense would indicate that they would have done the job in a way so as to cause considerable damage and not to leave it easily repairable for use by the enemy. Furthermore, the Chinese were totally ion prepared. Defense witness SFIMAMOTO testified that the Chinese foolishly fought with electric lights on in the barracks, while a. the Japanese approached from the dark and shelled; and the

Japanese version of events before the Lytton Commission showed

D-30. D-31. a. T. 18933. a. Ex. 2410, T. 19485. b. T. 22141. c. T. 22142. Page D-4-2

(D-38) that 320 Chinese were killed in the barracks at the cost of only b. two Japanese lives.

D-32. Even if there were no evidence at all to show that the Japanese had planned the whole incident, there is ample evidence before this Tribunal to sustain the finding of the Lytton

Commission that the Japanese bad a carefully prepared plan in the event of hostilities which was carried out swiftly and precisely on an occasion which did not justify military action--a finding which in itself is evidence of the highest order.

D-33. OKADA testified that when he joined the SAITC Cabinet in 1932 he learned from reports that the occurrence of September 18, a. 1931, was plotted and arranged by the clique in the Kwantung Army.

TANAKA, Ryukichi, a former army officer familiar with the Manchurian problem, testified fully from his own knowledge and from statements made to him by certain of the leading conspirators about the events connected with the Manchurian aggression. He named as the leading persons involved TATEKAWA, the accused HASHIMOTO, CHO, the accused b. ITAGAKI, ISHIHARA and OKAWA. In the fall of 1934, HASHIMOTO told him that the Manchurian Incident had been planned by the Kwantung

Army and that he, in accordance with the plan, had assisted it. i HASHIMOTO told him that it was the plan of the Kwantung Army to exploit Manchuria while under army occupation. HASHIMOTO named himself and the other five named by TANAKA as the conspirators and defined the purpose as being to occupy Manchuria, to destroy the influence of the war lords, and to bring about economic development

D-31. D-33. b. Ex. 57, T. 1791. a. Ex. 175- T. 1822. b. T. 1966. Page D-4.6

(D-33) c.

and army occupation. Captain CFO, another of the conspirators,

told TANAKA that the Manchurian Incident had been planned in

advance by the Kwantung Army, and that through the Sakurgkai

he had exerted efforts to have the Army and the people understand

the need of definitely settling the Manchurian issue. He named

as conspirators the same persons named by HASHIMOTO excepting d. TATEKAWA. CHC further admitted that to obtain Central Army

support for the Kwantung Army, he let loose rumors that the

Kwantung Army intended to carry out a separationist movement and

declare itself independent of Japan, and he thus obtained a change e. in favor of the Kwantung Army. In 1934, OKAWA told TANAKA that

the Manchurian Incident was the result of planning. He named the

same conspirators and stated that the events of September 18 were

the result of OKAWA's plan. He had been working on such a plan

and was extremely gratified that a similar plan was being prepared .and carried out by the Kwantung Army, in which ITAGAKI was the f. leader. In 1935, ITAGAKI, under whom TANAKA was then serving,

told TANAKA about the secret installation of two heavy guns sent 9• to Manchuria for Mukden. According to the witness, these guns were of sufficient range to reach the spot where the alleged h. explosion took place. In 1934, TATEKAWA told TANAKA that prior

to September 18, 1931, he had expected an outbreak in Manchuria

and that he had been sent as a special emissary, with specific

instructions to stop the Incident at all OOgtO but that he had pot

desired to stop it. The Kwantung Army officers, knowing he had

D-33. c. T. 1968-78. d. T. 2014-6. e. T. 2017, f. T. 1980-4. g. T. 1988-90. h. T. 1991. Page D-4-2

(D-38) come to stop it, took him to a restaurant to isolate him, and he

went willingly because he neither intended nor wanted to see other i. people in Mukden.

D-34. Other witnesses have also testified to contemporaneous

statements made by some of the conspirators. In August 1931, OKAWA

told SHIMIZU that Cols. KOMCTO and ITAOAKI would bring about an a. incident some time later on. In August 1931, both SHIGETO and

HASHIMOTO told the witness FUJITA that positive action should be b. taken in Manchuria. On September 19, when FUJITA, after reading

about the Manchurian Incident, confronted SHIGETO with the statement

that they had accomplished what they were contemplating in Manchuria, c. SHIGETO answered affirmatively. When he asked on the same day a

similar question of HASHIMOTO, the latter replied that things had d. come to pass as they should.

D-35. The testimony of TANAKA and others about the statements made by the conspirators in the course of the conspiracy with respect to their relations to the plan and its execution is corrob- orative of and is corroborated by other vital evidence which fully

reveals that the incident was no minor, unexpected clash, but a bold overt move to seize Manchuria. Even if there had been no

statement made by TATEKAWA to TANAKA, TATEKAWA's conduct during his mission disclosed that he had no desire or intent to stop the

incident from taking place and his conduct leaves room for no

inference other than TATEKAWA was acting as a conspirator in

furtherance of the scheme, and that the Kwantung Army assisted him

D-33,- D i. T. 2003-7. a. Ex. 157, T. 1404, 1410-11. b. Ex. 160, T. 1464. c. Ex. 160, T. 1465. d. Ex. 160, T. 1466.. r Page D-37

(D-35) wholeheartedly to fail in his mission. Admittedly, TATEKAWA was sent to Mukden as a result of SHIDEHARA's communications to a. MINAMI. MINAMI denied, however, that he had instructed TATEKAWA b. to stop the incident at all costs, and maintained that he was merely sent to investigate the Manchurian situation in light of c. the Cabinet discussion with SHIDEHARA; but at the same time,

MINAMI also stated that when TATEKAWA returned to Tokyo, MINAMI received a report that TATEKAWA had been unable to communicate d. the order, thus establishing the very order he denied. From e. f, the testimony of defense witnesses KATAKURA, ISHIFARA, and g. the accused ITAGAKI, it was revealed that the coming of TATEKAWA was known in advance. General MIYAKE, Chief of Staff of the

Kwantung Army, had notified Commander HCNJC who was on an inspection tour, and had requested the return of either ISHIFARA or the accused ITAGAKI to Mukden to meet TATEKAWA, ITAGAKI had h. been sent, It was shown through MORXSHIMA that both in traveling i. and while in Mukden, TATEKAWA was dressed in civilian clothes for this mission to an army in the field, which was so unusual under the circumstances as to alarm MQRISH1MA. ITAGAKI himself testified that toward evening he met and dined with TATEKAWA, and in the course of the conversation, TATEKAWA said nothing except that he was tired from his trip, When TATEKAWA finally mentioned that the superiors were worried about the unscrupulous conduct of the young officers, ITARAKI cut the conversation short by telling him there was no need to worry and that he would hear him at

Mi. a, T. 19822-3, b„ T. 19825, e. Te 19823. d. T. 19822. a. T. 18901. f. T. 22117-8, P. Ex. 3316, T. 30260-1, h. Ex. 245i T. 3019. i. Ex. 245, T. 3023. J. Ex, 245, T. 3019. Page D-4.6

(D-35) k. leisure the next day. In selecting ITAGAKI as the person to meet TATEKAWA, it is clear that the Kwantung Army was taking every action to stop anything from preventing their plan from going through. The only inference that can be drawn from MIYAKE's sending for either ISHIHARA or ITAGAKI, the known leaders in the

Kwantung Army of the policy to use force in Manchuria, and the sending of ITAGAKI, is that the Kwantung Army had decided to move and to allow nothing to interfere. The pleasant chat betv/een

ITAGAKI and TATEKAWA with ITAGAKI skillfully preventing the dis- cussion of any item touching on the subject was a mutual conspir- acy to keep silent on the vital matter, since both were aware that the breaking of the silence might bring the entire project to a premature end.

D-36. The actions of ITAGAKI and others during the night of the 18th further revealed that the conspirators were determined to carry through their plan and would permit no interference from

Tokyo or elsewhere. At 10.45 p. m., Assistant Consul MORISHIMA, in the absence of consul-general HAYASHI, was summoned to Army

Headquarters where he met ITAGAKI, HANAYA and others. When, after

ITAGAKI had told him that they must take appropriate measures through military force and that crders had been issued, MORISHIMA advised peaceful negotiations, which he believed would be success- ful , ITAGAKI told him not to interfere with the Supreme Command.

When MORISHIMA tried to reason for an amicable negotiation, HANAYA a. drew his sword and threatened to kill him. During the night

D-35,. D-36. k. Ex. 3316, T. 30261. a. Ex. 245, T. 3020-22. Page D-4-2

(D-38) consul-general HAYASHI tried repeatedly to persuade ITAGAKI to

cease fighting and to allow a peaceful settlement but was told to stop interfering with the Supreme Command and that the Army would proceed as planned. Without avail he notified the army of

the fact that the Chinese were proceeding on a policy of non- b.

resistance. On September 19 HAYASHI was compelled to report that the army was planning positive operations at various places along the railway zone and to ask the government to take immediate c. steps to stop them,

D-37. The testimony introduced by the defense shows equally clearly how far the matter was planned. ISHIHARA testified that the Kwantung Army had set up an operational plan to settle whatever incident might happen in the shortest possible time and had finished all its preparations. Two heavy guns were set up, armored cars were attached to the infantry, and explosives and other a, materials were prepared. The witness HIRATA testified that HGNJC had issued instructions that in case of necessity they should take positive action and try not to impair the prestige of the Army.

Accordingly, the witness issued ball cartridges to his men and put them on battle footing. He carried out more and more intense drills and frequent night maneuvers, and held emergency drills so that day and night maneuvers for defense of the railway zone were b. carried out.

3• THE MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS AFTER SEPTEMBER 18, 1931.

D-38. As soon as the outbreak of the hostilities was reported

D-36. b. Ex. 245, T. 3022; Ex. 181, T. 2179-80; Ex. 2193, T. 15735-6. c. Ex. 181, pt. 2, T. 2183.

D-37. a. Ex. 2584, T. 22113. b. Ex. 2404, T. 19283-4. Page D-4-2

(D-38) in Tokyo, an extraordinary Cabinet meeting was held on September 19,

1931, at which it was decided that the policy would be one of non- a. expansion and that the affair would be terminated at once. Baron

WAKATSUKI, the Premier at the time, testified about this meeting and the next one when MINAMI reported that for strategic and tactical reasons it had been necessary to pursue the Chinese into b Chinese territory, a protective measure which would not be extended.

WAKATSUKI also testified that, despite the unanimous opinion of the

Cabinet that the operations must cease immediately, the expansion continued, and in his daily conferences with MINAMI he was shown by MINAMI on maps the boundary which the army would not go beyond, but almost daily the boundary was ignored and further expansion c. reported with the assurance that it was the final move. Typical of the army maneuvers to evade the established government policy of non-enlargement was the movement of Korean Army troops across the Yalu River. On September 19, according to defense witness

KAWABE, Commander HAYASHI of the Korean Army wired to the Chief of Staff in Tokyo that steps had been taken to send to Manchuria a unit to relieve the Kwantung Army near Mukden. It was decided by the Chief of Staff to order the action stopped. An order was immediately sent to HAYASHI and also directly to the unit at

Hsinchow that the Korean Army should not attempt to cross the d. Yalu. On the afternoon or evening of the 21st HAYASHI reported to the general staff that he knew that the forces near Mukden had been diminished by the sending of forces to Kirin, and judging

D-3S. a. Ex. 162., T. 1554-5. b. Ex. 162, T. 1555. c. Ex. 162, T. 1556. d„ Ex. 2408, T. 19412-3. Page D-4-2

(D-38) that he should help the Kwantung Army, on his own discretion he e. had ordered Korean Army troops to be transported to Mukden.

Here, there was an outright and flagrant violation of the estab- lished policy of the government. Yet, nothing was done to disavow the action, to restore the status quo or to remove the commander.

On the contrary, the action was condoned and adopted. According to MINAMI's own testimony, he reported to WAKATSUKI that HAYASHI f. had moved the troops at his own discretion, but according to WAKATSUKI, MINAMI also reported that HAYASHI had received an g. urgent request from the Kwantung Army for aid. This latter statement was made undoubtedly to impress the Fremier with the fact that this was an emergency measure to meet an emergency which

MINAMI and the Army knew did not exist. At the Cabinet meeting on September 22, it was decided to defray the expenses incurred h. by the Korean Army in making the move. WAKATSUKI reported the i. Cabinet decision to pay the expenses to the Emperor, and KANAYA obtained the Imperial sanction approving retroactively the movement h of the troops. MINAMI admitted that they could always control the Supreme Command by refusing to authorize expenditures, but the idea of withholding funds never entered his mind and was not k. suggested by anyone else. The conclusion is clear that no one wanted to or dared to stop the Supreme Command or the Kwantung

Army. MINAMI further stated that HAYASHI had received punishment 1. from the Emperor, but was not recalled or replaced. The actual punishment received was only a reprimand. A reprimand could

D-38. e. Ex. 2408, T. 19414. f. Ex. 2435, T. 19782. g. Ex. 162, T. 1555-6. h. T. 1563-4; T. 19783. i. T. 1564; T. 19783. j. T. 1565-6; T. 19783. k. T. 19852-56. 1. T. 19857. Page D-4-2

(D-38) hardly be called adequate punishment for the deliberate flouting of a fixed government policy and for disobedience of a Supreme

Command order. It could hardly be called a deterrent against similar moves in the evolution of the conspiracy,

As a matter of fact, the army, represented by the

Supreme Command, never wanted the policy of non-enlargement of the

incident and never intended to carry it out. General MINAMI himself testified that the Supreme Command, represented by KANAYA and NINCMIYA, strongly favored sending reinforcements for operational reasons at the time of the outbreak of the incident and that it a. took some time before the non-expansion policy could be decided.

Cn September 19, the day the Cabinet made its decision, the accused

KIDO reported that WAKATSUKI was worried that the army was not b. driving home the policies decided by the Cabinet. On September

22, 1931, KIDO reported that the army was so strongly determined in its policy toward Manchuria that orders given by the central authorities might not be thoroughly understood, and that the army was indignant because the Emperor had approved the governmental c. policy under influence of his personal attendants. On the 29th

KIDO reported to the Lord Keeper his conversation with Baron

FARADA, Prince SAIONJT's secretary, to the effect that the Army

Chief of Staff had told WAKATSITKI that the Army might be compelled to send troops to the Yangtse River, and that if this happened, he did not want the government to interfere with the prerogative d. of the Supreme Command of the Army. On October 15 HAYASHI of

a. Ex. 2435, T. 19781. b. Ex. 179-H, T. 1936. c. Ex. 179-1, T. 1938. d. Ex. 179-K, T. 1939-40. Page D-4-2

(D-38) the War Office told KIDO and SFIRATCRI that it would be unwise to take time to solve the Manchurian cuestion since it needed a prompt solution from the point of view of army discipline. He stated it was necessary to create a new regime in Manchuria and that the authorities should give tacit approval and facilitate the problem, The militarists still planned to establish a new e. regime and their attitude had stiffened.

D-AO. On October 1, KIDO noted that he, HARADA, KCNCE and

SFIRATORI discussed the militarists' secret plot and plan for a coup d'etat to set up a dictatorship, and that it would be necessary a. to guide the military so they do nojb cause serious damage. On

October 7 he noted that efforts were being made to save the situation if something happened such as a rebellion among the b. young officers; and again on the 14th he learned that the plots c. of the army were progressing rapidly. This constant thread in the conversations of an expected move by the Army to seize control of the government was not without a basis in fact. In October, the conspirators, dissatisfied with the government's policy and regarding it as the one obstacle to carrying out the conspiracy, again planned to seize control of the government. This move became known as the October Incident. The accused HASHIMOTO admitted that he thought up the plan in early October 1931 to bring about a Cabinet headed by ARAKI, as a result of a conversation with d.

Captain CHO. In his testimony in the Tokyo Court of Appeals

OKAWA testified that the WAKATSUKI Cabinet was dilly-dallying, and

e. Ex. 179-Q, T. 1942-3.

D-AO. a. Ex. 179-1, T. 1940. b. Ex. 179-0, T. 1941. c. Ex. 179-F, T. 1942. d. .Ex. 3195, T. 28795.

\ Page B-44

(D-40) the aim of the incident was to crush the cabinet and set up a new and powerful party capable of solving important problems. He stated that he was the only civilian involved in the plan drawn up by two army officers and that he did not know all the details, that he received his orders from HASHIMOTO and that among those e. involved were SFIGETC, HASHIMOTO, ITAGAKI and DCIFARA. In his own testimony and through a witness, HASHIMOTO tried to show that

OKAWA was not Involved in the October Incident. However, in mew of the fact that OKAWA made his statement in a court proceeding, and in view of the fact that in his interrogation by the prosecution

HASHIMOTO admitted OKAWA's participation as well as that of fo NINOMIYA and TATEKAWA, and in view of the stories told by OKAWA, g. HASHIMOTO and'CHO to TANAKA of OKAWA's participation, this evid- ence would seem to be a mere belated idea to take advantage of

OKAWA's real or pseudo present mental condition. In 1932 Captain

CHO told TANAKA that the purpose of the incident was to cleanse the ideological and political atmosphere, to renovate Japanese politics by assassinating the leaders, to set up a new government and then to obtain with the new -unity, unanimous support for h. settlement of the Manchurian Incident. TATEKAWA also told

TANAKA that HASHIMOTO, CHO and OKAWA planned the October Incident to overthrow the government in power and to set up a new government i. which would support the Manchurian Incident. The plot was j- discovered; HASHIMOTO and others were arrested. Dg^l. In the meantime, the military operations in Manchuria

D-40. ~e. Ex. 2177-A, T. 15585-7. f. Ex, 2188, T. 15677. g. T. 1966, 1973-81. h. T. 1973. i. T. 2013. j. Ex. 3195, T. 28795. Page D-4-2

(D-38) continued to widen. Cn September 21 the Japanese had reached •« a. Kirin. In October, the Kwantung Army bombed Chinchow near the

North China border, during which operation, according to a neutral b. witness, they bombed everything except the military objective.

In November two riots were created in Tientsin to serve as a pretext for Japanese troops and a couple of airplanes to cross the Liao River, and immediately thereafter Chinchow was again c. bombed. It was finally occupied on January 3, 1932. From the middle of October until November 19, when the Japanese occupied

Tsitsihar in Northern Manchuria, they carried out the Nonni Bridge d. operation.

D-42. On December 10, 1931, the WAKATSUKI Cabinet resigned.

MINAMI in his testimony put the situation rather mildly when he stated that dissatisfaction had grown up in and out of Japan to a. the moderate policy of the WAKATSUKI Cabinet. WAKATSUKI himself testified that he exerted every effort to bring the Manchurian

Incident under control, going to the extent of trying to form a coalition cabinet which would show, rightly or wrongly, that the people as a whole were opposed to the Manchurian Incident. For « internal reasons this had to be given up. When ADACHI refused to b. go along, the Cabinet resigned. While admitting that there were also other causes for the resignation of this Cabinet,

SHIDEHARA stated that the Manchurian Incident aggravated the c. situation and compelled the Cabinet bo resign. As a result,

INUKAI took office with the accused ARAKI becoming his War Minister.

D-Al. D-42. a. Ex. 189, T. 2244. a. Ex. 2435, T. 19790. b. Ex. 57, T. 2248. b. T. 1575-82; Ex. 2435, T. 19790. c. Ex. 57, P. 66. c. T. 1344. d. Ex. 57, T. 2249. Page D-4.6

D-4-3» Immediately upon ARAKI's succession to office, there was an apparent change in the attitude of the government and in the cooperation between it and the Kwantung Army in furtherance of the conspiracy. A device was found, which, while it permitted the government to piously assert that it was carrying out the policy of the previous government of non-enlargement of the incident, enabled it to render the aid needed by the Kwantung

Army in effectuating the conspiracy. On September 21, China had a. appealed to the League of Nations, which after a series of preliminary moves, on December 10, 1931, adopted a resolution, which, inter alia, appointed a commission to investigate and report on any circumstances affecting international relations and b. which threatened to disturb peace between China and Japan.

Japan, on December 10, accepted the resolution with the reservation that it did not preclude Japanese forces from taking such action as might be rendered necessary to provide directly for the protection of the lives and property of Japanese subjects against c. the activities of bandits and lawless elements. However, it was stated that this was an exceptional measure due to the special situation-and its necessity would end when normal conditions were d. restored. This reservation was immediately seized upon as a pretext for action In furtherance of the conspiracy. The Lytton

Commission found that the Japanese immediately construed the resolution, in light of Japan's reservation, as giving Japan the right to maintain her troops in Manchuria, and as having made her

2 zAlz a. Ex. 57, T. 1693. b. Ex. 57, T. 1696-8. c. Ex. 57, T. 1703-4; T. 2252. d. Ex. 57, T. 2252. Page D-4.6

(D-43) e.

army responsible for the suppression of banditry. Upon this

construction Japan proceeded to complete the military conquest

of Manchuria.

D-44. In his interrogations by the prosecution, the accused

ARAKI admitted the role that he and the other government officials

played in this scheme. He stated that up until the time he became

War Minister, there had been no fixed policy and it was realized that the absence of policy would result in the spreading of a. hostilities. Soon after he became War Minister, ARAKI decided

that the four provinces under Chang Hsueh-Liang should be pacified b. and occupied. He made up his plan and obtained the approval of c. the Premier and Foreign and Finance Ministers. Cabinet approval d was then obtained either in full meeting or by individual consent.

Since the Diet was not then in session, and since the plan required e. an increase of expenditures of 30 to 50 million yen, the matter f. g was submitted to the Privy Council, and unanimously approved h. by December 20. The primary matter passed on by the Council was

the matter of the expenditure, but as ARAKI himself points out,

the policy itself was discussed because unless it was supported i. there could have been no appropriation. The only question that

was raised was whether there should be included in this program three or four provinces, since Manchuria from ancient times had only j. three provinces. It was finally decided to include four to keep

Chang Hsueh-Liang from retreating to Jehol and operating from there

D-45. In his own testimony, ARAKI attacked the accuracy of

D-42. e. Ex. 57, T. 2253.

D-44. D-44. a. Ex. 188-C, T. 2221. ' f. Ex. 188-C, T. 2222-3. b. Ex. 188-A, T. 2216-7. g. Ex. 188-C, T. 2234. c. Ex. 188-B, T. 2218-9. h. Ex. 3162, T. 28307. d. Ex. 188-C, T. 2222; 2233 i. Ex. 188-C, T. 2233. e. Ex. 3162, T. 28306-7. j. Ex. 188-D, T. 2237-8. k. Ex. 188-C, T. 2235. Page D-4-2

(D-38) his interrogations on the ground that he was misinterpreted by a. incompetent interpreters. However, when confronted by three of the interpreters who interpreted at most of the interrogations b. complained of, he could not identify them as the incompetent ones.

In light of this fact and in light of the further fact that no other accused who were interpreted by the same interpreters as were used in ARAKI's case have made any complaint of misinterpretation, the inference is clear that in his interrogations ARAKI said a little more than be, after reflection, thought wise to say. When his complaint was finally resolved to its component elements, it was found that it could be reduced to whether ARAKI used in,the course of the interrogations the word "occupation", based on the fact that he allegedly conceived of that term in a very narrow, technical sense. Yet ARAKI took no objection to the interpretation with respect to Exhibits 2220-21, where he again in his interrogation c. used the phrase "occupying the four provinces". An examination d. of Exhibit 3162, admittedly written by ARAKI, shows that it tells substantially the same story as was told in the interroga- e. tions, except that the word "occupation" is not used. The statement says that the aim was to restore public peace and admits that the opponents were the four chiefs of the Four Eastern

Provinces and that the area was the four provinces under Chang's f. control. As a matter of fact, this complaint by ARAKI is pointless and immaterial because, pursuant to his plan, the area of Japanese military operations continually widened until, in a

D-45. a. Ex. 3161, T. 28221-7. b. T. 28293-300. c. Exs. 2220-21; T. 15843. d. T. 28239. e. Ex. 3162, T. 28305-8. f. Ex. 3162, T. 28307. Page D-4-2

(D-38) little more than a year after the plan was adopted, it had spread all over Manchuria and Jehol, and because pursuant to his plan and other plans participated in by him, the Kwantung Army completely dominated, controlled and governed Manchuria as a satrapy of Japan.

D-46. Immediately after the Privy Council approved the plan, according to ARAKI, the government decided to send troops to Fengtien Province and an order was delivered to the General a. Staff which took steps to send the troops. On December 27 b. Imperial Sanction for moving a brigade from Korea was obtained, c. and on the 28th it was sent. The Lytton Commission found that beginning with December 23 there was a concentrated attack on

Chinchow, culminating in its occupation on January 3, 1932, and that the Japanese continued to the Great Wall. The Japanese then turned toward Harbin, occupying it on February 5, 1932. In March a division left Harbin to suppress anti-Kirin troops and advanced as far as Sanhsing. Early in May the 14th Japanese Division d. arrived. The pretense that these military movements were to preserve peace and order was abandoned in the Kwantung Army as defense witness KATAKURA, one of HONJO's staff, admitted that after December their purpose was to check the retreating Ting-Chao e. forces.

D-47. While the Kwantung Army was in the process of expanding its military operations in Manchuria, a series of events took place which threatened to expand immediately the scope of the conspiracy beyond the area of the first stage, at a time when the main

D-46. a. Ex. 188-E, T. 2240. b. Ex. 57, T. 2256. c. Ex. 3161, T. 28134. d. Ex. 57, T. 2256-60. e. T. 18996. Page D-5?

(D-55) conspirators were not yet ready to proceed. This series of events

has been often referred to as the First Shanghai Incident.

Throughout the period the situation between the Chinese and

Japanese had become worse. Anti-Chinese riots, the League of

Nations found, had occurred in Korea and had led to a boycott of

Japanese goods by the Chinese. With the occupation of Manchuria,

the boycott was intensified. The mounting tension led to incidents

and the Japanese residents of Shanghai asked for troops and war-

ships to put down the movement. The Japanese Consul! General

presented five demands to the Mayor of Shanghai. When on January

21, 1932, the Mayor asserted that it was difficult to comply with

two of the demands, the commander of the naval forces stated that

if the reply was unsatisfactory, he would take such measures as

necessary to protect Japanese rights. On January 24, the Japanese naval reinforcements arrived. On the 27th, the Japanese consul

asked for a reply by six o'clock on the 28th. In the meantime,

the Mayor, who was ready to make all possible concessions to avoid

a clash, closed down the Boycott Association on the night of

January 27-28. In the morning the navy commander announced he

intended to act the next morning if there was no satisfactory a.

reply. On the 28th, the Municipal Council of the International

Settlement declared an emergency from 4.00 p. m. that day, and

the Defense Committee assigned defense sectors to the foreign

forces, including the Japanese. At 4.00 p. m., however, the

Japanese consul announced that a satisfactory reply had been

D-50, a. Ex. 59, T. 3286-8. Page D-4.6

(0=47) received and no action would be taken. At midnight, after stating at 11 p. m. his intention to do so, the navy commander sent troops to the Chapei sector where they came in contact with Chinese troops, which would not have had time to withdraw even if they b. had wanted to do so, and the battle began. In the meantime, according to ARAKI's testimony, the navy asked for army aid. The government approved, an expedition was decided upon, and the army sent first a mixed brigade followed by the UEDA Division. These troops arrived from February 7 to the middle of the month. Later, there were sent further reinforcements of two divisions, which c. landed in a surprise landing behind the enemy lines on March 1.

D-4&. In the meantime, China had once again appealed to the

League on January 29, 1932. From February 16 to 29, the League a. tried various methods of stopping hostilities. Finally, on

March 4, 1932, the League called on both nations to enforce the orders given by military commanders to cease fire, and recommended that the nations negotiate for a definite cessation of hostilities and for the regulation of the withdrawal of Japanese forces. Cn

March 5, 1932, the United States instructed its military forces to cooperate. From March 14 to May 5, 1932, the parties negotiated, with the League Committee of Nineteen being required to intervene twice. An armistice was finally signed on May 5, pursuant to which, from May 6 to 31 the Japanese forces withdrew, one division b. going to Manchuria. D-49.. While on the surface the Shanghai Incident may appear

D-47. b. Ex. 59, T. 3289-91. c, Ex. 3161, T. 28135-38.

D-A8. a. Ex. 59, T. 3291-2. b. Ex. 59, T. 3292-3. Page D-4-2

(D-38) as a digression from the main stream of the story and to have no relation to the events in Manchuria, it is respectfully submitted that it has a definite connection with that portion of the con-

spiracy. While it is true that from one point of view, because the truce gave rise to a Japanese claim which became the focal point for initiating aggression in China proper, this series of

events could be considered as part of the second phase of the

conspiracy, it is also true that the incident gave rise to an

event which was to permit the conspiracy to be worked out in -

Manchuria as planned.

D-50. On May 5, 1932, the Shanghai Truce was signed, putting an end, in part through foreign intervention, to what was principally a navy project. On May 15, 1932, Premier INUKAI a. was assassinated by naval officers. According to the testimony of INUKAI, Ken, the premier's son and confidential secretary,

INUKAI was opposed to the expansion of the Manchurian Incident and was in favor of having the army withdraw, but had been b. unsuccessful in attaining this end. More important, he was opposed to the recognition of the puppet state of Manchukuo, c. regarding it as a violation of China's sovereignty. He had

gone so far as to send a delegate to Chiang • Kai-3hek in an effort

to settle the problem of Manchuria, but his message had been d, intercepted by the army. His son had been warned that if the

Premier continued his antagonistic policy to the army, his life e. would not be safe. However, the army was relieved of this

D-50. a. Ex. 161, T. 1479. b. Ex. 161, T. 1479-80. c. Ex. 161, T. 1480. d. Ex. 161, T. 1480. e. Ex. 161, T. 1481. Page D-4-2

(D-38) delicate task; the navy with its own grievance did it for them.

As a result of the assassination, SAITG became the premier, ARAKI remaining War Minister. The effect of this shift will be fully brought out in subsequent discussion.

D-^l. The military expansion in Manchuria continued according to plan. In July and August, the Japanese began the invasion of a. Jehol with two offensives. As of September 1932, the Investigating

Committee of the League could conclude that the Japanese, having made their reservation at Geneva, continued to deal with the b. situation in Manchuria according to plan. "bis continued through- out the rest of 1932, and in the beginning of 1933, the Battle of

Shanhaikwan was begun and key points along the Great Wall fell to c. the Japanese. On February 22, 1933, Japan sent an ultimatum in f the name of Manchukuo demanding that Chinese forces withdraw from

Jehol in twenty-four hours. Fighting began on February 25, 1933, d. and the province fell on March 2, 1933. On May 31, 1933, the

Tanpku Truce, whereby China agreed to withdraw south and west of a certain line and to give Japan the right to ascertain that this withdrawal, was carried out by the use of planes and other means of observation, was signed. The Japanese agreed not to cross the e. line and to withdraw to the Great Wall line.

D-52. By May 31, 1933, the military conquest of all Manchuria and Jehol had been completed. In connection with this military program, the accused have raised two defenses. First, they contend that in the early phases of the military movements they were acting

D-51. a. Ex. 192-A, T. 2269. b. Ex. 57, T. 2253. C. Ex, 192-A, T. 2269. d. Ex. 192-A, T. 2270. e, Ex. 193, T. 2272-4. Page D-5?

(D-55) in self-defense to protect Japanese lives and property and to

suppress banditry. However, in relation to the Question of the

suppression of banditry, the lytton Commission found that the

suppression of banditry was only a pretext for proceeding with

military action according to plan. Furthermore, it should be noted with respect to this plea of self-defense, that despite

the Japanese claim of the great inferiority of their troops, both

in training and in number, particularly the latter, the Chinese

constantly retreated in accordance with their policy of non-

resistance, and city after city fell without major battle. This

can only mean that the Kwantung Army met no resistance and took advantage of any sporadic act to increase the area of military operation. In addition, this whole defense is based upon an assumption that the Japanese forces were woefully inferior to those of the Chinese, an assumption which the defense itself has proved to be false. According to their own evidence, the Japanese regular army troops in Manchuria had increased from 10,590 on

September 18, 1931, to 22,400 in the latter part of April. In addition, there were 85,000 in the so-called "Manchukuo Army", an army made up of former Chinese regular troops and new recruits, and created with the aid of the Japanese army and advised by regular or retired Japanese officers. Also, there were 119,000 a. local police which were reorganized with Japanese help. Second, with respect to the later operations, the accused maintain that the Kwantung Army at that time was not acting as a Japanese Army

D-54, a. Ex. 2414, T. 19533-4. Page D-4-2

(D-38) but, pursuant to the protocol with Manchukuo, was defending Manchukuo,

an independent nation. This defense could be valid only if it were

found that Manchukuo was an independent nation. .Such a finding is

wholly impossible in light of the evidence which will be considered

next.

C. JAPANESE DOMINATION CF MANCHURIA.

1. POLITICAL.

D-53. Almost simultaneously with the beginning of military

operations and continuing throughout the first half year, there took

place a series of highly significant political events within Manchuria.

In Mukden the Kwantung Army took over, with DOIEARA as mayor, and normal civil administration was reestablished under the control of a number of Japanese. On October 20, 1931, Chinese officials took over a. the government. In Liaoning Province, General Tsang Shih-yi was

asked to form the government on September 20, and on his refusal,

Yuan Chin-kai, together with eight other Chinese, formed a committee b. for maintenance of peace and order on September 24. On October 21, the committee changed its name to "Liaoning Provincial Self-Government

Office", and on November 7 it became the "Liaoning Provincial Govern- ment ad interim" and severed relations with the former Northeastern c, and Central governments. Cn November 20, the name of the province was changed to Fengtien, and on December 15, General Tsang replaced d. Yuan as governor. In Kirin, on September 30, a new provincial e. government was established under General Hsi-Hsia. Cn September

27, General Chang Ching-hui formed an emergency committee for f. the special district at Harbin.

a. Ex. 57, T. 2754, T. 33603. b. Ex. 57, T. 2755. c. Ex. 57, T. 2756-7. d. Ex. 57, T. 2758. e. Ex. 57, T. 2759. f. Ex. 57, T. 2760. Page D-56

(D—53) In Heilungkiang, there was established after November 19 a Self-

Government Association which invited General Chang of the Farbin

Special District to act as Governor, a position which he accepted g. early in January, 1932. General Ma became Governor of Heilungkiang h.

in February.

DCn February 16 and 17, a meeting for the founding of

the new state was held at Mukden, and on the latter day, an admin-

istrative council was established with General Chang as chairman and the governors of the four provinces and the two Mongol princes a. as members. They decided to become a republic under a regent as b. chief executive and to issue a declaration of independence. On

February 18, they issued the declaration, and on the 19th they c. decided to ask Fu-Yi to become the chief executive. On February

29, an All-Manchurian convention was held at Mukden and a resolution

adopted welcoming the new state and designating Fu-Yi as provisional d. president. On March 9, Pu-Yi was inaugurated, and on March 12, e notice was given to foreign powers of the establishment of Manchukuo.

D-55.» This series of events was not a natural phenomenon.

Each and every one of them was an integral part of the conspiracy

to obtain control of Manchuria. The conspirators were placed in a

dilemma. Since ostensibly the military operations were being carried

out to maintain law and order, once law and order were restored,

there would no longer be any reason for keeping Japanese troops in

Manchuria' or for interfering in any manner. This did not suit the

conspirators' purpose. Japan could not openly make Manchuria part

g. Ex. 57, To 2761. h. Ex. 57, T. 2761.

a. Ex. 57, T. 2765-7. b. Ex. 57, T. 2767. c. Ex. 57, T. 2767-8. d. Ex. 57, T. 2774-5. e. Ex. 57, T. 2775-6. Page D-5?

(D-55) of her Empire because she stood committed by treaty not to Infringe on the sovereignty of China. The only alternative was to have the

separation from China appear as a spontaneous independence movement on the part of the Manchurians and, at the same time, to link the new "independent" government inextricably to Japan so that Japan might dominate and control it completely for her own ends and

purposes.

D-56. The independence movement had to be created out of whole cloth. The Lytton Commission, which made a thorough invest-

igation almost contemporaneously with the events and whose findings were endorsed by the entire league of Nations, found that the

independence movement had never been heard of before and that it a. was not a spontaneous movement. Defense witness HIRATA, who

commanded the 29th Infantry in Liaoning Province from April 1931 to August 1932, an excellent position from which to gain first-hand knowledge, volunteered during cross-examination that he was not b. aware or informed of any movement for independence. MORISHIMA stated that even though there might have been one or two exceptions c. there was no spontaneous movement from the people.

p-57. To bring about independence, the conspirators had to obtain control of the leaders and also to obtain ostensible support of the people. The methods used in obtaining control of the leaders were pressure and bribery. The Lytton Commission found that in

Liaoning Province, when General Tsang refused on September 20 to head a new provisional government independent of China, he was

D-56, a. Ex. 57, T. 2779. b. T. 19298-9. c. T. 3118. Page D-4.6

(D-57) a. arrested and kept confined until December 15, at which time he b. became Governor of Fengtien Province. In his new government, c. practically all important officials were Japanese. In Kirln, the new government was established only after General Tamon had

Interviewed General Hsi-Hsia and invited him to assume the chair- d. manship of the government. This government also had Japanese e. officials. In Harbin, when General Chang, the designated

Governor of Heilungkiang, friendly to the Japanese, was placed under restraint by General Tsang, he was released when the Japanese f. took Harbin. Japanese influence in that region increased. In

Heilungkiang, General Ma at first opposed the Japanese but sub- g. seouently, in February, came to terms with them. Defense witness

KATAKURA stated that after Ma was defeated at Hailun, he was interviewed by ITAGAKI and persuaded by the latter's statement of h. Japan's intentions to accept the position of governor. KATAKURA, who strongly maintained the theory of the spontaneity of the independence movement, admitted that ITAGAKI's assurances to Ma and others might be said to have served as a suggestion for the i. independence movement and as an indirect stimulus for it.

Prosecution witness Powell saw a long circular telegram sent by

Ma to Chiang Kai-shek in which Ma stated that in accepting office with the puppet government he had received a million dollars in gold from Japanese military sources after continuous discussions J • with the accused COIHARA. D-58. Obtaining control of the leaders alone was insufficient

D-57. a. Ex. 57, T. 2755. b. Ex. 57, T. 2758. c. Ex. 57, T. 2758. d. Ex. 57, T. 2758. e. Ex. 57, To 2759. f. Ex. 57, T. 2760-1. g. Ex. 57, T. 2761. h. T. 18950. i. T. 19081-2. j. T. 3233. Page D-4-2

(D-38) for the purposes of the conspirators. The movement had to be made to appear as a wholly spontaneous popular movement. This was done through the Self-Government Guiding Board. The Lytton Commission found that this agency was the chief one in 'bringing about indep- a. endence. Although it had a Chinese chief, It was organized and> largely officered by Japanese and functioned as an organ of the b. Kwantung Army with the main purpose of fostering independence. c. MORISHIMA concurred in this finding. On January 7, 1932, this organization issued 50,000 copies of a proclamation for an indep- d. endent Manchuria. The defense witness ISHIHARA, while attempting in the course of his testimony to belittle the role played by

ITAGAKI, admitted that he had stated previously to the prosecution that NAKANO and FASAGI had planned and studied this organization prior to the incident and had organized as early as 1928 various groups comprised mostly of Japanese, which groups were amalgamated after the incident to form the Board; that the Board was organized in September or October 1931 by NAKANO and KASAGI, that it came under the command of the Kwantung Army with ITAGAKI as its political advisor, and that everything it did had to be sanctioned by that e. army. KASAGI himself testified that immediately after the incident NAKANO was ordered by the Kwantung Army to join the Board and to foster, coordinate and direct the activities of groups f. urging independence. In October, KASAGI was called to Dairen and made chief liaison man for the Board at Mukden, He stated that while the Board had as its chief a Chinese, only about 15 of

D-58. a. Ex. 57, T. 2763. b. Ex. 57, T. 2764. c. Ex. 245, T. 3023-4- d. Ex. 57, T. 2764-71; Ex. 221, T. 2794. e. T. 22250-2. f. Ex. 221, T. 2791. Page D-60

(D-58) the 120 members were Chinese. Money for the organization he believed came from the Kwantung Army, since they closely cooperated and had to approve all policies and activities. ITAGAKI was in charge of activities and policies of the Board; ISFIEARA was in charge of strategy and tactics; and DOIHARA was in charge of special services or espionage. Much information on friendly g. Chinese was gained through DCIFARA's office.

D-59. The Board operated through local self-government boards in the various districts, and there were two or three representatives, a. mostly Japanese, from the central organ in each district. Immed- iately after the declaration of independence, the Guiding Board took b. a leading role in organizing popular support. It formed societies c. and organized branches to hasten the movement. From February 20, it issued a great deal of literature, held meetings of prominent persons and mass meetings and parades at which resolutions for a. independence were passed. The Japanese fired artillery guns, e. flew planes, and dropped leaflets. a, D-60. Exhibit 2296-A, introduced in ITAGAKI's behalf, has given us a most interesting example of the forced character of the alleged spontaneity of the independence movement. This is a report of a meeting held in Mukden on January 11, 1932. With the exception of six Chinese, the other 17 participants were all Japanese from the army, navy, consulate, Kwantung Government and b. c. the Railway. The chairman was Japanese, and the meeting was opened with the reading of a message from Ambassador YCSHIZAWA

D-58. g. Ex. 221, T. 2791-4.

a. Ex. 57, T. 2764; Ex. 221, T. 2791-2. b. Ex. 57, T. 2769. c. Ex. 57, T. 2769. d. Ex. 57, T. 2769-70. e. Ex. 57, T. 2773.

D-60. a. T. 30063. b. T. 30063-5. c. T. 30066. Page D-66 j.(D-60) d.

which impliedly invited independence. Every single idea at the

meeting was introduced by a Japanese and acauiesced in by the

Chinese. The idea of a new regime was proposed by a Japanese and e. half-heartedly concurred in by Yu Chung-Fan.

D-61. Mere independence of Manchuria from China was in-

sufficient. The new government had to be sufficiently centralized

so as to make its control and domination relatively easy. Due to

inter war-lord feuds, there was no one strong enough among the

Manchurian leaders to control the situation satisfactorily. However,

there was one person who by history and tradition commanded the

allegiance of all Manchurians. This was Henry Pu-Yi, former

Emperor of China, last of the Manchu line of Emperors. If he could be persuaded or forced to head the new government, he would serve as the focal point for arousing enthusiasm for the independence movement and would furnish through the common loyalty of all to him, a central government easily controlled and which the Japanese need not fear would disintegrate because of internecine feuds.

D-62. The task of bringing Henry Fu-Yi to Manchuria and making him head of the government was undertaken by the Kwantung

Army. In October, DOIFARA was sent by HONJO to Tientsin for the purpose of convincing Pu-Yi to come to Manchuria. DOIFARA, in his

interrogation, admitted that in October, while still Mayor of

Mukden, he was sent by HONJO to contact Pu-Yi. While the order

was issued by HONJC, the details of the meeting and transportation and expenses were arranged by ITAGAKI. His instructions were to

D-66. d. T. 30065. e. T. 30067. Page D-62

(D-62) convey to Pu-Yi the information that if he should return to Man-

churia, the Kwantung Army would welcome him. BOIHARA admitted

that he felt that the Kwantung Army must have had the idea that

they wanted Pu-Yi as head of the new puppet government and also

knew that Pu-Yi would understand what was meant by the welcome,

DOIHARA also stated that he was told by ITAGAKI not to use force

in getting Pu-Yi to return, a device which DOIFARA might well use

since it was his motto to see that whatever order he received, its a. purpose was accomplished. The statement that DOIFARA was sent b. to see Pu-Yi was confirmed by defense witness KATAKURA and the c. accused MINAMI. Pu-Yi testified that about this time he was

annoyed by a series of threats and terroristic acts, such as being d. sent a basket of fruit which contained a bomb. later, he learned

that this was the work of the Japanese militarists. DOIFARA was

then active in North China and Pu-Yi was reliably informed that

whatever happened, DOIHARA was the man pulling the strings from e o behind. Commander KASHII of the garrison forces in Tientsin

was then sent to persuade Pu-Yi to go to Port Arthur. Under f. KASHII's compulsion he went. He was taken to the Tientsin wharf by a Japanese and went to Yinkow, Takukow and Port Arthur accom- g. panied by three or four Japanese. Attempts have been made to

attack the credibility of Pu-Yi as a witness because of certain

alleged untruths about his willingness to become the head of a puppet government. While a man may become a puppet, no man will

admit he became one willingly. Furthermore, the issue of Pu-Yi's

D-62. a. Ex. 2190-A, T. 15726-9. b. T. 18970-1. c. T. 19906, 19912-3. d. T. 3954. e. T. 4124. f. T. 3955-6. g. T. 4130-1. Page D-64

(D-62) willingness or unwillingness to become a puppet is wholly immaterial.

The real issue is: was he or was he not a puppet, willing or unwilling. Moreover, his testimony is amply corroborated by the

Japanese themselves. The Foreign Office was kept fully advised of

DOIFARA's activities and Pu-Yi's movements.• On November 2, 1931,

MURAI, the consul at Shanghai, notified SFIDEHARA of an item in a newspaper publishing a telegram from Tientsin that DOIFARA was there secretly and was planning to take Fu-Yi to Mukden and that h. the latter had refused and was being threatened. The following day, KUWASHIMA in Tientsin reported that DOIFARA had stated that the present Manchurian government would conspire with China and there would be no prospect of the natural development of events expected by Japan; that to pretend Japan had nothing to do with

Pu-Yi's abduction, Fu-Yi would have to land at Yinkowj if Pu-Yi went, it would be possible to make it appear as a Chinese movement.

DOIFARA was advised by KUWASHIMA to give up the plan, but he refused and said he would sound out Pu-Yi and point out that there i. would be no future opportunity. On the same day, DOIFARA told the Consulate staff that if the enthronement of Pu-Yi was needed to save the situation, it would be outrageous for the Japanese government to try and prevent it. He threatened that the Kwantung

Army might separate from the government or that an incident might take place in Japan. He pointed out his close connections with

HONJC and that the latter had to take his influential background into consideration. On the same day, KUWASHIMA again reported

D-62. h. Ex. 288, T. 4363. i. Ex. 289, T. 4364-6. j. Ex. 290, T. 4367-9. Page D-64

(D-62) that on November 2, DOIHARA had seen Pu-Yi, insisted that Pu-Yi arrive in Manchuria by November 16, and promised that Japan would recognize him as head of an independent state and would conclude a k. defensive and offensive alliance. On November 4, KUWASHIMA reported that when Pu-Yi refused to go, he was threatened by 1. DOIHARA. Cn November 11, Pu-Yi left Tientsin and went to Yinkow.

Consul ARAKAWA at Yinkow reported that he had learned from the captain of the boat that DOIHARA was head of the escape plan and m. Pu-Yi was brought under armed guard. On November 13, KUWASHIMA, n. confirming his earlier report of the 12th, reported that he had learned from an army representative that despite denials the army knew all about Pu-Yi's movements and that they would protect the consulate by giving out the story that Fu~Yi fled and after several o. days appeared in Manchuria. Cn the same day, KUWASHIMA asked p. SHIDEHARA to issue a statement along the lines of the army story.

On the 13th, Consul HAYASHI in Mukden reported that, according to

HONJO, the army would have Pu-Yi taken to Tank-Kangtzu by the q. Kwantung Government and kept in light confinement, and on the same r. day another consul reported his arrival. later KUWASHIMA reviewed the whole story and reported to SHIDEHARA that DOIHARA had come to entice Pu-Yi and, despite all warnings that it was against national policy and deeming it unavoidable from the stand- point of the Kwantung Army, DOIHARA had entered into all kinds of plots, including the starting of a riot on November 8. On the s, failure of the riot, he carried out Pu-Yi's passage to Manchuria.

D-62. k. Ex. 291, T. 4373-4. p. Ex. 296, T. 4384-5. 1. Ex. 292, T. 4375-6. q. Ex. 297, T. 4387-8. m. Ex. 294, T. 4379-80. r. Ex. 298, T. 4390. n. Ex. 293, T. 4377. s. Ex. 300, T. 4394-7. o. Ex. 295, T. 4381-3. Page D-4.6

D-63. Fu-Yi having been brought to Manchuria, the pretense

that his coming had no political connection was continued. By-

telegram from the War Minister, the Kwantung Army was instructed

to take into consideration possible international repurcussions

and that for the time being the general public should be led to a, believe that Fu-Yi would have nothing to do with politics. On b. November 20, Fu-Yi was moved to Fort Arthur, and thereafter he

was joined by his wife, whose escape from Tientsin was likewise c, engineered by the army.

P-64. Fu-Yi was kept out of politics until January 29, a 1932. On that day on order of HCNJO he was interviewed by ITAGAKI.

According to Fu-Yi, ITAGAKI stated he hoped the former would become

head of the new political regime and told him that Japan had no b territorial designs on Manchuria and would respect its sovereignty. Fu-Yi refused because of the demand that Japanese be employed as e. Manchurian officials. Even ITAGAKI goes as far as to state that he was not sure whether after this interview, Fu-Yi would accept d. if he was net alio made Emperor. On February 21, ITAGAKI met e. with certain advisors ef Fu-Yi. According t© Fu-Yi, he was teld by his advisers that ITAGAKI had teld them that if he, Fu-Yi, did net accede, the Kwantung Army would take drastic action and his f. life would be in danger• ITAGAKI gave a different version of the

story. Me denied using any ooereien and stated that the advisors were sent hy Fu-Yi, and that following this meeting, on February

22, he, ITAGAKI, met with Fu-Yi and explained the situation, after

a. Ex. 299, T. 4392-3. b, Ex. 302, T, 4400. 0. Ex. 303, T. 4401) Ex. 304, T. 4402.

ML. a. Ex. 3316, T. 30280. b. T. 3959-60. e. T. 3962. d. Ex. 3316, T. 30281. 0. Ex, 3316, T, 30283. f. T. 3964-7. Page D-66

(D-64) g. which Pu-Yi approved. It is of absolutely no importance in this proceeding which of the two versions is accepted. In any event, it

is clear that Pu-Yi, who was then in Japanese hands, was at least persuaded, if not forced, to accept the regency of Manchuria by

ITAGAKI.

D-65. It is respectfully submitted that all of the additional

evidence heard by this Tribunal fully supports the finding of the

League of Nations, a finding which in itself is entitled to the greatest evidentiary weight. The League found that a group of

Japanese, civil and military, conceived, organized and carried through the Manchurian independence movement as a solution to the situation in Manchuria; that this movement received assistance and direction from the Japanese General Staff and could have been a. carried through only because of the presence of Japanese troops.

D-66. While the Kwantung Army was proceeding to set up the

Manchurian Government, Tokyo was taking steps to carry out the plan. At first, the authorities in Tokyo were opposed to the establishment of an independent Manchuria. On September 21, the a. Cabinet decided that no military administration would be set up. FCNJO had already appointed DOIHARA Mayor of Mukden and he did not b. immediately comply with this order. When he did comply after a month or two, he did so, it is submitted, principally because; as pointed out above, a military administration would have been ruinous to the entire project. On September 26, the Cabinet decided to prohibit Japanese participation in establishing the new

Ex. 3316, T. 30283-4. D-65. a. Ex. 57, T. 2882-3.

D-66. a. T. 19878. b. Ex. 2194, T. 15737-8; T. 19879. Page D-78

(D-66) government, and orders were sent to the consulates and the Kwantung c. Army. At first, HONJC complied with this order, hut his attitude d. gradually changed. This is evident from his actions in sending

DOIFARA to Tientsin. HCNJC now decided to have more active support from the central authorities. He reported his views both in e. November and January. Cn January A, 1932, ITAGAKI was sent to f.

Tokyo. According to KIDC's diary, in an audience before the

Emperor ITAGAKI hinted that Manchuria would be placed under a new

ruler, that the Japanese Army would take care of its national g defense, and that Japanese would become high government officials.

p-67. Following ITAGAKI's visit, there was a marked change in the Japanese government policy, and the Cabinet took for itself the power to regulate the business of Manchuria. While it was not, because of international reasons, yet ready to accord formal recognition to the new state, elaborate preparations were made.

According to ARAKI, in February or March 1932, following a report from HCNJC that it was advisable to set up Pu-Yi as head of the

Manchukuo government, the Cabinet established an administrative a. committee to create the independent state of Manchukuo. The policy adopted was that Japan should render all aid in a proper way, and instead of recognizing Manchukuo for the time being, it should have Manchukuo fulfill the conditions for an independent state gradually, and should try to have Manchukuo recognized b.

internationally. It provided that Japan, with respect to real power on foreign and home affairs, should permit the new state to

D-66. c. Ex. 2435, T. 19783. d. T. 19013. e. T. 19080 f. Ex. 3316, T. 30278. g. Ex. 2191, T. 15731-2.

D-80. a. Ex. 187-1, T. 2784. b. Ex. 222, T. 2817-8. Page D-75

(D-67). appoint a small number of Japanese officials and thereafter gradually increase them. When Japan decided its policies, the officials in

Manchuria would be notified and required to use their best efforts c. to lead the new state. Alternative plans for seizing the customs d- were advanced. They were to avoid appointing too many Japanese officials lest it stimulate a claim that the new state was a

Japanese protectorate, and for the time being Japan's control e. would be carried out through military power. On April 11, 1932, the Cabinet decided that Manchukuo should employ authoritative persons from Tokyo as the highest advisors on economic and political problems, and should appoint competent Japanese nationals to leading posts in the Privy Council, the central bank, and other organs. It also decided that real power of management of trans- portation should be held by Japan for purposes of national defense f. and the economic reouirements of Japan and the new state. Cn May 3, 1932, the Cabinet decided that Manchuria might buy a g. railroad and fixed the terms and manner of payment.

D-68. In May, the INUKAI Cabinet was succeeded by the SAITC

Cabinet. This cab3.net was definitely committed to the recognition of Manchukuo. However, at first it was not yet ready to openly recognize it. When on June 4, 1932, the Chief of Staff of the

Kwantung Army pointed out the necessity of seizing the customs houses to obtain revenue for the new government and that the whole problem would be easily solved if Japan formally recognized a. Manchukuo, ARAKI replied on June 10, 1932, that he understood

D-67. c. Ex. 222, T. 2819. d. Ex. 22?, T. 2819-20 e. Ex. 222, T. 2822. f. Ex. 223, T. 2825-7. g. Ex. 224, T. 2827-8.

D-76. a. Ex. 227, T. 2833-43. Page D-69

(D-68) the Chief of Staff's concern but that the time for official recog-

nition had a very delicate bearing on circles at home and abroad, b. and it would be effected whenever opportunity offered itself.

By August, however, the Cabinet was completely ready to recognize c. Manchukuo and agreed to do so; and on September 15, 1932, formal d. recognition was given and the Japan-Manchukuo Protocol signed.

The protocol contained two clauses, in the first of which Manchukuo

guaranteed all Japan's former rights, and in the second of which both agreed that every menace to one was a menace to the other and pledged to jointly defend themselves. For this purpose Japan was e. to have the right to station troops in Manchukuo. In addition, there were four strictly confidential agreements which Manchukuo f. confirmed and declared to be binding. By the first exchange of

communications Manchukuo entrusted her national defense and maintenance of peace and order to Japan and agreed to bear the

cost, Manchukuo also agreed to give, maintain and construct transportation facilities for the purposes of Japan's national defense, Manchukuo was to give all assistance to Japan in con- nection with the establishments needed by the Army, Japan was to have the right to appoint councillors to Manchukuo, and Japanese were to be appointed as officials in both the central and local governments. Such officials were t© be selected on the recommend- ation of the Commander of the Kwantung Array and their discipline ge was to be subject t© bis consent. The other three agreements were the transportation and airway agreements of August 7, 1932,

D-68. b, Fx. 228, T, 2846, e, Ex, 229, T. 2899-902, d. Ex. 3161, T. 28150-1; Ex. 440, T. 5034-5. a. Ex, 241, T, 2975-6; Ex. 440, T. 5034-5. f, Etc, 241, T. 2977. g, Ex, 241, T, 2978-9. Fage D-70

(D-68) h.

and the mining agreement of September 9, 1932. In connection

with the Protocol and the last three agreements, which were all

written in both languages, all disputes were to be determined by i. the Japanese text.

D-69. When the Protocol and secret agreements were being

considered by the Privy Council, the councillors were assured that a. their approval would not violate the Nine Fower Pact. They were

also assured that the Treaty improved Japan's position with the

Ieague and would prove effective in maintaining and expanding

Japan's special rights in Manchukuo and in elevating Japan from a b. troublesome international predicament. When these predictions failed to come true and the league branded Japan as a violator, c. Japan in March 1933 withdrew from the league.

P.-70. As soon as the Protocol had been signed, the accused

KCISC, then Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, was given on

November 3, 1932, an outline for the guiding of Manchukuo. It provided that nominally Manchukuo was to be a constitutional Empire but actually an autocracy. Japanese officials under the inner

leadership of the Kwantung Army were to lead, leaving the Manchukuoans a. to assume charge outwardly while Japanese controlled the substance.

A civil organ over which the Commander of the Kwantung Army would be the Chief was to be set up to accomplish Japan's national policy. The commander was to have control of all Japanese officials.

Diplomatically, while Manchukuo was to adopt a non-interference attitude toward China in principle, she would adopt an ant.i-Chinese

D-68. "h. Ex. 241, T. 2980-1. i. Ex. 241, T. 2981.

D-69. " a. Ex. 241, T. 2986. b. Ex. 241, T. 2993. c. Ex. 65, T. 2895-6.

D-70. a. Ex. 230, T. 2903-4. Page D-4-2

(D-38) principle and would have the same attitude as Japan towards the

Soviet and the United States. Temporarily, she was to advocate the Cpen Door and welcome foreign investment. Japan did not encourage political ideas among the people. Japanese participation in government was not to he limited in number, and Japanese must lead politics through control of the State Councillors. Japanese b. participation in industry was to be welcomed. In August 1933, a similar guiding policy was adopted. It emphasized that Japanese officials must be the nucleus of Manchukuo1s affairs. All concrete plans were to receive Japanese approval, and the most important c. plans were to be decided by the Japanese Cabinet. On December 22,

1-933, the Japanese Cabinet decided that, Manchukuo was to become a monarchy and so directed, and stated that this decision did not mean an}' change in policy or spirit in directing Manchukuo or any "d. hindrance to the execution of national policies.

D-71. To carry out these programs control was centralized both in Manchuria and Tokyo. In Manchuria, the Commander of the

Kwantung Army became the Governor of the leased Territory and

Ambassador to Manchukuo. In 1934, the offices of Commander and a. Ambassador were combined and the office of Governor abolished.

Since the holder of these offices came under different jurisdictions in Tokyo on different aspects of his work, the Manchurian Affairs

Board was set up under the presidency of the War Minister who was b. thus able to coordinate civil and military administration. D-72^. Pursuant to these policies, Japan exercised complete

D-70. b. Ex. 230, T. 2905-11. c. 'Ex. 233, T. 2927-32. d. Ex. 234, T. 2933-6.

D-71 . a. Ex. 452-A, T. 5115-6. " b. Ex. 451, T. 5113-4; Ex. 452, T. 5115-6. Page D-69

(D-72) political domination over Manchukuo. Even before the policies were

fully worked out, the Lytton Commission found that although the

Premier and other Ministers were Chinese, the Japanese exercised

the greatest actual power and controlled the Board of General

Affairs and the legislative and advisory bureaus which in practice a. constituted the Premier's office. It found that main political

and administrative power rested in the hands of Japanese officials

and advisors, who were becoming more and more constrained to follow b. the direction of Japanese official authority. The control

exercised after recognition, if anything, was even greater. The

witness TANAKA, who served in Manchuria under MINAMI when the

latter was Commander of the Kwantung Army, Governor of the Leased

Territory arid Ambassador to Manchukuo, testified that Manchukuo

was not independent. He stated that it could not be independent, because under the Joint Defense Pact of 1932 the Kwantung Army

could control internal affairs, and because it exercised through

the General Affairs Department the political and economic control c. that Japan desired. Important positions were entirely filled by Japanese and personnel shifts could not be made without Army d. approval. The General Affairs Board controlled the departments e. and the Board in turn was controlled by the Kwantung Army. The

Military Affairs Department had Japanese officer advisors and was f. closely linked to the Kwantung Army. In his interrogation,

MINAMI admitted that he advised Manchuria on all types of subjects

and his advice was accepted. He said one might say that his

D-72. a. Ex. 57, T. 2850. b. Ex. 57, T. 2853. c. T. 1998. d. T. 1999. e. T. 1999. f. T. 1999-200C. Page D-4.6

(D-72) g.

advice was in substance a direction. If it is true, as the

defense contends, that the Kwantung Army never ordered anything,

it is submitted that there was no need for it to order, since the

Army's power was so great it needed only to express its desire to

have it carried out.

D-73. Th e witness Pu-Yi testified at length as to the puppet

nature of his administration and how completely dominated it was

by the Japanese. He was told nothing about the treaty with Japan,

signed while he was Regent, until the day before signature, and a. he ratified it under threat of military force. He was not b. allowed to speak freely to the Lytton Commission. He could c.

appoint neither civil nor military officials. In 1933, prior

to becoming Emperor on March 1, 1934, he was told by Generals

MUTO and HISEIKARI that Japan planned to have IWanchukuo converted d. into an Empire along Japanese lines. The witness was not e. permitted to interfere in army or financial affairs. Practically f.

all vice-ministers were Japanese and they actually governed. All ordinances and laws were the work of the Director of the General

Affairs Board, the Vice-Ministers and the Chief of the Fourth

Section of the Kwantung Army, who all met as a una't, and the g. enactments had to be approved by the Kwantung Army. Chinese ministerial approval was only nominal, since all ordinances had to be first passed by the vice-ministers, who could enact minor h. laws without further approval. Fu-Yi's private life was closelv i. guarded. Control was carried so far that Shintoism was introduced

D-72. g. Ex. 2207, T. 15788-89.

D-73. a. T. 3978. b. T. 3982-6. c. T. 3986-7. d. T. 3988. e. T. 3990. f. T. 3992-3. g. T. 3993. h. T. 3994. i. T. 3996-4000. Page D-69

(D-73) and made compulsory in Manchukuo. Under orders of UMEZU as

Commander of the Kwantung Army, Pu-Yi in 1940 was taken to Japan and given two of the thrqe sacred treasures. Cn his return, the organic laws were revised to make Shintoism compulsory for everyone bl- under penalty of confinement.

D-74. The control exercised by Japan went far beyond the government itself and extended to control and domination of the people and their thought. The agency for this part of the task was the Concordia Society which was the spiritual successor to the Guiding Board. KASAGI testified that upon the installation of the new government, the Guiding Board was abolished and he helped to establish the Shiseikyoku, a branch of the new government dealing with cultural, spiritual and educational development. This was abolished in about three or four months, and its work was a. carried on by the government through the Concordia Society. b. This Society was formed on July 25, 1932, by a committee of which c.

ITAGAKI was a member. Its purpose was described by defense witness MATSUKI as being to stimulate and promote free expression of the people's will and to transmit government policy and intention d. to the people. In light of the attitude expressed as to the people's role in government in guiding policies and in view of the fact that the Commander of the Kwantung Army was its Supreme e.

Advisor, the Society was in fact an organ of control, similar to the subsequent I.R.A.A. in Japan, the peculiar Japanese variant of a nasi or fascist party. Its real purpose was' disclosed by the

D-73. j. T. 4005-17.

D-74.-. a. Ex. 221, T. 2795. b. Ex. 2439, T. 20179. c. Ex. 731-A, T. 7606. d. Ex. 2439, T. 20179.. e. Ex. 731-A, T. 7606. Page D-75

(D-74). Society in 1942 as nothing less than carrying out the ultimate purpose of Manchukuo to subserve Japan in her struggle against f. the Anglo-Saxon World and the Comintern. The organization worked through a series of congresses in the prefectures and provinces g- until it reached the National Combined Congress. It was so powerful that, as defense witness MATSUKI related, the ouestion arose as to how to harmonize legally the Society with the legislative h. Yuan required by the organic law of Manchukuo. The answer was simple: the legislative Yuan never came into existence.

D-75. In addition to the control of public opinion by the f Concordia Society, there was rigid control of the press. In 1935, the Kwantung Army proposed a plan whereby all the press organs would be organized into one organization for the purpose, inter alia, of facilitating unitary control and execution of propaganda a. necessary to accomplish national purposes. The association was b. to decide on propaganda policy and control propaganda operations. Expenses of the organization were to be borne by the Kwantung c. Army, Manchukuo and the Railway. D-76. Py 1936, Japan had acouired such complete control over Manchuria that it felt it could completely abolish extra- a. territoriality. On June 10, 1936, such a treaty was signed.

However, it was accompanied by a supplementary agreement which had b. many reservations in favor of the Japanese, which, coupled with the control already exercised by Japan, gave the Japanese even greater control and a much more privileged position than they held before.

D-74. f. Ex. 731-A, T. 7607. g. Ex. 2439, T. 20180. h. Ex. 2439, T. 20180.

D-75. a. Ex. 240, T. 2968. b. Ex. 240, T. 2969. c. Ex. 240, T. 2970.

D-76. a. Ex. 237, T. 2944-6. b. Ex. 238, T. 2949-58. Page D-4.6

2. ECONOMIC DCNIMATION

D-77.. Along with Japan's accmisition and exercise of

political power, she also acouired and exercised economic domina-

tion and control over Manchuria. The dominant idea was to form a

single economic unit of Japan and Manchukuo under Japan's control.

As early as April 11, 1932, immediately after the institution of

the new government, the Japanese Cabinet decided.that in order to

solidify the foundation of the state by establishing a financial

and economic policy to enhance international confidence and to

realize a single economic unit of Japan and Manchukuo, the new

state should employ Japanese as authoritative advisers on economic a. problems and should appoint Japanese officials to economic posts.

The same decision reserved real power of management over railroads b. and other means of transportation for Japan. Acknowledging that

Japan in November 1931 had decided to have the Japanese Transporta-

tion Company open regular air routes on the pretext of military

need to establish a foundation for acquiring aviation rights in

Manchuria and Mongolia, the SAITO Cabinet, in August 1932, decided

that it was important that this service become a permanent business

organization to be managed so as to contribute to the execution of

Japan's aviation policy, to the development of industry and to the c. acquisition of aviation rights in China proper. The business

was to be under the leadership and supervision of Japan through a

joint Japan-Manchukuo company in which Japanese would hold substantial d. leadership and supervision. Subsidies were to be given by the e. Manchukuo government and the Railway. In connection with the

D-77, a. Ex. 223, T. 2826. b. Ex. 223, T. 2826-7. c. Ex. 225, T. 2831-2. d. Ex. 225, T. 2832. e. Ex. 225, T. 2833. Page D-69

(D-77) signing of the Protocol, three of the supplementary agreements f

dealt with Japanese rights in transportation, aviation and mining.

D-78. The fact that these early steps were not isolated

phenomena of grabbing but were part of a complete plan to dominate

Manchuria entirely becomes established even more strongly when

Japan's actions subsequent to the recognition of Manchukuo are

considered. In the first guiding plan given by the Cabinet to

the Kwantung Army on November 3, 1932, it was stated that, econom-

ically, co-prosperity and co-existence should be the basic principl and that the system was to be an economic bloc between Japan and a. Manchuria. The idea of a "fit industry for suitable locality" was to be adopted so that each member of the bloc might coordinate

its industries with the other and abolish customs barriers with the aim of acquiring self-sufficiency and making an advance toward b. worldwide industry. Following the adoption of this policy, the

Cabinet decided a policy for Manchurian wire, wireless, telegraph, c. telephone and broadcasting enterprises. This company was to be a joint enterprise under the joint control of the government and military of both nations, but the Manchurian military could not inspect or make demands without previous approval of the Japanese military, and in case of dispute between the supervising authoritie; d. the view of the Japanese authorities was to prevail. In the guiding policy of August 8, 1933, it was provided that Manchuria's

economic aim lay in unification of Japanese and Manchurian economie so as to securely establish Japan's expansion of economic powers to

D-77. f. Ex. 241, T. 2980-1.

D-78. a. Ex. 230, T. 2907. b. Ex. 230, T. 2908. c. Ex. 231, T. 2919. d. Ex. 231, T. 2920-4. Page D-78

(D-78) the whole world and at the same time to strengthen Manchuria e.

economically. Japan's real aggressive designs cannot be

expressed any better than as stated in this instrument. Japan

was to come first, then Manchuria, and it is not at all clear that

even the economic strengthening of Manchukuo, the secondary con-

sideration, was to be for the benefit of the Manchukuoans. This

document also stated that certain industries were restricted by demands of Japan's national defense but others were to be open f. to all. It will be recalled that in this policy decision all

important matters were reserved to the Japanese Cabinet.

D-79. On March 20, 1934, the Cabinet decided on a Japanese-

Manchukuo Economic administration policy. The fundamental concept was the securing of a base for Japan's worldwide economic expansion a. and the strengthening of Manchukuo's economic powers. Basic

industries were to be restricted by the demands of Japan's national defense and such enterprises would be operated by special companies, which were to hold the dominant position and were to be directly b. or indirectly under the protection and supervision of Japan. The

industries to be encouraged were, inter alia, light metal, petroleum c. liquid fuel, automobile and mining industries.

D-80. On July 17, 1935, Japan and Manchukuo established a * Joint Economic Committee which was to advise the two governments on

important matters of economics and on the control and inspection of a. the business of joint companies. The committee was to have eight b. members, four from each country. The committee was limited in

D-78. e. Ex. 233, T. 2930. f. Ex. 233, T. 2930.

D-79. a. Ex. 236, T. 2939-40. b. Ex. 236, T. 2940. c. Ex. 236, T. 2941-2.

D-80. a. Ex. 851, T. 8434-5. b. Ex. 850, T. 8422. Page D-79

(D-80) its powers since matters important to the economies of both governments, but within Japan's power, were without the province of the committee, and such matters were to be made into a unilateral c. contract binding only upon Manchukuo. It was pointed out in the

Privy Council, as a secret matter, that the agreement in fact only d. bound Japan. However, even the limited powers reserved to the

Committee disturbed one of the councillors because of the equal division of members. His fears were quieted by the accused

FIROTA's pointing out that one of the Manchukuoan members, the

Chief of the General Affairs Board, was a Japanese whose primary duty was to see that there would be no conflict, and in case the

Manchukuoan members should scheme against Japan, the Chief would take proper measures after considering the interests of both e. countries. In November 1935, the yen bloc was established and

Manchukuo1s currency was taken off silver and stabilized at par f. with the Japanese yen.

D-81. The purpose of all this control of Manchukuo's economy became clear in 1937 when the plans disclosed that its economy was being integrated with that of Japan for war purposes.

In the Five Year Plan of Important War Industries of the War

Ministry of May 29, 1937, it was planned that the requisite industries should be pushed to the continent according to the principle of right work in the right place with Japan and Manchuria a. being treated as a single sphere. In the Outline of the Five

Year Plan for the Production of War Materials of June 23, 1937, the

c. Fx. 850, T. 8424. d. Ex. 850, T. 8425. e. Ex. 850, T. 8429-30. f. T. 8436.

D-81. a. Ex. 842, Pt. 1, T. 8437.

I Page D-69

(D-80) two primary aims of which were to perfect war preparations and to b. realize the Major Industries Plan, it was provided that in the o Five Year Industrial Plan for Manchukuo guidance would be given c. to the war industries. Efforts were to be made to overcome the factors impeding the speedy construction of war industries in d. Manchukuo.

D-82. In January 1937, Manchukuo promulgated a Five Year a. Industrial Flan, a plan In the drafting of which the accused b. HOSHINC admitted playing a large part. This plan, which provided for the creation and expansion of every type of industry, stated that emphasis was to be placed on opening up Manchukuo1s national resources necessary in time of emergency and that it was the desire to develop various types of industry to make Manchukuo c. self-supporting and to meet Japan's shortages. Under the plan, the production of agricultural products required as military d. stores was to be increased. In May 1937, Manchukuo enacted a law controlling important industries in which it required those who desired to engage in any important industry, including all those vital to war, to obtain government consent, and those already in such businesses were required to get government permission before e. making any change. By May 1937, all important industries were effectively in the hands of Japan or its dominated puppet govern- ment under a plan having war as its principal aim.

D-83• however, even the tremendous accumulation of power was not sufficient for Japan, and on October 22, 1937, the first

D-81. b. Ex. 8£L, T. 8261. c. Ex. 841, T. 8439-40. d. Ex. 841, T. 8441.

D-82. a. Ex. 446, T. 5071. b. Ex. 453,. T. 5126. c. Ex. 446, T. 5071. d. Ex. 446, T. 5072. e. Ex. 444-A, T. 5048-51. Page D-81

•(D-89) KCNCE Cabinet decided to set up one heavy industry company to

establish and develop heavy industry in Manchukuo. Cne half of

the capital was to come from Manchukuo and the other half from

Japanese private interests, designated as the Nissan interests in

the decision. The decision also provided for Japanese management a. and designated AIKAWA, Gisuke, as manager. Pursuant to this

decision, Japan and Manchukuo entered into an economic agreement

for the establishment of the Manchurian Heavy Industry Development b. Corporation. While ostensibly a Manchukuo Company, in view of

the economic agreement with Japan, it was really a "national policy" c. company of Japan. The company was to he under joint management

and its shares could be held only by the two governments or their

nationals. The President and Directors were to be appointed by d. the two governments.

D-84. It must be admitted that Japan's economic domination

of Manchuria resulted in making Manchuria's resources available and

in building up her industry on a large scale, but, at the same

time, it is submitted that every increment of improvement redounded

to the benefit of Japan. There was no benefit of any nature to

the thirty million people of Manchukuo. Defense witness KATAKURA

stated on direct examination that under the five year industrial

plan as expanded the benefits did not accrue to Manchukuo, since

the plan was directed toward assisting the prosecution of the 9. o China Incident rather than for Manchukuo's development. HCSHINO

admitted that in connection with Japan's wars he was satisfied that

D-83. a. Ex. 239, T. 2963-6. b. Ex. 840, T. 8472. c. Ex. 840, T. 8472. d. Ex. 438, T. 5018-20.

D-84. a. T. 19041. Page D-4.6

(D-84) b. Japan had taken everything out of Manchuria which could be obtained.

D-85. What Japan's domination of Manchuria's economy and resources really meant to the people of Manchuria was well depicted for this Tribunal b:7 the witness Pu-Yi. All industry--fishery, farming, commerce, electricity--came into Japanese hands and no

Chinese-were allowed to enter such industries and were forced into a. bankruptcy. The Japanese established sixty-four special companies b. with capital running into the billions.

D-SCj According to Exhibit 471, the total of Japanese government investment in Manchurian enterprise was ¥1,346,000,000, a. while private Japanese concerns had investments of ¥16,800,000,000.

The banks were in the hands of the Japanese and the Chinese were b. not allowed to borrow. A savings law was passed requiring all people to save money and the required amount of saving was annually increased until it reached $ 150.00 per person, or a total of some c. d. $ 6,000,000,000. The Japanese alone could borrow from the banks.

To do business, the Chinese had to obtain special permits from e. Japanese. There were many monopolies including opium, iron, steel, cotton and rice, all under the control of the Poard of

Monopolies set up by the Commander of the Kwantung Army and the

Chief of the General Affairs Bureau, and thus controlled by the f. Japanese. A Cotton Control act was passed and, as a result, the

Chinese could not get cotton during the winter and many froze to g- death. The private sale of rice among Chinese was prohibited, and the Chinese were given only the coarsest grades of rice to eat

D-84. b. Ex. 454-A, T. 5178.

D-85. a. T. 4021. b. T. 4022.

D-S6. a. Ex. 471, T. 5347. f. T. 4028-31. b. T. 4022. g. T. 4028. c. T. 4032-3. d. T. 4022. e. T. 4023. Fage D-70

(D-86) h. and those found with white rice were punished. Six million

Japanese immigrants came to Manchuria and land was requisitioned i. for them at a nominal price,- sometimes- no price. Chinese farmers were moved to far off undeveloped lands to make room for Japanese jo immigrants. A labor and civil service law was put Into effect when the accused UMEZU commanded the Kwantung Army, which required all persons between 18 and 45 to render labor service to the

Japanese army. These same persons were used for opening highways k. and digging mines under the control of the Japanese. Under this law, the Chinese were treated badly and were given no medicine and 1. m. poor quarters. Escaped Chinese were punished severely. In all n. matters, the Japanese came first, Koreans second, and Chinese last.

Even the salaries drawn by vice-ministers exceeded those drawn by o. Chinese ministers.

3• CFIUM AND NARCOTICS.

D-87. In the economic exploitation of Manchuria, the Japanese i did not limit their activities solely to the ordinary agricultural, commercial, and industrial enterprises, but extended their activities into fields abhorred by all civilized mankind.—enterprises which involved the wholesale debauchery of the people—the traffic in opium and narcotics. Bound by the International Convention on

Cpium and Narcotics to take effective measures to suppress the manufacture, internal traffic, and use of opium, to restrain and control opium in the leased territories, and to assist China to a. suppress the narcotics habit by preventing smuggling, the Japanese

D-86. h. T. 4029-30. i. T. 4033. j. T. 4033-5. k. T. 4037-8. 1. T. 4039. m. T. 4039. n. T. 4039. o. T. 4039.

D-70. a. Ex. 17, T. 4665-67; T. 20246. Page D-84

•(D-89) erected a fraudulent structure, apparently, in compliance with the

treaty but behind and through which they carried out their program.

Pursuant to the agreement of 1925 among Britain, France, Japan, The

Netherlands, Portugal, and Siam wherein the parties agreed that,

except as to retail sales, the importation, sale and distribution of opium should be a government monopoly not to be delegated or b. leased to any person, Manchukuo in November 1932, promulgated the c. Opium Law. The Opium Law followed the principle of gradual suppression by licensing known addicts to smoke in licensed shops, d. the approved practice. To carry out the program, Manchukuo

established the Opium Monopoly Administration under the supervision e. of the Minister of Finance.

D-88.. From the beginning, it became apparent that the law was being administered for the purpose of increasing the use of opium and narcotics rather than for its suppression. In the period between the Japanese invasion and the promulgation of the law, the narcotic situation had become alarmingly worse in Manchuria. Some of this Increase might have been expected in the earlier days due to the confusion of the military situation, but at the same time, after the promulgation and enforcement of the law, it might have • been expected that the traffic would have decreased. However, the facts are clear that from the time of the Manchurian Incident onward the use of narcotics in Manchuria increased. In Antung from Cctober

1931 to March 1933, the number of opium shops increased from about a 520, of which 500 were Japanese, to 829, of which 684 were Japanese.

D-87. b. Ex. 2446, T. 20246. c. Ex. 2450, T. 20269-71. d. Ex. 2447-A, T. 20252-3. e. Ex. 2462, T. 20309-10.

D-SS. a. Ex. 374, T. 4675-6. Page D-85

•(D-89) Opium dens were opened on all the leading streets and employed b. young girls as waitresses. 20,000 of the city's population of c. 130,000 had become addicts. In the rural districts, where

Chinese volunteers had kept illicit traffic under control, the d. volunteers were scattered and public"smoking introduced. In four districts around Antung with a population of 900,000, 80,000 were addicts and consumed annually $ 25,000,000 of opium.

Prior to the incident, morphine was used on a small scale, but after the incident Japanese and Korean hoodlums-openly imported it

Into Antung with the result that there were in the spring of 1933, f. 15,000 addicts. In the same four districts mentioned before, g. there were 60,000 addicts at a cost of $4,300,000. Heroin, which had been practically unknown, began to be increasingly h. handled by opium dens, morphine joints and opium retail shops. 130,000 people in the four districts were found to have become i. narcotic addicts. Py December 1934, the number of opium dens j* in Antung had further increased to 1206, of which 860 were Japanese.

In the same four districts, while the population had increased to

1,000,000 from 900,000, the number of narcotic addicts had increased k. from 130,000 to 340,000. D-69. In other districts the same tremendous increase was apparent. The opening of opium retail shops was advertised daily a. in the papers. These new retailers were all appointed by govern- b. mental authority. From September 18, 1931, many opium shops were opened in Mukden, and from March 1932, most of the Japanese commercial

L-JL, H-82.

b. Ex. 374, T. 4675. a. Ex. 377, T. 4688. c. Ex. 374, T. 4676. b> FiXc 377, t. 4688. d. Ex. 374, T. 4676. e. Ex. 374, T. 4675-7. f. Ex. 374, T. 4677-8. g. Ex. 374, T. 4680. h. Ex. 374, T. 4680. i. Ex. 374, T. 4681. j. Ex. 374, T. 4695. k. Ex. 374, T. 4697. Page D-86

•(D-89) shops were converted into opium shops with the result that there c . were 60C shops in fAikden selling opium and narcotics. Outside

Mukden, there we re 150 shops of which 90$ were run by Japanese d. and Koreans. Eacb shop had to employ Japanese or Korean guards e. and could hoist the Japanese flag. Most of the dens engaged f.

girl waitresses and tripled their business. There were 1000

dens in Harbin, each employing girls, 900 in Kirin and 500 in go Heilunkiang. All shops were registered with the monopoly at a h

fee of ¥500 per shop, and all opium was purchased from the monopoly.

In 1934, the Manchukuo Ministry of Interior officially reported

that 9,000,000 of the 30,000,000 Mancburians were habitual opium

smokers, and of these 13$ were below 15 years, 23$ below 25 and i. 33% below 30 years of age.

TD® figures with respect to the number of shops and

addicts, coupled with the fact that both opium smoking and narcotic

taking was made enticing and alluring by using girl waitresses in

. opium shops and by selling narcotics in houses of prostitution,

and the fact that such a large proportion of the addicts were

children and youths, make it reasonably evident that the program

followed was not one of gradual suppression but one deliberately

designed to foster the traffic. That this was the real situation

is further borne out by the fact that in January 1937, at a

Manchukuo provincial governors conference, it was pointed out

that after several years of the system none of the addicts had

stopped, a large number of the young people had become smokers

c. Ex. 377. T. 4691. d. Ex. 377, T. 4691. e. Ex. 377, T. 4691. f. Ex. 377, T. 4691-2. g. Sx„ 377, T. 4692. h. Ex. 377, T. 4693. i. Ex. 377, T. 4690. Page D-4.6

(D-90) a and the opium system caused more deaths than unsanitary conditions.

D-91.. The same critic also indicated the key to the problem

of the spread of this vice when he stressed that some considered

opium as a rich source of government revenue, and if it were cut a. off the loss could not be made up. Opium and narcotics were in

fact one of the principal sources of revenue for Manchukuo, a

nation which Japan had created and whose every action Japan dic-

tated. As early as June 1932, the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung

Army had pointed out to the Vice-Minister of War that 10,000,000

yuan out of Manchukuo's total revenues of 64-000,000 yuan were b. opium monopoly revenues. These revenues were pledged as security

for the payment of ¥ 30,000,000 of Japanese currency national

founding bonds issued by Manchukuo, and underwritten by the Bank c. of Japan. The accused MINAMI admitted that he believed that the d. opium traffic was one of Manchukuo's principal sources of revenue.

Defense witness NAMBA admitted that he had said the profits had

risen from ¥ 300,000 in the first year to ¥ 10,000,000 in 1935, to e. ¥ 20,000,000 in 1936 and ¥ 30,000,000 in 1937. Even after he

reduced the figures after an alleged investigation, he admitted f. that the profits in 1937 amounted to ¥ 20,000,000. The Manchukuo

Budget for 1943 showed on its face that opium revenue was ¥ ].10,000,000

It was not only the government that shared in this illicit wealth.

The accused MINAMI admitted that one of his reasons for abolishing

the Special Service Department during his tenure as Commander of i the Kwantung Army might have been that he had found that its

D-90. a. Ex. 383, T. 4715-6.

D-91. a. Ex. 383, T. 4717-8. b. Ex. 227, T. 2838. c. Ex. 375, T. 4684-5. d. T. 19976. e. T. 20348-9. f. T. 20349-50. g. Ex. 2461-A, T. 20306-7. Fape D-88

(D-91) h. members were running the opium traffic for their own benefit.

D-92. Rather than taking every action to discourage the traffic, the Japanese, who in addition to their responsibility as the real power in Manchuria had a recognized responsibility of a. their own growing out of Japan's holding the leased territory, did everything to encourage growth and spread of the traffic. loans were made to farmers who cultivated poppies in amounts seven times that given to other farmers and at one-third the b. interest rate. Paving been enticed to grow more poppies by favorable loans, the farmers, when forced to sell their product exclusively to a Japanese Company, could not repay the loans and c. lost their lands to the Japanese. The area of authorized poppy d. cultivation was increased. In 1937, the authorized area was e. increased from 133,000 to 150,000 acres. Defense witness NAMBA admitted that opium poppy seeds were distributed freely to cul- f. tivators. While there were efforts made to cut out unauthorized growing, it was pointed out in the League of Nations Advisory

Committee that in view of the Increased acreage and increased sales, this drive was nothing more than an effort to destroy g. competition.

By 1937, in view of the open criticism in Manchukuo and in view of the fact that the League of Nations had placed responsibility for Illegal narcotics In the Far Fast on Japan and a, Manchukuo, the authorities were compelled, at least ostensibly, to take some corrective measures. They professed to carry out an

h, T. 19976.

a. Ts 20335. b. Ex, 378, T. 4699. c. Ex. 378, T. 4700, d. Ex. 379, T. 4701-2. e. Ex. 383, T, 4713. f. Ex. 2462, T. 20323, g. Ex. 383, T. 4713.

a. Ex. 384, T. 4734-5. Tape D-89

(D-93) b. anti-opium purge and enacted the Narcotic Law of 1937. An investigator, charged with the duty of examining the effects of this purge, found that there was not much change in the organiza- tion and activities of the monopoly except for the enlargement of its activities and the increase of its income and concluded that the new laws and purge were- merely a blind dictated by the criti- c. cism against the traffic. i!hile the few private Japanese factories which had operated were closed in face of the League finding, he pointed out that the monopoly had always taken care that there should be no private factories, since it would result d. in a less of revenue to the government and licensees. Furthermore to those whose factories were closed it was semi-officially hinted e. that they could start again in North China. There were no f. restrictions on cultivation and use, and both increased in 1937.

In fact, in 1937 the poppy crop was 1,800,000 pounds, cultivation g- had increased by 30 to 35$ and the cost had increased 50$.

D-94. The increase in the traffic continued despite the purge. In 1939, the United States consul-general at Mukden reported that raw opium purchases had increased from ¥ 29,000,000 in 1937 to ¥ 32,000,000 in 1938, and sales had increased from

¥ 47, 850.000 to ¥ 71,500,000, and he pointed out that this was a. inconsistent with any intention to curb the use of narcotics.

In 1939, the consul at Mukden reported further increases in 1939 of sales to ¥ 90,908,000 and pointed out that'opium was Manchukuo's b. "money-getter", next to customs. He stated that purchases of

D-93. b. Ex. 2459, T. 20301-3.. c. Ex. 384, T. 4732-3. d. Ex. 384, T. 4733-4. e. Ex. 384, T. 4737. f. Ex. 384, T. 4738. g. Ex. 384, T. 4739-40.

D-94. a. Ex. 384, T. 4746. b. Ex. 387, T. 4750. Page D-90

•(D-89) raw opium in 1940 would be ¥ 43,470.000 and that the net profit was

estimated at ¥ 56,000,000.

D-95. Not all the opium manufactured in Manchukuo was used there. Behind the whole picture there was something much more sinister even than the debauchery of the Manchurian people. Japan, bound by treaty not to engage in the narcotic traffic, found in the alleged independence of Manchukuo a convenient method of carrying on a world wide drug traffic, and made Manchukuo the center of that traffic. In February 1937, the official government paper in Seoul,

Korea, printed that Korea had shipped 41,355 pounds of opium to

Manchuria and increased shipments would be made annually. More than 71$ of Korea's opium was being sent to Manchuria. The increase had been decided by the conference of departmental secretaries in Tokyo, and as a result Korean production was to be increased. In 1938, the Treaty Bureau of the Foreign Office reported a Cabinet decision authorizing the transfer of raw opium b. to Manchukuo and an increased poppy production acreage for Korea.

In 1939, the Treaty Bureau reported that Korea had sent to Manchukuo

75,000 kilograms of the 80,000 kilograms of opium produced, and pursiiant to a Cabinet decision of December 12, 1938, the authorized poppy acreage for Korea had been increased from 17,297 to 29,547 c. acres. These transfers from an integral part of the Japan

Empire, admitted in the reports of official government bodies, completely vitiate any defense which the accused may have offered on this issue. If they maintain that Korean opium was needed for

D~94. c. Ex. 387, T. 4750-1.

a. Ex. 380, T. 4706-8. b. Ex. 381, T. 4708-10. c. Ex. 382, T. 4711. Page D-91

•(D-89) use in Manchuria, they must concede, particularly in view of

increased production in Manchuria, that the use of opium in

Manchuria was increasing and not decreasing in the years when

they claim particularly strenuous efforts were being made to wipe

out.the habit. Cn the other hand, if they stick to their contention

that the use was decreasing in Manchuria, they must concede that

the transfers from Korea could have had only the one purpose of

being sent to Manchuria for preparation for distribution elsewhere.

Furthermore, in addition to Korean transfers, the Mitsubishi

Trading Company imported into Manchuria in 1939, 3000 cases of d. opium. In March 1938, this trading company and Mitsui Bussan

through the Foreign Ministry concluded an agreement to purchase

Iranian Opium for Japan, Manchukuo and China with delivery to be e. made in 194-0 and 1941.

D-96. The opium grown in Manchuria and imported there from

Korea and elsewhere was manufactured and distributed throughout

the world. In 1937, it was pointed out in the league of Nations

that ninety percent of all illicit drugs in the world were of

Japanese origin manufactured in the Japanese concessions in

Tientsin, Dairen and other cities of Manchuria, Jehol and China, a. always by Japanese or under Japanese supervision. In 1936,

the American Treasury Attache reported that drugs sold in North

China had formerly come from Suiyuan and Chahar but had been b. replaced by drugs imported from Dairen. In 1939, the attache

at Shanghai reported that the only opium to be allowed in

D-95. d. Fx. 382, T. 4861-3. e. Ex. 382, T. 4861-3.

P-96. "a. Ex. 383, T. 4729. b. Ex. 395, T. 4792. Page D-92

•(D-89) Japanese-occupied China would be that from Jehol, Persia, Suiyuan c. and Manchuria. The witness SATOMI, who carried out opium

operations in China under the Special Service Department of the

China Expeditionary army from 1938 to 1945, testified that until

1940 the opium sold by him was of Persian origin, but after that d. he sold Manchurian opium. It is thus evident that all of the

opium manufactured in Manchuria was not for use there but was

distributed for use in other countries.

D-97. The complete domination of Manchuria--militarily,

politically, economically and socially by Japan--eontinued until

the Japanese surrender on September 2, 1945. However, long

before, as soon as Japanese control was firmly established, the

conspirators were ready to move forward with the next step in

furtherance of the conspiracy.

D-96. c. Ex. 421, T. 4872. d. To 4884.