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‘IM versity MîciraUnis ME . Intemadomal

8612342

Said, Salim

THE GENESIS OF POWER: ' CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN INDONESIA DURING THE REVOLUTION FOR INDEPENDENCE, 1945-1949

The Ohio State University Ph.D. 1985

University Microfilms I nternstionâ!SOO N. Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, Ml48106

Copyright 1986 by

Said, Salim All Rights Reserved

THE GENESIS OF POWER:

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN INDONESIA

DURING THE REVOLUTION FOR INDEPENDENCE, 1945-1949

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for

the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate

School of The Ohio State University

by

Salim Said, B.A., Drs., M.A.

*****

The Ohio State University

1985

Dissertation Committee: Approved by;

Richard Gunther, Ph.D.

Goldie Shabad, Ph.D.

R. William Liddle, Ph.D., Adviser

Department of Political Science ©1986

SALIM SAID

All Rights Reserved Untuk generasi muda Indonesia, sipil dan m iliter, semoga mereka kelak sanggup mencapai saling pengertian untuk bersama-sama membangun

Indonesia sebagai yang kita dambakan bersama.

For the young generation in Indonesia, civilian and military: may they one day reach a common understanding on how to develop Indonesia together as we all desire.

11 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am greatly indebted to many individuals and institutions who helped me with my study, research and writing. First of all I wish to thank R. William Liddle to whom I am indebted intellectually. But more than that, I wish to thank him for his patience, tolerance and the help he extended to me and my family during our stay in Columbus.

My study and our stay in Columbus would certainly have been more difficult without the help of Professor Liddle.

I am also indebted to Professor B. J. Habibie, who not only encouraged me to further my study, but also partially shared the financial burden of my study. To Mr. Goenawan Mohamad of TEMPO I also wish to extend my gratitude for his constant help and encouragement.

The Ford Foundation, TEMPO Magazine and The Ohio State University are the three institutions that shared the main financial burden of my study. I thank them for their help.

During my research in the United States, the Netherlands and

Indonesia I received the assistance of many individuals. I can only mention some of them here. In Columbus, I wish to thank two members of my dissertation committee. Associate Professors Goldie A. Shabad and Richard P. Gunther, for their guidance in seeing me through to completion, and Dr. Terry Bigalke for his advice and editorial support along the way. In Athens, Ohio, I wish to thank Mrs. Li an The

Mulliner, bibliographer of the Southeast Asia Collection at Ohio

111 University, who never tired of providing me with materials I needed for my dissertation. Professor William H. Frederich from the History

Department of Ohio University also helped me in many ways. He not only guided me in the f ir s t few months of my academic life in the

U.S.A., but also consistently provided assistance during my study, research and writing. For that, I thank him very much.

In Washington, D.C. I wish to thank Mr. John Taylor of the

National Archive for letting me use the materials on Indonesia in his archival possession. In The Hague, the Netherlands, the cooperation of Mr. F. Plantingha of the Royal Dutch Archive and Mr. Adriaan

Geelhoed of the Defence Ministry Archive made it possible for me to conduct my research in a short time. I thank both of them.

During my field research in Indonesia, I was given special treatment by many persons, and only because of that I was able to reach my objectives without spending too much time. In Indonesia, fir s t I wish to thank President Suharto who, in spite of his hectic schedule, answered my questions presented to him through his staff.

Many thanks also to General Benny Murdani, Panqlima (Commander) ABRI, who kindly spent time with me discussing the socio-political functions of Indonesian military now and in the future. I wish also to thank

General (ret.) A. H. Nasution and Lt. General (ret.) T. B. Simatupang for their patience in answering my questions in repeated interviews.

Thanks also to Lt. General Soepardjo Roestam, the Interior Minister and the former adjutant to the late General Sudirman, for his kindness in sharing with me his experiences with his former Commander. To

Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX I also want to express many thanks for his

IV kindness in relating to me his personal experiences of the

revolutionary era. I take this opportunity to thank Major General

(re t.) R. H. Soegandhy and Lt. General (re t.) Sarwo Edhy Wibowo who,

or the last twenty years, have given me opportunities to learn from

f ir s t hand sources what it was like to be a soldier and a freedom

fighter during the revolutionary era. It is no exaggeration to admit

here that the idea for this dissertation originated and grew out of my

association with these two generals.

My short field research in Indonesia was made more pleasant by the

help I received from many friends. Unfortunately the space does not

permit me to mention all who were so kind to me. I wish to thank my

colleagues at TEMPO Magazine, my life-long friend Andi Makmur Makka,

Mr. and Mrs. P. Simatupang, Jshadi, Taufiq Ismail, Taufik Abdullah, H.

Prijopranoto, Marsillam Simandjuntak, Mochtar Mas'oed, Riyadi Gunawan,

Umar Kayam, G. Dwipayana, Ikranagara, Arif in C. Noer, and my parents,

Haji Said and Hajjah Salmah.

Jayne Allison, Dorothy Shanfeld, Sandy Wood and Julia Fisher typed numerous drafts including the final one, for which I thank them.

Last, but not least, I wish to thank my wif.“, Herawaty, for her constant support, patience and understanding during her long ordeal as wife of a graduate student. Herawaty and Amparita, our daughter, were

the two "permanent victims" of my absorption in study at OSU. I only

hope that both of them one day will be proud of the result of their

long ordeal. VITA

November 10, 1943 ...... Born — Pare-Pare, Sulawesi, Indonesia

1972 ...... B.A., University of Indonesia, Jakarta, Indonesia

1977 ...... Drs., University of Indonesia, Jakarta, Indonesia

1980 , . M.A., Ohio University, Athens, Ohio, U.S.A.

1983 ...... M.A., Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, U.S.A.

PUBLICATION

Profil Dunia Film Indonesia (Profile of Indonesian Film World), Jakarta, 1983.

FIELDS OF STUDY

Major Field: Comparative Politics

Minor Field: Political Theory

VI TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

DEDICATION...... ii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS...... i ü

VITA...... Vi

LIST OF FIGURES...... ix

LIST OF MAPS...... X

NOTE ON SPELLING...... xi

CHAPTER

I. INTRODUCTION ...... 1

Theories of Civil-Military Relations in the Third World: A Democratic B i a s ...... 5

The Indonesian Army and Western Civil-Military Relations Theories ...... 10

National Liberation Armies as an Alternative ...... 15

The Indonesian Army in Comparative Perspective: The Meaning and Effects of Self-Creation ...... 20

The Organization of the Dissertation...... 25

II. THE REVOLUTION...... 31

Revolution and the Reluctant Government ...... 41

The Pemuda T a k e o v e r ...... 46

III. THE CREATION OF THE ARMY...... 60

T.K.R. Comes Into Being ...... 65

Enter the Former Knil O ffic e rs...... 67

VI 1 CHAPTER Page

IV. THE ARMY, THE GOVERNMENT AND THE OPPOSITION...... 90

Enter Amir Syarifuddin ...... 101

Pepolit and Biro P e rju a n g a n...... 108

V. THE POLITICAL BEHAVIOR OF GENERAL SUDIRMAN ...... 121

The Dutch Educated Officers and The Rationalization of the A rm y...... 142

VI. FIGHTING FROM VILLAGES, JUNGLES AND MOUNTAINS ...... 177

The Military Government ...... 194

The Fighting ...... 209

Military Government and the Political Parties . . 210

The Military Government and the Emergency Government ...... 214

Back to the Conference T a b le...... 219

VII. CONCLUSION...... 241

ABRI's Origin and the Future Civil-Military Relations in Indonesia ...... 241

The Changing Ideology of the Indonesian Military . 250

The New Order: Conflicting Interpretations and the Possibility of Future Change ...... 260

GLOSSARY...... 273

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 277

V I 11 LIST OF FIGURES

Figure Pags

1. The Structure of the Military Government in Java

During the Guerilla War, 1948-1949 ...... 198

2, The Parallel Civil Administration and Military

Territorial Apparatus in Today's Indonesia ...... 257

IX LIST OF MAPS

Map Page

1. Map of J a v a ...... 74

2. General Sudirman's Guerilla Route ...... 217 NOTE ON SPELLING

In 1972, for the second time since independence, the Indonesian government implemented a new system of spelling. The firs t change was implemented during the revolution when the diphthong oe. (pronounced u_) was simplified to jj. In 1972 the main changes were that the old ^ became j^, while j_ became y, and ;y_ became c (pronounced c^). Use of the new spelling for personal names was made optional, so many individuals continue to use the old spelling. For the sake of consistency, I follow the 1972 spelling, except in quotations and in the names of several important persons still alive. For example, instead of Sjahrir, I write Syahrir. But I follow the way the present

Interior Minister, Soepardjo Roestam, writes his name, that is in the old spelling.

XI CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Since 1965 the m ilitary has dominated political life in

Indonesia. In 1952, only two years after sovereignty was transferred from the Dutch colonial power to the new Republic of

Indonesia, the military attempted to force President Sukarno to dissolve the provisional Parliament and to conduct a general election. The attempt failed, but after 1957, following the declaration of martial law—resulting from regional rebellion--the army became a real political force in Indonesian politics. After

1959, the year President Sukarno assumed dictatorial control over the government, the army and the Communist party were the two most powerful organized forces in Indonesia. Since the defeat and destruction of the Communists in 1965, the army has stood unchallenged in the Indonesian political arena.

How car: we understand and explain this political role of the

Indonesian military?

The purpose of this dissertation is to explain why the

Indonesian m ilitary as early as 1950 had already secured a place in the Indonesian political arena, a place from which that they slowly moved to the present position of political dominance. One principal 2 avenue of explanation has been the theories of intervention developed since world War II by comparative political scientists who have studied the military both in the newly independent and more established countries. In my judgement, for several reasons these theories are useful in explaining the political role of the military in Indonesia only to a certain extent. They are not fully satisfying, however, because these theories tend to assume that the political role of the military in the new states comes about as a result of intervention. By intervention the theories imply that a previously unpolitical military suddenly grabs power from civilian politicians. These theories are mainly trying to explain why an unpolitical military precipitously assumes a political role. This focus, no doubt, is rooted in the Western liberal tradition with its basic assumption of

...the existence of a democratic tradition and political e lite which is both unarmed and competent to lead the country under national laws and through efficient administration...!

Underlying this basic assumption is the belief, again rooted in the

Western liberal tradition, that involvement of the military in politics as illegitimate. Consequently many discussions of the role of the military in politics in the Third World are no more than discussions of the failure of Western-style democracy.

Although certain explanations of m ilitary involvement in Third

World politics found in the intevention literature help to understand the Indonesian case, this dissertation represents a departure from the underlying premises of current theories. 3

In this dissertation I will argue that post-revolutionary civil-military relations in Indonesia can be explained by the interaction between two factors: the involvement in politics of the

Indonesian military since its inception, and the weakness of civilian institutions. The m ilitary's involvement in p olitics, in turn, can be explained by several characteristics of the Indonesian military and its history since its inception in the early days of the revolution. The Indonesian army was a self created army. It was self created in the sense that it was established neither by the government nor by a political party. Instead, the military created, armed and organized itself out of the shambles of the Japanese- trained Indonesian m ilitia following the surrender of the Japanese and the proclamation of independence, when the newly organized government was reluctant to raise an army.

Because the reluctant government did not give proper guidance to the military, the military had to elect its own Panglima Besar

(Armed Forces Commander).2 The man elected was a former school teacher turned battalion commander during the Japanese period named

Sudirman. Because Sudirman was elected he fe lt more committed to his troops than to the government which later tried but never succeeded in placing the m ilitary under governmental control.

The political behavior of Sudirman as a logical consequence of the self creation of the army could not have developed as it did had it not been for the weakness of political and governmental institutions. This weakness not only caused the government to lose 4 control of the military but also convinced the officers under

Sudirman to pursue their own policy of independence from the

government.

The decision by Sudirman to conduct guerrilla warfare against

the Dutch when the civilian leaders decided to surrender to the

Dutch colonial army that stormed the Republican stronghold in

December 1948, can be understood only in the context of weak

civilian and governmental institutions. As a result of this

weakness, the m ilitary was forced to take over the government during the guerrilla war for eight months. The experience of conducting a military government in that period created in the minds of the first

generation of armed forces leaders an ideal-typical model of how

government should be coducted which has been a powerful influence on

their behavior ever since.

What is the connection between the history of civil-military

relations through the revolution and post-revolutionary period, and

ultimately military dominance after 1955? My argument is not that

the specific characteristics of military participation in the post­

revolutionary era, especially the political dominance of Indonesian military in the present New Order, as it is called, are a direct

result of the revolutionary events. Nor am I asserting that

military participation per se was inevitable in post revolutionary

politics. My position is, rather, that the circumstances of a self­

created army Surdiman's leadership and a weak civilian institutional

context, and a concrete experience of military government during the guerrilla war together constitute the circumstances which shaped subsequent behavior of m ilitary officers, or to put it metaphorically, the foundation on which the house of post-1950 civil-military relations was built.

Theories of Civil-Military Relations in the Third World: A

Democratic Bias

A number of devastating criticisms have been made against the theories of m ilitary involvement in politics conceived by Western scholars.3 My judgement, as I have already stated, is that the niain weakness of these theories in dealing with the Indonesian case is their point of departure. Basically all of these theories are biased toward the Western liberal democratic tradition. This bias is nowhere stated more clearly than in the confession of Morris

Janowitz, a prominent writer on the m ilitary in politics. Janowitz acknowledges that

...the investigation of developing nations by Western scholars predictably has been an extension and modification of their intellectual analysis of Western institutions and the process of sociopolitical change in the West.4

Insofar as this is the case, theories on the military in politics fall short of explaining the role of the military in the

Indonesian context. But apart from their normative assumptions, and their consequent tendency to view political involvement by the military as interventionist, some of these theories do provide insight into the deeper involvement of the Indonesian military in politics. 6

In discussing various theories of mlitary involvement in politics, I will group them into two types depending on whether they stress internal or external variables. Belonging to the first group are those theories which explain military intervention in politics as caused by factors that originated within the military itself, such as military tradition, military training, role expectation, coercive capacity and social origin of the officers. Belonging to the second group are theories that advance non-military or

"external" reasons for military intervention, such as weakness of civilian institutions, political culture, crises of legitimacy experienced by the government, and rapid socio-economic mobilization.

Samuel P. Huntington is the most prominent scholar who relies on external variables to explain m ilitary involvement in politics.

For Huntington,

...the most important causes of the military intervention in politics are not m ilitary but political and reflect not only the social and organizational characteristics of the military establishement but the political and institutional structure of the society. The reason for this is simply that military interventions are only one specific mani­ festation of a broader phenomenon in underdeveloped societies: the general politicalization of social forces and institutions.5

To Huntington it is the inability of the civilian leaders to preserve order that invites the military to intervene.

Close to Huntington's position is that of S.E. Finer. For this writer political culture is the explanation. After suggesting that

"one might conceive of societies as ranged at various levels of political culture according to strength or weakness of their 7 attachment to their civilian institutions," Finer concludes that it is in the societies with lower political culture--meaning weak attachment to their civilian institutions--where the military usually intervenes in politics.6

Not far from Huntington and Finer are Claude Welch, Jr. and

Arthur K. Smith. Instead of employing "order" or "political culture," Welch and Smith use legitimacy as their explanation. For these two writers,

[ojutright military intervention in politics arises primarily from the limited or declining legitimacy of civilian political institutions and is particularly likely to occur during the period of rapidly changing norms and rising political participations.?

Welch and Smith apparently see a time of rapidly changing social norm and the rising political participation as not conducive to proper institutionalization in a Huntingtonian sense. The result is a chaos which ultimately decreases the legitimacy of the government.

Thus, to quote Finer again, ",w.here public attachment to civilian institutions is strong, military interventions in politics will be weak...Where public attachment to civilian institutions is weak or nonexistent, military intervention in politics will find wide scope--both in manner and in substance."8 The lack of attachment of the public to civilian institutions is certainly a clear sign of the lack of legitimacy of the governing e lite .

Societal "splits" can also be seen as leading to military intervention in politics. In his book Politics and the Military in

Modern Spain, Stanley G. Payne writes; 8

These vertical and horizontal sp lits, caused by a combination of regional, ideological, economic, and social factors, ave rise to sixty years of kaleidoscopic politics. The struggle between various ideas and interests produced half a dozen civil wars, and as many different constitutions and types of government. Ultimately, such divisions could be reconciled only by force. Out of this situation came a new arbiter for the country's affairs--the Army. It had become a central factor in politics not necessarily because the m ilitary were ambitious or greeedy, but because Spanish political society had broken down.9

Close to Payne are the writers who together published their own

articles in John J. Johnson's The Role of the Military in

Underdeveloped Countries. Edward Shi Is, one of the contributors to

the booK writes.

The ascendancy of the m ilitary in the domestic life of these states has been a response to the difficulties which the new states have encounted in their efforts to establish themselves as modern sovereignties.10

In the same article Shi Is also writes that.

Military rule is one of several practicable and apparently stable alternatives when parliamentary democratic regimes f a lte r .11

But why does a democratic regime in the Third World falter? One answer to this question is that the society was split. And the society sp lit because no consensus was achieved on what kind of society was to be created. The unity of the society was preserved during the struggle of independence because it had a common goal, namely to free the country from colonial rule. Following the independence the society lost its drive to unite, the society sp lit, and the military emerged as a "stable alternative."

The last writer who will be mentioned in this category is

William R. Thompson. In his writing on Arab military coups. 9

Thompson identifies two basic explanations for the miltary

intervention in politics, namely "the push of the military

subsystem" and the pull of the system."12 While the f ir s t belongs to the group of internal variables discussed next, the second

belongs to the external. Thompson's explanation of "the pull of the

system" turned out to be very similar to Huntington's praetorian

soldier's intervention in politics, namely that the "weak

institutions pull the military into political actions."

The two principal spokesmen for internal military factors that

lead to military intervention are Morris Janowitz and Stanislav

Andreski, both sociologists. For Janowitz, too, the military

intervenes because of the weakness of civilian institutions, but

there are certain characteristics typica.Iy possessed by the

interventionist forces. One of them is cohesion. "Lack of

cohesion," writes Janowitz, "leads to unstable and fragmented

involvement and likelihood of the counter coup d'etat after the

seizure of power."13

Andreski looks for the explanation in the possession of

armaments and in the structure of the organization of the military.

Therefore, for Andreski,

[t]he predominance of the armed forces over the populace grows as the armament becomes more elaborate. This predominance can also be due, sometimes entirely, to the advantages of organization.14

The size and the sophistication of the military is also used by

several other writers to explain military intervention in politics.

For Janowitz, "[t]he size and the sophistication of the miltary 10 establishment are positively related to the propensity for

intervention in politics." In explaining his "push of the military

subsystem," William R. Thompson writes:

Perhaps the most obvious characteristic exhibited by military coups is that mlitary elites possess clear advantages in the access to and control of the instruments of organized coercion.15

Foreign influence can also be a reason for the military to

intervene in politics. Thus, according to Alexander T. Edelman,

"military training missions from foreign nations inculcate attitudes

favorable or unfavorable to military intervention in politics." For

Edwin Lieuwin, "military intervention in one country encourages

intervention by armed forces of other countries in their own

political systems."15

Military tradition is also used to explain military

intervention in politics. Thus for Amos Perlmutter and Valerie

Bennet,

the decline of authority explanation for the military intervention is not sufficient. It explains only the praetorian nature of the political system; i.e ., regime vulnerability may be exploited by any organized political force, one of which might be the m ilitary...

But the m ilitary regimes emerged only becasue the military was now relatively more powerful and possessed a tradition of political activism, not because of socioeconomic dislocation.17

The Indonesian Army and Western Civil-Military Relations Theories

Let us start with theories which rely on external variables to explain military intervention in politics. Samuel P. Huntington, as we have seen in the previous pages, stresses that it was the

inability of the civilian leaders to preserve order that invited the 11

military to intervene. It is clear that Huntington's theory explains the political role of the Indonesian military during the revolution only to a limited extent. Admittedly, the existence of the military government during the guerrilla was of 1948-1949 was the immediate result of the inability of the civilians to lead the country in time of emergency. But this is to put the cart before the horse. The military government of 1948-1949 is better seen as a logical extension and probable outcome of tne 194b act of self­ creation and subsequent leadership role of General Sudirman, in a context of Huntingtonian weak civilian institutions.

How about the argument that self-creation was itself due to weak institutions? Here Huntington perhaps has a better case. Yet

I would response that Huntington's theory was not designed to explain situations in which civilian and military institutions were created simultaneously, but rather to account for situations in which civilian power weakens and m ilitary power strengthens to f ill the vacuum. This clearly does not apply to Indonesia.

The same argument basically applies to Finer's political culture and Welch and Smith's legitimacy explanation. There certainly was a weakness of civilian attachment to the civilian institutions and, thus, the declining legitimacy of the political institutions which prompted the military to create a military government following the surrender of civilian leadership in

December 1948, But these writers could not explain the self 12

creation of the army and their political involvement as the

consequence of that particular event.

Splits in society was a reason for the military intervention

for Stanley G. Payne. This theory was applicable for Spain but not

for Indonesia, whose m ilitary was involved in politics from the

first day of its inception. But this theory could certainly help us

to understand better the event of 1948. In December 1948 the

Indonesian society was sp lit between those who wanted to fight the 1 Dutch colonial army and those who wanted to surrender and continue

the struggle through diplomatic channels. The first decided to

fight a guerrilla war, the latter surrendered to the enemy. But

even here one has to remember that the sp lit only deepened the

involvement of the m ilitary in politics, and clearly did not cause

it.

The theories that look to the military as the agent of

modernization as proposed by Shils and many writers in Johnson's

anthology will probably f i t the Indonesian case in post-195Qs, but

certainly not before. Even that only to a certain limit, since the

Indonesian army was well engaged in politics long before their

involvement in that period. In the period prior to the guerrilla war, when the program of rationalization of the army was launched by

the Defense Ministry and the army under Sudirman took a position of

opposing the policy, one can even talk about the m ilitary as the

anti-modernization agent.

Thompson's explanation of the "pull of the system" and

Huntington's praetorian soldier remain to be dealt with. The most 13 we can say about those theories is that both can help us to further understand the deeper involvement of the m ilitary in politics. But as I have already said, the weakness of the civilian and political institutions in Indonesia only caused the miltary to deepen their involvement in politics, and by no means prompted the military to intervene.

Turning to internal military factors that lead the military to intervene in politics, we will begin with Janowitz. Janowitz's

"lack of cohesion" certainly does not explain the self-creation of the army and its subsequent political role.

Andreski's theory of m ilitary predominance over the populace is probably hielpful in explaining how easily the military became dominant in Indonesian politics following the abortive coup d'etat in 1965. But this theory does not explain the genesis of the dominance, namely the self-creation of the army and their political role subsequently. For the Indonesian military the difference between the pre- and post-1965 periods is that before 1965 the military was one of two organized political powers--the other was the Indonesian Communist Party, the PKI—while after 1965 the m ilitary was the only powerful organized political force.

The same argument applies to Janowitz's theory of size and sophistication of the military establishment and the "push of the military subsystem" of Thompson. Both theories can help to better understand the deeper involvement of the m ilitary in politics since

1965, but certainly not during the revolution. 14

On the foreign influence over the military which causes them to intervene in p o litics, we have both Edelman's and Lieuwin's theories. For Edelman, military training missions from a foreign country inculcate attitudes favorable or unfavorable to military intervention. In the case of Indonesia the m ilitary did not exist prior to their self creation. There is then no reason to talk of foreign military training missions. One probably can talk about the legacy of Japanese militarism among Indonesian youths who were trained by the Japanese. But should also consider the Dutch- educated Indonesian officers who were presumably inherited the legacy of the Dutch non-political m ilitary tradition. Yet events suggest that both of these groups of officers worked closely through their involvement in politics from the f ir s t day of the inception of the Indonesian army. There is, then, no reason to talk about a

Japanese legacy of m ilitary political role in Indonesia.

In considering Lieuwin's theory one has only to consider that during the turbulent period of the early days of the revolution there was certainly no time for Indonesian m ilitary leaders to look for a model to emulate.

I will end this theoretical review by discussing Perlmutter and

Bennet's theory of the political activist tradition in the military.

Again, this theory can help us to better understand the creation of the mlitary government in 1948, the "middle way" of General A. H.

Nasution in 1958, and the political dominance of the military in post-1965, but it is inappropriate in explaining the army's self creation. 15

National Liberation Armies as an Alternative

To say that the literature on the mlitary in the new states is

basically biased toward Western democracy does not mean that we have

to start from scratch. In one of his books, Janowitz mentions what he calls the "national liberation" army. He does not elaborate this

kind of army any further, except to say that for this type of mlitary, "political involvement was a tradition and not an invention

or exception."18 in his list of the militaries of the national

liberation type, Janowitze includes four armies, namely Algeria,

Israel, Burma, and Indonesia.

In order to have more insight on the "national liberation" army model, its origin and impact on civil-military relations following

independence, let us now have a look at these four national

liberation armies.

Algeria

The anti-colonialist movement in Algeria was not established

firs t in Algeria, but in France in 1925. The name of the organization was Etoile Nord Africaine (ENA), founded by Hadj

Abdelkader, a member of the Central Committee of the French

Communist Party (PCF). His place was soon taken by Messali Hadj, who also joined the PCF and took part in the Third International in

Moscow in 1930. The members of ENA were mostly Algerian workers in

France, who later on took home the party and its ideology.19 ENA,

under a variety of acronyms, was to be the party most closely

associated with the outbreak of the revolution in 1954. 16

The end of World War II did not produce the same result in

France as in Algeria. While in France there were parties to celebrate the victory over Germany, in Algeria there was only disillusion among the nationalists, especially those who were fighting with the French Army during the war. These nationalists were expecting that the end of the war would bring a change in the relationship between France and Algeria. It was this disillusionment that radicalized the younger followers of Messali

Hadj.

In 1947 a group of some half-dozen young nationalists, all of them in their twenties, using their membership of Messali Hadj's legal MTLD party ,a new name for ENA. as a cover, conceived the idea of a para-military organization that might one day go into action. The founders met secretly throughout 1947, and put together what they called their "organisation secrete." There was no single recognized leader of the group, but its strongest personality was Ahmad Ben B el l a . ..20

Though retaining Leninist methods, this younger generation of nationalists were not Communist. Systematically excluding the members of the Algerian Communist Party from their organization, they also, later, fought against the Stalinist style leadership of Messali

Hadj.21

The Organisation Secrete (OS) did not produce the intended result. Its secrecy was uncovered by the French authorities in 1950.

But the former leaders of the OS, disillusioned as they were, did not abandon their program: to get rid of the colonialists by way of revolutionary war. It was this group of young leaders who in 1954 started the Algerian revolution.

In 1954 Algerian party politics had clearly reached a dead end. 17

In these conditions a third group of politically active young men made the decision to break with the ongoing political process and turn directly to armed insurrection as the only means of both reuniting the badly divided political elites and obtaining independence from a recalcitrant and threatened French government. 22

Early in 1954 nine former leaders of the OS organized themselves

into a revolutionary body, the Club des Neuf, which in March of the same year created the Commite Révolutionnaire pour L'Unite et L'Action

(CRUA), itself the immediate forerunner of the National Liberation

Front. By mid-September the CRUA members had divided Algeria into six willaya (zones) and decided on commanders for each one. Two months

later, on the firs t of November, the revolution broke out. On the fifth of November, the Armee de Liberation Nationale was officially set up by the Algerian revolutionaries, the young men who had been the members of OS and the followers of Messali Hadj before they decided to rely on physical violence to win the independence of A l g e r i a . 23

The Algerian revolution lasted for several years. During that period, there emerged a division among the Algerians fighting against the French authorities, an internal versus an external army. While the former was fighting inside Algeria the latter was mainly concentrated in the border areas of Morocco-Algeria and Tunisia-

Algeria. The political leaders of the revolution also resided outside the country. The result of being in different places was of great

importance, "for by so doing the politicians and revolutionaries created the conditions which permitted the formation of two new groups which were ultimately to contend for power."24 18

It was the result of rivalry between these two groups and the indecisiveness of the Government in exile that opened the way for the m ilitary to become more autonomous, even during the war of independence. After independence, Colonel Houari Boumedienne, commander of the external army, could unite the m ilitary by subduing the internal army, and the position of the military became even more powerful. It was understandable if the military had a very tough bargaining position vis-a-vis the politicians. In fact it was only because of trie support from the m ilitary under Boumedienne that Ben

Bella could become the first President of independent Algeria. The cooperation between Ben Bella and Boumedienne was never smooth. In

1965 Boumedienne, who was then defense minister as well as vice president, decided to get rid of Ben B e l l a . 25

Israel

According to Perlmutter,

The modern army of Israel has its roots in the security structures of the pre-independence pioneer movement of the Jews in Palestine. These defense units were created by the Socialist- Zionists, the most significant, powerful, and mobilizing element of Jewish Colonization... The Socialist-Zionist movement became the chief instrument of nation-building, the mobilizer of the pioneer revolution, the creator of the new society, and the founder of the Israeli a r m y .26

But even if the Israeli military was not exactly self-created, nevertheless during the war preceding the creation of Israel there were three separate and relatively autonomous groups fighting against the British Mandate and later on against the A r a b s . 27 19

Commenting on the fragmentation of the Israeli military prior to independence, Gavin Kennedy writes:

Israel did not have a prominent revolutionary officer's caste to lead it into independence. It had instead a revolutionary creed, Zionism, which united the majority of the Jewish population. The conflicting interpretations of this creed contributed to a certain amount of fragmentation in the early d a y s . . .28

But that fragmentation was soon to be overcome by a decisive action of the government. On May 31, right after independence, the Israeli

Defence Force (Zahal) was organized out of the three fighting groups.

Look'iiig back Lu chat period, Michael I. Handel writes:

In retrospect, the successful establishment of one unified military command under the control of the government must be considered one of the major achievements of Prime Minister and Defence Minister David Ben Gurion. This was not an easy task since he had to overcome s tiff opposition from both the le ftis t and rightist parties trying to maintain their own private armies under their own co m m a n d . 29

Burma

The history of the Burmese army should be traced back to the period before the Japanese invasion of the country in the early forties. To secure cooperation from the Burmese during the invasion,

Tokyo organized an intelligence mission to Rangoon in the 1940's. The

Japanese mission was met by the "Thakin" group under the leadership of

Aung San.30 It was Aung San who secured the cooperation of his fellow students to form a secret pro-Japanese party in 1941, and subsequently sent twenty-nine students, including himself, to a secret military training camp on Hainan island in the South China Sea.31

It was the anti-British attitude of the Thakin that brought them to cooperate with the Japanese army. But due to ruthlessness of the 2 0 occupational army, right before the end of the war the Burmese reversed their position from fighting with to fighting against the

Japanese. After the war, there was a three year time lag before Burma finally got its independence from the British. From the time of its

inception, the Burmese army kept itse lf intact, and after independence the only change was its political position from independence fighter to a non-political organ of the governnment. In part that was because of the legacy of the British, the former colonizer of Burma, but also because of the firm decision of Aung San, supported unanimously by his colleagues. Aung San himself left the military service to become a full time politician, leaving Ne Win to command the a r m y .32

In 1958 Burma, under Prime Minister U Nu, was in political disarray. Unable to solve the problem, U Nu invited General Ne Win to step in to form a caretaker government. The Parliament accepted U

Nu's decision, and the Burmese army then became involved in politics.

The caretaker government remained in office for eighteen months before it finally returned authority to U Nu. But stable government did not develop and the m ilitary staged a coup on the night of March 2,

1952.33

The Indonesian Army in Comparative Perspective: The Meaning and

Effect of Self-Creation

Based on our review of the history of the Israeli, Burmese and

Algerian armies, we now can compare them with the Indonesian army in terms of their origin and their civil-military relations following independence. In terms of origin, the three national liberation armies all originated in or were created by institutions outside 2 1 themselves: The Algerian army was created by former members of the OS which began as the le ftis t movement of Messali Hadj; the Israeli

Defense Forces were created by the Socialist Zionists, while the

Burmese army originated in the Thakin, a student le f tis t nationalist movement. Unlike the above three, the Indonesian army is the only army of national liberation which did not emerge from any political group or institution outside itself. Instead, as I shall show in this dissertation, the Indonesian army created and organized itse lf out of the ruins of the Japanese mobilized and trained m ilitia consisting of hundreds of thousands of mostly rural young men in a time when the government was reluctant to raise an army due to its policy of not offending the incoming Allies.

In terms of civil-m ilitary relations after liberation, both the

Burmese and Israeli armies were later subordinated to civilian rule.

In Burma this was only for a short period, but in Israel it was permanent. In the case of Israel there was a strong government- backed by a strong Labour Party--under Prime Minister Ben Gurion who succeeded in de-politicizing and completely controlling the military.

In the case of Burma, there was a British tradition of a non-political military which was followed by the political leadership until the government of Prime Minister U Nu in 1958 failed to govern the country and invited General Ne Win to take over.

There is a sim ilarity between the Algerian and the Indonesian armies in post-independence civil-m ilitary relations. Neither of them were ever completely under civilian control. But the similarity does not carry very far even though both of the armies now dominate their 22 respective political arenas. The reason is that in the Algerian case the army was the most important political force in the country from the beginning. Because of that the cooperation of the military was a conditio sine qua non for the first Algerian President, Ben Bella. As soon as the military decided to get rid of Ben Bella and to run the country on its own, they did so easily.

The post-revolutionary history of the Indonesian army has been different. Since independence the Indonesian army has always been an organized political force, but only one out of many. Between 1953 and

1955, due to the banning of the largest Muslim Party because of the involvement of some of its leaders in the regional rebellions of the late 1950s, the Indonesian army became one of two powerful organized political forces. The other one was the Indonesian Communist Party,

PKI. And only after the terrib le events of October 1, 1965, and the subsequent destruction of the PKI, did the Indonesian army completely dominate Indonesian politics.

How does a self-created army differ in its civil-military relations from the other types I have discussed? In my judgement, four factors from the period of the Indonesian revolution are critical in understanding the post-independence political system, at least in this case.

The first factor is the self-creation of the army. At the time following the Japanese surrender, when arms were readily available, m ilitarily trained people were prepared to defend the new-born country, and the threat of recolonization was looming on the horizon. 23 the central government under Sukarno was reluctant to raise an army due to its policy of wanting to achieve independence peacefully and its fear of antagonizing the Allies. The youth then took the initiative to arm themselves and defend the country.

The second factor is the weakness of the civilian governmental institutions. Basically there are two reasons for this weakness.

In Indonesia, unlike India where the British Raj created the Indian

Civil Service and even allowed the Indian Congress (Party) to develop long before independence, the Dutch in Indonesia systematically denied the nationalist movement a chance to grow. There was to be sure, a corps of indigenous civil servants cultivated by the Dutch colonial authority, but this body was devastated by the Japanese occupation forces and what was left was torn apart by unleashed popular power in the early days of the Revolution.

But the immediate cause of the weakness of civilian institutions was the sudden change of the governmental system in November 1945 from the American style presidential system to the European parliamentary system. The new system allowed the creation of many parties, some of which joined the government and others the opposition camp. The constant bickering between the opposition and the parties in the government under the ever present threat of Dutch annihilation of the newly born Republic, not only caused the government to lose control over the already politicized army, but also convinced the miltary to pursue its own policies independence from the government as much as it could. 24

In this connection it is interesting to compare the Israeli and

Indonesian armies in their f ir s t few months. Unlike Indonesia, Israel under Prime Minister David Ben Gurion was able to put the Israeli

Defense Force under the government's control. And because of this the political involvement of the Israeli officers could be successfully contained.

The third factor is the leadership and political behavior of

Panglima Besar General Sudirman. As the Armed Forces Commander,

Sudirman assumed the highest position in the military by way of election, and only later was he confirmed by the government in his position. As will be shown in the dissertation. General Sudirman's actions were the behavior of an army commander who, while recognizing the authority of the political leadership, also saw himself as more than a mere government soldier. This political behavior logically followed from the position of an army which created itself to fight an independence war when the government was s till very reluctant to raise an army. At the same time this particular behavior was also the result of institutional weakness as argued above.

The fourth factor is the experience in the guerrilla war following the Dutch attack on the Republican areas which began on

December 19, 1948, and lasted until August 11, 1949. The experience of guerrilla war was a logical consequence of the army's self creation. General Sudirman's leadership and political behavior, and the weakness of the government. The guerrilla war was an opportunity for General Sudirman to demonstrate the autonomy of the army. That 25 is, when the political leadership decided to surrender to the Dutch colonial army, Sudirman and his forces went to the jungle to fight a guerrilla war.

The guerrilla war experience--in which a military government was created—in turn created a model of civil-military relations, characterized by military control over the political system throughout the Republican controlled area, which has ever since played an influential role in shaping and informing the army leaders' conception of how they should relate to civilian society. After the late 1950s, parts of the model were once again put into practice.

Since 1966 the model has been the most important element in the structure and practice of Indonesian government.

The Organization of the Dissertation

Following the Introduction is a chapter on the Revolution in which I deal with the turmoil in the days following the Japanese surrender and the proclamation of Indonesian independence. In this chapter the nature of the mass movement during the revolutionary period--which essentially originated in the Japanese occupation--from whijh the armed youth emerged, is described.

Chapter Three, "The Creation of the Army", discusses the firs t thesis of this dissertation, namely the self-creation of the army amid the uncertainty and reluctance of the government.

Chapter Four, "The Army, the Government, and the Opposition," discusses the relationship between the army and the other political forces, inside as well as outside of the government. The second 26 thesis of this dissertation, the weakness of the institutions, is advanced in this chapter.

Chapter Five, "The Political Behavior of General Sudirman," is the chapter in which the third thesis of this dissertation is elaborated. The most important aspects of Sudirman's political behavior are his constant effort to keep the autonomy of the military intact and his perception of the military as the main defender of the country when the political parties--inside as well as outside the government—were fighting among themselves.

In chapter Six, "Fighting From the Villages, Jungles and

Mountains," the fourth thesis of this dissertation is advanced. In this chapter I try to show that even before the Dutch attacked and occupied the Republican area completely, the army had already prepared its own plan to govern the country. This plan was implemented when the Dutch launched their attack. As much as I can I try to specify how the m ilitary conducted the government, related to political forces outside the military, reacted to the policies adopted by the detained political leaders and to the Emergency Government which resided in

Sumatra. In this chapter the most important factors shaping the future of civil-m ilitary relations in Indonesia are two: f ir s t, the fact of the take over of the government by the military when civilian leadership abandoned the country; and second, the self-knowledge that the military leadership is capable of running the country when it is abandoned by the civilian leaders.

Based on the first factor the military later on claimed to have been the savior (penyelamat) of the country at a critical moment in 27 its history. From the second factor, the experience of governing, sprang the doctrine of Dwi Fungsi (Dual Function). Dual Function is essentially a doctrine which says that the Indonesian m ilitary is responsible for the defense of the independence of the country but at the same time is also a social force which has the same right as other social forces to participate in the socio-political affairs of the country. The Dual Function doctrine is accepted by all members of the

Indonesian military. In terms of its interpretation, there is however a continuing debate withing the armed forces. This debate centers on whether the military should have executive power or just a legislative presence; whether it should be a permanent political actor or only intervene directly in times of c risis, and whether it should take part in partisan politics or not.

From the beginning of the New Order government. President (and retired four-star General) Suharto has take one position on these issues and a number of prominent c ritic s have taken another. At the end of the Suharto era the debate will undoubtedly become sharper and louder, and eventually there may well be a major reinterpretation of the Dual Function. But no party to this debate desires a fundamental change in the pattern of Indonesian civil-military relations, and the

Western model of civilian control of the military is explicitly rejected by all of them.34

In the last chapter, "Conclusion," I try to explain the post-1965 political dominance of the military with the four theses proposed in this dissertation. It is imperative to understand that the four theses should not be taken one by one. Rather they should be seen as 28 an undivided set of variables, since all four are closely interrelated. Without the self creation, it would be very difficult to have Sudirman's unique political behavior. But self-creation and

Sudirman alone could not have shaped the future of civil-m ilitary relations in Indonesia as it is today if there had been a strong political and governmental institutional framework at that particular moment. And the above three factors would most likely have shaped nothing had not the surrender of the political leadership in December

1948 been followed by the creation of a m ilitary government.

Today's Dual Function thus in one sense grows directly out of the miltary government of 1948-1949. But I hope to make clear that it must be seen in the light of the to tality of the armed forces experience in the Revolutionary period. Self-creation, Sudirman's leadership, weak civilian institutions, and direct military administration of civilian government together constitute a powerful legacy which will undoubtedly continue to shape Indonesia's civil- military relations even as new events and conditions bring further adjustments and interpretations. 29

NOTES

1. Harold Ward Maynard, A Comparaison of Military Elites Role Perceptions in Indonesia and the Philippines (UnpublishedPh.D. dissertation, The American University, Washington, 1976), pp. 99.

2. Panglima Besar is sometimes translates as Armed Forces Commander. But since this position has a special meaning beyond just Commander of the Army, as demonstrated by Sudirman during the Revolution, the title Panglima Besar will not be translated in this dissertation. Moreover, this title was later abolished following the death of Sudinnan.

3. See Amos Perlmutter, "The Praetorian State and the Praetorian Army" in Comparative Politics, Vol. I, No. 3, April 1969, pp. 282-404; Claude E. Welch, Jr.: "Review on Perlmutter's The Military and Politics in Modern Times" in American Political Science Review, Vol. 72, December 1978, No. 84, pp. 1485-1486.

4. Morris Janowitz, Military Institutions and Coercion in the Develoinq Nations (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1977), p. 10; see also Ulf Sundhaussen: "The Military in Research on Indonesian Politics" in Journal of Asian Studies, Vol 31, No. 2, 1977, pp. 335-365.

5. Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changingf Societies, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 194.

6. S.E. Finer, The Man on Horseback (Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1975), p. 75.

7. Claude E. Welch, Jr. and Arthur K. Smith, Military Role and Rule (North Scituate, Massachusetts: Duxbury Press, 1974), p. 4.

8. Robert D. Putnam, "Toward Explaining Military Intervention in Latine American Politics" in World Politics, Vol. XX, No. 1, 1967, pp. 85-86.

9. Stanley G. Payne, Politics and the Military in Modern Spain (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press; London: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 3. 30

10. Edward Shils, "The Military in the Political Development of the New States", in John J. Johson, (ed.). The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1962), p. 8.

11. Shils, "The Military" in Johson (ed.). The Role, p. 9.

12. William R. Thompson, "Toward Explaining Arab Military Coups," in George A. Kourvetaris and Betty A. Bobratiz (eds.) World Perspective in the Sociology of the Military (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction B ooks,1977), p. 172.

13. Janowitz, Military Institutions and Coercion, pp. 144-145.

14. Stanislav Andreski, Military Organization and Society (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1971), p. 35.

15. Thompson, "Twoard Explaining," p. 172.

16. Putnam, "Toward Explaining," p. 87.

17. Amos Perlmutter and Valerie Plave Bennet, "Introdcution" in Perlmutter and Bennet (eds.). The Political Influence of the Military (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1980), pp. 15-16.

18. Janowitz, Military Institutions, pp. 86-87.

19. Aslan Humbaraci, Algeria: A Revolution that Failed (New York, London, Washington: Frederick A. Preager, 1966), p. 61; Alf Andrew Heggoy: Insurgency and Counterinsurqency in Algeria (Bloomington/London: Indiana University Press, 1972), p. 23.

20. Edward Behr, The Algerian Problem (New York: W.W. Norton and Company Inc., 1962), p. 59; see also William B. Quandt: Revolution and Political Leadership: Algeria, 1954-1968 (Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England: The MIT Press, 1969), p. 82.

21. Heggoy, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency, pp. 40-46.

2 2 . Quandt, Revolution and Political Leadership,

23. Humbaraci, Algeria, p. 34.

24. Quandt, Revolution and Political Leadership,

25. J.C. Hurewitz, Middle East Politics: The Military Dimension (New York, Washington, London! Praeger Publishers, 1970), pp. 195- 196. Chapter II

THE REVOLUTION

During the Japanese occupation a radical change took place in our minds, especially among the m ilitant pemuda (youth), and also military skills were widely acquired by the population. Subsequently there emerged a tendency among us to reach our goals by employing force, against the enemy as well as against ourselves . 1 May. Jen. T.B. Simatupang.

Sukarno and Hatta introduced the constitution, quickly organizing the cabinet and appointing the governors... But it was disappointing to us the pemuda, that there were no immediate instructions in the military field . 2 Dr. A.H. Nasution.

The most conspicuous characteristic of the Indonesian revolution was the existence of dual leadership, military and political. In this chapter it will be shown that this characteristic was rooted in the period of the Japanese occupation, and its development stimulated by the Japanese policy of mobilization, a policy which had been studiously avoided by the Dutch colonial authorities. The result of this Japanese policy was the deep politicization of Indonesian society, as Indonesian of all segments of society were made aware of the need to fight for an independent country. The Japanese presented themselves as the liberators of Indonesia from White colonial rule.

But as Indonesians incrementally felt the miserable life brought by

31 32 the Japanese, they concluded that there were no basic differences between Dutch and Japanese colonialism. As a result the mobilization policy became a double edge sword, benefitting the war effort of the

Japanese but setting in motion the opportunity, for the f ir s t time, for Indonesians to prepare themselves to ultimately fight for their independence.

Since the policy was specifically directed toward the youth or pemuda, it was no wonder that the pemuda emerged from the ruin of the

Japanese m ilitary occupation as one of the important participants of the revolution. But who were those pemuda or rather what kind of people belonged to the pemuda group? From a cultural point of view, youth or pemuda in Indonesian society is "a distinct stage in the linear trajectory of the life-arc between childhood and m aturity."3

Indonesian society measured maturity generally not solely by age but also whether one has already married. When the Japanese started to implement their policy of mobilization, their target was those youth who were youth in age--meaning among others not yet married--and because of that had not yet been contaminated by the colonial Dutch experiences as their elder had. It was because of this policy that the Japanese systematically excluded former Dutche trained young officers--A.H. Nasution, T.B. Simatpung and many others--from joining

Peta. Since the Japanese mobilized the youth from all works of society, we could then find in the pemuda camp youth from rural as well as from urban areas; youth from middle, lower as well as high class. Ideologically speaking pemuda was not a solid unit. Since they came from all kins of ideological background, the configuration 33 of ideologies in the pemuda camp only a reflection of the same situation in the society. These differences in ideological background became an important factor later when the newly formed political parties, with their different ideology, tried their hand to lure the pemuda into their ideologies.

But despite their differences, the pemuda were prepared by the

Japanese to fight. And it was because of this that by the time the independence was proclaimed the Indonesian pemuda, well trained and motivated, were ready to defend the newly born Republic of Indonesia.

When the older politicians--those who were already in politics before the Japanese invasion--were reluctant to move, the pemuda then took the initiative.

It is against this immediate background that we can best understand the events in the days following the surrender of the

Japanese and the declaration of the independence. However, nationalists explained and reinforced this desire for an independent

Indonesia by interpreting earlier struggle and rebellions throughout the archipelago as a long fight against Dutch colonial rule long before the birth of the nationalist movement led by Indonesian intellectuals prior to the Pacific War.4 But the spontaneous manifestation of it can be understood only against the background of the Japanese policy of mobilization.

The war of independence was certainly not the f ir s t opportunity for the Indonesians to fight for their independence. Long before that rebellions against the Dutch colonialists were already known in 34 the archipelago. Yet, none of those rebellions ever succeeded in expelling the Dutch. One reason for the failure was that the

Indonesians fought the Dutch locally, without any coordination among

Indonesian groups who were scattered across the archipelago. The

Dutch successfully manipulated the uncoordinated centers of power in

Indonesia. Thus, you will find in Indonesian history stories of one center of power fighting against another, without a coordinated purpose. In the end only the colonizers benefited from this fragmentation and infighting.

Despite these impediments, it took the Dutch decades to pacify all of Indonesia. We can safely say that the pacification operation was completed only early this century when the last bastian of the

Acehnese in north Sumatra fell to the Royal Netherlands Indies Army, popularly known as the Knil.5

Pacification was certainly not conducted just for the sake of conquest all over Indonesia. Colonizing Indonesia was tremendously important for Holland, a small country in the cold North Sea. To understand the psychological meaning of Dutch colonialism in

Indonesia, one must realize that Holland was the third largest colonial power because of its occupation of Indonesia.

More important than psychological satisfaction was, of course, the economic benefits. Dutch investment in Indonesia was vast. No

Dutchman could imagine life without the economic benefits derived from Indonesia.G Ironically, it was also because of Dutch capitalist interests and their expansion into Indonesia that there began the 35 emergence of an educated Indonesian e lite , who in turn became the

leaders of the nationalist movement.

The newly educated Indonesians were a result of the Dutch c a p italists' need for middle level sk ills and semi-skilled workers to be employed in the export oriented plantations and factories, as well as for bureaucrats to f ill the expanding bureaucracy.7 However, once this new elite began to realize their historical task to continue the long dormant desire for independence, the Dutch fe lt impelled to suppress their development. Even during the Nazi occupation of the

Netherlands, and the Japanese advance into Southeast Asia, Holland stubbornly refused to give any meaningful concessions to Indonesia.&

It was no wonder that Indonesians did not share Dutch concerns about the Japanese threat. In fact, there were many Indonesians who collaborated openly with the Japanese.9 The warm welcome was certainly also the fru it of Japanese propaganda. For long before the invasion. Radio Tokyo had already regularly broadcast a special program to Indonesia which always began with Indonesia Raya (Great

Indonesia), the national anthem of Indonesia. At the same time they let their listeners know that the coming of the Japanese to other parts of Asia--including Indonesia—was not motivated by greed, but by Asian brotherhood and cooperation.10

In the first few weeks of Japanese occupation, the mood was positive and cooperative. The Indonesian national anthem was played and the national flag was seen everywhere. No less important was the great show presented to Indonesia by their new conquerer, namely the 35

humiliation of the Dutch.H All of the Dutch were put in

concentration camps and their positions were given to their

Indonesian subordinates. At the same time, the speaking of Dutch was

forbidden and the teaching of Indonesian was intensified at schools.

All of these were viewed as signs of Japanese sincerity to bear the

burden as the liberator of their Asian brothers.

But the enthusiam soon faded. It soon became clear that the

Japanese were only another conquerer of Indonesia. Despite cosmetic

differences between the new and old master, their substantive policy remained the same. Professor Benedict Anderson from Cornell

University concluded that Dutch as well as Japanese rule in Indonesia rested on the same three fundamental political techniques: a) maintenance and reinforcement of ethnic differences and riv alries; b) the seduction and appropriation of the traditional ruling class, which was gradually bureaucratized and centrally controlled; c) the conscious fostering of racial superiority.

According to Anderson, the f ir s t technique could clearly be seen

in the horizontal fragmentation of Indonesia which was bureaucratically divided into Sumatra, Java and East Indonesia. Each unit was under its own mutually competitive and suspicious military administration. Accordingly, the communication between the three areas was almost non-existent during the occupation. Also contradictory policies were being pursued in each area. Sumatra and

Java were more closely aligned since both were under army commanders. 37 while East Indonesia was more diverse since its leadership was the

navy.

In the field of government, the Japanese followed their

predecessors in trusting the old civil servants (known in Indonesia

at that time as pangreh praja) . The third technique, racial

superiority, according to Anderson, merely substituted the Japanese

for the Dutch. "Anti-white slogans were simply the outward signs of

the dethronement of one myth to make way for another. "12

For our purpose, the first technique is essential to understand.

This particular policy divided Indonesia into three areas, and as we

already know each area pursued different policies. It is then

important to understand the impact of this policy in Indonesia during

the occupation and immediately after. For example, the policy of

mobilization--a policy the Dutch never valued--applied only in areas

controlled by the army, but principally in Java. Thus, you find Peta

(Pembela Tanah Air-The Defender of the Motherland)!^ in Java and its

counterpart Giyugun, in Sumatra. Nothing of this sort existed in

East Indonesia. This is one of the reasons why the battles for

Independence were mainly fought in the former Japanese army

controlled areas.

We have already touched upon the policy of mobilization. While

there has been, as Professor Anderson points out, a certain

continuity from the Dutch colonialism to the Japanese occupation, one

can also see elements of discontinuity. In the case of mobilization,

the Japanese followed an unprecedented course. In the beginning, the 38

Japanese mobilized people, including those in bureaucracy for their

own war efforts, in both economics as well as security.

Beside Peta, the youth received basic military training. Almost all of the people learned how to march with bamboo spears or wooden rifles in the neighborhoods (kumi) security body (keibodan), in the civil servant training, in the schools, in the youth organization (seinendan) and in vanguard body (shu- sintai). There was also the semi military organization of Hisbullah.

There was the training of people to familiarize them with the aspects of war such as long distance estafet so that they could be useful as couriers (for the army). There were also d rills to manage public kitchens, air raid drills, and many others.14

For these purposes the Japanese created all sorts of

organizations to tap the potential war capability in society. There were organizations for women, organizations for the youth, para military groups attached to the Moslem organizations, groups for

assisting the police force, organizations for the artists, and to mobilize people into development brigades far away from home.

To the historian Harry J. Benda, the clear effects of this mobilization policy were twofold:

In the firs t place, the negative accomplishments of Nippon's rule in tearing down many of the traditional barriers inhibiting dynamic social growth acted as a catalyst. Second, in its posi­ tive achievements, Japanese policy gave a new direction to social and political evolution.15

It is not an exaggeration to compare this policy of mobilization

by the Japanese with the opening of schools--as a result of the so- called Ethical Policy--for a select number of Indonesians by the Dutch early in the century. Both were the main causes of the two most

important social movements in Indonesia this century. If the product of Dutch education of Indonesians became the nationalist movement 39 leaders, the product of the Japanese mobilization was the creation of a cadre of military participants in the revolution.

To see the immediate impacts of this mobilization policy, one has only to look at the Indonesian youth at the end of the war, and in the early days of the revolution. As the war in the Pacific slowly turned against the Japanese, they fe lt compelled to meet more of the demands of the nationalists. At the same time, the Japanese themselves also realized that it was only a matter of time before they could not control the emerging Indonesian nationalism. The turning point came in I943I6, when the Japanese decided to recruit, train, arm and organize Indonesian pemuda into locally based battalions. It is interesting to examine the methods used by the Japanese who organized

Peta. The soldiers and officers at the battalion level were given extensive military training, while the battalion commanders, the

Daidancho, were only mildly exposed to m ilitary techniques. This was, in part, due to their prominence in their local areas. The Japanese intended to mold these politicians into father figures for their soldiers whose military training—and probably future combat experience--would be overseen by Japanese instructors (Sidokang) attached to each b attalio n .17

For military purposes, the Japanese paid careful attention to company commanders and their soldiers. All of these Indonesians were relatively young, in their mid 20s, which was famous in Indonesia as the pemuda age. The Japanese were certainly aware of the potential of the pemuda, not only for military training, but also for indoctrination. To understand this fully, it is interesting to follow 40 the story of Maruzaki Yoshio, the Japanese officer who was chief of a special Japanese intelligence office where the idea of the Peta originated. Nugroho Notousanto who interviewed him in Tokyo a few years ago writes about Maruzaki as follows:

During his stay in Indonesia, Maruzaki got the impression that the Indonesians he knew were not as backward as he had learned from Dutch sources he had studied. He also realized the burden of colonialization in the mind of most Indonesians, especially the older generation. From that observation he came to the conclusion that if the Japanese were to seek support from the Indonesians in the coming war against the West, the spirit of the Indonesians should be reborn. Their fighting sp irit should be rekindled based on selfconfidence and equality as an Asian. According to Maruzaki, it would be d ifficu lt to in still this in the older generations but not in the p e m u d a . 18

Peta was not the only organization in which Indonesians received military training. In many other organizations the Japanese required rudimentary military instruction. For the Japanese, the most important thing was not that all Indonesians should be able to professionally fight a war, but that the sp irit of the Indonesians should be directed. The best way to do this, according to the

Japanese, was through military discipline. Thus, even the elementary school students had to experience this kind of rudimentary training.

Because of this policy, by 1945, when the Japanese surrender, the

Indonesian youth, especially in Java, were a reservoir of trained personnel for the army . Some of them later joined the military but many more fought in emerging partisan groups known in Indonesia as lasykar.l9

It is true that it was in Peta that the Indonesians for the first time had an army commanded by Indonesians. But this by no means meant 41 that Indonesia never had a soldiering tradition. The many kingdoms scattered all over Indonesia prior to and in the early days of Dutch colonialism had their own m ilitaries. As the Dutch slowly dominated

Indonesia, the soldiering traditions became a thing of the past.20

Eventually, the only soldiers allowed to bear arms were those organized and commanded by the Dutch.

The colonial soldiers, true, were not all coming from Holland, but the officer corps was entirely made up of white Europeans. The soldiers were mercenaries from Africa or otiier parts of the world, but mainly of Indonesian origin. In the case of Indonesian recruitment, the Dutch did not deviate from the tradition carried on by other colonial powers of recruiting soldiers from a particular ethnic, geographic region of the country. In the case of Indonesia, the soldiers were recruited from the Christian areas of east Indonesia,

Manado, in North Celebes, and Ambon in Maluku. Only later were some

Indonesians allowed to become officers. Some of these officers later played a prominent role in the national army, during and after the revolution. Nevertheless, at the time of the Dutch surrender to the

Japanese on March 8, 1942, there were no more than 20 Indonesian commissioned officers and approximately 20,000 non commissioned officers in the army. 21

Revolution and the Reluctant Government

After lengthy and delicate negotiations, the Indonesian nationalist leaders and the Japanese High Command in Jakarta as well as the Cabinet in Tokyo were finally ready to discuss the technical 42

implementation of the proposed independence of I n d o n e s i a . 22 Thus, on

August 9, 1945, Sukarno and Mohamad Hatta, two prominent nationalist

leaders, left for Dalat, Vietnam, to have an interview with Marshall

Terauchi, the supreme commander of the Japanese Southern Army. They

arrived in Jakarta on the 14th of August with an understanding that

the declaration of independence would be made on the 22nd of that

month. In Jakarta, Sukarno and Hatta were welcomed by fellow

nationalists with the rumors of a Japanese surrender. Consequently,

according to these nationalists--who got their news from Allied radio

broadcasting--Sukarno and Hatta were urged not to wait until the date

agreed between them and Terauchi, since the Japanese promise was

rendered meaningless by their surrender. Sukarno and Hatta were

unwilling to go along with the idea of a proclamation without

consulting the Japanese f ir s t. They tried to avoid bloodshed, for

even if the Japanese had surrendered, their armed forces in Indonesia

were still intact. It was at this juncture that the famous kidnapping

of Sukarno and Hatta by the pemuda group took p l a c e . 23

On August 17, 1945, Sukarno and Hatta finally declared the

independence of Indonesia, despite the danger of being arrested by the

Japanese authorities who were under Allies order to keep the status

quo. The proclamation was enthusiastically greeted in Jakarta. In

the outer regions, it took several days for news from the capital to

arrive. One of the reasons for this was that nationalists in the

regions were suspicious of another Japanese created movements since

this was common practice during the occupation. 43

Once Indonesia had declared its independence the pemuda who had

kidnapped Sukarno-Hatta now pushed for an immediate reform. On the

day following the proclamation, the pemuda in Jakarta invited Sukarno,

Hatta and some other leaders to the student dormitory for a further

discussion on what to do. The pemuda prepared their position and even

printed 5000 copies to be distributed after securing the agreement of

Sukarno and Hatta. Adam Malik, a prominant pemuda at that time and

later the third vice president of his country, read the documents which stated that:

the Republic of Indonesia already exists and because of that it is imperative that a People's Army (Badan Ketentaraan Rakyat) be organized in which the former Peta and Heiho would be the n u c le u s .24

According to Adam Malik's account, Sukarno and Hatta disagreed with

the pemuda on this matter, because both of them:

were afraid that the Japanese would consider that decision as a sign of aggressiveness, and the Allies would also look at it as a threat against them. But the pemuda insisted__ that this is not a matter of feeling but of calculation.2t>

Despite a long and b itter debate, the result was the creation of the

Badan Keamanan Rakyat, BKR (People's Security A gency), 26 organized locally by the KNI, Komite National Indonesia, (Indonesian National

Committee, a temporary Parliament). Its stated purpose was to assist war victims. This took a week before it could be made public.

On August 22, the BKR was formally declared as an armed organization of the Republic of Indonesia. It is interesting to see that the body which declared the formation of the BKR was the Panitia

Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia, PPKI (Committee for the Preparation 44

of Indonesian Independence), a body organized by the occupying

Japanese. The day the BKR was formed, the PPKI also transformed

itse lf into the KNIP, (Central KNI). As for the government, on

September 4 Sukarno came forward with the lis t of ministers for a

cabinet. Missing from that lis t was the minister of defense. Only

on October 5, was a minister for security (Menteri Keamanan)

appointed. But Suprijadi, the appointed Minister, never took office because he was missing long before the Japanese surrender.27 it is then clear that there was a consistent policy of avoiding confrontation between Indonesian nationalists and the Japanese as well as the Allies followed closely by the government. And this was

later made clear by Hatta himself:

The policy pursued by the government of the Republic of Indonesia since independence has been based on the proper balance between diplomacy and m ilitary might. This is clear from the beginning, since our leaders--with years of experience in the national struggle--did not believe that we could achieve independence solely via m ilitary actions. Our military power was far from sufficient (to fight the Dutch)and very disorganized.28

Since the pemuda never insisted that independence should be achieved solely by military actions, the reason for the reluctance of the government to raise an army should be found elsewhere. It is known that Sukarno and his friends, the older generation, before and even after the formation of his cabinet, were not only afraid of the

Japanese but also of the Allied armies. This was because they already knew—from Allied radio broadcasts--that they were the first target of the incoming Allies, especially the Dutch reoccupation troops.29 By not having an army, Sukarno and his friends were hoping to show the 45

Allies that they were not the Japanese collaborators as the Dutch portrayed them. If they were indeed collaborators and Indonesia is a

Japanese puppet state, puppets of the Japanese, they certainly would have kept the Peta as their national army. It was in light of this policy that one can understand the position of Oto Iskandardinata, a nationalist leader close to Sukarno, who in the PPKI meeting on August

19 urged the abolition of P e t a . 30

This policy was not so popular among the youth who were caught up with revolutionary fever desiring to conduct a show of force to establish the sovereignty of the Republic vis-a-vis the Japanese, who were then acting as agents of the Allies charged with maintaining the status quo which meant: no Indonesian independence.31

Leaving aside the reaction of the people in the regions to the proclamation, to the government in Jakarta the critical moment was on

September 29, the day the Allies landed in Tanjung Priok, the harbor of Jakarta. On the eve of his departure to Jakarta, the commander of the expeditionary troop, Lt. General Sir Philip Christison, spoke on

Singapore radio. In the broadcast outlining Allied views, Christison made it clear that he did not see Sukarno and other Indonesian leaders as collaborators. And his troops would not interfere in Indonesian internal problems, for the Allies would enter Indonesia only as a

"guest" to fulfill a mission to recover the prisoners of war and disarm the Japanese army, and then return h o m e . 32

With this broadcast, the danger to Sukarno and his nationalist associates from Allied prosecution was mitigated. It was only after this statement that Sukarno agreed to raise an Indonesian army. Thus, on October 5, 1945, Sukarno declared the formation of the Tentara 46

Keamanan Rakyat, TKR (People's Security Army). The first task of the

government after the formation of the TKR was to search for someone to

organize the military amidst fighting in Java between the pemuda and

others over arms and supplies.

The Pemuda Take Over

The proclamation and the disintegration of the Japanese army

suddenly unleashed the accumulated power of the pemuda. In the firs t

few days after the proclamation, there was confusion over what was

really happening. Was the proclamation genuine or just a Japanese

political ploy? Finally they were convinced that the time had come

for the pemuda to act.

It began without coordination and on an individual basis the pemuda disarmed the Japanese and Japanese-created Indonesian police.They also occupied the Japanese houses and confiscated all of their belongings, including their cars. They then stuck labels stamped 'Belongs to The Republic of Indonesia' to all of those confiscated things.33

In general the pattern of action was as follows: the pemuda sent

a delegation to the Japanese to negotiate the terms of arms delivery.

When this didn't work, they then started to intimidate them by

mobilizing people with all sorts of weapons—bamboo spears, hunting

weapons, swords--to encircle the Japanese camps. At times this method

of intimidation worked well, but many times it did not. In Yogyakarta

for instance, the Japanese moved earlier than the pemuda. On

September 23, the Japanese-created Indonesian police was disarmed by

the Japanese themelves. This agitated not only the police but all the

pemuda in town. They then began sending delegations to the Japanese 47

camps. Diplomacy failed and force was then employed. It took them more than ten days before they could force the Japanese to surrender.

Accordingly, on October 6-7, 1945 at 11 p.m., all over the city one could hear people shouting Siaap (get ready)!... Within a second hundreds of pemuda from all parts of the city moved together to Kotabaru, the headquarters of the Japanese concentration. Together with the police and the members of BKR they encircled the Japanese barrack...

Instructions were issued to the mass that whenever they heard the explosion of a hand grenade, that means the electric current that electrified the fences was extinguished. That will be the time to move in.

At 4 a.m. the hand grenade was exploded and w ithout any h e s ita tio n the mass moved i n . 34

The fighting was bloody with heavy casualties on both sides. In the

end, at 10:30 a.m. on October 7, the Japanese agreed to surrender.

In Banyumas, West Central Java, the Japanese quickly realized the

futility of resisting the will of the pemuda who had already encircled

their camp. The most prominent leaders of Banyumas at that time were

Sudirman, a Peta battalion commander, and Raden Ishaq, a long time

member of the nationalist movement. Both of them, working together,

managed to convince the Japanese that by turning their arms over to

the Indonesians and leaving peacefully, they would assist the

Indonesians in their fight for freedom. The result was the

procurement of a huge arms c a c h e . 35 Accordingly, the arms were more

than enough to organize a division in Banyumas, so Sudirman then

decided to distribute the rest to many areas in Java. It was for this

reason that Sudirman later became a key figure in the conference of

army commanders that elected the first Indonesian army chief. 48

The details of this drive by the pemuda to get arms from the

Japanese are told vividly in the memoirs of Abu Hanifah, a medical doctor, a Moslem politician and later a cabinet minister and diplomat.

Hanifah was not a pemuda any more at that time. He was then head of the Catholic hospital in Sukabumi, West Java. Being a medical doctor in a district capital, he was certainly popular in and around

Sukabumi, a city with a center for police training long before the coming of the Japanese. Being close to Jakarta, it is understandable that Sukabumi reacted to the proclamation very early. He stated:

On the evening of 17 August, five young men came to my house. They were from the police school and from the agricultural school and they were very excited. In the beginning every one of them wanted to say something but then a young police officer decided to be the spokesman of the group. I had to smile at their eagerness to tell me their story. They had formed a committee of fifteen, and most of the members had some kind of followers who were willing to form a corps of militant freedom fighters. There were, for instance, the young people from the police school, then young men from the Peta, the members of the m ilitary trained labor group, Keibodan, the Youth movement, Seinendan, and others... They had two main problems. As yet they had no leader who could demand some respect and loyalty and who had some prestige among the local people. Secondly they had to have weapons. After a lengthy meeting they had decided to ask me to be their leader and then to request the Japanese commander to give them weapons to fight the Dutch...

They were glad when I said I would lead them but I told them that it should be confirmed by a meeting of the leaders of the region. They agreed. So we did not waste our time any more and began to discuss the plans that had already been drawn up. They would begin to try to get the weapons from the Japanese that (next) morning. Everything was ready. They had more or less surrounded the Japanese garrison already I had to smile a bit after they had informed me what kind of weapons they had. There were altogether thirty-six small bore guns, old fashioned carbines, even flintlock rifle s and revolvers. They had many swords, big jungle kinves, spears and even bows and arrows. I shuddered a l i t t l e at the possibility that the Japanese might resist with their modern weapons. It seems that a few Japanese officers had been informed already. But nobody could foretell what the reactions of the 49

officers and the commander. Colonel Yamato, would be. So it was decided that exactly at 6 o'clock in the morning the first shot would be fired. After that they hoped that God in heaven would take care of the rest.

At 5 a.m. two young leaders fetched me. I made the rounds with them. The men had surrendered the garrison and were hidden in ditches and behind bushes. Nearby were a hundred men ready to fall in case of emergency, mostly armed with bamboo spears or big jungle knives (klewang). In charge was one of the young teachers of the police school, and the technical committee consisted of some ex-officers of the Peta and the leaders of the newly formed guerrilla bands. Exactly at 6 o'clock in the morning the sign was given and a salvo was fired.

I saw through an old telescope that there was some confusion in the Japanese camp. Soldiers were running with weapons in hand. A couple of officers disappeared into the building. There was a second salvo from our side and now you could hear the bullets raining on the walls and roofs of the garrison building.

Suddenly a white flag appeared at the front of the main building and an officer came out with his hands up. He spoke Indonesian. Two of our people came out of hiding and approached the building. The officer told them something and one of the Indonesians ran back to where we were. He was excited. He said; 'Doctor, the commander of the Japanese would like to speak to us and especially you. He has given his word that the Japanese will not fire back but we have to decide quickly.' So a few men of the technical committee and I went into the garrison yard. The commander of the garrison. Colonel Yamato, had already appeared at the porch of the main building, accompanied by two of his officers. He had also a translator with him. He looked a little confused, a little angry, but he was very polite and correct.

The colonel and his officers listened attentively and seriously to my carefully translated speech. I saw the colonel was impressed...

The colonel this time agreed, under certain conditions. We must give him a week to leave Soekabumi and to inform Djakarta. The weapons would be left behind in the garrison building and the various buildings in town...

That week, all the power in the city was gradually handed over to the Indonesian authorities who up to this time had been working under the supervision of the Japanese. We had a big meeting one night in the old country club of the Dutch. Everybody who considered himself to be of any importance was there, provided he could prove that he had some kind of organization behind him and that he was the leader... 50

I was chosen by acclamation as the general leader having under me teams to take care of police, administration, defense, finance, etc. The revolution was there. So overnight, I became a revolutionary leader and I had to stick to it.36

The problem of wrestling arms from the Japanese was over by the middle of October. As the result of th is, in all over Java there emerged many armed groups of pemuda. Most of them had their military training in Peta, which already had 60 battalions in Java by the end of the w a r . 37 The rest were those pemuda who had their training in many different types of organizations as a result of the Japanese policy of mobilization. According to Nasution's calculation.

Following these locally organized moves to disarm the Japanese, we then had ten thousand arms in Sumatra, ten thousand in West Java, thirty thousand in Central and East J a v a .38

With 150 thousand Indonesians already trained by the Japanese, according to Nasution, the government at that time could have at least one combat battalion in every residency. To Nasution, this meant "we could have operational military power far more powerful than what the

Allies and the Dutch could mobilize in Indonesia between 1945-1949."

There was no reason to suspect that the newly created Indonesian government did not understand the importance of this development. To their detriment, there was a systematic and coherent policy of the government to disregard the m ilitary and concentrate on diplomacy.

When the armed pemuda in Surabaya resisted the occupation of the

Allies, the latter employed their maximum power to subdue the resistance. A bloody fight engulfed Surabaya. This was contrary to the peaceful policy of the government. When the Allies were cornered 51 by the resistance, they simply asked Sukarno to use his good offices to persuade the pemuda to retreat. Sukarno with Amir Syarifuddin, then Minister for Information, and later on Defense Minister, flew to

Surabaya. They did stop the annihilation of the Allies, but later events showed that Sukarno and Sjarifuddin were only misused by the

Allies. By the time the reinforcements were in place, the new operation was launched again. Only this time it was the resistance that was pushed out of Surabaya. The city then fell to the A l l i e s . ^9

Surabaya was not the only place where there was fighting between the Allies and the Indonesians. In Ambarawa, Central Java, bloody fighting also took place. The Allies moved freely from Semarang, the capital of Central Java, to the inland before being stopped in

Ambarawa, since a bloody fight had just been taking place in Semarang between the Japanese and the pemuda, when the latter tried to disarm the Japanese and failed.

While the fighting went on in many parts of Java, against the

Japanese as well as against the incoming Allies, there was an important political crisis developing in the capital. The pemuda, especially those around Syahrir, the underground leader, were very impatient to see the cautiousness of the new cabinet. They also resented the cabinet because almost all of its members, except Amir

Syarifuddin, were people who were working under the Japanese Military

Administration.40

There then took place the so called "silent coup" in which the

KNI, the temporary Parliament, authorized the dissolution of the 52 existing presidential cabinet and the formation of a new, parliamentary one, in which Syahrir would be prime m in i s t e r .41

Syahrir and the pemuda around him had to violate the constitution

in order to show the Allies that the administration of the newly born

state was not an authoritarian government made by Japan. One cannot

understand this radical policy without looking at the events in The

Hague and London at that particular time.

In Great Britain, the Conservative government of Churchill was replaced by the Socialist government of Prime Minister Attlee from the Socialist Party. In the Netherlands, the exile government under Gerbrandy from the Anti Revolutionary Party was replaced by a government of the Labour Party and the Socialist Party...

Syahrir was a former member of the left wing of the Labour Party when he studied in Holland... This will make it easier for a meeting of minds among Indonesia, Great Britain and the Netherlands.42

Being freed from the taint of Japanese collaboration, his pemuda

supporters expected Syahrir to have a more revolutionary policy. This did not materialize because Syahrir also preferred diplomacy more than

armed struggle. And while Syahrir conducted his policy of negotiation with the Allies, and later on with the Dutch, his grip on domestic

politics diminished. This became more pronounced in January 1946, when, because of Dutch terror in Jakarta, Sukarno and many parts of

the government moved to the new, temporary capital, Yogyakarta,

leaving Syahrir in Jakarta to conduct his policy of negotiation.

As will be seen later, following the formation of the Army, the

only m ilitary division which could be readily available for Syahrir was the West Java division called Siliwangi. And there were two 53 simple reasons for that; f ir s t, Siliwangi was located in West Java, close to Jakarta; but the most important reason, Siliwangi was mainly officered by Dutch trained officers, people who were trained to take orders from the civilian government. Another division were all officered by the Japanese trained Peta officers, people who were never trained to deal with the civilian government, and whose training was heavily colored by Japanese propaganda of seeing the Allies as worse than the devil.

We can thus say, that because of the reluctance on the part of the government to act promptly and decisively in the f ir s t few days following the proclamation of independence, the government not only lost control of the armed Indonesians--some of them later incorporated into the Indonesian Armed Forces--but also lost the opportunity to present itself as a cohesive body of political as well as military power, toward the Allies, and later toward the Dutch. The Indonesian revolutionary era was marked by a dual leadership. The Indonesian revolution era, as will be shown further in the following chapters, was marked by a dual leadership. On the one hand there was the political leadership under politicians who had been active in the nationalist movement long before the Japanese invaded Indonesia. One the other, there was the m ilitary under the leadership of the pemuda who emerged into the political arena as the result of the Japanese policy of mobilization. Each had their own policies and ideas of defending the

Republic and maintaining Indonesian independence. 54

Footnotes

1. Major General T.B. Simatupang, Pelopor Dalam Perang Pelopor Dal am Damai, (Jakarta: Sinar Harapan, 1981), p. 73.

2. Dr. A.H. Nasution, Memenuhi Pangqilan Tuqas, Volume I, (Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 1982), p. 70.

3. Benedict Richard O'Gorman Anderson, "The Pemuda Revolution: Indonesian Politics 1945-1946." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, 1964, p. 17. See also John R.W. Smail, Bandung in the Early Revolution, 1945-1946: A Study in The Social History of the Indonesian Revolution. (Ithaca, New York, Modern Indonesia Project, Southeast Asia Program, Department of Asian Studies, Cornell University, 1964), p. 17.

4. The name "Indonesia" was f ir s t used by British scholars, in 1850, who proposed it as a geographical designation. See Bernhard Dahm, History of Indonesia in the Twentieth Century, (London, New York, Washington: Praeger Publishers, 1971), p. 1.

5. W.F. Wertheim, Indonesian Society in Transition, (The Hague and Bandung: W. van Hoeve Ltd., 1959), p. 67.

6 . Herbert Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1962), p. 2.

7. The introduction of modern education in Indonesia at the turn of the century can be traced back to the Dutch "Ethical Policy" introduced in Indonesia in 1901. From the Dutch perspective, this policy was an admission of failure for the liberal expectation that colonialism, with its mission sacre, would automatically civilize the people in the colony. Instead, "In Java a state of declining welfare (mindere welvaart) prevailed—a fact admitted by Queen Wilhelmina. It became clear that the economic development of the colony could not be left to free individual in itiativ e, but that it was the government's duty to protect the economic forces at work. Since that time, the government authorities have endeavored to make positive contributions to the welfare of the native population by various means: irrigation, education, the promotion of popular credit 55

facilities, and expert agricultural advice," as Wertheim, a Dutch sociologist writes. See Wertheim, Indonesia Society, p. 96; On the failure of the policy, see H.J. Benda, 1he Crescent and The Rising Sun, (The Hague and Bandung: W. van Hoeve, Ltd., 1958), pp. 35-39.

8 . Dahm, History of Indonesia, pp. 77-81.

9. Benda, The Crescent, pp. 105-106.

10. George McTurnan Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, (Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press, 1970), pp. 102-103.

11. On the humiliation of the Dutch, David Wehl writes: "Dutch men, women, and children worked in the fields, cleaned latrines, carried loads, and performed the most menial tasks to which they were forced by the Japanese, who made excellent use of this valuable reinforcement to their propaganda talks and stage," See David Wehl, The Birth of Indonesia (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1948), p. 2.

12. B.R.O'G. Anderson, "Japan the 'Light of Asia'" in Joseph Silverstein(ed.), Southeast Asia in World War II: Four Essays, Monographseries no 7, 1966, Southeast Asia Studies, Yale University, pp. 17-18.

13. 'On Peta, see Nugroho Notosusanto: Tentara Peta Pada Jaman Pendudukan Jepanq, (Jakarta: Gramedia, 1979).

14 Simatupang, Pelopor, pp. 71-72.

Benda, The Crescent, p.

16. Nugroho Notosusanto,Tentara Peta,

17. Nugroho Notosusanto,Tentara Peta, Pelopor, p. 68.

18. Nugroho Notosusanto,Tentara Peta, 59.

19 During the revolution, lasykar was also known as strijdorqanisatie, a Dutch word which literally means "struggle organization." Anderson describes it as "emerging from the organizational debris of the Japanese period, formed from the bottom up on the basis of common aliran, ethnic origin, geographic propinquity, or simple friendship." See Anderson, "The Pemuda Revolution", p. 338; on how the government encouraged the political parties to have their own lasykar, see A.H. Nasution, 1TÜ Vol. I, (Jakarta: Seruling Masa, 1970), p. 25# 56

20. According to Nugroho Notosusanto, "Our military tradition had already started in the dawn of our history and ended at the colonial period. The tradition in the earlier period of our pre­ national glory was connected with the figure of Gajah Mada, the 14th century prime minister of the Kingdom of Majapahit. Gajah Mada started his career as the commander of the palace guard, known otherwise as Bhayangkari... The demise of the Kingdom of Majapahit brought Indonesia into the period of pre-national disintegration. It was in that period that Western imperialism invaded Southeast Asia in general, and Indonesia in particular. From this period on the Indonesians still kept their military tradition, but only in sp irit rather than in the field. "See pp. 75-89; and Professor Dr. Sartono Kartodirdjo, Sejarah Perlawanan- Perlawanan Terhadap Kolonialisme, (Jakarta: Departemen Pertahanan Keamanan, Pusat Sejarah Abri, 1973).

21. "The Creation and the Growth of Tentara Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Army)," Yogya Document No. 5652. National Archive, Jakarta, Indonesia.

22. When Tokyo learned that Russia was about to enter the Pacific War, they then decided to let the Indonesians have limited independence within the Japanese East Asian coprosperity sphere. Following the long bureaucratic and political infighting the Japanese military authority in Java finally agreed to organize the Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia, PPKI (Committee for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence). See Anderson, "The Pemuda Revolution", pp. 64-65; Bernhard Dahm, History of Indonesia, p. 108.

23. For the background and controversy surrounding the proclamation, see: Adam Malik, Riwayat Proklamasi Aqustus 1945, (Jakarta; Wijaya, 1982); Mohamad Hatta, Sekitar Proklamasi 17 Agustus 1945, (Jakarta: Tinta Mas, 1969); Pamoerahardjo (ed.), Peta Renqasdenqklok, (Jakarta: Yayasan Peta, 1984); B.M. Diah, Anqkatan Baru, (Jakarta: Masa Merdeka, 1982); Nugroho Notosusanto, Tentara Peta, pp. 131-134; Dr. Soejono Martosewojo and Professor Dr. Eri Soedewo (eds.), Mahasiswa '45 Prapatan 10: Penqabdiannya, Vol. 1, (Bandung: Patma, 1984), pp. 57-90; Sukarno, Autobiography, (Kansas City, New York: The Bobb Merrill Company Inc., 1965), pp. 210-220.

24. Dr. Soejono Martosemojo and Professor Eri Soedewo (eds.), Mahasiswa '45, p. 95.

25. Adam Malik, Menqabdi Republik, Vol. II, (Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 1978), pp .55.

26. According to Ismail Lengah, a pemuda leader in West Sumatra during the revolution, the BKR was already established in his 57

area even before the instructions from Jakarta reached West Sumatra. The name BKR, according to Lengah, had been used in discussions with Sukarno at the beginning of the Japanese occupation when Sukarno was s till there. Sukarno was detained by the Dutch authority in West Sumatra until the arrival of the Japanese. Before the latter sent Sukarno back to Java, he was assigned as advisor to the Japanese military administration in that area. It was probably at that time that Lengah and his friends discussed that matter with Sukarno. See Audrey Kahin, "Struggle for Independence: West Sumatra in the Indonesian National Revolution; 1945-1950," unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Cornell University, 1979, pp. 103-104.

If Lengah's information is correct, we can conclude that Sukarno's refusal to have an army in the fir s t few weeks of independence--and his preference for the BKR instead--can be understood not merely based on his fear of provoking the Japanese m ilitary or the Allies-, but that he fe lt there was no place for an army in the Indonesian polity. At least we can safely say that Sukarno did not foresee that independence would be won by way of military might. It is against this background that we should understand Sukarno's consistent support of diplomacy during the period of the revolution, regardless of his revolutionary rhetoric.

27. Suprijadi was a platoon commander in the Blitar (East Java) Peta battalion. The Blitar Peta rebellion started on February 14, 1945, and was easily and harshly crushed by the Japanese. Suprijadi, one of the rebellion leaders, was never heard of after. Nugroho Notosusanto suspects that he died during interrogation conducted by Kempetai, the notorious Japanese military police. See Nugroho Notosusanto, Tentara Peta, pp. 120-125; see also Sedjarah TNI-AD Kodam VII/Diponegoro (Semarang: Jajasan Penerbit Diponegoro, 1958), pp. 75-81.

28. Quoted by Nasution in "Kepemimpinan Pak Dirman," in Sides Sudiarto (ed.), Tinqkah Laku Politik Panqlima Besar Sudirman, (Jakarta: P.T. Karya Unipress, 1983), pp. 15-18.

29. On September 4, 1945, from Kandy, Ceylon, Hubertus Van Mook, Lt. Governor General of the Netherlands Indies emphasized that "on no account should the Republic of Indonesia be recognized as it was a Japanese puppet." See Oey Hong Lee, War and Diplomacy in Indonesia 1945-1950. (North Queensland, Australia, James Cook University, Southeast Asia Studies, Monograph series. No. 10, 1981), p. 25.

30. Anderson, Java, p. 102; on the farewell speech of Lt. General Y. Nagano, commander of the 16th Army, see David Wehl, The Birth of Indonesia, pp. 1-2; according to Sukarno, "When on 14 August 58

rumors circulated that Japan had already surrendered, the Peta army quickly readied itself for revolt. But the preparations were discovered by the m ilitary government and on the 17th and 18th of August the Peta army was disarmed and disbanded." See Sukarno's letter to the Supreme Commander of the Farther Eastern Regions, Colombo, the letter dated Jakarta, September 30, 1945. The National Archives, Washington, D.C., R.G. 226, Records of the OSS XL 32951.

31. Nugroho Notosusanto, The National Struggle and Armed Forces in Indonesia, (Jakarta: Department of Information, 1977), p. 56.

32. A short summary of the broadcast can be found in Osman Raliby, Documenta Historica, (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1953), p. 43; The Dutch protested the statement, London then was compelled to retire Christison in January 1946. See Anderson, "The Pemuda Revolution," p. 190; David Wehl writes that, "General Christison asserted most strongly that he had been misquoted..." see Wehl, The Birth of Indonesia, p. 43.

33. Sedjarah TNI-AD Kodam VII/Diponegoro, p. 28; Smail describes the movement of the pemuda in Bandung in the same period through one of his informants, who was seventeen. The following is the account of Smail's pemuda: "He said that before such attacks pemudas from several kampungs would gather and make plans. The f ir s t time one of the targets was a Japanese post in Tegallega (at the Southern edge of the city). On this occasion they were armed only with bamboo spears (bambu runtjing) and machetes (golok), and the attack failed. About seven of them were killed. The second time was when they attacked the same post. This time, howerver, many of them had guns, which they had borrowed from members of the police and from former Peta members, and they succeeded in capturing the post. They got some grenades and twelve guns, which were distributed so that each kampung group got one. At that time, the practice was for one gun to be used by seven to ten pemudas, each taking his turn. See Smail, Bandung in the Early Revolution, p. 57.

34. Sedjarah TNI-AD Kodam VII/Diponegoro, pp. 31-32; ee also Kenichi Goto, "Japanese Reactions in 1945 Indonesia." Paper presented to the annual meeting of the Association of Asian Studies, Washington, D.C., March 1984.

35. In September 1945, a delegation led by Sudirman, Ishak Tjokrohadisurjo and Sutirto conducted negotiations with the Japanese m ilitary authority in Purwokerto. At the same time the pemuda surrounded the Japanese camps in the city. The negotiations were s till going on when five Japanese tried to blow up the weapon storage. All of them were captured and summarily executed by the furious pemuda. The atmosphere became very tense 59

and the Japanese later decided to surrender. Sudirman and others then organized the evacuation of the Japanese from Purwokerto to Pekalongan, another Central Java city. Accordingly, the Japanese left behind guns and ammunition enough for six battalions. See Sedjarah TNI-AD Kodam VII/Diponegoro, p. 29; see also Dr. R. Nalenan, Ishaq Tjokroadisurjo Alumni Desa Bersemanqat Banteng, (Jakarta : Gunung Agung, 1982), pp. 69-72.

36. Abu Hanifah, Tales of Revolution, (Sidney: Angus and Robertson, 1972), pp. 169-174.

37. Simatupang, Pelopor, p. 70.

38. Abdul Haris Nasution, Tjatatan2 Sekitar Politik Militer Indonesia, (Jakarta: Pembimbing, 1955), p. 18; according to David Wehl, "In Central and East Java alone there were over 38,000 bayonets, over 26,000 rifle s, rifle ammunition over 11,000,000, pistols 3,646, light machine guns 604, with ammunition over 26,000,000, and hand grenades over 95,000, and many other weapons includingg mortars, anti tank guns, and tanks." See David Wehl, The Birth of Indonesia, p. 3.

39. On the Battle of Surabaya, see Wehl, The Birth of Indonesia, pp. 50-67; Bung Tomo, Dari 10 Nopember 1945 ke Orde Baru, (Jakarta, Gramedia, 1982), pp"I 65-78; and Dr. H. Roeslan Adulgani, Heroes Day and the Indonesian Revolution, (Jakarta: Prapanca Publishing House, 1964).

40. On the composition of Sukarno's cabinet and the position held by its members in the previous Japanese m ilitary government, see Anderson, Java, p. 110.

41. On the "silent coup", see Anderson, Java, pp. 167-189; Mohammad Hatta, the Vice President at that time had his own version of the "silent coup". According to Hatta, "...th e Working Committee of the KNIP suggested to us that a temporary parliamentary cabinet be formed to refute the foreign attacks on Sukarno, which pictured him as a Japanese collaborator. A parliamentary cabinet could refute these allegations in the name of the people. Sukarno discussed this move with me, and we agreed. On November 14, 1945, Sukarno appointed Sjahrir as prime minister of a parliamentary cabinet, on the understanding that he was delegating his authority in order to overcome some temporary difficulties the government was facing." See Mohammad Hatta, Memoirs, (Singapore: Gunung Agung, 1981), p. 257.

42. Ahmad Subarjo Joyoadisuryo SH, Kesadaran Nasional, (Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 1978), pp. 414-41FI Chapter III

THE CREATION OF THE ARMY

Our armed forces were not created by the state but were born spontaneously at the grassroots level.1 Sukarno.

The self perception of the army as a tool of the people's fighting was amplified by the fact that it was the local KNI which at the beginning created the BKR and TKR. It was the KNI which, in the early days, financed and provided their needs. This is the reason why the army and the lasykar considered themselves more of the people's tool to fight than an arm of the state dominated by the government.2 A.H. Nasution.

When Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta proclaimed the independence of

Indonesia on August 17, 1945, the country had neither a government nor an army. Following the proclamation the central government under

Sukarno and Hatta lost no time in creating the governmental machinery, but paid almost no attention to the field of defense. At the same time millions of pemuda, the very product of the Japanese policy of mobilization, were waiting for a role to play. When the pemuda did not get the orders they had expected from the government, they then took the initiative to create the defense arm of the new born

Republic.

This chapter will explore the roots of the pacifist policy of the civilian leaders, the pemuda reaction to this policy and its consequence for pemuda, and later army, relations with government. In this chapter it will be shown that the Indonesian army was created

60 61 by the pemuda who were looking for a role to play in the struggle for the independence of their country.

The first armed organization created by the civilian leaders was the BKR, Badan Keamanan Rakyat (People's Security Organization). But this organization was clearly not an army, because it was not centrally organized, it had no headquarters and its formation was dependent on the in itiativ e of the local National Committee or KNI.

However, the clearest sign that it was not intended to be an army was the fact that it was an organization attached to the much larger

BPKKP, Badan Penolonq Keluarqa Korban Perang, (Organization for Aid to

Families of War Victims).3

This organization--made public on August 22--was the result of a compromise between the pemuda and the political leaders under Sukarno.

As this order circulated among the regions the echo of the proclamation was already capturing local and national leaders and those in Jakarta were very late in giving immediate and firm guidance to the people in the regions. The pemuda f irs t began seizing arms from the Japanese. Having done this, they then started to organize themselves. Thus, even before Jakarta had instructed the people to form the BKR, armed organizations were already on their way to being a reality. To understand this development, one has to go back to the period of the Japanese occupation with its policy of mobilization. As we already have seen this policy not only prepared the pemuda to become armed fighters, but also organized them into many types of support organizations. There emerged a rough continuity between the 62 armed organizations during the war and the pemuda and BKR after the

Japanese surrender. Two examples of these are the Barisan Pelopor

(Vanguard Corps) and Hisbullah (The Army of God). These two armed groups were very popular during the early days of the revolution, and both were the product of the mobilization policy.4

By the time the order to form the BKR reached the regions, it became no more than an order to rename the organizations which already existed. To say that the BKR was one of many armed organizations is by no means to say that the BKR was on the same level as the other organizations. There were three reasons that made the BKR different from the other armed groups. First, the BKR was organized by the KNI, which was taken to be the embodiment of all the people; second, members of the BKR were mainly pemuda from the former Peta; third, when the government finally decided to organize an army, it was the locally organized BKR which became its nucleus.

Since there already exists an extensive body of literature about the pemuda armed organizations in the early days of the revolution, this chapter will not go into detail with that same story.5 It is sufficient to say that what was initially created or reoriented--in the case of the organizations that already existed during the Japanese occupation--as groups of volunteer soldiers to seize arms from the

Japanese, slowly developed into an armed extension of the political parties which came later.

The best example of these armed pemuda organizations which evolved to become the soldiers of a party was probably Pesindo, Pemuda 63

Sosialis Indonesia (Indonesian Socialist Youth). This organization was created out of the amalgamation of seven organizations at the end of a youth conference held in Yogyakarta on November 10, 1945.

According to Anderson, the conference was called by Amir Syarifuddin, a socialist who at that time was Minister of Information in Sukarno's cabinet. The original aim of the conference was to find a method of close cooperation among the pemuda. But the socialists at the conference were directing the sessions to suit their goals. There was a long and heated debate before seven organizations agreed to a merger and the others were left out.

It was common for people of many different groups in later years to look back at the youth congress as a turning point in post­ surrender political h isto ry ... It was claimed that this in itself forced the other groups of invitees to a much sharper selfawareness and a wider realization of the ideological diviisions within the pemuda movement.6

Out of many armed pemuda organizations, Pesindo emerged to become the most powerful. According to Anderson, there are two reasons for that; first, Pesindo had the ability to attract support from anti-

Japanese pemuda and made use of the underground associations and experiences of many of its leaders. The second was its association with Amir Syarifuddin, Defense Minister from 1945 until the beginning of 1948. It was widely believed that Amir provided Pesindo with a variety of resources, especially money and arm s.7 By doing th is, Amir and his party slowly molded the Pesindo into the army of the Socialist

Party, and later on, following the split of Amir Syarifuddin and

Syahrir in February 1948, of the Indonesian Communist Party. 64

While Amir and his party cultivated the Pesindo, the other parties did not s it idly by. Although there were no parties which controlled an armed pemuda comparable to the Socialist Party to

Pesindo, one can still point to the Barisan Pelopor, later to become

Barisan Banteng (Wild Buffalo Corps) as close to the PNI, Partai

Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian Nationalist Party), and Hisbullah (The

Army of Allah) to Masyumi (Muslim P a r t y ) . 8

It was against this background that one has to see the formation of the BKR and later the national army in Indonesia. The BKR itself had left almost nothing to remember, not only because of its short

lived nature, but also because of its dubious aims. It was certainly not a police organization, but neither was it an army. Most of the officers who came to the army by way of the BKR vaguely remembered it as a preparation for the army. They remember the BKR period as a period of regrouping for their men who had been discharged from Peta, a period when they had no rank, a period when what concerned them most was how to get arms from the Japanese as soon as possible.9 Most of the former Peta who dominated the BKR had their f ir s t combat experiences in the BKR, namely when they wrestled arms from the

Japanese. But so did the many armed pemuda groups who were fighting

in Bandung, Jakarta, Surabaya, Yogyakarta, Semarang and Ambarawa.

These same experiences along with the effects of Japanese mobilization made the pemuda and the BKR and later the army as well, share one common thing, namely all of them perceived themselves as pejuang

kemerdekaan (freedom fighters). 65

The attitude of the Indonesian pemuda who entered the BKR was not less idealistic than the pemuda who might be joining the political parties to fight the Dutch.

It was also because the pemuda could still be freedom fighters without becoming members of the BKR or the army that made many of them decide not to join the army when the government declared the formation of it on October 5, 1945. Those who decided not to join were then directed by the government to perfect their organizations, known at that time as lasykar (partisans), and to improve their armaments. As the political conflicts among the many political parties became more intense, the lasykar too had the difficulty of avoiding deep politicization. At the end, when the government had difficulty with the army, which jealously defended its autonomy, it was to the many lasykars it turned for support. The problems between the lasykar and the army will be dealt with later. It is sufficient for our purposes to know that by the time the government had realized that it already had lost the control of the military, it then looked to the many

1asykar as tools to counterbalance the army threat.

The TKR Comes into Being

Earlier, this dissertation touched upon the reasons for Sukarno and Hatta's hesitancy to raise an army. Those reasons suddenly disappeared when Lt. Gen. Christison, commander of the Allied expeditionary forces in Indonesia, made his famous radio broadcast from Singapore on the eve of the landing of Allied troops in Jakarta on September 29. A few days later, on October 1, when Christison was already in Jakarta, he made a more positive statement recognizing the de-facto government of Sukarno-Hatta. 66

The NRI (Negara Republik Indonesia, State of the Republic of Indonesia) Government will not be expelled and will be expected to continue civil administration in the area outside those occupied by the British forces. We intend to see the leaders of various movements and shall tell them that they are coming and intend to bring Dutch representatives and Indonesian leaders together at a round-table conference which the Dutch had steadfastly refused to do hitherto.11

Once the threat of being prosecuted as war criminals had been erased, there were no more reasons for the government to resist the wishes of the pemuda to raise an army. Accordingly, on October 5,

1945, Sukarno declared the formation of the army with the name of TKR,

Tentera Keselamatan Rakyat (The Army of People's Security). Elements of his prior hesitancy were still present, the name of the army still bore the stamp of the old BKR. Nevertheless, the army now existed.

But the most conspicious sign of this reluctance could be seen in the appointment of the long missing Supriyadi, on October 6, as the

Commander of the Army. But before proceeding with an analysis of this decision to have an army, let us f ir s t look at what was occurring in the regions at that time.

By the time the government had declared the formation of the army, armed clashes were occurring in many parts of Java. In

Surabaya, for example, on October 2, the Japanese decided to surrender to the pemuda who were encircling the camps asking the Japanese to give them arms. There was bloodshed, but because Admiral Shibata--

Navy Commander in Surabaya--reportedly harbored some sympathy to the

Indonesians, the arms were released to the masses.12 In Magelang,

Central Java, fearing an attack by the pemuda, the Japanese left the city on October 7 only after disarming the police. In Solo, another 67 city in central Java, bloody fighting took place between the Japanese army and the general population organized by the local pemuda, and only on October 13 did the Japanese raise the white flag to signify their surrender. The transfer of arms followed subsequently. Around the same time, clashes also took place in Yogyakarta.

It was against this background that one can see the reception of the pemuda to the government declaration of October 5. To most of the pemuda, in armed organizations as well as in the BKR, no significant ineaning attached to the declaration. Especially if the declaration was not followed with a clear instruction of implementation. Thus the declaration had little effect on the fighting in the regions.

In Jakarta, however, an important process had been going on.

Amir Syarifuddin, who was in a Japanese prison since 1943 because of his underground activities--was released on October 1. He was already named as Minister of Information while he was still in prison. But later his activities also involved security matters. One of the reasons for this was apparently because Amir, who was a Dutch civil servant before the war, had good contacts with the former Knil officers who at that time longed for a role to play.

Enter the Former Knil Officers

Before we proceed with the organization of the TKR, let us f ir s t look at the main organizers of the army, the former Knil officers. In the previous chapter, we became familiar with the Knil and their organization at the end of Dutch colonialism. What is important here is that by that time there were really two factions of Indonesians in 68

the Knil. The first faction was those people, older in age, who

entered the Knil due to their high social background in the colonial

society. Men like Urip Sumoharjo, for instance, the fir s t Chief of

Staff of the Indonesian Army--was the only Indonesian who had reached

the highest rank in Knil. He was a major when he retired long before

the war. It was impossible to reach such a high rank if one's

background was not very distinguished. Indeed Urip was a grandson of

a bupati (regent). Men like Didi Kartasasmita, and many other former

Knil officers who were to occupy the most important positions in the

Army Headquarters were all people with distinguished family

backgrounds.

As the Pacific War approached, the Netherlands Indies m ilitary establishment had no other choice but to admit to their hurriedly created military academy in Bandung people of lower social background, but yet qualified to be m ilitary o fficers.13 Those who belonged to this group were younger officers like Abdul Haris Nasution, Tahi Bonar

Simatupang, Alex Kawilarang, among others.

To all of these officers, Urip Sumoharjo was their senior.

During the Japanese occupation, when the former young officers, like

Nasution, were working underground they frequently made a v isit to

Urip's house in a small village outside Yogyakarta. We do not know much about the activity of the other older officers during the occupation, but of the younger officers, Nasution's memoir and

Simatupang's writings provide us with a clear picture.14 Nasution,

Simatupang and most of their former colleagues in the Bandung Military 69

Academy mainly stayed in that city during the occupation. While working in several government offices or taking part in some mobilized organization--except in Peta—almost all of these former officers kept contact with one another. Most of the time, the contact was extended beyond their group. Simatupang, for instance, had close contacts with

Syahrir, an underground leader who later emerged as the first

Indonesian Prime Minister. According to Simatupang, he basically had two contacts at that time; fir s t with his former colleagues in Knil, and second with the group of Syahrir. Simatupang remembers that time as follows:

We, the former cadets of KMA (Koninklijk M ilitair Akademij, Dutch Military Academy in Bandung) always got together and exchanged our opinions. I kept myself busy by reading any kind of reading materials available on revolutions and wars of independence. Materials on the Chinese revolution, Russian Revolution, French Revolution, as well as the writing of our leaders. The books of Clausewitz, I read all of them. With my colleagues of former KMA, like Nasution, Askari, I only talked about military problems. Political problems I discussed with my friends in Syahrir's group. At that time Syahrir was acting as our mentor.15

For Nasution, there was another activity that occupied him. He was involved in Seinendan, a youth organization organized by the

Japanese. In order for Nasution to become Seinendan's instructor he had to have a special training--including basic military training—in

Jakarta for three months. His position as a military instructor in

Seinendan and many other organizations in Bandung put Nasution in contact with many segments of the society, but especially the pemuda.

These contacts were to play a very important role following

independence, when Nasution was involved in the creation of the army. 70

Most of the pemuda in the army in West Java either were trained by

Nasution or at least familiar with him because of his position in BPP

(Badan Pembantu Prajurit Priangan, Body to Assist the Soldiers in

Priangan) in the last days of the occupation. Thus, for Nasution, the

period of Japanese occupation was a period:

in which I had important training. At that period, I had an opportunity to have a dialogue with the leaders of the society, especially the political leaders. It was at this time that I had my firs t chance to be involved in societal movements, especially the youth movements, formal as well as underground. All of them were very important experiences. I thank God for that opportunity given to me to educate myself in such a difficult period. Because of that [experiences] I came to the conclusion that that was an important period that determined my future life , namely to become not just a common soldier, but f ir s t of all to work hard and to participate in the struggle for independence. 16

It was because of their experiences during the Japanese occupation,

and certainly because of their pemuda age that the younger Knil

officers were in a better position to engage in the activities of revolutionary Indonesia compared with their seniors. While the

former Knil senior officers joined the army more as professionals

than as pejuang kemerdekaan (freedom fighters), the younger ones saw

themselves as pemuda pejuang (youth freedom fighters) on the

nationalist struggle for independence. Simatupang, the most

articulate among the young former Knil officers, explains himself as

follows:

. . . I joined the Indonesian National Army not as a former Knil officer, but as a student of war and revolution. I joined the army as an intellectual, more than as a combat so ld ier.1'

We will later return to the problems between the senior and the

junior Knil officers. However, it is now important to examine the

role of these former Knil officers in organizing the army. 71

We have seen that Amir Syarifuddin made contact with former Knil officers, one of whom was Didi Kartasasmita. Subsequently, following the October 5, declaration, Amir was instructed by Hatta to explore the creation of the army. Amir then discussed this problem with

Didi, a former Lieutenant in Knil, who at the same time was looking for a role for himself and his colleagues. According to Didi, after seeing too many organizations involved in security matters besides the BKR, he then asked Amir about what he, as a Dutch trained former officer, could do for his country.18 Amir then asked Didi

Kartasasmita

...if he and his friends, former Knil officers, were prepared to join the TKR. He answered that it all depended on one former high ranking Knil officer. Major Urip Sumoharjo, who was regarded by officers as a father figure whom they obeyed and whose decisions they followed. He was prepared to go to Yogyakarta to see him, provided the cost of the trip would be borne by the government. This was agreed to, and Didi Kartasasmita set out for Central Java. On his way home to Jakarta he planned to call in Bandung to hold discussions with a number of former younger Knil officers, among them A.H. Nasution.

After about a week, Didi Kartasasmita returned to Jakarta and came at once to the Ministry of Information to report that Major Urip had declared his willingness to join the republican military organization and had told him to urge the former young officers of the Knil to follow his example. After Didi had passed on Major Urip's message to them, they all agreed with his suggestions...19

According to Didi, he did not see Nasution, or even go to

Bandung, because in that city there were mainly officers whom he regarded as only cadets, meaning that they had not yet finished their training in the Academy by the time the Japanese invaded Java.

Instead he went only to Yogyakarta, met Urip and returned to Jakarta. 72

After thorough discussions with Amir and A1i Sastroamijoyo, the

second man in the Information Ministry, Didi and his 13 friends, former Knil officers, agreed to make public their alligiance to the

Republic of Indonesia and at the same time foreswore their loyalty to the Dutch Queen.20

Meanwhile, a telegram from Mohamad Hatta, the Vice President, reached Urip Sumoharjo in Yogyakarta on October 14. On the same day

Urip left for Jakarta. In her memoir, Mrs. Sumoharjo writes:

The next day, October 15, a cabinet meeting was held under Drs. Hatta in Pegangsaan Timur 55 Jakarta. Present, among others were Mas Urip , Didi Kartasasmita, Soedibyo, Sami jo and Dr. Soecipto a former Peta officer. It was at that cabinet meeting that a decision to form and to raise the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia was reached. The Chief of Staff of the organization was entrusted to my husband.21

The next day, on October 16, Urip returned to Yogyakarta to organize the headquarters. Apparently, Urip had convinced Hatta and other leaders in Jakarta that because of the landing of the Allies and the activities of Dutch troops who were returning to Indonesia accompanying the Allies, Jakarta was not a safe place for the site of the proposed army headquarters. In his discussions with Hatta, Urip f irs t mentioned Purworkerto--a central Java city situated between

Jakarta and Yogyakarta--but because Yogyakarta had far better f a c ilitie s ,22 and also because of the pro-republican sympathies of its ruler, the young Sultan of Yogyakarta, it was then agreed to have

Yogyakarta as the site for Urip to start his work. Only after this, when Urip had already started his duties did the government inform the public of what was going on. On October 20, it was 73 announced that the government had reorganized the Ministry of

People's Security and had appointed the following persons: Muhatnad

Soelyadikusumo as Minister ad interim, the long missing Supryadi, the former Minister for People's Security to be the highest leader, and

Urip Sumoharjo as Chief of S taff.23

It is interesting to see that the announcement of the formation of the army was not made by the government, but by the KNI, even though the Cabinet was already in place. The place to register for service in the pemuda were the BKR offices.24 But even though the

KNI had already urged the pemuda to join the army as early as October

9.25 the actual registration in Jakarta did not start until November

5.26

The timing for Urip to begin his assignment could not have been more detrimental. Fighting was going on almost all over Java in the middle of October. On his way back to Yogyakarta Urip was even arrested by the Central Java pemuda who had just returned from the fighting in Semarang. A few days after the arrival of Urip in

Yogyakarta, on October 20, the Allies had already landed in Semarang and subsequently moved to Magelang, a city 20 miles from Yogyakarta.

(see Map No. 1) Despite all of that, Urip went ahead with his plans.

Before he left Jakarta, Urip had already instructed Didi to inform the younger former Knil officers in Bandung to join him in his work to organize the army. Didi himself was assigned to create a

Command for West Java, as one out of the three key commands for all of Java, and one for Sumatra.27 Urip's message was received in Borneo *t Maluku wes%\Jrlan 4 Bal - S o o d /*

J a k a rta

Cirebo Xosgl Bandung Hagelang • Madiun Surabaya Purwokerto Kaliurang # #Tawmngm#ngw ^ Surakarta '^^•^^oavakarto

INDIAN OCEAN

Map No. 1, Java 75

Bandung and the former cadets decided to split up. Some went to

Yogyakarta to help Urip organize the headquarter, while the rest stayed in Bandung to assist Didi in the organization of the West Java

Command. Accordingly, T.B. Simatupang went to Yogyakarta, while

Nasution, Askari, and Alex Kawilarang stayed in Bandung.

In Yogyakarta Urip started to work from a room in a hotel and only later did the Sultan of Yogyakarta decide to give him an old building of the Sultanate to be used as the site of the headquarters.

But by the time Urip announced his decision to have three Commands in

Java and one in Sumatra, all he achieved was the renaming and regrouping of the already established armed pemuda who already organized themselves in the BKR. The command did not even get organized in Central and East Java even though Urip named two former

Knil officers as their commanders. 28 The soldiers in these areas simply disregarded Urip's instructions for reasons which we will soon touch upon.

In West Java the creation of the Command materialized only because in this area the former Knil officers played a leading role more than in the other parts of Java. Beside that, West Java for a long time--since early this century--has already been the area in which higher educational facilities were concentrated. Students from all over the archipelago came to Bandung, Jakarta, and Bogor to further their studies.29 By the time the Dutch surrendered to the

Japanese, there were a lot of students from all over Indonesia who were stranded in West Java. Since there were not many higher 76 education facilities opened by the Japanese during the occupation, many of these students simply joined the armed and mobilized organizations in that period, and others joined the underground. We have seen the decisive role of these students and the pemuda in the days of the proclamation in Jakarta.30 These same students and pemuda, later--when Jakarta was already in the hands of the Allies and then the Dutch--moved out of Jakarta to become part of the West

Java army. As for the former Knil, what made it especially easy for them to have good contacts with the armed pemuda--in the BKR as well as outside--was the position of Nasution during the Japanese occupation as we already touched upon.

In terms of the activities of Didi Kartasasmita, he then proceeded to West Java. Since Bandung was considered not a safe place to have his headquarters, Didi selected Tasikmalaya, a small city not far from Bandung, as the site of his central command. He then appointed Nasution as his Chief of Staff.

This is an account of the experience of Didi in creating his

Command :

In October 1945 I got instructions from the republican government to organize one division of TKR in West Java... Thus I created the division by following a process from top to bottom. But in reality the process went in the other direction, namely from the bottom upward... The commander of each unit was elected by his own troops, a section selected its own section commander, a company selected its company commander and so on. The requirement to be elected as a commander was not based on whether you had or didn't have knowledge sufficient for the job. Popularity was the only requirement. Hierarchical relationships were almost non-existent. Thus the TKR at that time was not an army but just a compilation of pemuda with all sorts of qualities. The costs of sustaining this division came from the people around us.31 77

As the Command Chief of Staff, Nasution's first activités were to

organize his newly created Command. His experiences in this field

are no less interesting.

The selection of the commanders was not always smooth, because the units had already been there, created by local initiative, and almost nothing could be done to change them. I had instructions to make the composition of their commanders "more military". But what I could do was just to confirm the already elected commanders. I once went to Garut with the intention to replace the regiment commander--which was already in the hands of a former judge with his chief of staff a former police chief. My candidate for this regiment, a former Peta Company commander, came together with me to Garut. Here again, I had merely confirmed the existing commander, since my candidate was refused by them.32

The experiences of Didi Kartasasmita and Nasution in West Java were a

typical scene in Java in the early days of the creation of the army.

But compared with what happened in East and Central Java, the efforts of Didi and Nasution in West Java produced far better results. We have seen that out of the three Java Commands only the West Java

Command could be organized. There were several reasons for this.

F irst, as mentioned above, was the role of Nasution during the

Japanese occupation. The other reasons were that the arms carried by troops in Central and East Java far exceeded the West Java troops.

This was because their moves to seize arms from the Japanese were far more successful, than in West Java.33 with such an amount of arms the pemuda in Central and East Java could get themselves organized very early, and the newly organized headquarters in Yogyakarta had no

leverage to reorganize them. Also in Central and East Java, unlike

in West Java, there were no former Knil officers available nor enough students to form the backbone of the new organization.34 There was 78 then an almost smooth transition from Peta to TKR in East and Cental

Java. The small amount of students—mainly from high school--in

these two areas, instead of joining the army as their counterparts in

West Java did, organized their own student a r m y .35

It is against this background that we can understand the

difficulty faced by Urip and his staff in Yogyakarta. But before we

proceed with the above mentioned d ifficu lties, let us now look to the

way Urip staffed his headquarters. As a Knil officer, Urip was put

in detention camp by tne Japanese for a few months following the

collapse of Dutch authority in Indonesia. After he had won his

freedom, Urip went into self exile in a small village near

Yogyakarta. Except for his clandestine contact with some former KMA

cadets, like Nasution, there were no signs of contact between Urip

and any other anti-Japanese movement during that p e r i o d . 36 Thus when

he was suddenly approached by Didi Kartasasmita in October 1945, and

subsequently authorized to organize the headquarters and its army,

there were no other options for Urip other than to rely on the former

Knil officers, whose loyalty he commanded very well. In West Java

this produced a good result, because, as we have seen, there were

many former Knil officers there. But in Central and East Java,

Urip's policy was completely counter productive. And this presents

the problem which arose between the former Peta officers and the

former Knil officers.

Peta, as we know, was organized locally, and was heavily

indoctrinated by the Japanese not only to have self-confidence and 79 rely more on their semangat (sp irit) rather than on their armaments, but also to hate the white men. One of the famous solgans at that time was Belanda kita landa, Inggris kita linggis, Amerika kita setrika (We will run into the Dutch, crow bar the British, and iron out the A m e r i c a n ) . 37 it was because of this mental indoctrination among the former Peta officers that they became very suspicious of

Urip and most of his staff, the former Knil officers. There was also another technical reason for these problems. As an army created locally, Peta never got a chance to develop into an army with a headquarters, even though in the last days of the occupation an embryo of general staff was already created.38 Because of this, it is understandable if the former Peta officers, without staff experience, had very little appreciation of how an army staff worked.

The immediate problems for Urip was certainly the suspicion of the former Peta officers toward himself and his staff. Mrs. Urip

Sumoharjo remembers this problem vividly in her memoirs:

The former Knil [officers] had open attitudes toward their younger colleagues and were ready to help them as much as they can. The younger [freedom] fighters harbored suspicious attitudes, some times bordering on hatred toward the others, whom they labeled cs "Dutch servants".39

Another, not less serious, problem for Urip, was the lack of direction from the central government toward the headquarters in

Yogyakarta. While the fighting was going on all over Java against the incoming Allies, the central government in Jakarta had its own policy toward the Allies, whom they regarded not as an enemy. And by befriending the British, Jakarta was hoping to isolate the Dutch who 80 were already "smuggled in" by the Allies. The battle of Surabaya was a good example of the confusion at that time. The Jakarta government was working hard to stop the fighting at the expense of the

Indonesian side, when the headquarters in Yogyakarta mobilized its entire force to fight in Surabaya, even if the recruits were cadets of the newly created Military A c a d e m y .40

It was because of this confusion, and because of the d ifficult position of the headquarters—sandwiched between the unclear direction of the government on one side, and the reluctance of the former Peta officers to obey the orders of the headquarters on the other side—that led Urip Soemoharjo to come to the conclusion that a special m ilitary conference in Yogyakarta was needed. It was planned to have all m ilitary commanders from Java and Sumatra as well as the representatives of the Jakarta government at the conference.

Accordingly, all the invitees were in Yogyakarta on November 11,

1945, the day the conference was o fficially opened by Urip. The conference was intended to discuss the confusion and to seek a common way to fight the enemy, and presumably to decide who the enemy was.

The government was represented by Sulyoadikusumo, Minister ad interim for People's Security.

The shadow of the problems between the former Knil and Peta officers were certainly not absent at this very historic meeting.

Thus, even before the meeting had started, the former Peta officers, the majority of the participants, had apparently already lobbied among each other. Nasution described the proceedings of the conference as follows: 81

Urip started by explaining about the indecision in Surabaya and Jakarta. He then stressed the need to have a common tactic and strategy. But Urip's explanation was very difficult to follow. The old man spoke more fluent Dutch or Javanese than Indonesian language. If half of his explanation was understood, that was something. Suddenly there emerged a certain Holland Iskandar, a former Peta officer. He stressed that what we really need is a leader, a Panqlima Besar (Commander in Chief). Like being mesmerized, Urip simply lost control of the conference, and Iskandar's opinion very easily had the support of his friends, the former Peta officers, who were dominating the conference. I am sure, before the conference, the former Peta officers had already discussed their position, and Holland Iskandar only acted as their spokesman. There was also the suggestion that the Minister of Defense should be elected. A suggestion was accepted, and the selection was summarily started. We elected the candidate by raising our finger for our choice.

The candidates for Panqlima Besar were, among others. Colonel Sudirman from Banyumas, Urip Soemoharjo and Mulyadi Joyomartono from Barisan Banteng Surakarta. I myself voted for Urip. But Sudirman won the election, among others, because the representatives from Sumatra gave all of their voices to Sudirman. After that, we proceeded to the election of the Defense Minister, while Sulyadikusumo was among us. Sultan Hamengkubuwono, attending the meeting in a general's o u tfit, won the election. The other candidates were Syahrir and Amir Syarifuddin. ...Following the election of Sudirman, there came an announcement that there would be a meeting on strategy. Interestingly enough, the announcement was not issued by Urip. And in the evening, we were all there, it was already Sudirman who chaired the meeting. But the topic of the meeting turned out to be not about strategy but all sorts of complaints... Then there was an announcement again, that there would be a meeting the next day in Kaliurang. The next day I went there, but nothing happened. We got together in a former Japanese house, sitting around and drinking.41

If the results of the conference were important, the proceedings were no less interesting. Didi Kartasasmita, who, together with Nasution and some other former Knil officers, representing West Java, remembers the occasion as follows:

We, from West Java, mostly former Knil, voted for Urip. But we lost, because former Peta officers were in the majority. At that time the Minister ad interim for People's Security, Sulyoadikusumo, was also there, and made a speech. But people 82

shouted him down, "Step down, you. That is not right." I too had my turn to speak, and was also shouted down." That is not so, step down." That was it, like playing cowboy (kayak koboi- koboian). The invitees all with their guns. It was crazy. It was really a revolutionary meeting.42

It was a revolutionary meeting and the mood was certainly playing a

very decisive role. To understand the election of Sudirman as

Panglima Besar, for instance, one has to remember not only the fact

that the majority of invitees were against Urip Sumoharjo because he

was Knil, but also because at the time of the revolution, an old man

like Urip--who was already over fifty at that time and twenty years

older than Sudirman--certainly had a small place among the younger

and more militant generation. But certainly his ability to communicate also should be considered. The fact that he spoke little

Indonesian was surely one of his major handicaps at a time when nationalism was very much the sign of the era. But the real reason for the election of the Panglima Besar should be found in the absence of Supriyadi, the hero of the Blitar Rebellion, who in the eyes of the invitees could never possibly shoulder the duty as leader of the army because of his absence long before the proclamation.

The case with the election of the Defense Minister can also be understood in the same light. Sulyoadikusumo was not a prominent person when he was appointed as Minister ad interim for People's

Security. As a former Peta battalion commander his achievement was nowhere near Sudirman's. And the fact that his performance in the

Yogyakarta conference--he was ordered down--was so unimpressive, could lead us to suspect that the election for the chair of defense 83 minister was the result of the unimpressiveness of the contemporary minister rather than because there was a coherent political concept of the former Peta officers to impose their will on the government.

What I mean by "a coherent political concept of the former Peta

officers to impose their will on the government" is something that

one can easily conclude from the later development of the political

position of the Indonesian army, especially in the period before

1956, namely the autonomy of the army from the government. It is

common for the writer who suspects the existence of what I call "a

coherent political concept..." to explain it by looking at the way

Peta-- as the majority in the Indonesian army--were trained by the

Japanese. Thus Ruth I. McVey writes that,

already in Peta, future army leaders had been persuaded by their Japanese mentors of the need for military independence from civilian control.42

Accordingly, the Japanese lectures to Indonesian soldiers were:

...based on article XI of the Meiji Constitution--on the so called "prerogative of Supreme Command." The article XI removed control of the armed forces in Japan from the general affairs and placed it directly in the hand of the E m p e r o r . 44

In pre-war Japan, due to the Meiji Constitution, the leaders of the

military were given freedom from the control of the civilian

government. They were then directly under the E m p e r o r . 45

Nasution, while not disagreeing with the possibility of a

Japanese legacy, also remains aware of the legacy of the Dutch

Netherland Indies, possibly brought to the Indonesian army by the

former Dutch trained Knil. 84

I think the problem of the Meiji constitution was made familiar to the Indonesians indirectly while they were trained by the Japanese. But then do not forget that, for the former Knil, they too had a tradition of Leger Commandant, Panqlima Besar (Army Commander in Chief) as the second man after the Governor General in the Netherlands Indies. And because at that time there was no defense minister, the Leger Commandant then automatically acted as chief of the War Department.46

For many of the participants in the conference, the election took place because it was a revolutionary time. A revolution is a time filled with uncertainty, and for that they needed leadership.

Sukarno did not give them clear guidance--if any--and Urip was a former Knil officer whose bahasa Indonesia (Indonesian language) was not even fully understood by his officers. But whatever the reasons for the election--be it the legacy of the Japanese, the Netherlands

Indies the revolution its e lf, or a combination of the three--one thing is clear: the election was only a pinnacle of the process of self creation of the army at a time when the government was not sure what to do in the field of defense.

In the following chapters we will see that the government finally determined to fully take control of the defense of the country. Nevertheless the reluctance of the government to deal with the military in the early days of the revolution already had created a particular pattern of civil-military relations, after which the government never succeeded in bringing the army completely under governmental control. Footnotes

1. Sukarno, An Autobiography as Told to Cindy Adams, (Kansas City, New York: The Bobbs Merrill Company, Inc., 1965), p. 266.

2. A.H. Nasution, Sekitar Perang Kemerdekaan Indonesia, Vol. Ill, (Bandung: Penerbit Anqkasa, 1977), p. 123; KNI or Komite Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Committee) was a body created out of PPKI, Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (Committee for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence). At the national level KNI was known as KNIP in which the letter P stood for Pusat (Central). KNIP was given the role of a temporary parliament. In each region there was regional KNI, and below that there were many local KNI. In the fir s t few months of the revolution--before the parties came into being— KNI, central, regional, as well as local were acting more like the Soviets in the early days of the Russian revolution.

3. Osman Raliby, Documenta Historica, (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1953), p. 17.

4. George McTurnan Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1970), pp. 161- 164; on the creation of Hisbullah, see H.J. Benda, The Crescent and The Rising Sun, (The Hague and Bandung: W van Hoeve Ltd., 1958), p. 179.

5. See footnote no. 19 in the previous chapter.

6 . Benedict R. O'G Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution, (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1972), pp. 376-377.

7. Anderson, Java, p. 259.

8 . See footnote no. 4 above.

9. The writer got this information from several interviews with retired army officers who were active in the early days of the revolution. Interviews were conducted in Indonesia, fall 1984.

10. Sajidiman Surjohadiprodjo, Langkah-Langkah Perjuangan Kita, (Jakarta: Departemen Hankam, 1971), p. 17.

85 86

11. Osman Raliby, Documenta Historica. p. 47.

12. David Wehl, The Birth of Indonesia, (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1948), p. 51.

13. May. Jen. T. B. Simatupang, Pelopor Dalam Perang Pelopor Dal am Damai, (Jakarta: Sinar Harapan, 1981), pp. 50-56.

14. According to Nasution, from his f ir s t meeting with Urip, the old man already encouraged him to think of a national army. See Nasution's memoir, Memenuhi Panggilan Tuqas, VCol. I, (Jakarta: Gungung Agung, 1982), p. 65.

15. I.E. Simatupang, interview, Jakarta, September 20, 1985.

16. Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan, Vol. I, p. 67.

17. I.E. Simatupang, inteview, Jakarta, September 20, 1985.

18. Didi Kartasasmita, interview, Jakarta, September 21, 1985.

19. Ali Sastroamijoyo. Milestones of My Journey, (St. Lucia, Queensland: University of Queensland Press, 1979),. pp. 106- 107.

20. Merdeka, October 16, 1945.

21. Rohmah Soemohardjo Soebroto, Urip Soemohardjo Letnan Jenderal TNI, (Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 1971), p. 100.

22. Mohammad Hatta, Memoir, (Jakarta: Tinta Mas, 1979), p. 471.

23. Merdeka, October 20, 1945.

24. A.H. Nasution, TNI, Vol. I, (Jakarta: Seruling Masa, 1970), p. 126.

25. Nasution, TNI, Vol. I, p. 126.

26. Merdeka, November 5, 1945.

27. Nasution, TNI, Vol. 1, pp. 208-211.

28. The commander of the East Java Command, Major General Mohammad, was even kidnapped by two of his subordinates, Zainul Sabaruddin and Jonosewoyo. Only in May 1947 were the last two officers finally put on trial. See Nasional.(daily published in Yogyakarta), May 17, 1947.

29. Ulf Sundhaussen, "The Political Orientation and Political Involvement of the Indonesian Officers Corps 1945-1946: The 87

Siliwangi Division and the Army Headquarters." Ph.D. Dissertation, Monash University, Melbourne, Australia, 1971, pp. 76-77.

30. Dr. Soejono Martosewojo, MD/MPH, Professor Dr. Eri Soedewo (eds.), Mahasiswa *45 Prapatan 10: Penqabdiannya Vol. I, (Bandungl Patma, 1984), pp. 49-157.

31. Interrogation of Didi Kartasasmita, Batavia (Jakarta), November 9, 1948, CMI Document no. 24, Royal Dutch Archieve, General Secretary, Box VII, No. 24.

32. Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan, Vol. 1, p. 32.

33. According to Smail, at the beginning of October 1945 a number of the local leaders in Bandung (West Java) entered into negotiations with local Japanese military commander. Major General Mabuchi. Some time before October 10, an understanding was reached. But while there was an understanding between the Japanese and the leaders--mostly nationalist politicians closely associated with Jakarta's policy of diplomacy--there was clear misunderstanding between these leaders and the pemuda. Thus the pemuda went on their own way with their spontaneous attack on the Japanese while the leaders still negotiated a way to get the arms. Feeling betrayed, the Japanese then abandoned the agreement and mounted an attack and once again brought Bandung under the Japanese control. This fierce action of the Japanese army toward the Indonesians apparently was the result of an instruction from the commander of the Japanese 16th army in Jakarta who in turn got the instruction from the already landed Allies.

As the result of the Japanese attack and sweep, Bandung's pemuda not only lost the chance to get arms, but also lost many arms they had already collected from their sporadic attacks against the many scattered Japanese posts in and around Bandung. See Smail, Bandung in The Early Revolution, pp. 58-64; on the bitterness of Bandung's pemuda toward the political leaders whom they blamed for the Japanese attack, see Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan, VOl. I, p. 76.

34. Lt. Gen. H. Sudirman, former commander of the East Java Division, remembers of his difficulty in Feta when he had to behave like an officer. "What is an officer? We in Bojonegoro .East Java had never seen any Knil officer. We had difficulty even to imagine how an officer should be different from a so ld ier... In East Java almost all of us were former Feta. That was the rason why we did not have problems with lasykar as they had in West Java. In West Java, the leaders of the army were students and the well educated former Knil officers. In East Java, the leaders were just the common people." Lt. GEn. H. Sudirman, interview, Jakarta, October 2, 1984. 88

35. West Java was the home of most of the higher educational institutions; there were then more students in this area than in East and Central Java. The small amount of students in the last two areas decided to join the army by the way of special organization. Thus in East Java there was TRIP, Tentara Republik Indonesia Pelajar (Indonesian Republican Army Student Branch), and in Central Java there was TP, Tentara Pelajar (Student Army). The integration of students of West Java into the army was also the result of Nasution's policy of not having armed organization outside the formal army. This particular policy had made the West Java Siliwangi Division the most e litis t of the Indonesian army divisions. Nasution even worked hard to disband all the lasykar and, following a tight selection, integrated them to his division. See Sundhaussen, "The Political Orientation", pp. 69-70; Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan, Vol. I, pp. 151-154; Keluarga Ex Anggota Brigade XVII Tentara Pelajar Compagnie Purwokerto, Sejarah Perjuangan Tentara Pelajar Purwokerto, (Jakarta; PT. Inaltu, 1979).

36. Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan, Vol. 1, p. 65.

37. This Japanese slogan was not only the root of the antagonism between Peta and Knil, but also the source of the resistance of most of the members of the army to the policy of diplomacy. Dayino, interview, Yogyakarta, October 31, 1984.

38. According to Lt. Gen. Kemal Idris and Colonel Zulkifli Lubis, the Japanese had just started to organize a sort of general s ta ff--Sidobu in Japanese--when the war suddenly came to its end. Zulkifli Lubis, interview, Jakarta, September 21, 1984, Kemal Idris, interview, Jakarta, September 20, 1984; see also Nugroho Notosusanto, Tentara Peta, p. 97.

39. Rohmah Soemohardjo-Soebroto, Oerip Soemohardjo Letnan Jenderal TNI, (Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 1973), pp. 90-91.

40. On the participation of the Yogyakarta Military Aacademy in the battle of Surabaya, see Drs. Moehradi, Akademi Militer Yogya Dalam Perjuangan Pisik 1945-1949, (Jakarta: Inalu, 1 9 7 7 ),pp. 48-50; on the position of the government and the visit of Sukarno to Surabaya to stop the fighting, see David Wehl, The Birth of Indonesia, pp. 55-57.

41. Nasution, interview, Jakarta, September 11, 1984.

42. Didi Kartasasmita, interview, Jakarta, September 21, 1984.

43. Ruth McVey, "The post-Revolutionary Transformation of the Indonesian Army," Indonesia, no. 11 (April) 1971, p. 136. 89

44. Rudolf Mrazek, The United States and the Indonesian Military 1945-1966, (Prague: Oriental Institute in Academia, 1978), p.

45. John M. Maki, Japanese Militarism, Its Cause and Cure, (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1945), p. 117.

46. Nasution, interview, Jakarta, November 17, 1984. Chapter IV

THE ARMY, THE GOVERNMENT AND THE OPPOSITION

We need a disciplined army structured along modern lines. Our youth as a whole must be given training to f il l this need. We therefore not only require a well-organized, modern army with up-to-date weapons, but also military training for our whole people, especially our youth. We must institute militia as soon as possible, in which all young people, beginning at a certain age, will have to undergo military training for a specified period... Since our struggle is expressed in the form of the Indonesian State, so we must utilize the power instruments of the state, we are compelled to build up the main instruments of the state struggle--in other words, the Army. But this certainly ought not to be taken to mean that we should become the slaves of the state or the military--i.e., fascists and militarists.! Sutan Syahrir

Frankly speaking, the leadership of the army never depended on the leadership of the state. The leadership of the army was a big component in the national struggle... It was I who tried to link the strategy of the army and the strategy of the political leadership.2 T.B. Simatupang

In the previous chapter we touched upon the "silent coup" which brought Syahrir to power. In this chapter we will see how the new government dealt with the m ilitary. But to understand this we should f ir s t examine the days prior to the end of the Sukarno government and the principles and policies for which the Syahrir government stood.

We have learned that Sukarno's presidential cabinet--which came into office on September 5, nineteen days after the declaration of

90 91

independence--was unable to control the revolutionary tide as

spearheaded by the pemuda. This was due primarily to the

unwillingness of the government to provoke the Japanese and its

insistence on showing the Allies that it was a peaceful government

which did not even possess any army. But while the pemuda disregarded this policy by adopting aggressive actions against the

Japanese and the Allies, in the political circle of Jakarta there were also moves to end the indecisive policy of Sukarno's government.

The f irs t such move came from Tan Malaka. Tan Malaka or Sutan

Ibrahim gelar Datuk Tan Malaka was an old nationalist who suddenly reemerged around proclamation day after having spent twenty years in exile under the Dutch and a few years in self-exile, somewhere in

West Java, during the Japanese occupation.

...Tan Malaka appeared in Djakarta precisely at the time when the republican leadership was experiencing the greatest anxiety about its future. It was a period when there was real reason to believe that Sukarno and Hatta would be arrested and tried for collaboration by the Allies and when there was as yet no real sign of the coming of pemuda tide. In late August and early September the future of the republic was completely problematic.3

According to Anderson's sources, Sukarno and Hatta then offered

Tan Malaka a post in their cabinet. But like Syahrir, Tan Malaka refused to have anything to do with the goverment. Tan Malaka, in a secret meeting in the house of Sukarno's personal d o c t o r ,4 advised

Sukarno to take refuge in the hinterland. No detailed information about the secret meeting exists, but a few days after that there appeared what became known as the "Tan Malaka Testament." The 92 testament was a by-product of the feeling of uncertainty of Sukarno and Hatta at that tim e.5 It specified that if both of them were harmed by the Japanese or by the Allies, the leadership of the country would then automatically pass into the hands of the persons whose names were designated in the Testament.

The Testament became irrelevant when General Christison's proclamation was broadcast from Singapore at the end of September.

But Syahrir and his group and Tan Malaka had another meeting in

October. Apparently both were trying to reach an agreement on how to present an alternative to Sukarno's administration. The meeting failed because, according to Anderson, Tan Malaka rejected Syahrir's idea of forming political parties that would organize a government to replace Sukarno's cabinet. For Tan Malaka the best strategy was to keep the contemporary government but reinforce it by bringing in the revolutionaries^.

Since the two politicans failed to reach common ground, they then pursued their own separate courses. Syahrir became prime minister and Tan Malaka led the opposition. Before becoming prime minister, Syahrir had to pave his way to that position from another important post, namely in the KNIP. It was his position as the chairman of the Badan Pekerja (working committee) of the KNIP that opened the door for Syahrir and his group to move the country in the direction they wanted. First he urged the government to give the

KNIP legislative power, when that body was merely in an advisory capacity to the president. He then moved toward the changing of the government, from a presidential to a parliamentary system, from a 93 more or less American system to European one. The reason behind this change, surprisingly enough, was s till consistent with Sukarno's insistence to show the Allies that the new state was not only peaceful but democratic. It was because the perceived need to demonstrate the democratic nature of the Republic that Syahrir and his colleagues in

KNIP arrived at the decision to push for legislation that encouraged the formation of many political parties in contrast to Sukarno's idea of one state party.7 It was this decision to have many parties-- opposed bitterly by Tan Malaka--that opened the gate for the further politicization of the society which later the government hardly could control. It is against this background that we should understand the deeper politicization of the Indonesian m ilitary. For, as Huntington has acknowledged, the reasons for the m ilitary to intervene also explain the politicization of other social forces in thes o c i e t y . 8

The politicization of the society was not the only result of

Syahrir's policy of multi-party system, for the system also opened the gate for bickering among the many political forces in the society as was shown clearly by the b itter confrontation between the Tan Malaka group and the Syahrir group. Elite bickering its e lf actually was not a sudden phenomena in Indonesian politics in the early days of the independence, for its history goes back even to the early days of nationalist movement decades before. One can even say that elite bickering was a conspicous character of Indonesian political life from the dawn of the nationalist movement early in this century down to the present day. But what was special about the e lite political 94

bickering in the early days of the revolution was that it took place

in a time when unity was badly needed. In addition Indonesian

political elites, unlike Indian political elites in the early days of

India's independence, were newcomers to the government and political

institutions. This is certainly due to the different colonial policies in the two countries. While the British Raj created the

Indian Civil Service and allowed the Indian Congress Party to develop long before the independence, the Dutch in Indonesia denied the nationalist movement any chance to grow. Instead of creating a corps of Indonesian Civil Service the colonial authority had relied on a traditional civil service whose life dated back to the traditional rulers in the archipelago long before the coming of the Dutch.

Moreover, this traditional civil service was devastated by the

Japanese policy of mobilization and what was left was torn apart by unleashed popular power in the early days of the revolution.

For Syahrir, working through KNIP, changing the party and political system was not the only way to pay his road to power. Thus on November 10, the day the Battle of Surabaya broke out, and two days before the military decided to elect Sudirman to be their

Panqlima Besar, the Department of Information in Jakarta published

Perjuangan Kita (Our Struggle) by Syahrir. In his preface to the

English translation of this political pamphlet 23 years after it was published. Professor Kahin writes:

Written in the first months of the nationalist revolution, it is probably not only Syahrir's most important political writing, but it is a document essential for understanding the course of the revolution's subsequent development. It represents as well 95

one of the most forceful statements by an Indonesian intellectual-politician of the problems of making the liberal- socialist parliamentary tradition of Europe relevant and meaningful to the aspirations, the concerns, and the h o stilities felt by Indonesian society as it emerged from the colonial experiences and sought to find a satisfying direction for its nationalism in an independent s ta te .%

At the time when there were so many pamphlets and leaflets being published and circulated, Perjuangan Kita would not have gained the attention it did had Syahrir not become Prime Minister. The pamphlet was

...a b itter inventory of the darkest features of the Japanese occupation: forced labor, compulsory rice deliveries, lawlessness, corruption , and brutality. But it focused particularly on what Syahrir felt to be the two most permanently dangerous consequences of the war years: f ir s t, the rise of a considerable group of nationalists whom he regarded as having sold out to the Japanese; and second, what he saw as the corruption of Indonesian youth by the militarist and fascist attitude inculcated through various Japanese-sponsored organizations.10

Because Our Struggle has already been discussed thoroughly by

Kahin and Anderson, we will only mention parts of it which are relevant to our purpose. The publication of Perjuangan Kita four days before Syahrir became the prime minister put this pamphlet in the position of not only outlining the policies and programs of the new government, but also presenting the justificaiton to end the reign of the old one:

The Indonesian Republican State, which we have made the instrument of our people's revolution, must also be made the instrument of our democratic struggle, purged of all traces of Japanese fascism. The present constitution, which is still far from fully democratic, must be replaced by a wholly democratic constitution which will imprint on every organ of state administration the fundamental rights of people...H 95

And the task of purging all traces of Japanese fascism should certainly be begun by discharging the old government, since those in control of that administration were

...fa r too accustomed to kowtow to and run errands for the Dutch and the Japanese. Psychologically they are irresolute and have proved quite incapable of acting decisively and assuming responsibility...many of them s till feel morally obliged to the Japanese, who "bestowed" on them an opportunity to "prepare" Indonesian Independence. In their own eyes, they have become the government because they worked together with the Japanese.12

The pemuda also had their place in this pamphlet:

The present psychological condition of our youth is deeply tragic. In spite of their burning enthusiasm, they are full of confusion and indecision because they have no understanding of their potentialities and perspectives of struggle they are waging. Thus their vision is necessarily very limited. Many of them simply cling to the slogan of Freedom or Death. Whenever they sense that Freedom is s till far from certain, and yet they themselves have not faced death, they are seized with doubt and hesitation.13

Indonesia's position and future is explicitly explained in the pamphlet:

Indonesia is geographically situated within the sphere of influence of Anglo-Saxon capitalism and imperialism. Accordingly Indonesia's fate ultimately depends on the fate of Anglo-Saxon capitalism and imperial ism . 14

Because of that particular position Syahrir then had no other choice but to negotiate with f ir s t the Allies and later the Dutch.

Syahrir's strategy in dealing with the Allies, especially with the

British, according to Subadio Sastrosatomo, a close associate of

Syahrir at that time,

was not treating them as an enemy. Rather he treated them as a victorious democratic power, the winner of a war against fascism, and coming to Indonesia only for the purpose of dismantling the power of the Japanese.15 97

This strategy obviously put Syahrir's cabinet in a position of unpopularity among the youth. This unpopularity became even worse when most of the former members of the previous cabinet--politicians scorned by Syahrir as "men without character"--joined the opposition and worked hard to win the sympathy of the pemuda inside as well as outside the army. We will return to this problem later, but let us now have a look at the development of the army following the election of Sudirman and the subsequent reaction of the government.

When in Yogyakarta the army decided to elect Sudirman as their

Panglima Besar and Hamengkubuwono IX as the Minister of Defense,

Syahrir was busy in Jakarta composing his cabinet. The cabinet's composition was made public on November 14, only two days after the election in Yogyakarta. Considering the difficulty of communication

at that time, we can easily conclude that Syahrir was not aware of

the election when he decided to have Amir Syarifuddin, former

Minister of Information in Sukarno's previous cabinet and his

colleague in the Socialist Party, to be the Defense Minister. We

have seen also that it was Amir Syarifuddin who managed to contact

the former Knil officers who later on became the nucleus of the Army

Headquarters under Urip Sumoharjo. Thus it was no wonder that

Syahrir decided to give Syarifuddin the post of Defense Minister.

This decision understandably antagonized the army. According to

Nasution,

...Prime Minister Syahrir defended his power to appoint whoever he wanted to be the Defense Minister. He had already appointed Amir Syarifuddin who was very popular as a minister among the people at that time. Accordingly, in one of the army working 98

conferences chaired by General Sudirman, one general launched a protest to the fact that we had a minister who was Christian while most of us were Moslem. At the same meeting, in which I participated as the representative of West Java, there was a long and heated negotiation. Finally we managed to compose a lis t of promotions to the offices in the general staff and other important positions which later on would be presented to the government.16

This meeting was taking place after the government finally recognized

Sudirman as the Panqlima Besar of the army on December 18, more than

one month after Syahrir became Prime M inister.17 During that period

defense matters in Indonesia were certainly in disarray. While in

Jakarta there was a Defense Minister who followed the line of

diplomacy, in Yogyakarta there were two separate leaderships of the

army. On the one hand there was Sudirman who, after the election,

was looked upon as the highest commander, but at the same time there was Urip Sumoharjo who s till functioned as the Chief of S taff.18

To most of the army, the instructions and orders they obeyed were the one issued by Sudirman, the commander they had elected to

command them. Behind this dualism of army leadership, there was

again the shadow of suspicion of the former Peta toward the former

Knil officers. Since most of the members of the Headquarters under

Urip were officers from the Knil, the orders and instructions from this office were rarely obeyed by the troops which mainly consisted of former Peta.19

It was expected that the dualism of the army's leadership would end when the government finally decided to recognize Sudirman as the

Panqlima Besar and Sudirman in turn retained Urip Sumoharjo as his 99

Chief of Staff. But one form of dualism disappeared only to be

replaced by another, this time between the Headquarters and the

Defense Ministry. The m ilitary and the government apparently each

had its own interpretation toward the confirmation of Sudirman in his

position as Panglima Besar. For the military the confirmation was

taken to be recognition by the government of the autonomy of the

miltary, while the government viewed its decision only as a first

step in the governmental policy to bring the army under control.

To understand this different interpretation and its consequences

for defense policies, one has to consider not only the historical

background of the creation of the army and its political and

psychological consequences, but also geographical aspects as well.

We have seen that by the time the government ordered Urip Sumoharjo

to organize the headquarters, the latter had decided upon Yogyakarta

as the site of the new office. Considering the differences of the

challenges faced by metropolitan Jakarta and the provincial town of

Yogyakarta, it is easy to understand the policy differences issuing from these different geographical backgrounds. In Jakarta were the

Allies and the newly created Dutch Civilian Authority, known as NICA.

In Yogyakarta, even the Japanese army was already disarmed. This

factor helps us to understand the conflict faced by Nasution as a

commander in West Java, the province in which Jakarta is located.

Accordingly, when the Allies in Bandung insisted that the

Indonesian army should leave the city to them, Nasution was in a very difficult position. Geographically he was close to Jakarta and 100

because of that he was in constant contact with Syahrir and

Syarifuddin, more so than with the headquarters in Yogyakarta which

at the time of revolution lacked in adequate communication equipment.

In Jakarta Prime Minister Syahrir decided that TRI [Indonesian Republican Army I should comply with the Allies demand, because the poorly armed TRI was no match for the 23rd Division of British. By doing this the TRI could be saved, and the city could be taken back by the way of diplomacy... But when I reached my command post, the Chief of Staff showed me a cable from Yogya without the address of the sender. It read "We have to defend every inch of our l a n d . "20

At such a time, when the enemy was in the center of the city waiting to implement their ultimatum and headquarters could not be reached,

Nasution had no other alternative but to choose a middle way.

As a commander who was responsible to decide what to do, I finally decided to deviate from the instruction from Jakarta, namely to leave the city [after conducting] a scorched earth, policy, infiltrating the guerrilla fighters into the northern part of the city area already occupied by the British .21

But whereas this middle way of Nasution was not a problem which concerned the government, it was a serious one for Yogyakarta. It took a few weeks for Nasution to straighten out his decision with the headquarters.

Nasution had never really succeeded in solving all of his problems with Yogyakarta. Geography was but one of many. Another problem was that the West Java Division, Siliwangi, as we have already touched upon, was dominated by former Knil officers who were accustomed to a m ilitary subordination to the civilian government.

Beside that, there were many officers in this division who had been students in Jakarta and Bandung during the Japanese occupation. Many of them had been related in one way or another with Syahrir's 101 underground during the occupation. So it is understandable if there were some factors, besides geography, that made the West Java division perceive itself as closer to Jakarta then to Yogyakarta.22

This problem between Yogyakarta and the West Java Division will be discussed further later. Suffice it here to say that the many conflicts in defense polities as the result of the dual leadership of the Army Headquarters and Defense Ministry as well as conflicts involving the West Java Siliwangi division were not only had historical, political and psychological causes, but geographical ones as well. One can even say that the lack of communication equipments

in the early days of revolution contributed sizeably to the deepening of the existing conflicts between the military and the government as well as within the m ilitary itse lf.

Enter Amir Syarifuddin

Amir Syarifuddin from the Socialist Party was in a Japanese jail when Sukarno appointed him to be Minister of Information in the f ir s t administration. Because of his involvement in the underground movement, the Japanese sentenced him to death in 1943. Only the

intervention of Sukarno and Hatta saved his life and his sentence was commuted to life imprisonment.

Amir was born in Sumatra in 1907, and was a Muslem before he converted to Christianity. He held a degree of law from the Law

Faculty in Jakarta after attending high school in the Netherlands.23

Before the Japanese came to Indonesia, Syarifuddin had been one of the leaders of the le ftis t political movement, Gerindo (Movement of 102 the Indonesian People) prior to being detained by the colonial government. He was then given a choice, to work for the government or to go into exile. He chose the former, and subsequently worked in the Department of Economy. Before the arrival of the Japanese, the

Dutch provided him with funds to use for underground activities against the Japanese.

Amir Syarifuddin came to the Defense Ministry when there was a movement among the army leaders to change the army from the Army for

People's Security (TKR) to the Army of the Republic of Indonesia,

(TRI). Thus one of Amir's f ir s t acts was to preside over this name change. The decision was made public on January 2, 1946 in

Yogyakarta, 20 days after Sukarno, the constitutional President, and most of the government agencies ahd left Jakarta, then in the hands of the Allies and NICA, the Dutch Civil Authority. The declaration to change the name of the army contained five points, of which two were important; f ir s t, the TRI was the only military organization of the Republic of Indonesia; and second, to improve the organization of the army, the government would appoint some experts on m ilitary affairs to a committee to prepare a plan for the reorganization of the army.24

The changing of the name and the fact that the government recognized TRI as the only armed organization which would be fashioned into the army, showed clearly the basic attitude of the government toward the army, namely as an instrument of the state. To understand the background of this decision one has to look back to 103 the days following the recognition of Sudirman as the elected

Panglima Besar, a month before. The f ir s t move of Sudirman to consolidate his power was to try to organize the army. He did not succeed, because

In that particular meeting the autonomy of the divisional commanders was clear. Their opinions showed clearly their reluctance to release the power already in their hands. 25

If we keep in mind that the commanders of all layers of the army -- from sections to Panglima Besar -- were the result of so many elections at a time when the government paid no attention to the army, it is not difficult to understand the reluctance of the commanders to subordinate themselves easily, even to Sudirman, the man they elected as their highest leader. One can then imagine that these common attitudes of the many commanders, at least morally, inspired Sudirman to behave the same toward the central government.

On May 17, the committee chaired by Urip made public its findings. The government subsequently reorganized the army based on that. On May 21 Sudirman was sworn in as the Panglima Besar and promoted to full general, while Urip Sumoharjo kept his old position as chief of staff with the rank of Lieutenant General. But neither the government nor the Panqlima Besar cared to appoint even one commander for the seven newly reorganized divisions. Instead they let the regimental commanders elect their own divisional commanders.

The election took place on May 12.26 on the same day the Defense

Minister and President signed the results of the election. The divisional commanders had the rank of Major General while their chiefs of staff were given the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. 104

The committee not only dealt with the army but also with the problem of the lasykar and their position in the defense structure,

since the government had already decided to unite all the armed organizations of the Republic. In this matter the committee didn't

succeed because the many lasykar showed their willingness to cooperate with the army but refused to be integrated. "They looked

to themselves as the fighters for a peoples' revolution."27 But while the lasykar were not integrated into the army, nevertheless, it was agreed that their budget would be looked after by the government.

In order to coordinate them, a new organization. Biro Perjuangan,

(Office of Struggle), was created in the Defense Ministry.

Originally this office was to be an office where all lasykar from different ideologies, different groups, would be coordinated. But since the Defense Minister was a socialist as were most of his assistants and because the best organized lasykar was Pesindo (The

Socialist Youth), the Biro Perjuangan slowly drifted into the control of the socialists.

Another product of the committee was a section in the Defense

Ministry which was in charge of political education in the army, known at that time as Pepolit, Pendidikan Politik Tentara (Political

Education for the Army). Both the Biro Perjuangan and the Pepolit were not popular among the army. For the more modern oriented officers, like Nasution and most of his colleagues in the West Java division, the Biro Perjuangan was not only creating dualism in defense policy, but also was acting as "party soldiers" whose 105

ideologies and strategies were mostly in conflict with their own.

The Pepolit, whose political officers were mainly politicians who

were given military ranks, was also perceived by the army as an

intervention of the politicians into their realm.28 But one can

understand fully the background of this controversy only in the

context of their time.

In their march to power Syahrir and his colleagues, employing

their position in KNIP, had managed to produce a declaration which

abolished the State Party created by Sukarno and replaced the one party system with the multi party system.29 Because of this, there then emerged many parties in the Republic. As early as the third week of November--the firs t week of Syahrir cabinet--the signs of sharp conflict between those who supported Syahrir and those who did not were already visible in the KNIP. Only after a long and heated debate did the KNIP on November 27 finally agree to let the cabinet work.30

But animosity between the cabinet and the opposition became even more sharp when the government moved to Yogyakarta. The opposition which rallied around Tan Malaka consisted of many kinds of people, including those politicians who were former members of Sukarno's administration. These politicians harbored not only political differences with Syahrir, but also personal embitterment because of their being scorned as "men without character" in Our Struggle. The main theme of the differences between the opposition and the government was basically still the old dichotomy between pemuda and 105 the government, namely perjuangan or diplomacy (to fight or to negotiate) in dealing with the Allies and later on, the Dutch.

As the political parties began taking their places in the

Republic, the pemuda, in the form of lasykar, also slowly drifted into the laps of the parties. Thus Pesindo slowly became the army of the Socialist Party, Hisbullah of Masyumi (Moslem Party), Barisan

Banteng of the PNI (Indonesian Nationalist Party) and so on. But the parties did not stop at the lasykar. Some of them tried to extend their hands into the army.31 Often this was not d ifficu lt, since the members of the army were mainly from Peta, and

Peta battalion commanders were recruited by the Japanese from among the leaders in the society . . . The political influence could reach the army through these former battalion commanders. Most of these people had already had their own ideological affiliation before they joined Peta. The relations with their old ideological affiliations were then revived after they became members of the army during the revolution.32

The leaders of the army apparently were very much aware of this link between the parties and their men inside the army. Accordingly,

Sudirman at every opportunity always stressed to his soldiers the need to realize that they are serving the nation and the state and not the party. At the same time, Sudirman also stressed the need to develop the ability of the army to cooperate with all organizations," but we have always to be aware not to be influenced by them," he said. Even more explicit was Urip Sumoharjo. In his speech in one of his inspection tours in West Java, Urip was quoted by the newspaper as saying that:

TRI as the backbone of the government should not be under the influence of political parties, cabinet or the changing of the 107

structure of the government. The army should always fight for the state. Its members as citizens should be aware of the aims of the political parties, but the most important thing is to maintain discipline, self-confidence and expect only the grace of God.33

The first open conflict between the opposition and the cabinet can probably be seen in the large meeting organized by Tan Malaka in

Purwokerto on January 4, 1946. It was in this meeting that an open challenge to the cabinet policy of diplomacy was promulgated.

Interestingly enough, Sudirman as the leader of the army was also present and gave a speech to the meeting. The second meeting of the opposition, known as Persatuan Perjuangan or PP (Struggle Union) was held in the same month in Surakarta, a capital of a principality in

Central Java, 60 kilometers north of Yogyakarta. It was also attended by Sudirman whose speech was clearly against the policy of diplomacy of S y a h r ir .34

There are various interpretations of the involvement of Sudirman in the opposition movement against Syahrir. We will deal with them in the following chapter, but it is imperative to say here that

Sudirman as the embodiment of the army, which perceived itse lf as the

"backbone of the state" and which at the same time should not be

"under the influence of the parties and the cabinet", did not only passively guard their position but actively engaged in political activity. One then can easily get a clear picture of the army's self-perception from Sudirman's activity. While he warned his soldiers about being influenced by the parties and the cabinet--which contained parties in it--he also did not hesitate to work with the 108 parties--in this case it happened to be the opposition—against the other parties which he perceived as betraying the revolution by conducting diplomacy with the enemy.

Meanwhile, despite the internal republican political situation at the time, the Defense Ministry began its efforts to bring the army under its control with mixed results. It was in that atmosphere that one has also to see the negative influence of Our Struggle toward the army. Since most of the army was made up of former members of Peta, it was then easy for the opposition to incite the army to oppose

Syahrir who scorned them as only knowing "the method of fascism" taught to them by the Japanese.35 At the same time the politicians also manipulated the suspicion latent between the former Knil officers against the former Peta officers. Apparently it was from the political intrigues between the oppostion and the cabinet that the story about the plan of Syahrir to replace Sudirman with the former Knil officer had originated.36

Pepolit and Biro Perjuangan

A common present day interpretation of Pepolit and Biro

Perjuangan is that they were consciously created by the Socialist government not only to subordinate the army but also to turn them and the country as well toward socialism. But upon closer examination one can find that both Pepolit and Biro Perjuangan were two institutions originally not looked upon as a potential danger for the army, and were even supported by some members of the army of them at their inception. Take Pepolit for instance. The idea to educate the 109 military politically clearly originated in Syahrir's Our Struggle.

The need to erase the elements of Japanese fascism was the reason for the political education. But at At the same time T.B. Simatupang also claims that he too from the outset had the idea of political education. According to Simatupang,

Political commisars [in the army] had not originated in the Red Army, because long before that, namely in the Cromwell army in England, that kind of institution was already there. Each time you have revolution you have to make sure that the army will adopt the philosophy of the revolution.37

But why then did Pepolit finally become the tool of the le ftist

Socialists to indoctrinate and to infiltrate the army?

Because the other parties had no ability to compete with them, and this is precisely the tragedy of Indonesia. All good things were never the monopoly of the communists, but they were always clever enough to make the other parties look f o o l i s h . 38

The observation of Simatupang is confirmed by Dayino, a former officer of Pepolit. According to Dayino, the chairman of Pepolit was a certain Sukono, a member of the Amir Syarifuddin wing of the

Socialist Party. The person representing Syahrir's wing of the

Socialist party was Wijono. Apparently Wijono was out-maneuvered by

Sukono, and the latter then was free to guide Pepolit according to his more leftist socialism.39

Sudirman and Urip were also against the Pepolit. Interestingly enough the reason for that was

because the political instructors were given very high military ranks. This was Amir's mistake. And indeed there were many political instructors who were interested in the high ranks more than in the aims of political education and their duties in that institution.40 110

Political officers were refused by Nasution in the West Java

Siliwangi Division apparently with the same reason as just mentioned by Simatupang. But also because Nasution refused the intervention of the politicians into the internal affairs of his division.

The case of Biro Perjuangan was even more serious than the

Pepolit. Originally the Biro Perjuangan was agreed upon as an instrument to coordinate the lasykar in order to facilitate their cooperation with the army. But here again the story of Pepolit was repeated, namely that the le ftis t Socialists out-maneuvered their rivals. We have seen that the leftist lasykar, Pesindo, was among the powerful, well armed and well organized lasykar. It is no wonder that the le ftists could easily dominate the Biro Perjuangan, and used this institution against the army. Thus, the result of Drip's committee was yet another dualism in the defense leadership of the

Republic. Accordingly,

Following the organization, the feeling that there were two leaderships was very conspicious. On the one hand there was the Defense Ministry, on the other hand you have the headquarters. Some times there were even competitions between them. The Ministry even had their own army, that was the lasykar brigade coordinated by Biro Perjuangan. Essentially the Biro Perjuangan became the rival of the army headquarters.

Biro Perjuangan, whose origin could probably be traced to the passage in Syahrir's Our Struqqle--"we must institute m ilitia as soon as possible"42__had later on become the military basis for the socialist government in its struggle against the opposition, especially when the army entertained an idea of neutrality in that conflict. It was this special position of Biro Perjuangan that put I l l it in the position of the favorite son of the socialist government.

And that meant arms and financial support, most of the time better than the army i t s e l f . 4 3 when in August 1 9 4 7 another reorganization was initiated by the government in its effort to bring the army under the control of the Defense Ministry, the Biro Perjuangan was even institu-tionalized as a special branch of the army. The reorganization of August 1 9 4 7 changed the name of TRI to become TNI or Tentara National Indonesia (Indonesian National Army). Here again the government, while working to unite the armed organization of the

Republic, nevertheless maintained the Biro Perjuangan in another form. This was certainly because the leftist socialists--who dominated the Defense Ministry--already were sure that they could not control the army. They then violated their own decision to have one army by christening the Biro to become what they called TNI

Masyarakat (TNI of the society).

In the next chapter we will touch upon the TNI Masyarakat and the problems it created for the army and the government, especially when the Socialist government was to be replaced by the Hatta government. But for now it is enough to say that TNI Masyarakat and the Pepolit together stood as a monument of the failure of the

Socialist government to put the army under its control. This failure to domesticate the army should also be seen as the failure of the government to develop a coherent defense and military policy. And there was no better time to demonstrate this failure than in a time of crisis. Thus when the government had decided to arrest the 112 members of the opposition parties, instead of relying on the army, the government preferred to rely on the lasykar. To make the situation even worse, the Army Headquarters then issued a statement of its non-involvement in the action.44

From the perspective of more than 40 years later we can now say that the very late efforts of the government to bring the army under its control failed not only because by that time the army already developed a certain self-perception--namely as a pejuang, fighting arm in arm with other pejuang--but also because the political conditions at that time were conducive for the army to look at the government not as the sole embodiment of the nation. In the midst of government fighting against the opposition, it was understandable that the politically naive officers, confused about what was going on, decided to stay away from the government.

And as the government ,especiallyl the Defnese Ministry, became more ideological in its approach to the army--with the Pepolit and

Biro Perjuangan and then TNI Masyarakat--the army slowly developed its own ideology. Thus, what began as institutional and administrative intricasies as the result of the reluctance of

Sukarno's government to creat an army, slowly developed into political and ideological problems, especially because of political bickering among the politicans and the weakening of the government because of it. And the wider the friction between the army and the government the more complicated the problem of civil-military relations became. Footnotes

1. Sutan Syahrir, Our Struggle, (Ithaca, New York: Modern Indonesia Project, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 1968), pp. 36-37.

2. T. B. Simatupang, interview, Jakarta, September 20, 1984.

3. Benedict R.O'G. Anderson, Java in A Time of Revolution, (Ithaca and London; Cornell University Press, 1972), p. 287.

4. Dr. Soeharto, Saksi Sejarah, (Jakarta: Gunung Aqung, 1982), pp. 32-33.

5. George McTurnan Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, pp. 147-149; Anderson, Java, especially chapter 12. We deliberately mention only two writers not merely because of their exhaustive treatment of the subject, but also because of their diametrically opposition to each other; Kahin was antipathetic while Anderson was sympathetic to Tan Malaka.

6. Anderson, Java, pp. 281-282.

7. Kahin, Nationalism, pp. 147-170.

8. Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 194.

9. Preface to Our Struggle, p. i i i .

10. Anderson, Java, p. 9.

11. Syahrir, Our Struggle, p. 10.

12. Syahrir, Our Struggle, p. 20.

13. Syahrir, Our Struggle, p. 21.

14. Syahrir, Our Struggle, p. 13.

113 114

15. Subadio Sastrosatomo, "Syahrir: Suatu Perspektif Manusia Dalam Sejarah," in Rosihan Anwar (ed.) Mengenang Syahrir, (Jakarta: Gramedia, 1980), p. XXXI.

16. A.H. Nasution, TNI Vol. I, (Jakarta: Seruling Masa, 1970), p. 241.

17. The f irs t news about Sudirman was published in the daily Kedaoelatan Rakjat, Yogyakarta on December 19, 1945. The news was as follows: The Headquarters of the Tentara Keamanan Rakyat made it public that in a meeting attended by the President, Vice President, Prime Minister and members of the cabinet, (officers of the) Headquarters, divisional commanders, regimental commanders from all over Java and Madura, yesterday, Tuesday, December 18, 1945, the honorable Sudirman was formally installed as Panglima Besar of the Tentara Keamanan Rakyat; the same newspaper on December 24 published a short biography of Sudirman. Then on December 21, Kedaoelatan Rakyat carried a short statement of Sudirman announcing himself as the highest leader of the army.

18. Until the installation of Sudirman as Panglima Besar, all instructions issued by the Headquarters were signed by Urip Sumoharjo. See Nasution TNI, Vol. I, pp. 138-144.

19. According to Soeparjo Roestam, Sudirman's adc from the time of Peta until the latter died in January 1950, "After the election, Sudirman commanded the army to fight the Allies at Ambarawa. At that time in the eyes of the members of the army Sudirman was already their Panglima Besar. Thus, by installing him, the government had merely recognized the already elected Panglima Besar." Interview, Jakarta, November 9, 1984; apparently it was this time that orders given by Urip were mostly disregarded by the army. Urip Sumoharjo had no other choice but to go to Sudirman for help. Didi Kartasasmita remembered this problem as follows, "If Urip gave the order, there was no guarantee that his order will be implemented. Sudirman then summoned the officers. Only after that the orders would be carried out." Interview with Didi Kartasasmita, Jakarta, September 21, 1984; Accordingly, this situation lingered on long after Sudirman was installed as Panglima Besar. Only the presence of good understanding between Sudirman and Urip saved the Headquarters.

20. Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan, Vol. I, pp. 128-13.

21. Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan, Vol. I. p. 131.

22. Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan, Vol. I, pp. 153-154; Lt. Gen. (ret.) Kemal Idris from the West Java division or Siliwangi, 115

comments on this problem as follows: "It could not be otherwise. Syahrir was the representative of the republic in Jakarta, and we were geographically close to Jakarta. The political recognition of the Allies (sic) enjoyed by the republic was there because Syahrir could handle the m ilitary. Syahrir ordered us to secure the supply line of the Allies from Jakarta to Bandung. We obeyed the order. We were ordered by Syahrir to guard the Allied officers who were on hunting vacation. We obeyed the order. Probably Yogyakarta did not like that kind of activities of ours." Kemal Idris, interview, Jakarta, September 20, 1984. It was probably because of this tense relation between the Headquarters in Yogyakarta and the Siliwangi division in West Java, coupled with the lack of coordination between Syahrir policy of diplomacy and the army's policy of defense, that made Kahin had come to the conclusion that Siliwangi, the West Java division, was created by Syahrir as a balance against Sudirman. See Kahin, Nationalism, pp. 184- 185. From all the available documents and from all the politicans and officers I interviewed during my field study in Indonesia in the fall of 1984, there was no information or documents to support Kahin's conclusion; On the creation of Siliwangi, see Siliwangi Dari Masa Ke Masa, (Bandung: Angkasa, 1977), pp. 39-42, Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan, Vol. I., pp. 147-148; Cuplikan Sejarah Perjuangan A.P., (Bandung: Dinas Sejarah Militer Angkatan Darat, 1974), pp. 42-53; and Subadio Sastrosatomo, a close associate of Syahrir, interview, Jakarta, September 7, 1984. Subadio categorically denies Kahin's conclusion. But then, Kahin is not the only writer who takes Syahrir as the creator of Si 1iwangi. The following writers--to mention some of them--are also of the opinion that it was Syahrir who created Siliwangi, They are: Guy J. Pauker in his "The Role of the Military in Indonesia," in John J. Johnson (ed.) The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1962), p. 202; Bernhard Dahm, History of Indonesia in The Twentieth Century, (London, New York, Washington: Praeger Publishers, 1971), p. 123; Anthony J. S. Reid credited Amir Sjarifuddin as the creator of Si 1iwangi. See Reid, Indonesian National Revolution 1945-1950; (Hawthorn, Victoria, Austrialia, Longman, 1947), pp. 79-80.

23. Amir Syarifuddin was certainly the most controversial figure in the days of the Indonesian revolution. He was a Muslem before converting to Christianity, he was a radical nationalist before becoming a Dutch employee, right before the Japanese invasion. His underground activities before being arrested by the Japanese security apparatus in 1943 had made him closer to the main stream of the le ftis t and communist movement in Indonesia. And yet until the day of his execution as the leader of the failed 116 communist rebellion in September 1948, almost no body suspected that Syarifudddin was a communist, as he said about himself.

According to his former colleagues, Amir Sjarifuddin had a very unstable personality. When he was in the government, as Defense Minister as well as, later. Prime Minister, he was constantly under the pressure of a well organized small group of people who later on emerged as members of the newly reconstituted PKI, Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party). The members of this pressure group were communists who were working clandestinely in many le ftist parties in Indonesia in the early days of the revolution. It was only at the end of the Dimitrov line and the new era of Zdhanov doctrine that these communists started to reveal their identities and organized themselves in the Indonesian Communist Party, PKI. As the result of this new communist doctrine, the Socialist Party of Syahrir and Amir Sjarifuddin split in February 1948. The left wing part of the party joined the PKI, while the followers of Syahrir organized a new party, the Socialist Party of Indonesia, or PSI.

A wave of shock was sent all over the Indonesian political community when in mid-1948 Syarifuddin suddenly revealed that he had been communist since 1935, the days when he was active as the leader of a radical nationalist party. As a good Christian and a good member of a Christian church, Syarifuddin had to respond to the inquiry of the Indonesian Council of Churches. And this he did. Accordingly, he did not abandon his Christian faith, but while being Christian he also saw communism as the bearer of truth. In essence he did not see the contradiction between his Christian faith with his communistic political ideology.

For most of the people who knew him personally, Syarifuddin became communist not only as the result of the work of the pressure group around him, or because of his association with many underground communists during the Japanese occupation, but he became one because of his disillusion with America--which he fe lt abandoned him and the cause of Indonesian's fighting to free the country from the Dutch colonialism. It was Syarifuddin's disillusion that was manipulated by the communists who looked to the Soviet Union as the new ally rather than the pro-Dutch United States. It is interesting to see that in his interview with American correspondents only a few months after the demise of the Indonesian Communist Party following the September 1948 rebellion which caused Amir Syarifuddin his life. President Sukarno denied that Syarifuddin was a communist. For Sukarno, Syarifuddin was no more than a disillusioned Christian 117

with socialist leanings. (Berita Indonesia, June 23, 1949); on the exchange between Syarifuddin and the Indonesian Council of Churches, see Merdeka, September 9, 1948; on Amir Syarifuddin's colleagues on Amir Syarifuddin, see Abu Hanifah, "Revolusi Memakan Anak Sendiri: Tragedi Amir Syarifuddin," in Taufik Abdullah, et.al (eds.) Manusia Dalam Kemelut Sejarah, (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1981), pp. 189-218; the w riter's interview with Subadio Sastrosatomo, Jakarta, September 7, 1984; see also Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, pp. 256-331; Dr. R. Soeharto, Saksi Sejarah, p. 69; Anderson, Java, pp. 413-414; Jaques Leclerc: "Amir Sjarifuddin 75 Tahun," Prisma, Vol. XI, 1982, No. 12, pp. 53-76; on the U.S.A. involvement in the Indonesian revolution, see Robert J. McMahon, Colonialism and Cold War, (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1981); on the soviet view of the Indonesian revolution, see Ruth T. McVey, The Soviet View of the Indonesian Revolution, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University, 1957).

24. Merdeka, February 1, 1946; Chaired by Urip Sumoharjo, the other members of the committee were General Dr. Mustopo, Maj. Gen. Didi Kartasasmita, Commodore Suryadarma, Colonel Sutirto, Colonel Sunjoyo, Colonel Holland Iskandar, Major Simatupang, Professor Roosseno. See Nasution, Sekitar Perang Kemerdekaan, Vol. I ll, p. 124.

25. Nasution, TNI, Vol. I, p. 42.

26. Nasution, TNI, Vol. I, p. 265.

27. Nasution, Sekitar Perang Kemerdekaan, Vol. I ll, p. 131.

28. Nasution, Sekitar Perang Kemerdekaan, Vol. I ll, pp. 131-138.

29. The one party system was introduced on August 22, 1945 by PPKI before the latter transformed itself to become KNI. On the same day the state party was also created under the name of PNI, Partai Nasional Indonesia or Indonesian National Party (not to be confused with PNI of Sukarno before the war, or another PNI after the end of the one party system). For the common people at that time the party was also known as the party of Sukarno. See Osman Raliby, Documenta H istorica, pp. 15-16; Anderson, Java, pp. 176-177; on the founding of PNI in the multi party system, see J. Eliseo Rocamora, Nationalism in Search of Ideology, The Indonesian NasionaTTst Party, 1946-1965, (Quezon City: Philippine Center For Advanced Studies, University of the Philippines, 1975), pp. 14-18.

30. Dr. A. Halim, "Syahrir Yang Saya Kenal," in Rosihan Anwar, (ed.) Mengenang Syahrir, (Jakarta: Gramedia, 1980), p. 103. 118

31. President Suharto, who was brigade commander in Yogyakarta during the revolution, remembers very well how the politicians were trying to bring him under their influence. But "they did not succeed." Written interview, Jakarta, November 12, 1984.

32. Nasution, interview, Jakarta, November 17, 1984.

33. Merdeka, March 20, 1946.

34. Anderson, Java, p. 291-295.

35. According to Kahin, Syahrir's Our Struggle was generating antagonism within the army, who mainly consisted of pemuda who were trained by the Japanese. See Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, p. 169. For Nasution, reading a pamphlet like Our Struggle was a luxury for even an officer at that time of revolution. But Subadio Sastrosatomo is of the opinion that it was the members of the opposition parties who instigated the army to take an antagonist position toward Syahrir. Thus, while only a limited group of officers had an opportunity to read the pamphlet, the knowledge about it nevertheless was widely shared by many officers through the political intrigue of the opposition. Nasution, interview, Jakarta, November 17, 1984; Subadio Sastrosatomo, interview, Jakarta, September 7, 1984.

36. Apparently this kind of story was widely circulated at that time. My many interviews could not locate the sources of this particular story. One can then just speculate that in tense political atmosphere of the revolutionary days such a story or even rumor could well be exaggerated and also exploited by the opposition parties. But one then should not simply dismiss the possibility that the government had been contemplating to replace Sudirman with the officers they thought they could put under their control. And this they did at the end of 1947 and early 1948, when Sudirman finally lost his position to Suryadarma, a former Knil officer. The problem here is whether the replacement of Sudirman by Suryadarma was the result of a well planned political move by ruling parties or it was simply the result of a technical effort to improve the military.

37. Simatupang, interview, September 20, 1984.

38. Simatupang, interview, September 20, 1984.

39. Dayino, interview, Yogyakarta, October 31, 1984; on the ideology of Amir Syarifuddin's leftwing Socialist Party, see footnote 22 above.

40. Simatupang, interview, September 20, 1984. 119

41. Nasution, Sekitar Perang Kemerdekaan, Vol. III, p. 134.

42. Syahrir, Pur Struggle, p. 41.

43. Onghokham, Rakyat dan Negara, (Jakarta: Sinar Harapan, 1983), p. 158.

44. The first wave of arrest of the opposition took place on March 18, 1946. The arrest was ordered by Defense Minister Amir Syarifuddin, not by the Attorney General, and was carried out by Pesindo and the m ilitary police which were under the Defense Ministry rather than under the Army Headquarter. The latter was the result of the reorganization as the consequence of Urip Sumoharjo's committee. Three days after the arrest took place, the Army Headquarters issued a statement denying any involvement in the arrest. See Anderson, Java, pp. 327-329.

These days there is a tendency to interpret the army's denial of involvement of the arrest of the opposition, led by Tan Malaka, as a sign of the opposition of Sudirman and the army toward the government. But Abimanyu, a close associate of Sudirman at that time, disputed this interpretation. In his letter to the editor of the monthly journal Prisma, he writes that even before the arrest took place, Sudirman had already sent Abimanyu and Maj. Gen. Notoatmojo to President Sukarno to inquire the reasons of the government not to arrest Tan Malaka and people around him. The reason for this inquiry was Sudirman's change of opinion toward the opposition. It was true, according to Abimanyu, that Sudirman was very much for the opposition before the le tte r's congress in Surakarta in January 1946. But it was precisely at that congress that Sudirman came to the conclusion that the congress was "disgusting" and the opposition merely instigating the people against the government. Accordingly, Sudirman left the congress even before the main speaker. Tan Malaka, delivered his speech. The fact that Sudirman's Headquarters denied the army's involvement in the arrest is explained by Abimanyu as the result of Amir Syarifuddin's tactic to "involve" Sudirman in the operation against the opposition by making it public that the arrest had been approved by the army, when such involvement never happened. See Abimanyu's letter to the editor of Prisma, reprinted in Taufik Abdullah et al. (eds.) Manusia Dalam Kemelut, pp. 265- 269; Mohammad Hatta, Vice President during the revolution, in his memoir writes about Sudirman and the opposition at that time as follows: "The same night February 1946 the Supreme Commander Sudirman came to see me. He reported that the Struggle Union movement the opposition was planning a coup d 'etat." Bung Karno and you needn't worry, he said, "The army is ready." See Mohammad Hatta, Memoirs, (Singapore: Gunung 120

Agung, 1981), p. 259. Abimanyu's letter and Hatta's experience with Sudirman are two good pieces of information supporting each other in showing Sudirman's position which was located between the opposition and the government. Chapter V

THE POLITICAL BEHAVIOR OF GENERAL SUDIRMAN

Sudirman was a pejuang (freedom fighter) and a former teacher. His knowledge of military technicality was meager. Consequently there was disappointment felt toward him by the professional soldiers, officers like Nasution and Simatupang. But the most important role played by Sudirman was the role of unifier.1 Sultan Hamengkobuwono IX.

The political independence of the army required a figure like Sudirman. Thus Sudirman had only reaffirmed the tendency that already existed. At the same time Sudirman represented a symbol and example of the army that emerged during the revolution. 2 T.B. Simatupang.

The most important aspects of Sudirman's political behavior that shaped civil-military relations in Indonesia were his constant efforts to keep the autonomy of the military intact and his perception of the mlitary as the main defender of the country when the political parties--inside as well as outside the government--were fighting among themselves during critical times in the life of the newborn Republic. In this chapter the political behavior of Sudirman will be explored in the context of his election as Panglima Besar by the self created army, the weakness of the institutions and the bickering among the political parties.

To understand Sudirman's political behavior, there are several factors one has to consider: his background before he joined the

121 122

Peta; his training in Peta; the way he was elected as Panglima Besar;

and the political situation during the time he assumed the position

of Panglima Besar.

Sudirman was born on January 24, 1916 in a village located in

the western part of Central Java.3 He came from a poor family, and

only obtained an education because his uncle, a civil servant,

adopted him as his son. But despite th is, he could only study until

the level of junior high school. He started his education in an

elementary school owned by the government, but he later moved to a

nationalist school operated by Taman Siswa, an educational

organization created by Ki Hajar Oewantoro, a famous Indonesian

n atio n alist.4 According to to Nugroho NotosusantoS, nationalism,

patriotism and religiosity colored Sudirman's life and could be

traced back to the period when he was in this school. Accordingly,

there were three important teachers in that school who influenced

Sudirman's life. One of them was a secular nationalist, the second was a muslim nationalist, while the third was a graduate of the Royal

Dutch Military Academy in Breda, the Netherlands. The last one was a disillusioned officer in the Dutch colonial army before joining the

group of people who decided to stay away from the government.

While still studying at the elementary school, Sudirman was, also

a member of the Hizbulwathan, a boy scout group of Muhamadiyah, a

reformist Muslem organization. 6 His activity in Hizbulwathan gave him the opportunity to deepen his knowledge of Islam, and at the same time gave him an opportunity to develop his ability as a leader. 123

When he later became a teacher in one of Muhamadiyah's school,

Sudirman also became one of the leaders of Pemuda Muhamadiyah a youth organization of this Muslem reformist organization. By the time the

Japanese invaded Java, Sudirman was already one of the leaders of

Pemuda Muhamadiyah in the Residency of Banyumas.

In 1943 the Japanese Military authority decided to organize

Peta. The Japanese certainly realized that the Dutch once had an idea of mobilizing the Indonesians to be an auxiliary army to the

Knil right before the collapse of Dutch colonialism in Indonesia, without any positive r e s u lt.7 And the reason for that was because the Indonesians had no stake whatsoever in defending Dutch colonialism against the invading Japanese. To avoid the same mistakes, the Japanese then created Peta as a part of the Japanese promise of independence for Indonesia.

It is clear then that there were two aspects, working together in the creation of Peta. First, the military aspect, that is that the Japanese were in a d ifficu lt position in terms of manpower. The political aspect was that in order to have the manpower, the

Indonesians were mobilized to defend their country which would be given independence by the Japanese. 8

In the formation of Peta these two aspects, political as well as military, were visible in the different criteria applied to the recruitment of the leaders and the soldiers. Belonging to the leaders were those battalion commanders (daidancho) with the rest being soldiers. While the soldiers were trained militarily, the 124 leaders were given only a very mild military training, because their duty was not really to fight or to command their soldiers, since this duty was already taken care of by Japanese officers (sidokang) attached to each battalion. Thus the duty of the battalion commander of Peta was no more than a father for his soldiers, a spiritual as well as political father. And for that purpose the requirement to be daidancho (battalion commander) was prominence in the society.

Sudirman f it this requirement, and he then became a daidancho.

When Peta was disbanded following the surrender of the Japanese,

Sudirman as a "father" to his soldiers did not allow them to disperse^, even though their arms were already collected by the

Japanese. As a "father" of his "children" Sudirman then worked hard to get arms for them from the Japanese. He succeeded beyond his need, and his division was not only the best armed division, but also the best organized division. The latter was the result of Sudirman's policy to keep his soldiers intact when other Peta units obeyed the order to disband.

We have seen the way Sudirman was elected as the Panglima Besar, and now it is necessary to explore the meaning of the election to

Sudirman himself in the light of his training and experiences in Peta and in the events following the liquidation of Peta. Seeing the election from Sudirman's eyes, one can easily understand his election as Panglima Besar as a clear sign of trust of the army in Sudirman as a father. And Sudirman was very much aware of th is. Even though his age was only slightly greater than most of his soldiers and officers. 125

Sudirman almost always started his speeches by saying, "My children, the members of the armed forces, members of the State Police, all the members of the lasykar and Barisan Perjuangan (Struggle

Body)..."10 And to his soldiers and officers, Sudirman was affectionately referred to as Pak Dirman.H

In the previous chapter we have already seen the political situation at the time of Sudirman's election. It is not necessary to repeat it here, but one thing which is clear is that there was a constant struggle between the government and the parties in the opposition at a time when the enemy was deep within Indonesian territory. To a politically naive patriot like Sudirman, the political fighting between the government and the opposition at a time when the destiny of the nation was at stake, was simply unacceptable.

Sudirman had two initial reactions to this. First, he disassociated himself and his army from both the government and the opposition; second, he tried to mediate between the two of them.

Before these actions are explored further one thing should be f ir s t established, namely the self perception underlying Sudirman's reactions. At the time of the revolution it is probably safe to say that the self perception was developed together with the two spontaneous reactions, neither one preceded the other. But whichever came first, it is clear that for Sudirman, we can surely say the same thing for his pemuda army, the quarrels that were going on between the government and the opposition were proof that both of them were 126 firs t of all concerned with their political interests rather than for the freedom of the country. 12 when both of them, the government and the opposition, were claiming to represent the people, Sudirman had no other choice but to turn to his army. For Sudirman his army was

the very expression of the nation in arms, formed out of the pemuda population by a natural process of selection.13

This choice or decision of Sudirman to withdraw himself and the army from the political bickering between the opposition and the government was not without cultural roots. According to Indonesian folklore the brave pemuda, or the satria or jago as they were known in an earlier time,

could fight for a good ruler or a good official as for their own life . But whenever they considered somebody to be harmful to the interests of the realm, subjects or community, they could be fairly irreverent, and insignia of authority means nothing to them.14

Apparently the parties, in the government as well as in the opposition, in the eyes of Sudirman were already "harmful to the interests of the realm ..." But Sudirman was not a figure in the old folklore, and as a patriot he was compelled to work toward overcoming the constant fighting between the opposition and the government.

Sudirman, the Government and the Opposition

The f ir s t contact between Sudirman and the opposition probably took place in the f ir s t few days of January 1946. When the government was s till in Jakarta, Tan Malaka and his followers were working toward an organization that was intended to unite the people to oppose the policy of diplomacy of the Syahrir's cabinet. The f ir s t meeting was held in Purwokerto, and Sudirman was invited. When 127 the government moved to Yogyakarta, Sudirman was at the railway station to welcome Sukarno, Hatta and Amir Syarifuddin. It was at that time that Sudirman got a chance to discuss the invitation. The

President and the Defense Minister, Amir Syarifuddin, who were also invited but did not come, agreed to let Sudirman go with a message that the Panglima Besar would watch the situation so that it did not get out of hand.15

The background of the Purwokerto congress of the Persatuan

Perjuangan, held from January 3 to 5, and the Surakarta congress subsequently is described by Tan Malaka in his memoirs:

Considering (1) the contradiction between the will and the actions of the president and the will and the actions of the people/pemuda everywhere; considering ( 2) the contradiction and animosity among the parties (Islam contra Socialists in Pekalongan, Cirebon and Priangan); considering (3) the fighting among our troops in Surabaya (shooting each other behind the line); considering (4) the attitude and the policy of the British to recognize the sovereignty of the Dutch over Indonesia and the action of the first to assist the latter militarily to impose its sovereignty over the Indonesians who already declared their independence; considering (4) finally, the arrival of van Mook with his proposal of gemeene-best (mutual good) and Rijksverband (Indonesian limited independence under the umbrella of the Kingdom of the Netherlands) which is just the same as the promise of Queen Wilhelmina in December 1942...

Relating all of that with (1) the fact that what I have been worrying about, that there would emerge many parties if one party was allowed to be formed; (2) my experiences in Surabaya and many foreign countries, on how the colonialists treat the colonized; (3) and how the fake Tan Malaka appeared everywhere, I then came to the conclusion of the need to coordinate all the parties, the army, lasykar and the Body (of struggle), which are now uncoordinated, so that together we can fight against the policy of diplomacy of the Dutch who are assisted by the well armed B ritish.16

The main theme of the congress was unity (persatuan) and struggle (perjuangan) in order to fight the enemy for the sake of 128

100% merdeka (freedom). Sudirman apparently was caught by the fiery

spirit of the congress and when he made his speech he then said, "it

is better to be atom-bombed than to have freedom less than 100%."17

The second congress of the Persatuan Perjuangan was held in

Surakarta on January 16 and 18. Sudirman was invited and became the

only person with a governmental position to attend the congress. It

was here that the group adopted the name Persatuan Perjuangan, PP

(Struggle Union). At the same time a seven point program suggested

by Tan Malaka was also accepted by the congress. The seven point

Minimum Program ran as follows:

1. The State should be based on the acknowledgement of 100% Sovereignty, and all foreign troops should leave the shores and waters of Indonesia. 2. [Formation of] a People's Government. 3. [Formation of] a People's Army. 4. The disarming of all Japanese troops. 5. Taking charge (menqurus) of all European internees. 6. Confiscation and control of Plantations. 7. Confiscation and control of industrial installations.18

As in the previous gathering. Tan Malaka was the star of the congress and his speech was constructive and well prepared. Beside

Tan Malaka, other speakers were mainly attacking the government. And

it was because of this that Sudirman decided to leave the congress even though his name was included in the small committee to improve the seven point Minimum Program mentioned above.19

According to Brigadier General Abimanyu, Sudirman's adjutant at that time, the congress in Surakarto was a "turning point" for

Sudirman in his relations with the opposition. Before that congress,

Sudirman's relations with the opposition were very close, and Tan 129

Malaka himself had visited Sudirman in his house in Yogyakarta discussing the negotiations between Syahrir and the Dutch. For

Abimanyu, the influence of Tan Malaka on Sudirman was very visible in a speech given by Sudirman at a rally in the coastal North Java city when he said, "Brothers, I want you to know that there are among our leaders ones who want to sell our country".20

Did Sudirman suddenly become pro-government following the

Surakarta Congress? The answer to this question could be found in the political behavior of Sudirman between the Surakarta congress and the end of the war of independence in 1949, in which he demonstrated that he was the captive of neither the government nor the opposition.

It was against this background that we should understand Sudirman's extensive contacts with the opposition, even after the congress in

Surakarta. Looking at this fact from the perspective of the history of the creation of the army and the background of Sudirman himself, we can easily see the point on which Sudirman and the opposition could find common ground. And that was because both of them shared the ideas of perjuangan (armed struggle) instead of diplomasi

(diplomacy), and persatuan (unity of all the potential) instead of banyak partai (multi parties).

But as soon as the opposition went beyond this, as soon as they showed their interest to take over the government, as perceived by

Sudirman in the speeches of the participants of the Surakarta

Congress, Sudirman sudenly saw the opposition as no more than an organization that was used to mobilize people to topple the 130 government. It was this kind of attitude that made Sudirman suddenly leave the congress in Surakarta. But in doing so he did not abandon his own basic attitude of perjuangan and persatuan. Looking back to that period, Lt. General Soepardjo Roestam, the present Minister of

Interior and one of Sudirman's adjutants at that time, explains:

Sudirman joined the PP (The Struggle Union) because he agreed with Tan Malaka's idea of unity of all of our potential in our fight against the enemy. In this case Sudirman was really mani­ pulating PP for his own aim.21

Whether Sudirman manipulated PP or Tan Malaka manipulated

Sudirman is another question outside the focus of this study. But it is certainly interesting to examine the phenomenon of a military commander rubbing shoulders with the opposition at a time when the government badly needed the support and the loyalty of the army.

Following the Surakarta congress, Sudirman maintained his contact with the opposition. Accordingly, he even personally appointed some of the members of the opposition to be his personal advisors. On this advisory board of Sudirman's there is a controversy which rages t i l l today. Ulf Sundhaussen sees the move to have the advisory board as one to replace the Pepolit (political education officers). According to Sundhaussen, the advisory board was formed on April 20, 1945.22 But according to Colonel Zulkifli

Lubis, Chief of Intelligence of the Ministry of Defense at that time, the advisors to Sudirman already existed long before the Pepolit.

And the reason given by Sudirman to have the advisory board, according to Lubis, was because Sudirman realized his inadequacy.

"He only knew how to fight the Dutch militarily, but how to do it politically, for that he needed advice," says Lubis.23 131

Ahmad Subarjo Joyoadisuryo recalled in his memoir that one day he was introduced by Dr. Sukiman, a Muslem leader, to General

Sudirman. According to Ahmad Subarjo, Dr. Sukiman was already an advisor to Sudirman at that time. From that time on, by Sudirman's request, Subarjo also joined Sukiman to be an advisor to Sudirman. 24

It is interesting to see that each advisor or advisory group did not realize that there were other advisors or groups of advisors.

Harsono Cokroaminaoto, deputy Defense Minister under Defense Minister

Amir Syarifuddin, and a long time friend of Sudirman, has also claimed to have been an advisor to Sudirman right after Harsono stepped down from the cabinet. According to Harsono,

Right after I quit from the cabinet, Sudirman asked me to be his advisor. At that time there was already an advisory board to the Panglima Besar which was known as the cabinet of the Panglima Besar. Formally and constitutionally there was no base for this kind of advisory board. But it was created anyway. At that board there were military advisors, Didi Kartasismita, and political advisors like me. Our position as confidants was not binding. And Sudirman did not always consult with us before he took any step. For instance, his relation with Tan Malaka was never discussed with u s . 25

Apparently Sudirman solicited advice from just about everyone he met, and that caused many people to later claim to be Sudirman's advisors.

According to Soepardjo Roestam, before making any decision, Sudirman did not only listen to his staff, but also he solicited the opinion of people outside the army. "He maintained good relations with practically all of the center of power in the society," says Roestam.

And that was because, according to Roestam again, Sudirman was really a politician more than just a military commander. And as politician. 132

all of his decisions were taken only after consulting his staff around him, and more than that, he also listens to the opinion living in the society. It was probably because of this that his decisions many times were not in line with the expectations of the cabinet. 2o

General Simatupang, who at that time held a high position at the

Headquarters, remembers that

Sudirman appointed his own advisors personally. The Head­ quarters was not involved, and the meetings with his advisors were held in Sudirman's house. At that time the Panglima Besar firs t of all was a leader (pemimpin). And our leadership at that particular time was not rational, but s till charismatic. Sudirman's activities were needed because without that the position of the army in society will be very difficult. For the Headquarters at that time, Sudirman was not only Panglima Besar, but also an important figure (tokoh) in s o c i e t y .27

Simatupang's information brings us to the position of Sudirman

and the relation of Sudirman with his headquarters. We have seen in

the previous chapter that after being elected to become Panglima

Besar Sudirman retained Urip Sumoharjo as his Chief of Staff.

Apparently both of them managed to develop a cooperative relationship. Realizing his inadequacy in military technicalities,

Sudirman then entrusted to Urip the military aspects of the army, and kept for himself the political aspects. Sudirman respected Urip and gave him a free hand to do what ever the old man thought necessary in the military field. On the other hand, Urip did not interfere in

Sudirman's political a c tiv itie s. Didi Kartasasmita who was close both to Sudirman and Urip at that time, remembers that

He Sudirman never involved the Headquarters in his political activities. And this is not a difficult thing to understand if you know the situation at that time. The army at that time was not yet accustomed to the idea of hierarchy and discipline. The only discipline we knew at that time was a personal discipline. 133

meaning that if an order was issued by a certain general, most likely it would not be carried out. But if Sudirman gave the order, you can be sure that it would be obeyed by just about everybody.28

Here then lies the problem of the Indonesian military in its early years, namely the problem of Headquarters' relation to its commander. Realizing that he had no military knowledge nor staff training, Sudirman left everything m ilitarily to Urip, and adopted the position of a politician in uniform for himself. Unfortunately there emerged an issue which came out of the fact that Urip Sumoharjo and most of his associates were Dutch trained officers while the officers out side the Headquarters were mostly Japanese trained ones.

The antagonism between the former Peta and the former Knil officers together with the inability of Urip Sumoharjo to communicate with his subordinates due to his imperfect knowledge of the Indonesian language, all worked together to paralyze the Headquarters. Looking back to that period almost 40 years later. Col. Zulkifli Lubis says:

The headquarters did not function as expected. We did not feel the leadership of the Headquarters. So much so that each divisional commander took his own in itia tiv e .. .Sudirman made speeches in the PP congress as the leader of people's army. The Headquarters did not care, because, as I said, the Headquarters did not function properly, but was even very disorganized.28

The disorganization of the Headquarters was the immediate concern of a group of young officers, mostly Dutch educated officers like

Suryadarma and Simatupang. The disorganization and the disfunction of the Headquarters was also concern of the government who never tired to bring the army under their control. We will return to this

later. Meanwhile let us return to Sudirman's political activities. 134

Coming out of the congress of Surakarta, Sudirman was apparently convinced that there was a limit to his cooperation with the opposition. He agreed with some of their points, but disagreed with

some others. Sudirman agreed with the idea of unity and the idea of

fighting instead of diplomacy. The most important disagreement was

with the way the opposition dealt with the government. Sudirman

apparently was suspicious of the opposition whom he perceived as only

interested in replacing the government. The lesson he learned from

the Surakarta conference compelled Sudirman to define his own

position as somebody standing in the middle. And because of that he

then played the role of a go-between.

Probably because of the need to play this role Sudirman decided

to take a second residence which was located in Surakarta.

Surakarta, the second big city in the Republican area at that time,

was a city that slowly developed to become the center of the

opposition. Since the fa c ilitie s in the city of Yogyakarta were not

enough to accommodate the many politicians moving from Jakarta

following the move of the capital to Yogyakarta, many of these

politicians, especially those who were not in the government, chose

Surakarta as their place to live. Slowly then, Yogyakarta and

Surakarta became two cities opposing each other politically.

Interestingly enough, that was not the f ir s t time Yogyakarta and

Surakarta were in the position opposing each other. As the two

cities originally were an integral part of the Kingdom of Mataram, it

was Dutch colonialism which divided the kingdom and created two

opposing smaller kingdoms out of i t . 30 135

Far from the daily routine of the Headquarters and the

intricacies and controversies between the latter and the Defense

Ministry, Sudirman the politician seemed to enjoy living in

Surakarta. On the weekends, he usually went to the mountain resort

of Tawangmangu, a small resort town 40 miles north of Surakarta. It

happened that the political detainees--the PP leaders like Tan

Malaka, Iwakusuma Sumantri, Subarjo, and Yamin, who were detained in

March 1946--were kept by the government in this mountain resort.

There were meetings taking place between the detainees and Sudirman.

Accordingly, there were some suggestions proposed by the political

detainees that Sudirman later on communicated to the government. On

the other hand, at the same time, the government also used Sudirman

as feeler to detect the direction of the opposition, for even though

their leaders were already arrested the influence and the potential of the opposition was still a threat to the government.

It was in this kind of meeting that, one day in June 1945, the political detainees, led by Mohammad Yamin, discussed with Sudirman their idea of governmental change. According to Nasution, there was even a talk of replacing Sukarno as the President and the possibility of a military governmental. But whatever took place in Tawangmangu at that time, one thing is clear, namely that the opposition was entertaining the idea of a coup d ' e ta t, and hoping Sudirman would play an important role in it.

In Yogyakarta, meanwhile, the political atmosphere was very tense due to the secret negotiations between Prime Minister Syahrir 136 and the Dutch representative in Jakarta. Rumors circulated around that Syahrir was asking the Dutch only to recognize Republican sovereignty over Java, Madura and Sumatra, thereby abandoning the other islands. Agitated by the rumors, Sudirman decided to see

Sukarno and Hatta in order to get first hand information. Neither of them could satisfy the Panglima B e s a r . 32

It was against this background that the famous incident of the kidnapping of Prime Minister Syahrir took place. The story of the kidnapping was started by Hatta who, together with some other leaders, gave a speech at a public gathering in Yogyakarta on June

27, 1946. In his speech, Hatta suddenly revealed that negotiations between Syahrir and the Dutch, which was the biggest rumor at that time, indeed were goingon. Accordingly Syahrir only requested the

Dutch to recognize de facto sovereignty of the Republic over Java,

Sumatra and Madura, and let the Dutch conduct plebiscites for the rest of Indonesia to decide their future. In his memoir, Iwa Kusuma

Sumantri who was present at that gathering describes the reactions to

Hatta's speech as follows:

The public was shocked and did not quite understand the meaning of Hatta's speech. Sudirman shook his head as a sign of his disagreement. The public was confused, especially those who understood the meaning of the speech, which is a clear humiliation to a nation and a state. But the common people stayed c a l m . 43

Emerging from this gathering, the group of the opposition, some of whom were people who met Sudirman in Tawangmangu, held an informal meeting in a house of a former member of PP in Yogyakarta. The meeting was joined by two army officers. Major General R. P. 137

Sudarsono, the commander of the greater Yogyakarta division, and

Major A. K. Yusuf, the military commander of the city of Yogyakarta.

It was under the order of Sudarsono that Yusuf had conducted the

expedition to Surakarta to intercept and to arrest Prime Minister

Syahrir who was on his way from East to West Java.34

When the knowledge of the kidnapping of Syahrir became public,

the Republican area was suddenly stricken by panic. Sukarno made a

radio speech appealing to the kidnappers to release Syahrir who was

summarily released from his captivity somewhere in the Surakarta

area. But the kidnapping was only a prelude to a bigger shock to the

political community of the Republican area at that time. A few days

after the release of Syahrir, early in the morning on July the third.

Major General Sudarsono, accompanied by a group of politicians,

including Mohammad Yamin, went to the palace of Sukarno. The politicians were not given a chance to see Sukarno, and Sudarsono was summarily arrested right after he came out of Sukarno's room to present petitions composed by Yamin a few hours before the journey to the palace started.

If the news of Syahrir's kidnapping a few days earlier had created panic in the Republican area, the coming of Major General

Sudarsono and the politicians to the palace in the early morning of

July 3 created even more panic in the government. There were two reasons for that; first, the content of the petition itself and second, the statement of Sudarsono to the President that he was acting under the orders of Sudirman. Sudarsono presented Sukarno with a set of petitions, one of which read as follows: 138

Proclamation no. 2

At the urging of the People and the Army in the second stage of the Indonesian Revolution, who are struggling to defend the whole people and the whole archipelago under (sic) the Sovereignty of the Republic of Indonesia on the basis of 100% Independence, I, the President of the Republic of Indonesia, this day dismiss the entire State Cabinet of Sjahrir and Amir Sjarifuddin.

Jogjakarta, 3 July 1946 President of the Republic of Indonesia35

In the eyes of the government the action of Sudarsono was clearly an attempt at a coup d' etat. The coup d' etat certainly failed following the arrest of Sudarsono. The problem now was to find out the position of the Panglima Besar. The effort then was concentrated to contact Sudirman who was in Surakarta at that time. Several telephone calls were made, but Sudirman refused to come. He gave the reason that tensions had mounted in Surakarta because of the arrival of so many lasykar from East Java which was apparently mobilized by the then Defense Minister, Amir Syarifuddin, when Syahrir was kidnapped and his whereabouts were not known. Since the Defense

Ministry could not rely on the army, Amir then decided to rely on the lasykar whose loyalty he surely could command.

The tensions between Sukarno and Sudirman had really begun at the time when Syahrir disappeared. Through Amir Syarifuddin's network of intelligence, Sukarno knew that Sudarsono was involved in the kidnapping. He then ordered Sudirman to take action and at the same time to work toward the release of Syahrir. Sudirman, who was in Surakarta at that time, was not yet able to implement Sukarno's 139 order when Amir Syarifuddin, mobilizing the lasykar and the state and military police, started to arrest the opposition. This apparently hurt the pride of Sudirman. He then decided to do nothing. The opposition took this passivity of Sudirman as a sign of his approval of their actions. They then decided to move, even employing the name of Sudirman as a person behind the July 3 p e titio n s.36

Sudirman fin ally appeared in Sukarno's palace on the evening of that day. There was no definite information about what went on at the meeting between the Panglima Besar and the politicians in the p a l a c e . 37 From the events following the July 3 affair one can easily conclude that Sukarno was a decisive factor at that time. But was

Sudirman a suspect in that affair? In the eyes of the cabinet of the socialist government, he certainly was. Dayino, an army officer in the headquarters and a close associate of Syahrir, remembers how his group was pushing for the expulsion of Sudirman. "Among us there were even those who suggested that Sudirman be liquidated. "38

Two years later, in the military tribunal that tried the July 3

Affair, Sudirman denied his complicity as was claimed by Major

General Sudarsono. He said that all of his orders were always given in writing. Sudarsono certainly could not have presented proof of a written order by Sudirman to go to the palace to present the petitions. The military court cleared Sudirman from any charges and sentenced Sudarsono, Yamin and some other politicians. But even today the mystery surrounding Sudirman's relations with the July 3 affair is still an interesting topic of research. For this study the 140 important thing is not whether Sudirman did or did not give the order to Sudarsono as the latter claimed. The important thing is to show how far Sudirman was involved in the area outside the pure military field, namely politics.

But whatever the result of the July 3 affair, one thing is clear, that is that Sudirman's position as a go between was clearly a failure. One of the reasons for this fa ilrre was his lack of control over his officers. We have seen that the Headquarter's military activity was entrusted by Sudirman to Urip Sumoharjo. It is then understable if Urip Sumoharjo and the officers in the Headquarters also gave Sudirman the privilege to deal with all political matters involving the army and army personnel. The July 3 affair demonstrated clearly how Sudirman was embarrassed by Sudarsono and for that reason he decided to punish Sudarsono by rejecting any association with h im .39

The July 3 affair was an end to one episode of the political history of newly independent Indonesia. The most important opposition figures were brought behind bars as the result of this affair. The policy of diplomacy of the government could now be pursued without any meaningful hindrance. And Sudirman emerged from the affair with a bitter lesson to contemplate on. As a new episode of Indonesian political history began, Sudirman certainly emerged with a new role for himself.

We have seen that Sudirman as Panglima Besar had a great tendency for perjuangan (fighting) rather than conducting diplomacy 141 with the enemy, and he started political maneuvering by associating himself with the opposition under the guidance of Tan Malaka. When he realized that the opposition was against the government beyond what Sudirman could accept, he then disassociated himself from them.

Subsequently, Sudirman placed himself between the opposition and the government. By being a go between, Sudirman could s till keep his notion of perjuangan without having anything to do with the opposition, and at the same time he could maintain his position as army commander, meaning government o fficial, without commitment to the idea of diplomacy. For a few months Sudirman maintained this position until he was embarrassed by Major General R. P. Sudarsono.

Before the affair took place Sudirman was moving freely among the government officials and the opposition. Whenever he fe lt that the meeting of the opposition would likely be disturbed by the pro­ government lasykar, he ordered his troops to guard the meeting. And it was in this period that just about everybody could have an interview with Sudirman or simply invite the Panglima Besar to give a speech at any meeting or congress that took place. And in his speeches according to Nasution, Sudirman

discussed the political problems, especially the relation with the Netherlands. He was trying to bridge the "left wing government" with the opposition of the "Struggle Union" (PP). He was always taking part in any important meeting in the government as well as among the opposition.40

As the debacle of the opposition of the PP had become a reality, what lessons did Sudirman learn from his failed role as go-between and what role did he choose subsequently for himself? 142

The Dutch Educated Officers and The Rationalization of The Army.

Sudirman's over extended activities outside the army and his failure in political activities apparently brought him to the conclusion that the safest place for him to act was the army. To understand Sudirman's position in the army at that time we firs t should look at the structure of the leadership of the military.

In the previous chapter we analyzed the efforts of Urip

Sumoharjo's committee to reorganize the army and its subsequent result, namely the new dualism of the leadership of the Indonesian military--the Headquarters and the Defense Ministry. At the same time there was the problem of so many lasykar which refused to be integrated into the army. Interestingly enough, Sudirman supported the decision of the lasykar to have their own units separated from the army.41

Sudirman's sympathy with the lasykar was a consistent attitude not only because of his self-perception as the "father" of all the armed pemuda, but also based on a certain military conception.

According to General Simatupang, one of the reasons why Sudirman and

Tan Malaka were once close to each other was because they both shared the same military conception.

The m ilitary conception of Tan Malaka was not a regular and well organized army. It was more of a people's army which stressed sp irit semangat rather than military technicality. This conception was very close to Sudirman's. For Sudirman, the struggle was the peoples struggle. This was certainly different from the intellectual conception of ours which differentiated the state, the people, the army, the civil servants and so fo rth .42 143

Only later, after slowly realizing how deep the lasykar was already manipulated by the many parties, did Sudirman agree to the policy of integrating the lasykar into the a r m y .43

In reference to this dualism, we then have to return not only to the period of Drip's committee, but even beyond that.

Constitutionally the highest leader of the army was the President.

That was according to the constitution implemented right after the proclamation. But then the "silent coup" of Syahrir's group occurred which changed the governmental system without replacing the old constitution. The matter became even more complicated with Sukarno's decision to maintain his legal position as the Commander in Chief.

At the same time there was also the Military Council of the Republic of Indonesia (Dewan M iliter Republik Indonesia) whose members were the President, the Panglima Besar, the Vice President, the Defense

Minister, the Chief of Staff of the Navy and the Air Force. Besides this council there was also the Defense Council of the State (Dewan

Pertahanan Negara) which included the Defense Minister, Prime

Minister and the representatives of lasykar and the struggle organizations (Badan Perjuangan).

In this jungle of defense organizations it was very difficult to come to a decision agreed to by all the members of the "defense establishment". Without such a decision nothing meaningful could be done. It was amidst this chaotic situation that the divisional commanders often decided whatever they thought useful for their

divisions. To the professional officers like Nasution and 144

Simatupang, this kind of situation was intolerable. From his divisional headquarters in West Java, Nasution wrote several letters, complaining about the situation, to the headquarters, to the Defense

Ministry, and the Panglima Besar himself, and even to KNIP without any result. In Yogyakarta, meanwhile, Simatupang and some other young Dutch educated officers organized a discussion club on the topic of the improvement of the defense organization.44 At the same time the Defense Minister, Amir Syarifuddin, and his friends in the left wing of the Socialist Party were working hard to bring the military under their control.

The result of the "cooperation" between the Defense Ministry and the Dutch educated former Knil officers, was the birth of an important Presidential decree in May 5, 1947.45 jhe decree in essence was just a repetition of the old decree on the unification of the army and the lasykar based on Drip's committee. The only new element was the name of the army: Tentara Nasional Indonesia, TNI

(The Indonesian National Army).

The first follow up of the Presidential decree was the creation of a committee to oversee the integration. This time the chairman of the committee was President Sukarno himself. The members of the committee were the Defense Minister, the Panglima Besar, high officers from the General Staff of the Army, Navy and Air Force, the representative of the student army (Tentara Pelajar) and five leaders of the l a s y k a r . 46 There were high expectations at this time about the committee since the President himself and the Panglima Besar--two 145 persons widely respected among the many different groups--were included. But the maximum result achieved by the committee was the

integration and reorganization among the lasykar into regiments and brigades, together organized under the name of TNI Masyarakat (TNI

Society). It is clear that TNI masyarakat was just a new name for the old lasykar group which was formerly organized under the name

Biro Perjuangan. And that means the Presidential Decree of May 5,

1947 did not achieve its goal, and the dualism in the leadership of the Indonesian m ilitary persisted.

While in the Republican area, attention was focused on military reorganization, the Dutch army suddenly launched an attack in the

Republican area on July 21, 1947. The disorganized and underarmed

Indonesian army and lasykar were devastated by a sudden attack by the modern well-equipped and well-organized Dutch army. The whole strategy of linear defense was useless. The cities and towns could not be defended, and the army and the lasykar had to retreat to the villages. Since the army and the lasykar at that time were not prepared for such an attack they were subsequently disorganized even in retreat. Nasution who was commander of the West Java Siliwangi division at the time, describes the result of the attack as follows:

Many times the commanders did not know the where about of their troops. Within a short time the highways would not be useable anymore. For TNI the only way to retreat was to go through pathways between the villages. And the disorganized troops were dispersed and everybody returned to their home towns.47

Luckily for the Republic the Dutch attack was limited to areas economically important for them. Yogyakarta and the c itie s around it 146 were s till in Indonesian hands. But it was clear that after the cease fire of August 4, 1947, what was left of the Republic was an area even smaller than present day Central Java. And in that shrinking area there came a huge amount of refugees from the occupied area.

The Dutch attack and the loss of the Republican area was a great blow to the army. Open criticism was launched against the army which was blamed for not being able to defend the Republic. It was against this background that the "left wing" of the Socialist Party in the

KNIP, in association with the Dutch-educated officers in the a r m y ,48 introduced the new law that required the rationalization of the army.

The bill was introduced on December 20, 1947. Since the KNIP was heavily dominated by the Socialists, it was easy to pass the bill.

On December 27, the government issued an order to implement the law of rationalization. According to Nasution,there were two important points contained in the new law:

First, the organization and the power of the TNI should be made smaller and simpler so tiiat the army could fit the position of the Republic at that time. Beside the fact that the Republican area had already become very small, social and economic suffering were also in the background [of the rationalization]. The state and society could no longer finance more or less 350 thousand soldiers (army, navy and air force) plus 470 thousand lasykar.

Second, in the preparation for the formation of the United States of Indonesia in which we had to compete with the officers we would inherit from the Dutch, we should have officers whose military knowledge could match their counterparts.49

In order to fully understand the political meaning of the law on the rationalization of the military, we have to put it into context.

First, the law was introduced when the defeat by the Dutch had just 147 hit the army and subsequent harsh criticism followed against its

leadership. Second, at the time of the introduction of the law,

negotiations were going on between Indonesia and the Dutch aboard the

battleship "Renville," made available by the U.S. Navy, in the bay of

Jakarta. Even before the negotiations were concluded on January 17,

rumors were already circulating around that Indonesia had to accept

the fact that the Dutch would recognize the Republican government as

the government of a state which would participate, together with many

other Dutch made states, in the yet to be created United States of

Indonesia. The rumor turned out to be true. Yogyakarta was hit by

political turmoil which cost Prime Minister Amir his cabinet. On

January 1948, Amir Syarifuddin's "left wing" socialist cabinet

resigned. A few days after that an emergency cabinet under Vice

President Hatta was sworn in. The governmental change did not cool

the political tension. One of the reasons was because Hatta was

determined to implement the Renville agreement.

On January 2, the President issued the Presidential decree

number 1/1948 as the f ir s t concrete effort to implement the

rationalization. The real meaning of the rationalization was

suddenly clear, namely the demotion of Sudirman from his position as

number one in the m ilitary. At the same time the armed forces would

be fully brought under the Defense Minister. In Sudirman's place

entered Suryadarma, the Dutch educated air force chief of staff. His

second in command was T.B. Simatupang, another Dutch educated

officer. Sudirman could s till keep his title as Panglima Besar, but

this charismatic position had become no more than an operational 148 commander who took orders from Chief of Staff Suryadarma, who in turn was just an assistant to the Defense Minister. Amir Syarifuddin could never achieve greater authority from his f ir s t day as Defense

Minister and he tried to get it at a time when the army was under fire from the Dutch as well as from the politicians. Unfortunately for Amir Syarifuddin, he did not stay longer in the government to enjoy the fru its of his efforts to become the person in control of the military. It was Mohammad Hatta, Vice President, Prime Minister and Defense Minister ad interim, who became the implementor of the rationalization policy of Amir.

The Presidential Decree was met with a hostile reaction from

Sudirman and Urip Sumoharjo and most of the officers in the army headquarters, Sudirman and Urip Sumoharjo went to see the President and the vice president.

The plan that was prepared by Amir's cabinet on this reorganization and its subsequent mutation in the leadership of the armed forces apparently were not discussed with them.50

But the first open and harsh reaction of Sudirman at that time was not directed toward the rationalization. Rather it was against the pretext on which the rationalization was based. Against the rumors that the Renville agreement had to be swallowed by Indonesia because of the inability and the unpreparedness of the military to fight, Sudirman ordered his spokesmen to issue the following statement which clearly blamed the cabinet for what had happened.

In relation with the rumor that the acceptance of the Renville agreement was caused by the unpreparedness (tak ada lagi kesanqgupan) of the Indonesian armed forces to continue its struggle, the Panglima Besar would like to make it clear once and for all that the rumor is totally false (bohong semata- 149

mata). From its inception until today the Indonesian Armed Forces has never stopped its struggle and will never stop it before we have reached the goal and ideal of Indonesian defense fullÿ. Moreover, the decision to accept the agreement was taken by the special cabinet session .51

One of the results of the Renville agreement was the evacuation of the Siliwangi division from West Java to Central Java. When the f irs t Siliwangi group arrived in Yogyakarta in mid February, Sudirman himself went to the railway station to welcome the evacuated dvision.

But within a short time relations between the Panglima Besar and

Siliwangi became strained. The reason was not difficult to guess.

Siliwangi, whose commander, A.H. Nasution, and most of the other officers were Dutch educated, was in favor of the rationalization.

The problem between the Japanese trained officers and the Dutch educated officers was then the topic of the day.

The problem became complicated when relations between the senior and the junior Dutch educated officers came to the surface. The junior officers were close to Amir Syarifuddin, and later to Mohammad

Hatta, who finally succeeded in removing their seniors from the leadership of the army. Urip Sumoharjo, Didi Kartasasmita--to mention two of them--suddenly lost their positions to their juniors.

According to Simatupang, the most influential junior former Knil officer at that time.

In the beginning the senior former Knil officers were playing important roles in the army. But their capacity was very limited, and their ability to adjust themselves to the army which was s till disorganized were even more limited. We, the younger officers were accepted in the army not because we were former Knil officers, but because we could contribute something our seniors could n ot.52 150

For Didi Kartasasmita the problem of their being pushed aside by their juniors was very simple, "they just wanted to be at the top in a very short time." Didi says further that.

They suggested to Hatta that Urip and several other senior former Knil officers be given positions outside the army. Urip was then appointed as a member of the DPA (Dewan Penasehat Aqunq, Supreme Advisory Council). Nasution, Simatupang and their friends then moved up. After that, we the senior officers felt disillusioned.53

Yogyakarta in the f ir s t few months of 1948 was a city filled with tension. The army under Sudirman was hostile toward the rationalization. And since the implementors of that policy were the former Knil officers, the target of anger was certainly these Dutch educated officers. At the same time there was the problem created by the Renville agreement. The left wing of the socialist party, after leaving the government, now became the opposition. They opposed just about everything the Hatta government did, including the implementation of the rationalization policy which they had originated. Nasution, who arrived with his troops in Yogyakarta in

February 1948, describes the situation in the capital at that time as follows :

Meanwhile, without realizing it, suddenly I was involved in a fierce political struggle. I did not realize that there were three factions involved: the government, the opposition and the Army Headquarters.. .When the Chief of Staff [Suryadarma] gave me a short explanation [on what was going on], he had to take me to the bath room. He was very suspicious of his surroundings.54

The situation was so tense that the swearing in of the new Chief of Staff could not take place. Meanwhile the opposition to the rationalization was getting out of hand. Sudirman who spent most of 151 his time in Surakarta was fast becoming the rallying point of the anti-rationalization group which had become the dominant power in the armed forces. In a Navy commanders call of March 25, the Navy

Commander, Admiral Atmaji, openly criticized the rationalization program of the government. He even disclosed that Sudirman had said that if the government persisted with that plan there certainly would be a civil war in Indonesia. He also said that Sudirman would rather retire than stay as the commander only over combat troops.55

Around the same time, the East Java commander, the former Peta officer and former Dutch marine. Major General Sungkono also openly attacked the rationalization policy which he accused as only following the conception of General Spoor, the then Dutch army

Commander in Indonesia. When Yogyakarta decided to replace Sungkono with one of his former colleagues in Peta, Colonel Bambang Supeno,

Sungkono simply disregarded the new commander. Bambang Supeno returned empty handed to Yogyakarta. The Chief of Staff could do nothing to enforce his decision, and the Panglima Besar threw his weight to Sungkono.55

In the beginning of March a rumor circulated that the government was in the process of negotiation with the Dutch on the creation of the federal army in which the TNI would be inserted. It was against this background that Sudirman and his supporters put pressure on the cabinet. Hatta then had no other choice but to publish a statement in which he denied the rumor. At the same time, as the result of pressure Hatta decided to give a free hand to Sudirman to reorganize 152 the army. The statement was issued on March 8, at a time when the divisional commanders were having a commanders call in Yogyakarta.

The commanders moved solidly behind Sudirman who then consolidated

his new mandate by going to see Sukarno for more power. Sukarno, who

himself was not happy with the rationalization,57 supported Sudirman.

He then suggested the formation of a committee of three persons to

oversee the problems of rationalization. It was then decided to have

the following officers in the committee: Major General Susalit

(representing former Peta officers and lasykar), Major General

Suwardi (representing the senior former Knil officers), and Colonel

Nasution (representing the junior former Knil officers).

According to Nasution, the committee was really no more than an

auxiliary toSudirman.58 The Panglima Besar and the committee met

with Sukarno several times in which Sudirman himself conducted the

negotiations. Basically Sudirman was pushing toward the revocation

of the whole rationalization plan. But since the plan was based on

the law which was already accepted by the KNIP, the only avenue

available was to keep the law but implement it according to the will

of Sudirman. At least that was apparently the ta c it agreement

between Sudirman and Sukarno.

Sudirman and the three members of the committee started a long

and tortuous negotiation process on who should be appointed to the

position as the result of the reorganization of the leadership of the

Armed Forces. The only thing they all agreed, even before the

negotiation, was that Sudirman was the highest officer in the 153 military hierarchy. The problem then became how to satisfy the four components of the m ilitary--the former Peta, lasykar, the senior former Knil officers and the junior former Knil officers, in the distribution of seats in the leadership of the armed forces.

Nasution suggested that the new Chief of Staff, Suryadarama, keep his position but at the same time also become the Vice Armed

Forces Commander (Wakil Panglima Besar). Sudirman bluntly refused

the suggestion. He then held a series of negotiations with the

senior former Knil officers out of which came the idea of reappointing Urip Sumoharjo to his old position for a short term

before giving the post to Nasution himself. Apparently Sudirman

sJiared with Urip Sumoharjo and his colleagues the b itter feeling of the senior former Knil officers toward their juniors. But at the

same time Sudirman realized the potential of the junior officers. He then decided to take a middle road, namely to accommodate the senior former Knil officers for a short time--"one or two months" according

to Sudirman--before turning over the position to a junior officer,

Nasution.59 The latter was elected apparently on the suggestion of

Urip Sumoharjo who, as we know, had had good relations with Nasution

since the Japanese occupation.

Before Sudirman had the chance to implement his version of

rationalization the situation suddenly became complicated again. For

Hatta, the Prime Minister and Defense Minister ad interim, Sudirman went too far. Commodore Suryadarma at the same time fe lt that he

already lost whatever chance he had to pursue the plan he had worked 154

out with his group in Yogyakarta. On May 1, Suryadarma sent a letter

of resignation to the President. The reason given for the

resignation was that he was left out of the process of

rationalization while he was formally still the Chief of Staff.

Sukarno refused the resignation.60 on July 15, he repeated his

request for resignation and was again refused by Sukarno and Hatta.61

A week after the first letter of resignation of the Chief of

Staff reached Sukarno, another letter of resignation reached him

also. Only this time it was sent by Sudirman. On May 9, in his

letter to the President, the Panglima Besar asked to be released from

his position in the army. The next day Sukarno refused the

resignation. On May 19, Sudirman sent another letter to Sukarno in

which he stated that he would keep his position in the army only if

the following conditions were met:

The government will agree to: 1. The position which I made clear in my letter dated May 9, 1948, which is the common position of all members of the armed forces in connection with the position of the armed forces in the future. This position should be confirmed and should be made as the guidance (not to be compromised).

2. In order to implement the position I mentioned in my letter of March 1948, the composition of the armed forces as mentioned in the Presidential Decree no. 14, should be r e v i e w e d .62

To understand this second letter of Sudirman we have to go back to the days in March when Sukarno showed his sympathy to the opponents of the rationalization. Apparently there were differences between Sukarno and Hatta in that matter. Whereas Sukarno was in favor of accommodating the opponents of rationalization by letting

Sudirman have a decisive role to play in the process, Hatta who was 155 really in charge as the head of the government had changed his mind after seeing that Sudirman, after his March 8 victory, was really disregarding the whole idea of rationalization. On May 10, Hatta then issued a new decree. Decree No. 14, to replace the controversial

Presidential Decree No. 1. But there were no basic differences betweeen the two decrees from Sudirman and his group's point of view.

Suryadarma was s till the Chief of Staff with two deputies. Colonel

Hidayat, a Siliwangi and Dutch trained officer, and Simatupang. Even worse for Sudirman because Hatta had placed Nasution as the Chief of

Operational Staff of the Panglima Besar. Thus Sudirman was encircled by the Dutch trained officers.

The reaction against this new decree was even more hostile than the earlier one. This time the issue was not only Suryadarma and his two former Knil officers as deputies, but also the appointment of

Nasution who had just arrived from occupied West Java. The rumor then started to circulate that this time Hatta was ready for an all out war because he knew that the wel 1-organized and well-armed

Siliwangi would stand behind him.63 Nasution was in a very difficult position. He not only had to face the criticism of the former Peta officers but also his seniors, the former Knil officers. The last group even went as far as publishing open criticism in the newspapers in which they questioned Nasution's knowledge in the field of military strategy.64

On Sudirman and the former Peta officers' attitude toward him,

Nasution has the following explanation. 156

As the second man of Sudirman, I fe lt at that time that he did not trust me when both Sukarno and Hatta trusted me very much. But Sudirman's attitude toward me had a close connection with the political situation at that time. When I arrived in Yogyakarta from West Java, the opposition toward the government was already very sharp. It was the opposition that exploited the differences that existed inside the army...The former Peta officers never really liked me because in my rationalization in West Java there were many former Peta officers who lost their positions.65

While Yogyakarta was engulfed in political turmoil the divisional commanders outside the capital, except that of Siliwangi, were rallying around Sudirman. In Surakarta on May 29 an important meeting was organized by the supporters of Sudirman. The meeting was chaired by Colonel Sungkono, Commander of the East Java division, and attended by most of the divisional commanders, except the Siliwangi.

Some unit commanders from the Navy and most of the newly created brigades, former lasykar commanders, were also present. The

Surakarta meeting, hosted by Colonel Sutarto, the Commander of the

Surakarta army division, decided that the government should renounce the Decree No. 14 and subsequently issue a declaration following the proposal of Sudirman. "If the government refuses, then there will be a desertion from the military in order to form a freedom fighter group to keep up with the sp irit of August 17, 1945, proclamation," says Sungkono. 66

Yogyakarta had not failed to learn of what was going on in

Surakarta. On the same day Nasution sent a report to Sudirman who was on tour in Madiun. Without waiting a moment, Sudirman instantly reacted with the following letter to his second in command. 157

The message dated May 25, 1948 had already reached me and I have read it with full attention. If the situation is that tense, and a dangerous situation could escalate, I am of the opinion that while we are s till in the middle of an emergency situation, all actions that could end up in friction among us should immediately be terminated. The reconstruction and rationalization plan for the time being should be replaced with a total mobilization. Every soldier who was in the army should be called back. All former commanders should be given back their commanding positions in order that they can contribute to the perfection and the strengthening of the defense of the State. The unity of the armed forces should immediately be restored and be made a unit that could forcefully resist the danger of colonialism.

In confronting the threat of the enemy, it is not necessary to show the outside world how perfect our organization is. Never mind if the outside world looked down to us as long as we are united. That is even better than having a good organization but we are fighting each other.

That is my opinion. I hope you will pay attention to it so that we will stay as a powerful unit that can overcome every possibility.67

Against the background of the meeting of the commanders in

Surakarta, Yogyakarta received Sudirman's letter as a sort of ultimatum. A high level negotiation promptly took place in which

Sukarno, Hatta, Surayadarma and probably also Hidayat, Nasution and

Simatupang participated. The government, probably at the urging of

Sukarno, finally succumbed to Sudirman's "ultimatum." Here again a middle way was invented to avoid the situation in which the government lost face. The Decree No. 14 was not revoked, but behind the scenes it was agreed that the Chief of Staff would be placed under the Panglima Besar. This was certainly a violation of the decree that was based on a law which was approved by the KNIP. But, as we remember, that was not the f ir s t time the law was abandoned in order to make adjustments to the emergency situation. We have seen 158 that the parliamentary system which was started by Syahrir's cabinet was a clear violation of the constitution which stipulated a presidential system for Indonesia.

On June 1, the new leadership of the Indonesian Armed Forces was sworn in in Sukarno's palace. Sudirman as Panglima Besar was representing the whole newly appointed officers in taking the oath.

Immediately after the ceremony Sudirman ordered Nasution to see him in his office. It was at that meeting that Nasution, as the chief of the operational staff of the Panglima Besar, got his order to revoke the rationalization which was already under way. The only thing

Sudirman agreed to keep was the term "combat command."68 other than th at, the whole structure basically returned to their composition before rationalization. Thus the whole story and endeavors of rationalization instantly became meaningless.

The story of the organizational problems of the army, however, did not end following Sudirman's victory over the government.

Immediately after his victory, Sudirman launched his own version of rationalization only this time it was known as reorganization. It is interesting to see that again, as in the case of the defeated rationalization, it was the former Knil officers who were the braintrust of this reorganization. This time Nasution was playing the important role.

Accordingly there were two factors working together that made the reorganization seem unavoidable at that time. The first factor was Sudirman's evaluation of the situation of the Dutch-Indonesian negotiations at that time. We have already seen that the leadership 159

braintrust of this reorganization. This time Nasution was playing

the important role.

Accordingly there were two factors working together that made

the organization seem unavoidable at that time. The first factor was

Sudirman's evaluation of the situation of the Dutch-Indonesian

negotiations at that time. We have already seen that the leadership

of the army was very much against the Renville agreement. Urip

Sumoharjo even went so far as to submit his resignation because he

fe lt humilitated by the agreement. The dragging process of

negotiation following the agreement convinced Sudirman that sooner or

later the Dutch would storm the Republic. It was based on this

confidence that Sudirman revoked the rationalization, and launched

his reorganization instead. The second factor was Nasution's

experience in conducting a guerrilla warfare in West Java following

the first Dutch attack in 1947. When Sudirman felt compelled to find

a new strategy to fight the coming Dutch attack Nasution was ready with his concept of a total guerrilla warfare. Confident of his

control of the army, Sudirman then did not hesitate to give Nasution

a free hand to implement his concept in preparation for the guerrilla war.

Nasution's experiences fighting the Dutch in West Java brought

him to the conclusion that it was useless to fight a well-equipped modern army in a conventional way. And for that reason Nasution

convinced Sudirman to reorganize the army so that it could fight a guerrilla war if the Dutch attacked the Republic. There were two

basic points in Nasution's concept: 160

1. Dividing the forces into two large factions: A. Units that were prepared for guerrilla warfare in the Renville areas (occupied by the Dutch in their firs t attack in July 1947). B. Units that were prepared for infiltration to West Java, Borneo and East Indonesia.

2. Reorganize the army into three parts: combat units whose members would be armed in ratio of 1 to 1 ; te rrito ria l units whose members will be armed in ratio of 1 to 3 or 5; and te r r i­ torial cadres who were prepared to lead the people in villages to fight under the territorial organizations of KDM (Komando Distrik M iliter, District Military Command) and KODM (Komando Onder Distrik Militer, Sub-District Military Com m and).69

Once again, as the case with his relations with the Headquarters when

Urip Sumoharjo was s till the Chief of Staff, Sudirman showed no interest in the technical day to day operation of the reorganization, and let Nasution implement his concept. But here again the old story was repeated. Almost all of the divisional and brigade commanders refused to let their units be reconstructed and reorganized according to the Nasution concept. The most violent reaction came from the brigades whose origin was lasykar, especially those whose orientation was le ftis t. These brigades were once the favorite of Amir

Syarifuddin during his tenure as Defense Minister.

Incidentally, Nasution's reorganization was launched at a time when the leftist socialists, now organized into the FDR (Front

Demokrasi Rakyat, People's Democratic Front) on their way to be PKI

(Partai Komunis Indonesia, Indonesian Communist Party), were bitterly and violently attacking the government.70 There then emerged a close cooperation between the le ftis t elements in the Army and the opposition. Since these former lasykar were concentrated in

Surakarta, Surakarta once again played the role of headquarters of 151 the opposition and the resistance to the reorganization. But in

Surakarta there was also a concentration of Siliwangi troops who were there since their evacuation from West Java. Nasution was certainly relying very much on the division he helped create. And since

Siliwangi were perceived as the troops of Nasution and Hatta,

Siliwangi then became the target of the opposition.

Sudirman was already sick when the turmoil in Surakarta began to be the center of attention in Republican p o litics. But he was s till well informed on what was going on. We have seen that the commander of the Surakarta division, Sutarto, was very much in the front row in supporting Sudirman against the rationalization. Apparently during his stay in Surakarta, Sudirman developed a special relationship with this Surakarta division. Explaining this particular special relationship we probably have to look to the background of Sudirman and the Army in Surakarta. Both of them were from Peta. And when

Sudirman did not feel at home in Yogyakarta--a city filled with Dutch educated government and military officials--one readily understands

Sudirman's decision to take a second residence in Surakarta.

When the army in Surakarta resisted the reorganization of

Nasution, and the former lasykar started to provoke the Siliwangi in

that city, Sudirman then urged Siliwangi to evacuate Surakarta.71

Nasution and most of the Siliwangi officers refused Sudirman's order

and the tensions mounted. The opposition seized the opportunity and fighting broke out. The well armed and well organized Siliwangi

could easily drive out Surakarta's army. But it was precisely at 162 that time that le f tis t elements in the army in Madiun, fearing that

Nasution will liquidate them because of their resistance to the reorganization, proclaimed a National Front government on September

18.72 The communist leaders, notably Amir Syarifuddin and Muso, had no other choice but to go along with their armed pemuda who already proclaimed a separate communist government. At this point the problem became a national level problem, and Sukarno and Hatta had to intervene. An emergency meeting was held in Yogyakarta to discuss the measures to be taken against the rebels. The Panqlima Besar gave orders to his subordinates to take over Mandiun from the rebels. But at the same time, secretly, Sudirman sent a peace feeler to Madiun.

It happens that the messenger was Lt. Colonel Suharto, the present day President of Indonesia, and Lt. Colonel Suadi, the favorite officer of Sudirman from the Surakarta division. Suharto reached

Madiun before Siliwangi began to attack the city. He met Muso, persuaded him to stop the rebellion. Muso agreed with certain conditions. But before Suharto reached Yogyakarta, Madiun was already under attack.73 when he learned about Suharto's mission,

Hatta reportedly was very angry with Sudirm an. 74

It is clear here that Sudirman once again tried to repeat his old role as a go-between. Since the Dutch could at any time launch an attack in the Republican area--indeed they did only two months

after the beginning of the Madiun Affair--it is understandable if

Sudirman the politician would work hard, even by violating his order

to attack and recapture Madiun, to stop the civil war. For Sudirman 163 apparently the Madiun Affair was a result of the unwise

implementation of the reorganizationp o l i c y . 75 it is true that he

himself ordered the reorganization following his approval of

Nasution's concept, but when he realized that the reorganization could trigger friction among his "sons", the "father" of the army would rather sacrifice the plan and choose harmony and unity instead.

In this case he was really a solidarity maker type politician rather than an army commander.76

The Madiun Affair was the end of the reorganization as initiated by Nasution. Not only because the troops were mobilized to put down the rebellion, but also because the proceeding of the Dutch-

Indonesian negotiations--as the follow up of the Renville agreement-- had led to a dead end. It was at that time that Sudirman had to completely rely on Nasution to prepare for a guerrilla war. Due to the deterioration of his health condition, Sudirman then had to be treated in a hospital in which he finally lost one lung by operation.

Free from political conflict, Nasution could now develop the idea he already introduced in the Operational Order No. 1 (Perintah

Siasat Nomer 1) which he prepared and was signed by Sudirman on June

12, 1948. The basic points of this Operational Order were as follows:

1. There would be no linear defense.

2. To delay the movement of the enemy in order that a total retreat (all civil servants and so forth) can be organized together with the implementation of a scorched earth policy. 154

3. The formation of pockets of resistance in every sub­ d istric t with guerrilla government in a wehrkreise system whose duties included the mountain areas around the sub-district.

4. The troops from the "federal area" [the areas taken by the Dutch in their firs t attack] would launch a wingate [infiltration to their former areas] in order to establish pockets of resistance, so that the whole of Java, and later the whole of Indonesia, would be a big field of guerrilla warfare.77

To implement this order Nasution created two military commands in the Republican area, the Java Command and the Sumatra Command.

(Nasution was later appointed to be the Java Commander.) Under these commands there were territo rial commands whose commanders were also military governors for their area. Below these territorial commands ther were respectively Sub Territorial Military Commands, District

Military Commands and Sub District Military Commands. 78

Meanwhile the organizational structure of the military leadership was still divided between the institution of Panqlima

Besar and the Chief of Staff even though the latter was no more than a name since Sudirman's ultimatum arrested the process of rationalization on June 1. To end the dualism, a group of officers proposed a solution, namely that Sudirman was to be formally apointed as Chief of Staff while still functioning as the Panqlima B esar. 79

With his additional position Sudirman was completely victorious over the government.

With his victory Sudirman went ahead to completely undo whatever changes had been produced by the rationalization. During the period of "the war of attritio n " between Sudirman and the government, the latter had managed to retire a huge amount of unfit and unwanted 165 soldiers and officers. When the danger of th Dutch attack became very visible, Sudirman from his hospital bed then issued an order to rehabilitate all the retired soldiers and officers. On the eve of the third anniversary of the birth of the Indonesian Army, it was

learned by the government that Sudirman would announce his order in his anniversary speech. The government, which was in the middle of negotiations with the Dutch, was very disturbed by Sudirman's decision. There was then a high level maneuver to prevent the

Panglima Besar from using the radio to announce his order, for that certainly could be taken as an act of sabotage to the negotiations. On the morning of October 5, 1948, the day of the anniversary, Hatta sent the following letter to Sudirman.

After considering everything mentioned by Colonel Simatupang in his letter dated October 3, I came to the conclusion that it is not proper to announce the mobilization of the former members of TNI, who were demobilized during the process of rationalization, in the speech of the Panqlima Besar on October 5. This kind of announcement will only be misunderstood by people inside as well as outside the country. Formally we already made it public internationally that our armed forces had been rationalized from the size of 460 thousand men to become 170 thousand...

If this mobilization is announced, that certainly can be interpreted as the enlargement of our forces. Hence it will be better to do it secretly, without announcing it via radio.80

When almost two months after the mobilization the Dutch stormed the Republican area, Sudirman, s till weak and yet to recover from his operation, went to the mountains to fight a guerrilla war as the

Panglima Besar of an army whose size was no less than the size he commanded during the f ir s t Dutch attack in 1947. But with the Dutch attack, Sudirman could clearly prove to the government and the Dutch 166 educated officers the uselessness of the rationalization when the defense of the Republic needed as much participation as it could mobilize in a guerrilla war against the well-organized and well-armed

Dutch army.

In the following chapter we will again find Sudirman in confrontation with the government. This time the problem was to continue the guerrilla war until the victorious end or to reach settlement through negotiation. As in the case of his disagreement with the rationalization policy that made him send his letter of resignation, he would rather retire than follow a government policy he did not believe would bring the intended result. He only abandoned the idea of retiring when he was presented by Nasution with the choice of putting the interest of the state above the military or vice versa. Sudirman then decided to sacrifice m ilitary interests for the sake of national unity.

Long after Sudirman's death, when the military officers remembered their Panqlima Besar, they commonly spoke about his role in the political process of the young Republic and his independent attitude toward the government. At the same time, however, they emphasized his record of never entertaining the idea of coup d 'e ta t, a lesson that remained etched on their minds in the years ahead. Footnotes

1. Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX,interview, Jakarta, October 15, 1984.

2. T.B. Simatupang, interview, Jakarta, September 20, 1984.

3. Nugroho Notosusanto. "Soedirman: Panglima Yang Menepati Janjinya." in Taufik Abdullah, e t . a l . (eds.) Manusia Dal am Kemelut Sejarah, (Jakarta; LP3ES, 1981), p. 48. For another date of Sudirman's birthday, see Solichin Salam, Djenderal Sudirman (Jakarta: Djaja Murni, 1953), p. 15, and Yusuf A. Puar, Jenderal Sudirman Patriot Teladan, (Jakarat: Pustaka Antara, 1981), p. 19. According to Salam, Sudirman was born on February 7, 1912, while according to Puar, the general's birthday was September 7, 1912. We decided to follow Notosusanto' s date because his was adopted by the government as the official birthday of the Panqlima Besar.

4. On Taman Siswa see Charles 0. van der Plas, Nationalism in the Netherlands Indies, (New York: Netherlands-Netherlands Indies Council Institute of Pacific Relations, 1942), p. 4.

5. Nugroho Notosusanto, "Soedirman" in Taufik Abdullah e t.a l., (eds.) Manusia, p. 51.

6 . On Muhamadiyah see Alfian, "Islamic Modernism in Indonesian Politics: The Muhammadijah Movement during The Dutch Colonial Period (1912-1942)." Unpublished dissertation. University of Wisconsin, 1969.

7. Charles 0. van der Plas, Nationalism, pp. 14-16.

8 . Nugroho Notosusanto, "Soedirman" in Taufik Abdullah e t.a l., (eds.) Manusia, p. 51.

9. Yusuf A. Puar, Jenderal Sudirman, p. 19.

10. Nugroho Notosusanto, "Soedirman," in Taufik Abdullah e t.a l., (eds.) Manusia, p. 56. See also Kumpulan Amanat Panqlima Besar Djenderal Soedirman, (Jakarta, Departemen Pertahanan-Keamanan, Pusat Sedjarah, ABRI, 1970).

167 168

11. is an abbreviation of Bapak (father), which is used as a form of familiar but respectful address. Dirman is a shortened form of Sudirman.

12. According to Dayino, an officer in the Army Headquarters at that time and a close associate to Syahrir, Sudirman's attitude to the differences between the government and the opposition should be understood against Sudirman's background as a Panqlima Besar without prior political education to prepare him for his position. Interview, Yogyakarta, October 31, 1984.

13. B.R.O. Anderson, "The Pemuda Revolution," unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Cornell University, 1967, p. 350.

14. Rudolf Mrazek, The United States and Indonesian Military, 1945- 1965, (Prague: Oriental Institute in Academia, 1978), p. 32. Satria is Indonesian equivalent for knight, and jago is a fighting cock. Jago is metaphorically used in Indonesian language to symbolize bravery.

15. Putusan Mahkamah Tentara Agung Republik Indonesia Di Djogjakarta Tanggal 27 Mei 1948, p. 84T

16. Tan Malaka, Dari Pendjara ke Pendjara, Vol. Ill (Djakarta: Widjaja, 1984), p. 55.

17. According to Tan Malaka, Sudirman's statement was made in the Purwokerto congress. But Anderson maintained that it was in the Surakarta's congress. See Tan Malaka, Dari Pendjara ke Pendjara. Vol. I ll, p. 56; and Anderson, "The Pemuda Revolution", p. 408.

18. Anderson, "The Pemuda Revolution," pp. 404-405.

19. On the inclusion of Sudirman in the small committee, see Merdeka, January 19, 1946. On Sudirman's decision to leave, see footnote 43 Chapter IV of this dissertation.

20. See footnote 19 above.

21. Soepardjo Roestam, interview, Jakarta, November 9, 1984.

22. Sundhaussen, The Road to Power, p. 27.

23. Zulkifili Lubis, interview, Jakarta, September 21, 1984.

24. Ahmad Subarjo Joyoadisuryo, Kesadaran Nasional, (Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 1978), pp. 419-420. In the military court which 169

tried the politicians and officers who were involved in the July 3 Affair, Sudirman denied having a political advisor as a Panglima Besar. See Putusan Mahkamah, pp. 85-86.

25. Harsono Cokroaminoto, interview, Jakarta, October 11, 1984.

26. Soepardjo Roestam, interview, Jakarta, November 9, 1984.

27. T.B. Simatupang, interview, Jakarta, September 20, 1984.

28. Didi Kartasasmita, interview, Jakarta, September 21, 1984.

29. Zulkifli Lubis, interview, Jakarta, September 21, 1984; Major General Slamet Danusudirjo gave me the same story. Slamet Danusudirjo, interview, Jakarta, September 30, 1984.

30. Selosoemardjan, Social Changes in Jogjakarta, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1962), pp. 10-12.

31. A.H. Nasution, Sekitar Perang Kemerdekaan Indoneisa, Vol. Ill, (Bandung: Penerbit Angkasa, 1977), p. 32.

32. Nasution, Sekitar Perang Kemerdekaan, Vol. Ill, p. 323.

33. Professor Mr. Haji Iwa Kusuma Sumantri, Riwayat Hidup Seorang Pejuang Kemerdekaan (forthcoming), chapter on July 3 Affair, p. 10.

34. Benedict R.O.'G. Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution (Ithaca and London; Cornell University Press, 1972), p. 384.

35. Anderson, "The Pemuda Revolution", p. 592.

36. In his defense when he was on trial on April 30, 1948, Major General Sudarsono went so far as mentioning Sudirman as the person who gave him the order to present the petitions to Sukarno. See "Pembelaan Dari Sudarsono Reksoprodjo Terhadap Tuntutan Dan Requisitoir Dari Djaksa Tentara Agung Mr. Tirtawinata, Dibacakan Pada Tanggal 30 April 1948." This document can now be found in the Arsip Nasional, Jakarta. Sudirman, who appeared in the same court as a witness, fla tly denied Sudarsono's claim. On Sudirman's denial, see Merdeka, March 25, 1948.

37. Both Anderson and S.I. Poeradisastra agree that in the meeting in the palace Sudirman worked hard to protect his soldiers from the prosecution of the government as the result of the July 3 Affair. He certainly could not save Sudarsono who led the party to the palace. But other than Sudarsono there were no army officers who were court martialed. See Anderson, Java, p. 402, 170

and Professor S.I. Poeradisastra, "Hubungan Panglima Besar Soedirman Dengan Persatuan Perjuangan, Suatu Percobaan Rekonstruksi Latar Belakang Peristiwa 3 Juli 1945" in Sides Sudiarto (ed). Tingkah Laku Politik Panqlima Besar Soedirman, (Jakarta, PT. Karya Unipress, 1983), p. 83.

38. Dayino, interview, Yogyakarta, October 31, 1984; M. Natsir, Minister of Information in Syahrir's cabinet and was deeply involved in the aftermath of the July 3 Affair was responsible for the publication of the government statement which claimed that what happened in the morning of July 3, 1946 was a coup d'etat) explained to the writer of this study that he was in the palace, attending the important meetings on the July 3 Affair for almost a week, and during that period he never heard any talk about Sudirman's involvement in the abortive coup d 'e ta t. M. Natsir, interview, Jakarta, September 22, 1984.

39. Unfortunately we have not enough information on the relation between Sudarsono and Sudirman. But we know that Sudarsono was older than the Panglima Besar. Sudarsono had a higher education and more experiences in the security field than Sudirman, for Sudarsono had been in the police force long before the coming of the Japanese. And if Sudirman was the leader in Banyumas, Sudarsono was the hero of Yogyakarta in the days when the pemuda wrestled arms from the Japanese. There is then reason to guess that Sudarsono did not have full respect for Sudirman. And because of that he even intimidated Sudirman--by pointing his revolver at the Panqlima Besar--when he was "interrogated" by Sudirman in Surakarta the night before he went to the palace. Thus, besides political reasons--that while disagreeing with the policy of diplomacy of Syahrir on one hand, Sudirman on the other hand did not favor a coup d 'e ta t—there were also personal reasons behind Sudirman's disassociation from Sudarsono. On Sudarsono pointing his revolver at Sudirman, see Merdeka, March 25, 1948.

40. Nasution, Sekitar Perang Kemerdekaan, Vol. Ill, p. 123. Apparently Sukarno was disturbed by many speeches made by Sudirman at that time. Sukarno then suggested to Sudiro--the Resident of Surakarta at that time--to tell the Panqlima Besar to restrain himself from making too many speeches. According to Sudiro, Sudirman was very popular at that time, and Sukarno was afraid that his own popularity would be endangered by Sudirman's speeches. Sudiro, interview, Jakarta, September 10, 1984.

41. Nasution, TNI_, Vol. II, p. 282.

42. Simatupang, interview, Jakarta, September 20, 1984. 171

43. In a meeting with high ranking m ilitary officials on May 8, 1948, Sudirman regretted that TNI Masyarakat which originally was designed as a public relations branch of the army was developed by the then Defense Minister as an army in itself. See Notulen Rapat Dewan Siasat M iliter, (May 8, 1948), Yogyakarta Document, 5530 Arsip Nasional, Jakarta, Indonesia. Interestingly enough Sudirman later, when the reorganization was taking place, once again agreed to the demand of the TNI Masyarakat to be incorporated into the army in its old formation. On May 15, TNI Masyarakat was formally abolished and its members were integrated into the army by the way of creating a special brigade for them. Here again we can see Sudirman as a politician, as the father (bapak) of all the armed pejuang (fighter) more than the army commander. Sudirman's decision was later on proved to be fatal. When the Madiun Affair--the communist rebellion--broke out in September 1948, it was the brigades of the former TNI Masyarakat who were fighting side by side with the communists. On Sudirman's decision to let the TNI Masyarakat have its own brigades, see Nasution, TNI, Vol. II, p. 210.

44. According to Nasution the most important member of the young officers group was Simatupang. See Nasution, Memenuhi Panqqilan Tugas, Vol. I., p. 122. It was because of the involvement of the young--and mostly Dutch educated--officers in the preparation of the rationlization that created a suspicion among the former Peta officers toward athem. Most of the former Peta officers suspected these young and well educated officers as having a conspiracy with the government to replace the Panglima Besar. This suspicion apparently is still alive among the former Peta officers long after they had retired. Most of them openly shared their suspicion with me when I interviewed them in the fall of 1984. Zulkifli Lubis, the most articulate among the former Peta officers, explained to me that, "The former Knil officers could easily cooperate with the government because they could understand the way of thinking of the Western educated government officials at that time." Lubis, interview, Jakarta, September 21, 1984. For Nasution, to understand the cooperation between Simatupang and Syahrir and Amir we should know that for the well educated Indonesian at that time--including those in the army—Syahrir and Amir Syarifuddin were regarded as the vanguard of the modernization. Nasution writes, "The intellectual groups in TNI would very much like to have a decisive and rational leader. Generally they respected Pak Dirman as a father and a unifier but it was regretted that his leadership was more of a solidarity maker rather than a problem solver as expected by the intellectuals." Nasution, written communication, Jakarta, April 24, 1985. 172

45. Nasution, TNI, Vol. II, p. 84.

45. Nasution, TNI, Vol. II, p. 92.

47. Nasution, Memenuhi Panqqilan Tugas, Vol. I, p. 57.

48. Nasution, TNI, Vol. II, p. 130.

49. Nasution, TNI, Vol. II, p. 133.

50. ™ , Vol. II, p. 144.

51. Pengumuman No. 3/48, Yogyakarta January 25, 1948. Yogyakarta Document 5390. Ar?ip Nasional, Jakarta, Indonesia.

52. Simatupang, interview, Jakarta, September 20, 1984.

53. Didi Kartasasmita, interview, Jakarta, September 21, 1984.

54. Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas, Vol. I, p. 253.

55. Notes of an important meeting on May 26, 1948, CMI document 5703, CAD, HK 66, GG 67, Archive of the Dutch Defense Ministry, The Hague.

56. Nasution, TNI Vol. II, pp. 182-184. The refusal of Sungkono to follow the order and the compromise of Sudirman was only a repetition of what was happening in the early days of the army when the force was created from the bottom up. In this case one can suspect that Sungkono did not transfer his position to Bambang Supeno because his soldiers did not allow him to. Thus it is clear that in the father-son relation (the commander was the father and the soldiers were the sons) it was not the father that always decided the last move. And since Sudirman was more of a "father" rather than the commander of the army, it is understandable if he at times listened to his "sons" rather than to his superior, the government.

57. Sukarno and Hatta were known during the revolution as the Dwi Tunggal (duumvirate). But this by no means that they were always in agreement. Long before independence, in the time of the nationalist movement, Sukarno and Hatta were already attacking each other in the newspapers. They cooperated during the Japanese occupation. During the revolution the signs of their differences at times came to the surface. And nowhere were the differences clearer than in the relation between the Army and the government. While Hatta was very close to the Dutch educated officers, Sukarno showed his sympathy to Sudirman. The Sukarno-Hatta cooperation came to an end in the mid-fifties. The differences between them that lead to the 173

resignation of Hatta are described by Herb Feith as the differences between the Solidarity Maker type (Sukarno) and the Administrative or Problem Solver type (Hatta). See Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, (Ithaca, New York : Cornell University Press, 1962), pp. 24-25. On Sukarno- Sudirman and Sudirman-Hatta relations, the sources are Nasution, interview, Jakarta, September 11, 1984, and Zulkifli Lubis, interview, Jakarta, September 21, 1984.

58. Nasution, TNI, Vol. II, p. 156.

59. Nasution, Memenuhi Panqqilan Tugas, Vol. II, pp. 9-11. Apparently Sukarno intervened by consulting the former Knil officers, senior as well as junior. Sukarno then informed Hatta that Suryadarma was not acceptable to the senior former Knil officers, while Urip was not acceptable to the junior former Knil officers. Sukarno then suggested that Colonel Hidayat from Siliwangi be appointed as the Chief of Staff. See Sukarno's letter to Hatta, dated June 2, 1948, in CMI Document 5300, CAD, HK 55, GG 56, The Dutch Defence Ministry Archive, The Hague. Hatta's decision was to keep Suryadarma in his place but appoint Hidayat as the f ir s t assistant to the Chief of Staff.

50. Suryadarma's letter to Sukarno, dated May 1, 1948, in CMI Document 5329, CAD, HK 65 GGG 56, The Dutch Defence Ministry Archive, The Hague.

61. Suryadarma's letter was discussed in a meeting as reported by Dutch m ilitary intelligence in CMI Document 5328, CAD, HK 65, GG 56, The Dutch Defence Ministry Archive, The Hague.

62. Sudirman's letter to Sukarno dated May 9, 1948, in CMI Document 5329, CAD, HK 65, GG 56, The Dutch Defence Ministry, The Hague.

63. The interrogation of Didi Kartasasmita, CMI Document 23/Secret, The Royal Dutch Archive (ARA)/The General Secretary (AS), Box VII, No. 24, The Hague. In his memoir, Nasution writes that he intended to make Siliwangi available for Hatta because he trusted the Vice President/Prime Minister as the rational leader. See Nasution, Memenuhi Panqqilan Tugas, Vol. I, p. 251.

64. Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas, Vol. II, pp. 9-10.

65. Nasution, interview, Jakarta, September 11, 1984.

66. Report from an important meeting held on May 26, 1948, CAD, HK 65, GG 67, The Dutch Defence Ministry Archive, The Hague. The host of the Surakarta meeting was Colonel Sutarto, the commander of the Surakarta division and firm supporter of Sudirman. When Sutarto was shot to death by a mysterious sharp shooter on July 174

2, 1948, he was replaced by Lt. Colonel Suadi, the favorite officer of Sudirman. On the shooting of Sutarto, apparently there are several theories. Nasution is of the opinion that he was shot by a Dutch agent in order to provoke animosity between the Surakarta division against the Siliwangi division which was in Surakarta at that time. Nasution, interview, Jakarta, September 11, 1984. But according to Lubis, it was Siliwangi which murdered Sutarto, because the latter was considered to be leftist and anti-rationalization and reorganization plan. Zulkifli Lubis, interview, Jakarta, September 21, 1984,

67. ARA (The Royal Dutch Archive)/Section Two, The Attorney General, Period 1945-1950, No. 221. DOBI NO. 648.

68 . Nasution, TNI, Vol. II, p. 186.

69. Nasution, TNI, Vol. II, pp. 160-161.

70. FDR, Front Demokrasi Rakyat (People's Democratic Front) was a new name for the left wing of the Socialist Party after Amir Syarifuddin stepped down from the premiership and became the leader of the le ftis t opposition. FDR then proclaimed the class struggle and openly pressed the Hatta government to rely on the Soviet Union rather than on the United Sttes. Because ofthis, Syahrir and his followers left the Socialist Party and organized the Partai Sosialis Indonesia, PSI (Indonesian Socialist Party) in February 1948. With the arrival of a previously exiled communist leader, Muso, in Indonesia in August 1948, the FDR became more radical. Before the Madiun Affair, FDR proclaimed itself to be the PKI, Partai Komunis Indonesia, (Indonesian Communist Party). See Robert J. Myers, "The Development of The Indonesian Socialist Party." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1959. pp. 26-28.

71. The background of Sudirman's attitude here could not be understood out of context of his relation with Hatta. For Hatta the provocation against Siliwangi was the first step of the communist plan to an open rebellion. For Sudirman what happened to Siliwangi was purely the result of the rationalization policy which was supported fully by Siliwangi. When Sudirman ordered Siliwangi to get out of Surakarta, he told Lt. Colonel Sadikin, a Siliwangi brigade commander, that the Surakarta division were his "sons" (anak-anak saya). "Whose sons then are we?" asked Sadikin. It is clear here that if he had to choose between Siliwangi, commanded by the Dutch trained officers, and the Surakarta division, commanded by the Japanese trained officers, Sudirman would have favored the latter. See further Nasution, Memenuhi Panqqilan Tugas, Vol. II, pp. 43-46. 175

72. On the Madiun Affair, see David Charles Anderson, "The Military Aspects of the Madiun Affair," Indonesia, No. 2 (April) 1976, pp. 1-60; Onghokham, "Pemberontakan Madiun 1948: Drama Manusia dalam Revolusi" in Onghokham,Rakyat dan Negara, (Jakarta: Sinar Harapan, 1983), pp. 143-168; Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, pp. 284-303; Aidit, Pilihan Tulisan, Vol. I, (Jakarta: Pembaruan, 1955); R.S. Kain, "Moscow in Indonesia," Current History, XVII, No. 95, August 1949, pp. 65-70; Ruth I. McVey, The Soviet View in Indonesian Revolution, (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University, 1975).

73. President Suharto, written communication, Jakarta, November 12, 1984; Suadi's participation in the mission had created confusion in Surakarta. According to Sudiro, the Resident of Surakarta at that time, "Suadi was close to the communists, but also close to Sudirman. Suadi's v isit to Madiun when the city was under attack by the government forces could not simply be disregarded. There were many people who knew about that v isit. But what we did not know was the relation between Suadi and Sudirman." Sudiro, interview, Jakarta, September 10, 1984.

74. Nasution, interview, Jakarta, September 11, 1984.

75. It is interesting to see that for Sudirman the Madiun Affair was more of a result of rationalization and organization policy rather than a well prepared communist plan. Sudirman was certainly very saddened by the Madiun Affair, but the reason was because the rebellion only weakened the unity of the Indonesian who were badly needed to unite against the Dutch. It was against this background that he sent Suharto and Suadi to Madiun. And when the Dutch finally launched their attack on the Republican area, Sudirman issued an order to the leaders of PKI/FDR and its enemy, the Army and the Muslem party to work and fight together. In his order Sudirman stated, among others, that, "...all faiths or ideologies embraced must serve the welfare of the country and the nation so that the people of Indonesia who have suffered and sacrificed hundreds of years can be independent and free from imperialist-capitalist influence. The main thing is that, despite our professing a variety of ideologies, there is one obligation which must be fulfilled by all of us together, that is: "Free the soil of Indonesia from the threat of colonial imperialism."

At present we all face a common enemy, the Dutch. Therefore, all groups must unite: the events of the past must be completely forgotten so that we can be truly solid nad united and the people of Indonesia form one impregnable fortress capable of resisting attack from any quarter..." See Herbert Feith and Lance Castles, (eds.), Indonesian Political Thinking, 1945-1965, (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1970), 176

pp. 364-365; That Sudirman harbored a suspicion toward le ftist politicians, probably can be seen in his move to organize an intelligence body specializing on spying on the left wing socialists. The body was created personally by Sudirman in May 1948, and staffed by the followers of Tan Malaka. See further Yogya Document 5380, Arsip Nasional, Jakarta. With the creation of an intelligence body spying solely on the leftwing socialists, it is clear that Sudirman made a clear line between the leftists in the Army and the civilian leftists. For Sudirman the armed pemuda, regardless whether they were in the army, left wing lasykar or right wing lasykar, all were the "sons" of the Panglima Besar.

76. Herbert Feith, The Decline, pp. 24-25.

77. Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan, Vol. II, p. 32.

78. Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan, Vol. II, p. 36.

79. According to Nasution, the dualism was overcome by firs t appointing Colonel Hidayat as Chief of Staff ad interim while Suryadarma returned to his position as Air Force Chief of Staff. When Hidayat was later transferred to Sumatra as the commander of the Sumatra Army, Sudirman became fully Chief of Staff and at the same time Panglima Besar of the Indonesian Armed Forces. See Nasution, TNI, Vol. II, p. 197.

80. Hatta's letter to Sudirman, SH. Spoor Collection 216, number 39, ARA (The Royal Dutch Archive) The Hague. CHAPTER VI

FIGHTING FROM VILLAGES, JUNGLES AND MOUNTAINS

...If the Dutch military decided to persist in employing power to destroy the Republic of Indonesia by invading Yogyakarta, then 70 million Indonesians will rise to fight and I myself will lead the guerrilla war.l -- Sukarno.

...All of you will obey the cease fire order issued by the President/Commander in Chief on August 3 [1949]... But as the father of the army I very much realize that you will implement the order with a broken heart. But military discipline compels us to do so.2 -- Sudirman.

The reason that the Dutch were finally willing to withdraw their forces from Indonesia was not because they were defeated by our army, but because they were weakened and stymied by us so that there was no longer any hope for them to destroy the Republic. When their efforts to do this were frustrated, international pressure hastened the transfer of sovereignty.3 -- A. H. Nasution.

The signing of the Dutch-Indonesia agreement on board the U.S.S.

Renville on January 17, 1948 initially was expected to bring the conflict to a peaceful conclusion. In it both parties agreed that together with the Dutch created States they would work toward the

177 178 creation of an independent RIS (Republik Indonesia Serikat, United

States of Indonesia). But at the same time it was also agreed that in the period leading toward the formation of the RIS, the sovereignty of

Indonesia, s till the "Netherlands East Indies" to the Dutch, was to

4 remain within the Dutch hands. Since there was no blue print for the formation of the RIS, it was left to both parties to make their own interpretations. This room for discretion would ultimately paralyze the implementation of the agreement. In this chapter we will explore not only the differences between the Dutch and the Republicans in interpreting the agreement, but also the differences among the

Republicans in accepting, understanding and implementing it. As will be shown in this chapter the controversy in the Republican camp s till centered on whether to win independence by way of diplomacy or through armed struggle.

While the m ilitary tacitly approved the policy of diplomacy, they nevertheless prepared for a guerilla war in case of a deadlock in negotiations. When the deadlock became a reality, and the Dutch attacked the Republican area, the crisis then engulfed the Republican camp. It was in this time of crisis that the military took over.

Subsequently, while conducting the Military Government, which was created following the surrender of the civilian government, the m ilitary acquired experience in governing the country. It was this experience, together with the military's political role from the outset of the revolution and the political behavior of Sudirman, that later on shaped the self perception of the military from which later emerged the doctrine of Dwi Funqsi (Dual Function). 179

Going back to the days following the Renville agreement, we can see that as soon as talks began on the implementation of the agreement, the Dutch delegation made it clear that during the transition period an interim federal government under the Dutch High

Representative in Jakarta reserved the right to dispatch Dutch troops into areas where it found interval disturbances to exist.^ The

Indonesian delegation flatly rejected this Dutch position arguing that any such claims could only be made after the formation of RIS.

If the Indonesians succumbed to the Dutch claims then the I.N.I.

(Indonesian National Army) would certainly have been disbanded by the

Dutch. The agreement did specify for the reduction of troops on both sides, but in the ensuing negotiations the Dutch demanded the complete disbandment of T.N.I., out of which there would be a selection for those who would be admitted into the yet to be created federal army.

But as we have seen in the previous chapter, even the plan to reduce the size of the T.N.I. could not be carried out by the cabinet of

Mohammad Hatta.

In his letter to the Dutch Foreign Minister Dirk Stikker, Hatta tried to explain that it was not that easy to disband the T.N.I., because this force was growing together with the Republic of Indonesia in the struggle for independence.

Hatta then proposed a compromise in which the T.N.I. would not be disbanded but be incorporated -- together with the Knil and security battalions created by the Dutch following Renville -- into the army of the R.I.S.^ It was amidst these actions that Hatta decided to take 180 over the policy of rationalization of the army from the previous cabinet of Amir Syarifuddin. Seen from this perspective, it is understandable that the many former Peta officers, notably Sudirman,

Sungkono, and Sutarto -- officers known for their anti-diplomacy position -- were in opposition to the rationalization and even went as far as labeling it the "Spoor plan." Hatta's proposal was refused by the Dutch.

In early June, a report prepared by the American State

Department's Office of Intelligence Research sent a warning to

Washington about the breakdown of Dutch Indonesian negotiations and the possibility of another armed action by the Dutch against the

Republic.^ Meanwhile the Dutch proceeded with their own plan to create the United States of Indonesia by forming an interim Federal

Government on March 9. At this time, the Dutch, ignoring the

Republican protests, went ahead with their policy of creating several puppet states in the areas formerly belonging to the Republic. On

February 20, Madura, an island at the eastern edge of Java, was organized into a state. Five days later, in West Java the State of

Pasundan was created, and on March 25 the State of East Sumatra came . , 8 into being.

The Dutch persistence with these plans with or without the participation of the Republic apparently had something to do with relations between The Hague and Washington at that time. As the cold war between East and West became clear, Washington moved to implement its containment policy by carrying out the Marshall Plan and creating 181

NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, in Western Europe. In this policy, Dutch cooperation was essential to the success of containment. At that time it was ill-advised for Washington to alienate The Hague by denouncing its colonial policy. The Joint

Chiefs of Staff of the United States Armed Forces even called the

Netherlands "a vital area to American national security." According to the evaluation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, The Netherlands ranked fifth in the world as a country of direct importance to the United

States

But events in September suddenly tipped the balance in favor of

Yogyakarta. The communist rebellion in Madiun and the prompt action of the government to suppress i t had convinced Washington of the anti-communism of the regime in Yogyakarta. While in Central Java the

T.N.I. was on the move to eliminate the communist rebels, in China the red Chinese were gathering momentum in their fight against the

Nationalists. At the same time in Europe, American and British forces were trying to cope with the Soviet blockade of West Berlin. It was against this background that Washington slowly changed its policy toward the Dutch-Indonesian conflict.

The winds of change in Washington did not go unnoticed by The

Hague. The Dutch government hurriedly sent Foreign Minister Stikker to Washington. But even before leaving Holland, Stikker already knew how he would be received in Washington, for his request to have an interview with State Secretary Marshall was already politely refused by the State Department. But Stikker flew to Washington anyway. 182

When he arrived in Washington the State Department fe lt compelled

to arrange the meeting of the two foreign ministers. Meetings took

place twice on the same day in September. The f ir s t meeting was held

in the State Department which was left by Marshall less than one hour

after the talk had begun. The second meeting took place before both

of them attended a dinner party given by United Artists in Marshall's

honor. Describing the mood and the results of the meeting almost

twenty years later, Stikker in his memoir writes as follows:

Although in our brief discussion in the afternoon Secretary Marshall had been nowhere nearly as frank and outspoken with me as he was later with United A rtists, there was no mistaking the policy line he had nonetheless revealed. There would be no support whatsoever for us from the United States; we were expected to get on with the task at hand, and the Republic was to get American support. I had certainly not felt any optimism before my meeting with Marshall, but I now lost hope for any reasonable solution. Even more did I fear m ilitary action, which would backfire against us.

Returning home, Stikker faced public sentiment which had been

increasingly disenchanted with the Republic. The disenchantment was

in part caused by the biased news coverage of the alleged growing

communist influences in Indonesia, but especially in the Army. The

government was also under pressure from the rural Catholic areas of

the Netherlands, which contained the families of the greater 12 percentage of Dutch soldiers operating in Indonesia. It was

against that background, and only after a long effort to persuade his

colleagues in the cabinet—especially Minister E.M.J.A. Sassen who was

in charge for Overseas T erritories--to comprehend the Netherlands' d ifficu lt position that finally Stikker succeeded in convincing his 183 cabinet to start to negotiate with Indonesia. But this time it was

Stikker himself who would lead the Dutch delegation to Yogyakarta.

The Dutch delegation arrived in Jakarta on October 31. Realizing the urgency of his mission, Stikker did not waste his time in Jakarta before proceeding to Yogyakarta. He spent his f ir s t few days in

Indonesia in meetings with different groups of Indonesians as well as

Dutchmen.

The results were not encouraging. All with whom I met spoke of the absolute necessity for military action, the forecasts of which were uniformly optimistic. Once the decision was taken, it was said, action could start in six days, and would not last longer than three weeks. After three months the new administrative reconstruction could begin, and Dutch soldiers might be repatriated by August of 1949.13

On November 4 Stikker and his entourage proceeded to Yogyakarta.

After a formal lunch and a private discussion with Hatta the working group was organized on both sides before they finally got down to business in Kaliurang, a mountain resort a few miles outside

Yogyakarta. Stikker and his delegation stayed in the Republican area for four days. Stikker spent his time -- besides negotiating — in meeting as many officials as possible. On remembering that period,

Stikker writes.

The more I saw during my first visit in Kaliurang, the more I became aware of the hostile determination to defend what the republicans believed they had achieved, that is, what they regarded as the sovereignty for which they had fought. To break through this wall of h o stility seemed at f ir s t, a hopeless task, as I tried to ascertain where our differences lay, where the positions had hardened, and where we might find some openings to break the deadlock... The main problems remained the status of the Republic vis-a-vis the Indonesian Federal States, the role of High Representative of the Crown and his veto in the interim period, the position of the TNI (the Republican army), the command over 184 these and our forces in the period in which law and order had to be restored, and the date of elections.14

Stikker interrupted the meeting to return to Jakarta because of the arrival of Sassen, the Dutch Minister for Overseas Territories.

Two weeks after that, Stikker and Sassen came to Kaliurang to have a talk with Hatta. According to Hatta, there was a change of mood in the Dutch delegation this time.

Sassen was the one who did most of the talking. His position was very different from that of Stikker. He held to the earlier Dutch position that the TNI had to cease its function as an army and become merely a 'gendarmerie'. So our discussions came to a dead end.15

On his way home, Stikker fe lt that at least he had broken the deadlock by reopening the negotiations. But the cabinet's acceptance of his mission was very cool. The Dutch cabinet, nevertheless, decided to continue what had been started by Stikker. But the negotiations led nowhere. Finally, on December 11, 1948, the Dutch representative in Jakarta informed the Committee of the Good Offices of the United Nations that i t had been impossible to continue the talk with the Republic. On December 13 Hatta fe lt compelled to send a

letter to the Dutch delegation in which he recognized the Dutch

sovereignty during the interim period. But in the same letter, Hatta

also asked the Dutch to impose upon themselves certain limitations on

the exercise of power. On December 17 the Dutch delegation sent its

reply to Hatta. According to George Kahin, who was in Yogyakarta at

that time, the reply was:

...in effect an ultimatum demanding that the Republic agree to complete compliance with the Netherlands point of view within eighteen hours. It stated that Hatta's letter was not in itself sufficient to induce the Netherlands’ government to revise the 185

conclusion set forth in its note of December 11. It made it clear that the Netherlands would countenance no change in its stand concerning the powers of its High Representative of the Crown and that the Republic could be incorporated into the projected federal organization only "on the same footing as the other federal areas."16

The Dutch "ultimatum" apparently did not create an immediate panic in Yogyakarta. One of the reasons was that Hatta and the people around him believed that the United States, whose sympathy was now well known, would not let the Dutch begin military operations. It was because of this that Sukarno went ahead with his preparation for a state visit to India on the invitation of Jawaharal Nehru, the Prime

Minister of India. The military, on the other hand, was already on alert ever since Stikker left Indonesia without any follow-up of his talk. Accordingly, on November 9, Colonel Nasution circulated a secret instruction to all of the commanders in Java of the possibility of the Dutch attack. "...[It is] probably only a matter of time."^^

As it became clear that the Stikker mission had gone nowhere, the

Army then started to carry out their preparation for a guerrilla war.

To avoid the eyes of Dutch intelligence, the preparations were conducted in the form of m ilitary training exercises. Included in the preparation was the search for a secure hiding place for Sukarno from where he could lead the guerrilla war as he had promised. According to Nasution, he gave orders to Lieutenant Colonel Latief, the

Commander of the Yogyakarta Military Garrison, to find a place that could immediately be used in the case of a sudden Dutch attack. From that place Sukarno then would be moved to Samigaluh, a village outside 186 18 Yogyakarta, as the f ir s t post after leaving the c a p ital.

According to Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX, who was a Minister without portofolio in Hatta's cabinet, he too was ordered to find a safe place for the President in case of the Dutch attack. Hamengkubuwono IX remembers that

Around seven months before the Dutch army stormed Yogyakarta I had a meeting with Sudirman, Hatta and Sukarno. In that meeting it was decided that the government would leave the city if the Dutch launched its attack. I was then ordered to find a place somewhere in the northern area of the Residency of Banyumas for the leaders of the Republic from where they would lead the guerrilla war.19

Meanwhile the situation in Yogyakarta became increasingly tense.

The political leaders s till doubted that the Dutch would launch an attack so long as the negotiations were continuing and indeed Hatta was s till trying to respond to the Dutch "ultimatum" which was brought to Jakarta by Merle Cochran, the American representative on the 20 Committee of Good Offices of the United Nations. On the morning of December 18, Colonel Simatupang, the Vice Chief of Staff, went to see the Panglima Besar, who had been bedridden for three months following an operation that removed one of his lungs. On that visit,

Simatupang later writes;

...although we considered the situation very tense, our political leaders believed that the Dutch could not afford to attack so long as the exchange of notes through the United States representative on the Three State Commission was s till proceeding. Under such circumstances, an attack by the Dutch would be the policy of madmen -- such was the general opinion in political circles. Nonetheless, Pak Dirman evidently had a premonition that the Dutch would attack after all. That same day he announced that he had taken the command into his own hands again. He intended this announcement, of course, mainly as a psychological measure, because at that moment Pak Dirman had by no means recovered. He had received me lying on his bed.21 187

Tension engulfed Jakarta and The Hague around the same time. The

Dutch authorities in Jakarta had come to the conclusion that only a m ilitary solution could break the stalemated negotiations. But The

Hague was under pressure from Washington to continue to talk. It was at this time that the United States had threatened The Netherlands with the possibility of the discontinuation of the Marshall Plan had 22 the Dutch decided to solve the Indonesian question m ilitarily.

The threat apparently created a fight between the doves and the hawks in the Dutch cabinet. The latter won and the decision to launch the police action, as the Dutch called it, was taken.

To keep the element of surprise for their military action, the

Dutch authority in Jakarta did not inform the Republican delegation of the decision to abrogate the negotiation until thirty minutes before midnight on December 18. By the time they realized what was going on, the Indonesian delegation was not in the position to inform Yogyakarta of the Dutch decision, not only because all of the lines of communication were already cut off, but also because the members of the delegation were already put under arrest. A few hours after that, at 5:30 on the morning of December 19, Dutch bombers launched an attack on Maguwo, Yogyakarta's airfield. After bombing it for about an hour, paratroops were dropped. There was no meaningful resistance from the airfield guard and within one hour the airfield was under 23 Dutch control.

Sultan Hamengkubuwono was in his kraton (palace) on that morning.

The sounds of the low-flying Dutch airplanes woke him up. The following is his account of that day. 188

When I saw that the airplanes did not belong to us, I became suspicious. I then decided to go to Gedung Aqunq [the presidential palace]. The f ir s t person I met there was Suryadarma. I asked him, "What happened?" His answer, "Ya, I just sent people to find out what happened." Wah, this is d iffic u lt, the Air Force Chief of Staff himself did not know what was going on. I went in and met Bung Karno. I asked President Sukarno, "The Dutch apparently already started the war, what will be the government reaction? Will we go out or stay in the city?" Bung Karno said, "Stay." I then excused myself. Before I left Sukarno asked me to go to Kaliurang to fetch Bung Hatta. On my way out I met Syahrir. He joined me. We then drove together to Kaliurang. But before we reached our destination, we saw Hatta's car heading toward Yogyakarta. I turned my car back and returned to Yogyakarta. I could not follow Hatta's car, because in the air a Dutch plane was flying low while dropping hand grenades here and there. I finally managed to arrive in Gedung Aqunq at one o'clock. I saw Pak Dirman already there. He was the one who told me that the cabinet already decided that the government would not evacuate the city. I then met Sukarno, who told me the same story.24

General Sudirman was s till recovering from his operation when the

Dutch started its m ilitary action. But as we have seen from

Simatupang's story, the Panglima Besar was very sure that the Dutch attack was only a matter of time. When he took command of the Armed

Forces less than 24 hours before the attack, he was urged by his staff to leave the city. He refused the advice and would only leave

Yogyakarta after the f ir s t Dutch bomb was dropped. The following is an account of Captain Soepardjo Roestam, Sudirman's adjutant at that time, on Sudirman's reaction to the attack.

When he received the report that the Dutch had already begun their attack, i t was as though he had gained renewed strength. For the firs t time, after being bed-ridden for three months, he could stand up unassisted. At 8:00 a.m., Panglima Besar Sudirman sent Captain Supardjo to see President Sukarno in order to obtain the central government's instructions and also, if necessary to discuss other matters. At the same time. Commodore Suryadarma came to report to the President on the situation on Maguwo. President Sukarno was s till in his pajamas. While Captain Supardjo was at the Presidental Palace, many ministers and high ranking civilian and military personnel arrived, among them 189 Colonel Simatupang. Consequently, Captain Supardjo could not immediately return to Panglima Besar Sudirman. At 9:00 a.m., the latter was no longer content to await the Captain's return. Wearing the black overcoat over his pajamas, Pak Dirman accompanied by Dr. Suwondo, Captain Tjokropranolo, etc., went to see the President. Several ministers and leaders had already arrived at the Palace, among them, Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX, Ir. Djuanda, Sutan Syahrir, Dr. Asikin. Bung Karno told Pak Dirman, "Nothing important happening. You are i l l , so please go home and rest." Then the President said to Dr. Suwondo, "Mas doctor, would you mind taking Mas Dirman home to rest and please take good care of him." Twice Bung Karno advised Pak Dirman to rest. The f ir s t time, he replied, "Thank you, late r." The second time, he answered, "I don't want to. I am going to stay here." Professor Dr. Asikin then asked if he would like to rest at the Palace, in which case a room would be prepared. Pak Dirman answered, "I want to stay here." After most of the ministers had arrived, they held a cabinet meeting. Pak Dirman remained outside the meeting room. Meanwhile the Dutch aircraft were flying around, bombing and strafing various places in the city. Under the circumstances. Dr. Suwondo thought it likely the Presidential Palace would also soon come under attack from the air and that, therefore, those inside were in danger. He advised Pak Dirman to leave. Pak Dirman followed this suggestion. While trying to find a place for Pak Dirman, we learned that quarters within the walls of the kraton complex had already been reserved for the families of state leaders. Dr. Suwondo was told to see Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX, then participating in the cabinet session, to get permission for Pak Dirman to occupy the Mangkubumen building at Kadipaten, Jogjakarta. Permission was granted and Dr. Suwondo was told to make the place ready. Having done this. Dr. Suwondo returned to the Presidential Palace to report. During his absence, Pak Dirman had instructed Captain Supardjo to issue an urgent order to the entire Republican Armed Forces over Radio Republic Indonesia. Pak Dirman and his retinue returned to his house at Bintaran. He refused to rest there. He stood in the front part of the house watching the Dutch aircraft circling over the city and bombing various areas. Before long, the old Vredenburg Fort opposite the Presidential Palace was attacked. Dr. Suwondo urged Pak Dirman to leave his house immediately because the Dutch surely knew where it was and it was not impossible that they would not attack it. After first burning documents to prevent them from falling into enemy hands, Pak Dirman left, at about 11:30 a.m., for Kadipaten via Bintaran, Mergangsan, Tungkak, Gading, the Alun-Alun Kidul, and Ngasem. He then rested for about an hour. At approximately 2:00 p.m.. Colonel Abdul Latif, City Military Commander for Jogjakarta, arrived at Kadipaten. He reported that the Dutch had already 190 entered the city and that Pak Dirman should leave if he did not want to be captured. In a very weak physical condition because he had not eaten or drunk anything since morning but impelled by the force of his will, Pak Dirman left the city and his fam ily.25

Colonel T. B. Simatupang was in the Presidential Palace when the radio announced Sudirman's declaration of war. But by then the formal decision of the cabinet had not been reached. The Ministers were still in session. The following is the account of Simatupang of his experiences in the Palace that day.

I suggested to a number of cabinet members that a cable should immediately be sent to Bukit Tinggi transferring power to the Minister of Finance Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, who was there at that time. I said that orders had been given to maintain continuous connection with Bukit Tinggi for the sending of government cables. I also proposed that the President, the Vice President, and the other leaders should leave town immediately and go to Wonosari. The Sultan had already given orders by telephone to reserve the Regent's residence at Wonosari for that purpose. I had myself already sent a le tte r from the palace asking Lt. Colonel Daan Jahja, Chief of Staff of the Siliwangi Division, to reserve some troops to escort the President and others to Wonosari... Apparently, the cabinet felt that even if the President and the others left, they still risked being captured later. Evidently, it was believed that such a situation would have more adverse consequences than if things were clear right from the start. Namely, if the President, the Vice-President and the ministers were immediately captured by the enemy. At least, that was more or less as I understood things; as I noted previously, no one was prepared to give me full explanation. As Bung Hatta was about to leave the Palace, I had a chance to propose that the government should at least make a statement calling for the continuation of the struggle even if its members were captured by the enemy,"26

The Dutch paratroops did not encounter meaningful resistance in

Yogyakarta. Not only because the tactic of the Indonesian army was to abandon the city, but also because most of the troops were already evacuating the city days before in disguise as troops on maneuvers.

In fact, the day of the attack was the day of the general exercise for 191

the m ilitary as was announced to the public days ahead. That was the

reason why many people at f ir s t took the Dutch attack as the maneuver

of the Indonesian Army. Thus when it was clear that the Dutch

paratroops were already on the outskirts of the capital, there was a

sudden rush in the headquarters to destroy important documents.

Nasution as the Commander of the Java Territorial Army was on tour

to East Java at that time. The highest officer in the headquarters

was Colonel Zulkifli Lubis. The following is the account of Lubis on

his experiences that day.

Long before the attack we had already made preparations. Included in the preparations was a plan to evacuate Sukarno and Hatta. We told Sukarno about that. But at the time of the Dutch attack the headquarters was empty. Almost everybody went to East Java on tour with Nasution. I voiced my disagreement with Nasution's plan. But he went anyway. When the Dutch launched its attack the headquarters was almost without officers, except the three of us, Bratamenggala, Gani and myself. I sent Bratamenggala to the Palace while Gani and I destroyed the documents. Bratamenggala returned from the Palace with the news of the cabinet who decided to stay in the city. The enemy was s till outside the city when I decided to send an andong (horse cart) to fetch Sukarno. My man did not meet Sukarno, but met Simatupang instead. I got a letter from Simatupang which explained that Sukarno decided not to evacuate the city. I am not disappointed with Sukarno, because he was civilian. But Simatupang as a m ilitary officer should have been able to convince Sukarno that we had an agreement that all of us should evacuate the city at the time of the enemy attack.27

I t is true that Sukarno and Hatta had made promises to lead the 28 guerrilla war in case of the Dutch attack of Yogyakarta. We certainly have no way of making sure whether the promise was a sincere one or simply propaganda designed to discourage the Dutch from storming Yogyakarta. But whatever it was, the following is the account of Hatta on the background of the decision not to join the guerrillas. 192 A cabinet meeting was held that morning in the President's office. Quite a number of ministers were out of town and only four people were able to attend. There were three matters on which a decision had to be made. At that time it was already known that the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Sudirman, had decided that he himself would lead the guerrilla struggle. He had come to see the President that morning to take his leave. As he was very sick (he was suffering from T.B.) Sukarno tried to persuade him to stay in the city and suggested that he would contact the Dutch commander when he entered the city so that he could be attended to in the hospital. But Sudirman refused. Colonel Simatupang said that it would be important if the President and Vice President would join the guerrilla forces, since this would strengthen the struggle of the people and the army. But if we decided to join the guerrillas it would be necessary to assign at least one battalion of soliders to guard us. The fact was that there weren't that many soldiers available because they had all left the city. Minister Laoh said that it was clear that the President and Vice President could not be properly protected in the field so they had to stay in the city. This also had the added advantage that we could remain in constant communication with KTN [Komite Tiga Negara, the Indonesian name for Committee of Good Offices of the United Nations], the instrument of the UN. When the vote was taken it showed that nearly all the Ministers who were there believed that the President and the Vice President should remain in Yogyakarta. It was also agreed that as the Minister for Defense, I should urge the army and the people over the radio to join in the guerrilla warfare against the Dutch. We also sent a cable to Syafruddin Prawiranegara in Bukit Tinggi to the effect that he was authorized to form an Emergency Government and a cabinet, to take over temporarily the function of the Central Government.29

It is interesting to see that Sukarno’s account of that day — especially his confrontation with Sudirman -- is completely different from the accounts of all other people who were involved. According to

Sukarno,

Two hours before the landing [of the Dutch paratroops], our army's Commander in Chief, Sudirman, who was s till in his 20's, woke me up. Revealing his advance information, he pleaded, "I urge you to escape. My plan is to flee the city into the jungles. Come with us." Hurriedly dressing myself, I said, "You are a soldier. Your place is in the field with your men. It is not my place to escape. I must remain here that I may be in a position to bargain for us and to lead." "There is probably a price on your head. If you stay they may kill you." 193 "And if I run, they may shoot me. Either way I face death, but don't worry; I have no fear." "Our men bury the Dutch dead. Our way has been to fight civilized, but..."— Sudirman clenched his fist --"we will send word if anybody harms Sukarno there will be no mercy. It will be mass murder." My sitting room opened out onto a verandah. Sudirman darted out and look anxiously at the sky. There was s till no sign. "Have you any last-minute instructions before I leave?" he asked. "Yes, put up no fight on the streets of Jogja. We haven't a chance. But get your army outside the cities. General, and fight to the death. I order you to spread them through the villages. Infect the countryside with them. Put them behind every bush. This is 100 percent total guerrilla warfare. Though we return to amputations without anesthesia and sterilized banana leaves for bandages, let the world never say independence was awarded us out of a diplomat's briefcase. Let them know we bought it and paid dearly with our blood and sweat and determination. "And don't come out of the hills until your President orders you to. Remember, even if your leaders are taken, the next man, be he soldier or civilian, must take over. Let it be agreed Indonesia will never, never, never surrender."... At 1:30 the Colonial Army lined up with machine guns across from the istana [palace]. My small palace guard, less than one platoon, resisted valiantly, but in the face of the overwhelming odds I ordered them to lay down their arms. Mid-afternoon I dispatched a guard with the white flag. For good measure, the Dutch machine gunned the front hall and strafed the inside. The istana was so closely surrounded that I even heard the communication from Colonel Van Langen, who was in charge of storming the gates. He radioed his commanding general, "Sir, I am reporting we have captured Dr. Sukarno and are keeping him here."30

By the time Yogyakarta was under fire, Nasution and his entourage were on the way home from East Java in a special train. The train was around twenty kilometers from Yogyakarta when Nasution was already sure that it was dangerous to continue the journey. Nasution then ordered the train to stop, and the whole group continued the journey on foot, but not to Yogyakarta. At that time Nasution gave orders to all of his officers to carry out the already prepared plan for a guerrilla war. Nasution himself with a small group of officers decided to set up temporary headquarters in a village not far from 194 where the train ended its journey. From this village Nasution then mobilized his officers to collect as much information as they can on the situation of the central government and the political leaders in the city of Yogyakarta. Within three days Nasution had finally came to a conclusion that the government of the Republic had ceased to function due to the surrender of their leaders. The crisis as the result of the surrender of the civilian leaders had put the fate of the Republic even worse than what Cloude Welch Jr. and Arthur K. Smith describe as "declining legitimacy of civilian political 31 institutions" that made military to take over the government. It is clear here that the m ilitary, in this case Colonel Nasution, did not take over the government but created a new one, a Military

Government. Accordingly, as the Commander of the Java Army

Territorial Command, Nasution declared the formation of a Military

Government for all over Java on the third day of the guerilla war.

The Military Government

Before discussing the conduct of the guerrilla war fought by the

Indonesian army against the invading colonial army, let us for a moment return to the period of preparation for the confrontation. We have seen in the previous chapter how Nasution was given instructions by Sudirman to prepare the military to face the Dutch attack.

Basically there were two things Nasution did to implement these instructions. First, he reorganized the army into two forces, the mobile army and the te rrito ria l army. Second, he prepared the people for a total war. 195

The separation between the mobile and the territo rial army was conceptualized based on a strategy of a war of a ttritio n , in which the mobile army or the shock troops would concentrate on attacking the enemy wherever they were, while the territo ria l troops would be posted in definite locations to be the nucleus of the people's resistance against the enemy. Nasution explains this as follows:

My original conception was that for Java it would be enough if we could have a few brigades as the centers for several shock troop battalions. The rest of them would be organized in tens of territorial battalions as the centers for the people's resistance in each d is t r ic t... In this original plan each residency would have at least one battalion of shock troops and at least a company for every district.32

But this plan could not be implemented fully due to the opposition of many commanders like Sungkono, Sutarto and Atmaji, as we have seen in the previous chapter. As the result of this failure, the guerrilla war was fought by the Indonesian army almost without a clear distinction between the mobile and the territo rial troops.

But while Nasution, who as the deputy to Sudirman, failed to reorganize the army to fight a guerrilla war, he did succeed in developing an overall plan which would be implemented in the ensuing guerrilla war. In early August 1948, Nasution distributed to the m ilitary commanders as well as to the civilian government officials a pamphlet entitled "Executing Total People's Resistance." The highlights of the pamphlet are as follows:

When the enemy attacks again, he will start by occupying the towns, by controlling the main roads and then by occupying the economically important region. His strength in Java is only three to four divisions. In order to occupy Java down to the sub-district, he would need more than ten divisions, and it is certain that he is unable to form as many as that. He is able to 196 maintain occupation of only a small part of the territorial regions. The remainder he tries only to patrol or may even never go there at a ll. Therefore, he will try to break our strength gradually by political, social or psychological means to win the hearts of our people and some of our civil servants. He will distribute clothes, medicines, food, etc. He will make widespread propaganda campaigns. The members of the population following him will be protected, will be given all their daily necessities. The people who will have none of him will be terrorized by banditism, by arson, by kidnapping and so forth, in such a way that they will always feel unsafe, afraid, and thus eventually they will lose hope and become tired of the struggle... That is why it is necessary from the beginning to organize a territorial structure taking the form of military district commands, military sub-district commands and village territorial cadres. These bodies are chai ged with preparing measures in the civil field. When the enemy attacks, it is necessary to evacuate the people in an organized way to scattered places already prepared, in order that they shall not be used by the enemy, who thirst for people to command. It is very important to evacuate government officials and leaders, for they are greatly needed by the enemy as tools for exercising enemy control over the people. All the equipment important for continuing the struggle should also be evacuated; nothing may be le ft behind of such a kind that it might be of benefit to the enemy... Because of this a permanent m ilitary government is needed which the people will always know is there. This military government will be in the hands of the army's territo ria l officers. The civil administration will be included within this structure. In this way it can be arranged that the Republic of Indonesia’s de facto authority continues firmly over the people... In conducting an administration of state such as this, the regional unit which is compact and which can be guided directly is the village. That is why the village leaders, the 1 urah, are the core of the maintenance of the Republic's government. The 1urah are the only leaders amidst the people who are still obeyed by the people. And these 1 urah are indeed the choice of the people themselves, whom people knew closely, and who know the ins and the outs of the village... Higher than 1urah, the camat [su b -d istrict's head] is the only level of official who can permanently control his region intact. A sub-district should be maintained as an integral part of the administration. For this purpose, it is necessary that the military Sub-District Command (KODM) hold the military government. Higher levels will no longer be able to exercise full government, so that they become intermediates, inspectors and plan-makers. The Military Sub-District Command together with the camat ought to guide and to coordinate the activities of the 1urah, because the Sub-districts are the pockets of our administration... 197

Two kinds of troops are needed, namely those with territo ria l duty and those who are mobile. For each Military District Command (KDM) we should try to have a strength of between a company and a battalion. Their task is to protect the Republic's pockets by guerrilla means, both against attack from within as well as from without...... i t is not necessary to form large numbers of these mobile units, if there is one battalion mobile in each sub-territory [STM, or Military Sub-Territory], i t is more than enough. Whereas territorial units and people's resistance troops tie down and harass the enemy sub-district by sub-district, so that the enemy's strength is nailed to wherever it happens to be scattered as guard detachments, as police detachments and as a small patrols, the mobile units obtain an opportunity to fight and to destroy the isolated enemy detachment, his small patrols, and his communications... At last the enemy will have only two paths open, namely, to keep on sending out troops for his own defense, and it is obvious that he has neither men nor money enough for this, or to vacate parts of the regions he has occupied. He could vacate some regions altogether or he could concentrate his forces in the towns. But this would mean that he degenerates in strategy, even though in tactics he still attacks every now and then, as his equipment is more perfect and in every way is adequate. This implies that he is no longer able to advance in the military sense.33

Based on this concept the army in Java, which was already divided

into four divisions, was given the power to govern the island in a time of emergency. Nasution as the Commander of the Java Army was the highest m ilitary as well as government authority during the emergency. Under him were the four divisional commanders, who were appointed as the military governors for their respective areas. Right below the divisional commanders and the military governor were STM

(Sub Territorium M iliter, Sub Regional Military Command) commanders who paralleled the Resident as the head of a Keresidenan (residency).

Below this there was the Kabupaten (d istrict) which was paralleled by the KDM (Komando D istrict M iliter, D istrict Military Command). One level below was the Kecamatan (sub-district) and it was matched by 198

H. Q. Of Java Army Command

Divisional Commanders/Military Governors

Wehrkreise Commands STM (Residency)

KDM (District)

Mobile Troop

KODM (Sub-district)

Lurah/Village Cadres

(Vil1 age)______

Figure 1. The Structure of the Military Government in Java during the guerrilla war, 1948-1949. 199

Nasution with the KODM (Komando Order Distrik M iliter, Sub-District

Military Command); see Figure 1.

All of the civilian heads of the above mentioned governmental structure, from governor down to camat (sub-district head) were subordinated to the officials of the military government. Thus the governor became a mere advisor to the divisional commander and military governor; the resident an adviser to the STM commander; the bupati (D istrict head) of the KDM commander; the camat of the KODM commander.

Only the 1urah (the village's head) could s till function more or less as usual. But unlike before, during the guerrilla war, the 1urah was controlled not by the camat anymore but by the commander of the

KODM. And around the 1urah there were some pemuda who were already trained as the village cadres by the army. These village cadres were the extension of the KODM to supervise the day to day operation of the

1 urah.^^

Compared with the m ilitary governmental structure, the organization of the mobile troops during the guerrilla war was far simpler. Under the divisional commander there were what was called at that time Wehrkreise (independent units) whose area paralleled the residency of the STM. Most of the time, the commander of the

Wehrkreise was also the Commander of the STM. All of the fighting units in the Wehrkreise were operationally under the command of the

Commander of the Wehrkreise. Due to the failure of the reorganization as initiated by Nasution, the troops in each Wehrkreise were mostly mobile troops. Thus the mobile troops were not only assigned to fight 200

the enemy but also to assist the Military Government, a task which was

supposedly assigned to the territorial army. The task of the Military

Government itself was basically to make sure that the following three

principles would be implemented:

First, the Republic would continue to resist as a state and by using the instruments of a state. Second, no matter how difficult the circumstances of the war became, the administration would have to continue — even for instance, in regions which had become isolated, were frequented by Dutch patrols, or in which permanent Dutch military posts had been established. To this end, civil servants at all levels would have to be paralleled by military personnel, and extensive authority should be delegated to the regions. Third, the military administration was first of all a means of resistance, that is, a means for mobilizing and organizing all fighting forces and a means for using local resources in the resistance.35

The first opportunity to implement Nasution's concept came

actually a few months before the Dutch stormed Yogyakarta. When the central government decided to crush the communist rebellion in Madiun

in September 1948, the Army Headquarters also organized territorial officers to accompany the troops that moved to Madiun. Slamet

Danusudirdjo, one of the territo ria l officers at that time, remembers that Major General Jatikusumo, a high ranking officer in the Defense

Ministry, instructed him and his colleagues to accompany the troops and take care of the areas already liberated from rebel control.

Pak Jatikusumo apparently had information that most of the 1urah and camat in Madiun were either killed by the communists or were joining the rebellion. And that means there would be a vacuum in the governmental leadership in the area following the liberation. We then joined the troops and took over the leadership of the kecamatan and kelurahan following the liberation. Many 1urah and camat were killed by the communists. Still more simply disappeared because of their fear of being assassinated.36

According to Slamet Danusudirdjo, himself a student army, (Tentara

Pel ajar) most of the territo ria l officers were members of the 201

army from the student branch. Thus, the students from the university

level were assigned as camat while the ones with high school education

were assigned as lurah. The reason for this, according to Slamet, was

because it was very d iffic u lt to find members of the regular army to

37 be assigned to territorial duty.

The same story was then repeated during the guerrilla war.

Following Nasution's proclamation of the military government for all

of Java, most of the commanders of the Werkhreise, which were mainly

responsible for the mobile troops, had automatically become the

commanders of STM, which was the military head for the residency military government. They then had to organize the KDM (d istric t military government) and KODM (sub-district military government).

Usually they still could find officers to be commanders of the KDM, but i t was almost impossible to have officers for the position of

KODM. There were some m ilitary officers who were finally found for these jobs, but mostly for a short period. To understand this situation we have to go back to the failure of Nasution's effort to create a territorial army by way of reorganization. Most of the officers resented the idea of leaving what they perceived as the heroic position to fight the enemy directly and to be assigned a job

in the rear. To be assigned a territorial job meant to surrender one's arms to the mobile unit, and that was almost anathema to the soldiers who acquired their arms by way of storming the Japanese camps

in the early days of the revolution.

I To overcome this problem, the military leaders then decided to enlist the services of the student army. In his Report From Banaran, 202

Simatupang writes about the student army and their role during the guerrilla war as follows:

The most extensive pool of leadership cadres during the resistance, however, has been the students. These students have long been organized in armed units under such names as the Tentara Pel adjar (TP), the Tentara Republik Indonesia Peladjar (TRIP) and the Tentara Geni Peladjar (TGP)1 A11 these are now organizationally incorporated into one brigade, the Seventeenth Brigade. Throughout Java, and in several places in Sumatra too, student units have attained a respected name among the Armed Forces, the people, and even the enemy. These student units have suffered some of the highest casualties. So long as a wholehearted struggle for national independence at the risk of one's life remains highly valued, the names of TP, TRIP, TGP, etc. will be honored. During the first Dutch attack and after the Muso uprising, the government mobilized students who were not yet enrolled in organized units to assist the resistance and the efforts to reconsolidate the administration and reassure the people. In view of the need for leadership cadres to conduct the resistance, especially in the military administration, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces issued a decree on the "Mobilization of Students," on February 1, 1949. The decree stipulated that "all high school and university students not yet organized into armed units should be mobilized . "38

At times the commanders of the KDM even had to be found on the spot, especially for those areas geographically very difficult to control by one Wehrkreise commander. The best example of this was the experience of Major General (ret.) Dr. Azis Saleh. Azis Saleh was a medical doctor in a Jakarta hospital before he was mobilized to be a m ilitary doctor in the early days of the revolution. With a rank of

Lt. Colonel, Saleh was the head of the Surakarta military hospital when the Dutch stormed the Republican territo ry . He left the city with the troops and within a few weeks he got a sealed envelope from

Colonel Gatot Subroto, the Military Governor of the Surakarta area, appointing him KDM commander of the Boyolali d istric t. According to the information circulating around, Saleh had to replace the former 203

Boyolali KDM commander because, "while people were busy coping with the Dutch attack the commander took a second wife." The following are the accounts of Azis Saleh on his sudden occupation of this position:

Basically I had two important things to do. To take care of the logistics for the mobile troops and to look after what is now known as territo ria l management. Well, you know that was a people's war, so we involved the people by letting them take care of the soldiers. Whenever the troops passed by a village, we then asked the villagers to be the host for the troops. So the troops stayed and were fed by the villagers. If the soldiers had to find their own food, they could at most prepare boiled cassava for themselves. We did not have a radio communication at that time, so we organized the pemuda in the village to be our couriers to link the mobile troops with the territo ria l officers. Whenever we got the news of the coming of the troops we then discussed it with the 1urah, and the la tte r would make sure that each soldier could have a house to stay in. I told the soldiers to be good guests and to help their hosts as much as possible. It was then common to see the soldiers working side by side with the villagers in the rice fie ld .39

When Azis Saleh took over KDM Boyolali, he basically had to build

the network of the m ilitary government from the bottom up. Since it

was d ifficult to find army officers for these jobs, he then decided to

appoint the student army to be the KODM commanders. One of the

students was Sunarto from Surakarta. Most of the student army at that

time were without rank, but for his job as KODM commander, Azis Saleh

gave Sunarto the rank of f ir s t lieutenant. The following is my

interview with Sunarto on his experiences as KODM commander in

Kecamatan Temon, not far from Surakarta.

Question: How was your relation with the civilian officials at that time?

Answer: Ya, just like nowadays. The soldiers gave the orders, Pak Camat carried them out.

Question: How many members did you have on your staff? 204

Answer: Twelve. Some of them with weapons. I myself had a pistol. But we really did not need weapons, because our mobile troops were always around.

Question: During the guerrilla period, what kind of activ ities did you have in your sub-district?

Answer: I happened to be a student from the Department of Pharmacology at that time. So when I left Surakarta I brought along medicines. I then took care of the Polyclinic in Temon. For educational activities, I employed the students who took shelter in Temon. Suddenly we had a high school in the area which never had such a school. The students of the schools were mostly the children of the refugees. And the teachers were refugees too. The economic life was functioning relatively well. Economic relations between Temon and Surakarta were s till there, mainly because the services of the bakul (female vendors) who commuted to Surakarta. I did not create a new tax, because the old taxes were still collected by the civilian apparatus. It was from that many kind of taxes that we could feed the mobile troops.

Question: How were your personal relations with the camat?

Answer: He did not like me. According to the people around me, the camat once said, "That commander is too young; the only thing he knows is to shoot." Actually I never shot any people, but I once made it public that I will shoot if my orders were disregarded.

Question: What was your daily routine at that time?

Answer: Mostly making the rounds. If there was something wrong I told the people to correct it. As far as I can remember there were not many problems at that time. Everything ran well.

Question: Were there any political parties in Temon at that time?

Answer: Yes. As you know at that time the Madiun communist rebellion was just crushed. We still could see the after-effect of the rebellion at that time. I remember that the members of the le f tis t parties and the members of the religious parties were unable to get along. I told them to refrain from politics, work together against the colonialists instead. You can go back to your politics after we defeat the Dutch, I told them. They obeyed my order, and there was no politicking during the guerrilla war.40 205

These days, almost forty years after the guerrilla war was over,

it is certainly d ifficu lt to prove whether the people-military relations in the villages were as smooth as the present day army historians would like us to believe. But seeing the culture and the tradition of the Indonesians, especially the Javanese, who always have a great respect toward the state, it is understandable if they looked to the army as the armed instrument of the state. In the area around

Yogyakarta, i t was reported that the army was seen as implementing the orders of Sukarno and Sultan Hamengkubowono IX. To the peasants in the Central Java area, assisting the guerrilla fighters was certainly not a new phenomenon, for almost 100 years before their predecessors were already providing food and shelter for the soldiers of Prince

41 Diponegoro who were also fighting the Dutch colonial army. The guerrilla war and the Military Government, in the eyes of the peasants of Java, were only a modern version of the legendary history of the

Diponegoro war.

The m ilitary government was based on Nasution's concept, however.

On the day-to-day operations apparently there were differences, following the differences of the resources and the traditions of each area. In the rich areas, areas with fe rtile soils, the people supported the army by submitting some parts of their harvest to the m ilitary government. In the areas known for their trading activ ities, the military government collected taxes from the population. Also the ways to feed the army were not uniform. There were areas in which the individual soldiers got their meals in the house where they lived.

Still another area established public kitchens. In the last case it 206 was usually the mobile troop commanders who took the in itiativ e.

Accordingly, in the village Bibis, near Yogyakarta, the troops of

Lieutenant Colonel Suharto (the present day Indonesian President) were fed from the public kitchen. Suharto le ft Yogyakarta with some amount of money for his activities. To the kitchen operated by the 1urah,

Suharto allocated money for the preparation of food. The money was certainly not enough, and the people of Bibis cooperated by contributing vegetables, cooking oil and sometime goats or cows to be 42 siaughtered.

In the fe rtile and mountainous area of West Java, the Siliwangi division did not have to worry about dishes to accompany the rice staple. They could easily get fish from the ponds and vegetables were everywhere. What they needed was only rice. The army then collected rice by requiring every household to contribute one cup of rice every day.

According to Lt. General Kemal Idris, a Siliwangi 'Captain at that time, they had collected so much rice that they had to redistribute it to the people again when the guerrilla war was over.^^ In East Java

Dutch intelligence reported that the activities of the Military

Government in that area were financed from the contributions of the rice field owners. Each rice field owner was required to contribute

20 percent of his harvest. The Military Government also collected 44 money from people who needed identity cards.

It was probably because of this lack of uniformity that the

Military Governor of Area III (West Central Java), Colonel Bambang

Sugeng, fe lt compelled to issue Military Decree No. 1 on March 27, 207

1949. Considering that the guerrilla struggle would last for a long time, the decree gave detailed directions on the collection of taxes to finance the Military Government and the guerrilla war. The following are the three most important parts of the decree:

A. a) Land rent

1. The land rent to be paid by the taxpayer is 10% of the cost price [of the paddy harvested], plus 1 kg dry paddy for each 10 cents of the paddy cost price rounded off upwards.

2. For the paddy producing areas, the increase was to be paid with maize or gaplek (cassava) in proportion to the local rice price.

3. In the areas that do not produce paddy but other yields that are more valuable moneywise than paddy (e.g. coconut, tobacco, etc.), the taxing increase must be made by the local government in particular regulations and these provisions should be directly proportional to that of paddy.

b) Income Tax

4. The income tax is 10% of the fixed income, having as base the income enjoyed on January 1, 1949. The assessment will be fixed by a committee consisting of:

1) a chairman - the commandant of the KODM 2 ) a vice chairman - the camat 3) the 1urah 4) a person capable in that matter (e.g. tax employee),

c) State property

5. In the case of clearing the forests, for which a concession of the Forestry Service is needed, a quarter of the harvest (paddy gogo, maize, soybean, etc.) must be yielded to the government. The remainder (3/4 part) belongs to the farmer.

6 . If one has already started reclaiming before this regulation has been promulgated and without having a license of the Forestry Service, he has to yield 1/3 of the harvest to the government, and the remainder (2/3 part) is his property. 208

7. The product of other state farming enterprises must be yielded to the government by the Forestry Service concerned.45

Apparently the Decree did not change the practices that were already going on in the area of Military Region III. For on June 21, the Dutch authority in Purwokerto reported that KODM had financed its operations by collecting 10 kilograms of brown sugar from each sugar mill every five days. And for 100 kilograms brown sugar to be traded to the Dutch occupied area, the trader was required to pay fifty rupiah OR I (Uang Republik Indonesia, Indonesian Republican Money).

In Magelang area, Sujito, the Commander of KODM Candi Mulyo, an area also under M ilitary Region III, never had to change anything because of the decree. There were several reasons for that. One was because the established practices were already sufficient to maintain the m ilitary government. According to Sujito, to create a new tax will only be an added duty for the officials who were already busy 47 taking care of the fighting troops. The other reason was that the troops already consolidated their position according to plans that were drawn before the war had begun. And because of this they now started to harass the colonial army that was only in control of the big cities and the main highways. Since most of the troops were mobile ones, the main power mostly joined the attacks and only small amounts of officers were left to take care of the territorial management. 209

The Fighting

The harassments had something to do with the progress of the Java military authority to organize its troops and the military government

outside the occupied areas according to the plan drawn right after the

Dutch stormed the Republican area. In the plan, the Java military

authority divided the period ahead into three phases. Phase one was

the "power vacuum" phase, which was from the time of the attack until mid-February 1949. The second phase was the "reorganization" phase,

that was from mid-February to circa April 1949. The third phase was

that of "position and stabilization," which was to be from May 1949

until the end of the war.

In phase one the population was in a panic while the evacuations were taking place. The army's only visible act was based on one idea, namely to halt the Dutch wherever they may be. But organized leadership was not clear yet. While following the scorched earth policy, the army also moved to occupy their planned places. It was only in the middle of the second phase that they could start to harass the enemy.And one of the most publicized harassments was the attack on Yogyakarta on March 1, 1949.

Early on the morning of March 1st, the troops of Lieutenant

Colonel Suharto were already infiltrating the city. As the siren from the Knil commanding post started to sound the end of the night curfew, the infiltrating guerrilla army then began its attack. George Kahin, who was in Yogyakarta at the time, describes the attack as follows:

The Republican army had very nearly captured Jogyakarta. The situation there was so serious that the Dutch authorities had felt obliged to admit that there had been heavy fighting lasting two 210

days and involving some 2000 Republican troops, and those troops had "gained temporary successes."49

The daring attack on Yogyakarta was only one out of many attacks

launched by the guerrilla army at that period. As a matter of fact

the Yogyakarta attack was only the pinnacle of so many small scale

ambushes taking place around that time. What was special about the

Yogyakarta attack was that it was designed to show the world, but

especially the United Nations, that the Dutch claim that they had 50 already pacified Indonesia was a total lie.

The general attack on Yogyakarta was only the beginning of the

general attacks launched by the Republican guerrillas on the Dutch

posts all over Java. On March 17, under the command of Mayor Ahmadi,

the Student Army Commander of the Surakarta area, Surakarta was

attacked. The guerrillas succeeded in occupying the city for 24 hours. The city of Magelang, Temanggung, Wonosobo and Pekalongan, all

in Central Java, also became the target of guerrilla general attacks.

Meanwhile the Siliwangi division, which had penetrated West Java, was

also in a good position to launch a general attack on the city of

Sukabumi on March 12. In East Java, the city of Mojokerto, which had been in Dutch hands ever since the f ir s t police action was also under 51 attack at about the same time.

Military Government and The Political Parties

When the Dutch attacked the Republican area the political community in that area was s till divided between the rebel Communist

Party and its fellow travelers and the non-communist ones. The 211

Communist Party and other leftist parties were not outlawed following the rebellion, but Indonesian jails were full of the arrested members of the parties who supported the rebellion. When it was clear that the Dutch had already started their "police action" the government 52 issued an urgent order to release the political detainees. Later, in the guerrilla period, together with the s till free communists, these former detainees were organizing their own units to fight a guerrilla war. If we can tru st the report of Dutch intelligence, then the name of Buyung Saleh, the leader of the leftist Sarbupri (Serikat

Buruh Perkebunan, Plantation Trade Union), could be cited as one out of many le ftis ts who was active in reorganizing the former Pesindo 53 into guerrilla fighters.

The leftist or the communist guerrilla fighters then became a problem for the Java Military Government because they were not only fighting against the Dutch but also against the members of the army, especially those who were regarded as anti-communist. In his memoirs,

Nasution claimed that two of his officers were assassinated by 54 communist armed gangs in the early days of the guerrilla war.

Another problem for the Java Military Government was the activities of Tan Mai aka and his followers. Tan Malaka himself was released from the jail at the time of the communist rebellion in

Madiun. Many people at that time speculated that Hatta did that because he would like to manipulate Tan Malaka to fight the communists.We have no information about the activ ities of Tan

Malaka between the time of his release and the day the Dutch stormed

Yogyakarta. Only after that, a few days after Yogyakarta was already 212 under the Dutch army, Tan Malaka made a speech from a clandestine radio station in Madiun area. It was clear that for Tan Malaka,

Sukarno and Hatta were finished. And in that opportunity he urged the people to fight the Dutch and he himself took over the leadership.

Following that radio speech, the Republican intelligence started to receive information about the activity of Tan Malaka and his followers. This group was even successful in attracting an army major with his battalion, namely Major Sabaruddin. The major became close to Tan Malaka apparently during the letter's detention in the jail of

Yogyakarta. The Commander of the East Java Division was then compelled to act against this group.

But due to the unexpected attack by the Dutch in Kediri in the early morning of December 12, 1948, R. Effendy and Sj. Udaya [two leaders of Mai aka's group] and Major Sabaruddin, thanks to the activities of the enemy spies who acted provocatively, and also with the aid of men from Sabaruddin s Battalion, managed to escape. Tan Malaka himself was convicted and later executed by Brigade S of Lt. Colonel Surachmad.57

Following the sweep operation against the Tan Malaka followers, the Military Governor of East Java, Colonel Sungkono, apparently felt it was necessary to issue a guideline on the political activities in his area of authority. The order read as follows:

The Struggle has only one aim, that is the victory of the R.I. In relation with this, all other interests of the citizens must succumb to the general interest. No interests of any parties or groups should be entertained. The struggles of the parties and groups for the time being should be suppressed, so that all the physical as well as spiritual powers could be mobilized for the benefit of the struggle of the Republic of I n d o n e s i a . 58

The idea of banning political activities actually was not one that only emerged during the guerrilla war. According to Simatupang the 213 idea was circulating even before the Dutch attack in various

Republican circles and only "became more powerful, particularly in 59 certain Armed Forces circles" during the guerrilla war. It is against this background that we should understand the observation of

Nugroho Notosusanto, a former member of the student army and himself a guerrilla fighter, as follows.

There were some political party leaders in our Kecamatan, notably from PNI (Indonesian National Party) and Masyumi [Moslem Party]. But they seemed not to be very active, perhaps because the Military Government prohibited acts which might endanger the unity of the people in our Kecamatan. Anyway they did not belong to the "ruling elite" in our Kecamatan.60

If the army in East and Central Java had to face the le ftis t and communist armed gangs, in West Java the returning Siliwangi had to fight the 01 (Darul Islam), with its III (Tentara Islam Indonesia, or

Indonesian Muslem Army). DI, which aspired to create an Islamic state in Indonesia, was a movement which was already active long before the

Dutch occupied West Java following the firs t Dutch attack in 1947.

When the Renville Agreement was promulgated and the Republican authority subsequently evacuated West Java, the DI decided to stay and fight the Dutch. From that time on they also stopped their recognition of the Republic of Indonesia. When Siliwangi returned to

West Java, they then had to fight not only the Dutch but also the

DI/TII. The DI/TII problem was a complicated one for the Indonesian authorities long after the Dutch had le ft Indonesia, and only in 1960 did Siliwangi succeed in capturing Kartosuwiryo, the self-appointed

President of DI, and end the rebell ion. 214

The Military Government and the Emergency Government

We have seen that a few hours before the invading Dutch troops had taken over Yogyakarta, Colonel Simatupang urged Prime Minister Hatta to transfer his authority to Minister Syafruddin Prawiranegara who was in Sumatra. This Hatta did, and Syafruddin then became the head of the PORI, Pemerintah Darurat Republic Indonesia (Emergency Government of The Republic of Indonesia). At the same time, there were some cabinet ministers who were not in Yogyakarta on that day. When they realized that the capital had already been taken by the Dutch, they decided to join the army in the guerrilla war. It was these ministers

-- especially Home Minister Sukiman who was also Defense Minister ad interim -- who legitimized the Military Government by issuing a decree no. 15/R.I./U on January 7, 1949.^^

When the radio communications between Java and Sumatra had already been resumed, there were then efforts to establish regular contacts between the Ministers in the guerrilla area and the Military

Government with Syafruddin. From their guerrilla sanctuary in Central

Java, the Military Government submitted a proposal to the Emergency

Government that a representative of the Emergency Government should be established in Java. Besides the name of the Ministers who were in guerrilla areas, the proposal also included the name of Panglima Besar

Sudirman as a candidate for the yet to be established institution.

But:

the head of the Emergency Government opposed seating the Panglima Besar on the Commissariat, on the grounds that, political leadership should remain separate from military leadership.63 215

Syafruddin's decision was clearly based on the common assumption

of the Western democratic tradition of subordination of the military

to the civilian authority. In the light of this, it is then

interesting to see the conduct of the guerrilla war in Sumatra at that

time. According to Audrey Kahin,

Although all levels of the government on Sumatra were now "militarized," major authority in each area usually remained in the hands of a civilian, albeit now with military title. In the People's Defense Headquarters (MPR) the local military commander was the deputy head, and thus at least nominally subordinate to these militarized civilian officials.64

The difference between civil-military relations in Java and in

Sumatra during the guerrilla war was certainly not solely caused by

the presence of Syafruddin in Sumatra at that time. Long before

Syafruddin was there, the Sumatran leaders were already questioning the applicability of Nasution's concept of reorganization and People's

Defense for Sumatra. When for instance, Nasution, backed by Mohammad

Hatta, pushed forward the idea of reorganizing the military in

Sumatra, the Commander of the Sumatra Army, Lt. General Suharjo, simply said that the army in Sumatra was not yet a state army but s till a people's army. Nasution broke the resistance of the Sumatra

army leaders to the reorganization by transferring some Siliwangi officers from Java to Sumatra. The reorganization, however, was not yet properly implemented when the Dutch began their military action.The Sumatra military and civilian leaders went to fight the guerrilla war by adjusting Nasution's People's Defense concept to the local conditions. The leaders in Sumatra decided to have a

Military Government, but unlike Nasution's concept, the leaders of the 216

Military Government in Sumatra were not m ilitary officers, but militarized civilians. The reason for this was because the leaders were afraid that without a militarized civilian government the people would be reluctant to provide the army with food and other supplies.

The leaders were also afraid that the crude behavior of the military could turn the people against the Republic.

It is interesting to see that Colonel Hidayat, the Commander of the Sumatra Army — replacing Lt. General Suharjo who lost the battle against Nasution -- agreed to support the Sumatra's People's Defense concept. As early as January 1, 1949, Colonel Hidayat issued instructions to his army not to request food from the people directly but instead through civilian o fficials.

To go back to Syafruddin, the Military Government in Java apparently understood his position. But the reason for this acquiescence was probably also based on the fact that the Commissariat could almost do nothing other than to recognize the existence of the

M ilitary Government. Thus on March 31, 1949, Susanto and Haji

Masykur, two of the Commissariat members sent a cable to Syafruddin informing him that the establishment of the Commissariat was no more than a fiction since the members of the Commissariat could never get fi7 together.

Meanwhile the radio contacts between the Military Government in

Java and the Emergency Government in Sumatra were improving. It was through these radio contacts that Nasution had been able to report to

Syafruddin of the development of the guerrilla fighting in Java. From

Sumatra, Syafruddin relayed the news to India where a representative 217 of the Republic of Indonesia had been established long before

Yogyakarta was taken by the Dutch. It was from New Delhi that the world was able to follow what was going on in Indonesia at that time.GB

+C.MERBABU

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Ndjo^art yP’^aî'P-»-'' iTulunjajun, "■^Ba^ak Bando “ an iju l

INDIAN OCEAN

Map 2. Sudirman's Guerrilla Route 218

Through couriers, Nasution also maintained contacts with Sudirman who was very mobile at that time. Since his condition did not allow him to walk, Sudirman then had to be carried in a palanquin.

Sudirman's mobility made it difficult for Nasution's couriers to reach him. But finally Sudirman's entourage found a safe place for the

Panglima Besar to establish headquarters, and that was in Sobo, a village in South Central Java, (see map 2). After wandering in East and Central Java for over two months (see Figure 3) in Sobo Sudirman could rest and be treated by a d istric t doctor. His own personal doctor had already been arrested by the Dutch when he went to

Yogyakarta to find additional medicines for the General. In his diary

Captain Soepardjo writes about their stay in Sobo as follows:

During this stay, day-to-day work was arranged in orderly fashion with very satisfactory results. He worked from 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m., with a break between 11:00 a.m. and 2:00 p.m. After sunset prayers, Pak Dirman held discussions with Captain Supardjo and others which usually lasted until midnight. The discussions covered political and m ilitary questions, as well as religion, education and other matters. During the stay in Sobo, many things happened, including v isits by couriers from the divisions and from Sumatra. On March 3, the emissaries arrived from Colonel Gatot Subroto [Military Governor of Surakarta area], along with a company of troops under Lt. Colonel Suadi. The company had been ordered to escort Pak Dirman. Lt. Colonel Suadi and his party had great difficulty finding Pak Dirman. Once Suadi had asked a certain djogobojo (village watchman) in the village where Pak Dirman was staying, but the man had refused to give any information, even though he was threatened with death. Eventually, Lt. Colonel Suadi was taken to the Military Administration for the area. Only after producing all his papers could he see Captain Supardjo...At Sobo we could arrange our work as though in an office. Food and communications were good, and with the help of radio sets, we could get news about the situation at home and abroad. We had entertainment from a record player. The couriers were very faithful. Even when given letters to deliver to commanders of divisions whose quarters they did not know, they always executed their task faithfully...Some of the couriers only found the person they were looking for after the 219 government had returned to Jogyakarta. Many visitors came to Sobo. Minister Susanto Tirtorpodjo and leaders of all sorts of political groups frequently visited Panglima Besar S u d i r m a n . 69

From Captain Soepardjo's diary it is clear that Sudirman, as the highest authority of the Military Government at that time, had not always relayed his order through Nasution as the person in charge of the Java Military Government. One of the reasons for this was certainly because of the emergency situation and the difficulty in establishing contact with Nasution. But at the same time one should not forget the fact that most of the commanding officers in Central and East Java were former Peta officers who fe lt close to Sudirman rather than to the former Knil Nasution. It is against this background that one has to see the fact that Suadi, who was detained following the turbulence in Solo that led to the Madiun communist affair, was welcomed by Sudirman to be his bodyguard, while Nasution was s till busy dealing with the armed communist gangs. It was from

Sobo that on May 9, 1949 Sudirman had issued his secret order to the army, the communist and the Muslem parties to unite and to fight the

Dutch t o g e t h e r . I n t e r e s t i n g l y enough, at around the same time

Nasution reported to the Emergency Government in Sumatra about the success of the army in suppressing "the armed activities of the red parties in the border between Madiun and Semarang."^^

Back to the Conference Table

We have seen earlier in this chapter that the Dutch attacked

Yogyakarta when the United Nations Good Offices Committee (GOC) was still working to avoid the deadlock of the negotiation between 220

Indonesia and The Netherlands. When they finally failed to carry out their duty, the only thing the GOC could do was to report to the

Security Council of the U.N. The Security Council responded quickly.

On January 28, 1949, the delegations of the United States of America,

China, Norway and Cuba introduced a resolution that required the restoration of the Republican leaders to their official position in

Yogyakarta. The resolution also required Indonesia and The

Netherlands to cooperate, under the supervision of the United Nations, toward the formation of the United States of Indonesia.

The resolution was clearly a blow to the Dutch adventure in

Indonesia, especially because i t was the United States of America that sponsored the resolution. Nowhere was the impact of the resolution more devastating than in The Hague. The first result of the resolution was a cabinet crisis in Holland right after the vote ir the

Security Council. The Minister for Overseas Territories, E.M.J.A.

Sassen, was intransigent against the resolution, while other members of the cabinet apparently looked to B ell's Plan -- L.J.M. Bell being the Crown High Representative in Jakarta at that time — as the more plausible solution.

Bell's Plan essentially went halfway to meet the requirements stipulated by the Security Council resolution, namely to work toward the formation of the United States of Indonesia, but without restoring the Republican leaders to Yogyakarta. Bell then planned to have a round table conference in Holland on March 12. But before that he had to have a preliminary meeting with as many Indonesian leaders as possible. He then sent invitations to many leaders, including the 221

Republican leaders -- Sukarno, Hatta and others -- who were in a detention camp on Bangka Island off the coast of eastern Sumatra. On

February 26, most of the leaders of the puppet states accepted the invitation, but when two days later Sukarno, Hatta and other

Republican leaders refused to participate, the other leaders then changed their mind. This was clearly a moral victory for the

Republicans.

But the change of mind had not taken place simply because Sukarno,

Hatta and others refused to participate. It was because the news about the guerrilla resistance slowly convinced them that the 72 Republican position was improving at the expense of the Dutch.

Indeed even before the Security Council discussed the Indonesian question, the position of the Dutch army in the Republican area was already very d iffic u lt. George Kahin who visited Yogyakarta between

January 6 and 10, 1949 found that the city had become a city of women, children and old men.

A majority of the young men had gone to the countryside to fight the Dutch from there. Few people ventured out of their houses. The city was not under complete Dutch control. Its central area and part of its suburbs were occupied by a Dutch garrison of about 1,000 men possessing ten Stewart tanks and large numbers of armored cars and Bren-carriers. But much of the periphery of the city was either no-man's land or actually occupied by the Republican guerrillas. The Dutch m ilitary authorities informed the writer that several areas of the city to which he wished to go were "not safe."'3

Since m ilitary personnel had to concentrate in the big cities and only occasionally went out to patrol the sub-districts and the villages outside the occupied areas, the Dutch occupation essentially created a huge chain of islands on the island of Java. Outside the 222

Dutch controlled areas, the Republican m ilitary government was firmly in control. As the Republican troops consistently improved their consolidation, the land communications between occupied cities became increasingly very difficult to the point of impossibility. There was a time when the Dutch Air Force had to drop supplies for their troops in the Madiun area because the land routes in all directions were already under Republican control. The increased capability of the guerrilla fighters to harass the enemy should not be seen separately from the consolidation of the m ilitary government and its network of territo ria l management. For the mobile troops could only operate easily if they were backed with proper logistics.

Reports about the structure and the activities of STM, KDM, and

KODM were flowing steadily into the headquarters of the Dutch army in

Jakarta. As a matter of fact the writer of this dissertation learned more about the activities of the guerrilla government from the Dutch intelligence reports than from the Indonesian archives. So occupied were the Dutch with the activities of the m ilitary government that in his report dated July 19, General Major J.K. Meyer, The Central Java

Knil Commander, came to the following conclusion:

The KDM and ODM are creating a smokescreen between us and their fighting groups. So successful are they that it is very difficult to shoot or to annihilate them. To overcome this problem it is urgent that we create a small unit of commandos out of selected persons and operate under an intelligence o f f i c e r . 74

While in Indonesia the Dutch army was constantly harassed by the guerrilla fighters, in The Hague, the Dutch government was under increasing American pressure to solve their colonial problems in the

Far East. Thus, in March, when Dutch Foreign Minister Stikker was in 223

Paris, Averill Harriman, a high ranking official from the United

States Department of State, called on Stikker officially under

instructions from Washington. Harriman informed Stikker that he

...should clearly understand that the United States, while prepared to create NATO and to give military aid to its future allies, would not be willing to give such aid to allies like The Netherlands so long as they had not solved their colonial difficulties.'5

It was because of this pressure that The Hague finally agreed to

send its ambassador at the United Nations, Dr. J.H. Van Royen, to

Indonesia to take over the negotiations after being left by Bell, the

High Representative of the Crown, who refused to follow the "softer"

attitude of The Hague toward Indonesia.

On March 26, the United Nations Commission on Indonesia, the new name for the former GOC, had issued invitations to the Dutch and

Indonesian delegations to start negotiations as stipulated by the

Security Council resolution of January 28, 1949. On April 12, Van

Royen arrived in Jakarta. Two days later the preparatory meeting was held under the supervision of Merle Cochran, United States representative in UNCI. The real negotiations started on April 16.

Meanwhile a new development took place on the Republican side.

Fearing that the negotiations would only mirror the negotiations before, in which the Dutch only manipulated the Indonesians in order to gain time to consolidate their power, the Army then voiced their disagreement with negotiations. Not only that, they also questioned the legitimacy of Sukarno and Hatta, who in their eyes had already surrendered and were under the Dutch detention. Thus on April 25, 224

Sudirman wrote a lette r to Colonel Hidayat, the Commander of the Army in Sumatra, which read as follows:

What has happened in the past, which has become the cause of our trouble since December 19, 1948, should not happen again. I want you to tell me whether there is any right for those people, who were under arrest, or closely watched by the Dutch, to conduct negotiations and make political decisions which will determine the fate of our state, while we actually have an Emergency Government which was introduced to the whole world on December 19, 1948 by the President? Since that time all the authority was transferred to the Emergency Government in Sumatra under Mr. Syafruddin Prawiranegara.76

Despite Sudirman's protest the negotiations went on in Jakarta.

Sudirman then fe lt compelled to issue an order of the day to the Armed

Forces of the Republic of Indonesia on May 1. One of the ten points of the order read as follows:

5. Remember and reflect deeply on the b itter suffering [we have endured] since December 19, 1948, which is caused by the behavior of our leaders, civilian as well as m ilitary, who are infatuated with negotiations and forget that the Dutch are always ready at our front d o o r . 77

On May 7, the negotiations in Jakarta finally produced what was later known as the Rum-Royen agreement, bearing the name of Mohammad

Rum, the chief of the Indonesian delegation and van Royen, the chief of the Dutch delegation. Three important points were produced by the negoti ation:

1. Cease fire order to be issued to the guerrilla fighters;

2. To cooperate toward peace and the maintenance of law and order;

3. Participation in the Round Table Conference as a step toward the unconditional transfer of sovereignty to the R.I.S.78

The negative reactions toward the Rum-Royen agreement surprisingly enough not only came from the Republican army but also from the Dutch 225 m ilitary. A few days following the announcement of the agreement,

Dutch military forces were reported to have increased their operational activities. There were many sub-districts which were never before touched by Dutch power were now included in the mopping

up operations of the Dutch army. Even inside the occupied cities the

Dutch army increased its sweeping operations. It happenedthat on May

28, a group of Dutch troops stormed the office of the Sultan of

Yogyakarta which was also used as the office of Indonesian officials 79 who were working to implement the Rum-Royen agreement.

While the negotiations were s till going on, Nasution as the Java

Army Commander as well as the head of the Java Military Government was also occupied with protests from the many guerrilla commanders who were opposing the negotiations and the possibility of a cease fire.

Nasution sent several letters to Mohammad Rum in Jakarta, to Sukarno in Bangka and Syafruddin Prawiranegara in his jungle headquarters 80 protesting the negotiations. Despite that, and the protest of

Panglima Besar Sudirman, the negotiations proceeded and an agreement was reached.

As had happened when the central government decided to rationalize the army, this time the Army then resisted the policy of negotiation.

Each commander had his own way of disregarding the negotiations. In the Surakarta area. Lieutenant Colonel Slamet Riyadi, a brigade commander, issued the following statement on May 20:

The steps taken by the state leaders have defeated the basic ideas of our state as it was proclaimed by the same leaders to the whole world on August 17, 1945.. . I t is only with singleness of purpose and the firm attitude of the Armed Forces and the pemuda, that the goal of the struggle of Indonesian people can be reached.81 226

In East Java, the reaction to the Rum-Royen agreement within the military was bitter. It was reported that a new organization was

created by a certain army group and some former followers of Tan

Malaka somewhere around Mount Kawi. The group, which later became

known as the Pakta Kawi (Kawi Pact) was committed to continue the

fight against the Dutch regardless of the negotiations. The members

of the army in the pact were ready to leave the army and to fight as

freedom fighters. A report which reached Nasution at that time said

that the Kawi Pact was contemplating the establishment of a Partai 82 Tentara (party of the army) to continue the fight.

The Rum-Royen agreement had created confusion among the guerrilla

fighters in Java and Sumatra, but especially on the position of the

Army following a cease-fire. All of them were afraid that the cease

fire would only repeat the bitter experience of the Renville Agreement

which was the cause of the evacuation of Siliwangi from their

resistance pockets in West Java. To placate the guerrilla fighters,

on May 18, Colonel Simatupang, the Deputy Chief of Staff cabled

Syafruddin in Sumatra.

TNI troops should remain in place until sovereignty is transferred or until a deadlock occurs and fighting resumes. A definite settlement regarding TNI troops after transfer of sovereignty can be reached jointly by the governments of USI and Gov. Rep. Indon.; in short it is a national issue and definite intervention should be opposed.83

On May 23 Sukarno and Hatta together wrote a letter to Sudirman

urging the Panglima Besar to move his headquarters closer to

Yogyakarta to make it easier for the civilian leaders to get in touch 227 with the military leaders at the time when the Republican authority 84 was restored in Yogyakarta.

Finally the Dutch agreed to abandon Yogyakarta and restore the

Republican authority to that city. On June 23, Sultan Hamengkubuwono

IX, who meanwhile was appointed Security coordinator, issued an order to guerrilla fighters around Yogyakarta to avoid armed conflict with the Dutch in order to give the latter time to prepare for the evacuation of the city. It took the Dutch one week before their last soldier left the city. Meanwhile Lieutenant Colonel Suharto, whose troops were in charge of Yogyakarta, slowly lost his patience and started pounding the city. It was reported that Suharto, as many other army officers, were very disappointed with the Rum-Royen agreement. Dutch intelligence reported that Suharto could not understand why the Republican delegation took so lightly the role of the TNI.

According to the report, Suharto also said that:

If the delegates do not trust TNI, TNI will appoint its own delegates. The government leaders should not think that they can do to TNI whatever they like to do. As soon as TNI returns to Yogyakarta, TNI will directly create a m ilitary administration, and put everything under m ilitary control.85

The same report also quoted Suharto as saying that "General

Sudirman and other TNI leaders should do something." Finally, Suharto was also reported to be very angry with the Sultan because the latter

"did not insist the Dutch to evacuate the area outside Yogyakarta."

Interestingly enough, Suharto himself was accused by an underground pamphlet, which were mushrooming at that time, as "joining a federal army." It was because of these provocations in the 228

Republican area that Nasution felt compelled to issue a decree on June

1, 1948, in which he stated that the return of Yogyakarta should be seen as an additional pocket to our many already consolidated pockets.

Finally on June 31, at 2:00 p.m. the last Dutch convoy left

Yogyakarta for good. At the same time, from other directions the troops of Lt. Colonel Suharto entered the city. A week later,on July

6, Sukarno arrived safely in the capital. Now everybody waited for the Panglima Besar to return. But would he return or would he stay in his sanctuary in the hinterlands? So began a process of persuading

General Sudirman to return to Yogyakarta.

In Yogyakarta it was decided that Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX should write a letter, and Lt. Colonel Suharto would deliver it to the

Panglima Besar. The Sultan's letter apparently succeeded in persuading the General, and on July 10 all of Yogyakarta waited for him. Early in the morning of that day Colonel Simatupang drove to

Wonosari, a village not far from Yogyakarta. It was there that

Simatupang would welcome Sudirman and his entourage. After a brief rest, Sudirman, Simatupang, Suharto and the whole party continued their journey to the capital. Simatupang remembers that journey as follows:

From our discussions in the car, I got the impression that, psychologically, Pak Dirman still could not completely accept recent developments. Understandably, those who had spent several months participating in the people's war had lived in a mental world quite different from that of our leaders who had conducted the negotiations in Bangka and Djakarta. Nonetheless, in the course of the conversation, Pak Dirman did agree that we had no choice now but to support the agreement and, at the same time, to build up our strength.87 229

While Sudirman and his entourage were on his way, in the main square (a1un-alun) of the Yogyakarta Sultanate, a military parade was prepared to welcome the Panglima Besar. Originally Sudirman wanted to go directly to the parade to meet with his soldiers, but Simatupang and some other senior officers persuaded him to go first to the Palace to meet with Sukarno. Sudirman agreed and they went to the Palace. 88 The meeting was a moving event.

But the tense relations between the military and civilians were s till there. The problem now was about the timing of the cease fire .

Sudirman and his officers insisted that the cease fire should come later, that is after the completion of the negotiation. Sukarno and the other political leaders were of the opinion that the Rum-Royen agreement stipulated that only after the cease fire could the Round

Table Conference in Holland take place. Thus on August 1 both delegations in Jakarta reached an agreement on the cease fire which would be announced later. On the same day Sudirman sent a memo to

Sukarno as follows:

For your Excellency's consideration in facing the cease fire, it is necessary that I explain the reason why I came to Yogyakarta. I came to Yogyakarta to bring along the message of all the army and the people who are now still continuing the struggle outside Yogyakarta. I had promised them to fight for their message. After I arrived in Yogyakarta, I had a General Staff meeting in which Colonel Hidayat, the Commander of the Sumatra Army was present. The meeting supported the message and even made it a guideline to be defended in the session of the technical commission. In the session of the Dewan Siasat Militer (Military Strategic Council) on July 21, 1949 which your Excellency also attended, it was also decided that no cease fire order will be issued prior to the completion of the work of the technical commission. For me who had made the promise, it is d iffic u lt to amend it. It is then very urgent to inform your Excellency that I 230 will defend the message even if I have to face all kinds of possibilities.89

The technical commission is the military part of the delegation that would negotiate the cease fire between the guerrilla fighters and the Dutch army. Sudirman and his commanders were sure that since

there were no demarcation lines — because the pockets of resistance were scattered all over Java and Sumatra — the cease-fire then could

be very difficult, if not impossible, to achieve. In that situation

they would like to have seen the negotiations take place before the

cease fire, so that if the negotiations would be deadlocked the fight

could then be easily resumed. The next day, August 2, Sukarno asked

Sudirman and Nasution to see him at the Palace. The President was

alone since Mohammad Hatta, Colonel Simatupang and some other

Ministers had already gone to Jakarta to make preparations for the

coming Round Table Conference. Nasution's accounts of the meeting are

as follows;

Pak Dirman said in brief, that he could not follow the government policy. Because of that he asked to be released from his position. I supported his decision. The President tried to explain the 'Bangka strategy' which for the time being required compromise but at the long run would open the gates to the fulfillment of our original ideas...The President then said how could we disregard the decision when Bung Hatta and the delegates were already on their way to the Round Table Conference. Pak Dirman persisted in his position. The eyes of the President several times were directed at me as if asking my help. I f e lt sandwiched by the government decision [and the position of Pak Dirman]... Finally, the President came out with his last card: "If the leaders of TNI resign because of this, we as the President and the Supreme Commander will also resign." Silence. Tears in the President's eyes. Tears in Sudirman's eyes. I was very moved. Tears came also from my e y e s .90 231

In the afternoon, following the Palace meeting, Sudirman's adjutant informed Colonel Nasution that the Panglima Besar would like to see him immediately. When Nasution arrived in Sudirman's residence. Captain Soepardjo showed the Colonel the signed but yet to be numbered letter of resignation of the Panglima Besar. The letter reads as follows:

It has been more or less four years since I started to follow Your Excellency's steps in dedicating myself in the military field in order to establish and to safeguard the state of the Republic of Indonesia. Together with the late Lt. General Drip Sumoharjo and some other colleagues, I established the National Army, which was f ir s t known as BKR and later became TNI, in order to defend the Proclamation of August 17, 1945 which became our basic guideline forever. Various difficulties and tests I had to go through in founding our National Army, but yet it has survived. It can be said that the only national asset which does not change, even though we're confronted with so many problems and changes, is APRI, [Angkatan Perang Republik Indonesia The Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia]. It is the duty of all of us -- the people who will always defend the Proclamation of August 17, 1945, to take care and to make sure that this only intact national asset could not be changed by whatever situation. If our leaders can still stand firm in their original ideas, God willing our National Armed Forces will exist forever and will be able to guarantee the security and the safety of the fatherland and our people. But time passes by, history marches forward and at times people's ideas also change. It flashes in the front of my eyes the changing direction taken by our leaders. Those kinds of things are sharply observed by people that follow our struggle closely. All of that had caused physical and spiritual suffering to the concerned persons. The death of some of our officers, among them Lt. General Drip Sumoharjo and Colonel S. Cokronegoro, was caused by mental stress. In the Armed Forces that kind of death is also known as spiritual suicide. On my own suffering that caused the deterioration of my health. Your Excellency is certainly aware of its main cause. Since human beings are required by God to search for ways out, I then decided to devote myself to a place which is fit for me. In accordance with that I hereby ask your Excellency to:

1. release me from my position as Panglima Besar, APRI.

2 . discharge me from membership in the military. 232

I am looking forward to a satisfying reply from your Excellency. 91

Without solicitation, Nasution voluntarily offered his opinion about the le tte r to Sudirman. Accordingly, Nasution presented

Sudirman with two alternatives: to have a good strategy at the expense of the unity of Sukarno-Hatta and the TNI, or to have a bad strategy with the unity of TNI and Sukarno-Hatta. The first choice would clearly divide the country and what the TNI has been fighting for. Finally Sudirman abandoned his idea to send his letter of resignation to the President.

The following day. President Sukarno went on the air to announce the decision to have a cease fire and at the same time to persuade the guerrilla army to implement the cease fire order. To convince the

Army of the importance of the cease fire , Sukarno, among others, said:

...I know, my sons from the Armed Forces, that you will obey my order...Your sacrifices are already uncountable, and I and the whole nation thank you for that. And with this political settlement your task now is changing from conducting guerrilla war to stopping guerrilla war while working for the maintenance of order in your own areas. TNI is your creation, and you are heroes in war time as well as in peace tim e.92

On August 11, 1949 the cease fire took effect all over Java and in

Sumatra four days later. From August 23 to November 2, the Round

Table Conference was held in The Hague. And on December 27, 1949 the

Dutch finally transferred sovereignty over the former Dutch

Netherlands Indies to the Republik Indonesia Serikat in which the original state of the Republic of Indonesia was one out of 16 member states. But RIS was a short lived state. Immediately after the Dutch army was pulled out of Indonesia the unitary movement in each member 233 state suddenly became a powerful force and within a few months the history of RIS ended. On August 15, 1950, RIS was formally abandoned and the Republic of Indonesia became the name of the former

Netherlands East Indies. Unfortunately for Sudirman he did not live long enough to see the result of his long struggle. He died of tuberculosis on January 29, 1950. NOTES

1. Sukarno, Merdska, May 29, 1947.

2. Sudirman, Kumpulan Amanat Panglima Besar Soedirman, (Jakarta: Departemen Hankam, Pusat Sejarah ABRI, 1970), p. 42.8.

3. Abdul Haris Nasution, Fundamentals of Guerilla Warfare, (Singapore; Donald Moore Books, 1965), p. 15.

4. Alastair M. Taylor, Indonesian Independence and The United Nations (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1960), p. 95.

5. George McTurnan Kahin, Nationalism And Revolution In Indonesia, (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1970), p. 332.

6. Ide Anak Aqunq Gde Aqunq, Renville, (Jakarta: Sinar Harapan, 1983), pp. 144-145.

7. Robert J. McMahon, Colonialism And The Cold War, (Ithaca and London:Cornel1 University Press, 1981), pp. 217-219.

8. Taylor, Indonesian Independence, pp. 111-117.

9. McMahon, Colonialism, p. 117.

10. Arnold Brackman, Indonesian Communism: A History, (New York: Praeger, 1953), p. I l l .

11. Dirk U. Stikker, Men of Responsibility: A Memoir, (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1965), p. 117.

12. Susan Prindeville, "The Netherlands' Loss of the East Indies: Internal and External Pressures on Dutch Policy From 1945 - 1949." Thesis, American University, Washington, D.C., 1971, pp. 71-72.

13. Stikker, Men of Responsibility, p. 121.

14. Stikker, Men of Responsibility, p. 124.

234 235

15. Mohammad Hatta, Memoirs (Singapore; Gunung Agung, 1981), p. 289.

16. Kahin, Nationalism, p. 335.

17. Nasution's le tte r No. 67/Sec/MBKD, dated November 9, 1948, Yogyakarta Documents number 5444, The National Archive, Jakarta, Indonesi a.

18. A. H. Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas, Vol. II (Jakarta; Gunung Agung, 1983), p. 62.

19. Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX, interview Jakarta, October 15, 1984,

20. The Committee of Good Offices (CGO) or the Three States Committee as it is known in Indonesia, because its members consisted of three states, was the product of the United States proposal to the United Nations Security Council meeting on August 25, 1947. The meeting was about the controversies following the f ir s t Dutch attack on the Republic of Indonesia in July 1947. The U.N. Security Council meeting decided to have a committee of three persons representing their own states. The procedure to elect the three members was as follows; Indonesia and the Netherlands selected their favorite states, and the two elected states then had to elect the third member. Indonesia chose Australia, The Netherlands chose Belgium, and the third member was the United States. See further Taylor, Indonesian Independence, pp. 54-55.

21. T. B. Simatupang, Report From Banaran; Experiences During The People's War (Translated by Benedict Anderson and Elizabeth Graves), Modern Indonesia Project, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, New York, 1972, p. 16.

22. Stikker, Men of Responsibility, p. 139.

23. The Yogyakarta airport had no an ti-aircraft guns to protect it. Several times before Yogyakarta was attacked, Suryadarma, the Air Force Commander, asked Nasution to help him find a 12.7 caliber machine gun for the airfield guard. Nasution failed to persuade the army to deliver one of their machine guns to the Air Force. As the machine guns and all of the weapons were not distributed by the government to the army, but wrestled by the army from the Japanese, the government then was not in the position to force the army to deliver even one machine gun to the Air Force. See further Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan, Vol. II, p. 71.

24. Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX, interview, Jakarta, October 15, 1984.

25. Quoted in Simatupang, Report From Banaran, pp. 151-152.

26. Simatupang, Report From Banaran, pp. 21-22. 236

27. Zulkifli Lubis, interview, Jakarta, September 21, 1984. According to Mohammad Natsir, then Minister for Information, most of the members of the cabinet took it for granted that under Sukarno's leadership, they would all go to fight the guerrilla war if the Dutch stormed Yogyakarta. Natsir was bedridden in a Yogyakarta hospital when the capital was under attack. He lost his contact with the cabinet until he was captured and arrested together with his colleagues from the cabinet. Only here he learned surprisingly that Sukarno did not go to the jungle to fight the guerrilla war. Mohammad Natsir, Interview, Jakarta, September 10, 1984.

28. On his trip to Sumatra in September 1947, Mohammad Hatta was interviewed by a certain Swinton who worked for the Associated Press (AP). It was in that interview that Hatta was quoted as saying that if the Dutch refused the peaceful means to solve the problems between the two countries, Hatta himself would go to the jungle in Sumatra to lead the guerilla war. See Kedaoelatan Rakjat, September 20, 1947.

29. Mohammad Hatta, Memoirs, p. 295.

30. Sukarno, An Autobiography As Told to Cindy Adams (Indianapolis, Kansas City, New York: The Bobbs Merrill Company, Inc., 1965), pp. 252-254.

31. Claude E. Welch, Jr. and Arthur K. Smith, Military Role and Rule, (North Scituate, Massachusetts: Duxbury Press, 1974). p.4.

32. Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan, Vol. II, p. 60.

33. Nasution, Fundamentals, pp. 108-115 and Memenuhi Panggilan Vol. II, pp. 33-37.

34. Nasution, Fundamentals, p. 116.

35. Simatupang, Report From Banaran, p. 130.

36. Major General (ret.) Slamet Danusudirdjo, interview, Jakarta, September 30, 1984.

37. Slamet Danusudirdjo, interview, Jakarta, September 30, 1984.

38. Simatupang, Report From Banaran, pp. 131-132.

39. Major General (ret.) Or. Azis Saleh, interview, Jakarta, September 22, 1984.

40. Sunarto, interview, Jakarta^ September 24, 1984: See also Nasution, Fundamentals, p. 258. 237

41. Prince Diponegoro, a distant uncle of the ruling Sultan of Yogyakarta in the early nineteenth century, was fighting against the Dutch between 1825-1830. The war broke out because Prince Diponegoro resented Dutch interference in the internal problems of the Sultanate of Yogyakarta.

42. Hisbaron Muryantoro, "Partisipasi Rakyat Bibis Selama Clash II Pada Awal Tahun 1949." B. A. Thesis, Gajah Mada University, Yogyakarta, Indonesia, 1980, p. 12.

43. Lt. General (re t.) Kemal Idris, interview, Jakarta, September 20, 1984.

44. Report of the office of Recomba (Dutch Government Comissariat) of East Java, dated July 22, 1949. Attorney General file no. 38, Royal Dutch Archive, The Hague, The Netherlands.

45. Maklumat Gubernur Militer Daerah Militer Istimewa III, No. l/Pem/GM/49. CAD, GG.51, HK 65, The Netherlands Defense Ministry Archive.

46. Report of the Office of [Police] Intelligence of Purwokerto Area. The Attorney General file no. 37, Royal Dutch Archive, The Hague, The Netherlands.

47. Brig. General Sujito, interview, Jakarta, November 12, 1984.

48. Report of the Intelligence Office of the Java Army Territorial Command, dated June 7, 1949. CAD, HK 65,GG55, The Netherlands Defense Ministry Archive.

49. Kahin, National ism, p. 411.

50. The idea of launching a general attack on Yogyakarta is now a matter of controversy. Sultan Hamengkubuwono claimed that the original idea came from him. According to the Sultan, one day as he listened to the foreign radio news broadcast, he learned that the United Nations was about to discuss the Indonesian question. He then got the idea for a general attack as a way to show the world that the Republic had not yet been silenced by the Dutch. Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX, interview, Jakarta, October 15, 1984; H. Nasution, written communication, Jakarta, February 19, 1985. In his written communication to the writer, Nasution mentions the story told to him by the younger brother of Bambang Sugeng, the division commander to which Suharto's brigade belonged. This younger brother heard his older brother giving orders to Suharto to attack Yogyakarta. Nasution, written communication, Jakarta, February 19, 1985. 238

51. Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan, Vol. II, pp. 35-39.

52. CMI (Centraale Mi 1itair Inlichtingen Dienst, Central Military Intelligence Service), Daily Political Report no. 62, Batavia [Jakarta], June 23, 1949, The Royal Dutch Archive/General Secretary, File IX/no. 3, The Hague, The Netherlands; It is interesting to see that as early as December 17, 1948, the United States Consulate in Jakarta already reported to Washington of the plan to release the communist political detainees at the time of the Dutch attack. United States Department of State, incoming telegram to the State Secretary, 856E.00/12-1748 HH, Washington, D.C.

53. CMI, Weekly Highlight Political Report, Batavia [Jakarta] April 22, 1949. The Royal Dutch Archive/General Secretary, Indonesian Report, 1945-1950, f ile 178, The Hague, The Netherlands.

54. Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan, Vol. II, p. 104.

55. Tan Mai aka, Dari Pendjara Ke Pendjara, Vol. Ill (Jakarta, Widjaja, 1948), pp. v-vi.

56. Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan, Vol. II, pp. 102-103.

57. Report of the intelligence office of the Java Army T erritorial Command, dated June 7, 1949. CAD, HK 65, GG 55, The Netherlands Defense Ministry Archive.

58. Instruction of the East Java Military Governor, dated January 22, 1949, CMI Document no. 5682, CAD, GG 58, The Netherlands Defense Ministry Archive.

59. Simatupang, Report From Banaran, p. 130.

60. Nugroho Notosusanto, "Some Effects of the Guerrilla War (1948-1949) on Armed Forces and Society in Indonesia," in Nugroho Notosusanto, The National Struggle and The Armed Forces In Indonesi a (Jakarta, Department of Information, 1979), p. 105.

61. A. H. Nasution, Sekitar Perang Kemerdekaan Indonesia, Vol. IX, (Bandung; Penerbit Angkasa, 1977), pp. 295-297; On DI/TII and its relations with Islam in Indonesia, see B.J. Boland, The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia, (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1082), pp. 54-74.

62. CMI Document no. 5694, CAD, HK 65, GG 58, The Netherlands Defense Ministry Archive, The Hague.

63. Simatupang, Report From Banaran, p. 131. 239

64. Audrey Kahin, "Struggle for Independence: West Sumatra in the Indonesian National Revolution: 1945-1950," Ph.D. Dissertation, Cornell University, 1979, p. 311.

65. Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan, Vol. II, pp. 22-23.

6 6. Audrey Kahin, "Struggle for Independence," p. 312.

67. CMI, Daily Political Report No. 7. Batavia [Jakarta], April 12, 1949, The Royal Dutch Archive/General Secretary, f ile X, No. 3, The Hague, The Netherlands.

6 8. Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan, Vol. II, p. 141.

69. Quoted in Simatupang, Report From Banaran, pp. 158-159.

70. See footnote no. 73 in chapter V.

71. CMI, Weekly Digest Political Report no. 22, issued in Batavia [Jakarta] dated June 18, 1949. The Royal Dutch Archive/General Secretary, Indonesian Report 1945-1950, f ile 179, The Hague, The Netherlands.

72. Kahin, Nationalism, pp. 408-409.

73. Kahin, Nationalism, p. 395.

74. A report of Major General J. K. Meyer, the Commander of the Central Java Dutch Army Java/Territorial Command, prepared in Semarang, dated July 19, 1949. CAD, HK. 65, GG 67, The Netherlands Defense Ministry Archive, The Hague.

75. Stikker, Men of Responsibility, pp. 145-146.

76. Sudirman's letter to Colonel Hidayat. Knil, the Cabinet of the Army Commander, no. Kab/2207/9732/PZ, The Royal Dutch Archive, SMG/201/5, The Hague.

77. A. H. Nasution, TNI, Vol. I ll, (Jakarta: Seruling Masa, 1971), p. 64.

78. Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, Renville, pp. 271-272.

79. Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan, Vol. II, p. 159.

80. Nasution, TNI, Vol. I ll, p. 67.

81. Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan, Vol. II pp. 160-161. 240

82. Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan, Vol. II, p. 178; see also the intelligence report of the East Java [Dutch] Military Command, dated October 12, 1949. The Attorney General's file no. 573, The Royal Dutch Archive, The Hague, The Netherlands.

83. Simatupang, Report From Banaran, p. 135.

84. Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan, Vol. II, pp. 156-157.

85. CMI, Daily Political Report No. 62, Batavia [Jakarta] June 23, 1949. The Royal Dutch Archive, The General Secretary, File IX, no. 3, The Hague, The Netherlands.

8 6. Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan, Vol. II, pp. 166-167.

87. Simatupang, Report From Banaran, pp. 159-160.

8 8. Simatupang, Report From Banaran, p. 160.

89. Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan, Vol. II, pp. 181-182.

90. Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan, Vol. II, pp. 182-183.

91. Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan, Vol. II, pp. 184-185.

92. Nasution, TNI, Vol. I ll, p. 83. CHAPTER V I I. CONCLUSIONS

A3RI‘s Origins And The Future of Civil Miltary Relations in Indonesia

During the approximately four years of the Revolution and War of Independence, the TNI under its Commander-in-Chief, General Sudirman, participated in the political decision making process of the Government. There was not what in western countries is called "civilian supremacy over the military," but neither was there a "military supremacy over the civilians." This set-up became a national tradition, and what has always been reality is now officially formulated as the socio-political function of the Indonesian Armed Forces.^ -- Brig. Gen. Nugroho Notosusanto.

The Guerrilla War or people's war was a very decisive experience for the self-understanding of the ABRI [Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia]. Even though that experience did not automatically bring us to the present situation of military dominance in the politics of the country, nevertheless that particular experience was a model, and as such it was later developed after 1950... After the transfer of sovereignty, we realized the possible effects of the Guerrilla War. From our readings we knew that states that reached their independence by way of guerrilla war usually will have an unstable political life. We then came to the conclusion that we had to support a civilian government under which we could reorganize the army, and train its members as fast as possible so that its size could be reduced. By entertaining that idea we hoped that the military would not be a source of trouble for the government.2

— T. B. Simatupang.

In this dissertation I have described four aspects or facets of

Indonesian military experience during the Revolution: the army's self-creation, the institutional leadership of General Sudirman, the context of weak civilian institutions in which that leadership was exercised, and the pattern of direct military government during the

241 242 guerrilla war. In the Introduction I asserted that this experience ' makes ABRI unique among third World m ilitaries, not only in its origins but in the way in which civil-military relations developed after independence was won. I suggested that since the interventionist model is not fully satisfying in explaining the political role of the military in Indonesia — because the military never intervened but always acted as one among several recognized political forces--so also one could not talk of a "return to the barracks" in Indonesia. There are, in other words, few lessons to be learned from countries like Nigeria or Brazil, where armies have never been legitimate as dominating political forces either among their own officers or in society at large. Inevitably, then, they have been transitory power holders.

Beyond the permanence of some form of military participation in

Indonesian political life , what are the implications of Indonesia's unique past for its civil-military future? In particular, was a model created during the Revolutionary years that today continues to serve as the military's guiding principle for their political participation? A brief look at the events of post-independence political-m ilitary history and at the reworking from time to time of the armed forces' ideology will show that the answer is both yes and no.

Yes in the sense that the basic idea that the military as a corporate entity is a legitimate political actor has never changed.

And substantively the army leadership has always defined its role by reference to its self-creation, to Sudirman's example, and to what 243 they imagine the 1948-49 m ilitary government to have been like. But no in the sense that the army leaders' actual behavior and the specific justifications they have offered for that behavior have not remained constant. New situations have continuously forced them to adapt, involving themselves in politics in new ways and constructing wholly new legitimating arguments linking their behavior to the

1945-49 foundation. Indonesian civil-military relations today are thus rigid in that the right of the military to participate cannot be questioned, but flexible in that the form that participation can take moves along a potentially very broad spectrum of possibilities.

We have seen that following the transfer of sovereignty and the establishment of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, the political role of the military was severely curtailed, if not completely cut off. There were three reasons for this. First, the constitution -- known as the 1950 Provisional Constitution -- was clearly based on the Western Liberal democratic tradition in which the military was subordinated to civilian supremacy. Remembering that period more than twenty years late r, T. B. Simatupang, the Chief of

Staff at that time, wrote:

In the early fifties we were observing the eagerness [of the military] to concentrate attention on the development of military expertise. That approach was based on an assumption that the political groups would institutionalize the political system and manage to develop the society, the economy, and the culture. Had the "experiment" succeeded our situation today would be different.3

Second, the army was in the hands of the modernizers, officers like 244

Nasution and Simatupang who, as we have already seen, were the motor behind the rationalization and reorganization in 1948. Third, after the death of Sudirman in January 1950, the m ilitary lost the irreplaceable father who never hesitated to oppose the government whenever he thought one of its policies would victimize the army. The death of Sudirman also meant the loss of the indispensible unifier for the heterogeneous army. It was this lack of unity that made the army the object of civilian interventions for many years, until Suharto in

1959 finally succeeded in unifying the army under his control.

Despite the three factors working together to weaken the military, it never abandoned politics completely. As early as the formation of the first cabinet of the unitary state in 1950 under Prime Minister

Mohammad Natsir, the m ilitary was involved in deciding who the defense minister should be. The candidate from Natsir's party was finally replaced by a person acceptable to the army.^

In the early 1950s two events occured which had a critical impact in the direction of civil-military relations. These were the October

17, 1952 incident and the so-called June Affair in 1955.

In order to understand the background of the October 17 incident we first have to know the attitude of the military toward the civilian politicians right after the transfer of sovereignty. The bitter experiences with the "surrender" of Sukarno on December 18, 1948, the cease fire of 1949 and the powerful position of the civilian politicians under the new constitution were the background for the affair. Moreover, most of the members of the provisional Parliament 245 at that time and some of the ministers did not belong to the groups genuinely fighting for independence. This is easy to understand if we know that the Republic of Indonesia post-1950 was a product of an integration between the original Republic, whose capital was

Yogyakarta, and the areas formerly under the federal states created by the Dutch. As we have already seen, during the physical revolution, in order to contain the original Republic, the Dutch had been creating many states all over Indonesia. It was to those many states -- joined together with the original Republic as the United States of Indonesia

-- that the Dutch transferred sovereignty at the end of 1949. But those many states existed only for a very short period. Within a year following the transfer of sovereignty all of those states dissolved themselves and merged with the Republic of Indonesia.^

The 17th of October incident, the f ir s t open conflict between the army and the civilian politicians in post independence Indonesia came into being when the provisional Parliament discussed a topic which was regarded by the army as its internal problem. The topic was the modernization of the army. This idea as developed by Nasution, then

Commander of the Army, was opposed by a certain group inside the army itself. The latter group had close contact with President Sukarno and with a certain group on the opposition side of Parliament. It was really as a result of a letter sent by the latter group that the

Parliament started to discuss the military problem.® Army

Headquarters and several regional commanders were very irritated by this action of Parliament. On October 17, 1952, the officers from 246

Army Headquarters together with some regional commanders went to the palace to see President Sukarno and asked him to assume power and dissolve the provisional Parliament. Sukarno did not succumb to the military pressure, and Nasution, as the highest ranking officer from

Army Headquarters, resigned thereafter.^

Commenting on the failure of the October 17, 1952 incident, an observer wrote later:

As to the officers, they failed to achieve their purpose not only because the president was able to intimidate them by his magnetic hold on the masses but also -- perhaps primarily -- because of the lack of consensus and discipline among themselves...To illu strate, while Colonel Nasution, Chief of Staff of the Army, was being hostile to Parliament and inclining towards an authoritarian and m ilitaristic approach. Major General Simatupang, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, was arguing against a military dictatorship.8

As a result of the October 17, 1952 incident, "...th e overall bargaining strength of the army vis-a-vis everyone else in the political arena was seriously impaired."^ And it was that weak bargaining position of the army that became the root of another conflict between the army and the government.

On July 31, 1953 a new cabinet came into being with Iwa Kusuma

Sumantri, a well known le f tis t, as Minister of Defense. There were two policies of Kusuma Sumantri that irritated the Army. First was his open sympathy to the le ftis t group which consisted of people who were involved in the 1948 communist rebellion in Madiun. The second was the policy whereby the Minister maintained or even deepened the cleavage between the pro- and the anti-October 17 groups. Looking back to this period Ali Sastroamijoyo, the then Prime Minister, wrote: 247 Naturally, Iwa'§ policy produced an uneasy feeling in the army as a whole, and it was this perhaps which caused a growing desire within the army to make peace among themselves so that TNI would become united and strong again and could withstand strongly and resolutely the interference of politicians in army affairs. The idea of restoring the unity of the army had developed in the middle of 1954, but it was not until February 17, 1955 that it took on a more concrete form, when a meeting held in Yogya was attended by more than 250 TNI o ffic ers.10

Feith writes that:

The conference in Yogyakarta showed the army determined to close its ranks in the face of outsiders, so determined indeed that "the anti-October 17 group" was prepared to go along with a return of the "pro-October 17 group" to a position of dominance.H

Commenting on the result of the conference, Nasution in his memoir writes:

With the unity of the TNI, the palace [meaning: President Sukarno] and the parties could not again freely intervene into internal TNI problems.12

It turned out that Nasution was wrong. On June 10, 1955, the government decided to appoint Colonel Bambang Utoyo, a man of fairly low seniority as an officer, to become Chief-of-Staff.

The appointment was clearly in defiance of the leaders of the Jogyakarta conference, and Bambang Utojo initially refused it. But a little later he agreed. Bambang Utojo was formally installed as Chief-of-Staff on the morning of June 27, 1955. At the same time he was made a major general. But the army was not there to see it, except for some five or six officers invited. So effective was the boycott, carried out on orders of Acting Chief-of-Staff Zulkifli Lubis, that no military band could be found to play the national anthem.13

The boycott, which later became known as the "JuneAffair," resulted in a debacle for the cabinet. To a foreign observer.

The June 27, 1955 affair can be considered to be the dividing line between the period when the army was mainly concerned with resisting political interference in its internal affairs and the period when it began to play an active role in politics.15 248

Before the cabinet left office in March 1957, Prime Minister Ali

Sastroamijoyo had proclaimed nationwide martial law. The reasons for this state of seige were not only because of the June Affair, and with

it the political offensive of the officers, but also because of the developments in the regions and their relations vis-a-vis the capital. The bad relations developing between the center and the regions ultimately ended in the PRRI/Permesta rebellion in several 15 parts of the country.

Martial law gave the military an opportunity to exercise more power. Together with the President, who under the parliamentary government was constitutionally weak but personally very influential, the military initiated a return to the strong presidential system of the revolutionary period. But even before the return to the old 1945 constitution there were already some generals in the cabinet.To justify that, Nasution, after being returned as the Chief of Staff of the Army in 1955, had declared in November 12, 1958 the "Middle Way" principle. According to Nasution he was essentially making clear the position of the army in the society, namely:

...not just the "civilian tool" like in the Western countries, nor a "military regime" which dominates the state power, but as one of many forces in the society, the force for the struggle of the people [kekuatan perjuangan rakyat] which works together with other people's forces [kekuatan rakyat lainnya].!?

In July 1959 President Sukarno formally declared the return of the country to the 1945 revolutionary constitution in which the president played the central role. The decision was made after the

Constitutional Council, the body elected in 1955 to draw a new 249 constitution, failed to reach consensus on which constitution to adopt. In 1960 President Sukarno banned several parties, the most important among them being Masyumi (the modernist Muslim Party) and the PSI (the Socialist Party of Indonesia). The reason given for the ban was that both parties had some important leaders involved in the regional rebellions. With the Nationalist Party (PNI) weak and divided, this decision left the Communist Party (PKI) as the only powerful party in Indonesia.

The period from 1959 until 1965 in Indonesian political history is known as the period of Guided Democracy. During this period.

President Sukarno and the army leadership under Major General (subsequently Lieutenant General and later General) Nasution were the principal power elements in government... Soekarno continued to lack a political organization of his own. In order to maximize his influence vis-a-vis the army, therefore, he needed to find support from political groups hostile to the army... But it was the PKI which provided Soekarno with his best organized, most vociferous, and most reliable body of support against the army leaders. Hence it was that the President repeatedly shielded the PKI against the effort of Nasution and his associates to reduce its p o w e r . 18

Sukarno stayed in power as long as he could manage to balance these forces. Once the balance became unbalanced, as happened in

October 1965 after the assassination of six generals from Army

Headquarters by a group of young officers apparently in alliance with 19 the Communist Party, Sukarno was no longer in control.

After months of intensive psychological warfare between Sukarno and the Army, on March 11, 1966, Sukarno finally authorized General

Suharto, then Chief-of-Staff of the Army, to take any action he felt necessary for the country on behalf of Sukarno. The first action 250

Suharto took was to disband the PKI. With no PKI and a weak Sukarno, the military stood unchallenged on the stage of Indonesian politics.

The Changing Ideology of the Indonesian Military

Beginning in 1957, martial law legalized the entry of the officers into politics. But General Nasution -- who had been reinstated as the

Army Chief of Staff in 1955 -- s till needed a doctrine to justify the political role of the military in terms of its own history and experiences. It was here that he looked back to the period of

1945-1949. From this time on the name of Sudirman reappeared again as the symbol of the autonomy of the army vis-a-vis the politicians who controlled the government. It is interesting to see that the reappearance of Sudirman's name in the Indonesian political arena coincided with a political situation which very much, in the eyes of the officers, resembled the situation in the early days of the revolution. And their reaction was simply a repetition of Sudirman's reaction as explained in Chapter V of this dissertation.

In the late fiftie s the m ilitary were (once again)

angry at the confusion of political parties, the corruption, the ideological strife, the political instability, all of which they believed, in simplistic fashion, was to blame for the lack of progress in the country...20

At the same time, while conducting operations against the rebels --

DI/TII, RMS, PRRI/Permesta — Nasution slowly adjusted his guerrilla concept into an anti-guerrilla tactic, complete with a m ilitary territorial staff paralleling the civilian government. 251

A clear picture of the military's socio-political role was not presented until Nasution's "Middle Way" speech in November 1958. By that time military officers had already started to occupy many positions which normally belonged to the civilian domain. One month before Nasution made his historic speech at the National Military

Academy in Magelang, Central Java, Lt. Col. Isman was already dispatched to New York to be the adviser to the Indonesian delegation at the United Nations. Even before that, as the result of the nationalization of Dutch companies, many officers had already become 21 company managers. Thus when Nasution in his speech insisted that the military would not be purely a spectator but must be granted the opportunity to participate in the government on an individual basis to make use of its non-military sk ills, Nasution was simply seeking the justification for a new development that had already become a reality.

In the midst of news about coups in many newly independent states at that time, the "Middle Way" speech was looked upon as a lesser evil compared to a total military takeover. It is no wonder that within three days after Nasution's speech Prime Minister Djuanda came up with 22 his approval.

The next step taken by Nasution after his "Middle Way" speech was to launch the idea of abandoning the liberal democratic system through the readoption of the revolutionary Constitution of 1945. The reason given by Nasution for this step was as follows:

...to regain the unity and the spirit of national struggle, to cultivate a stable government ideally and structurally after the liberal system failed to bring about stab ilizatio n ...23 252

In practical terms, the return to the 1945 Constitution was a part

of Nasution's strategy in his effort to give the military a legal

socio-political position in the country. Following Nasution's

interpretation, under the 1945 Constitution there are three kinds of

political representation: political parties; functional groups; and

the representatives of the regions. The Armed Forces of the Republic

of Indonesia, for Nasution, are clearly part of the functional

groups. Other members were peasants, artists, journalists, religious 24 scholars, workers, women, youth and intellectuals.

While working toward the reenactment of the 1945 Constitution,

Nasution was also busy reviving and redefining his old theory of

guerrilla war and territo rial management. And since his "Middle Way"

policy stipulated the involvement of the m ilitary in all aspects of

public life , there seemed to be no better way to implement it than the revival of the practice and the experience of the guerrilla war of

1948-1949 in the form of territo rial management. Right after the

"Middle Way" speech Nasution instructed the Seskoad (Army Staff and

Command School) in Bandung to prepare a doctrine through which the

"Middle Way" policy could be carried out based on the experiences in the revolution. While Seskoad worked slowly to construct the doctrine, Nasution in his many speeches never failed to propagate his guerrilla war and territo rial management concept. In one of his speeches in 1950, Nasution said that

A state which realizes that it is poorly armed, equipped and organized would practice Territorial Warfare against its opponents who are superior in number of arms, equipment and good organization, etc. 253 Territorial warfare absolutely requires territorial support and service from the whole people in the territory.25

In order to have territorial support and service from the whole people there are several requirements proposed by Nasution. The number one requirement is what he calls the territorial elements, elaborated as follows:

...Indonesia is divided into Military District Commands with their organization from top to bottom. The task of each command is to build up its own territory to prepare itself to face any possibility such as rebellions, foreign attacks, etc.26

The above mentioned quotation very much reminds us of the

Wehrkreise system which was practiced by the Indonesian army during the Guerrilla War in 1948-1949. As we already know the Wehrkreise system was a system developed by Nasution during the revolution to cope with the situation in which the enemy, the Dutch colonial army, was far superior to the Indonesian guerrilla army. With the

Wehrkreise system it was expected that each area could fight independently from other units. It was based on that system that

Nasution developed a network of m ilitary government in which the civilian government was subordinated to the military government by having a parallel m ilitary governmental apparatus to control every level of civilian government.

In March 1962 Seskoad finally produced the doctrine which was called "The Doctrine of Territorial Warfare." For those who are familiar with Nasution's concept of guerrilla war during the revolution this doctrine is no more than a refinement of the old one.

The most important and decisive part of the doctrine for the future 254 socio-political role of the military is point 4 of Part One from Book

One which reads as follows:

For the successful implementation of territo rial warfare, attention must be given to the following:

1. Stabilization in the political field.

2. Consciousness that the Pantjasila is our only ideology and that it has but one official interpretation.

3. A single authoritative leadership which is constantly felt.

4. Complete integration of the three services (land, sea and air) and their utilization in territorial warfare on the basis of the capability of the state.

5. Planned over-all development which in turn will maximize the resources for territorial warfare.

6 . Territorial management which will permit self sufficiency in carrying out territorial w a r ..27

In the previous pages we have already seen how Nasution had promoted the idea of readopting the revolutionary Constitution of

1945. By doing that Nasution not only had envisaged the socio-political role of the army under the revolutionary constitution, but also expected that at the same time there would be a

"stabilization in the political field" (point one as quotedabove) since it was expected that the ideological conflicts of liberal democracy would be eliminated by adopting Pancasila as the "only ideology and that it has but one official interpretation" (point two). Point three, on leadership, while reminding us of the traumatic experience of the army during the revolution when there was no unified political and military leadership, at the same time must also be seen 255

as in support of Sukarno's leadership and his doctrine of Guided

Democracy in which the army had a socio-political role.

It is against this background, (points two and three) that we have to understand Nasution's drive to minimize the position of the political parties and their ideologies and to maximize the role of the functional groups in the Indonesian political arena. Thus in his speech at Seskoad on August 7, 1961, Nasution clearly says that

...in thinking about the challenge inherent in the ideals of Guided Democracy, and with this concept of guidance and this method of consultation, we believe that it is no longer necessary to have various parties and ideologies. We have in our Pantjasila and in our revolutionary ideals, one basis and objective for our revolution, one national mission. There is no need for anything else. The principles and objectives parties adhered to in the past are no longer necessary, and since they are no longer necessary, our society can be divided along the lines of its work in the revolution.28

A point which very much reminds us of the practice of guerrilla war in

1948-1949 is point six, territo rial management. It is based on this point that we should understand the recreation of the territorial apparatus of the army to parallel the civilian government apparatus.

Thus following the adoption of the "Middle Way" policy the army started to create m ilitary commands (Kodam, Komando Daerah M iliter,

Regional Military Command) in each province. Beneath the Kodam is

Korem (Komando Resort M iliter, Sub-Regional Military Command), paralleling the Residency of the civilian government's administrative structure. Next comes Kodim (Komando Distrik M iliter, District

Military Command), the counterpart of the civilian kabupaten

(district). Under the district are two more levels of civilian government, the kecamatan (sub-district) and kelurahan (village). 256

These levels are paralleled respectively by Koramil (Komando Rayon

M iliter, (sub-District Military Command) and Babinsa (Bintara Pembina

Desa, Village Development Non-Commissioned Officers). (See Figure 2).

At each level of this governmental and military structure there is a council whose members include the highest official in the civilian government, the chief of police, the military commander, the chief prosecutor, and the head of the court. The council is known as

Muspida (Musyawarah Pimpinan Daerah, Council of Regional Leadership) and the chairman of this Council is always the military commander.

This system, reintroduced in the late 1950's, still exists today.

The territorial apparatus created nation-wide following the

"Middle Way" policy was formally organized to sustain military operations against the PRRI/Permesta rebellion of the late 1950's.

But the rebellion was successfully crushed and martial law lifted in the early sixties. The army, already recognized as a functional group under the revolutionary Constitution of 1945, now used the territorial apparatus to compete with the PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia,

Indonesian Communist Party) which became very powerful during the 29 Guided Democracy era.

In the last days of Guided Democracy, when the PKI had already outmaneuvered the other political parties, and Sukarno was perceived by many as very sympathetic to the communists, it was to the Army that most of non-communist Indonesia — especially the elites — looked.

It was then no wonder that following the abortive coup d'etat of 257

Military Civil

Kodam Province

Korem Residency

Kodim D istrict

Koramil Sub-District

Babinsa Vi 11 age

Figure 2. Parallel Civil Bureaucracy and Army Territorial Command 258

October 1, 1965 the Army got the whole-hearted support of non-communist Indonesians to crush the PKI as well as to depose

Sukarno.

Only four months following the transfer of power from Sukarno to

General Suharto on March 11, 1966, Seskoad in Bandung held an important seminar to review the army doctrine. This seminar is known as the Second Army Seminar, since the f ir s t seminar was held in 1965 a few months before the abortive coup d 'etat. There were two reasons to have the second seminar; f ir s t, the product of the f ir s t seminar was heavily contaminated with the le f tis t jargon of Guided Democracy.

Second, the firs t seminar was held under the assumption that the Army was only one out of many functional groups in the country. The debacle of the PKI and the fall of Sukarno brought Indonesia into a completely new era in which the Army found itse lf to be the dominant political force in the country. For this they needed a new doctrine.

The basic ideas of guerrilla warfare and territorial management were s till there, but the new doctrine, christened Tri Ubaya Cakti (Three

Sacred Efforts), does not only talk about the Army as one of many functional groups but already outlines the policies which should be followed by the Army in running the country. Thus in the f irs t part of the doctrine one can read the new self perception of the Army as follows:

In these days all of the people's hopes are addressed to ABRI [Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia] in general and TNI-AD [Tentara National 259 Indonesia-Indonesian National Army] in particular. Hope for the ABRI there is only one alternative. That is to realize what the people have entrusted to ABRI. And because of that ABRI is compelled to construct and cultivate a respectable government, a government which is powerful and progressive. 30

To ju stify the dominant position of the m ilitary in Indonesian politics since October 1965, the officers started to refer to their experiences with the civilian politicians during as well as after the revolution. Commenting on the divisive nature and the disintegrative effects of the political parties, General Ali Murtopo, then a political adviser to General Suharto, wrote that

From the history of our country we can conclude that it is only because of the presence of ABRI that the disintegration heading toward the destruction of our country several times could be avoided. Historically speaking ABRI is the only group in society which was born together with the new institution, namely the state based on Pancasila...It is because ABRI has the ability and tradition to overcome [mengatasi] groups' ideologies and interests that make it the leader of the country.31

In addition to being the unifier (pemersatu) of the country, ABRI was also called Indonesia's savior (penyelamat). In this case the officers then mention their experiences in fighting the Dutch army during the revolution, the communist rebellion in 1948, the DI/TII for many years, the regional rebellion of PRRI/Permesta in the late 32 fiftie s and the recent abortive coup of October 1965.

Besides being the unifier and savior, ABRI also claimed to be the dinamisator. With this they really mean that ABRI, as explained by

President Suharto in 1969, wants to make the society dynamic by

"leading by example in the front, inspiring in the midst of the people, and encouraging from behind (Ing Ngarso sung Tulodo, Ing Madyo 33 Mangun Karso, Tut Wuri Handayani) . 260

The New order: Conflicting Interpretations and the Possibility of

Future Change

Against this background of events and ideological change we can

clearly understand why the Western theories of civil-military relations are not satisfying in explaining the political role of

Indonesian m ilitary. Even civilian politicans and intellectuals do not talk about an immediate alternative to military rule, because nobody can present an alternative. "The only group that can run

Indonesia is ABRI," says Dr. Yuwono Sudarsono, a political scientist at the University of Indonesia in Jakarta.And most of the intellectuals apparently agree with him.

What many people are concerned about -- civilians as well as military officers — is the interpretation of the Dual Function or Dwi

Fungsi, as the present New Order version of the doctrine is called.

Before we come to the disagreement, we firs t have to remember that the

Army doctrine of non-military involvement is a document that has been adjusted again and again to the latest political position of the military. The "Middle Way" speech was made when the military already occupied a wide range of non-military positions, notably as managers of the former Dutch companies. "The Territorial Warfare and

Territorial Management" doctrine of 1960 was introduced when the network of territorial apparatus was already there when the military officers already occupied all kinds of civilian positions except the

Presidency. And when in 1966 Seskoad revised the old doctrine to 261 accommodate the latest developments, the military was already the sole power holder of the country. Thus the Dual Function in Panglima

Sudirman's era was different from Nasution's era, and both of them were different from Suharto's time.

It is interesting to see that since 1966 there has been no significant change in the doctrine itself. This certainly can be understood by the unchanging political dominance of ABRI from that time on. But this by no means indicates that there are no changes taking place. Only now the changes are taking place in the implementation of the doctrine. A good example of this adjustment in implementation occurred in the late 1960's when the government of

General Suharto finally had to compromise with the political parties to adopt the proportional representation system instead of the single d istrict system as intended by the Army before. In return for this concession the Army was guaranteed 100 seats in the parliament and did not have to contest elections.

To the critics of the Suharto government, m ilitary as well as civilian, the compromise on the election system is perceived as the beginning of series of continuing adjustments made by the government in interpreting and implementing the Dual Function which is taken to be a way to perpetuate the reign of the present government.

Discussing the various interpretations of the Dual Function of the

Indonesian Armed Forces one cannot avoid bringing in Gen. Nasution.

Nasution is certainly not the only c ritic of the way the military-dominated government interprets and implements the Dual 262

Function, since there are many retired generals who have organized

themselves to voice their concern to the government. But from all

those criticizing the government it is only Nasution who has a clear

idea of how the Dual Function should be carried out.

It is an irony in Indonesian history that Nasution, who

conceptualized the political ideology of the military, and led them

into the political arena in the I950's, at the end became a bitter

critic of the implementation of his brainchild. As early as 1966, in

his lecture at Seskoad, Nasution already warned his colleagues about

the need for the "purification of the meaning and the implementation" 35 of the Dual Function concept.

What Nasution means by "purification" has been explained by him in many articles, lectures, pamphlets and interviews. In one of his

interviews Nasution made it very clear that the political function of

ABRI should be interpreted in terms of Section 2 of the 1945

Constitution. This section of the constitution deals with functional group political representation.^^ And if ABRI were to adhere to this section of the constitution, according to Nasution, then the political role of ABRI will only be visible in the MPR (Majlis

Permusyawaratan Rakyat, People's Consultative Assembly) and not in day to day politics. By doing th is, according to Nasution again, the

legitimacy of ABRI's political role will not solely derive from its historical role during the revolution, but more than that it will have 37 the guarantee of the constitution.

Another point of Nasution's criticism of the government is the 263 position of ABRI toward relationship between the political parties and the state party Golkar (Golongan Karya, Functional Groups). According to Nasution, ABRI should not favor one political group over another, especially during elections. This criticism came about after seeing

ABRI openly backing Golkar in all elections held in Indonesia since the m ilitary came to power.

Since Nasution's criticism and also similar criticisms from other retired generals have been discussed elsewhere, it is not necessary here to go beyond what has been outlined above.What is more interesting if we are trying to assess the possibility of future change, is to find out the government reaction to the criticism.

But before we proceed to the government reaction to their c ritic s, one thing should first be said. While almost no civilians have been involved in the debate on interpretation or misinterpretation of the

Dwi Fungsi, the criticism from inside -- Nasution and many other retired generals -- does have a spill-over effect outside the military circle. Thus when students openly criticized Suharto in 1978, they were not against the military and the Dual Function but merely against

Suharto's policy of running the country. In the streets of Jakarta and Bandung in 1978 one could see posters and logos on the T-shirts of the students: "Bring ABRI back to the people." This is clearly another way of expressing what Nasution had said many times in the late seventies, that is that the way the Dual Function is now implemented only puts ABRI in the same position as the Dutch colonial army, an army which was used by the government to implement its 264

policies. This, according to Nasution, is contrary to Panglima Besar

Sudirman's position, namely that the Indonesian Army should not be a

"dead tool" in the hands of the government.

The government reaction to the student criticism was dramatic and

decisive. In 1978 many students were arrested, some were tried. When the recalcitrant were finally taken care of, the time for explanation

arrived. No less than President Suharto himself came up with a clear answer to his c ritic s. On March 27, 1980, in addressing an Armed

Forces "Commanders' Call" in Pakanbaru, eastern Sumatra, President

Suharto made it clear that ABRI as the apparatus of national defense stands above all groups. But ABRI as a functional group must choose a 39 trusted partner, a partner who is clearly working for Pancasila.

A complete reaction to the critics of Suharto's interpretation of the Dual Function only appeared in public when Pejuang dan Prajurit

(Fighter and Soldier), a book edited by Brigadier General Nugroho

Notosusanto, was published in 1984. Curiously enough the book, prepared in the Defense Department, claimed not to be the official voice of the government, even though, as a manuscript, it was already widely discussed inside the military establishment before being published. The book is really a repetition of the many already known reasons and explanations for ABRI to play a non-military role. In this case the book is very tautological and pedantic, redundant with quotations from everybody whose writing could be used to support

ABRI's political role. But for the observer of the Indonesian military's political role, the book is essentially prepared to counter

Nasution and some other retired generals' continual criticisms. 265

On page 180 of the book, for instance, Nasution is not only shown

to contradict himself through a comparison of his statements made at

different times, but also his idea that ABRI should stay away from day

to day politics is labeled unrealistic, showing only that Nasution

does not know what political life is about. Interestingly enough, right after discrediting Nasution, the book praised Lt. General (ret.)

T. B. Simatupang as an example of a person with a positive approach to the military's socio-political role. Apparently Simatupang is praised for having said that:

In projecting the TNI's role in the future in the Pancasila state which is developing itself, we can have a negative and a positive approach. The negative approach discusses ways to diminish and to end the non-military role of the army in the future. The positive approach discusses how we can make use of the TNI, besides the other social forces in the society, to overcome our weakness as a nation, especially in the political field. By advancing in political development, the socio-political role of the TNI will certainly, even though slowly, decrease.40

Unlike Nasution, Simatupang, who openly does not like the term Dual

Function ("to give it a name is to make it permanent"), never discussed the Dual Function in detail. This certainly put him in a favorable position in the eyes of the government vis-a-vis Nasution who keeps the government irritated with his very specific criticisms.

On the differences in interpretation of the Dual Function,

Nugroho's book acknowledges that even among the active military officers there are varying opinions about the proper political role of

ABRI.^^ But despite that, the book clearly shows that there is nobody entertaining the idea of abandoning the Dual Function. This time not for historical reasons -- that since the revolutionary period

ABRI already has two functions -- but because 256 . . . i f ABRI's socio-political function is dropped, and ABRI only acts as the tool of the government, then if political turbulence occurs in which social forces oppose each other because of their interests contradicting each other diametrically, is there any other potential [power] that can play the role of moderator and stabilizer?42

Thus we then can conclude that the m ilitary has no plan to abandon the power in their hands, which is not surprising. What is more surprising -- in comparative perspective -- is that by holding that power the Indonesian m ilitary does not have the problem of legitimacy like the one disturbing ruling militaries in most other third world countries. And as we have seen in the previous pages, most politically conscious Indonesians also do not question the legitimacy of the military in politics. What they are concerned about is the interpretation and the implementation of the doctrine, not the doctrine itself.

What will be the form of future military participation in politics? According to Ali Murtopo,

The statements of the leaders of ABRI already have made it clear that the Dual Function will be there to stay. And this is justified by the constitution...43

But at the same time General Murtopo also writes that the dominant position of ABRI in the country's politics is a different story. ABRI became dominant, according to Murtopo, because the situation forced it to come to that position. And this is because "until now we have not yet had civilian political groups which have clear and firm programs." Because of th is, writes Murtopo further.

We can logically conclude that it is very possible that the dominant position of ABRI will decrease and even disappear, if the situation becomes normal, and if the civilian political groups free themselves from the elements of subversion, and if they can prove that they are better than n o w . 44 267

For General Benny Murdani, the present ABRI Commander, the Dual

Function is a state of mind and not something physical. "The physical part of it is the byproduct of the state of mind," he said in an interview with the author. It is because of this that General Murdani is not surprised to see multiple interpretations of the Dual

Function. General Murdani basically sees three interpretations currently circulating in society. First is Nasution's interpretation. On this Murdani says.

General Nasution left the service more than ten years ago. He has busied himself reading books on philosophy and then reaches a conclusion. But that conclusion will probably only be applicable twenty five years from n o w . 45

The second interpretation is the "shallow" one, namely understanding the Dual Function only as a way to provide patronage to the m ilitary personnel by placing them in civilian posts. This interpretation is certainly the result of the fact that most of the important positions in Indonesian civilian bureaucracy are being taken by the military officers, active as well as retired ones. "This is a clearly wrong interpretation," snapped Murdani. According to the General, the placement of so many officers in the civilian posts since 1965 should not be seen out of context of the purge of the bureaucracy out the elements of communist and the followers of Sukarno following the abortive coup of October 1965. The third interpretation, according to

Murdani, comes from people "Who know nothing and talk as if the Dual

Function will stay forever as it is today." By saying this Gen.

Murdani is clearly referring to some high ranking military officers 268 who do not see any possible change in the shape of Indonesian civil-military relations in the future. For Murdani what will happen in the future will not solely be determined by ABRI. "Let the coming generation decide what will be good for our country in the future," said the General.

Will m ilitary dominance be a long term characteristic of

Indonesian politics? The answer, apparently, is yes. The legitimacy is there and the civilian political force is yet to come. And as the civilians are still standing on the fringe of the political arena, the inner dynamic of power will clearly originate and circulate among the military officers themselves. In this case the most likely debate to have our attention in the near future will be the debate about interpretation and implementation emanating from inside the military.

But looking to the history of the military doctrine that has always adjusted itse lf to the latest development, hope is s till there that as the society changes and as the civilians become ready, the doctrine will be adjusted once again.

I I NOTES

1. Brig. Gen. Nugroho Notosusanto, The Socio-Political Function Of The Indonesian Armed Forces (Jakarta, Department of Defence and Security, Centre For Armed Forces History, 1978), p. 11.

2. T.B. Simatupang, interview, Jakarta, September 2, 1982.

3. T.B. Simatupang, Peranan Angkatan Perang Dal am Negara Pancasila yang Membangun (Jakarta: Yayasan Idayu, 1980), p. 21.

4. According to M. Natsir, T. B. Simatupang, the Armed Forces Chief of Staff at that time, refused the candidate of Natsir for the position of defense minister. Natsir then had to accept the candidate of Simatupang, namely Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX. M. Natsir, interview, Jakarta, September 22, 1984.

5. Herbert Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1962), pp. 58-77.

6 . Dr. A. H. Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas,Vol. 3 (Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 1983), p. 179.

7. Feith, The Decline, pp. 246-273; Nasution: Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas, Vol. 3, pp. 1-214.

8 . Guy J. Pauker, "The Role of the Military in Indonesia" in John J. Johnson (ed.). The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1962), pp. 208-209.

9. Feith, The Decline, p. 395.

10. Ali Sastroamijoyo. Milestones on My Journey (St. Lucia, Queensland, University of Queensland Press, 1979), pp. 272-273.

11. Feith, The Decline, p. 398.

12. Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas, 3 (Jakarta: PT Gunung Agung, 1983), p. 277.

269 270

13. Feith, The Decline, p. 399.

14. Pauker, "The Role," p. 211.

15. Feith, The Decline, pp. 487-555.

16. The f ir s t two Generals to be members of cabinet were Sambas Atmadinata from the Army and Nazir from the Navy. They were sworn in on April 9, 1957. See Nugroho Notosusanto (ed), Pejuang Djin P ra ju rit, (Jakarta: Sinar Harapan, 1984), p. 76.

17. A. H. Nasution, Tonggak Tonggak Dwi Fungsi (Jakarta, mimeo, 1981), p. 17. See also Daniel S. Lev, The Transition To Guided Democracy: Indonesian Politics, 1957-1959, (Ithaca, New York: Southeast Asia Program, Department of Asian Studies, Cornell University, 1966), pp. 191-192.

18. ruith. The Decline, pp. 591-592.

19. See Donald Hindley, "Political Power and the October 1965 Coup in Indonesia" in Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. XXXVI, No. 2, Feb. 1967, pp. 237-249; Justus M. van der Kroef: "Interpretation of the 1965 Coup: A Review of Literature" in Pacific A ffairs, Vol. 43, No. 4 (Winter 1970-1971), pp. 557-577; van der Kroef, "Origin of the 1965 Coup in Indonesia: Probabilities and Alternatives" in Journal of South East Studies, Vol. I ll, No. 2 (Sept. 1972), pp. 277-298; B. R. O'G. Anderson and Ruth McVey, A Preliminary Analysis of the October 1, 1965, Coup in Indonesia (Ithaca, New York : Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University, 1971).

20. Lev, The Transition, p. 59.

21. Lev, The Transition, p. 192.

22. Lev, The Transition, p. 193.

23. Dr. A. H. Nasution, Kekarjaan ABRI (Jakarta: Seruling Masa, 1971), p. 18.

24. Dr. A. H. Nasution, Toward The People's Army, (Jakarta: C. V. Delegasi, 1964), p. 20.

25. Dr. A. H. Nasution, Toward, p. 39.

26. Nasution, Toward, p. 43.

27. Guy J. Pauker, The Indonesian Doctrine of Territorial Warfare And Territorial Management (Santa Monica, California: The Rand Corporation, 1973), p. 56. 271

28. Pauker, The Indonesian Doctrine, p. 170.

29. See Herbert Feith, "Dynamics of Guided Democracy" in Ruth I. McVey (ed), Indonesia, (New Haven: Southeast Asia Studies, Yale University, 1963), pp 336-342.

30. Indonesia, Angkatan Darat, Seskoad, Doktrin Perdjuangan TNI-AD "Tri Ubaya Cakti," (Jakarta: Angkatan Darat, 1966), p. 10.

31. Ali Moertopo, Strategi Politik Nasional (Jakarta: Yayasan Proklamasi, CSIS, 1974), pp. 108-109.

32. Nasution, Kekarjaan ABRI, p. 41.

33. Nugroho Notosusanto (ed) Pejuang Dan P raju rit, (Jakarta: Sinar Harapan, 1984), p. 288. On the self-perception of ABRI as savior, unifier and dinamisator, see R. William Liddle, "Soeharto's Indonesia: Personal Rule and Political Institutions," in Pacific A ffairs, Vol. 58, No. 1, Spring 1985, pp. 84-85.

34. Quoted in Notosusanto (ed), Pejuang, p. 162.

35. David Jenkins, Suharto and His Generals, Indonesian Military Politics 1975 - 1983, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1984), p. 216.

36. Section Two of the 1945 constitution reads as follows: 1. The membership of the Provisional People's Consultative Assembly consists of members of Parliament plus regional delegations and groups according to the regulations established by the law. 2. The Provisional People's Consultative Assembly holds a meeting at least once in five years in the capital of the state. 3. All the decisions of the Provisional People's Consultative Assembly shall be decided by the majority [my emphasis]. Thus when the army talks about the functional groups and their relation to the constitution, they really are referring to article two of the 1945 Constitution. It is clear that the word groups (qolonqan-golongan) does not specify who belongs to it.

37. A. H. Nasution, "Dwi Fungsi ABRI: Pada Mulanya dan Kini," Prisma, No. 12, Vol. IX, December 1980, pp. 42-43.

38. Jenkins, Suharto and His Generals, pp. 217.

39. Apparently Suharto did not concern himself with the possibility of a conflict of interest between ABRI's position as defender of the country on the one hand and as a social force on the other. 40. Quoted in Notosusanto (ed) Pejuang dan Prajurit, pp. 180-181. 272

41. Notosusanto (ed) Pejuang dan P ra ju rit, p. 334.

42. Notosusanto (ed) Pejuang dan P ra ju rit, p. 349.

43. Moertopo, Strategi P o litik , p. 123.

44. Moertopo, Strategi P o litik , p. 124.

45. General Benny Murdani, interview, Jakarta, November 13, 1984. GLOSSARY

ABRI Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, The Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia. This name became popular after 1954 when the police were integrated into the armed forces.

AMN Akademi Militer Nasional, National Military Academy.

Babinsa Bintara Pembina Desa, Village Development Non-Commissioned Officers bapak father, leader, patron

Barisan Banteng Wild Buffalo Corps

Barisan Pelopor Vanguard Corps

BKR Barisan Keamanan Rakyat, People's Security Organization

BPKKP Barisan Penolong Keluarga Korban Perang, Organization for Aid to Families of War Victims. chodancho Company Commander in the Japanese-trained Peta. daidan, daidancho battalion, battalion commander

Dswan Perjuangan Struggle Council diplomas! diplomacy

DPR Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, Parliament

Drs. title denoting that its holder has completed all requirements for the doctorate except the dissertation.

Fujinkai Women's Association during the Japanese occupation.

Golkar Golongan Karya, Functional Group

273 274

G .30.S. Gerakan Tiga Puluh September, The Thirtieth September Movement

Hankam Departemen Pertahanan Keamanan, Department of Defence and Security "

Heiho Auxiliary Forces

Hisbul1 ah The Army of Allah

Ir. engineering degree jiwa spirit, soul kabupaten d istric t kedaulatan rakyat sovereignty of the people

Keibodan Vigilante Corps

Kenpeitai Military Police of the Japanese Army

Kerakyatan "people-ness", democracy

KNI Komite Nasional Indonesia, Indonesian National Committee

Knil Koninklijk Nederlands Indisch Leger, Royal Netherlands Indies Army

KNIP Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat, Central Indonesian National Committee

Kodam Komando Daerah M iliter, Regional Military Command

Kodim Komando Distrik Militer, District Military Command

Kopkamtib Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban, Operations Command to Restore Order and Security

Koramil Komando Rayon Militer, Sub-District Military Command

Korem Komando Resort M iliter, Sub-Region Military Command

Kraton royal palace 275

MPR Majlis Permusyawaratan Takyat, People's Consultative Assembly

Masyumi Majlis Syura Muslimin Indonesia, Consultative Council of Indonesian Moslems^

Mr. a law degree

Muhamadiyah modernist Islamic social and educational association

Muspida Musyawarah Pimpinan Daerah, Council of Regional Leadership

NEFIS Netherlands Eastern Forces Intelligence Service

NICA Netherlands Indies Civil Administration

PORT Pemerintahan Darurat Rakyat dan Tentara, People's and Army's Territorial Emergency Government

Peta Pembela Tanah Air, Fatherland Defence Force

Pesindo Pemuda Sosialist Indonesia, Indonesian Socialist Youth

Pepolit Pendidikan P o litik , Political Education perjuangan struggle

PP Persatuan Perjuangan, Struggle Union

PKI Partai Komunis Indonesia, Indonesian Communist Party

PNI Partai Nasional Indonesia, Indonesian Nationalist Party

PS Partai Sosialis, Socialist Party

PSI Partai Sosialis Indonesia, Indonesian Socialist Party

PPKI Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia, Committee for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence rakyat people, common people romusha forced labor during the Japanese occupation 276

SEAC Southeast Asia Command

Seinendan Youth Corps

Seinandoyo Youth Training Camp

Shodancho piatoon commander

Seskoad Sekolah Staff dan Komando Angkatan Darat, Army Staff and Command Coliege

TNI Tentara Nasional Indonesia, Indonesian National Army

TKR Tentara Keamanan Rakyat, People's Security Forces

Tentara Pel ajar Student branch of the Army BIBLIOGRAPHY

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