The Japanese-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact

Japan’s Policy toward the Soviet Union, 1931–1941: the Japanese-Soviet Non-aggression Pact

Tobe Ryōchi

This essay examines changes in Japanese policy toward the Soviet Union from the Manchurian Incident in 1931 to the beginning of the Pacific War in 1941, with a focus on the response to the possibility of a Japanese-Soviet Non- aggression Pact. Through a review of the discussions and policies regarding the non-aggression pact, it sheds light on the core Japanese perceptions of the Soviet Union. The first section evaluates Japanese responses to the Soviet proposal for the non-aggression pact during the period following the Manchurian Incident. The second section shows that the non-aggression pact continued to be considered as a policy option toward the Soviet Union even after Japan declined the Soviet proposal in later 1932. Finally, the third section scrutinizes the process that led Japan to renew their consideration of a Japanese-Soviet Non-aggression Pact, which followed the overall review of its foreign policy after the Japanese defeat in the Nomonhan Incident of 1939 and the outbreak of World War II in Europe. This result in the conclusion of the Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact in April 1941.

1 Non-aggression Pact Proposals after the Manchurian Incident

Since the establishment of diplomatic relations with Japan in 1925 the Soviet Union had approached Japan several times with proposals for a non-aggression pact. This was in accordance with the Soviet foreign policy of committing to non-aggression or neutrality treaties with its neighbors. Japan had persistently viewed such proposals unfavorably. In 1928 , for example, Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Tanaka Giichi set one such proposal aside, explain- ing that it was still premature and that the priority was the conclusion of the treaty of commerce and resolution of outstanding economic issues (Hattori 1998). The Soviet proposal was shelved for a period and was raised once again after the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident. In late December 1931, the ambassador to France and future foreign minister, Yoshizawa Kenkichi, stopped in Moscow on his way home and was offered a proposal for the conclusion of the non-aggression pact by the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Foreign

Minister Maxim M. Litvinov. The Soviet Union felt threatened by the move of the Japanese Kwantung Army into northern Manchuria and replied with a message of appeasement that sounded more like a “sign of distrust” than of friendship with Japan (Hirai 1965). Yoshizawa knew that Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi and his minister of war, Araki Sadao, were skeptical about the Soviet proposal and did not place the issue of a Japanese-Soviet Non-aggression Pact on the cabinet agenda. He nonetheless instructed the First Section of the Bureau of Euro-American Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to study the matter. The First Section came up with three options: 1) immediate acceptance of the proposal; 2) re- frainment from immediate acceptance; and 3) rejection. In its opinion, if a pact were to be concluded, the Soviets might assume that Japan would not re- course to an outright military counterattack, and they might strangle Japanese regional interests through “crafty measures.” The First Section reasoned that as Japanese and Soviet interests clashed following the Manchurian Incident, the Soviets would certainly respond to Japanese actions in a “domineering man- ner.” Furthermore, the section pointed out that in the future a pact might be concluded but until that time the problems of fisheries and concession rights should be resolved and interests in northern Manchuria coordinated (Satō 1986). Tentative conclusions were thus reached among Foreign Ministry officials; however, the final decision was postponed after the fall of the Inukai cabinet following the May 15 Incident of 1932, in which Premier Inukai was assassi- nated. The next prime minister and navy elder, retired full admiral of the Imperial Japanese Navy, Saitō Makoto, had been the head of the Japan-Russia Association. Although not a strong supporter of the Soviets, he had expressed a willingness to work with them. In fact, shortly before the launching of the Saitō cabinet, the Soviet plenipotentiary representative, Ambassador Troyanovskiĭ, contacted the former chief of the Naval General Staff and secretary of the Japan-Russia Association, Katō Hiroharu, to discuss a proposal for Saitō to visit the Soviet Union in order to improve Japanese-Soviet relations (Sakai 1984). The issue of the non-aggression pact would once again be broached during the Saitō cabinet. In the meantime, the Soviet side continued to lobby. In March 1932, Litvinov attended the Geneva Conference on Disarmament and met with the Japanese ambassador to the United Kingdom, Matsudaira Tsuneo. After express- ing Soviet concerns about Manchuria, Litvinov urged the conclusion of the non-aggression pact to dispel all mutual misgivings. In May, the Soviet offi- cial newspaper Izvestiya published an editorial calling for the signing of the non-aggression pact that would facilitate a peaceful settlement of unresolved disputes and unravel the Japanese-Soviet entanglement. In November, when